Internet voting is seen by many as an efficient way to exercise democracy in a digital world.

For others, it’s a dangerous use of technology that could open Pandora’s box, leading to coercion of voters, the loss of secrecy and the possibility for large-scale manipulation of the electoral process.

This year, Norway implemented an online voting pilot program during the elections for Municipality and County Councils that took place on 11-12 September.  Authorized by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 10 municipalities saw a number of voters casting ballots through the Internet for the first time in Norway’s history. This pilot program also included extending the right to vote to 16-17 year olds in 20 municipalities.

A team of IFES experts was present to observe the process.

These trials, especially the online voting component, have generated much debate in the media and Norwegian Parliament, with opinions strongly divided about the use of this technology on Election Day.

Advocates of online voting point to easier voter access – especially for voters with disabilities – and potentially higher turnout at the polls as hugely beneficial. Those against the process were concerned about the ability of voters to cast secret ballots in their homes and workplaces, and the possibility that family members may use such uncontrolled environments to coerce voters.

Voters in the pilot municipalities were able to vote online from 10 August – 9 September.  As was the case in Estonia, where Internet voting was introduced in 2005 and those voting online were allowed to cast as many votes as they wished during the Internet voting period. The only vote that was counted, however, was the last one cast.

A long voting period is also offered to those voting through paper ballot thanks to early and advanced voting. To ensure that multiple voting did not take place, any paper ballot cast during this period or on Election Day superseded an Internet ballot. Aside from ensuring that only one ballot is cast per person, this measure ensures that even if an Internet voter is coerced, the coercer cannot be sure that this vote will be the one that is included in the final count.

The Norwegian Internet voting system, implemented by ErgoGroup and Scytl, included another important and novel safety mechanism – the provision of a return code for each voter. Each voter is provided with a unique set of codes for each party on the ballot and after voting a code for the party selected is sent to the voter by text message. The voter can then check this text against their set of codes printed on the polling card to ensure that their vote has been recorded as cast. Beyond providing an aspect of verifiability for the Internet voting system, it also addresses the issue of the security of the voting platform – the personal computer – as it allows the voter to be sure that their PC has not submitted a different vote than intended.

To ensure their assessment of the trial was completely thorough, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development asked IFES to help observe and analyze the internet voting pilots.

Seven areas are being assessed; IFES is concentrating on three: the efficiency of the counting and tabulation of internet votes, providing an overview of international experiences with internet voting and assessing the extent to which the Norwegian system complies with international electoral standards.

The IFES team, consisting of experts from Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, attended a conference held by the Ministry about the Internet voting pilots. They were also present as observers of regular polling on Election Day, at the electronic counting of paper ballots and at the decryption and counting ceremony for internet votes.

Overall turnout for municipal elections across Norway was 63.8 percent, and a little lower in pilot municipalities at 62.3 percent. The use of Internet votes in pilot municipalities was high considering it was the first time that Norway had used the Internet for elections, with approximately 25 percent of voters in pilot municipalities using the Internet to cast a vote.

The full results of the assessment for the Ministry will be completed in early 2012 and will be published on the Ministry’s website as well as the IFES website.

Ben Goldsmith is the author of Electronic Voting & Counting Technologies: A Guide to Conducting Feasibility Studies