On January 14, the parliament of Kazakhstan approved a “people’s initiative” authorizing a referendum to extend President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s term by another eight years. If passed, the referendum will cancel the 2012 presidential election and amend the country’s constitution to allow Nazarbayev — Kazakhstan’s only president since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 — to remain in power without even a symbolic challenge in the electoral arena.
By all accounts Nazarbayev has adeptly guided the country through its difficult post-Soviet days and has increased the standard of living for most in the country. Foregoing elections, however, is an anti-democratic practice as well as a major opportunity cost. Casting ballots in transparent, inclusive elections to choose leaders and have a say in one’s government is not only a fundamental human right, it also lends crucial legitimacy to those in office. Further, this latest effort to extend Nazarbayev’s term in office raises questions about the future of Kazakhstan’s leadership: How will power be transferred in 2020, what happens if the president falls ill and is unable to continue performing his duties or if he dies, and is there a plan for who will assume the presidency after Nazarbayev? As the recent crises in other Muslim-majority countries such as Tunisia and Kyrgyzstan show, authoritarian rule often does not lead to long-term stability.
The effort to extend the president’s tenure began on December 23 when a forum of 900 people in the eastern city of Ust-Kamenogorsk put forward an initiative to extend, via a referendum, the president’s term in office until 2020 and to cancel the next presidential election scheduled for 2012. According to reports, the president himself publicly stated his opposition to the initiative, even going so far as to order the constitutional court — which is controlled by loyalists to Nazarbayev’s Nur-Otan party — to investigate the legality of the change. The initiative went forward because its organizers allegedly gathered over 5 million signatures (over half of the total number of eligible voters in the country) in support of it. This was significantly more than the 120,000 signatures gathered from Kazakhstan’s 14 oblasts and two major cities needed to override a presidential veto. Interestingly, the great majority of these 5 million signatures were verified by the Central Election Commission in a mere 72 hours.
This is not the first attempt to expand the president’s tenure and prestige. In 2007, presidential term limits for Nazarbayev were eliminated entirely. In June 2010 he was declared “Leader of the Nation,” which carries with it immunity from prosecution. Still, this latest move seems more brazen than the past not only because it entails scrapping an election, but also because it comes on the heels of Kazakhstan’s term as Chair-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). A key component of the principles Kazakhstan agreed to when it accepted this responsibility was to uphold best international practices in democratic elections. By advancing this referendum, Kazakhstan goes squarely against the norms of Western democracies that have long been calling for democratic reforms and political liberalization in the country.
Yet, aside from the obvious affront to citizens’ right to choose, this initiative also raises serious concerns about presidential succession. With the removal of term limits and elections, Nazarbayev’s own long-term health would appear to be the only inhibiting factor in how long he remains in office. But what happens when Nazarbayev, whose political dominance has been bolstered by Kazakhstan’s massive oil wealth and the appointment of family members to key government positions, is no longer physically able to remain in office?
Unfortunately, at this point, the opposition does not offer a viable alternative to this proposed extension or to Nazarbayev himself. It has shown itself to be perpetually too tepid and disorganized to present a real political challenge or even to attract a strong support base. This is due as much to its own internal dysfunction as to the ruling regime’s total dominance of the political sector. While the president remains generally popular, the presence of clear efforts to control political opposition, including severe restrictions on free media, makes it ultimately very difficult for the opposition to develop. The result is a state exhibiting all the signs of Russian-style, single-party dominance — the same condition native to other republics in the region and only recently thrown off by Kyrgyzstan.
It is also unclear whether anyone within the party or Nazarbayev’s family is being groomed to take over in the future. Does the probable extension of his term indicate the lack of an heir apparent among the close advisors or president’s children? If so, a power struggle dominating the later years of his extended term might have a deleterious impact on the country’s stability. More to the point, is the country destined for a Turkmenistan-style succession in which a strong protégé assumes office and maintains strict authoritarian control, or will events such as the two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan or recent events in Tunisia prevail?
Thus far, the other four Central Asian republics as well as those of the Caucasus, Russia and Belarus have avoided or, more precisely, short-circuited factors that would destabilize the status quo. Through a combination of electoral malfeasance, media and message control, and occasional extra-judicial measures, regime stability has been a constant for most of the ex-Soviet states — just as it has been for long-standing authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, Tunisia notwithstanding. What is the tipping point, the “x factor” that causes apparently rock-solid though democratically challenged governments like Tunisia’s or Kyrgyzstan’s to suddenly implode, and what are the warning signs? Is Kazakhstan prone to the same weaknesses that led to Askar Akayev then Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s ousters in Kyrgyzstan, or to Zine Ben-Ali’s overthrow in Tunisia?
Electoral manipulation appears to be one feature which can lead to regime change, as in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, or repeat elections as seen in a host of countries. Certain conditions do need to be present, as electoral manipulation is a rule more than an exception in many if not most of the post-Soviets states and only a select few have seen electoral misdeeds spawn public movements resulting in regime change. There appears to be a saturation point related to abuse of power and state resources, such as for personal or family gain, that can spark sudden, violent protests capable of sweeping away well-entrenched leaders. Moreover, this type of regime transition appears more prominent in Muslim-majority countries, where democratic traditions are less well-developed, political opposition is extremely suppressed and weak, and a prolonged, deeply ingrained tolerance of government excess is pronounced. Kazakhstan appears to fall into this category, even with its religious diversity and ethnically mixed population.
If the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Tunisia tell us anything, it is that complete control of the levers of power combined with massive family wealth and restricting opposition voices can lead to an angry mob scenario, even in exceptionally tolerant countries such as Kazakhstan. As a resident of Kazakhstan told the author, “they think we’re all sheep.” One might conclude Mr. Bakiyev and Mr. Ben-Ali felt the same about their subjects.
Though counter-intuitive to the leaders of authoritarian regimes, holding open elections in which the opposition gains a sizeable share of legislative seats or key posts in government may actually enhance the staying power of a strong-willed regime such as Kazakhstan’s without significantly altering its immediate course but still forcing it to liberalize somewhat. Such a liberalization, in turn, may make the country a more responsible political actor and more reliable trading partner, certainly worthy of OSCE member status.
Time will tell how democracy continues to take shape in Kazakhstan, and much can change in the next decade of Nazarbayev’s presumed rule. Regardless, the government should be attentive of world events and resist the urge to count sheep at night, no matter how secure it feels.