While most of the focus on the MENA region has been on a few primary narratives over the last few decades — the struggle of moderates versus militant political groups, Islamic extremism, 9/11, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and of course the Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts — most of these dynamics did not play much of a role in the popular uprisings we have witnessed in the Middle East in the last seven months.  

Instead, the uprisings started because of an accumulation of frustrations often related to economic wellbeing; they started with calls for a democratic regime change and a desire for a new order which respects citizen’s human, political and economic rights.

Now what are the citizens of the MENA expecting as an outcome of the protests and where do the countries stand in achieving them?

Though only two out of the 22 countries in the region have actually deposed their rulers, there has been movement toward opening up of political space in most countries where protests have occurred, and the current governments of the region are under extreme pressure to deliver and address the concerns of their people.

Egypt and Tunisia

In the immediate aftermath of the uprisings in both Tunisia and Egypt, thousands of individuals identified as political prisoners were released from jail, new political parties have been authorized and many media and online restrictions have been lifted. Also, the dismantling of the former regimes’ security apparatuses is ongoing, and former ruling parties in both countries (NDP and RCD) have been dissolved with former party officials arrested and prosecuted.

Additionally, both interim governments have formed working committees to advise on political and legal reforms and investigate corruption by former ruling elite. In Tunisia and Egypt, independent election commissions have also been created to administer election processes leading up to the election of a National Constituent Assembly (Tunisia) and Parliament (Egypt).

Much, however, remains to be done. While these reforms have been welcomed, authorities in both countries have struggled with how to resolve differences of opinion over reform priorities, the relative legitimacy of various political actors and the details of implementation of reforms in a very short time frame.

Additionally, looking closely at the transition process that is taking place in Egypt and Tunisia, it is evident that the process has not been transparent, inclusive or comprehensive. For example, while women were an active part of the protests in both countries, they have been startlingly absent in the transitional governments and during the actual reform process. In Egypt, the new constitution fails to retain the 64-seat quota for women in the parliament; additionally, no positions were given to women on the transitional council, known as the Committee of Wise Men, responsible for drafting amendments to the constitution.  While the new people’s assembly election law does have a requirement for women on candidate lists, it remains to be seen how this will translate to seats in parliament.

In Tunisia, on the other hand, women have been given parity on the candidates’ lists; however, there is a growing fear that there will be a backward slide in this progress if women are caught in the middle of an ideological and religious tug-of-war over their rights. Similarly, while hopes were initially high in both Egypt and Tunisia that the electoral authorities would engage in a consultative dialogue with a variety of stakeholders including civil society, these hopes have increasingly diminished as election dates approach and few consultations have actually taken place.

Finally, there is also growing frustration in both countries about the lack of actual changes. In Tunisia, elections scheduled for July were delayed until October. Parliamentary elections scheduled in Egypt will now be held in November. While the delays are due to the legitimate need for more time to organize elections, lack of communication has led to increasing suspicion and frustration in both countries, and a fear of a backward slide toward the old regimes. In Tunisia, processes that were to be handled by the independent election commission under the new electoral law are now being reverted back to some of the old government institutions that previously inspired suspicion.

Recent protests calling for more purges of police, civil society and judiciary in Egypt are also a sign of growing frustration with what many citizens feel is a slow pace of bringing corrupt Mubarak-era officials to justice, and a very slow reform process.

Jordan and Morocco

Jordan and Morocco are slightly different cases. In both Morocco and Jordan, the monarchs have made an attempt to pre-empt and co-opt revolutions by announcing that they will seek changes to the balance of power.

In Morocco’s case, a constitutional commission prepared a draft of constitutional changes, which included the establishment of a constitutional/parliamentary monarchy which relegates the monarchy to a more ceremonial role, provides the parliament with broader powers and takes steps towards protection of the judiciary. The country voted in a referendum on the reforms on July 1. The turnout was 72 percent — which is extremely high, especially in a country notorious for low turnout — with 98 percent voting yes for the changes. It remains to be seen how much power will actually shift since the king will remain in charge of religion, security issues and strategic major policy choices. This could still allow him to retain control of major decisions. With this in mind, a small group is still protesting for “real reform.” Parliamentary elections will be held in October, one year earlier than scheduled. The outcome of the elections could determine whether reform efforts continue or die away.

Similarly, in Jordan, King Abdullah has announced he will curtail his powers and will pursue electoral and political law reform through creation of a National Dialogue Committee, which released recommendations for change in early June. Proposed changes include a call for the establishment of an independent election management body. It remains to be seen whether the long-term result will be true democratic change.

Syria

In Syria, it remains to be seen if a clear reform process will take place. The government has signaled that it is willing to negotiate, starting with a lifting of the Emergency Law. There have been other tangible results, including the release of hundreds of political prisoners, the creation of a national dialogue to review a new election law, the adoption of a law that allows political parties other than the ruling Baath Party to form, and creation of constitutional and media reform committees.

But protesters say much has not changed — there has been no discussion of an independent judiciary or compensation for political exiles and disappeared political prisoners. Despite political amnesty, hundreds more have been arrested and held. Economic unrest has grown due to the political crisis, and it is possible the newly unemployed may join the protests. Crackdowns have not slowed down, and dissidents are discussing creation of a shadow government to steer the country toward free elections and a new constitution. Syria’s future remains quite murky.

Other Countries Facing Change

In Bahrain, an uneasy national dialogue is under way, but most opposition members are not participating, and many dissidents remain in jail. It is generally held that this dialogue will be largely ineffective and no substantive reform will come out of it. There is, however, an independent Investigative Commission appointed by King al-Khalifa that includes internationally renowned human rights experts who will investigate the events in Bahrain in February and March to determine if the human rights of protestors were violated.

In Libya and Yemen, too, the democratic process remains unclear. In recent days, reports indicate Ghaddafi might be willing to step down. Similarly, Yemen’s President Saleh has made repeated overtures indicating he is willing to hold early elections in order to turn over power. In both cases, no process or plan is defined, and much political haggling may take place to actually determine any shifts in power.

Conclusions

Many factors will continue to play a major role in shaping the reform movement and the future of the countries undergoing transformation. These factors pertain to the struggle between reformists and entrenched forces carried over from the former regimes, the potential shape of the new political order, the future role of Islamist movements in the government and society, the role of the security forces in steering political events, open and transparent dialogue with all stakeholders, and the difficult diplomatic balance of encouraging greater democratic openness without undermining other foreign policy priorities and interests.

It is vital, however, that there is demonstrable progress to ensure a more competitive and open political process. This should be complemented by robust participation from an informed electorate and administration as well as oversight of the political process by authorities who are independent, transparent and accountable. Only with real progress in these areas will countries be able to create an environment for the credible transfer of power, earning them confidence and participation from citizens and moving them forward along a path of meaningful political reform.

These remarks were first delivered during an event for the Transatlantic Policy Network on July 14, 2011.They were updated on July 26, 2011.