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Case Study: Fiji

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January 2004



Prepared by IFES for the Delimitation Equity Project
with funding from the United States Agency for
International Development



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Delimiting Communal Seats to Guarantee Ethnic Representation

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The Pacific Island state of Fiji is an ethnically divided country with a history of political tension resulting in several coup d'états. The two major ethnic groups are the indigenous Fijians and the Indo-Fijians. (The Indo-Fijians are primarily the descendants of indentured laborers brought by British colonists from India to work on sugar plantations during the 19th century). These two groups are roughly equal in size – according to the 1996 census, 51.1 percent of the population is indigenous Fijian and 43.4 percent Indian.

Since independence in 1970, indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians have cast votes in separate communal constituencies, although under two of the three constitutions since 1970, “open” constituencies have also existed. Political parties tend to be ethnically identified and voting is, for the most part, ethnically-based. Because the population is approximately balanced, electoral victory tends to be dependent on the results in the open constituencies. The delimitation of constituency boundaries, especially open constituencies, is therefore of considerable significance in Fiji.

Historical Background

Following independence from Britain in 1970, Fiji appeared to make a relatively successful transition to multi-ethnic democracy. But in 1987, following the election of a government seen by the indigenous Fijian-dominated military as overly close to the Indo-Fijian community, two coups occurred. Eventually a new constitution, with provisions that weighed strongly in favor of the indigenous population, was promulgated.

The 1990 Constitution adopted a new electoral system based entirely on communal representation of ethnic groups, with separate electoral rolls for Fijians, Indians and “general electors.” The indigenous Fijian population was guaranteed primacy in most senior government and administrative positions, including the office of the prime minister; the Indo-Fijian population, on the other hand, was under-represented in government relative to its proportion of the population.

In 1994, following economic difficulties, international condemnation (including expulsion from the Commonwealth of Nations) and a high level of emigration by the Indian community, the Fiji government established a Constitution Review Commission to re-examine the constitution and recommend a less biased form of representation. The Commission ultimately recommended a new constitution containing an innovative package of electoral arrangements designed to encourage the development of multi-ethnic politics in Fiji. One of these recommendations was the adoption of an Alternative Vote System.¹

¹ Under an Alternative Vote System, electors rank the candidates in order of choice. If no candidate has over 50 percent of the first-preferences, lower order preference votes are transferred until a majority winner emerges. (This system is used in Australia and some other South Pacific Island countries.)

The 1997 Constitution as approved included the recommended preferential voting system. However, the constitution also retained communal seats: two-thirds of the seats in the new parliament were to be elected on a communal basis, the remaining one-third of the parliamentary seats were to be elected from an open electoral roll.

Elections under the new constitution were held in May 1999. These elections ended in a surprise victory for the Indo-Fijian party, the Fiji Labour Party (FLP), and Fiji's first Indo-Fijian Prime Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry. One year later, on May 19, 2000, the Prime Minister and other high-ranking government officials were taken hostage in the parliament building by an armed group led by George Speight, a member of a radical group of indigenous Fijian nationalists. Chaudhry's government was dissolved, martial law was declared and the 1997 Constitution was abrogated.

In July 2000, the military transferred power to an interim administration (one that had not been elected) and indigenous Fijian Laisenia Qarase was sworn in as Prime Minister. Following significant pressure from the international community, the interim administration held elections in August 2001 under the provisions of the 1997 Constitution.²

The electorate voted mainly along ethnic lines and the political party of the interim Prime Minister Qarase won the most seats (31) in the 71 seat parliament; the deposed Prime Minister's Fiji Labour Party came in second with 27 seats. Mr. Qarase was sworn in as Fiji's new Prime Minister on ten September 2001. (The next election is to be held in September 2006).

Electoral System

The bicameral parliament of Fiji is composed of an appointed Senate³ and an elected House of Representatives. The 71 members of the House of Representatives are directly elected from single-member constituencies by a preferential voting system.

The 71 legislative constituencies are comprised of 46 "communal" constituencies and 25 "open" constituencies, with the members elected as follows:

- 46 members are elected by voters registered on one of 4 separate electoral rolls:
- 23 are elected from a roll of voters who are registered as indigenous Fijians
- 19 are elected from a roll of voters who are registered as Indians
- 1 is elected from a roll of voters who are registered as Rotumans
- 3 are elected from a roll of voters who are not registered as Fijians, Indians or Rotumans (this is the "general voters" roll)

² In November 2000, the High Court of Fiji ruled that the military's abrogation of the 1997 Constitution was illegal.

³ The 34 senate seats are appointed as follows: 24 are appointed by the Great Council of Chiefs, nine are appointed by the president, and one is appointed by the council of Rotuma.

- 25 members are elected by voters from all communities registered on an open electoral roll

The outcome of an election depends heavily on the demographic distribution of ethnic groups and the way in which electoral boundaries – particularly the open seats – are drawn.

Legal Framework for Delimitation

Boundary Authority The 1997 Constitution dictates that delimitation (redistribution) be undertaken by a Constituency Boundaries Commission composed of three persons:

- A chairperson, who must be, or is qualified to be, a judge. The chairperson is appointed by the President, acting in his or her own judgment, following consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition.
- Two additional members, both appointed by the President, one on the nomination of the Prime Minister and the other on the nomination of the Leader of the Opposition.

A person cannot be appointed as a member of the Commission if he or she is, or has been at any time during the past four years, a member of Parliament, or another representative body, or a member of a state service.

Final Authority Although the Commission must report its final determination to the House of Representatives, together with a summary of any objections made to it and the reasons for its final determination, the legislature does not vote on the determination and cannot veto it. Subject to the jurisdiction of a court to entertain an application for judicial review,⁴ the decision of the Commission is final.

Public Input into the Process Whenever the Constituency Boundaries Commission proposes to alter a boundary, it must publish a notice and invite submissions from political parties, members of the House of Representatives and any other person or body wishing to make a submission. The invitation for submissions must specify a period of not less than 60 days for the making of submissions.

Notice must be placed in the daily newspapers and played on local radio stations indicating where anyone interested may inspect maps showing the provisional boundaries and a summary of the reasons for the provisional boundaries. The notice must also indicate the last day on which the Constituency Boundaries Commission will receive written objections to the provisional boundaries.

If any objections are received, the Constituency Boundaries Commission must publish an announcement specifying the places where the objections are available for public inspection and the last day on which the Commission will receive counter-objections, being not less than 21 days after the date of publication of the notice.

⁴ Although the court can consider objections to a constituency plan, this has not happened to date – no one has brought a claim against a redistribution plan.

After considering any objections and counter-objections, the Constituency Boundaries Commission makes a final determination and produces a report outlining the basis for its final determination and submits this report to Parliament.

Timing of Redistributions The Constituency Boundaries Commission must, in the year following each official census, review the boundaries and determine whether or not the boundaries should be changed to ensure compliance with established redistribution criteria.

Criteria for Redistributions The Constitution specifies a number of criteria the Commission must follow when drawing constituency boundaries, depending on the type of constituency.⁵

In determining the boundaries of the 23 Fijian communal seats, the Commission must ensure that the boundaries for 17 of the constituencies are in accordance with the provincial boundaries, with the provinces of Ba, Tailevu and Cakaudrove comprising two constituencies each, and the other provinces each comprising one constituency. The remaining six Fijian constituencies are to be composed of predominately urban areas in which the number of voters is to be, as far as reasonably practicable, equal.

The boundaries for the remaining 23 communal seats (19 Indian, one Rotuman and three General seats) are to be drawn in such a manner that each seat has roughly the same number of voters within its own communal category.

The boundaries for the 25 open constituencies are to be drawn so that each constituency has roughly the same number of voters and “a good proportion of members of the different ethnic groups.”

In addition, the Commission must give due consideration to:

- the constituency’s physical features
- the boundaries of existing administrative and recognized traditional areas
- means of communication and travel within the proposed constituency

1998 Delimitation Exercise

Both the 1999 and 2001 parliamentary elections were conducted using the constituency boundaries created by the 1998 Constituency Boundaries Commission.⁶

The 1998 Commission divided the Fiji Islands into the requisite 71 constituencies. Of these, 25 constituencies are “open seats” where candidates and voters are from any ethnic group. The other 46 constituencies are communal seats in which a voter casts a vote only for candidates from his or her own ethnic community. In the Fijian communal constituencies, for example, only indigenous Fijians vote for indigenous Fijian

⁵ The criteria are listed in Chapter 6, Part 2 (Article 52) of the 1997 Constitution.

⁶ The next parliamentary elections are not scheduled until September 2006.

candidates; in the Indo-Fijian constituencies, only Indo-Fijians vote for Indo-Fijian candidates. There are 23 communal seats for indigenous Fijians, 19 for Indo-Fijians, one for Rotumans and three for general electors (for those who are not on any of the other rolls).

Each elector appears on two rolls – one for the open seat and one for the communal, or racially-reserved, seat – and each voter casts two votes, one for an open seat representative and one for a communal seat representative. (There are actually two sets of constituency boundaries drawn for the country: a set of 46 communal constituencies that encompass the entire country and a set of 25 open constituencies that also encompass the entire country).

Rural Fiji has high territorial segregation, and the outer islands are almost entirely indigenous Fijian. The main island and urban centers are more ethnically mixed and constituencies could be drawn in these areas that are, at least in part, more ethnically diverse.

Communal Constituencies According to the Constitution, the boundaries of most of the communal constituencies are to be drawn so that each constituency has roughly the same number of voters within its own communal category – for example, the 19 Indian constituencies should each have about the same number of Indo-Fijian voters. However, the Constitution places additional constraints on the 23 Fijian constituencies: the boundaries of 17 of the constituencies are to follow the provincial boundaries; the other six Fijian communal constituencies must be predominately urban.

As a result of these requirements, the populations of the constituencies vary quite dramatically. Table 8.1, below, lists the average number of voters for each type of communal seat, as well as for the open seats. (Appendix A provides the populations of all 71 constituencies for both the 1999 election and the 2001 election).

Table 8.1: Average Population by Seat Type, 1999 Electoral Constituencies⁷

Type of Seat	Number of Seats	Number of Voters	Average Number of Voters Per Seat
<i>Fijian Reserved Seats</i>			
• Provincial (Rural)	17	143889	8464
• Urban	6	76375	12729
• Total	23	220264	9577
<i>Indian Reserved Seats</i>	19	197621	10401
<i>Rotuman Reserved Seat</i>	1	5232	5232
<i>General Reserved Seats</i>	3	14029	4676
Total Reserved Seats	46	437146	9503
Open Seats	25	437146	17486

⁷ This table is based on data reported in Appendix A and obtained from the Fiji Elections Office at www.elections.gov.fj/results2001/voter-pop.html.

The population quota for the 46 communal seats was 9,503 in 1999,⁸ but the average number of voters per type of seat varied substantially from this quota. The provincial Fijian reserved seats were, on average, smaller than the population quota (the average number of voters in 1999 for these seats was 8,464, but the actual range in seat population was from 2,856 to 16,051 voters), while the Fijian urban reserved seats were, on average, much larger than the population quota. The Indian reserved seats were also, on average, larger than the population quota. The general reserved seats, and the seat reserved for Rotumans, were, however, considerably smaller than the population quota.

The total percent population deviation for the 46 communal seats was very close to 140 percent. This is quite high; most consolidated democracies that have established tolerance limits for population deviations have set the limit at around plus/minus ten percent, producing a total population deviation of no more than 20 percent. On the other hand, the total percent population deviation for the open seats was substantially smaller in 1999: only 29 percent.

Open Seats According to the 1997 Constitution, the Constituency Boundaries Commission must give due consideration to the principle that “voters should comprise a good portion of members of different ethnic communities.” However, the 1998 Constituency Boundaries Commission found that achieving ethnic parity in the 25 open constituencies was “impossible” and instead opted to “provide that the overall balance of the ethnic communities was maintained over the 25 open seats.”⁹ This was done by distributing majority ethnic Fijian and majority Indo-Fijian constituencies roughly in proportion to their respective weights in the national population.


The Commission created ten open seats in which Fijian voters composed over 55 percent of the total voters. Indian voters made up over 55 percent of the total voters in eight open seats, and were a majority (between 50 and 55 percent of the voters) in an additional three seats. (Appendix B provides the ethnic composition – percent indigenous Fijian, Indian, Rotuman, and general – of the open constituencies when they were drawn).

⁸ The population quota is obtained by dividing the total population (437,146) by the number of seats (46).

⁹ Constituency Boundaries Commission, Final Report, September 1998.

The Figure below, reprinted from an article written by Jon Fraenkel,¹⁰ illustrates the ethnic profile of the open seats:

Figure 8.1: Ethnic Profile of Open Constituencies



Only a few of the open seats created by the Commission were truly ethnically mixed. These seats included:

- Nausori / Naitasiri: 49% Fijian and 48% Indian
- Nasinu / Naitasiri: 49% Fijian and 48% Indian
- Lauca: 48% Fijian and 45% Indian
- Samabula / Tamavua: 47% Fijian and 44% Indian
- Suva City: 49% Fijian, 35% Indian and 11% General
- Nadroga: 48% Fijian and 51% Indian

These ethnically mixed open seats proved pivotal in the 1999 and 2001 elections.

Results of the 1999 and 2001 Parliamentary Elections

¹⁰ Jon Fraenkel, "The Alternative Vote System in Fiji: Electoral Engineering or Ballot-Rigging?" *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, volume 39 (2), July 2001, page 10.

Since independence in 1970, electoral contests in Fiji have been marked by ethnic conflict between indigenous Fijian-supported and Indian-supported political parties. The indigenous Fijian communal seats have consistently elected representatives from a separate set of parties as the Indian communal seats. As a consequence, the election has typically been decided by the open seats (when they have existed), and the most important open seats have been those with a heterogeneous population. The two most recent elections – 1999 and 2001 – are no exceptions to this rule.

1999 Parliamentary Elections Voting in 1999 was strongly along ethnic lines. Table 2 displays the results of the election by type of seat.

Table 8.2: Results of 1999 Parliamentary Election¹¹

	FLP	FAP	SVT	PANU	VLV	UGP	NVTLP	INDP
Open	18	2	3	0	0	1	0	1
Fijian	0	9	5	4	3	0	1	1
Indian	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
General	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Rotuman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	37	11	8	4	3	2	1	5

FLP	Fiji Labour Party
FAP	Fijian Association Party
SVT	Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei
PANU	Party of National Unity
VLV	Veitokani ni Lewenivanua Vakarisito
UGP	United General Party
NVTLP	Nationalist Party
INDP	Independents

All 19 of the Indian reserved seats went to the Fiji Labour Party (FLP), but not a single one of the Fijian communal seats went to the FLP. Five major Fijian parties split among themselves 22 of the 23 reserved indigenous Fijian seats, but not one of these parties carried a single Indian seat. In fact, the largely Indian-supported parties (the FLP and the National Federal Party (NFP), which obtained a substantial portion of the Indian vote but no seats) obtained less than two percent of the indigenous Fijian vote, while the largely Fijian-supported parties received less than one percent of the Indian vote.

As Table 2 indicates, the Indian-supported FLP won the election with 37 seats, primarily because indigenous Fijian voters split their votes across five parties and the vast majority of open seats went to the FLP. The FLP not only carried the open seats in which Indian voters were a majority (which the FLP usually won on the first count), but also number of open seats in which the transfer of votes (Fiji has an Alternative Vote System) ultimately led to a victory for the FLP.¹²

¹¹The data for this table was reported by the Fiji Elections Office and found at www.elections.gov.fj/results2001/voter-pop.html.

¹² Had the parties supported by indigenous Fijians agreed to exchange preferences, the FLP would probably not have won nearly as many open seats. However, three ethnic Fijian parties (including the FAP and PANU) consistently put the FLP in second position in their preference lists rather than list each other.

The Indian-backed FLP, after managing to secure an absolute majority of the seats, named their leader, Mahendra Chaudry, as the country's first Indian Prime Minister. One year later, George Speight marched into Parliament and took the Prime Minister and most of his cabinet hostage. Although the coup was eventually defeated, a caretaker regime, composed largely of indigenous Fijians, was installed and new elections were called for August 2001.

2001 Parliamentary Elections The results of this election are listed in Table 3.

Table 8.3: Results of 2001 Parliamentary Election¹³

Type of Seat	Political Party						
	FLP	SDL	MV	NFP	NLUP	UGP	INDP
Open	8	13	1	1	1	0	1
Fijian	0	18	5	0	0	0	0
Indian	19	0	0	0	0	0	0
General	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
Rotuman	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	27	32	6	1	2	1	2

FLP	Fiji Labour Party
SDL	Soqosoqo Duavata Ni Lewenivanua
MV	Matanitu Vanua
NFP	National Federation Party
NLUP	New Labour Unity Party
UGP	United General Party
INDP	Independents

Ethnically polarized voting in the 2001 election led to another divisive victory, but this time the winner was the indigenous Fijian-backed Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party – a new party founded by a coalition of ministers serving in the post-coup caretaker regime – that emerged as the winner of the election.

As in 1999, no indigenous Fijian-supported party won a single Indian seat, and Indian-supported FLP did not win a single Fijian seat. In 1999, the victorious FLP received less than two percent of the indigenous Fijian vote; in 2001 the SDL received a mere .1 percent of the Indian vote.

All of the Indian communal seats went to the FLP. All of the Fijian communal seats, on the other hand, went to one of two indigenous Fijian-supported parties, the SDL or the Matanitu Vanua (MV). The open seats with large indigenous Fijian population also went to either the SDL or the MV. The other open constituencies obtained by the SDL were won on the basis of transfers of party preferences.

The 2001 election (as well as the 1999 election) produced very disproportionate results: the percentages of votes received by the parties were very different from their shares of total seats won. For example, the SDL won 27.5 percent of the vote, but received 45.1

¹³The data was reported by the Fiji Elections Office, www.elections.gov.fj/results2001/voter-pop.html.

percent of the seats. Table 8.4, below, reports the percentage of votes and seats won for the parties that actually secured seats.

Table 8.4: Percentage of Votes and Seats Won, 2001 Parliamentary Election¹⁴

Party	Percent of Votes Won	Percent of Seats Won
FLP	26.5	38.0
SDL	27.5	45.1
MV	4.2	8.5
NLUP	1.3	2.8
UGP	.3	1.4
NFP	1.2	1.4
INDP	1.4	2.8
Total	62.4	100.0

Some commentators have argued that the reason the results were so disproportionate, and that the 1999 and 2001 elections were decided in the near-parity open seats, is that the proportion of open seats to communal seats is not high enough and the open seats are not well-designed:

“The way electoral districts were drawn... ensured that opportunities for genuine inter-ethnic cooperation were rare. Because only the 25 open electorates enabled multi-ethnic competition, and of these no more than eight were reasonably balanced in their mixture of indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian voters, the vast majority of electorate-level contests provided no opportunity at all for cross-ethnic campaigns, appeals or outcomes... The CRC’s recommendation for a “good” proportion of members of both major communities in all open seats was interpreted extremely loosely, to mean ethnic balances of up to 90:10 in some cases, which obviated the need for intra-communal vote swapping. In most seats, clear Indian or Fijian majorities prevailed.”¹⁵

Other writers (such as Jon Fraenkel in a series of articles discussing the Fiji electoral system) disagree with this assessment and contend that it is the Alternative Vote System that has failed. Regardless of which argument is correct, it is clear that the Fiji system has failed to foster the desired multi-ethnic cooperation.

Conclusion

Since 1970, when Fiji gained its independence, indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians have voted in separate ethnically-based communal constituencies. Voting is ethnically polarized, and political parties tend to be aligned with one ethnic group or another. As a

¹⁴The data for this table was reported by the Fiji Elections Office and found at www.elections.gov.fj/results2001/voter-pop.html.

¹⁵ Benjamin Reilly, “Evaluating the effect of the electoral system in post-coup Fiji,” *Pacific Economic bulletin*, Volume 16 (1), May 2001, page 146.

result, it is the votes cast in the open constituencies, where all voters – regardless of race or ethnicity – cast ballots that have decided recent elections. This, and the fact that the electoral system depends on majoritarian voting in single-member constituencies that can distort the partisan votes to seats ratio, means that constituency boundaries have important implications in Fiji.

Appendix: Fiji

Appendix A: Total Voting Population Registered for General Elections in 1999 and 2001¹⁶

Code	Constituency	1999	2001
	Fijian Provincial Communal		
01	Bua	6,357	6,972
02	Kadavu	5,845	6,540
03	Lau	6,807	7,536
04	Lomaiviti	8,131	8,743
05	Macuata	9,377	9,964
06	Nadroga / Navosa	16,051	17,415
07	Naitasiri	1,449	12,488
08	Namosi	2,856	3,053
09	Ra	9,570	10,589
10	Rewa	6,289	6,832
11	Serua	3,909	4,065
12	Ba East	10,019	11,115
13	Ba West	12,435	13,141
14	Tailevu North	8,946	9,535
15	Tailevu South	8,738	9,635
16	Cakaudrove East	8,054	8,847
17	Cakaudrove West	9,062	9,855
	Fijian Urban Communal		
18	North East	13234	14,477
19	North West	15307	16,306
20	South West	12070	13,230
21	Suva City	11653	12,675
22	Tamavua / Laucala	12573	13,709
23	Nasinu	11538	12,423
	General Voter Communal		
24	Suva City	3,772	4,113
25	North Eastern	4,556	4,895
26	Western / Central	5,701	5,942
	Indian Communal		
27	Vitilevu East / Maritime	7,761	8,239
28	Tavua	8,477	9,197
29	Ba East	10,049	10,487
30	Ba West	10,188	11,240
31	Lautoka Rural	9,667	10,264
32	Lautoka City	11,849	12,355
33	Vuda	11,289	11,584
34	Nadi Urban	1,236	13,019
35	Nadi Rural	9,678	10,161
36	Nadroga	11,179	11,833
37	Viti Levu South / Kadavu	7,839	8,291

¹⁶ This data was obtained from the Fiji Elections Office at www.elections.gov.fj/results2001/voter-pop.html .

Code	Constituency	1999	2001
38	Suva City	13,280	14,467
39	Vanua Levu West	8,839	9,186
40	Laucala	14,453	15,352
41	Nasinu	12,090	13,081
42	Tailevu / Rewa	10,875	11,520
43	Labasa	9,668	9,996
44	Labasa Rural	9,775	10,113
45	Macuata East / Cakaudrove	83,32	8,721
	Rotuman Communal		
46	Rotuman	52,32	5,571
	Open		
47	Tailevu North / Ovalau	17,306	18,555
48	Tailevu South / Lomaiviti	19,759	21,372
49	Nausori / Naitasiri	16,631	17,915
50	Nasinu / Rewa	17,034	18,619
51	Cunningham	17,578	18,996
52	Laucala	15,939	17,046
53	Samabula / Tamavua	16,280	17,504
54	Suva City	15,565	17,099
55	Lami	15,865	17,090
56	Lomaivuna / Namosi / Kadavu	18,668	20,154
57	Ra	17,962	19,750
58	Tavua	15,814	17,181
59	Ba	19,477	21,352
60	Magdro	17,572	18,743
61	Lautoka City	18,114	19,081
62	Vuda	18,920	19,555
63	Nadi	20,807	21,809
64	Yasawa / Namaka	17,008	17,995
65	Nadroga	17,333	18,524
66	Serua / Navosa	19,056	20,536
67	Bua / Macuata West	17,913	19,186
68	Labasa	16,252	17,014
69	Macuata East	18,299	18,615
70	Cakaudrove West	15,572	16,889
71	Lau / Taveuni / Rotuma	16,422	18,192

Appendix B: Ethnic Composition of Open Constituencies¹⁷

Code	Open Constituency	Percent			
		Fijian	Indian	General	Rotuman
47	Tailevu North / Ovalau	87.7	8.8	3.3	.3
48	Tailevu South / Lomaiviti	68.3	31.0	.6	.1
49	Nausori / Naitasiri	48.9	47.5	2.1	1.1
50	Nasinu / Rewa	45.2	52.8	1.3	.7
51	Cunningham	57.4	35.1	5.6	1.8
52	Laucala	47.9	44.8	3.9	3.4
53	Samabula / Tamavua	46.8	43.6	6.7	2.8
54	Suva City	49.4	35.4	10.8	4.4
55	Lami	66.8	20.1	11.6	1.5
56	Lomaivuna / Namosi / Kadavu	82.8	16.1	.7	.4
57	Ra	64.7	34.7	.5	.1
58	Tavua	42.6	54.9	1.1	1.3
59	Ba	17.1	81.8	1.0	.1
60	Magdro	26.8	72.6	.4	.1
61	Lautoka City	39.0	54.2	4.8	2.0
62	Vuda	27.4	70.5	1.5	.5
63	Nadi	36.5	59.1	3.3	1.1
64	Yasawa / Namaka	36.6	63.1	.3	.0
65	Nadroga	48.2	50.6	1.0	.2
66	Serua / Navosa	66.9	30.1	2.6	.4
67	Bua / Macuata West	61.5	36.2	2.2	.1
68	Labasa	21.1	75.6	2.0	.1
69	Macuata East	21.5	78.0	.5	.0
70	Cakaudrove West	73.5	14.3	11.9	.3
71	Lau / Taveuni / Rotuma	81.0	7.1	3.8	8.2

¹⁷The data for this table was reported by the Fiji Elections Office and found at www.elections.gov.fj/results2001/voter-pop.html .