IFES Survey on Voters’ Intent: Libya
A nationwide survey exploring public opinion of the political situation in Libya and voter intentions to participate in future elections

August 2018
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Survey Methodology

Sample Specifications
The sample was designed to be nationally representative of Libya’s adult population (18 years or older). The sample consisted of 1,994 respondents who were randomly selected and interviewed face-to-face in their homes. The sample was stratified proportionately across Libya’s basic 13 electoral districts. A weight factor was introduced to bring the realized sample in line with the population parameters to adjust for minor discrepancies in observed age and regional proportions compared to the national population as per the latest census.

Survey, Questionnaire and Report Specifications
The survey questionnaire was composed of 61 closed questions, six open-ended questions and nine demographic questions.

- The sample size of the survey was 1,994 respondents.
- Sample sizes for key demographic segments:
  - Gender:
    - Male = 997
    - Female = 997
  - Age groups:
    - 18-24 = 276
    - 25-34 = 384
    - 35-44 = 488
    - 45-54 = 465
    - 55+ = 381
  - Education groups:
    - Illiterate = 105
    - Primary = 229
    - Secondary = 947
    - University or above = 687
  - Regional groups:
    - East = 513
    - West = 887
    - South = 273
    - Tripoli = 321

- Unless otherwise noted, the margin of error for the entire sample is ± 2.19 percent with a 95 percent confidence interval.
- Fieldwork dates: April 17-May 22, 2018
- Survey firm: The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) contracted Diwan Research, a Tripoli-based research organization, to implement the survey. Oversight was provided by IFES’ Center for Applied Research and Learning.
• **Charts:** There may be slight variation between numbers presented in the analysis and the data figures or tables due to rounding. This occurred in only a few cases and the difference was never greater than 1 percent.

• **Regional groups:** Throughout this report, data is frequently disaggregated by region. Libya’s 13 electoral districts have been distributed into four different geopolitical zones. While districts in each grouping may share similar economic, political or social characteristics, the divisions presented in this survey are not meant to correlate with official geographic or political classifications. In this report, Tripoli is treated separately from the West region due to the high population density in Tripoli and its attributes as the largest urban center in Libya. The four geographic areas have been divided as follows.
  - **East:** Tobruk, El Bayda, Benghazi, AJdabya-Kufra
  - **West:** Sirte-Jufra, Misrata, Gharyan-Nalut, Al Khums-Tarhouna, Al Azizyah, and Al Zawya
  - **South:** Sabha-Al Shatii, Ubari-Murzuq
  - **Tripoli:** Tripoli
Overall Findings

In 2018, IFES – with the support of the United States Agency for International Development – conducted a nationwide household survey exploring public opinion of the political situation in Libya and voter intentions to participate in future elections. Questions in the survey included views on the Libyan transition, public perception and awareness of the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) and Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections (CCMCE), elections and democracy, women in politics, persons with disabilities, and women’s rights and freedoms.

The survey found that close to half of all Libyans believe that the political situation in the country has gotten worse compared to the situation one year ago. Overall, 48 percent say that the political situation has worsened in the past year, while 35 percent say it has stayed the same. While this represents a largely pessimistic outlook, it is an improvement from the year before, when a sizeable majority of 69 percent saw the situation as worsening. In 2017, only 6 percent saw the political situation as being better than a year prior, with 25 percent saying it was the same. Security and economic issues are the top reasons for concerns about the direction of change, and there is only a low level of optimism about the potential outcomes of the current political dialogue initiatives.

While most Libyans do not think that they can influence decision-making by the government, a majority still believes that Libyan citizens should take part in future elections. A plurality of Libyans say that elections are either very important and that every Libyan should absolutely participate (59 percent) or that elections are generally important and that Libyan citizens should try to participate (25 percent).

Sixty percent of Libyans note that, in their opinion, stability is more important than the preservation of democratic rights, while 27 percent see the preservation of rights as important but balanced with necessary compromises to ensure stability. Conversely, only 10 percent say that preservation of democratic rights should be prioritized over stability in the country.

The survey also shows that Libyans are divided as to the progress that has been made under the action plan developed by the United Nations (UN), although they do express some optimism that the plan can lead to a lasting and stable outcome in the country. Different attitudes in this area can be seen as resulting from regional views on the best sequence of events going forward and which institution is best equipped to lead the country. Libyans overwhelmingly say they would vote yes on the Constitution Drafting Assembly’s (CDA) constitutional proposal, although only a third of the country say they are very likely to participate when the referendum occurs. An additional 42 percent say they are somewhat likely to vote.

The survey shows remaining differences in the attitudes of men and women toward women’s political participation. As such, women are much more likely to advocate for women’s political participation in Libya, including serving as a legislator or president of the country, while men are significantly more likely to say they would not vote for a woman to serve in either of these roles. However, a sizeable number of women share this attitude. Views on freedom of movement and association for women also limit women’s participation in the political sphere, with many agreeing that women should be limited in associating and moving freely within society.
Assessments of Current Political Situation in Libya

A plurality of Libyans continue to believe that the political situation in the country is worse than a year ago, with security and economic issues the primary reasons for concern about the direction of change. These concerns are a factor in most Libyans professing a preference for stability over democratic rights in the survey. These sentiments may also be expressed because a majority of Libyans have at least some concerns about democracy in the country, although sentiments are somewhat more positive than in 2017. While most Libyans do not think that they can influence decision-making by the government, a majority still believes that Libyan citizens should take part in elections.

Current Political Situation in Libya

- Close to half of all Libyans believe that the political situation in the country has gotten worse (Figure 1), compared to the situation one year ago. Overall, 48 percent say that the political situation has worsened in the past year, while 35 percent say it has stayed the same. Only 16 percent see the situation as having improved.
- While this represents a largely pessimistic outlook, it is an improvement from the year before, when a sizeable majority of 69 percent saw the situation as worsening. In 2017, only 6 percent saw the political situation as being better than a year prior, with 25 percent saying it was the same.
- Libyans living in the South are most likely to see the political situation as worsening. Seventy-three percent of those in South say the situation is worsening, while only 4 percent say it is better. Conversely, in all other regions, 50 percent or fewer of the respondents note that the situation is worsening. There is more optimism about the political situation in the East (20 percent) and Tripoli (22 percent) than in other parts of the country.

![Figure 1: "How would you assess the current political situation in Libya relative to a year ago? Is it better, the same, or worse?" (n=1,978)](chart.png)
• Asked to assess the biggest issues facing Libya at the moment, respondents largely point to security and economic issues (Figure 2). Sixty percent of Libyans point to violence and instability as being the biggest problem facing the country, while 21 percent point to terrorism and 13 percent point to ISIS. Forty-seven percent point to general economic problems in Libya, with 30 percent seeing corruption as a major issue in the country. Others point to political issues, including external interference in Libyan affairs (15 percent), a divided political regime (11 percent), and a lack of political leadership (9 percent).

![Figure 2: "In your opinion, what are the biggest problems Libya faces as a country? (n=1,988)"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence/ Instability/ Lack of security</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General economic problems</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External interference in Libyan issues</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided political regime</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of political leadership</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care problems</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems with electricity</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional tensions</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty about the future</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the concerns over instability in the country, in the short term there is some preference for pursuing stability over democratic rights. Despite this, in the long term, there is a widespread view on the importance of elections, indicating that the preference for stability reflects only a short-term perspective (Figure 3). Sixty percent of Libyans note that in their opinion, stability is more important than the preservation of democratic rights, while 27 percent see the preservation of rights as important, but balanced with necessary compromises to ensure stability. Conversely, only 10 percent say that preservation of democratic rights should be prioritized over stability in the country.

• Those living in Tripoli (16 percent) and Eastern Libya (12 percent) are more likely to advocate for the preservation of democratic rights over stability in Libya, with fewer having this opinion in the South (8 percent) and West (6 percent).
Perceptions of Democracy and Elections in Libya

- Perceptions of the state of democracy in Libya have improved somewhat from 2017, but largely still skew negative (Figure 4). While 48 percent say that Libya is presently a democracy, most note there are either minor (13 percent) or major problems (32 percent) with the way that it functions. Indeed, only 3 percent say that Libya is a full democracy. A plurality of 47 percent note that Libya is not presently a democracy in any form.

- These perceptions do represent an improvement over findings from the 2017 survey, where 56 percent said that Libya was not at all a democracy.

- While there are higher perceptions of democracy in Eastern Libya, the perception is largely that it is a flawed democracy. While a slight majority of 55 percent say Libya is a democracy, most note that there are minor (17 percent) or major problems (34 percent).
Despite the assessments of democracy in the country, Libyans largely see elections as important and believe that citizens should try to participate as much as possible (Figure 5). A large majority of Libyans say that elections are either very important and that every Libyan should absolutely participate (59 percent) or that elections are generally important and that Libyan citizens should try to participate (25 percent). Conversely, very few understate the importance of elections, with 7 percent saying they are not too important and 7 percent saying they are useless.

Libyans are more likely to see elections as being very important than in 2017. Indeed, the amount of Libyans saying elections are very important has increased by nine percentage points from 50 percent to 59 percent since last year.

Men are more likely than women to perceive of elections as being important in Libya. Overall, almost nine-in-ten men see elections as being either very (66 percent) or generally important (23 percent), compared to just over eight-in-ten women (53 percent very important; 28 percent generally important).

Overall, 69 percent in the South and 64 percent in the East say that elections are very important and that all citizens should participate, compared to 58 percent in the West and 54 percent in Tripoli.

When asked if they feel free to vote on Election Day, Libyans say they are largely free to vote without external influence; however, despite this they do express concerns as to whether their vote has the ability to change anything in the country (Figure 6).
A large majority of Libyans say that they are free to vote for whomever they want on Election Day without external influence. In total, 67 percent strongly agree and 22 percent somewhat agree with this statement, with very few either somewhat (5 percent) or strongly disagreeing (6 percent).

Despite this, just over half say that voting gives Libyans a chance to influence decision-making (53 percent) and even fewer say that regular Libyans can influence decisions made by the government (40 percent). Given that a majority of Libyans say voting gives them a chance to influence decision-making, this indicates that there is a perception that elections are a vehicle through which citizens can influence the government.

Assessments of Libyan Political Institutions

Libyans are more likely to express confidence in non-political institutions within the country, with the highest levels of confidence placed in judicial bodies (Figure 7). Political figures and representative political institutional bodies receive lower levels of confidence. Despite this, the Libyan National Army (LNA) receives a high level of confidence.

The institutions that Libyans express the most confidence in are both judicial bodies, the Judiciary (68 percent) and the Supreme Court (61 percent). Other institutions in which a majority of Libyans express confidence are the LNA (61 percent) and the Civil Registration Authority (58 percent).

The Audit Chamber (47 percent) and the CCMCE (36 percent) see less positive assessments, with less than half of respondents expressing confidence in each.

Less than one-third of Libyans express confidence in Seif Al-Islam (32 percent), the House of Representatives (HoR) (27 percent), the Government of National Accord (GNA) (25 percent), the Interim Government (25 percent), and the Presidency Council (22 percent).
The institutions in which the fewest Libyans express confidence are the HoR/High State Council (HSC) dialogue committees (15 percent), and the HSC (13 percent), which fewer than one in five express confidence in.

A main factor determining confidence level is region, which tends to impact the degree to which Libyans express confidence in an institution (Figure 8).

The Judiciary sees far more support in the East (72 percent) and West (71 percent) compared to other regions, while the Supreme Court receives its highest amount of support from the West (68 percent) and Tripoli (62 percent).

The LNA sees a very high level of confidence in the East, where 99 percent express either a great deal or fair amount of confidence in it. Significantly fewer express confidence in the South (56 percent), West (46 percent), and Tripoli (40 percent).
• Seif Al Islam sees significantly higher assessments of confidence in the South (57 percent) and West (44 percent) compared to other regions.

• While residents of Tripoli (39 percent) and the West (32 percent) express confidence in the GNA, only 4 percent in the East do so. Conversely, 38 percent in the East express confidence in the Interim Government, with far lower rates in other parts of the country.

• Residents of Eastern Libya are significantly less likely to express confidence in the HoR/HSC dialogue committees (6 percent), Presidency Council (4 percent), and the HSC (3 percent) compared to those in the other regions of the country.

**Figure 8: Percent expressing great deal or fair amount of confidence in each institution by region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Tripoli</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan National Army</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Registration Authority</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Chamber</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seif Al Islam</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of National Accord</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim Government</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidency Council</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Representatives/High State Council Dialogue Committees</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High State Council</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Civic Engagement of Libyan Citizens**

• Presented with a list of six activities through which Libyans could be engaged politically or civically in their country, very few say that they have engaged in any of the activities in the past (Figure 9).

• Overall, 22 percent say they have attended a community meeting to express an opinion, 18 percent have attended a meeting organized by a civil society organization, 13 percent have called into a radio or television talk show or written to a newspaper to express an opinion, 8 percent have signed a written or email petition, 8 percent contacted a community leader or public official to express an opinion, and 4 percent have attended a meeting or rally organized by a political candidate.
• Notably, for each activity at least 45 percent of respondents say they would never participate, signifying a gap in engagement within the country.

Figure 9: "Please tell me if you have done any of these activities to express your views:"

- In total, around one-third of Libyans say that they have participated in one of these activities in the past, with the remaining two-thirds having never taken part (Figure 10).
- Men are more likely than women to have previously participated in civic activities. Overall, 42 percent of men have taken part in at least one of these activities, compared to only 23 percent of women.
- Libyans in the South (43 percent) and in Tripoli (39 percent) are more likely to have previously engaged in civic activities compared to those living in the East (33 percent) and West (28 percent).
- Finally, those who have a greater interest in politics and government are twice as likely as those who are less interested to have participated civically previously (40 percent to 21 percent).
Figure 10: "For each one, please tell me if you have done any of these activities to resolve an issue or express your views?" (n=1,964)
Count of yeses, by gender, age, region, interest in politics and government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>1 activity</th>
<th>2 activities</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very/ somewhat interested</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not too/ at all interested</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- 3-6 activities
- 1-2 activities
- None
Attitudes Toward Reform Efforts in Libya

Libyans are divided on the progress that has been made under the UN action plan, although they do express some optimism that the plan can lead to a lasting and stable outcome in the country. Many of the attitudinal divides result from regional perceptions about the best sequence of events and which institution is best equipped to lead the country. Libyans overwhelmingly say they would vote yes on the CDA’s constitutional proposal, although only a third of the country say they are very likely to participate when the referendum occurs, and an additional 42 percent say they are somewhat likely to vote.

Assessments of the Libyan Action Plan

- While a majority of Libyans say that they are aware of the action plan presented by the UN special representative of the secretary general in September 2017 to help resolve the conflict in Libya, most who have heard about it have only heard a little about the plan (Figure 11). Indeed, while 13 percent have heard a lot about the action plan, 44 percent have heard only a little, and 40 percent have heard nothing at all about the plan, indicating a need for greater information on the action plan.
- Awareness of the plan is higher among men. Over twice as many men (18 percent) have heard a lot about the action plan compared to women (8 percent), but the majority of men still have only a little or no information on the plan.
- Awareness of the action plan is highest in Tripoli, where 15 percent say they have heard a lot about the plan and 48 percent have heard at least a little about the plan. Awareness is lowest in the South, where 12 percent have heard a lot, and 43 percent have heard at least a little.
- Those who are interested in issues of politics and government are far more likely to have heard about the action plan than those who are less interested. Indeed, among those who are very or somewhat interested in politics, 19 percent have heard a lot and 50 percent have heard a little, compared to far fewer among those who are less interested.
Among those who have heard at least a little about the action plan, there are mixed attitudes about the implementation of the action plan (Figure 12). Two-in-five Libyans express that they are either very (4 percent) or somewhat satisfied (35 percent) with the progress made towards meeting the objectives of the action plan, while 34 percent are somewhat dissatisfied and 24 percent are very dissatisfied.

While women, in general, express lower levels of awareness of the action plan, they are slightly more likely than men to express satisfaction with its implementation. Overall, 43 percent of women say they are very or somewhat satisfied, compared to 38 percent of men. Notably, men are far more likely to express that they are very dissatisfied in the implementation (28 percent), compared to 19 percent of women.

Satisfaction with the implementation of the plan is the highest in Tripoli, where 45 percent express satisfaction. Comparatively, in all other regions, satisfaction is under 40 percent.

Those who have heard a lot about the action plan are more likely to express satisfaction in the action plan, although a majority remain dissatisfied with its implementation. Overall, 46 percent of those who have heard a lot are satisfied with its implementation, compared to 53 percent who are dissatisfied. Among those who have heard only a little about the action plan, only 38 percent are satisfied, while 58 percent are dissatisfied.
• Furthermore, among Libyans who see the situation in the country to be better than a year ago, they tend to be more likely to be satisfied with the progress of the action plan. Indeed, among those seeing the country as better off, a slim majority of 55 percent express satisfaction with the action plan’s implementation, compared to lower rates who have seen no or negative change. Conversely, among those seeing the country as worse off from one year ago, 68 percent express dissatisfaction with the action plan’s implementation.

![Figure 12](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By gender, region, knowledge of action plan, and direction of the country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (n=620)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (n=479)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East (n=286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West (n=471)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South (n=127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli (n=215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard a lot (n=252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard a little (n=847)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better (n=198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same (n=418)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse (n=472)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• While Libyans are slightly dissatisfied with the implementation of the action plan, there is some hope for it going forward (Figure 13). A slight majority of 53 percent say that they are either very or somewhat optimistic that the action plan can produce a lasting and stable outcome for Libya, while 45 percent are pessimistic that this will occur.
• Gender of the respondent does not seem to have any impact on optimism, with 52 percent of women and 54 percent of men expressing optimism in the action plan.
• With the exception of Eastern Libya, a slight majority in each region expresses optimism in the outcome of the action plan in Libya. Fifty-five percent of Libyans in Tripoli, 54 percent of Western Libyans, and 54 percent of Southern Libyans express optimism in the plan, compared to 49 percent in the East.
• Increased satisfaction in the action plan to date portends higher levels of optimism in the lasting and stable outcome from the action plan. Among those who are satisfied with the action plan to date, a large majority of 85 percent express that they are either very or somewhat optimistic in the outcome of the action plan, compared to only 32 percent of those who are dissatisfied with the action plan’s progress to date.

• Libyans are mixed as to who they see having the most success in leading Libya out of the current situation (Figure 14). There is a sharp divide as to whether a military leadership (39 percent) or a newly elected president (33 percent) would have the most success in leading Libya out of its current situation. A sizeable amount note that personalities from the former regime (15 percent) would have success in doing so. Very few argue that either a new (5 percent) or the existing GNA (4 percent) would be successful in leading Libya out of the current situation.

• Regional divides account for the varying attitudes towards who Libyans see as the best actors to lead Libya out of its current situation. In the East, there are high levels of support for a military leadership, with over three-quarters saying this would be the most successful leadership type. The support for a military government is related to the increased levels of confidence in the LNA in this region.

• A newly elected president garners more support in the West (43 percent) and Tripoli (35 percent), compared to the South (25 percent) and East (18 percent). The South expresses
highest levels of support for personalities from the former regime, with 31 percent saying they would be the most successful in leading Libya out of its current troubles.

- While there is not much support for the GNA in leading Libya out of the current troubles, it is highest in Tripoli, where 11 percent back the current GNA and 9 percent back a new GNA.

### Attitudes Toward Constitutional Reform in Libya

- More Libyans have heard about the constitutional proposal passed by the CDA on July 29, 2017, than the UN’s action plan, although the level of information remains limited (Figure 15). Overall, 15 percent have heard a lot about the constitutional proposal, with an additional 54 percent having heard a little about it. Over a quarter of Libyans have not heard anything at all about the CDA’s proposal.

- Men are more likely than women to have heard about the CDA proposal, and almost twice as likely to say that they have heard a lot about the constitutional proposal. Nineteen percent of Libyan men have heard a lot about the proposal, with 53 percent having heard a little. Conversely, only 10 percent of women have heard a lot, with 56 percent having heard a little.

- There are greater levels of information on the CDA’s proposal in the South (22 percent have heard a lot about the proposal) and East (18 percent).

- Interest in politics and government does lead to higher levels of awareness of the constitutional proposal. Overall, 21 percent of those who are very or somewhat interested in politics and government have heard a lot, compared to only 4 percent who are less interested.
While no date has been set for this proposed referendum, at this point it seems unlikely that many Libyans will participate in the referendum. Only 32 percent say that they are very likely to participate in a referendum on the constitutional proposal, which, from previous surveys, tends to highly correlate to the actual turnout in elections and referendums. (Figure 16).

Men are almost twice as likely to say they are very likely to participate in the referendum. Overall, 44 percent of men say they are very likely to vote in the referendum, compared to only 24 percent of women.

Older Libyans express a higher level of willingness to vote in the referendum. The highest percentage of very likely voters are seen in Libyans 55 and over (40 percent) and those between the ages of 45 and 54 (37 percent). Conversely, only 29 percent of Libyans under 25 say they are very likely to vote.

Those living in Tripoli are the most likely to participate in the referendum, with 41 percent saying they are very likely to participate in the referendum. Comparatively, the lowest levels of interest in participating are in the East, where 30 percent say they are very likely to vote.

Levels of information on the referendum impacts the likelihood of voting in the referendum. Among Libyans who have heard a lot about the constitutional reform process, 71 percent say they are very likely to participate, compared to only 29 percent of those who have heard a little.
Among those who are very likely to vote in the referendum, 77 percent say they would vote yes to the constitutional proposal, while only 12 percent would vote no (Figure 17), suggesting that the referendum would pass overwhelmingly.

While there is widespread support for the referendum, it is highest in Western Libya, where 82 percent say they would vote yes, and in Eastern Libya, where 80 percent say they would vote yes. Comparatively, 72 percent would vote yes in the South, with 64 percent voting yes in Tripoli.
Preferred Sequence of Transition in Libya

- Libyans are sharply divided as to the best sequence of events under the current circumstances. While 44 percent say that the constitutional referendum should be postponed and are in favor of an election for an interim president, 42 percent say that there should be the immediate implementation of the constitutional referendum based on the CDA’s proposal, and 4 percent say the referendum should be postponed with the continuation of the Presidency Council as the executive power.

- Regional differences largely account for varying attitudes on the best sequence of events for the transition period. Only in the East is postponement of the constitutional referendum in favor of the election of an interim president seen to be the best sequence of events, with 67 percent preferring this sequence there. Conversely, in all other regions, a plurality of Libyans would rather see the immediate implementation of the constitutional referendum based on the CDA’s proposal.

![Figure 18: “In your opinion, what would be the best sequence of events for the transitional period under the current circumstances?” (n=1,965) By region](image)
Awareness and Attitudes Toward the High National Elections Commission

Information levels on HNEC remain limited, with less than a quarter of the population saying they have a lot of information on the election management body (EMB). However, the percentage expressing this is roughly consistent with IFES’ findings in other countries about awareness of their electoral management bodies. Despite the lower levels of information, two-thirds of Libyans express confidence in HNEC’s ability to organize credible elections and largely positively assess HNEC’s work in different areas of the electoral process. Information on HNEC is mostly received through television. While almost half of Libyans are aware of HNEC’s online presence, less than a quarter have utilized this to learn more about the EMB.

**Awareness of HNEC**

- While most Libyans say that they have heard of HNEC, the level of information remains limited (Figure 19). Overall, 23 percent say that they have heard a lot, 59 percent say they have heard a little, and 18 percent say they have not heard anything at all about HNEC.
- This represents an increase from findings from the 2017 nationwide survey, when 18 percent had heard a lot, 46 percent had heard a little, and 34 percent had heard nothing at all. Indeed, the share of Libyans having heard nothing at all about HNEC has halved since 2017.
- Men are twice as likely to have heard a lot about HNEC and its work in Libya than women. Thirty-two percent of men have heard a lot about HNEC, compared to 15 percent of women.
- Information about HNEC is higher in the East (28 percent have heard a lot) and South (27 percent), compared to the West (22 percent) and Tripoli (19 percent).
- Interest in politics results in higher levels of information about HNEC. Among those who are very or somewhat interested in politics and government, 32 percent say they have heard a lot about HNEC, compared to 9 percent who are not as interested.

![Figure 19: "How much have you heard about the HNEC that is responsible for conducting general elections in Libya? (n=1,964) By gender, region, and interest in politics](image)
Attitudes Toward HNEC’s Conduct of Elections

- Among those who have heard about HNEC, there exists a sizeable majority who express confidence in the ability of HNEC to organize credible elections (Figure 20). Overall, 22 percent express a great deal of confidence, 43 percent a fair amount of confidence, 26 percent very little confidence, and 5 percent no confidence at all in HNEC’s ability to organize credible elections.

- These findings largely mirror the 2017 survey in Libya. At that point, 23 percent expressed a great deal of confidence and 42 percent a fair amount of confidence, indicating little change in positive assessments of the body.

- Men are much more likely to express confidence in the ability of HNEC to organize credible elections in Libya. Overall, 71 percent of men express at least a fair amount of confidence in HNEC, compared to only 58 percent of women.

- Confidence in HNEC’s ability to organize credible elections is highest in the East, where 71 percent express at least a fair amount of confidence. Other regions express consistent levels of confidence in HNEC (63 percent West, 62 percent South, 62 percent Tripoli).

- Information levels on HNEC impact the level to which respondents express confidence in HNEC. Those with more information about HNEC express a far higher degree of confidence than those who have not heard as much. Among those who have heard a lot about HNEC, a large majority express confidence, with 49 percent with a great deal of confidence and 38 percent a fair amount of confidence. Conversely, among those who have heard only a little about HNEC, 11 percent have a great deal of confidence and 45 percent have a fair amount of confidence. Conversely, those with limited information express little to no confidence (39 percent) than those who have heard a lot (13 percent).

Figure 20: "How much confidence do you have in the ability of High National Elections Commission to organize credible elections?" (n=1,565)
By gender, region, and awareness of HNEC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Awareness of HNEC</th>
<th>Great deal of confidence</th>
<th>Fair amount of confidence</th>
<th>Very little confidence</th>
<th>No confidence at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total 2018</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total 2017</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard a lot</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard a little</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Libyans largely express positive assessments of different aspects of HNEC’s work, and professionalism and transparency is most highly assessed (Figure 21).

• Overall, the highest level of agreement is on HNEC’s professionalism in organizing elections. Twenty-four percent strongly agree that HNEC is professional in organizing elections, 47 percent somewhat agree, 9 percent somewhat disagree, and 5 percent strongly disagree with this sentiment.

• A similar percentage of Libyans agree that HNEC is transparent and informs the public and the media about its activities. Twenty-seven percent strongly agree with this statement, with 43 percent somewhat agreeing. Conversely, only 11 percent somewhat disagree with 5 percent strongly disagreeing.

• Libyans also widely say that HNEC staff are competent in managing the voter registration process. In total, 28 percent strongly agree, 41 percent somewhat agree, 8 percent somewhat disagree, and 5 percent strongly disagree that HNEC staff are competent in managing the voter registration process.

• HNEC is likewise largely seen to be performing its duties with honesty and integrity. Overall, 27 percent strongly agree with this statement, 40 percent somewhat agree, 12 percent somewhat disagree, and 5 percent strongly disagree.

• A majority of Libyans see HNEC as being independent and not influenced by political considerations, although agreement with this is at somewhat lower rates than in other areas. Twenty-seven percent strongly agree with this statement, while 36 percent somewhat agree, 12 percent somewhat disagree, and 8 percent strongly disagree.

• In all areas, there are slight increases in assessments of the HNEC’s work, suggesting slight improvements in attitudes since 2017, although in all areas the change falls within the margin of error (Figure 22).
Awareness and Utilization of HNEC’s Website

- While almost half of those aware of HNEC have heard of the HNEC website, located at www.hnec.ly, only 23 percent have visited the website before, suggesting that it is an underutilized resource (Figure 23).
- Both awareness and utilization of the website is lower among women than men. Twenty-six percent of men have used the HNEC website, with an additional 28 percent aware of the resource, compared to 19 percent of women who have used and an additional 23 percent aware.
- Overall usage of the website is highest among younger Libyans. Those under 25 are most likely to have visited (30 percent), while overall awareness is highest among those between the ages of 25 and 34.
- Libyans in Tripoli are most likely to have used the HNEC website (30 percent), while those in the East are the least likely (17 percent).
Among those who have used the website, nearly three-quarters of Libyans (74 percent) say they use it to get information on how to participate in elections (Figure 24). Smaller percentages say they utilize the website to learn how to run as a candidate (21 percent), learn the value of participating in elections (21 percent), learn the purpose of elections (20 percent), or to look at election results (20 percent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information about political candidates</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election results</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of the elections</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of participating in elections</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to run as a candidate</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to participate in elections</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Information Sources Used to Learn About HNEC**
- The most common source of information from where Libyans receive their information about HNEC is television, which a large majority of Libyans (82 percent) use to learn about HNEC (Figure 25).
- Word of mouth is utilized by a quarter of Libyans, who hear about HNEC from family, friends, and colleagues.
- Web resources see limited usage among respondents. Overall, 13 percent receive information from Facebook, 9 percent from the HNEC website, 8 percent from other websites, 8 percent from the HNEC Facebook page, and only 1 percent from HNEC Twitter.
- Other sources used to learn about HNEC include posters, pamphlets, flyers (10 percent) and radio (8 percent).
Figure 25: "Where do you get most of your information about HNEC?" (n=1,615)
Past Voting Patterns and Future Incentives to Vote

To date, over two-thirds of Libyans say they have voted in at least one of the nationwide elections held since 2012, indicating that participation in elections is seen as an effective method of affecting political change within the country. That said, there is a desire for more transparency in the process, as well as for improved quality of the candidates for elections.

Past Voting Patterns in Libyan Elections

- While a majority of Libyans report having voted in the 2012 GNC election (61 percent), turnout for subsequent elections in Libya have been significantly lower (Figure 26).
- Indeed, only 39 percent of respondents participated in the 2014 CDA election and 45 percent participated in the 2014 HoR Election.
- In total, 68 percent of Libyans have previously voted in an election, suggesting an interest in participating in the political process.

Future Incentives to Participate in Libyan Elections

- Most pressing reforms to motivate people to vote involve improving both the quality of the electoral process and the candidates running for office in the country. Forty-eight percent say they would be more likely to vote if the electoral process is serious and transparent, while 41 percent say they would be more likely to vote if candidate were true to their promises (Figure 27).
- Security is a concern among many Libyans. This is reflected in that 33 percent say they would be more willing to vote if security of the process was guaranteed.
- Information gaps play a large role in getting people to vote. Thirty percent say more information on the electoral process would motivate them to vote, 23 percent say more information on what the elections are about, and 18 percent say more information on how to vote.
- Ease of voting is a factor, with 20 percent saying easier access to polling stations, 18 percent for polling stations located closer to voters, and 13 percent for improved services and facilities for persons with disabilities are motivating factors.
- Notably, 15 percent of Libyans say nothing could motivate them to vote in future elections.
Influential Factors for Libyans in Choosing a Candidate

- Given the concerns of stability in the country, it is unsurprising that 61 percent of Libyans look for candidates who are able to restore stability (Figure 28). Other factors among respondents’ candidate choice include looking at candidates who are not corrupt (44 percent) and choosing based on candidates’ political platforms (32 percent) and personalities (19 percent).
When asked which issues elected officials should be prioritizing, a majority of Libyans stated reinforcing stability, improving security, or reducing violence (54 percent) and fighting corruption (54 percent) should be prioritized (Figure 29). Other top issues noted included national reconciliation (35 percent) and improving the economy (31 percent). This largely mirrors findings on main problems that the country is currently facing.

![Figure 29: "In your view, which of these issues should elected officials be prioritizing?" (n=1,994)](chart)
Municipal Elections in Libya

Libyans are less likely to have participated in municipal elections than nationwide elections to date. One factor in this lower level of participation is a lack of information about these elections, with only 10 percent of Libyans saying they have a lot of information on the CCMCE, which is responsible for organizing these elections. This lack of information may influence future participation in municipal elections, with only 35 percent saying they are very likely to vote in the next municipal elections.

Information on the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections

- A majority of Libyans (57 percent) have heard some information regarding the CCMCE, although the level of the information tends to be limited, with only 10 percent having heard a lot about the CCMCE (Figure 32). Slightly less than half of Libyans report not having heard anything at all about the CCMCE.
- Men are more likely than women to have heard about the CCMCE, with 13 percent having heard a lot and 49 percent having heard at least a little. Comparatively, 8 percent of women have heard a lot with 45 percent having heard a little.
- Age and region do not have much bearing on information levels of the CCMCE, with relatively uniform levels of awareness across each age group and region.

Figure 32: "How much have you heard about the CCMCE that is responsible for conducting municipal elections in Libya? Have you..." (n=1,945)
By gender, age, and region
Participation in Past and Future Libyan Municipal Council Elections

- Thirty-nine percent of Libyans have voted in previous municipal council elections (Figure 33).
- Participation rates in past elections are significantly higher among men. Just over half of men (51 percent) have voted in a municipal council election previously, compared to only 26 percent of women. This matches findings from other areas of the survey, where women have gaps in knowledge and interest in political participation.
- Likelihood of having voted in a municipal council election increases with age, with 46 percent of those 55 and over having voted in municipal council election before, compared to only 24 percent of those under 25.
- Libyans in the South (52 percent) are significantly more likely to have voted in a municipal council election previously, compared to those living in the other regions. Only 28 percent of Libyans in Tripoli have voted previously in one of these elections.

Figure 33: "As you may know, some people vote in elections, and others do not, for a variety of reasons. Did you vote in any municipal council elections?" (n=1,944)
By gender, age, region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>DK/NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female (n=967)</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>70%</td>
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<td>Male (n=977)</td>
<td>51%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24 (n=268)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34 (n=376)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44 (n=476)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54 (n=455)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+ (n=330)</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East (n=505)</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West (n=842)</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South (n=254)</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli (n=343)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Participation in Future Libyan Municipal Council Elections

- Thirty-five percent of Libyans stated they are very likely vote in future municipal council elections, which represents a slight decline from Libyans who previously voted in municipal council elections (39 percent) (Figure 34). An additional 33 percent say they are somewhat likely to vote in these elections.
- Libyans who have previously participated in municipal council elections are significantly more likely to say they are very likely to vote in future elections of this type. Among previous voters, 56 percent say they are very likely to participate in the next round of elections, compared to only 22 percent of those who have not participated before.
- Men are significantly more likely to say they are very likely to vote in the next municipal council elections, with 48 percent expressing this opinion, compared to 22 percent of women. This mirrors historical gaps in turnout between men and women in the municipal council elections.
- Likelihood to vote is largely consistent across the regions, with 37 percent in the East, 36 percent in the West, 35 percent in the South, and 31 percent in Tripoli saying they are very likely to vote in future municipal council elections.
Attitudes Toward Voter Registration

While a majority of Libyans are currently registered to vote, gaps in registration rates remain, especially among women and youth. These two groups are registered at significantly lower rates compared to the general population, suggesting either limited access to the registration process or a lack of desire to register to vote. Efforts to increase the number of registered voters have increased the registration rates from previous years, and there are overall positive assessments of these efforts to enroll more voters.

Current Registration Status

- Presently, just over seven-in-ten Libyans say that they are registered to vote by the HNEC (Figure 35). This represents an increase of eight percentage points from 2017, when 63 percent of Libyans said that they had registered to vote.
- Key gaps remain in the registration rates among women and youth in Libya. Men are far more likely to be registered to vote compared to women, with 82 percent of men having registered, compared to 59 percent of women. This remains consistent with the gap seen in the 2017 survey.
- Furthermore, Libyan women under 25 (54 percent) and 55 and over (55 percent) are less likely to be registered to vote compared to those between the ages of 25-54 (62 percent).
- Libyans under the age of 25 are less likely to be registered to vote compared to other age cohorts. Among those under 25, 58 percent are registered to vote, whereas at least 70 percent of other age cohorts are registered to vote.
- Taken together, this indicates that there should be an emphasis placed on ensuring both women and youth in Libya are registered to vote going forward, allowing all Libyans an equal chance to participate in elections and referendums.
- Registration rates are slightly higher than the national average in the East (75 percent) and South (74 percent), while they are slightly lower in Tripoli (65 percent).
Participation in Voter Registration Update Process

- HNEC recently carried out an update of the voter registry allowing Libyans to either register to vote or to move their polling location. Over half of Libyans say that they participated in this process in one form or another (Figure 36). Forty-six percent say that they registered to vote for the first time during this exercise, while an additional 8 percent say they moved their registration to another polling center. Forty-six percent say they did not participate whatsoever.
- Men were more likely to participate in this registration campaign, indicating that this registration campaign did not reach men and women equally. While 55 percent of men say they registered to vote for the first time during this campaign, only 37 percent of women did.
Participation in the campaign was largely consistent across age groups.

A large majority of Libyans who participated in the voter registration update process report that they did see some HNEC voter registration campaign materials leading up to and during this process (Figure 37). Overall, 82 percent report having seen the material at least once during the campaign, while 15 percent of participants did not see any of the materials.

Men are more likely to report having seen some of the materials during the campaign (86 percent) compared to women (77 percent), suggesting a slight gap in the dissemination of information.

Conversely, younger Libyans report seeing the campaign materials at a much higher rate than other age groups. Eighty-nine percent of Libyans under the age of 25 say they saw at least one of the HNEC’s voter registration campaign materials, a significantly higher rate than other age groups. Indeed, this age group is the most likely to say they saw the materials in many locations.
Libyans largely view the recent voter registration update process to be a credible process (Figure 38). Two-thirds of Libyans say that the campaign was either very (26 percent) or somewhat credible (41 percent), with far fewer seeing it as either not very credible (9 percent) or not credible at all (3 percent).

Men are significantly more likely to rate the process as being credible than women in Libya. In total, 75 percent of men say the process was credible, compared to 58 percent of women.

Western Libyans are more likely to say that the voter registration update was credible (71 percent) compared to those in other regions.

Participants in the campaign are significantly more likely to say the process was credible than those who did not participate. Among those who either registered to vote or updated their polling unit during the process, 81 percent say the update was credible, compared to 49 percent of those who did not participate.

Among those who say the process lacked credibility, many point to corruption and a lack of transparency within HNEC (57 percent). Other issues raised include ineffective employees and advertisement (14 percent), lack of security (10 percent), manipulation of the registry (7 percent), and a lack of improvement in the country (6 percent).
Figure 40: "How would you rate the credibility of the latest voter registration update process carried out by the HNEC?" (n=1,934)
By gender, region, and participation in update process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very credible</th>
<th>Somewhat credible</th>
<th>Not very credible</th>
<th>Not credible at all</th>
<th>DK/NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (n=963)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>29%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male (n=971)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East (n=507)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>West (n=837)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>South (n=251)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli (n=339)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participated in update (n=1,049)</strong></td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Did not participate in update (n=851)</strong></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- Very credible
- Somewhat credible
- Not very credible
- Not credible at all
- DK/NR
Concerns of Electoral Violence in Libya

Half of Libyans express concern that they could be a victim of political violence or intimidation in a future election. Perhaps because of this, there is a widespread attitude that the use of violence is never justified in Libyan politics. A majority, however, also says that sometimes violence can be justified. These contrasting views between general opposition to violence while accepting situation-based use of violence indicates that the country may continue to be impacted by politically-based violence.

Perceptions of Potential for Electoral Violence

- Libyans are mixed as to whether electoral violence will affect them personally in a future election or referendum. Just over half of respondents (51 percent) express a degree of concern around being impacted by electoral violence in the future. Conversely, 24 percent of respondents were not too concerned with electoral violence and 21 percent were not concerned at all (Figure 39).
- Expectations of violence are slightly lower in comparison to 2017 results, in which 55 percent of respondents expressed concern revolving around electoral violence. This may reflect changing attitudes on the status of democracy and stability in the country.
- Women are slightly more likely to express concerns about election violence, with 53 percent saying they are concerned that they may be a victim, compared to 49 percent of men.
- Those living in the South (63 percent) and Tripoli (59 percent) report the highest levels of concern regarding electoral violence. Conversely, among those living in the East, 41 percent report being concerned about becoming a victim of electoral violence, the lowest rate in the country.

Figure 39: “Suppose elections or a referendum are taking place in Libya today. How concerned would you be that you may personally become a victim of political intimidation or violence?” (n=1,957)
By gender and region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Yes, Very Concerned</th>
<th>Yes, Somewhat Concerned</th>
<th>No, Not too Concerned</th>
<th>No, Not at all Concerned</th>
<th>DK/NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Yes, Very Concerned
- Yes, Somewhat Concerned
- No, Not too Concerned
- No, Not at all Concerned
- DK/NR
• A large majority of respondents surveyed agree that the use of violence is never justified in Libyan politics. Overall, 61 percent strongly agreed, 23 percent somewhat agreed, while 8 percent somewhat disagreed, and 5 percent strongly disagreed with this statement (Figure 40).

• The overall number of Libyans agreeing that violence is never justified in Libyan politics remained the same from 2017, although the percentage of respondents who strongly agreed dropped by 10 percentage points in 2018.

• A sizeable gap (11 percent) between genders that strongly agreed with this statement was evident, with 67 percent of men strongly agreeing in comparison to 56 percent of women.

• Those living in Tripoli (67 percent) and in the South (66 percent) have the highest percentage of respondents who strongly agree with the statement. Conversely, the East (55 percent) has the lowest percentage of respondents who strongly agree with the statement.

• While a large majority of Libyans agree that violence is never justified in Libyan politics, over half of respondents (54 percent) agree that it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause (Figure 41). Almost half of respondents (48 percent) have contrasting views on these statements, which may indicate either a perception that some issues are more important than politics or should not be decided in the political arena.

• Twenty-five percent of respondents strongly disagree with this statement, a significant decline from 50 percent of respondents who strongly disagreed in 2017.

• Less than half of women (49 percent) agree with this statement in relation to 60 percent of men who agree.
Respondents from Tripoli (43 percent) had the lowest percentage of respondents agreeing to the use of violence in support of a just cause. Conversely, at least one-half of all other regional respondents agree with the statement, including Libyans from the Eastern region (67 percent), which had the highest percentage.

Figure 41: “Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about political violence in Libya: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause” (n=1,931) By gender and region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>DK/NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018 East</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018 West</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018 South</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018 Tripoli</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Women</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Men</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 East</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 West</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 South</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Tripoli</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assessments of Women in Politics and Current Status of Women in Libya

Gaps remain in the attitudes of men and women toward women’s political participation. Women are much more likely to advocate for women’s political participation in Libya, including serving as a legislator or president of the country. But while men are significantly more likely to say they would not vote for a woman to serve in either of these roles, a sizeable number of women share this attitude as well. Attitudes toward freedom of movement and association for women also limit women’s participation in the political sphere, with many agreeing that women should be limited in associating freely and moving freely within society.

Attitudes Toward Women’s Political Participation

- A large majority of Libyans (82 percent) agree that men make better political leaders than women do, only marginally lower compared to the 83 percent of the 2017 respondents who agreed with the statement (Figure 42).
- A significant gender gap was evident, with 90 percent of men agreeing that men make better political leaders than women in relation to 74 percent of women. This still indicates that among women, most say that men make better leaders than women.
- Twenty-six percent of women disagree that men make better political leaders than women, representing the highest level of disagreement when compared to women respondents in 2013 (14 percent) and 2017 (19 percent).  

1 The 2013 responses were captured during a Status of Women survey carried out by IFES Libya with support of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/libya_status_of_women_survey_report_final2_2.pdf
Seventy-two percent of Libyans agree that men make better business executives than women do, ten percentage points lower than Libyans who agreed that men make better political figures than women (82 percent) (Figure 43).

A lower percentage of men disagree with the statement that men make better business executives than women, down to 16 percent in relation to 21 percent of men who disagreed with the statement in 2017.

Conversely, 40 percent of women disagreed with the statement representing the highest level of disagreement in relation to women respondents in 2017 (31 percent) and 2013 (24 percent).

More than half of Libyans (54 percent) stated they would prefer that a man represent them in parliament, if the male and female legislators were equally qualified. This figure was up slightly from 2017, when 50 percent of respondents noted preferring a man legislator (Figure 44).

Men are significantly more likely to say they would prefer to have a man represent them in parliament. Indeed, 72 percent of men say they would prefer a male representative, with only 3 percent saying they would prefer a female to represent them. Conversely, women are far more divided in their opinions, with 36 percent preferring a male to represent them, 19 percent a female, and 44 percent that it does not matter to them.

The share of men who prefer a male representative has increased over previous surveys, increasing from 62 percent in 2017 to 72 percent in 2018. Conversely, the number of women
expressing preference for a female representative is likewise increasing, from 12 percent in 2017 to 19 percent.

- Twenty-three percent of Libyans say they would vote for a woman as president of Libya if equally qualified as male presidential candidates. This figure indicates a slight increase from 2017, indicating an increased willingness to have a female president, although work remains to socialize Libyans to a greater acceptance of this idea (Figure 45).
- Nearly three times as many women (34 percent) are willing to vote for a woman as president of Libya in comparison to men (12 percent). Indeed, 74 percent of men say they would not vote for a woman in these circumstances, while only 47 percent of women say they would not.
- There is an increasing openness to having a woman president among Libyan women. The percentage of support from women has increased from 23 percent in 2017 to 34 percent in 2018. There is no change in perceptions of Libyan men.
While there is largely support for gender quotas in Libyan politics, just under three-in-ten Libyans (29 percent) strongly support the use of gender quotas to increase the number of women in elected bodies (Figure 46). This indicates that while there is openness to the idea of quotas, it is not a high priority for many Libyans.

Women are more likely to support the idea of quotas than men. Eighty-three percent of women support the idea of a gender quota, with 40 percent strongly supporting. Conversely, while a majority of men are open to the idea of a quota (64 percent), only 17 percent strongly support the idea of a quota for women.
Status of Women in Libya

- Men express higher levels of freedom in being able to express themselves and to move freely in Libyan society compared to women. Presented with five statements on freedom of movement and expression, men express significantly higher levels of freedom in this regard (Figure 47).
- While both men and women largely feel free to express their views of critical issues to family members, and to a lesser extent to neighbors and friends, there are significant gaps in freedom of movement and association.
- While 90 percent of men agree that they are free to associate with persons of their choosing, only 70 percent of women say they are free to do this.
- Larger gaps exist in freedom of movement. While 82 percent of men say they can move about in public areas without fear or pressure, only 51 percent of women agree. Similarly, while 85 percent of men agree they can leave their house without permission, only 34 percent of women agree.
- These findings may provide some evidence as to why women express lower levels of political participation and civic activism. With only a minority saying they are free to leave their house without permission, opportunities to be engaged civically in their country is limited. Those who feel free to leave the house and to move about in public are much more likely to have voted in elections previously and be registered to vote, as well as be engaged civically in their communities (Figures 48 and 49). Those who do not feel free to move about in public or leave the house without permission are over 20 percentage points less likely to have voted in previous elections in Libya.

![Figure 47: "To what extent do you feel free or restricted in doing the following actions:"
Percent expressing completely or somewhat free to do each statement](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Women (%)</th>
<th>Men (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expressing your views on critical issues to family members (n=1,972)</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associating with persons of your own choosing (n=1,971)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving about in public areas without fear or pressure (n=1,939)</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving your house without permission (n=1,968)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressing your views on critical issues to neighbors or friends (n=1,973)</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When asked why they feel restricted to move about in public areas, the majority of men (91 percent) and women (67 percent) noted concerns centered around a lack of security and violence in their open-ended responses (Figures 50 and 51).

A significantly higher percentage of women (22 percent) note cultural and social norms as to why they feel restricted to move about in public areas in relation to men (5 percent).
• Current ability to associate with others and to move freely are largely reflective of societal ideas on these matters. While a majority of both men (78 percent) and women (85 percent) agree that women should be free to express their views on critical issues, in many other areas there are far lower levels of agreement (Figure 52).

• Women are three times as likely (46 percent) as men (15 percent) to say that women should be free to associate with persons of their choosing outside the house, indicating that this is an area where there is a sharp divide in attitudes between the genders.

• While significantly more women agree that women should be free to move about in public areas without being accompanied by a male family member (28 percent women; 14 percent men) and that women should be free to leave their house without permission (22 percent women; 6 percent men), it is striking that a large majority of women do not think that these freedoms should be granted.
Nearly half of Libyans say they will make their own decision on who to vote for, without consulting anyone else (Figure 53). This figure is far higher among men (58 percent) than it is among women (39 percent). Indeed, a majority of women say that they will either vote for the candidate selected by their family (13 percent), or after consulting with family (20 percent) or others (19 percent) on who to vote for.

A clear majority of Libyans (93 percent) say that violence between married people is generally rejected within their neighborhood or area, with nearly identical figures among both men (94 percent) and women (93 percent) (Figure 54).
• A slight increase is evident in the percentage of Libyans who noted violence between married people is generally rejected in comparison to the previous year, moving from 89 percent in 2017 to 93 percent in 2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Completely rejected</th>
<th>Somewhat rejected</th>
<th>Somewhat tolerated</th>
<th>Widely tolerated</th>
<th>DK/NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total 2018</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 2017</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 2018</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female 2018</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 2017</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female 2017</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Ninety-four percent of Libyans note that domestic violence or the physical abuse of wives by their husbands is generally rejected, consistent with respondents from the previous question (Figure 55).
• Likewise, 95 percent of men and 93 percent of women note that domestic violence or the physical abuse of wives by their husbands is generally rejected.
• Cross-year comparison reveals an increasing percentage of Libyans that generally reject domestic violence and physical abuse of wives, moving from 81 percent in 2013, to 93 percent in 2017, and 94 percent in 2018, indicating that the repudiation of domestic violence is increasing in the country.
Eighty-four percent of Libyans say they do not believe it is acceptable for husbands to hit their wives in certain situations (Figure 56).

Women are more likely to say that it is unacceptable for husbands to hit their wives than men (88 percent women; 80 percent men).

This year’s figures (84 percent) highlighted the highest percentage of Libyans responding “no” to this question in relation to 2017 figures (72 percent) and 2013 figures (73 percent).

Additionally, the percentage gap between women and men with a “no” response dropped to its lowest level in 2018 (8 percent) in comparison to 2017 data (14 percent) and 2013 data (13 percent).
• While a large majority of Libyans (84 percent) stated it is not acceptable for husbands to hit their wives in certain situations, when respondents were presented with more nuanced conditional statements, a significant number of Libyans said that it may be justified to hit one’s wife in certain circumstances (Figure 57).

• Situations which highlighted the highest percentages of respondents stating husbands were always or sometimes justified in hitting their wives included: if she went out without telling her husband (39 percent), if she was disobedient or did not follow his orders (35 percent), and if she participated in a political activity outside the house (30 percent).
- Attitudes on this are surprisingly consistent among both men and women, with no large gap in attitudes (Figure 58).

![Figure 57: "For each of these situations, please tell me if you think it is always justified, sometimes justified, or never justified for husbands to hit their wives" (n=1,929)
By gender](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Always justified</th>
<th>Sometimes justified</th>
<th>Never justified</th>
<th>DK/NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If she went out without telling her husband</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If she was disobedient or did not follow his orders</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If she neglected the children</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If she tried to impose her views</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If she participated in a political activity outside the house</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If she refused sex</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If she neglected household responsibilities</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 58: Percentage saying each action always or sometimes justified violence (n=1,928)](image)

- If she went out without telling her husband: 38% women, 41% men
- If she was disobedient or did not follow his orders: 35% women, 35% men
- If she neglected the children: 28% women, 27% men
- If she tried to impose her views: 28% women, 30% men
- If she participated in a political activity outside the house: 29% women, 30% men
- If she refused sex: 22% women, 28% men
- If she neglected household responsibilities: 26% women, 25% men
Conclusion

With the relatively slow and volatile development of the Libyan transition, many Libyans believe that the political situation in the country is worse than a year ago. Furthermore, overall there are high levels of dissatisfaction with the progress of plans led by both national stakeholders and the international community. On that basis, Libyans seem split on what the preferred sequence of events in the transition should be – a constitutional referendum or immediate presidential elections.

This is reflected in significant concerns over instability and a lack of trust in almost all post-revolution institutions – with the exception of the HNEC – which seems to translate into the prevalence of worries about political violence or intimidation in future elections, and a consequent short-term preference for pursuing stability over democratic rights.

Despite this, in the long term there is widespread regard for the importance of elections, and Libyans generally show great interest in participating at both the national and local levels. As Libya progresses toward the next steps in the transition to democracy, this is encouraging. Furthermore, the high level of trust in and awareness of the HNEC as the institution responsible for administering national elections in Libya provides a positive foundation for the conduct of future polls.