



Annex B

Pilot Report for Gender-Sensitive Early
Warning Indicators Global Framework

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I. Introduction




Between September and December 2020, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) worked with Nigerian partner organization, Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI), to test five gender-sensitive indicators as part of the Nigeria Election Violence Report (NEVR) initiative,¹ KDI and IFES' existing electoral violence monitoring project. This Nigeria pilot is one component of IFES' project in collaboration with the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations on "Enhancing Predictions of Political Violence: Developing and Piloting Women, Peace and Security Indicators." The aim of the project is to develop a publicly available set of qualitative and quantitative gender-sensitive indicators to enhance the effectiveness of global risk analyses and early warning systems.

Nigeria was chosen for the pilot in part due to IFES' history supporting electoral violence monitoring throughout the country in collaboration with KDI. KDI works alongside local and international organizations in Nigeria to promote peaceful elections, active citizen engagement in democratic processes, and a sustainable economy. KDI collaborates with IFES on the NEVR initiative, which aims to build the capacity of civil society organizations to monitor, analyze and respond to incidents of election-related violence during and after elections in Nigeria.² The project uses a mixed methodology approach for its election violence monitoring, including deploying local monitors who fill out incident reports and interview eye witnesses; conducting local media monitoring; and establishing a well-publicized toll-free hotline that enables members of the public to report incidents of electoral violence.

As well as having an existing working relationship with IFES, KDI was selected as the local implementing partner for this pilot due to its established network of local monitors across Nigeria; knowledge of local customs and ethnic groups in different parts of the country; and expertise in collecting and analyzing subnational data. Nigeria also fit the criteria that IFES had developed for selecting a pilot country to test its gender-sensitive indicators, as it has experienced political, electoral and/or extremist violence; had upcoming pertinent political events (elections); had regional and cultural diversity across states; and had existing violence monitoring efforts.

II. Pilot Locations

Nigeria has 36 states (see map below³), which are divided into 774 local government areas (LGAs). Each LGA is divided into wards with a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 15 for each LGA.



Initially when Nigeria was set as the pilot country, it was envisaged that local monitors would be able to integrate the five gender-sensitive indicators in the pre-electoral violence monitoring that was already taking place ahead of the elections for governor in Edo and Ondo states. It was hoped that having monitors deployed across the two states would provide a significant amount of statewide data on each of the five indicators. However, these elections were held on September 19, 2020, in Edo and on October 10, 2020, in Ondo, and the pre-election monitoring was already nearly completed by the time the gender-sensitive indicators were finalized and were ready to be tested. KDI advised that as the monitoring in these two states was already well underway, it would be too disruptive to call the monitors, who were already in the field, in for a training session on the additional indicators or on the updated incident reporting form. Monitoring took place in six states holding by-elections and two states holding statewide local elections. One monitor also remained in Ondo to monitor any potential post-election violence and to further test the common place monitoring indicator. A total of 42 monitors, including 23 women, were deployed across the nine states. The table below lists the states where monitoring took place, the type of elections that were conducted, and the number of monitors deployed to each state disaggregated by sex.

Table 1: Pilot State Data

State	Election Date	Election Type	Election Level	Election Location Name	Locations in Which Monitors Were Present or Visited	Number of Total Candidates	Number of Women Candidates	Number of Women Monitors/Out of Total Number of Monitors	Date: First Day of Monitoring	Date: Last Day of Monitoring
Ondo	10-Oct-20	Governor election	Statewide	Ondo	Araromi, Isolo, ba Adesida, Oke-Aro	17	1	1/1	15-Oct-20	31-Dec-20
Bayelsa	5-Dec-20	Senatorial by-election	Local Government Area (LGA) (3)	Bayelsa Central	Igbogene, Amassoma, Amatolo, Otuan, Etegwe, Nedugo, Ogboloma, Sagbama town, Toru-orua town	11	2	2/3	23-Oct-20	31-Dec-20
Bayelsa	5-Dec-20	Senatorial by-election	LGA (2)	Bayelsa West	Ekeremor, Isampou	13	1	1/2	23-Oct-20	31-Dec-20
Cross Rivers	5-Dec-20	Senatorial by-election	LGA (5)	Cross River North	Ishibori Village, Abakpa village, Nkum Irede Village, Igoli town, Abouchiche village, Ugboro village, Biaragidi village, Ijibor village, Utukwe village, Ijibor inland village, Ukpe village, Kakum village, Kutiang village, Igwo village, Atekpe village, Ohong village, Benuagbong village, Aboikep village, Utugwang village, Ikpong, Kakum village, Akekpe village	9	1	3/5	23-Oct-20	31-Dec-20
Imo	5-Dec-20	Senatorial by-election	LGA (6)	Imo North	Amaraku village, Umunkwo village, Amokohia village, Amainyi village, Okata village, Achara Village, Obowo village, Umuezu 1, Okewella 1 and 2, Onuiom	14	1	3/5	23-Oct-20	31-Dec-20

State	Election Date	Election Type	Election Level	Election Location Name	Locations in Which Monitors Were Present or Visited	Number of Total Candidates	Number of Women Candidates	Number of Women Monitors/Out of Total Number of Monitors	Date: First Day of Monitoring	Date: Last Day of Monitoring
Kogi	5-Dec-20	Senatorial by-election	LGA (1)	Ibaji Constituency	Ega, Ejule jobe, Onyedega, Ojuba, Ejule onu, Eurgwi, Odogwu, Anyigba, Ojule Ojebe, Idah, Shendam, Sabongari Idah, Unale		2	3/5	15-Oct-20	31-Dec-20
Lagos	5-Dec-20	Senatorial by-election	LGA (5)	Lagos East	Ikorodu, Akodo, Abule Parapo, Awoyaya, Ile-Ige, Orimedu, Noforija Epe, Shomolu, Gbagada, Ifako, Odogbonle	6	1	2/5	15-Oct-20	31-Dec-20
Plateau	5-Dec-20	Senatorial by-election	LGA (5)	Plateau South	Wase Tofa, Pilgani, Shimankar, Kurwat, Mile 3, Shendam town, Pangshoom, Ajikamai, Yamini, Tudun Doruwa, Ega, Ejule Jobe, Onyedega, Kurgwi town	10	1	3/5	15-Oct-20	31-Dec-20
Gombe	19-Dec-20	Local government election	LGA (4)	Gombe North	Yalanguraza, Dawaki, Nasarawo, Akko, Federal low cost	12	0	1/2	11-Nov-20	31-Dec-20
Gombe	19-Dec-20	Local government election	LGA (3)	Gombe Central	Wuro buggo, Akko, Jekadafari, Bolari, Sabo line, Mallam Inna, Kumo North, Kasuwan Gwari	9	0	1/1	11-Nov-20	31-Dec-20
Abia	19-Dec-20	Local government election	LGA (9)	Abia South	Umuafor, Aba North, Aba town, Akunekpe Eziama, Ahia Ohuru, Umunwankwo, Ahia Nkwo, Unuola Egbelu, Unuola Egbelu, Osusu, Umuelendu, Umuokea	18	0	2/3	11-Nov-20	31-Dec-20
Abia	19-Dec-20	Local government election	LGA (6)	Abia Central	Ehere, Umuiheukwu, Umuchichi Obingwa village, Umuabali village, Ohuru Isimiri village, Ariaria Aba, Umuehilegbu village, Okpunumuobo Obingwa village, Isiala Ngwa south	12	0	1/3	11-Nov-20	31-Dec-20

III. Pilot Indicators

In partnership with IFES, KDI adapted five indicators from the short list created for the global framework into its electoral violence monitoring effort. The indicators needed to easily fit into existing electoral violence monitoring efforts but also be applicable or adaptable to other early warning systems with a broader monitoring focus beyond elections. The indicators aimed to measure rapid and differentiated changes in behavior among and incidents involving women and men that are currently being overlooked but that signal potential violence or conflict. The indicators were selected after conducting desk research on gender norms and women's rights in the identified Nigerian states and holding consultations with KDI.

The modified five gender-sensitive indicators chosen were:

1. Number of incidents of targeted violence and intimidation against voters, electoral officials, and party representatives – disaggregated by sex, victim, and perpetrator;
2. Number of arrests of individuals active in political and electoral processes – disaggregated by sex and by the level of violence during the arrest;
3. Number of campaign communications that utilize or refer to misogynistic, homophobic, or sexist references or propaganda;
4. Percentage of individuals who are women present in designated common places; and
5. Rate of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, leading up to and after the election

These indicators were designed to fit into the electoral violence monitoring efforts, but also to enable IFES to draw broader lessons learned from the pilot that could be applied to early warning systems that have a wider focus than monitoring electoral violence only during a defined period of time. As the pilot progressed, the focus further broadened beyond just monitoring electoral violence, in part due to the postponement of the elections and the temporary suspension of all campaigning due to nationwide deadly protests against police brutality.

IV. Data Collection

The data collection strategy used for these indicators included a combination of a) filling out an incident reporting form that was updated to include additional gender, victim, and perpetrator disaggregates and was also updated to include questions designed to collect pertinent pilot indicator information; b) weekly monitoring of social media accounts of candidates, whereby the local monitors developed a monitoring schedule to weekly check the Twitter and or Facebook accounts of all candidates who had accounts as well as daily monitoring of local media outlets; c) monitoring public spaces frequented by women at the same time and day each week; and d) observing political events and campaign rallies to report on incidents and interview eyewitnesses. As per KDI's existing verification methods, all reported incidents that were not witnessed directly by the local monitor or reported on in mainstream news outlets had to be verified by a second source. These secondary reports could include incidents reported through eyewitness accounts (but not from monitors) or the toll-free phone line set up as part of NEVR monitoring efforts. This second verification layer could include seeking a second eyewitness account, obtaining confirmation from local police stations, or visiting hospitals to confirm a victim of violence had been hospitalized (while retaining confidentiality without identifying the victim).

Monitors were also requested to visit their local police stations and hospitals to gather weekly or fortnightly arrest rates, accounts of violent incidents, and reports of gender-based violence, including sexual violence. This strategy, however, was not always successful, for two main reasons: firstly due to the significant underreporting of gender-based violence as a result of stigma, meaning official rates will not represent the full picture of gender-based violence being committed in a particular community; and secondly due to local authorities being reluctant to provide this information in a timely and regular manner. This lack of cooperation from authorities was further exacerbated by the local monitors not having any formal identification papers to substantiate their involvement in early warning monitoring efforts. Though it is unclear if identification papers would have guaranteed cooperation from the police, having identification could help the monitors either collect data or prove their identity in certain instances. It should be noted, though, that in some contexts, early warning monitors might become targets themselves, so it is important to consider whether identification papers would increase or decrease risk. During the deadly protests against police brutality that broke out across Nigeria in mid-October 2020, there was a further heightened level of distrust from local police officials to provide any arrest-related data. During the pilot implementation, there was not sufficient time to set up a similar community toll-free phone line, as is established during other NEVR electoral violence monitoring efforts, to encourage the reporting of violent incidents from community members. KDI advised that, in past efforts where the phone line has been well-publicized, it was a useful tool for increasing the number of reported incidents that monitors were not able to witness themselves but could verify once an incident had been reported via the phone line. Where the resources are available, it would be worthwhile considering setting up a similar phone line during early warning monitoring efforts and encouraging community tip-offs relating to the gender-sensitive indicators chosen and adapted for the local context. Similar verification methods could then also be applied to verify the reported incidents.

The data collection strategies for these indicators (as further described in the table below) included a combination of an updated incident reporting form with additional sex disaggregation and gender-specific information; monitoring candidates' social media accounts as well as local media outlets; local monitors designating common places well attended by women, which were then monitored at the same time and day each week; and observing political events and campaign rallies to report on incidents and interview eyewitnesses. Table 2 below lists the five indicators as well as their rationales, definitions and data collection strategies.

Table 2: Pilot Indicators

Indicator	Link to Violence / Rationale	Definition	Data Collection Strategy
<p>1. Number of incidents of targeted violence and intimidation against voters, electoral officials, and party representatives</p> <p><i>Disaggregated by: gender (female, male, unable to determine), type of electoral stakeholder (voter, electoral official, party representative)</i></p> <p><i>Further disaggregated by: victim and perpetrator, based on whether they are known to be local residents of that area</i></p>	<p>If there is an increase in threats, harassment, and physical violence against women, they will not feel safe participating, and this will decrease their willingness to engage in electoral or political processes.</p>	<p>This indicator tracked violence or intimidation against men and women as it is important to compare how these differ.</p> <p>All tracked incidences must have taken place during electoral periods, including pre- and post-election. The pre-election period is defined as the 60 days before Election Day and the post-election period is defined as 60 days following Election Day. "Targeted violence" is any attempt of violence or intimidation – whether successful or not – that could have the effect of dissuading women's participation in the electoral process.</p>	<p>Individual incident report forms were completed for unique incidences identified through direct primary sources such as observation or through secondary sources such as weekly police reports and media reports where available.</p>
<p>2. Number of arrests of individuals active in political and electoral processes</p> <p><i>Disaggregated by: gender (female, male, unable to determine)</i></p> <p><i>Further disaggregated by: level of violence during the arrest (1 = standard arrest, 2 = some heightened level of force, 3 = excessive force, unknown)</i></p> <p><i>If excessive force used, also disaggregate by weapon used if applicable (baton, pepper spray, stun gun, firearm, other)</i></p>	<p>If there is an increase in arrests of women for participating in political or electoral processes, this can be seen as an attempt to dissuade women from participating, as well as signify a broader closing of political space and overall decline in peace and security in a given country.</p>	<p>The arrests made under this indicator must have been in part due to a woman's participation in political or electoral processes. Arrests made for suspicion of criminal activity or actions unrelated to an individual's political or electoral participation would not count toward this indicator. For instance, the arrest of a female voter for reckless driving would not count toward this indicator. Examples of "political or electoral participation" can include, but are not limited to: voting, taking actions to prepare to vote (such as registering or obtaining voter information), protesting, campaigning, attending campaign rallies or other political events, joining a political party, or openly supporting or debating the merits of political candidates.</p> <p>"Standard arrest" refers to an arrest where there is no resistance from the individual being arrested and there are no altercations or any use of force applied during the arrest.</p> <p>"Heightened level of force" refers an arrest that was heavy handed despite the individual being arrested not resisting arrest or that resulted in a scuffle or use of verbal intimidation by the arresting officer toward the individual being arrested.</p> <p>"Excessive use of force" is when the force used to arrest the individual exceeds what is necessary to arrest an individual. It can involve the use of a weapon and result in injury to the individual being arrested.</p>	<p>Individual incident report forms were completed for unique incidences identified through direct primary sources such as observation or through secondary sources such as weekly police reports and media reports where available.</p>

Indicator	Link to Violence / Rationale	Definition	Data Collection Strategy
<p>3. Number of campaign communications that utilize or refer to misogynistic, homophobic, or sexist references or propaganda</p>	<p>Increased use of traditional social norms and stereotypes to undermine political opponents is a form of hate speech that can reinforce the role of men as decision-makers in society and the expectation that women should not participate in leadership and political processes. Support for such rhetoric also undermines efforts for promoting gender equality, which is linked to insecurity.</p>	<p>“Misogynistic, homophobic and sexist references or propaganda” refers to the use of social norms to undermine or belittle opponents. This can include, but is not limited to, calling into question a person’s masculinity/fatherhood/ breadwinner status, femininity/motherhood, or sexual orientation; bragging about sexual exploits or prowess; speaking about sexual violence to attack opponents, and using perceived negative stereotypes to discredit individuals (such as calling women “aggressive” or “emotional”).</p> <p>Misogynistic and sexist references can be directed at a political candidate, families, or associates, and members of either gender or of any sexual orientation. “Campaign communications” refers to any print, visual, or audio content attributed to a political candidate or party as part of a political strategy. Print, visual, and audio content includes: speeches, leaflets, interviews, social media posts, campaign videos, political endorsements, among others. Campaign communications can be counted whether or not the candidate produced or endorsed a message. To count, the communication should be produced or supported by campaign or political party officials; for instance, in the case of social media, retweets by campaign or political party officials can be counted.</p>	<p>Weekly review of campaign material for major candidates was conducted, including following of social media accounts and monitoring of local news, which was already occurring.</p>
<p>4. Percentage of women present in designated common places</p> <p><i>Disaggregated by: location type (market, place of worship, political event, public transport, eateries, places of leisure)</i></p> <p><i>Disaggregated by: number of people present; as well as disaggregated by percentage of women that make up total number of people present</i></p>	<p>A sudden change, particularly a sudden decrease, in women attending common areas usually frequented by women could signal a fear of imminent violence.</p> <p>(It is understood that COVID-19 restrictions limited the number of people conducting their regular business in common areas. However, it is still important to monitor whether there are any further noticeable changes in the lead-up to or surrounding a political event.)</p>	<p>“Designated common places” refers to locations in target states that are highly frequented by the public, such as markets, places of worship, locations for political events, public transportation, eateries, or places of leisure (i.e. parks, pools, etc.). For each location, the monitor referred to the number of women present. The denominator will be the total number of people present at that location. “Present” was determined as individuals captured through photographs and may not be representative of every individual who was actually physically present in a specific location.</p>	<p>Observation of common places utilizing the NEVR incident form. As well as political events and rallies that may be monitored, the local observer was requested to identify two key common places to regularly observe such as weekly/ fortnightly markets; places of worship (including their own); town hall meeting; etc.</p> <p>Locations observed were monitored at the same day and time for each observation. Observers attempted to position themselves in locations where a broad number of people present at the location could be captured. For example, in a market, a monitor would want to be near the entrance or near produce sections, as opposed to more narrow aisles.</p> <p>The first few weeks of data collection served as the baseline to then compare with as the data collection continued.</p>

Indicator	Link to Violence / Rationale	Definition	Data Collection Strategy
<p>5. Rate of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, leading up to and after the election</p> <p><i>Disaggregated by: gender of victim (female, male, unable to determine)</i></p>	<p>Levels of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, are known to rise during economic and humanitarian crises and conflict settings, as well as during pandemics as seen during global COVID-19 lockdowns. Monitoring gender-based violence ahead of political events such as elections could also signal rising insecurity. Increases in sexual violence could be used as a strategy to discourage women from participating in the electoral process and convey broad attitudes about women being unequal to men.</p>	<p>“Rate” relates to the number of reported incidents. “Gender-based violence” is an umbrella term that covers a broad spectrum of gendered sexual, physical, psychological or emotional abuse, or violence including rape, attempted rape, sexual exploitation, domestic violence, trafficking, forced sex work, female genital mutilation (in some contexts), and reproductive coercion. (This definition is based on different definitions of gender-based violence and sexual violence from the United Nations.)</p> <p>While most cases of gender-based violence will occur against women and girls, it is also perpetrated against men and boys – therefore the victims should be disaggregated by gender as well, noting that reporting on instances of sexual violence against men and boys is particularly low due to the stigma associated.</p>	<p>Media monitoring and seeking out rates of reported gender-based violence, including sexual violence, from local authorities including police, humanitarian actors, and local hospitals.</p>

V. Data Management

There is no value in collecting data without effective tools for managing it and quickly obtaining disaggregated values from new entries. To demonstrate that any organization – regardless of resources and capacity – could take up these efforts, it was important for the project to utilize cost-effective and user-friendly data management tools. IFES created a spreadsheet-based database in Excel that could be hosted on a platform like Sharepoint or Google Sheets to enable simultaneous data entry and updating. This database allowed managers to input and correct data in real time. Access to data is not actionable until it is organized, analyzed, and easily synthesized; the spreadsheet database made that an immediate possibility and is a low-cost resource. The creation of such a dashboard and data management system should be considered, especially where an existing violence monitoring process is not already in place and if the indicators are not being integrated in an established early warning system with analytical tools already developed.

Particularly given the remote collaboration between IFES and KDI, it was also beneficial to provide regular feedback (conducted on a weekly basis) on the quality of the data being collected and identify potential improvements in the data collection process. Without this immediate feedback, adjustments would not have been made and the quality of the data would not have improved over the course of the pilot. As part of this effort to track data quality, a dashboard was set up to evaluate the weekly data being received across all five indicators. Data received for each of the indicators was scored weekly on a scale from one to five. On the lower end of the scale, a score of “one” meant *“significant number of data entries are inaccurate, incomplete, missing, or irrelevant for key fields. Data often appears to be contradictory or unclear.”* Fields are left empty instead of noting that information was “N/A,” “0,” or “Unable to Determine (UTD).” At the top of the data quality scale, “five” indicated *“complete sets of data are received. There are no contradictions, inaccuracies, or inconsistencies that require follow-up.”* Fields with no relevant data are clearly labelled as “N/A,” “0,” or “UTD,” to make it clear that the field has not been overlooked. When no relevant incidents are tracked/observed in a given week, this is communicated to IFES. Despite the overall data collection challenges experienced during the pilot outlined below, this feedback system and data quality scoring process enabled the consistent improvement in quality of data being reported. The average data quality score improved from 1.5 to 4.3, out of five, over the course of the monitoring period.

VI. Data Collection and Monitoring Challenges

In addition to COVID-19 related restrictions on movement, there were other challenges that impacted the local contexts being monitored and the ability of monitors to safely and regularly collect data. Among these were the deadly protests against police brutality in Nigeria in October, which led to curfews, lockdowns, and the postponement of several local elections.

Unlike presidential or gubernatorial races, the by-elections monitored in six of the states were localized and thus did not generate either much regional or national media attention or interest from the local communities in which they were happening. The local nature of the elections meant that candidates only hosted a limited number of campaign events, which drew small numbers of people. There was also less media coverage, which meant less media monitoring could be done and thus did not produce much data either. Had the pilot been able to focus on two statewide governor elections as was originally intentioned, significantly more data would have been able to be collected and analyzed for each of the indicators. Several states were also impacted by floods, which further limited campaigning and the ability of monitors to travel within their local areas. These factors meant that some monitors were not able to systematically collect data on some of the indicators during this period, leading to less data than anticipated. In addition, given that training for monitors was done quickly to ensure that there was enough time in the pre-electoral period to allow for data collection, some edits to the data collection methodology – which affected the data being collected – occurred during the data collection period. Where possible, IFES continued to work with KDI to improve the quality of the data that could be collected, including through adding new victim and perpetrator codes to account for the protests, as well as on detailing the total number of women and men involved in an incident (where this data was available). As outlined below, the data challenges also led IFES to concentrate specifically on the common place monitoring, as that was the indicator generating consistent data.

In the post-pilot survey, the top three challenges listed by monitors in terms of data collection were concerns for their safety; lack of consistent access to police reports; and too many changes in data collection/indicators during the monitoring period. These are important lessons that need to be applied to future efforts. As part of their training, all local monitors received security training; however, with the heightened tensions from the deadly protests, the post-pilot feedback from the monitors clearly indicates the need to strengthen this aspect of the training and to provide ongoing guidance throughout the course of the monitoring period. A summary of key learnings from the pilot to address these issues is included below.

VII. Results

Indicator 1: Number of Incidents of Targeted Violence and Intimidation Against Voters, Electoral Officials, and Party Representatives

A total of 130 violent incidents were reported during the monitoring period and, of these, 49 (or 38 percent) were directed toward women. The monitoring of this indicator was impacted by the national #EndSARS protests, which led to the suspension of the elections and campaigning, and state-imposed curfews. During the suspension of campaigning, monitors started reporting on other violent incidents they had either witnessed or learned about from media monitoring, including community violence, looting, and arson. This focus on other violent incidents highlighted the need to provide clearer details and definitions of the type of violence monitors should report.

While the pilot did not yield reliable data on the differentiated rates of electoral violence toward women and men, KDI and its local monitors considered this indicator itself as being extremely relevant to continue monitoring. During the training sessions with local monitors, the monitors indicated that violence, intimidation, and sexual harassment of women during elections is a common occurrence and is used to intimidate women voters and candidates. A post-pilot survey of local monitors listed this indicator as the second-most relevant to monitor after the proportion of women in common places. This survey is included in the annex of this pilot report.

Indicator 2: Number of Arrests of Individuals Active in Political and Electoral Processes

This indicator produced the least amount of data with only three incidents of violent arrests that were reported. There are three main reasons for the lack of data. First, for safety reasons, monitors did not attend the #EndSARS protests. The protests also led to statewide curfews, which further limited in-person monitoring activities. Second, the suspension of the elections included the cancellation of all campaign-related activities and therefore meant fewer opportunities to monitor campaign events and regularly collect data. Third, local monitors encountered challenges in seeking arrest rates from local police stations, especially during the #EndSARS protests.

Local monitors, however, reported 18 violent incidents perpetrated by police or security forces, nine (or 50 percent) of which involved women, but these were logged under Indicator 1, as the incidents were violent in nature but did not result in arrests.

Indicator 3: Number of Campaign Communications That Utilize or Refer to Misogynistic, Homophobic, or Sexist References or Propaganda

Monitors reviewed local media outlets and the Twitter or Facebook accounts of 35 candidates on a weekly basis for misogynistic, homophobic, or sexist references or propaganda. This remote virtual monitoring did not result in any identified incidents of such hate speech or propaganda. KDI advised that due to the small-scale and localized elections occurring in each state, candidates were unlikely to be very active on social media and would mostly communicate with their supporters during in-person meetings.

When monitors were able to attend campaign rallies in person, they did report sexist and misogynistic comments directed toward women candidates on four separate occasions. Such comments included that women cannot deliver for the people, and that women should be responsible for their families rather than contesting an election. The wife of a candidate was also described as a “buzzing mosquito.” The challenges with data collection shed light on how it could be improved for this indicator: for example, by providing more guidance and examples of sexist, misogynistic, and homophobic derogatory terms commonly used in that local context as guide for what to look for and establishing clear media and social media monitoring strategies from the outset of a monitoring effort.

Indicator 4: Percentage of Women Present in Designated Common Places

Given the inconsistencies in campaign-related events and the monitoring of these, focus turned to continually improving the data collection for the common place monitoring, which was producing the most consistent amount of data on a weekly basis.

Once the curfews were lifted, between October 29 and December 31, KDI collected data for 82 common places across the pilot states, including at markets, churches, mosques, and central bus stops. Monitors recorded the date and time of their visit; the estimated total number of people there; the total number of people there the previous week (after the first week of monitoring); percentage of individuals who are women present in designated common places; and the percentage of women for the previous week (after the first week of monitoring). Monitors were also asked to provide narrative text to explain any changes in the percentage of women from previous weeks and to also account for any overall changes in the number of people attending that common place.

To ensure the quality of data being collected, the monitors were asked to do three things when monitoring this indicator.

- First, monitors were asked to select public places that they knew were well attended by women and provide the specific name, location, and description of the chosen place to KDI, which then compiled a full list of all of the common places being monitored.


- Second, once a common place had been determined by monitors, monitors were asked to continuously monitor that same location unless there was a very specific reason (like flooding) that prohibited them from monitoring that area.
- Third, monitors were encouraged to attend the common place at the same time and day each week and log this information when submitting this information. The results from the common place monitoring highlighted the importance of working with local monitors well acquainted with the areas being monitored, not only to be able to select the most relevant places to monitor, but to then be able to ascertain the possible reasons for fluctuations in percentage of women attending, as well as overall population changes.

As mentioned above, in a post-pilot survey, 39 out of 42 local field monitors (or 98 percent), thought this was the most relevant indicator to monitor in their local contexts and 38 out of 42 (or 90 percent) thought it was the easiest to monitor as well. There were many different reported reasons beyond signaling rising insecurity for the variations in women’s attendance and overall population numbers at the different common places. These included: flooding, which kept people away from many public places; preparation for the upcoming festive season that increased the number of people shopping or selling goods; other religious festivals, which brought more people to the area; a relaxation of state-imposed curfews; increased activity ahead of anticipated COVID-19 related lockdowns; the end of harvesting season; and the holding of political events and elections, which attracted more people to the area. There were also 21 separate occurrences where changes to women’s presence in the common places were attributed to changing perceptions of security. These findings demonstrate that changing security perspectives are a key factor in fluctuations in women’s presence in common places and is therefore important to monitor. The fact that there are a number of reasons why there might be changes in women’s participation in common places shows the importance of integrating more than one gender-sensitive indicator into monitoring efforts; while a change in one indicator might not signal violence or conflict, a change in multiple indicators over a period of time could indicate future violence or conflict.


For example, a Wednesday morning church service in Kobi state, whose congregation was typically between 60 and 80 percent women, one week dropped to only 35 percent women, following the outbreak of violence the previous Saturday. Similarly, a church service in Imo state that was usually made up of 70 percent women fell to 30 percent as a result of a state of unrest in the area following the death of a young person. The local monitor reported that women were afraid to go out as they feared potential retaliatory attacks or mass arrests by the police. It took a month for the women’s attendance to return to baseline (70 percent) again. At a market in Lagos, women’s attendance jumped from 50 percent to 80 percent in one week due to the presence of police at the markets, which according to the local monitor, encouraged women to come to the market. Two weeks prior, when women’s participation was only 40 percent, the field monitor reported community clashes. These examples demonstrate the benefit of regularly monitoring changes to women’s attendance in common places as indicative of actual or perceived security or insecurity in the area.

The graphics and tables below present the data collected from October 29 to December 28, 2020, in 82 common places across the pilot states. The hyphen (-) in a cell indicates that data was not collected for that week.


Table 3: Proportion of Women in Common Places




Common Place	Nov 8- Nov 14	Nov 15- Nov 21	Nov 22- Nov 28	Dec 1- Dec 7	Dec 8- Dec 14	Dec 15- Dec 21	Dec 22- Dec 28
Market A	85%	90%	80%	85%	85%	90%	76%
Market B	-	-	-	91%	95%	98%	99%
Market C	60%	-	60%	70%	-	-	-
Market D	85%	90%	70%	60%	70%	89%	92%
Market E	-	-	-	-	80%	87%	95%
Market F	-	85%	78%	92%	96%	98%	99%
Church A	-	72%	88%	90%	97%	98%	-
Church B	-	-	-	70%	60%	70%	35%
Market G	65%	80%	95%	55%	60%	67%	45%
Market H	-	-	90%	95%	97%	99%	99%
Garage A	-	-	-	50%	50%	68%	75%
Market I	25%	50%	50%	50%	80%	85%	89%




Common Place	Oct 29- Oct 31	Nov 1- Nov 7	Nov 8- Nov 14	Nov 15- Nov 21	Nov 22- Nov 28	Dec 1- Dec 7	Dec 8- Dec 14	Dec 15- Dec 21	Dec 22- Dec 28
Market A	85%	85%	80%	65%	62%	60%	65%	75%	50%
Market B	80%	75%	78%	79%	79%	74%	77%	80%	87%
Market C	-	-	-	-	-	85%	85%	93%	97%
Market D	-	-	85%	70%	90%	90%	70%	70%	78%
Church A	-	-	-	-	90%	70%	70%	85%	85%
Market E	80%	85%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Church B	-	-	-	-	-	75%	85%	90%	93%
Market F	60%	-	-	-	-	70%	60%	70%	35%
Round About A	-	-	65%	80%	95%	55%	60%	67%	45%
Market G	-	-	-	-	90%	95%	97%	99%	99%




Common Place	Oct 29- Oct 31	Nov 1- Nov 7	Nov 8- Nov 14	Nov 15- Nov 21	Nov 22- Nov 28	Dec 1- Dec 7	Dec 8- Dec 14	Dec 15- Dec 21	Dec 22- Dec 28
Market A	-	-	-	-	-	90%	90%	94%	95%
Market B	-	-	-	-	-	70%	70%	74%	78%
Market C/ Church A	70%	-	50%	60%	70%	-	-	-	-
Headquarters A	-	-	70%	23%	70%	-	-	-	-
Market D	-	-	85%	90%	80%	85%	85%	90%	76%
Market E	80%	60%	70%	45%	90%	80%	80%	60%	73%
Market F	-	-	-	-	80%	90%	95%	97%	98%
Church B	-	-	-	70%	70%	75%	65%	65%	80%
Church C	-	-	70%	-	90%	30%	30%	25%	55%
Church D	60%	65%	70%	76%	60%	70%	70%	75%	87%
Churches E/F	60%	-	-	-	-	73%	73%	73%	77%
Market G	60%	73%	73%	73%	73%	73%	74%	75%	78%




Common Place	Nov 8- Nov 14	Nov 15- Nov 21	Nov 22- Nov 28	Dec 1- Dec 7	Dec 8- Dec 14	Dec 15- Dec 21	Dec 22- Dec 28
Market A	-	-	-	-	-	69%	70%
Church A	-	-	65%	65%	50%	55%	50%
Church B	-	-	-	-	50%	70%	85%
Church C	63%	50%	69%	69%	69%	60%	65%
Market B	65%	60%	60%	75%	58%	58%	60%
Mosque A	5%	5%	10%	10%	10%	15%	40%
Market C	-	25%	35%	15%	15%	20%	21%
Church D	-	-	-	-	51%	49%	60%
Market D	-	68%	70%	65%	62%	65%	66%
Market E	67.5%	70%	70%	78%	58.5%	52%	54%




Common Place	Oct 29- Oct 31	Nov 1- Nov 7	Nov 8- Nov 14	Nov 15- Nov 21	Nov 22- Nov 28	Dec 1- Dec 7	Dec 8- Dec 14	Dec 15- Dec 21	Dec 22- Dec 28
Church A	-	-	-	75%	70%	60%	60%	75%	80%
Market A	-	-	80%	80%	80%	90%	90%	92%	96%
Headquarters A	80%	-	-	80%	65%	65%	85%	95%	92%
Market B	60%	-	65%	65%	65%	65%	65%	73%	80%
Market C	30%	70%	90%	60%	70%	50%	50%	63%	70%
Market D	70%	60%	60%	50%	50%	60%	60%	75%	82%
Market E	70%	70%	60%	70%	60%	60%	60%	70%	83%
Church B	70%	70%	30%	-	-	60%	75%	75%	89%
Church C	-	-	-	-	-	80%	85%	85%	92%




Common Place	Oct 29- Oct 31	Nov 1- Nov 7	Nov 8- Nov 14	Nov 15- Nov 21	Nov 22- Nov 28	Dec 1- Dec 7	Dec 8- Dec 14	Dec 15- Dec 21	Dec 22- Dec 28
Market A	78.3%	68.8%	53.3%	80%	80%	70%	73.5%	85%	87.5%
Market B	-	-	80%	85%	89%	90%	85%	87%	88%
Market C	-	-	-	-	85%	85%	86%	89%	90%
Market D	70%	70%	80%	85%	90%	90%	95%	96%	96%
Church A	-	-	-	50%	70%	50%	60%	70%	80%
Market E	-	-	50%	60%	75%	90%	90%	91%	92%
Church B	-	-	61%	65%	65%	65%	55%	60%	65%
Church C	60%	70%	70%	85%	85%	83%	35%	70%	86%
Church D	-	-	70%	70%	75%	50%	55%	65%	80%



Common Place	Oct 29- Oct 31	Nov 1- Nov 7	Nov 8- Nov 14	Nov 15- Nov 21	Nov 22- Nov 28	Dec 1- Dec 7	Dec 8- Dec 14	Dec 15- Dec 21	Dec 22- Dec 28
Market A	60%	40%	70%	50%	80%	82%	90%	92%	93%
Market B	45%	-	55%	55%	56%	60%	70%	60%	70%
Church A	45%	50%	60%	60%	60%	60%	60%	55%	60%
Church B	-	-	70%	70%	75%	85%	87%	90%	75%
Garage A	60%	50%	70%	70%	70%	70%	70%	75%	75%
Bus Stop A	40%	40%	60%	40%	40%	40%	40%	40%	40%
Mosque A	45%	60%	70%	70%	80%	80%	80%	85%	86%
Market C	50%	60%	50%	70%	80%	60%	80%	81%	82%
Mosque B	50%	80%	70%	90%	90%	70%	80%	85%	86%
Market D	60%	40%	70%	50%	80%	82%	90%	92%	93%



Common Place	Oct 29- Oct 31	Nov 1- Nov 7	Nov 8- Nov 14	Nov 15- Nov 21	Nov 22- Nov 28	Dec 1- Dec 7	Dec 8- Dec 14	Dec 15- Dec 21	Dec 22- Dec 28
Church A	55%	45%	45%	45%	45%	45%	70%	50%	60%
Market A	60%	60%	60%	65%	65%	65%	5%	75%	77%



Common Place	Oct 29- Oct 31	Nov 1- Nov 7	Nov 8- Nov 14	Nov 15- Nov 21	Nov 22- Nov 28	Dec 1- Dec 7	Dec 8- Dec 14	Dec 15- Dec 21	Dec 22- Dec 28
Mosque A	50%	40%	45%	55%	20%	50%	90%	90%	92%
Church A	90%	40%	40%	70%	45%	70%	70%	30%	70%
Church B	45%	40%	43.5%	37.5%	50%	55%	43.5%	43.5%	48.5%
Market A	-	70%	76%	80%	60%	80%	85%	90%	92%
Market B	45%	40%	40%	45%	50%	50%	70%	75%	76%
Market C	75%	75%	80%	85%	90%	90%		80%	81%
Church C	-	-	75%	80%	78%	80%	95%	80%	82%
Market D	54%	75%	85%	65%	60%	65%	65%	70%	71%
Market E	-	70%	88%	80%	45%	80%	90%	92%	93%

Indicator 5: Rate of Gender-Based Violence, Including Sexual Violence, Leading Up to and After the Election

During the monitoring period, monitors reported 22 instances of gender-based violence (GBV) that were all based on media reports. Monitors were not able to obtain rates of reported GBV cases from local authorities. In addition, KDI identified a predominant culture of silence around GBV in Nigeria, per the post-pilot feedback. As in many countries, local authorities would still not have the full picture of GBV, as it is greatly underreported due to stigma and other factors. Further research is required in terms of an effective data collection strategy for this indicator, especially at the subnational level where secondary data sources are not as readily available.

VII. Key Adaptations and Improvements

Over the course of the pilot, there was also noticeable progress made in the collection of sex-disaggregated data, in addition to the improvements in the quality of data collected for indicator 4 (monitoring of common places). When reporting on violent incidents and arrests, monitors increasingly provided, where available, details on victims and perpetrators, including: the total number of victims; the number of female victims; the number of male victims; the number of victims whose gender is unknown; the total number of perpetrators; the number of female perpetrators; the number of male perpetrators and the number of perpetrators whose gender is unknown. This sex disaggregation enabled IFES to have a greater understanding of the incidents being reported on and then analyze overall victim and perpetrator rates.

In light of some of the reported violent incidents whereby security sector personnel were the perpetrators of violence, IFES also updated its perpetrator codes to reflect the number of violent incidents committed by security force personnel or police officers. The finalized perpetrator codes were security force/police; member of the public; individual linked to a political party; partner/family violence perpetrator; sexual violence perpetrator; election worker; or unknown.

As the scope of the monitoring extended beyond just electoral violence, the victim categories were also updated to include government/state actor; political party leader or supporter, candidate, or candidate supporter; party agent; election observer/monitor; election worker; voter; protester; government/local authority property; gender-based violence victim; or member of the public. For future efforts, victim categories could be further expanded to include, where applicable, women activists, nongovernmental organization workers, journalists, and prominent figures.

At the end of the pilot, 26 percent of local monitors indicated that data for gender-sensitive indicators was challenging to collect, 29 percent said it was both easy and challenging, and 45 percent thought it was easy. However, despite more than half of the monitors experiencing some challenges with gender-sensitive data collection, 88 percent of them agreed that gender-sensitive indicators are very helpful in understanding conflict in Nigeria and 12 percent thought they were somewhat helpful. None of the monitors thought that gender-sensitive indicators were either somewhat unhelpful or not helpful at all. This finding highlights the understanding among early warning monitors of the need to continue improving the data collection strategies for gender-sensitive indicators and why these are important to integrate in early warning systems.

VII. Key Findings

While the pilot highlighted some significant challenges in collecting data on gender-sensitive indicators, it also provided IFES with key lessons learned related to planning, training, and data collection, which could inform and improve future similar efforts:

Planning

- Allocating sufficient time before the start of the monitoring period to develop, test, and fine-tune the context-specific gender-sensitive indicators and their data collections strategies in consultation with local implementing partners, women's organizations working on local conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, and monitors who will be collecting the data;
- Integrating indicators and data collection methodologies into reporting tools already being used by local monitors rather than creating entirely new tools, forms, or processes;
- Crafting exact definitions of each indicator to allow for consistent data collection and ensuring that monitors understand all the definitions; and
- Issuing identification to local monitors to use when seeking eyewitness interviews or speaking with local authorities, only in contexts where identification will make monitors safer rather than targets of violence.

Training

- Ensuring the security training and ongoing guidance provided to the monitors is sufficient to alleviate the safety concerns of local monitors;
- Allowing at least two days for in-person training that draws on context-specific scenarios and examples for monitors to practice, if resources allow (instead of a daylong training session provided in a hybrid in-person and virtual environment due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, as was done in this pilot); and
- Developing an accompanying toolkit for monitors for reference after the training sessions have been completed.

Data Collection

- Establishing a well-publicized toll-free community phone line to collect information on incidents of violence against women, intimidation, threats, or attacks on women's organizations and women in public roles, or instances of sexist, misogynistic, or homophobic hate speech and propaganda. Such a tool can allow for safe reporting of incidences of violence and increase the data collected, when resources allow;

- Providing regular feedback to local implementing partners that could then be immediately implemented and reflected in the following week's dataset;
- Not relying on local police stations for arrest data and rates of reported gender-based violence. Instead, implementors should establish relationships with women's shelters, women's organizations, and/or humanitarian actors providing front-line services to survivors of sexual or domestic violence or working on other community-level gender equality initiatives. Implementors should ensure that the data collection strategy for arrests and gender-based violence in no way further jeopardizes the safety of the survivors or the organizations helping them;
- Seeking eyewitness accounts that can provide further details on who was involved in a particular incident wherever possible, as media monitoring alone often does not provide sufficient sex-disaggregated data; and
- Developing, in consultation with local partners, a compendium of commonly used derogatory terms used in local contexts (e.g., a hate speech lexicon) as a way of providing more guidance on what to look for when monitoring for sexist, misogynistic, or homophobic hate speech and propaganda.

There would be significant benefit in retesting these five indicators across Nigerian states that are holding statewide governor elections over the next two years. This additional pilot testing would enable sufficient time to provide more in-depth training to the local field monitors, carefully plan the data collection strategies across each state, develop online and event monitoring rosters for the local monitors, generate a significant amount of data across all states, and provide further valuable information on the effectiveness of each indicator. It would also be advantageous to conduct similar pilots testing these five indicators, or others included as part of this framework, in other countries and regions to expand further on the lessons learned from this pilot.

Annex: Post-Pilot Survey of Local Monitors



Thank you for participating in the KDI-IFES pilot to test women, peace, and security indicators for early warning systems and electoral violence programs. As the first pilot to test the indicators and their data collection strategies, your feedback and experiences monitoring these indicators will be incredibly useful in developing recommendations for other local practitioners and for future pilots to integrate gender into local early warning systems.

Please tell us to what degree you agree or disagree with each statement by placing an X in one column per row [required]:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. The pilot, its purpose, and objectives were well described to me						
2. The training prepared me well to collect data accurately for this pilot.						
3. The training materials provided were helpful references throughout the pilot.						
4. When the pilot began, I understood what data I needed to collect for each indicator.						
5. The indicators tracked meaningful data.						

6. For understanding conflict in Nigeria, would you say that gender-sensitive indicators are [required]:

- Very helpful
- Somewhat helpful
- Somewhat unhelpful
- Not helpful at all

7. Which indicators were most relevant to your local context? **Choose up to TWO.** [required]

- Number of incidents of targeted violence and intimidation against voters, electoral officials, and party representatives
- Number of arrests of individuals active in political and electoral processes
- Number of campaign communications which utilize or refer to misogynistic, homophobic or sexist references or propaganda
- Percentage of women present in designated common places
- Rate of sexual and gender-based violence leading up to and after the election

If you selected any indicators in the above question, please explain why [optional]:

8. Were there any indicators you monitored that were not relevant to your local context? **Choose all that apply.** [required]

- Number of incidents of targeted violence and intimidation against voters, electoral officials, and party representatives
- Number of arrests of individuals active in political and electoral processes.
- Number of campaign communications which utilize or refer to misogynistic, homophobic or sexist references or propaganda
- Percentage of women present in designated common places
- Rate of sexual and gender-based violence leading up to and after the election
- All were relevant to my context.

If you selected any indicators in the above question, please explain why [optional]:

9. Of the 5 indicators, which were the easiest to monitor and report on? **Choose up to TWO.** [required]

- Number of incidents of targeted violence and intimidation against voters, electoral officials, and party representatives
- Number of arrests of individuals active in political and electoral processes.
- Number of campaign communications which utilize or refer to misogynistic, homophobic or sexist references or propaganda
- Percentage of women present in designated common places
- Rate of sexual and gender-based violence leading up to and after the election

Why were the indicators you selected in the above question the easiest to monitor and report on [optional]?

10. Of the 5 indicators, which were the most difficult ones to monitor and report on? **Choose up to TWO.** [required]

- Number of incidents of targeted violence and intimidation against voters, electoral officials, and party representatives
- Number of arrests of individuals active in political and electoral processes.
- Number of campaign communications which utilize or refer to misogynistic, homophobic or sexist references or propaganda
- Percentage of women present in designated common places
- Rate of sexual and gender-based violence leading up to and after the election

Why were the indicators you selected in the above question the most difficult to monitor and report on [optional]?

11. Do you have any recommendations for how to improve the following indicators and/ or data collection for them? [optional]

- **Indicator 1:** Number of incidents of targeted violence and intimidation against voters, electoral officials, and party representatives: _____

- **Indicator 2:** Number of arrests of individuals active in political and electoral processes: _____

- **Indicator 3:** Number of campaign communications which utilize or refer to misogynistic, homophobic or sexist references or propaganda: _____

- **Indicator 4:** Percentage of women present in designated common places: _____

- **Indicator 5:** Rate of sexual and gender-based violence leading up to and after the election: _____

- I don't know how I'd improve these indicators or data collection for them.

12. Would you say that data for gender-sensitive indicators are usually: [required]

- Easy to collect
- Challenging to collect
- About an equal mix between easy and challenging to collect

13. Did you face any of the following challenges during data collection? **Check all that apply.** [required]

- Concerns about my safety.
- Lack of consistent access to police reports.
- Challenges understanding what data to collect.
- Too many changes in data collection/indicators during monitoring period.
- I didn't face any of these challenges.
- Other

14. During the monitoring period, did you experience any other challenges not listed in Question 13? Please explain. [optional]

15. Do you have any recommendations for improving overall local monitoring for this pilot? [optional]

16. Of the five indicators, are there any that should be part of KDI’s regular monitoring? **Choose all that apply.** [required]

- Number of incidents of targeted violence and intimidation against voters, electoral officials, and party representatives
- Number of arrests of individuals active in political and electoral processes.
- Number of campaign communications which utilize or refer to misogynistic, homophobic or sexist references or propaganda
- Percentage of women present in designated common places
- Rate of sexual and gender-based violence leading up to and after the election
- None

Why do you feel that the indicators you selected above should be part of KDI’s regular monitoring? [optional]

17. Are there other gender-sensitive indicators that you think should have been piloted? [optional]

18. Do you have any other comments or thoughts you'd like to share? [optional]

Thank you very much!

Endnotes



- 1 Nigeria Election Violence Report, accessed February 11, 2021. Available at <https://www.nevr.org/main>
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 By Domenico-de-ga, translated and adapted by xandar - Self-adapted from de.wikipedia, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=6354185>.



HQ | 2011 Crystal Drive | 10th Floor | Arlington, VA 22202 | USA

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