From Civil War to Civil Society:
Lessons from the IFES Democratic Development Programs in Deeply Divided Societies.

By Joseph J. Foy, Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Notre Dame

Manatt Fellow for Democracy Studies
International Foundation for Election Systems

July-August 2002

International Foundation for Election Systems
1101 15th Street, N.W.
Third Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Acknowledgements

I wish to begin by thanking the entire staff at the International Foundation for Election Systems for giving me the chance to work with them as a Manatt Fellow for the summer of 2002. Their openness, hospitality and resources were greatly appreciated. In particular I would like to thank Dr. Juliana G. Pilon for introducing me to this project, as well as helping to guide and assist me through its development; Art Levine for his assistance in the F. Clifton White Resource Center; Program Coordinator Mary Lou Schramm for her introduction to the workings of IFES; Steve Connolly, Ed Morgan, Philippe Lemarche, Mike McCord, Emily Parkinson, Kellie Bethke, Hilary Dauer and Caroline Vuillemin for sharing their knowledge and experiences; and IFES President Richard W. Soudriette for his encouragement and continuing dedication to the Foundation and its programs.

I would also like to extend a special thanks to Dr. Sue A. Foy and Kristi Sue Nelson for their ideas and insight; Dr. Erik Pratt of Carroll College, David Hancock of OSCE and Nathan Breen for their knowledge and experience with the Balkan region; and James O. Foy for the resources he helped to provide. Thanks also to Dr. Andrew Gould and Dr. A. James McAdams of the University of Notre Dame and Dr. Andrew Reynolds of the University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill for their recommendations and support.

Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to the Honorable Charles T. and Kathleen Manatt, without whom none of this would have been possible. Thank you for all you have done, and continue to do, for the development of free societies in the U.S. and abroad.

Although I had all of these excellent people and resources available to me during this project, human endeavors often incorporate some error. If any mistakes are found within this text, I take full responsibility.

Introduction

Citizen participation in the political system is one of the cornerstones of modern democratic governments. Although participation through voting, lobbying, referenda, interest group formation and a variety of other forms is often taken for granted in the established democracies of the West, within transitioning nations lacking experience with democracy such concepts can be so unfamiliar as to turn people away from involvement with the political system. Thus, in order to help a democracy survive after an initial transition, the individuals who have recently become "democratic citizens" must be made familiar with the rules, institutions, operations and points of access of their newly crafted political system. Such familiarization takes time and significant effort. To cite Giuseppe Di Palma: ". . . just as it takes time to craft an agreement, so it takes time and habituation before the agreement is secure and any danger of failure, stemming from the transition or its antecedents, is removed."[1] Therefore, international organizations interested in promoting the survival of regimes after democratic transition must be prepared to commit themselves to helping individuals of a state become active citizens in the political process.

Within many transitioning nations, however, there is another obstacle complicating the promotion of civic activity in a democratic system. A history of ethnic and religious tension, often resulting in periods of violence, introduces a number of potential problems for the development of civil society and political cooperation among citizens. The wars of secession in the former Yugoslavia, the ethnic genocide in Burundi

[1] Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990), p. 110.

and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the civil conflicts in Indonesia—just to name a few—are all very recent demonstrations of how deep and explosive differences among ethnic and religious groups can be. Each of these is an example of how the difficulties of democratic transition, an uncertain and volatile process itself, are exacerbated by histories of deep ethno-religious divisions and hostility. Each of these is also an example of the difficult tasks facing international organizations attempting to promote democracy with aid and technical assistance in deeply divided societies. If democracy depends on cooperation, agreement on the "rules of the game," and a unified vision of the state, how can these notions become a reality in countries where recent violence and genocide has been branded onto the minds of their people with all-too-real force?

What follows is an examination of one of the methodologies for inculcating democracy in deeply divided societies. With an initial focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the program for civil society promotion introduced by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), a number of observations can be drawn that will help further what is known about democratic promotion in states with deep segmental cleavages among their populations. These observations are then extended to a comparative analysis of other civil society promotion programs that are being conducted by IFES in Indonesia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi in order to show how the lessons learned in Bosnia can be applied to other deeply divided states in transition. Ultimately, this will help to introduce and analyze a type of approach that international organizations can use to help countries that are separated by ethnic hatred realize a unified vision of democratic tolerance and cooperation.

The first chapter is dedicated to operationalizing the theoretical concepts that define ethnically divided societies undergoing democratic transition. More specifically, this section deals with operationalizing amorphous terms such as "civil society" and "deep division" so as to avoid analytical confusion that these words might produce. This is followed by a second section that reviews the methods employed in this study in order to further crystallize the process of analysis and how conclusions were reached.

Chapter three is comprised of an in-depth look at civil society promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which serves as a case study for highlighting the civic education methodology used by IFES from 1996 to 2002. By highlighting this approach, this case study will not only show how organizations might approach civil society promotion in ethnically divided societies, but will also serve as a basis for extracting lessons that can be applied to other areas facing similar circumstances.

Chapter four is an application of the lessons learned from Bosnia-Herzegovina to other countries in which IFES is currently working to promote democracy through civil society in deeply divided contexts. The three cases in this study are Indonesia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. They serve not only as examples of ethnic and religious division, but also as a representative sample of the many other parts of the world that are undergoing democratic transitions from authoritarianism. By filtering the lessons learned in Bosnia-Herzegovina through these cases, formal conclusions about civil society promotion in deeply divided states can be drawn.

I conclude with a discussion about the conclusions reached in the preceding chapters. More specifically, this section highlights the findings of this evaluation of democracy promotion and civil society development programs, and emphasizes the

crucial role that context plays in determining the methods that an international organization might employ in an effort to assist and promote democracy.

Chapter One: Defining Core Concepts

One of the most difficult tasks in evaluating the empirical workings of international organizations from a scholarly perspective is the effort to speak a "uniform language" with which all readers are familiar. This is difficult, in large part, due to the fact that terms like "civil society" and "deep division" carry with them a number of different meanings in academic studies and organizational practices.[2] Thus, in order to avoid any analytical confusion, I feel it necessary to define some of the core concepts as they will be used throughout this study. It is important to note that I am not attempting to redefine or add to the debates that are often centered on these concepts. Instead, what I have attempted to do is synthesize the most commonly understood ways of conceptualizing these terms in scholarly circles and international organizations into clear definitions that can be used in the evaluation of democratic promotion programs.

Conceptualizing Civil Society. According to Janine Wedel, "A 'civil society' exists when individuals and groups are free to form organizations that function independently of the state, and that can mediate between citizens and the state."[3] Chris Hann equates Wedel's and others' definitions of civil society to the "voluntary or non-governmental sector" that "[mediates] between the family and the state."[4] Thomas Carothers places such notions within the context of democratic transition by describing civil society as the "connective

[2] See Gabriel A. Almond, "Separate Tables," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (November 1998).
[3] Janine Wedel, "US Aid to Central and Eastern Europe, 1990-1994: An Analysis of Aid Models and Responses," as quoted in *Civil Society: Challenging Western Models* by C. Hann and E. Dunn eds. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 1.
[4] Chris Hann, "Civil Society," in *Civil Society: Challenging Western Models*, C. Hann and E. Dunn eds. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. i.

tissue" nations in transition need in order to "join the forms of democracy with their intended substance."[5] Taken together these perspectives help to define civil society as that public space between the private and governmental, in which groups of people voluntarily band together to pursue a variety of social and political interests.[6]

The strong commitment to the development of civil society in nations transitioning to democracy by organizations like IFES became popular beginning in the early 1990s and it continues to be so in the new millennium. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, lists "helping develop politically active civil societies" as one of its four primary goals for "developing and consolidating democracy and governance."[7] According to Ottaway and Carothers, the U.S. government alone "devotes more than $500 million annually to such activities, with a number of U.S. agencies . . . and U.S.-funded nongovernmental organizations . . . responsible for developing and implementing suitable programs."[8] Likewise, USAID reported that "by the end of the 1990s, Agency spending on civic education had reached roughly $30

---

[5] Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 248.

[6] Not only does this definition satisfy a basic consensus in academic literature, but is also consistent with the definitions used by international donor agencies when they describe civil society promotion. See USAID, "Agency Objectives: Civil Society," Found online at http://www.usaid.gov/democracy/ civ.html, last updated November 16, 2001. It is important to note here, as well, that I have chosen to focus on the "political side" of civil society. There are those voluntary groups and organizations, examined most notably by Robert Putnam, like bowling leagues and choral groups that citizens might belong to that could have an impact on society through the rise or decline of social capital. However, as Ottaway and Carothers point out, this view of civil society has little appeal for donors, because they need to answer to Congress and to the American-taxpayer through the press that it receives, and "they could hardly get in the business of setting up bowling leagues in the name of democracy. Thus, for the purposes of examining civil society promotion from the perspective of international organizations seeking to foster democratic consolidation in transitioning states, civil society shall be limited to those groups directly involved in, or pursuing, political activities. See Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, "Toward Civil Realism," in *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democratic Promotion*, M. Ottaway and T. Carothers, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p. 10.

[7] USAID, "Program Highlights," *USAID Homepage*, found online at http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/ cbj2003/highlights.html, last updated 2003.

[8] Ottaway and Carothers (2000); p. 5.

million a year, with the total for the decade approaching $232 million."[9] This commitment on the part of the United States government, and the governments of many other countries who seek to promote democracy around the globe, is predicated on the belief that the encouragement and development of a strong civil society is one of the best ways to maintain stability and democratic consolidation in transitioning nations. Although the assumption that civil society promotion and democratic viability go hand-in-hand is sometimes critiqued or debated, the devotion of a great amount of resources to the development of civil society remains an empirical reality.

The link between civil society and democratic consolidation is not, however, without its merits. In his 1999 work, *On Democracy*, Robert Dahl argues that one of the primary difficulties that twenty-first century democracies will face is the inadequate level of citizen competence to make such a system active and viable. For Dahl, an active citizenry—able to effectively work within a system of self-rule—is a necessary component of democratic sustainability. According to Larry Diamond, one mechanism for establishing and maintaining competent citizen activity is a vibrant civil society.[10] Such arguments, popular in modern scholarship, are often based on a Tocquevillian logic that the propensity for Americans to form associations of all types and purposes creates the foundational strength for their democratic government.[11] Robert Putnam has made one of the most vigorous arguments linking democracy with an active civil society. In concluding his study of civic culture in northern-Italy, Putnam argues that democracy

[9] USAID, "Approaches to Civic Education: Lessons Learned," Technical Publication Series, June 2002, Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID, Washington, D.C., p. 1.
[10] Larry Diamond, "Winning the Cold War on Terrorism: The Democratic Governance Imperative," Institute for Global Democracy, Policy Paper No. 1, March 2002.
[11] Richard Heffner, (ed.), *Democracy in America* by Alexis de Tocqueville (New York: Mentor Books, 1984).

relies on egalitarian, social activity.[12] For Putnam, democracy may not be defined by associational activity, but such activity is what makes democracy work.

Fostering civil society in transitioning nations is an increasingly important activity of the international donor community, and not without merit. In addition, the support and development of civil society by donor groups is a practical and feasible task, unlike so many others during periods of transition. According to Ottaway and Carothers, "reform of government institutions [is] a large-scale undertaking that [does] not dovetail well with the limited funds available."[13] The authors conclude that fostering civil society is a way for international organizations to bring about the most change for the least amount of resources.

It is for all of these reasons that civil society promotion is an appealing target for the international donor community. Not only does it have theoretical support, but it is a practical means for bringing about desired results. This does not mean that civil society promotion is an easy task, however, and it should not be taken lightly. The education and stimulation of civil organizations is a process that will encounter a number of difficulties, which are magnified within the context of a deeply divided society. It is on this notion that I now focus attention.

Contextualizing Deeply Divided Societies. As with notions of civil society, it is important to conceptualize what is meant by a deeply divided society, so that the selection of cases themselves might be understood. For starters, a deeply divided society is a *plural society* —one in which a number of ethnic, religious, cultural, racial, linguistic and political

[12] Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).
[13] Ottaway and Carothers (2000); p. 8.

groups co-exist with one another. What separates a typical plural society from a deeply divided one, however, is that the segmental cleavages formed by these differences are highly salient, and associational patterns within a deeply divided society tend to mutually reinforce these descriptive differences.[14] For example, a person's ethnicity would determine what church they attended, what party they joined, what social clubs they were members of, and so on, to the point that there would be little to no cooperative activities across lines of identity. According to Arend Lijphart, political interests within societies that have these characteristics tend to manifest themselves along the divisional segments within the population. Society itself, therefore, is organized as a product of difference, as it is formed along these rigid lines of separate group identities.[15]

What seems to be missing from deeply divided states that are in the process of transitioning from authoritarian rule to democratic governance is "a symbol, acceptable for the whole population and really able to play the function as a basis for the development of the national identity."[16] For scholars like Michael Ignatieff the "symbol" to strive for among these different groups is what he labels as *civic-nationalism*, which is a form of nationalism based on a patriotic attachment to the political foundations of a

[14] Both Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz have done extensive writing on the nature and composition of deeply-divided societies. Lijphart, however, uses the term "plural" to describe the social phenomenon that Horowitz describes as "deeply divided." I have decided to use the Horowitzian labeling to distinguish those heterogeneous societies that have a high degree of cooperation and mixing among the different groups from those with long-standing histories of division, hostility, tension, hatred, and even conflict among these different social groupings. For more on this, see Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Lijphart, *Power Sharing in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, 1985); and Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
[15] Lijphart (1977); Lijphart (1985).
[16] S. Budhisantoso, "National Identity and Development in the Plural Society of Indonesia," in *Interface of Cultural Identity Development*, B. Saraswati (ed.) (New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, 1996), found on-line at http://ignca.nic.in/ls_03015.htm.

state.[17] Within the United States of America, for example, civic-nationalism might take the form of unifying different racial, religious and ethnic groups under the umbrella of being an American. Civic attachment to common symbols like the Bill of Rights can be used as a point of reference with which most (if not all) Americans can identify. Thus, regardless of racial or ethnic heritage (African, Latino, Irish, Asian, etc.), language (English, Spanish, etc.), religion (Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Jew, etc.), there are "national symbols," like the Bill of Rights, that each citizen can envision to identify themselves with "Americaness."[18]

Ignatieff's conception of civic nationalism is consistent with the increasingly popular notions of Benedict Anderson, who offers a definition of a nation as "an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[19] According to Anderson, a nation is considered to be *imagined* because people who identify themselves with that nation are doing so without knowing, or ever even hearing of, a vast majority of those individuals who make up the nation. There is an imagined bond between each of these individuals, which establishes a commonality among them all—symbols of shared meaning that create brethren out of people who might never know one another. This deep sense of camaraderie is what lends itself to the notion of a "community." Anderson goes on to note that this national community is also

---

[17] Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (New York: Henry Holt, 1997).

[18] Some scholars who have studied the dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism argue that the two must work in a symbiotic interplay in order to be successful. That is, there must be shared elements of these two factors in order to adequately gain support for the state. See, for example, Margareta Mary Nikolas, "False Opposites in Nationalism: An Examination of the Dichotomy of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Modern Europe," Masters Thesis for Monash University's Centre for European Studies, reproduced on line be *The Nationalism Project*, http://www.nationalismproject.org/articles.html, March 11, 1999. Although I do not take a position on the validity of these claims, I feel it is important to point out that, for the purposes of analytical clarity, these two ideas remain distinctly separated throughout my exploration of democratic promotion programs in ethnically-divided societies.

[19] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (New York, London: Verso, 1991), p. 5.

"limited" in that its boundaries, even if they be elastic and ever changing, are fixed in some way so as to separate one group from all others. Not everyone can be an "Irish-American" or else such a distinction loses its meaning as a descriptive qualifier. Finally, Anderson concludes his definition of a nation by describing it as "sovereign" in that it is free to determine its own political and cultural future apart from external imposition—a nation defines itself.

On the face of it, nationalism can be seen a unifying force that individuals use to identify themselves with a larger group or community. This is not a necessarily harmful notion. The problem with the "communities" that are manifested in many forms of nationalism is that they keep themselves distinct from others, and often define themselves in opposition to, others. Joseph Campbell addresses this issue in his work *The Power of Myth*. Campbell writes:

> Now brotherhood in most of the myths I know is confined to a bounded community. In bounded communities, aggression is projected outward. For example, the ten commandments say, 'Thou shalt not kill.' Then the next chapter says, 'Go into Canaan and kill everybody in it.' That is a bounded field. The myths of participation and love pertain only to the in-group, and the out-group is totally other. This is the sense of the world 'gentile" – the person is not of the same order.[20]

Campbell's description of myth in relation to the bounded community is similar to other writings on the issue of nationalism, as it relates the idea that a limited group, united by common symbols, sees itself as separated from others by those group symbols. Identity, then, is identity as it segments one community from others; it is a negative relationship to the rest of the world. The result, as Campbell notes, is that aggression is projected outward, and the essence of nationalist conflict is revealed.

From this perspective we see that nationalism can be both a unifying and fractionalizing force among citizens within a given state; it can either provide a common,

[20] Joseph Campbell, *The Power of Myth* (New York: Anchor Books, Random House, 1991), p. 28.

or at least an "in between," vision for the diverse people of a state to work towards, or it can divide loyalties to the point of tearing a state apart from the inside. Thus, within deeply divided societies, the descriptive divisions—reinforced by voluntary associations along those divisional lines—become determinants of survivability depending on how individuals come to see their roles as citizens within the democratic state.

A Note on Democracy. Although many of the scholarly examinations of democratic transition and civil society lend themselves to an exploration of what is meant by "democracy," it is important to note that the focus of this study is empirical and not normative. I am not attempting to say what type of democracy "should" be implemented, but how a program works within the context of the democratic type that already "is" there. That is why I do not feel it is necessary to place qualifiers on the concept of "democracy," or enter into the debate about sub-types and institutional forms. To do so would only detract from the main purpose of this study. As David Collier and Steven Levitsky point out, there are various types and forms of democracy as they are envisioned by academics and policy-makers around the world. These authors note that there are almost innumerable kinds of democracies around the world, ranging from economic, liberal, delegative, republican, and so on *ad nauseam*.[21] However, instead of arguing for a specific type of system or form, the focus of the following cases will remain on the programs themselves and how they work within these fledgling democracies. Thus, the issue is how well the activities of the international donor community help citizens work within the government they have, whatever type or form that government might take.

[21] See David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," *World Politics*, 49 (1997), pp. 430-451.

Chapter Two: Methods

Given the logical connections between democracy and a vibrant civil society, it becomes necessary to examine how international assistance is attempting to avoid the formation of groups that are actively (and even violently) hostile to one another. In short, how do international organizations seek to develop a cooperative civil society and unified vision of democracy in areas that have faced recent histories of deep ethnic-conflict and genocide?

The answer to this question is not an easy or obvious one, nor is it singular. There are many different programs that are developed by a variety of international organizations dedicated to supporting democracy through civil society promotion. What follows is an examination of one organization's attempts to strengthen of civil society and promote democracy in deeply divided states. In the end, this exploration can help understand what approaches an organization can use to produce positive results, what lessons can be learned from these approaches, and most important, how these lessons can be applied to other programs in other countries.

Selection of Cases and Program Method. The methodology employed here is an examination of the IFES civic education program as it was implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and an application of the lessons learned from this program to IFES projects in other deeply divided societies. BiH was selected as the primary case because it represents a well-documented case of ethnic and religious division that has received much attention by the media, policy-makers, academics and international organizations

interested in democratic transition in divided societies. The case of BiH shares many of the contextual elements of other deeply divided countries that are undergoing a transition to democracy, including outbreaks of ethnic and religious violence during their transitions from authoritarian rule to a democratic state; deep ethnic, racial or religious segmentation within the population; a lack of a history of cooperation or a unified vision of the state among groups; and a sense of elections as a zero-sum game between different groups vying for power. The similarities between BiH and other countries in transition mean that relevant lessons might be more readily applied to other parts of the world.

An additional factor motivating the selection of BiH is the fact that there has been relative progress in inculcating democratic principles and fostering of a civic culture. This is important because it enables specific results to be traced to their proper programs. Richard Katz, for example, points out the fact that political institutions and programs cannot bridge a gap between peace and conflict in a society that is not ready.[22] Therefore, selecting a case where programs failed might skew the lessons that can be extracted, as the faults might have less to do with specific programs and more to do with the lack of readiness on the part of the society to embrace peace and cooperation. On the other hand, even when a society is ready to begin the healing process, the right kinds of approaches —approaches sensitive to the historical and cultural circumstances—still have to be implemented in order to achieve success. The methods employed by a given organization will have a better chance of success if they are the right tool for the job. Thus, BiH offers a proper laboratory for analyzing how international organizations might assist civil

[22] Richard Katz, Presentation of ideas at "Democracy Exchange: Ethnic Conflict and the Electoral Process" seminar, USAID Development Information Services, Washington, D.C, July 9, 2002.

society in countries transitioning from periods of deep ethno-religious tension and conflict.

The countries selected to establish a comparative application of the lessons learned in BiH are Indonesia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. These countries were chosen because they fit the criteria of being deeply divided societies in transition to democracy. They share a context of violence during their transition from authoritarianism, segmentation within their populations, a sense of mistrust among primary ethnic groups that lack a history of cooperation, and a perceived winner-take-all vision of competition for power. Likewise, these cases also help to establish a more global representation of civil society promotion in divided societies. Taken together, these cases demonstrate civil society promotion in Europe, Asia and Africa, and as such help test the ability of these lessons to travel across borders as well as examine their applicability to other transitioning states.

It is important to make it clear that each of these cases contains differences that dilute the conclusions that can be extracted about democratic promotion because of the important role that context plays in assisting or hindering democratization efforts. Not only do these countries differ in history and demographic composition, they also represent different stages in the transition process. Thus, such a comparative analysis is limited in how well it can help further an understanding the role of international organizations in promoting democracy through civil society in deeply divided states. However, the variation that comes out of using these countries helps to avoid problems of "conceptual stretching" by generalizing too quickly from the Bosnian case specifically to

deeply divided nations in general.[23] Therefore, despite its limitations, this approach does serve to produce meaningful conclusions that transcend one or two countries or contexts.

The purpose of this study is to draw concrete analysis of international donor programs that will allow for generalizations to be made that might be transferable to the process of civil society promotion. In order to appropriately examine the nature and form of the programs implemented, I have chosen to focus on one institution that has been deeply involved in BiH and the other cases, the International Foundation for Election Systems. IFES specifically has been selected for the following reasons. First, IFES is a non-partisan, non-profit and private organization with an established history of civil society promotion and has had a good deal of success in attempting civil society promotion in the countries selected for this paper. Second, it was possible to trace longitudinal changes and results within BiH over a period of time. Third, thanks to a Manatt Fellowship, I have been given a great deal of freedom and access to the people involved with different programs and countries at IFES, as well as all of the information compiled before, during and after the implementation of the IFES programs. In addition, IFES uses an approach to civil society promotion that is unique among other international organizations that practice democratic assistance around the world.[24] The IFES approach is fundamentally based upon establishing dialogue between civil society and the government and direct engagement with the people rather than just with social elites.[25]

---

[23] For further explanation on this approach, its benefits and drawbacks, a good resource is Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (1970), pp. 1033-1053.

[24] For a further understanding of the IFES methodology, and an evaluation of the success that it has had in promoting civil society around the world, see Juliana Geran Pilon, "The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Political Reform: Lessons Learned and Best Practices," working paper, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., 2002.

[25] Juliana Geran Pilon, Interview with Author, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., August 5, 2002.

This explains my reasons for looking into the IFES methodology, and for evaluating its effectiveness in deeply divided societies. Narrowing the focus of this project to IFES and its programs helps to more accurately demonstrate valuable lessons that develop out of international civil society promotion and highlights elements of a program that has been used across different cultures.

For this study I have conducted extensive reading on civil society, nationalism and ethnic conflict, and democracy promotion by international organizations. In addition, I have used the election information and project reports assembled by IFES in the F. Clifton White Resource Center in Washington, D.C. Finally, I have conducted interviews with IFES team members and project coordinators dealing with issues relevant to civil society promotion and their civic education programs.

Limitations of the Study. One of the primary drawbacks of this approach, or for any approach attempting to examine the promotion of civil society in transitioning countries, is the limitation of being able to quantify a threshold for a "vibrant civil society." What amount of activity is enough? How long must it be sustained? How many groups, or individuals, must be active? All of these questions are difficult to answer, and therefore guidelines for evaluating civil society development are more fluid than one might hope. In the words of O'Donnell and Schmitter:

> [The] transition is over when 'abnormality' is no longer the central feature of political life, that is, when actors have settled on and obey a set of more or less explicit rules defining the channels they can legitimately employ in their conflicts with each other, the procedures they should apply in taking decisions, and the criteria they may use to exclude others from the game. Normality, in other words, becomes a major characteristic of political life when those active in politics come to

> expect each other to play according to the rules – and the ensemble of these rules is what we mean by a regime.[26]

This problem is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that some empirical qualifiers do exist. Is there a low, moderate or high-level of activity in the civil society? Has that activity increased over time? How many groups are involved? How many people are reached? These and other similar questions act as evaluative mechanisms used by IFES to judge the relative success of their democratic promotion programs. Answers to these queries can ultimately guide a study of civil society so that some general lessons and principles can be drawn, even though it is impossible to quantify results too rigidly.

An additional drawback to this approach is that IFES's role in BiH was limited in its scope by its contract with USAID, which was also sponsoring a number of other international organizations seeking to promote democracy in BiH. NGOs like the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and Center for Civic Education (CCE) were conducting other programs in different parts of BiH and were focusing on different issues that are relevant to the promotion of democratic institutions. Thus, although the successes of IFES are directly related to its programmatic approach to civil society, the success of BiH as a whole can be attributed to the variety of programs and methods. Likewise, because IFES programs were dependent on funding from USAID as a donor agency, ending those funds threatens the continuity, and as such the efficacy, of these programs. Therefore, IFES's approach has to be evaluated in this context when drawing conclusions about its impact on BiH. The same is true for the other cases.

[26] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 65.

Chapter Three: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Beginning in July 1996, and lasting until October 2001, IFES worked on a series of contracts with USAID to develop a civic education project designed to encourage and promote civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unlike some civic education programs that focus on educational institutions and curricula, the IFES methodology was more directly focused on "advocacy programs"[27] that promoted civic activity by individuals and community groups. Throughout the five year period, the IFES program was adapted from an initial "Voter Education Program" to a more inclusive "Civic Education Project."[28]

These methods were similar to civic education programs implemented in other parts of the world in that they were designed to help foster cooperation among NGOs and individuals within BiH, promote their programs and goals, encourage activity in the political realm, and familiarize individuals with the workings of the new democratic regime. However, the BiH program had to deal with many different issues not faced in other transitional societies. In particular, the IFES programs had to deal with the religious and ethnic hostilities and violence that have long been part of Balkan history.

---

[27] This is the term that IFES Program Coordinator Mary Lou Schramm used to distinguish the IFES approach to civic education in Bosnia from other methodologies of other organizations. Mary Lou Schramm, program overview discussion, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., July 1, 2002.

[28] Although the methodologies employed in these types of projects were very similar – divided into three election phases, development of similar tools and resources, same types of meeting and training formats, etc. – there were different goals for the systems that make them distinct. For instance, the voter education program was targeted at mobilizing people to vote, and simultaneously showing them how. The civic education program, more primarily directed at civil society promotion, was less about elections and more about encouraging groups to be active in directing the workings and governance of their democratic systems. Ed Morgan, et al., *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Voter Education Program for 1996* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1996), p. 4. IFES, *IFES BiH – Civic Education Project: Final Report, 2000-2001* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 2001), p. 2.

History. One can trace the history of pluralism and violence in BiH back to the 1200s when Bosnians fought a two-front war for independence from the Kingdom of Hungary, battling both their Hungarian rulers and Serbian neighbors. Such violence was to become an all-too-familiar theme in BiH. In the late 14th century, Bosnia once again fought, this time to retain its independence from the Ottoman Turks who were sweeping through the Balkans on a mission of conquest. Minor struggles erupted until 1463 when Bosnia finally succumbed to the more powerful Ottoman Empire.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century, Bosnia was left to be administered by Austria. During this time, Bosnia was threatened by the upsurge of nationalism arising out of Serbia. Although the nationalism promoted by Serbia did not take a violent cast at first, soon all of Europe would be drawn into World War I because of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo. The Bosnian people were divided during WWI, some choosing to fight with the Austro-Hungarian army and some with the Serbian forces. With the end of the war in 1918, Serbian nationalism won out, and control of the Slavs within the Balkan region was theirs.

The 1920s to 1940s were extremely turbulent times for the entire Balkan region. Violence between Serbian and Croatian nationalist groups would flare up, and the result was a strong military crackdown throughout the region by Serbian forces. This was the situation throughout the South-Slav state until the Nazi invasion in 1941 in which Hitler and Mussolini divvied up the Balkans, leaving Bosnia under the control of the fascist Ustasha regime of Croatia. Meanwhile, Serbian nationalists (the Chetniks) began fighting for an "ethnically pure" Serbia, which included demands on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Genocide and ethnic cleansing followed, and—caught between the Croatian Ustasha in the west and the Serbian Chetniks in the East—Bosnia became the primary killing-field. Such attacks gave rise to a multi-ethnic communist army. Known as "Partisans," the communists fought bitterly to oppose the Chetniks and Axis forces throughout the Balkans. The reprisal attacks by Nazi forces were devastating to villages in the region, but with the help of Allied support, the Partisans were able to beat back the Axis and Chetnik forces, and a unified Yugoslavia was formed.

In 1945, Josip Broz Tito, leader of the Partisans, became the head of the new communist federation in Yugoslavia. His dictatorship lasted more than three decades, and during this time the religious and ethnic identities of people throughout Yugoslavia were suppressed. Tito sought to create a "new Yugoslav man," and religious and ethnic ties were seen as interfering with the communist ideology.[29] Throughout this period, tensions between rival ethno-religious groups were pushed underground, but the memories of the past were not easily forgotten. Tito, a Croat, was seen as an enemy to Serbian nationalism, and the hostilities of the Serbs towards other groups festered beneath the surface of everyday activity. These hostilities became obvious with the death of Marshal Tito in 1980. Shortly after, the communist ideology began to unravel, which began the

[29] There are some that argue that Tito himself instrumentally used nationalism to further his own political ends. This is true to a certain degree. For instance, Dan Morgan wrote a piece in the *Washington Post* that details how Tito loosened centralized police control, and even helped support Albanian ethnic movements in Kosovo in order to achieve personal or political ends. Likewise, as Leo Tindemas and his colleagues noted in *Unfinished Business: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans*, Tito's leadership can be described as often employing a strategy of "divide and rule," where nationalism was used as a basis for justifying policies of the state, and authoritarian measures were used to enforce them. However, as Morgan also notes, when nationalist rhetoric began to interfere with Tito's ability to rule in communist Yugoslavia, he "eventually cracked down." Therefore, one can conclude that Tito's use of nationalism was instrumental in that he fueled ethnic sentiments from time to time in order to further his own political ends, but suppressed these sentiments when they began to interfere with his own authoritarian policies. See Dan Morgan, "One Nation Under Tito," *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1999, p. A37.; Leo Tindemas, et al., *Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), pp. 23-24.

dissolution of Yugoslavia. A resurgence of nationalism began to fill the ideological void when communism failed, partly due to the shift of federal power to the republics that occurred with the 1974 Constitution, leading to the wars for secession within the Balkans in the early 1990s.

The resulting period of genocide and destruction from 1991 (beginning in 1992 in BiH) and ending in 1995 are now well known throughout the world. This period of time, however, was but one more in a long history of violence that plagued BiH and the surrounding region. Fortunately, the history of BiH was not created entirely through the shedding of blood nor through the absence of pluralism. Though nationalism and violence played a major role throughout Bosnian history, there were also the roots of pluralism and cooperation. Although often overshadowed by the brutality that the world was exposed to beginning in 1992, long periods of cooperation have existed in BiH between a variety of ethnic and religious groups dating back to the settlement of the area by the Slavs in the 7th century A.D. When Bosnia had established its independence from Hungary at the start of the 13th century, it allowed religious pluralism to take shape—something largely unheard of throughout the world—as Orthodoxy, Roman-Catholicism and even a localized form of Bosnian Christianity were allowed in the country. Likewise, the Ottoman influence brought with it the religious practices of Islam, which (although a contemporary source of much conflict) was embraced by many throughout Bosnia.

Along with religious pluralism, to the degree that the two can be separated, there was also a greater degree of ethnic cooperation and tolerance than is often attributed to BiH. Robert Donia and John Fine detail the historical cooperation that existed within Bosnia, pointing out that there were traditionally high degrees of inter-ethnic marriages

and cooperation.[30] This lead them to characterize the war as "betraying the history" of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Others would agree with this characterization; parts of Bosnia—especially Sarajevo—were seen by many as an outstanding example of multiethnic cooperation.[31] Thus, as with religious institutions, one must not be too quick to generalize about the "long history of tension" between ethnic groups within Bosnia. To do so would not capture the element of cooperation that has also existed. On the other hand, the tolerance that has existed from time to time in the history of BiH should not be made out to be so powerful as to be taken for granted. The fact that Bosnia erupted into full-scale genocide shows the power of nationalism to manipulate identity, but one cannot make up tensions out of thin air. Cooperation and conflict have for centuries walked a thin line in Bosnia.

Demographics. The ethnic and religious compositions of Bosnia and Herzegovina create a complex contextual environment for fostering democratic consolidation. Of the nearly 4,000,000 citizens of BiH, approximately 44% are Bosniak, 31% Serb, 17% Croat, 5.5% Yugoslav, and 2.5% other. The population is almost equally divided by gender at all age groups [see figure 1].[32] Likewise, the religious composition is divided among 40% Muslim, 31% Orthodox, 15% Roman-Catholic, 4% Protestant, and 10% other groups [see figure 2].[33] It is important to note, as an indication of the "deep division" of the population, that religious and ethnic associations are often divided among the same line.

---

[30] Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
[31] Paul Csagoly, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Politics of the Environment," *The Bulletin*, Vol. 7, No. 3. (Autumn-Winter, 1997), pp. 13-14.
[32] CIA, *CIA World Factbook, 2001*. Found online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
[33] Ibid.

For example, Bosniaks are identified with their Muslim affiliation, Serbs as Eastern Orthodox, and Croats as Roman Catholic. Such ethno-religious diversity creates a number of social cleavages among the populace, making BiH what is commonly referred to as a *plural society*. To merely refer to BiH as "plural," however, is to overlook the recent (and the long-standing) ethnic and religious tensions that exploded into violence throughout the Balkan region. These highly salient religious and ethnic differences, and the conflict that resulted from them in 1992, have earned BiH the label of a deeply divided society.

Figure 1.



Figure 2.



Obstacles to Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the death of Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the instrumental revival of ethnic nationalism and segmental hatred arose to fill the vacuum created by the destruction of the long-standing authoritarian rule of a communist Yugoslav state. The ethnic identities that existed within Yugoslavia were repressed under the authoritarian rule but not erased. In this way, identities were held below the surface of public space like a pressure cooker, erupting (sometimes violently) with the first cracks in the machine. This is part of the initial problem within deeply divided societies undergoing transitions to democracy. The identities that have been pushed underground become suddenly active, and—now that they are forced to compete in popular

elections—political elites can mobilize support along these lines of identity through demagogic appeals to nationalist sentiments.[34]

An intrinsic part of the process of developing civil society is the renewal or development of collective identities. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter:

> Although we cannot provide hard data to prove it, our personal experience in having lived through several of these moments indicates that the catalyst in this transformation comes first from gestures by exemplary individuals, who begin testing the boundaries of behavior initially imposed by the incumbent regime. This leads to mutual discoveries and common ideals, which acquire enormous political significance just because they are articulated publicly after such a long period of prohibition, privation, and privatization. In the precarious public spaces of the first stages of transition, these individual gestures are astonishingly successful in provoking or reviving collective identifications and actions; they, in turn, help forge broad identifications which embody the explosion of a highly repoliticized and angry society.[35]

The "mutual discoveries and common ideals" noted by O'Donnell and Schmitter, however, do not necessarily imply that they are (assuming they were ever intended to be) mutual and common to all. As a matter of fact, differences among individual groups become all the more apparent when a society becomes actively involved in shaping the directions of political institutions. One might even call to mind the argument between the two socialists at the end of Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle* in which both are proclaiming the hopeful visions of socialist America, but are in such deep disagreement about how, why and to what end that they must be asked by one listener if they agree on anything. Thus, while mutual discoveries and common ideals might be found among groups, it should be emphasized that differences also become more obvious and salient in these "repoliticized and angry" societies. The degree to which there is potential for violence, however, varies according to context.

[34] Laura Silber and Adam Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997).
[35] Ibid.; p. 49.

The context of a deeply divided society does not create the most easily imagined situation for a peaceful and stable transition. In reality, one might look to the former Yugoslavia to see to what such a transition within this context leads. The suppression of ethnic identities by the communist government of Marshal Tito, and the destruction of a nongovernmental public sphere, forced ethnic-hatreds and differences underground only to violently resurface with the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation. When the three-year war between Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia ended in 1995, approximately 250,000 people had been killed and more than 3,000,000 had become refugees.[36] Such conflict, not so different from numerous others all over the world, shows the darkest side of human nature and the sickening horror of what might result within transitioning nations with a deeply divided populace. The recent wartime history of Bosnia demonstrates a number of lessons about transitions within deeply divided societies.

First, the wars for secession in the former Yugoslavia illustrate the turbulent uncertainty that often faces a population during such periods. When a deeply divided society is in the throes of any sort of transition, the instability and uncertain future that results sows the seeds of violence and conflict. Within Yugoslavia, the uncertainty was, according to Andras Riedlmayer, largely started with the economic uncertainties surrounding Croat and Slovene moves to liberalize the economy of the Federation. This enabled nationalist leaders like Slobodan Milosevic to play on the fears and uncertainties

[36] Although it is easy to lose sight of the systematic horror of the Yugoslavian wars of secession due to the vast numbers, one must be certain that the people caught in this crisis do not become mere statistics. Serbian ex-military leader Radovan Karadzic, for example, was alleged to have sanctioned such things as rape, torture, the massacre of civilians, and the establishment of concentration camps. For more see PBS Online and WGBH/Frontline, "The World's Most Wanted Man," found online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/, last updated 1998. Likewise, Robert Kaplan describes in heart-wrenching detail the stories of mothers having to watch their babies thrown into the air and caught on the blades of knives by soldiers, and men being tied to logs and tortured by having their pants pulled down and their backsides split open with axe-blades during the conflict. See Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

of the Serbian population in the face of a failing economy and empowered those like him to drive an angry wedge between them and other ethnic groups.[37]

In addition to the problems of uncertainty, the former Yugoslavia exemplifies how deeply divided societies are at risk for the dredging up of historical tensions and violence in the name of furthering political visions. Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. Ambassador to a unified Yugoslavia, described how Slobodan Milosevic manipulated Serbian ethnic sentiments by forcing a Serbo-centric view of Balkan history. According to Zimmerman, such accounts tended to blame the contemporary problems facing Serbs on the historical oppression thrust upon them by other ethnic groups.[38] Naturally, this also leads to the enemy-creation of one group against another, as all the problems facing one group can be laid at the doorstep of another.

The third lesson taught by the Bosnian example, implicit within the explanations of the first two lessons, is that deep seated divisions among the citizens of a state provide an appealing tool for political elites to further personal agendas. Such instrumental use of nationalism by elites has captured much attention, largely due to the Bosnian experience.[39] Through instrumentalism, it is easy to see how the ability of elites to use

---

[37] Andras Riedlmayer, "A Brief History of Bosnia-Herzegovina," as compiled for the *Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering Project*, found online at http://www.kakarigi.net/manu/briefhis.htm., summer 1993.
[38] Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers* (New York: Random House, 1999).
[39] Viera Baĉová gives an excellent account of instrumentalism, as opposed to primordialism, in regard to nationalism. According to Baĉová, "The individual's attachments to particular communities that are of instrumental character are of the opposite pole of primordial attachments. These are individuals' affiliations to the communities which are beneficial to them or bring them practical advantages (mostly economic and political). They are based on rational awareness, not closeness, but the need for protection of common interests. The individual understands the community as an instrument for achieving his goal." See Viera Baĉová, "The Construction of National Identity: On Primordialism and Instrumentalism." *Human Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 1. (January, 1998), p. 32. It is important to note here, however, that I do not discount primordial explanations of the foundations of nationalism. I am simply drawing forth one of the primary lessons of how nationalism is used in context. Whether or not nationalism is fixed or created (primordial or instrumental), the fact that it is used by elites for personal gains makes it, at least in part, instrumental. For

nationalism as a rallying cry for support can create a zero-sum game between rival factions within a society. Likewise, this enemy creation often must take on greater and greater rhetoric until an "us-versus-them" mentality has nowhere else to go but into violent conflict. Such sympathies were played on all sides from Milosevic and Karadzic on the Serbian side to Tudjman on the Croatian.[40]

But why is nationalism so appealing to individuals? What makes it the obvious ideology to exploit, and why is its pull so powerful? Although there are a number of explanations, one of the best accounts is offered by Juliana Geran Pilon (1992) who compares the ideologies of Marxism and nationalism. Pilon writes:

> While it is explicitly anti-nationalistic, Marxism paradoxically served some of the same functions as nationalism: it provided a sense of group identity beyond the individual; a messianic sense of history; and a moral framework designed to justify aggressive acts against others, who were perceived as exploitative, in a power-struggle for social, political, and cultural control . . . In short, people need a way to identify themselves – a common fate to transcend loneliness amid the insecurities of the free market and before the finality of death.[41]

A similar account is offered by Anderson (1991), who also writes about the appeal of nationalism as it is wrapped up in the quest for permanence in an ever changing world, and the ability to live beyond one's self. For Anderson, much like Pilon, nationalism is a way for the individual to live on as long as the community lives, even after one's own death.

For the former Yugoslavia, the Marxist history of the Tito years made nationalism appealing for another important reason. Returning to Pilon:

---

more on the discussion of primordial attachments to nationalism, see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[40] For further insight into the specific instrumentalist practices and tactics employed, see Christopher Bennett, "How Yugoslavia's Destroyers Harnessed the Media," found online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/bosnia/media.html, last updated 1995.

[41] Juliana G. Pilon, *The Bloody Flag: Post-Communist Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Spotlight on Romania* (New Brunswick, London: Social Philosophy and Policy Center and by Transaction Publishers, 1992), p. 31.

> Four decades after its forced imposition in East-Central Europe, Marxism has left deep, possibly even inescapable scars. Continues Simecka: "People are used to thinking in ideological terms. Nationalism, like communism, gives people a sense of being for or against." In brief, nationalism is the new euphemism – the mantle that covers a multitude of both sins and virtues – with the resulting confusion that is the necessary correlate of all ambiguity.[42]

Thus, the Marxist history that dominated the Yugoslav republics under the united Federation led to the inculcation of a worldview that made it easy for the seeds of nationalism to take root. After the collapse of communism, nationalism arose to fill the political vacuum in the Balkans, much as it did throughout Eastern and Central-Europe.

IFES Civic Education Program and Civil Society Promotion. The emerging democratic government in Bosnia was established constitutionally through the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. The Dayton agreement established a multi-ethnic, power-sharing arrangement within Bosnia, with a national government democratically elected through a system of preferential voting (PV) and proportional representation (PR). The power-sharing agreement distributed political seats evenly among the three primary ethnic groups, giving equal representation in the executive and legislative positions.[43] Along with the establishment of a national government, Dayton also made arrangements for two separate administrative divisions to handle internal affairs: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS). The Federation of BiH and RS are products of the conciliatory nature of Dayton towards different ethnic groups within Bosnia, with the Federation resting in the control of the Bosniaks and Bosnian-Croats and the RS in the control of Bosnian-Serbs. These administrative divisions handle much of

[42] Ibid.; pp. 32-33.
[43] The executive branch of the Bosnian power-sharing government is comprised of a three-member presidency that is elected by popular vote, but must include one Bosniak, one Bosnian-Serb, and one Bosnian-Croat. Likewise, the two Houses of the legislative branch guarantee equal seats for each of the three ethnicities with 14 seats in the *Predstavnicki Dom* going to each ethnic group (42 seats total), and 15 seats within the *Dom Naroda* being divided into 5 seats for each.

the internal domestic affairs, while the national government deals with issues like international affairs, trade and the economy.

In order to actively engage the citizenry of BiH, IFES created a Civic Education Project that promoted civil society and elections from 1996 to 2001. When the IFES project began, it had only one office located in Zenica. By 2000, it had established 6 field offices, in Zenica, Livno, Bihac, Doboj, Visegard and Bijeljin. The project itself was broken up into three sections per election cycle:

- The Pre-Election Phase – educating voters on how to vote, where to vote, and informing them as to what candidates are being put on the ballot by which parties; meeting with local officials to explain the role of IFES and establish local governmental cooperation; setting up radio and television information-broadcasts; developing education materials including flash cards, comprehensive voter education manuals, posters and introduction brochures; developing a "get-out-and-vote" mobilization campaign
- The Election Phase – act as election observers; set up hotlines to inform voters on how to find their proper polling station; conduct exit-polls; assist polling stations with questions or problems
- Post-Election Phase – report results of elections to citizens; attend and report on municipal-council meetings; work on assisting NGOs in BiH with their citizen activist initiatives; bringing citizens and organizations together to promote citizen action and inter-group cooperation

In addition to its own work, IFES also established a sub-agreement with the Centers for Civic Initiatives (CCI), a local NGO that was created in 1998 with the assistance of NDI and mentored and funded by IFES to organize grassroots movements and civic education programs country-wide. CCI was established to facilitate the transition and guarantee that civic education and civil society promotion did not dissolve once international support was phased out.[44]

Although the IFES civic education program has a significant number of facets and details, for the sake of parsimony and analytical clarity I will focus only on the program highlights so as to familiarize the reader with the general approach used by IFES in BiH.[45]

Voter Education Sessions. Beginning in 1996, IFES established and ran a number of voter education sessions. Due to their relative success that first year, these sessions became a permanent part of the IFES civic education program in BiH. Taking on the name "GOGs" (*Grupa za Obuka Gradjana*), these meetings were designed to inform voters on how to vote, tell them who is running for office and for which party, instruct them as to the workings of preferential voting and proportional representation, talk about

[44] The CCI prepared regular reports that it submitted to IFES throughout the 2000-2001 election cycle. Readers interested on the workings of CCI, their efforts and results, can find a thorough recasting of their reports in *IFES BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; pp. 45-65.

[45] Those interested in examining the complete details of the IFES Civic Education Program in BiH from 1996-2001 would be well served in reading through the civic education reports prepared by IFES for USAID. These reports can be found in the F. Clifton White Resource Center at the International Foundation for Election Systems in Washington, D.C. Suggested reports include: Morgan, E., et al, (1996); Dorrit K. Marks, *NGO Coordination and Development: Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, July-August 1997* (Washington D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1997); James Miller et al, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Information and Technology Mission, May-September 1996* (Washington D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1996); Jeff Fischer and Scott R. Lansell, *IFES/OSCE: On-site Technical Assistance Mission: Bosnia and Herzegovina January-March, 1996* (Washington D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1996); IFES/OSCE Electoral Code Working Group, *Bosnia and Herzegovina Activity Compendium January-March, 1996* (Washington D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1996); *IFES BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*.

important issues facing the local community, and so forth. These sessions also included a voter mobilization campaign and the distribution of informational materials put together by IFES, USAID and OSCE. In the post-election phase of the program, IFES team members compiled lists of the elected representatives with information on how to contact them, as well as election results in general, and distributed them to meeting attendants.[46]

In 1996, IFES conducted more than 300 voter education sessions and reached approximately 3,500 eligible voters in these GOGs. In 2000, that number had grown to 2,625 GOGs, reaching 36,828 citizens. This shows the significant growth in the impact the IFES program throughout its development in BiH. Although it is difficult without the proper survey data to measure the precise effect these sessions had on individual voters, one piece of anecdotal evidence relates a larger theme of impact. IFES reports:

> As one can imagine, it was an unusual task to explain compensatory mandates to elderly villagers who have virtually nothing – no shops to buy food, no bus line, no ambulanta or other conventional services. Yet, after hearing many bitter words and complaints, our trainers were told 'you are the first ones who have visited us for the last several years.'[47]

Such communication with citizens unfamiliar with the voting process, and so removed from the system itself, helps to make individuals feel a part of the new democratic state. Likewise, it helps empower them to know how to make the system begin to recognize them through the ballot-box and direct activities. Thus, although further data would have to be collected in order to draw more general conclusions, *prima facie* the GOGs appear to have served an important part of the democratic process.

---

[46] Many of the citizens who attended the GOGs in the post-election phase were unaware of the outcomes of the elections due to an inadequate coverage of the elections by the media. Likewise, IFES team members reported seeing a number of elected officials with these guides that IFES prepared, as they were not even properly informed of election outcomes and representative contacts. By the end of December, IFES teams informed approximately 8,155 citizens in 825 GOGs the results of the November elections. See *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; p. 15.

[47] *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; p. 6.

Figure 3. IFES GOGs for November 2000 Elections in BiH.[48]

Bihac	**GOGs**	**Attendance**	**Bileljina**	**GOGs**	**Attendance**
Oct 10	57	810	Oct 10	37	406
Oct 14	60	824	Oct 14	66	885
Oct 21	62	992	Oct 21	76	1075
Oct 28	67	1105	Oct 28	81	1468
Nov 2	61	930	Nov 2	95	1135
Nov 10	64	971	Nov 10	95	1288
Totals	**371**	**5632**	**Totals**	**450**	**6257**
Livno	**GOGs**	**Attendance**	**Doboj**	**GOGs**	**Attendance**
Oct 10	76	740	Oct 10	71	1227
Oct 14	78	869	Oct 14	84	1489
Oct 21	70	747	Oct 21	88	1860
Oct 28	83	969	Oct 28	86	1353
Nov 2	81	966	Nov 2	92	1312
Nov 10	78	839	Nov 10	70	1191
Totals	**466**	**5130**	**Totals**	**491**	**8432**
Zenica	**GOGs**	**Attendance**	**Visegard**	**GOGs**	**Attendance**
Oct 10	88	1352	Oct 10	15	243
Oct 14	88	1140	Oct 14	35	517
Oct 21	93	1301	Oct 21	37	592
Oct 28	99	1222	Oct 28	51	620
Nov 2	118	1528	Nov 2	72	872
Nov 10	93	1158	Nov 10	60	832
Totals	**579**	**7701**	**Totals**	**270**	**3676**
		Weekly AOR Totals			
		GOGs	**Attendance**		
	Oct 10	344	4778		
	Oct 14	411	5724		
	Oct 21	426	6567		
	Oct 28	467	6737		
	Nov 2	519	6743		
	Nov 10	460	6279		
	Totals	**2652**	**36828**		

The GOG sessions helped to serve an additional purpose that is often overlooked, but nonetheless vital in a transitioning democracy. By informing voters about the process

[48] *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; p. 67.

of voting and elections, IFES was concomitantly enabling politicians to focus more attention on their own political messages and programs. For example, the Vice President of the BiH Ministry Council and Minister of Civic Affairs, Tihomir Gligoric, related the following to IFES team members:

> I really can't point out how much I appreciate IFES work in the field. This approach is the most efficient for education of our citizens. If citizens are technically well educated and prepared for the elections it's easy for politicians to focus their pre-election campaign on explaining their political platforms. Few years ago on pre-election rallies we had to explain to citizens voting techniques and after that nobody took care about political platforms.[49]

Gligoric's comment, therefore, demonstrated a "spill-over" effect of IFES' civic education program. By taking on the role of educating citizens about the political system, it enables partisan politicians to focus on their own campaign role. This helps to connect candidates to the system in a more specifically political role, and it enables true debate and policy to be offered on important issues relating to a candidates constituency.

Although at first the GOGs appear to be more about the promotion of individual voting and not about civil society promotion, these education sessions do have a significant impact on civil society in general. For one, it becomes a way of connecting citizens to the political process, creating a unified vision of how a system works that is lacking in deeply divided societies. By fostering agreement and understanding of the "rules of the game," this type of civic education helps to promote the feeling of incorporation of all people into a more universal system of activity. People become a part of the system, and such a feeling is crucial if they are ever to become active in attempting to influence that process. Likewise, these voter education sessions brought people from different ethno-religious backgrounds together for lessons and discussion. In this way, people could see that, just as they were a part of the system, democratic government

[49] Ibid.; p. 5.

applies to all equally. This is another very important part of promoting cooperation, and in the long run serves to help routinize and habituate those ideas within a citizenry.

Candidate Forums. In all elements of its civic education program, IFES attempted to directly mobilize citizen involvement in both the pre- and post-election cycles. In the pre-election phase, IFES conducted candidate forums in which party members running for office would participate in an open question-and-answer session with voting constituents. Similar to "town hall meetings," these pre-election forums brought office seekers and constituents together for a mutual exchange of ideas on a variety of issues ranging from corruption and the black market to youth emigration. Likewise, these gatherings enabled voters and candidates to see some of the most important aspects of representation. Some of the "major party" candidates did not show up to these sessions, which in turn caused a number of the citizens to begin reflecting on the concept of representation. One citizen even asked the candidates, "Do you plan to attend the sessions of parliament and take your salary and leave, as those representatives do now?"[50] This coupled with one attendee's observation that "we should vote only for these parties who are represented here tonight because they cared to come,"[51] shows how some of the larger themes of democracy—for instance, what it means to represent—were being given meaningful thought in a constructive forum.

Again, it is difficult to quantify exactly what precise impact these pre-election forums had on the outcomes of issues or representation. However, the mere attendance and participation of citizens and candidates in these events shows definitive action on the

[50] Ibid.; p. 10.
[51] Ibid.

part of individuals in the system. In itself, this is a demonstration of an increasingly active civil society, as these forums helped to carve out a public sphere for people to participate in and influence the direction of politics. In the pre-election phase, there were 15 candidate forums held in different parts of BiH. These were attended by nearly 1,000 citizens. Taken in conjunction with the GOGs, these numbers show that—just with these two activities—IFES had an impact on nearly 40,000 voters throughout BiH.[52]

Citizen Activist Initiatives. Turning to an element of the civic education program more specifically targeted toward civil society promotion, IFES also worked with a number of local BiH NGOs in the form of *Gradjanska Aktivna Inicijativa* (GAINs). These GAINs, or "citizen activist initiatives," were designed to energize the citizenry that was once made passive by the destruction of public-sphere activity by authoritarian repression. These initiative activities helped to coordinate citizen desires for change in their local communities by showing them how they could influence policy and make the government more responsive to their needs rather than just to the parties in power.

After elections had been decided, the GAINs continued to assist in the promotion of civil society. It is in this phase that the "activist initiatives" began to take shape. This aspect of the GAINs program was the bringing together of people in local communities to discuss issues of concern to them; what they needed, what they wanted, what they expected to gain from their elected officials. It was in these sessions that IFES team members helped citizens craft petitions to local authorities in order to make their concerns heard, as well as educate them on how to follow up with these petitions through

[52] The GOGs and candidate forums conducted by IFES were held in 74 of the 154 municipalities in BiH (48.05%).

"affirmative advocacy." Such activities were described by IFES team members as being "completely foreign" to the people of BiH, and prior to the implementation of the GAINs, "they did not know that they could do this and had no idea how to do so."[53]

By the year 2000, IFES had established more than 300 GAINs groups, which in turn had launched 561 citizen initiatives by 2001. Of the 561 initiatives, 285 (50.8%) were successfully completed in that the people received what they were seeking from government officials.[54] In addition, of those 285 initiatives that were successful, 103 (36.1%) were initiated by groups without IFES support. This indicates the long-term chance of survivability of such activity, and demonstrates how international groups can begin a process to assist with democracy that can be sustained after international support is phased out.

It is through the GAINs process that another important lesson is learned about civil society promotion in the context of deeply divided, war torn societies. Many of the groups involved with the GAINs were attempting to address issues that were by-products of the recent conflict. For example, prisoner of war issues, fairness and treatment of inter-ethnic marriage partners, and infrastructure repair were some of the main issues addressed within these citizen groups. Likewise, through the establishment of inter-ethnic group coalitions that dealt with some of these issues, an additional process for habituating cooperation among ethnic and religious groups was started.

Another important element to this style of citizen participation is similar to an argument about the consolidation of democracy made by Adam Przeworski about

---

[53] *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; p. 19.
[54] For a complete listing of the GAINs groups, as well as the requests they were seeking and the status of those requests, see "Appendix V" in *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; pp. 110-173. Likewise, for a sampling of a variety of the GAINs groups and their experiences, see *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; pp. 22-25.

providing incentives so that people will want to remain a part of the democratic game.[55] Even though Przeworski is dealing with losing parties and electoral incentives, the same logic applies with these citizen initiatives. By giving individuals the means of influencing the democratic system through avenues other than simply elections (in which their candidate or party might not be successful), elections themselves do not become a "zero-sum game." Instead, losing groups might form civic coalitions with other like-minded citizens and lobby the government to work on resolving particular concerns important to these citizens. Thus, citizens find a reason to continue to support the democratic system even though they might not have been successful in influencing it in the election phase, and have non-violent means of resolving contentious issues that they are confronted with.

Working with Local NGOs. In 1996 and 1997, IFES began a contract with the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation that had given a grant "to provide technical assistance to help [NGOs] become engaged in the political process."[56] It initially took the form of training local staff on how to mobilize citizens in order to advocate for their concerns. The program developed into a more concrete and comprehensive source of training local NGOs in representing a variety of humanitarian interests, such as advocacy on behalf of women that had been raped, war veterans, orphaned children, and women's health issues. Dorrit Marks writes about these groups: "Many non-governmental groups formed to provide relief to deal with the humanitarian crisis during and after the years of war. They now work with children, the elderly, adults in areas of education, home health care,

[55] Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
[56] Marks (1997); p. 1.

human rights, rights of refugees, psycho-social assistance."[57] These were the types of organizations targeted by IFES under the Mott grant, and IFES assisted by providing technical instruction to these organizations so that they might be more effective in advocating for their concerns.

It is important to note that many of these groups Marks writes about were those local groups that started without the prompting of the international community. This demonstrates that much of IFES' work was not in "finding problems to deal with," but helping those who were already trying to deal with problems find the political means to become efficacious in their pursuits. The technical assistance provided by IFES was critical to achieving these ends. Because these groups, and the officials they would be dealing with, had no prior experience with democracy, they would have found it difficult to operate within such an unfamiliar environment. By assisting with organizational issues, the development of tactics, and by providing essential knowledge and experience, IFES helped to develop these local NGOs into more efficacious political actors as they sought to achieve humanitarian ends in war-torn BiH.

Local NGO training is important for a variety of reasons. First, because these groups are local, they are more directly attached and associated with the citizens of their community. Direct attachment helps to provide a base of support, taps into preexisting lines of communications, and builds on established bonds of trust. This means that the groups themselves will be more likely to rally public support and at the same time are more likely to produce direct political engagement by local citizens. Additionally, these local NGOs are dealing with issues that directly affect the daily lives of people trying to cope with the loss of war and the rebuilding stages that follow. Such activities can get to

[57] Ibid.

the heart of trauma caused by the ethnic genocide and hatred, and help ease the troubled and painful memories by directly dealing with the difficult issues that many groups are facing. Finally, local NGO training also has a pragmatic element—helping foster groups to be successful now means they will be more likely to carry over their experience into the regime when international assistance has been phased out. This was the goal of IFES's coordination with CCI: establishing a network of functioning and experienced local NGOs to foster a vibrant civil society after the democratic transition process.

Reaching Voters through the Media. In conjunction with both the GAINs and the GOGs, IFES also utilized media outlets for a program of increasing voter education and mobilizing individuals to become active in the political process. IFES used radio and television as a medium for broadcasting voter education sessions prior to the elections. This approach was extremely beneficial to the efforts of IFES, especially given the context of BiH. Due to the war, many roads were destroyed, homes were bombed, and the infrastructure was in general disrepair. During the warm months of the summer (which were right before the elections), people were concentrating a lot of effort on rebuilding and could not attend the regular information sessions. Likewise, it was difficult for many citizens to reach some of the GOG locations, and the high levels of poverty made transportation all but impossible for many. Thus, these "broadcast GOGs" helped to reach voters that were not able to attend the other education sessions, and more people were reached by the civics program.

One of the drawbacks to this method is the limitation placed on international organizations due to resources. In some areas where IFES had wanted to run the voter

education session by radio, they could not because the radio broadcast stations were not giving them free airtime as a public service. Instead these stations demanded money for such a service, and so "canned OSCE tape, which were not as explicitly informative"[58] had to be used. However, by using the radio and television, IFES estimates that anywhere between 50,000 and 100,000 additional people could be reached.[59] Thus, adapting the program to the social and economic realities of BiH helped to increase the spread of the civic education message to more and more people every year.

Citizens Guides. In order to continue educating the people of BiH as to how their new political system operated, as well as the proper channels to follow in order to influence the system, IFES developed the *Citizens Guide to the Zenica Municipality*. These guides, developed by BiH citizens working on the IFES staff, were reference booklets to inform the people of BiH of how their local governments worked and of relevant laws applicable to them.[60] Containing also the contact information for political authorities, these guides were designed to tell citizens (and elected officials) what the roles of different departments in their local government were, what the budgets looked like and how they were decided, and what the job descriptions of officials were so they would know who to engage for proper assistance.

According to Emily Parkinson, program assistant for the IFES program in BiH, the centralized coordination of these citizen guides by IFES helped to make them highly successful. Although these booklets were developed within local townships for local

[58] *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; pp. 6-7.
[59] Morgan et al (1996); p. 5. It should be noted that precise numbers are not available because of the lack of any sort of sophisticated measuring device for determining numbers of viewers or listeners in BiH.
[60] Emily Parkinson, Interview with Author, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., August 2, 2002.

citizens, all guides were reviewed for content and layout by the IFES office in Zenica. This type of review enabled IFES staff to make sure that the information contained within one booklet was parallel to that contained within other guides. Such centralization not only demonstrates the openness of communication among the different offices, but also represents a desire to maintain a consistent level of support for all regions and localities.[61]

Two important lessons can be drawn from the development of these guides. The first is that the guides were most helpful because they were prepared openly with the assistance of local governmental authorities. Conferences were held with officials, who offered recommendations about information that would be helpful to them and might be helpful to people seeking more information about their local system. Thus, IFES was not working in a vacuum and attempting to create an instructional document based solely on what they thought should go into it. Instead, a cooperative effort was set up with authorities in BiH so that the documents could most effectively target the constituency they were to serve.

A second lesson that can be drawn relates to the problems that are faced within deeply divided societies. Within the development of some of the brochures that were to be distributed in the Croatian areas of Herzegovina, there was a lot of contention surrounding the use of the word "canton" (*zupanija*) versus the word "cantonal" (*zupanijski*) within the localized citizen guides. Although such linguistic "nit-picking" might seem trivial to the western reader, these types of issues require serious consideration when working with populations that are deeply divided by ethnic

[61] Ibid.

differences.[62] Ultimately, the situation was resolved by choosing the word "canton," because that was the word used in the official government printings of the Dayton Accords in the Croatian language, and there was little contention about the usage after the printing of the guides. What this goes to show, however, is that any program set within the context of a deeply divided society must be sensitive to the cultural particularities of a target community. To simply forge ahead with a program without such concerns runs the risk of isolating groups and entrenching feelings of hostility toward the new democratic state. Context is critical.

The end result of this component of the IFES program was the production of guides for 62 BiH municipalities. Though the production of a single guide is itself a time- and labor-intensive effort, the outcome was extremely valuable to the democratic promotional efforts of international groups working in BiH. Not only did IFES receive a number of positive "comments from OHR, OSCE, the UN, and various embassies,"[63] the Japanese government funded the UNDP for the production of 32 additional municipality guides. Thus, through a coordinated effort by the international community, based on the initial efforts of the IFES program, 94 municipalities had citizens guides to help inform citizens and local authorities alike as to the nature and workings of the local governments.

Refugee Reading Centers. In 1996, IFES began a program specifically designed to aid the war-torn country of BiH: the establishment of 24 refugee reading centers. As

[62] After the wars of secession, for example, Croatian linguists began reformatting the Croatian language so as to distinguish it from the Serbian. Everyday terms as simple as common greetings are being reformalized into a distinct linguistic pattern defined apart from old forms of Serbo-Croat. This highlights the importance of language in group identity.
[63] *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; p. 35.

discussed in the overview of the recent history of violence in BiH, one of the biggest problems confronting the transition to democracy was the high rate of refugees coming into the region. The displacement of different ethnic groups causes significant trouble in post-war societies, because of the inability for these groups to assimilate into the political system or actively defend their rights. These reading centers provided refugees with local newspapers and nonpartisan election information prepared by IFES, OSCE, and USAID/OTI. This gave refugees access to important and relevant materials to assist them in understanding their rights and becoming informed about the area around them.

The introduction of such centers is an important step in not only healing the wounds of a war-torn society, but it becomes a way of mitigating potential problems before they occur. Giving refugees information and access to the government in such a way that their concerns are addressed helps them to become a part of the system locally. This helps resolve problems that ethnic and religious diasporas have often caused in Eastern and Central Europe, because it maintains the protection of a concentration of ethnic refugees and pacifies potential sources of continued ethnic hostility both domestically and internationally.[64] Outsiders become embraced by the larger process, and through that inclusion they find reasons to support its ultimate success.

Election-Cycle Activities. The pre- and post-election activities performed by IFES were crucial for the development of an active citizenry that took part in the initial process and

[64] For further insight into the potential problems of diasporic relations, but internal and international, see Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), *The New European Diasporas: National Minorities and Conflict in Eastern Europe* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2000). In this book, Mandelbaum assembles a number of case studies from a variety of regional experts, and confronts the problems that arise from diasporas and ethnic displacement. Dealing with refugees in a fair manner that incorporates them into the political system is one of the primary lessons one can learn through the cases within this text.

continued its efforts after the votes were tallied and the winners were announced. However, IFES also concentrated serious effort in the actual election process in order to guarantee that the proper steps were taken for the conduct of free and fair elections.

During the November 2000 elections, IFES had many independent programs running all at once. For example, they established a hotline for voters to call when they could not find, or were unsure of, the location of their polling station.[65] Likewise, IFES established 22 two-person teams that each visited 5 polling stations to evaluate the process and conduct exit polling to gauge citizen sentiments. In total, 108 polling stations were visited in 50 different municipalities. Finally, members of IFES were sent to each of the 21 teams where ballot counting, sealing and shipping took place.

Due to their observations of the election process, as well as the prior informational sessions, IFES staff compiled a list of the main lessons that could be taken from the process. These observations were:

- Polling Station Committee Members relied too much on the PSC chairpersons. They did not know the rules and regulations.
- Party candidates and activists did not understand the preferential system.
- The size and layout of the cantonal and RS Assembly ballots were confusing.
- The RS Presidency ballot included instructions on the back side that included a small ballot with six boxes. Some voters filled in the back.
- Many OSCE ballot posters were altered by cutting off the slogan "Change for a better life."
- There was a low level of participation by young people.
- Two hours of training for PSC members was not sufficient.

[65] During the elections of November 11, 2000 elections, the hotline received over 100 calls by citizens who were unable to find where they were supposed to go to cast their vote.

- Younger PSC chairpersons were recommended in some instances.[66]

In general, the observations reported by IFES team members were positive in regard to the elections. There were, however, some reports of trouble in Western Herzegovina where OSCE had worked against a referendum established by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) to become "more assertive in preserving their culture within BiH."[67] Likewise, OSCE had removed many leading candidates off of the ballot "as punishment for this separatist activity."[68] This resulted in a less than warm reception for any international group overseeing elections in this area. Such resentment, however, can be expected in a deeply divided society that is still grappling with the cultural memory of history. The important thing is that these initial separatist movements that occur are not successful in destroying the democratization process. As one IFES member reported:

> Resorting to the fear that ethnic groups are, or will be, somehow, put at a disadvantage, rekindles the historic lamentations over losses of separate identities felt by Croats since the death of their last king, Zvonimir, in 1097 which resulted in their subjugation to Hungary and others, and felt by Serbs since their loss to the Ottomans in 1389. Getting over this hurdle of romantic historic imagery will require many years.[69]

Therefore, despite a number of successes, and the smooth conduct of the elections in other parts of BiH, international donor groups were still bearing witness to the tenuous balance that exists within deeply divided societies.

The exit polling conducted by IFES team members was a crucial part of the program in BiH. These exit polls enabled IFES officials to report on problems that still existed within the election process. These suggestions, which IFES began submitting to OSCE in 1996, helped to improve the election process over-time. In the 2000-2001 cycle,

---

[66] *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; p. 15.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.

the IFES exit poll consisted of five basic questions with multiple sub-components. These questions were designed to identify voter knowledge and attitudes on items like access to information about Voter Registers and polling station assignments, open lists, multi-member districts, PR voting, and level of confidence in the election process. The results were tallied, and IFES made the following observations based on the survey data.[70]

- Nearly 50% of voters did not see candidates before election day
- Voter Register improved but still not perfect
- Voters too passive about correcting Voter Register
- Voters not clear about MP process
- 50% of voters indicated they understood the preferential system used in the RS Presidency elections, but did not use it
- Increased number of party and NGO observers
- Optimism for future diminished
- PSCs still require additional training[71]

Although the results of the survey show some room for improvement, and concomitant recommendations, one striking result is that the level of confidence placed upon future elections had diminished from previous years. One possible explanation that arises from the comparative politics literature in academia is that a regime transition is usually followed immediately by a "honeymoon" period in which optimism for the future is high. Common wisdom would dictate that a drop in optimism is to be expected. However, further survey research should continue in the upcoming years to see if this trend continues, or if it stabilizes at a reasonable level over time.

[70] For a look at the questionnaires used, the tallies for each of the municipalities, and statistical results, please see "Appendix III," *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; pp. 70-108.
[71] *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; p. 72.

External Coordination. To paraphrase the thoughts of Carothers that were noted earlier, democracy promotion is a popular activity in the international community. The efforts of one group are but one piece of a larger puzzle. Within BiH, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States has identified over 40 international organizations that are active, and that listing does not include IFES, USAID, NDI, CCE, IRI, or any of the other American organizations that are active in promoting democracy and civil society.[72] Needless to say, a high level of coordination among agencies is invaluable to the success of democratic promotion.

Throughout its work in BiH, IFES remained in constant contact with U.S. Ambassador Thomas J. Miller, embassy officials, members of OSCE and USAID. Likewise, IFES coordinated with representatives of NDI to make sure that their activities did not come into conflict with one another or crossover. This is important because without such coordination, a citizenry might become confused by the mixing of signals and messages, and such confusion could work against efforts to help mobilize and activate a population. Openness and mutual cooperation with other international organizations, which establishes communication among the donor groups throughout all of the phases of their program, is a central tenet of the IFES method. This not only prevents the problems of undoing one another's work, but it also helps the learning process by multiplying the successful (or unsuccessful) lessons learned by some across a larger coalition of groups working to foster civil society and consolidate democracy.

Ultimately, these different components to the IFES civic education program were successful in activating and mobilizing the citizens of BiH during the transition process.

[72] *CIA World Factbook, 2001*.

As previously noted, there is no precise way to quantify just how much success IFES had *en route* to this larger goal, but to cite analysis offered by a recent USAID study on civic education and civil society promotion, "Given low rates of participation in most political systems, particularly in the developing world, even moderate differences connected with good civic education programming hold the potential to make a significant contribution to democratization."[73] Thus, by fostering hundreds of citizen advocacy efforts, by helping numerous individuals find where and how to vote, and by providing forums for candidate-citizen meetings (just to name a few of the activities discussed) the IFES method in BiH can definitely be seen as such.

Lessons from the IFES Approach in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In June 2002, USAID published a study of the effects of civic education approaches on transitions to democracy. Although catered to a more generalized context, rather than having a specific focus on deeply divided societies, the "lessons learned" cited by USAID provide an understanding of why the IFES approach in BiH was successful. According to the USAID study, the course design and quality of program used in the promotion of civil society through civic education is critical to the success of those programs.[74] The study goes on to show that "courses are most effective when sessions are frequent, methods are participatory, and teachers are knowledgeable and inspiring."[75]

---

[73] USAID, "Approaches to Civic Education: Lessons Learned," Technical Publication Series, June 2002, Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID, Washington, D.C., p. 8.
[74] The USAID study employed both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to demonstrate empirical effects of civic education programs on the democratization process. The study focused on civic education programs in the Dominican Republic, Poland, and South Africa. For more on the specific research methods and findings of the USAID study, see USAID, "Approaches to Civic Education: Lessons Learned," Technical Publication Series, June 2002, Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID, Washington, D.C.
[75] Ibid.; pp. 1-2.

The IFES program confirms these results. The IFES GOGs and GAINs met regularly, and traveled to remote locations so as to remove transportation obstacles that might have prevented attendance by some. Likewise, the team leaders used directly participatory methods to instruct Bosnian citizens on how to become active in the democratic process. The GAINs activities especially, because they were tied to NGO groups and to citizen advocacy efforts, demonstrated the very active approach utilized by IFES, which the USAID study shows is far more effective than passive teaching methods. This also helped confirm an additional element of the USAID study, which noted that projects are most effective when they concentrate attention on issues that directly affect the day-to-day lives of citizens. By assisting groups that had formulated their own concerns and problems to be addressed, IFES enabled the people of Bosnia to deal with those issues of most importance to them, rather than what outside groups might have felt was more important. Finally, IFES coordinated proper training of its trainers from the very start of the program in an attempt to make sure that its team members were knowledgeable about electoral laws and processes so that they might make issues relevant and interesting to the citizens of Bosnia. Thus, the success IFES had in getting individuals active in the political process helps to confirm the quantitative and qualitative results of the USAID survey.[76]

In addition to confirming the results detailed by USAID in their study, there are a number of lessons that can be gleaned from the IFES program in BiH that help to further

[76] USAID also made a number of recommendations for future projects within their study, which included aspects already covered in the IFES methodology, such as trying to "design around obstacles to frequent participation," "use as many participatory methods as possible," "build opportunities for participation directly into the program," "focus on themes that are relevant to people's daily lives," "invest in training of the trainers," "target voluntary associations," and "avoiding inflated expectations." Although these are all important issues, and issues covered in the detailing of the IFES methodology, they remain only recommendations and not empirically supported claims. Thus, I am hesitant to include these issues in an assessment of why the IFES program was successful.

understand how a civic education program might incur more success if it followed a solid design. Although some of the lessons are obvious in the discussion of the program highlights, there are some lessons that are either implicit or need further exploration in order to emphasize their importance to the process of civil society promotion in deeply divided societies. These lessons are:

- Organizations must be willing to make a long-term commitment to countries in transition.
- Communication and coordination with other donor agencies should be performed often and openly.
- International donor organizations should work closely with local officials.
- International organizations must be well-versed in, and have a developed sensitivity toward, the history and culture of the different ethno religious groups in the deeply divided society.
- Local NGOs should be given realistic goals, not tough criteria.
- International organizations should foster local NGOs that can carry out the work of those international organizations once their support begins to be phased out.
- International organizations must be alert of and help coordinate against separatist movements that threaten the stability of a fledgling democratic regime in order to preserve the chance of democratic survivability.

Not only are these lessons applicable to understanding the overall success of the IFES methodology, but they can be extracted and formed into general principles that might be useful to other countries going through a transition to democracy.[77]

[77] Juliana Pilon, Senior Advisor for Civil Society at IFES, has written an excellent paper outlining the lessons that have been learned from the nearly two decades of democracy assistance by international donor agencies and civil society promoters. Her analysis incorporates a comparative case analysis that is quite expansive. From these comparisons, Pilon observes nine lessons that have been learned from efforts at civil society promotion: 1. civil society must be involved well before credible elections, 2. civil society assistance should be based on well-designed survey research, 3. NGOs need to be trained on how to

The IFES project in BiH is deemed as being relatively successful in terms of reaching a great number of voters with a significant depth of information. Its methodology was so successful that is has been directly applied to programs in Armenia, Kosovo and Azerbaijan.[78] Thus, it is important to focus attention on the most relevant lessons that can be extracted from the BiH program in order to see how democratic development programs might experience similar chances of success in other countries.

Lesson 1. Organizations must be willing to make a long-term commitment to countries in transition. Many scholars who have studied trends in the global democratization process have noted that the world has seen mixed results when it comes to democratic transition.[79] Not all democracies are guaranteed to last, and even those with a great amount of international support can fail. Katz goes even further by pointing out that the

---

constructively engage parties and governmental sector, 4. NGO assistance is intertwined with work media and government, 5. civil society-building must take place when election reform stops or back-slides, 6. civic education is essential to civil society promotion, 7. sustainability is an important part of NGO assistance, 8. impacts are difficult to measure in the short term, 9. assistance should be coupled with strong media exposure. The lessons that I have extracted from the Bosnian case should be seen as a *supplement* to her work, and not as a response. For example, the lessons learned in BiH would concur with her assertion that "The involvement of civil society must take place long before credible elections establish the rudiments of democratic institutions." Such a conclusion is implicit in the BiH case study, as are other conclusions that she has already supported with strong analytical clarity. Thus, to see what other lessons can be taken from the work that has been done in the realm of democracy promotion and civil society assistance, please see Pilon (2002).

[78] Parkinson (2002).

[79] For example, Samuel Huntington points out that there have been a number of "reverse-waves" of democratic transitions in which countries revert back to some form of authoritarian rule. Giuseppe Di Palma also writes about the "mixed results" that have occurred since the 1970s where not all countries have been successful in making the democratic shift from authoritarianism. O'Donnell and Schmitter have also concluded that some shifts to democracy will not revert back to the same kind of authoritarianism, necessarily, but there is a chance that new types of authoritarianism will take hold in these countries. Finally, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan edited an entire series of books on the breakdown of democratic regimes. Taken together, these authors all point to the same conclusion – democracy is a difficult process, and satisfaction is not always guaranteed. See Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth-Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993); Di Palma (1990); O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986); and Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.) *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

failure of transition is particularly relevant in the context of a deeply divided society.[80] Thus, international organizations that wish to see a successful transition to democracy must enter into the process with realistic expectations. One cannot expect the change to occur overnight, and one cannot expect to develop too complex of a methodology and expect it to work immediately. Development takes time, and international organizations need to take this into account when attempting to consolidate democratic regimes in deeply divided societies.

In the IFES BiH methodology there is a sense of the importance of long-term commitment to a country undergoing transition. First, one can see a great amount of headway being made from the program's inception in 1996 to the end results reported in 2001. More people were being reached as programs adapted over time. Success in some areas gains the attention of other donors who wish to support agency action. Trust between local officials and international organizations needs to be earned. These are all important reasons why democracy promotion must be a long-term commitment. If the international community is too transient, it will not give the seeds of democracy enough time to take root, and the democratization process will be more likely to fail.

In addition to these more general issues, the comments of IFES team members about the "historical memories" and "romantic images of the past" of different religious and ethnic groups also demonstrate how important it is for international organizations to remain active in a country over a long period of time. These images of the past are not immediately erased; they are a part of the national myth, the shared symbols that distinguish some groups from all others. At the same time, cooperation is also not easily translated into habit. Thus, in order to overcome legacies of tension and violence,

[80] Katz (2002).

democratic development programs must take time and a deep commitment on the part of international organizations.

A final reason why a long-term commitment is necessary is shown by the survey results of the 2000 exit polls compiled by IFES staff. Democracy is given presumptive legitimacy in its early stages by the citizens who are war-weary and looking for alternate means of conflict resolution. However, the grinding of the gears, the slow movement forward, and the time it takes to instruct people how the system works, all begin to wear down that optimism. When the "honeymoon" is over, international organizations need to be prepared to ensure that activity and interest continues. Once this becomes stabilized and routine, the transition process has a better chance of surviving in the long run. Short-term, however, there is always a risk of breakdown or regression. Thus, commitment is crucial.

Lesson 2. Communication and coordination with other donor agencies should be performed often and openly. There is an understandable temptation on the part of international agencies that are working side-by-side in a country with democratic transition projects to compete with one another, especially when they are relying on the same sources for funding and resources. However, in the BiH case, the IFES method of working in coordination with other international agencies proved to be beneficial for the main goal of promoting democracy and citizen understanding. Without this coordination, there was a likely chance that groups would either waste resources because of duplication, or worse yet send out mixed messages to the citizens of a transitioning nation. Open communication may also lead to the free-exchange of trial-and-error, which can promote the effectiveness of the different organizations who do not then need to

repeat the mistakes of others. Likewise, open dialogue across organizations can also lead to a sharing of "best methods" and successful approaches, which can also be beneficial for increasing the efficacy of these groups. Thus, communication and coordination across international agencies is an important element of the process of democracy promotion.

Another way that open communication plays an important role in the success or failure of democratic development programs is within the coordination between donor and contract agencies. For example, Parkinson points out that an initial problem with the IFES program in BiH was in the lack of "goal-coordination" between IFES and USAID. Both organizations seemed to have different goals in mind for BiH for different reasons. However, Parkinson goes on to note that in the end IFES and USAID were both seeking the same comprehensive end-point, and through coordination were able to get there.[81]

One additional benefit that comes as a result of communication and openness across agencies is that it helps organizations find where there is need, and it helps them target that need in an effective manner. No one organization can do everything, and if it tries it will most certainly fail. Thus, it is important that international organizations concentrate on the areas where they can be the most help, and where their efforts will yield the most results. To borrow from the words of Samuel Kernell, these organizations "don't need to know everything, but they need to know what they need to know."[82]

Lesson 3. International donor organizations should work closely with local officials. Throughout the implementation of their civic education program in BiH, IFES team members worked in constant contact with local officials. This was important for a variety

[81] Parkinson (2002).
[82] Samuel Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*, third edition (San Diego: University of California Press, 1997), p. 24.

of reasons. First, it enabled IFES to build a rapport with the office holders and authorities, which in turn gave them increased access to, and understanding of, the political system. It showed the leaders that these groups were not committed to one platform or party over another but were committed to democracy in general. This enabled them to take on a nonpartisan position that was accepted by local elites. Likewise, keeping in contact with local officials enabled IFES to also expose these individuals to issues that helped the authorities to understand and execute their job more easily. Thus, the program did not just help citizens learn how to work within the new political structure, it also served to make sure that the system itself was functioning in a more efficient and effective manner.

An additional benefit to international organizations working closely with local officials is the familiarity these authorities can gain from learning more about the international programs as they are being implemented. For example, by becoming more aware of the IFES civic education program, political leaders learned that they did not have to concentrate their campaign efforts or political messages around telling voters how to vote, nor do they need to spend all their time trying to get voters to the polling stations. Instead, by becoming familiar with the IFES efforts, local elites could move toward developing platforms and messages that related to issues of concern to them and their constituents. Therefore, an international organization working closely with local officials has significant benefits for the democratic process.

Lesson 4. International organizations must be well-versed in, and have a developed sensitivity toward, the history and culture of the different ethno-religious groups in the deeply divided society. This lesson almost certainly goes without saying, but I do not feel that it can be emphasized enough. The context of division within a society has established

an "enemy creation" mentality among rival ethnic and religious groups. If international agencies are to avoid exacerbating these problems, they must be extremely sensitive to the historical and cultural context within which they are operating. IFES demonstrated its commitment to this type of understanding when it took the time to pay special attention to the types of words it used when developing its citizens guides. Likewise, by remaining focused on the processes of government, IFES established itself as a nonpartisan and unbiased institution. This enabled it to work freely across groups, and its efforts were more readily accepted by citizens and politicians from different backgrounds. If this type of rapport was not developed, then IFES would have been unable to further its democratic promotion with all citizens.

Cultural context, however, is not just about sending a message of nonpartisanship. If international organizations send a message that they are unwilling to acknowledge group particularities, and if they seem to disregard the culture of the people they are attempting to help, then there is a chance that they will further atomize societies and create increased hostilities among national groups. Part of the instrumental use of nationalism as a political force by leaders prior to the wars of secession was to play on a feeling of historical oppression by groups with different backgrounds. If international organizations play into that rhetoric by making cultural mistakes, then it merely provides fodder for further nationalism by leaders trying to gain personal power.

Being familiar with the cultural and historical circumstances of BiH also enabled IFES to find and assist local NGOs that were already established and working toward political change. Human rights advocates that had formed coalitions and movements during the war, and continuing to attempt to effect change during transition, were active

in BiH. What these groups were lacking was information, education and assistance. IFES was able to provide this type of help because of the understanding it had of the area and its history. This also helped to ensure that the goals being worked towards were truly the goals of the citizens of BiH, and not merely the imposed values of an imperialist-international organization.

Lesson 5. Local NGOs should be given realistic goals, not tough criteria. In order to be successful, programs should remain as parsimonious as possible. Not only is this true because of the limitations of resources, but because the more basic the program, the more likely that program is to be properly communicated and understood by all. Likewise, programs that remain reasonable and clear are also easier to oversee and manage. If a program gets too detailed—if there are too many components all running at the same time in order for it to work—the likelihood that things will get overlooked and mistakes will be made also increases. The IFES approaches to fostering citizen education and activity demonstrate that a program does not need to be complex in order to produce significant results. Putting together booklets describing local offices, reporting on who won the election, getting candidates and citizens together to share their plans or concerns, teaching NGOs how to petition government, etc., are not complicated tasks. These programs take time, they take follow-up commitment, they take resources, and require lots of concentrated effort, but they are not so complex as to get lost in the details. This is crucial if a program is to be successfully coordinated.

I should make note that I am not equating "basic" with "easy." Nor should this be translated into a presumption that these tasks and programs are irrelevant. Sometimes the most basic steps require the most diligence and effort in order to make sure that the

foundation for the future is strong enough to build upon. Thus, one must be careful not to misunderstand the valuable lessons gleaned from the IFES experience in BiH listed here.

Lesson 6. International organizations should foster local NGOs that can carry out the work of those international organizations once their support begins to be phased out. Just as international organizations must be willing to establish long-term commitments to countries in transition, they should also work at developing local institutions that can take up their work once international support is phased out. The ultimate goal of international assistance is not to develop a state that is dependent on the international community indefinitely. Rather, the goal of international organizations and the donor community is to establish a network of democratic support that will survive long after support has been removed. Thus, establishing and fostering specific groups designed to carry on the activities of international organizations is extremely helpful in the process of democratic consolidation.

In BiH, IFES helped to support and mentor the Centers for Civic Initiatives, which was developed as a means of organizing grassroots efforts and continue civic education activities after IFES support had been phased out over time. CCI was highly active in the election phase of the 2000 elections, assembling 232 discussion groups that reached more than 6,000 people in BiH, as well as mobilizing nearly 5,500 citizens to act as election observers.[83] Likewise, CCI produced and distributed 30,000 pieces of election-related materials, worked closely with media representatives from across BiH, began holding community organization and discussion sessions, and developed an

[83] *IFES in BiH – Civic Education Project, Final Report 2000-2001*; p. 46.

ongoing newsletter entitled *Inicijativa* to promote the work of groups in the nongovernmental, public sector.[84]

On October 19, 2001, IFES transferred its equipment and resources to CCI at the request of USAID. This helped to complete the transition from international to local civil society assistance. Because of the initial mentoring steps taken by IFES to foster CCI, the group was organizationally and structurally competent and had successful experiences that could be built upon in the upcoming years. This helps to create a society that is self-reliant and active long after the international community has phased out it support. Thus, the IFES methodology in BiH helps show how important it is to concentrate efforts not only on the present, but to also take steps to ensure that work that is being done continues to habituate and routinize cooperation and civil society activity when international assistance is no longer available. This helps prevent a regression from democracy back to authoritarianism and helps to consolidate the regime transition.

Lesson 7. International organizations must be alert to and help coordinate against separatist movements that threaten the stability of a fledgling democratic regime in order to preserve the chance of democratic survivability. Although this is a lesson that is only tangentially related to the IFES methodology, I felt it important to address the issue of separatist movements as they are a constant threat to the sustainability of democracy in a deeply divided context. As described in the election phase activities of IFES, some hostility to the international community was being shown by ethnic groups in the Eighth Canton of Western Herzegovina. Here, OSCE had taken efforts to decrease the efficacy of a referendum by Croat groups to separate from the larger control of BiH and form their

[84] Ibid.; pp. 46-50.

own governmental entity that was under their sovereign control. Such an attempt is common within deeply divided societies, as groups are seeking to ensure that their rights and demands will be protected, and they fear that leaving their fate to a multi-ethnic national government will lead to discrimination or oppression of their community.

There are two conclusions that can be summarized under this heading. The first is that the international community should work to inform citizens within a transitioning country about the risks such movements have and ways that they can be prevented. Civic education programs should address this problem by coordinating domestic groups against such referenda and mobilizing people to use democratic means to put down non-democratic or separatist movements. The purpose is to create larger routines of cooperation, as well as national symbols behind which all groups can rally. If separatist movements are allowed to work unchecked, then they have a good chance at being successful, which causes larger problems for the consolidation of democracy and tears away at the possibility of national unity. Thus, separatist movements should be targeted and contained in order to prevent the dissolution of democratization attempts.

Second, this goes to show that international organizations need to be sophisticated in dealing with volatile situations in deeply divided societies. Not everyone is going to be accepting of the movement toward a plural, democratic society. Likewise, not everyone will be favorable towards international involvement in promoting such ends. What international organizations need to work towards, therefore, is continuing to show the benefits that such a system will have for all groups and individuals. Sometimes this must be done in a less than friendly, or worse, an openly hostile environment. However, continued efforts at working with the people and engaging them on the same playing field

can produce positive results. It may not be the best of all possible scenarios, but bitterness towards an international agency (or groups of them) is far better than the often violent alternative.

Chapter Four: Comparison of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Projects in Indonesia, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo

While the lessons learned from the IFES methodology of democratic promotion in BiH help to confirm studies done by USAID on civic education, and help further an understanding of how to successfully implement such programs, the analysis remains incomplete without an application to outside cases that specifically involve deep division within the population. A comparative application of the primary findings in the Bosnian program will help to not only interpret the situations facing other deeply divided societies, but it can also help establish valid recommendations for these countries and other projects of this nature.

The cases selected to further this analysis are Indonesia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. As previously noted, these cases stand as a representative sample of many other countries attempting to deal with the problems of deep division and democratic transition. Not only are they representative because of regional, racial, ethnic and religious contexts, but they also represent different stages of transition. These characteristics help control for cultural specificity and political development in drawing conclusions and proposing future recommendations. And, although the historical and programmatic details will not be as extensively examined within these cases as they were in the Bosnian case, these three nations will serve as laboratories to see how well the lessons from BiH travel to contexts outside their own.

Indonesia. Whereas the historical development of BiH can be seen as it has been produced through periods of violence and cooperation among ethnic groups, the political

and cultural development of Indonesia is perhaps characterized best as coming in "waves."[85] The first wave was that of Hinduism and Buddhism that existed within the islands of Java and Sumatra. The Hindu kingdom in Java spread throughout the area that is now modern Indonesia and the Malay Archipelago, bringing with it a number of cultural influences including a system of writing, a codification of the legal system, and poetics. The domination of the Hindu culture was overtaken by the second wave of Islam, which spread its religious, political, and cultural practices throughout the islands from a period of about the 12th to the 16th century A.D. The Islamic influences that were perpetuated throughout Indonesia at this time left a deep impression on the contemporary cultural context, as Indonesia remains overwhelmingly Muslim.

Beginning in the late-16th and early 17th centuries in Indonesia, the European-wave of influence began to swell. Although the colonial influences brought with the Dutch during these periods did not have the same cultural impact that the Islamic influences had, especially in the long-term, the political control over the area lasted from about 1619 until Indonesian independence in 1949. The governing body established by the Dutch trade companies, known as the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), created a number of trade routes and military outposts within the area, especially under the aggressive leadership of Governor Jan Pieterszoon Coen. The maintenance of a powerful military force in the area was essential not only to keep away other European powers interested in establishing influence in the area, but also to maintain control over

[85] The use of "waves" to describe the different periods of cultural influence in Indonesia was originally used in the online journal *Alamanach de Bruxelles*, which subsequently lists the different waves of influence, but does not fill in the gaps with historical detail. Thus, I use their outline in order to structure the brief summary of Indonesian history here, but do so with historical documentation from other sources. See *Almanach de Bruxelles*, "Indonesia," found online at http://www.almanach.be/search/i/indonesia.html.

the different internal groups struggling for prominence and to squelch a number of uprisings that threatened the trade empire the Dutch companies had established.

It was in the early-20th century that one might be able to pinpoint the origins of Islamic nationalism in Indonesia. In 1908, a group of Javanese students established *Boedi Oteomo*, an organization that spread nationalist sentiments throughout Indonesia. Likewise, Islamic leaders like Haji Agus Salim began promoting a modernization of Islam, and taking a staunchly anti-government position in politics. Nationalist fervor began to grow, and in "[1928] various youth organizations from all over the colony attended a congress in Jakarta and declared a landmark oath: 'One country-Indonesia, one people-Indonesia and one language-bahasa Indonesia.'"[86] The 1900s also marked the time when communist thought began to permeate a lot of the political activity within Indonesia, and when in-fighting between "modernist" and "traditionalist" forms of Islam began to fractionalize the people of Indonesia. Thus, among the political insurrections directed at overthrowing Dutch colonial rule, there was also a growing division among the people who were attempting to define their visions of an independent Indonesia.

It was shortly after the surrender of the Japanese in WWII that Indonesians got the chance to assert their political vision of a free Indonesian state. In 1942, the Japanese had occupied Indonesia, and when they were forced to withdraw in 1945, Indonesian political leaders demanded an Indonesian state free from foreign interference. Although the Dutch attempted to resurrect their colonial rule, they could not reestablish footing in the area, and in 1950 Indonesia became a sovereign state under the leadership of the avowed nationalist Sukarno.

---

[86] CNN.com, "CNN.com/World: Indonesia," found online at http://asia.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/02/19/indonesia.timeline/index.html#sukarno, last updated February 21, 2001.

Although the initial vision was of a democratic Indonesia, in-fighting among various groups, along with a CIA-supported coup that failed to violently overthrow the Sukarno presidency quickly destroyed that dream. Instead, in 1959 President Sukarno halted the activities of the Indonesian Constitutional Assembly (*Konstituante*) and restored the executive-dominated, interim constitution of 1945. Backed by a weak coalition of nationalists, communists and Islamists, the Sukarno regime did little to end the further segmentation of Indonesian society. In fact, prior to his resignation in 1966, there was a communist uprising that led to the death of seven top military leaders. It was then that Major-General Suharto stepped in, ended the attempted coup, and began a nation-wide assault on the communists within Indonesia. In just a little over one year, an estimated 300,000-400,000 communist sympathizers were slaughtered.

Major-General Suharto took control of the Indonesian government after massive protests and upheaval forced the resignation of Sukarno, and he ruled Indonesia as president for 32 years. During this time, nationalism and internal fragmentation continued to flare up, but Suharto's tight military-authoritarian control over the country put an often violent end to each of these flashes of hostility. In this way, the leadership of Suharto might be compared to that of Marshal Tito in communist Yugoslavia, as unity was maintained through a pervasive, and oppressive, government rule. However, as with Tito's death in the 1980s, President Suharto's downfall, and subsequent appointment of successor B. J. Habibie, in 1998 opened up ethnic riots and religious skirmishes throughout the country.

In 1999, Indonesia saw the instatement of a democratically elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid. A well-known Muslim leader in Indonesia, Wahid's presidential

honeymoon would not last long. In January 2000, Wahid was implicated in two major instances of corruption that had resulted in the taking of over $6 million of illegal monies. The charges that were laid upon Wahid caused his supporters to begin demonstrations that threatened the fledgling democratic regime in Indonesia. Thus, because of nationalist tensions that had resulted in periods of violent conflict, and because of a history of political corruption that carried on into the Wahid presidency, many around the world did not predict a bright future for Indonesian democracy. Thus, like in BiH, international agencies interested in promoting democracy needed to deal with issues of deep division and corruption lest the experiment fail.

The ethnic and religious differences that exist in Indonesia have been a product of the historical culture waves that have been previously discussed. Ethnically, Indonesia is comprised of Javanese (45%), Sudanese (14%), Madurese (7.5%), Malays (7.5%) and other groups (26%), which together make up the population of nearly 230,000,000 [see figure 4].[87] What really distinguishes the demographics of Indonesia from those of BiH is the overwhelming dominance of one religious group. In Indonesia, nearly 88% of the population is of the Islamic faith. The remaining 12% is divided among Protestantism (5%), Catholicism (3%), Hinduism (2%), Buddhism (1%) and other practices (1%) [see figure 5].[88]

[87] *CIA World Factbook, 2001*.
[88] Ibid.

Figure 4.



Figure 5.



There are obvious differences, then, between BiH and Indonesia. However, the similar situations facing these two nations are also quite striking. The periodic explosions of violence, the lack of democratic traditions and the deep segmental divisions that have been instrumentally mobilized by political elites are all present in both countries. Thus, Indonesia becomes a strong case for applying the lessons of the IFES approach to civil society promotion in BiH in order to test how well these concepts can be applied to other divided countries in transition.

IFES began its work in Indonesia with a Pre-Election Technical Assessment (PETA) in September 1998, before an IFES field office was established. The purpose of the PETA was not only to provide "an assessment of the current legal and procedural environment relating to the electoral and political system in Indonesia," but also to "provide recommendations to the GOI [Government of Indonesia] and the donor community for actions to take to implement democratic reform."[89] Gathering archival, interview and other data from citizens, political party members, government elites and elections specialists, the PETA served to inform those interested in promoting and stabilizing democracy on the best places to start and potential problems that needed to be addressed. Thus, the PETA demonstrated an application of one of the first lessons from the BiH program. It opened dialogue among international and domestic organizations, and helped them know what they needed to know about Indonesia.

A second lesson learned from BiH that can be applied to the Indonesian case is the close working relationship that IFES developed with local officials and NGOs. In Indonesia, IFES helped address ethnic and religious divisions by working with social and

[89] Mary Lou Schramm, Frank Vassallo, and Bob Dahl, *Republic of Indonesia: Pre-Election Technical Assessment, October 1998* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1998), p. 1.

religious organizations (for example, the Islamic *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*, and the Christian *Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia* and *Kantor Waligereja*) in voter and civic education activities, using their influence and national networks to engage the electorate. These activities focused on eliminating electoral fraud, educating citizens about election laws and procedures, and mobilizing the electorate to take an active part in the political process by voting.

In addition, IFES helped develop and foster Local Consultative Forums (LCF), which were similar to the interest groups in BiH. An LCF was "a forum to discuss matters related to life at a particular locality."[90] According to Kellie Bethke and Hilary Dauer, program assistants for the IFES Indonesia project, the LCFs were more directly regional programs that enabled local leaders and the media to network with each other and receive input from the public on issues that were of direct concern to them.[91] Such regional activities were very important given that much of the division and tension in Indonesia remains isolated in regional struggles. Thus, IFES was able to foster new associational and identity networks to promote democracy. Ultimately, as in the Bosnian case, groups that could have continued to be a divisive influence were working together to promote civil activity and democratic participation.

Finally, the Indonesian case demonstrates the importance of another lesson from BiH in that civic education programs run by IFES were largely successful because of the direct political engagement used in their methodology. Much like the candidate forums in BiH, IFES helped sponsor and coordinate an ongoing political talk show, *Indonesia Baru*, whose guests have included the President of the Republic of Indonesia, members of

[90] Local Consultative Forum, *LCF Newsletter*, Vol. I, June 2002, p. 1.
[91] Kellie Bethke and Hilary Dauer, Interview with Author, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., June 29, 2002.

Parliament, state ministers, and members of political parties and NGOs.[92] Likewise, IFES established a broadcast of full parliamentary sessions and debates known as Voice of the People's Representatives – *Swara Wakil Rakyat*, or *SWARA* (similar to a C-SPAN in the United States, or Prime Ministers Questions in England), in order to show the electorate what their representatives were doing and how the process ultimately works. This direct exposure to parliamentary procedures and activities, to candidates, and to the democratic process helped engage individuals directly with the system and introduced an element of transparency in the political system.

Although the similarities between these two programs are apparent, the contextual differences did require adaptation and adjustment of the IFES methodology. The primary focus of IFES' Indonesia program has been more national than regional. The methodology focused on what IFES deems as the primary threats to democratic transition and consolidation, including the legacy of harsh authoritarianism and political corruption. These primary issues had to be addressed before full attention could be turned to more regional problems. However, the strategy from the early on has been to transfer many IFES activities to local communities and groups. Currently, IFES is trying to sustain its programs long enough to foster "seed" organizations, or groups that can be easily identified and work with international organizations assisting with elections and government when the time comes. Therefore, the focus in Indonesia remains similar to the one in Bosnia—preparing groups for the time when the international community will transfer all operations back to the people.

[92] IFES, "IFES in Indonesia," Bulletin of IFES Activities in Indonesia, Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1999, p. 2.

The IFES program in Indonesia, much like in BiH, yielded positive results in regard to democratic promotion. According to a 1999 pre-election survey done by IFES, 48% of Indonesians strongly supported, and 46% mildly supported, democracy. This unusually high level of support was marked by another characteristic, which was a linear relationship between education and democracy: more educated persons were more likely to strongly support democracy.[93] What is interesting to note is that such a high-level of support for democracy (nearly 95%) can be coupled with another result from the survey, which was that 60% of Indonesians felt there were big changes happening within the political system prior to the 1999 elections. In addition, a plurality of citizens did not like the moral character of their political leaders. Taken separately, these statistics tell a little bit about Indonesia but don't relate a complete story. However, when one considers the high degree of corruption that was never allowed to be addressed by Indonesian society and the lack of tolerance for demonstration and opposition by past Indonesian governments, the statistics relate an entirely new tale. Citizens of Indonesia are highly supportive of democracy because they see it as providing the necessary change to improve their quality of life and political situation. Likewise, they see it as a system in which they can address the corruption of their leaders and influence the direction of the society as a whole. Thus, these survey results help to paint a picture of the changes that are occurring in Indonesia and the mechanisms that garner support from the people.

Although these results do not prove a direct correlation with, or success of, the IFES methodology, they suggest that the more familiar Indonesian citizens are with their government, the more likely they are to support that system. By increasing the knowledge

[93] Steven Wagner, *Summary of Public Opinion Preceding the Parliamentary Elections in Indonesia – 1999* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1999), pp. 6-7.

of individuals about the process and how they can be a part of it, by introducing them to their leaders and showing how they might change that leadership if it is not effectively working for their needs, and by directing groups to become active in shaping and guiding the political system through civil society, IFES is helping to build the level of support for democracy in order to habituate and consolidate its practices for the future. Thus, continuing these educational efforts and expanding the programs to reach rural citizens can definitely help promote and stabilize the democratic transition.

Burundi. The cases of BiH and Indonesia offer optimistic visions of civic education and the success it can have in the promotion of democracy in divided societies. However, these states have the advantage of a relatively mature NGO network and international assistance. Likewise, international development programs, police networks and humanitarian assistance are all helpful in channeling hostilities away from violent outbursts and toward peaceful, democratic means of conflict resolution. What about countries that do not have all of these resources available to them? Can democratic promotion and civil society building work as effectively when these other factors are less developed (if even present at all)? Can the lessons learned in BiH, and supported by experiences in Indonesia, carry over to countries that are not as far along in the developmental and transitional path?

In an attempt to answer these questions, I turn first to the case of Burundi. Unlike BiH and Indonesia, the history of conflict and violence in Burundi is not centuries old. In fact, it was not until the end of Belgium's colonial rule over Ruanda-Urundi in 1961, and

the subsequent formation and independence of Burundi, that violence really became a routine force in the country. To cite Stephen Weissman:

> "What distinguishes the violent conflict in Burundi from so many others is the extent to which elite-led, politico-ethnic rivalry for power has become entwined with mass killing and fears of group extinction. Ethnic violence and genocide are the results not of ancient tribal hatreds but of divisive colonial policies and the post-independence struggle for power among politico-ethnic elites in a polarized and over populated country."[94]

The "divisive colonial policies" discussed by Weissman refer to the Belgium Colonial Administration's policies of educating the dominant Tutsi and excluding all other groups from the administrative and business life of the country. This created an entrenched caste system within Burundi, which exploded when the monarchy (a stabilizing force similar to Tito's government in Yugoslavia and Suharto's in Indonesia) was abolished after Burundi declared independence from colonial rule on July 1, 1962.

To understand the violence that has dominated Burundi from 1965 until the present day, one must understand the ethnic context and its implications for social organization. Burundi is divided between two primary ethnic groups: Hutu (*Bahutu*) and Tutsi (*Watusi*). The Hutu people, who constitute 80-85% of the population,[95] were once slaves who cultivated crops for the elite Tutsi, who comprise 14-19% of the population [see Figure 6].[96] Thus, by continuing to educate only the Tutsi and fostering their advancement in the business and governmental spheres of society the colonial administration made sure that socio-economic status would be determined almost entirely on the basis of ethnicity. This policy lies at the heart of tribal conflict.

---

[94] Stephen R. Weissman, "Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy," *Peaceworks*, No. 22, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. (July 1998): p. v.

[95] Although the numbers have fluctuated a bit over-time, most all sources have the numbers within the 80-85% range. See: *CIA World Factbook 2001*; Weissman (1998); Human Rights Watch, *Proxy Targets: Civilians in the War in Burundi* (New York, Washington, London, Brussels: Human Rights Watch, 1998). IFES, *Burundi: A Pre-Election Assessment Report* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1992).

[96] Ibid. The additional 1% of the population is comprised by the Twa, which is an indigenous tribe of pygmies.

After independence, the animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi created almost continual social conflict, violence and political unrest. Naturally, the Hutu people rejected the notion that the Tutsi minority should rule, and in 1965 violence broke out with the assassination of Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe. In the same year, rebels within the armed forces shot and killed Leopold Biha, Ngendandumwe's successor. One year later, Military Leader Michel Micombero declared Burundi a republic and appointed himself president. His regime would last only about a decade, but before he was deposed in a military coup in 1976, somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 people (the majority of whom were the few educated Hutu) were killed in an unsuccessful Hutu revolt.

Nearly ten years after Micombero was overthrown and replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, Major Pierre Buyoya ascended to power in 1987 in a bloodless coup. Throughout this time, violent clashes continued. In an attempt to end the violence, Buyoya established a multi-ethnic National Commission of Inquiry and National Unity. In 1991, the Charter of National Unity was established, which guaranteed equal rights to all regardless of ethnicity. Concomitantly, a multi-ethnic commission was established to develop a constitution. Violence again erupted between Hutu and Tutsi factions, but Buyoya was committed to continuing the process of building a peaceful Burundian republic. The continued violence that threatened to derail the process of peaceful democratization prompted one IFES official who was in Burundi to comment: "While the Charter embraces national reconciliation, the incidents of November 1991 clearly confirm that not all Burundians have accepted its spirit."[97]

[97] IFES, *Burundi: A Pre-Election Assessment Report*; p. 10.

Figure 6.



In 1993, elections were held that brought about the Presidency of Hutu leader Melchior Ndadaye. His presidency was, however, short lived. In October of 1993, he was assassinated. His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was killed two months later when the plane that was carrying him, along with the president of Rwanda, was shot down over Kigali. The problems in Rwanda, similar to those in Burundi, were also complicating the Burundian political environment. In 1994, clashes between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda lead to the deaths of about 800,000 people. This produced a large number of refugees that spilled over into the borders of Burundi. Violence continued as a way of life between Hutu and Tutsi factions throughout the region.

In 1996, Major Buyoya once again assumed power in a coup d'état that overthrew President Ntibantunganya. Once in power, Buyoya suspended the National Assembly and banned political party activity, which prompted the imposition of economic sanctions on the country by the international community. Violence continued, and from 1993-1998, an

estimated 150,000 people were killed. The violence and sanctions left Burundi in a catastrophic plight socially and economically. The UNDP published an assessment of the area in December of 1998 that estimated that nearly 1,000,000 Burundians were forced from their homes into refugee camps or across borders. The report noted that poverty had jumped from 35% in 1990 to nearly 60% in 1997. Likewise, from 1993 to 1996, the number of children in primary school fell from 70% to approximately 40%, and the inability to vaccinate caused mortality rates to skyrocket.[98] Needless to say, by the time sanctions were lifted in 1999, Burundi was socially and economically decimated.

The path taken by Buyoya to assume power increased the social and economic problems faced by the people of Burundi. Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of the United States "bars assistance under that Act to any country whose duly elected head of government was deposed by military coup."[99] This meant that direct assistance to the Burundian government could not be given by U.S. governmental agencies or NGOs unless it was targeted directly toward anticorruption, AIDS, election or humanitarian efforts, or if given permission via an executive waiver for national interest. These restrictions limited the ability and scope of U.S. assistance and the programs implemented by agencies like IFES.

The elections that were scheduled for 1998 were suspended by presidential decree. However, IFES has begun work to promote civil society and reconciliation in Burundi with the help of the International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG). Such promotional efforts are founded on the principle that democratic support should start as

[98] UNDP, "Choosing Hope: A Case for Constructive Engagement in Burundi," *UNDP Report*, December 1998.
[99] United States House of Representatives, "Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002," HR 2506, signed into law on January 10, 2002.

soon as possible in order to give it time to work. In 1992, IFES was called in to do a pre-election assessment and begin democratic promotion on the basis of its findings and recommendations. The assessment was published in April 1992, and elections were scheduled for early 1993. With less than a year to have any influence on the system, with violent activity still occurring throughout the country, and with broad recommendations that attempted to get at the very heart of social discontent, the IFES program was not given adequate time or context to be successful.[100]

The 1992 assessment performed by IFES did, however, provide insight into the IFES methodology in Burundi and how it was adapted to the social context. First of all, conducting an assessment prior to taking action again confirms the important lesson of finding out what needs to be done and how. Without being aware of social, demographic, economic and political realities, implementing a program would have little or no chance of success. For example, IFES saw the need to use graphics and visual aids to spread the democratic message in Burundi due to the high rates of illiteracy that have dominated the country for so long—and will continue to dominate given the high dropout rates that resulted from the embargo. If IFES were to just develop written citizen education guides, the message would almost surely never get across to the people. Thus, knowing what one needs to know is again a crucial factor for guiding democratic promotion in transitioning societies.

Currently, IFES has two programs targeting civil society in Burundi: The Great Lakes Justice Initiative and the Burundi Initiative for Peace. Started in April 2000, the Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI) is a long-term program focused on strengthening

[100] For a complete look at IFES' activities and recommendations in 1992, see IFES, *Burundi: A Pre-Election Assessment Report*.

civil society.[101] According to Philippe Lemarche, Project Director for IFES-Burundi,GLJI is crucial because most people in Burundi do not know that they have a role to play in resolving the ongoing conflict and crises. Therefore, the GLJI targets the "silent majority"[102] in order to increase their awareness of how they can help facilitate peace and bring about democratic governance.

There are a number of facets to the GLJI program. For starters, IFES brought together 1,600 people from the silent majority to work on issues that are of direct concern to the people of Burundi.[103] The participants in these discussions came from various ethnic, economic and social backgrounds, and the purpose was to initially create cohesion and build trust among rival ethnic groups. After cohesion and trust were established, IFES helped mediate discussions among these participants to identify problems of immediate and direct concern and discuss how people could solve these problems through their own means.[104] Likewise, IFES educated participants on the peace process and the workings of democracy and even set up meetings between the participants and members of the governmental assembly and ministries in an attempt to fill the gap between government and civil society. Finally, IFES staff worked with the participants to provide them with organizational, media and mobilization skills so that the people could begin taking direct action to confront daily problems. Interestingly enough, the participants used these skills to form a lasting association made up of the people involved

[101] Philippe Lemarche, Interview with Author, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., August 6, 2002.
[102] The "silent majority" is a term used by Lemarche to mean the people of Burundi who are not part of the governmental or civil society elite.
[103] Lemarche (2002).
[104] According to Lemarche, two main problems identified were returning refugees and the rampant spread of AIDS. The assembled participants then laid out plans for building homes for the refugees, and thought of ways to educate people about the causes and spread of the AIDS virus. These are examples of how this facet of the GLJI program worked.

in this aspect of the GLJI program in an effort to formalize these informal networks that IFES helped to build. The association is currently working on broad-based community mobilization programs that attempt to sensitize the people of Burundi to political activity.

A second facet of the GLJI program is the use of the media for the purposes of furthering civic education efforts. IFES is currently working in close association with Search for Common Ground to develop radio broadcasts to inform the people of Burundi about important political themes that are not being addressed by the government or other groups. IFES has developed five shows that deal with such themes as the transitional constitution, refugees, land conflict and rights, and the peace process. These programs are similar to the town hall meetings put on by IFES in BiH in that they bring in local elites and governmental officials, and a moderator asks questions that have been prepared by citizens interested in these issues. Therefore, these broadcasts serve the function of connecting the government with citizen concerns and educating the people on these topics and governmental positions.

Finally, the GLJI consists of financial assistance in the form of small grants (usually $2,000) from IFES to local NGOs that are attempting to promote the peace process and democratization. Grants have been given for civic education projects to inform local leaders from all over Burundi, who in turn help to educate people from their province, as well for groups working on women's issues, the media and land conflict. IFES also provided an $18,000 grant for the construction of a resource center in Gitega (similar to the IFES resource centers in BiH, Indonesia and the DRC, and a UN resource center in the Burundian capital of Bujumbura), which receives an average of 80 visitors

per day.[105] Finally, IFES provided a $10,000 grant for survey research to evaluate public perceptions of democracy and elections and provide the results to public officials and representatives so they can redress the negative views citizens have after the 1992-1993 elections. Thus, these grants seek to strengthen the activities of civil society and provide the information necessary to address problems of direct concern to the daily lives of the Burundian people.

The second program implemented by IFES in Burundi is the Burundi Initiative for Peace (BIP), which is run in cooperation with USAID/OTI. The BIP also focuses on providing grants for democratization efforts. However, because IFES is working in conjunction with USAID/OTI, it has more freedom to work directly with the Burundian government.[106] The BIP grants support four types of initiatives:

- Dissemination of Information on the Peace Process
- Increasing the quality of relations between citizens and their representatives
- Financial assistance for building up infrastructure[107]
- Open category for important democratization efforts that do not fall within the first three categories

The grants distributed under the BIP program, therefore, enabled IFES to complement governmental initiatives with efforts to strengthen civil society. In the words of

[105] According to Lemarche, the resource center in Gitega is used by pupils, students, governmental officials, civil society elites, and members of the military. Although an IFES grant helped to establish the resource center and provide books, computers, and internet access, a hotel and restaurant were built nearby to generate revenue to keep it open and operating.

[106] USAID/OTI has been granted "not withstanding authority" under section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which enables them to provide targeted assistance to the interim government of Burundi prior to elections. Thus, these financial grants can go to governmental agencies or officials that are committed to democratization efforts.

[107] Although the building and repairing of infrastructure in Burundi is not directly related to the peace or democratization process, Lemarche said that this category was included so that the people of Burundi could see tangible benefits to these efforts, which increases support and momentum for peace and transition. Lemarche (2002).

Lemarche, "BIP in conjunction with GLJI allows us to work on both the supply and demand sides of civil society strengthening."[108]

An important element of the IFES method in Burundi has been to seek the help of religious institutions in the promotion of civic education. As in BiH and Indonesia, involving institutions of social identity became a way of mitigating some of the hostilities arising out of segmental cleavages. Burundian religious institutions could be used not only as a means of established cross-cutting forms of identification (approximately 62% of the population is Roman Catholic, and another 23% follows indigenous forms of religious practice),[109] [see figure 7] but also as a way to prevent further atomization of society along religious lines by incorporating these social identity groups. Thus, much as in the cases of Indonesia and BiH, targeting and coordinating with established associational groups that shape identity was one way to help promote peaceful cooperation and tolerance and spread the message of civic responsibility.

Figure 7.



[108] Lemarche (2002).
[109] *CIA World Factbook, 2001*.

The case of Burundi is important as it shows how, in order to take more developed steps toward democratic promotion, international organizations must be willing to resolve conflict and promote some level of cooperation *a priori*. The Bosnian example shows how SFOR and NATO forces were able to keep the peace long enough to get groups to negotiate peace, which began the process of cooperation. However, when that is not present, alternative means of dispute resolution and cooperation enhancement need to be developed. That is precisely what IFES and the IHRLG are attempting to establish within Burundi presently. IFES is currently attempting "to promote reconciliation through dialogue by bringing together people from the myriad religious, racial and socio-economic factions."[110] Therefore, establishing networks of cooperation and a public space of citizen action becomes an essential first step to establishing a foundation for democratic action.

The failures of the international community to help assist with democratic state building in 1993 in Burundi actually help confirm additional lessons drawn from the Bosnian case study. Organizations must have the necessary time to enact their programs, as well as provide realistic goals and not impossible criteria. In the 1992 assessment, IFES identified more than ten obstacles standing in the way of democratic progress, including psychological hatreds from past ethnic conflict, refugees, restrictions on parties, censorship of media, lack of governmental transparency and accountability, and the macro-economic structure. Likewise, more than thirteen recommendations were made for resolving these problems. However, much like the problems themselves, these recommendations were not minor. They consisted of simultaneously bringing rebel

[110] IFES, "Burundi: Building Civil Society and Promoting Reconciliation," IFES homepage, found online at http://www.ifes.org/reg_activities/africa.htm#Burundi, last updated July 2002.

groups in active confliuct together for reconciliatory dialogue, assisting the development of a free media and educating a largely peasant culture about the complicated "block-list" system of voting (something the report notes is difficult for even electoral systems experts to understand).

Each of these obstacles, and their corresponding solutions, required a massive concentration of effort, resources and time. International organizations must be willing to commit to a long-term assistance program if any headway is to be made. Likewise, realistic expectations, goals and criteria must temper unachievable idealism. If the standards developed by international organizations are too restrictive or the methods too complex and rigorous, the entire democratic promotion process is in danger of failing. Thus, these failures in 1992 and 1993 help to confirm lessons learned from the BiH experience.

Because the IFES program in Burundi is in its infancy, it is all but impossible to draw any concrete conclusions. However, according to survey research done by IFES, the programmatic efforts of the GLJI are having an impact on the knowledge of the people of Burundi about the government and the peace process. The survey results taken from a comparative sample of 80 participants in the IFES-GLJI project and 80 other Burundians with similar ethnic, social and economic backgrounds showed that people who participated in the IFES program scored on average 20 percent higher than people who did not.[111] The gap between these two samples was even higher on the section of the survey that specifically dealt with the peace process.[112] This shows that programs like the

[111] Lemarche (2002).
[112] Ibid.

GLJI can and do have a positive impact in preparing the silent majority for living within a democratic form of government.

As the process of democratization continues in Burundi, it will provide an even better laboratory for evaluating the IFES approach to civil society and democratic promotion in deeply divided states. Burundi serves as an example of how international organizations must find areas where progress can be made or where progress might be essential to the democratization process. Without the proper foundation—as the failures of Burundi in 1993 demonstrate—no program will be successful. The prospects for democracy, however, remain grim. On October 6, 2001, for example, 11 people were killed in an ethnic clash, and such violence continues to threaten the democratization process even today. Such a situation tests the limits of democratic promotion programs by international organizations. Only time can reveal what lies in the future for the ethnically traumatized Burundi.

There is some hope that the work of IFES and other international organizations working in Burundi are having at least some success in the country. Lemarche points out that after rebel attacks on the capital in early August 2002, no division or mobilization took place within civil society to respond to the violence with force. This is a big shift away from similar instances that had occurred throughout Burundi. Without a violent response on the part of civil society, such actions on the part of rebels do not escalate into mass conflict that could endanger the whole country and put democratization efforts at risk. According to Lemarche, "When civil society does not retaliate, it is the difference between 100 people killed and 100,000."[113] Lemarche attributes the willingness of civil society to hold back from such conflict not only to their weariness with continued

[113] Ibid.

violence, but also to the efforts of groups like IFES to show alternative means of finding a political voice. Lemarche did note that there remains a gap between civil society and government, which IFES is working to fill. He is confident that as civil society continues to develop, strengthen and mature, patterns of nonviolence and cooperation will become habitual and will offer a chance for lasting peace and democratic governance.

Democratic Republic of Congo. The history and development of the DRC is similar to that of Burundi in that it has a colonial history that led to increased ethnic tensions and violence. However, unlike Burundi, much of the conflict in the DRC stems from external forces in the form of uncontrolled refugee immigration and international border conflicts with Rwanda. Thus, as in BiH, the DRC's problems are not just internal. In Bosnia there were border disputes with Croatia and Serbia that caused increased violence, just as the DRC is facing with Rwanda and Uganda. This leads to problems of foreign elites instrumentally mobilizing ethnic hostilities across borders to further their own political power. In addition, the large number of refugees leads to the problems of diaspora detailed by Mandelbaum and his colleagues. Ultimately, the troubles in the DRC are as much an international problem as they are a domestic one.

Internally, there are more than 200 identifiable ethnic groups in DRC, which makes it rather difficult to diagram.[114] Many of these ethnic groups are part of a larger Bantu nation, which comprises nearly half of DRC's population.[115] The primary ethnic tensions are the result of "ethnic pockets," largely refugees that are targeted by foreign governments as sources of potential rebellion.

[114] *CIA World Factbook, 2001*.
[115] Ibid.

Along religious lines, the country is more clearly divided, with approximately half Roman Catholic and the remainder comprised of Protestants (20%), Kimbanguists (10%), Muslims (10%) and other syncretic sects (churches that blend traditional and Christian practices) and indigenous beliefs (10%) [see figure 8].[116] The important thing to note about these religious associations is that they are not segmented along ethnic lines. This gives peace-makers and democratic promoters a source of potential unity and cooperation through the engagement of these religious groups in the processes of political transition.

Figure 8.



The stress between groups finds its roots in 1885, when King Leopold II began a brutal relationship between his Belgian kingdom and the Congo. Nearly 10 million people died from starvation and slaughter after Leopold began his exploitation of the Congo and forced the people of the area into servile labor. Belgium later took over the

[116] Ibid.

administration of the Congo, establishing it as a colony until it gained it independence on June 30, 1960. Much as in the three preceding cases, a political power vacuum was created when the Belgian government stepped out of the country, leading to violence and instability. Less than two weeks after Belgium pulled out of the Congo, civil war broke out as different provinces began trying to secede and form independent states. Civil war continued despite UN efforts to quell such hostilities. Initially these conflicts were over boundary issues and leadership. It was not until the rise of Mobutu Sese Seko in 1970 that ethnic hostilities began to take root.

After his ascension to power, Mobutu made several sweeping reforms in what was then Zaire. Not only did Mobutu nationalize almost all industry, he also began to take steps to eliminate the influence of religious practice in the country. In 1977, the United States and France helped Mobutu repel an invasion by Angolan forces seeking to take over important mining areas of the country for economic purposes. This began a standing cooperation between the U.S. government (particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, which supported Mobutu in exchange for using Zaire as a base to launch covert operations) and the Mobutu regime.

Mobutu retained despotic control over Zaire until he was overthrown in a coup in 1997. Led by Laurent Kabila, the coup largely resulted from Mobutu's ethnically driven policies to remove ethnic Tutsis from the Eastern part of Zaire. Rwanda's government, interested in protecting the Tutsi diaspora, supported Kabila's efforts to topple Mobutu, as did many other governments that were hostile toward Zaire. When he took over, Kabila reinstated the country name of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and rode an initial wave of popular support for helping to rid DRC of the corrupt and oppressive rule

of Mobutu. However, Kabila established his own form of authoritarianism, and his denial of investigations into the mass slaughter of ethnic Hutus further exacerbated ethnic tensions. In August 1998, Kabila's one-time ally, Rwanda, sent military forces, arms and support to ethnic Tutsis in an attempt at insurrection. Kabila was able to suppress it, but the instrumental use of identity by foreign leaders continued to cause problems that manifested in internal and external border disputes.

In July 1999, Kabila made overtures to end the ongoing wars by agreeing to draft accords to end the violence. Outbreaks of violence continued, and Kabila's efforts at peace were cut short when he was assassinated by one of his own body guards in January 2001. He was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila, who continues his father's attempts at establishing peace. In May 2001 Kabila made promises to the United Nations that he would attempt to move the DRC towards a more democratic form of government.[117] However, some international rights organizations are skeptical of such claims because of repeated cases of torture and humanitarian violations throughout DRC.[118]

IFES's role in the DRC remains largely centered on attempting to provide information and establish networks of cooperation in civil society. The ultimate goals of such programs are the fostering of "democratic transition and good governance,"[119] which can be achieved though building civil society networks, carving out a public sphere and linking it to the private, and using civic education programs to promote democratic culture. In this way, the foundational elements of the IFES methodology

---

[117] Mike Donkin, "UN Optimistic Over Congo," *BBC News Online* (May 30, 2001), found online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1361000/1361053.stm.
[118] Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo, Torture: A Weapon of War Against Unarmed Civilians," found online at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AFR620122001?OpenDocument&of =COUNTRIES/DEMOCRATIC+REPUBLIC+OF+CONGO, last updated on June 26, 2001.
[119] IFES, "Supporting the Transition to Peaceful Democratic Governance in DRC," IFES homepage, found online at http://www.ifes.org/reg_activities/africa.htm#DRC, last updated July 2002.

follow the initial efforts in BiH. Likewise, by providing public resource centers that give individuals access to information about the country's political transition and related experiences in Africa, another tenet of the methodological approach used in the DRC, IFES is able to more adeptly coordinate with other international organizations and with local authorities. This, too, follows the BiH model.

According to Caroline Vuillemin, program officer for the Democratic Republic of Congo, the IFES method in DRC follows a "consensual and national initiative" approach, which is focused on establishing regional networks of cooperation among social and political elites working on representing citizen concerns.[120] Vuillemin emphasized the fact that IFES's main objective in DRC is network building and that the cross regional approach increases the effectiveness and impact of the program by including as many provinces as possible. Likewise, IFES has incorporated the local "church network" as a means of communicating its programs in different provinces around the country. These religious networks, according to Vuillemin, are one of the few ways of transferring information to the people of DRC because of the lack of infrastructure and mass communication.

IFES also has a twofold civic education approach in the DRC. The first is designed to educate civil society elites and local leaders about their responsibilities and the technical workings of the governmental system. This part of the program is designed to give civil society a voice, even if it is just concentrated within the elite for the time being. This aspect of civil society promotion seeks to help these social leaders carve out a public space that remains independent from parties and the government. The second part

[120] Caroline Vuillemin, Interview with Author, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., July 30, 2002.

of the civic education approach is directed at the mass citizenry and avoids the more complex technical details in order to make the program more easily understandable. Given the high rates of illiteracy in the country, IFES worked with the Congolese to develop what they call a "picture box" to reach the people. The picture box uses simple visual aids to communicate lessons centered around three core themes: peace, democracy and development. Such methods are used to lay the foundation for future technical training. The picture box aspect of the program is so popular that it is being looked at for use in Guinea and Burundi.[121]

A final, and extremely important, aspect of the DRC program is that IFES is working in close coordination with other international organizations at these beginning stages of civil society promotion. As a part of the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), IFES works in coordination with USAID and NDI in its approach to democracy in DRC.[122] This enables these very important aid agencies to coordinate philosophies and divide and allocate their efforts from the beginning of the transition process. Likewise, IFES works to train journalist and the media in the roles they must play in a free, democratic society. This effort is coupled with similar efforts by the Swiss agency *Fondation Hirondelle*, and both organizations remain in close communication about their efforts. This enables a division of responsibility among the organizations and offers them the luxury of focusing their efforts on the issues they are best equipped to handle. Thus, as the lessons learned in BiH demonstrate, open

[121] Ibid.
[122] CEPPS, *Zaire: Joint Pre-Election Assessment Mission, September/October 1996* (Washington, D.C.: Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, 1996); See also IFES country report on DRC found online at http://www.ifes.org/reg_activities/DRC-reg-act.htm.

coordination and communication among international organizations can be extremely valuable to democratic assistance programs.

Where the two programs primarily diverge is in the different levels of relative peace or conflict that surround Bosnia and the DRC. In BiH, NATO and SFOR military units have been able to police the country and prevent violence so that international assistance can take root and become effective. This is not the case, however, in the DRC where internal and external threats remain ever present. What this demonstrates is not a failure of the IFES methodology but rather the limitations of civil society promotion in ethnically divided societies. When a country's populace is not ready to embrace democratic principles and peaceful means of resolving conflict, civil society assistance and promotion cannot be expected to make significant headway. That is precisely the problem according to UN officials and ambassadors who have visited rebel leaders in DRC. They are reluctant to put down their arms and turn to democratic means of conflict resolution, and some are unwilling to meet with international groups that are seeking peace in the country.[123] Thus, the only thing that an IFES program, and programs like it, can do is help lay the foundation of NGO development, coalition building and information assistance so that, when the violence stops and a transition is fully underway, there is a framework for democratic promotion to build upon.

There are a number of contextual problems that make the prospects for a successful transition dismal. The first is the lack of direct international support to the Congolese government, especially from the United States, due to debts owed by DRC to foreign governments. The Brooke Amendment in the United States is working to block U.S. assistance to the government of the DRC because of outstanding debts. Second, the

[123] Donkin (2001).

inability to travel easily across the country and the lack of mass media tends to concentrate democratization efforts too heavily in Kinshasa, which leads to the increased alienation of regions outside of the capital.

One source of potential optimism is the treaty that was signed between DRC and Rwanda to end the devastating four-year war between the two countries. This could potentially be the beginning of social stability that can allow for the seeds of transition to take hold.[124] The accord does not guarantee peace, and there still is no enforcement mechanism to compell both sides to live up to the agreement. However, the signing of the treaty does put the DRC back on the agenda of the international community. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has promised to "dispatch more human rights monitors to help ensure a peaceful transition."[125] Such assistance by the UN might help prevent further conflict so that the civil society and democratic promotion programs can take hold. Finally, IFES officials remain optimistic about the change that civil society promotion can bring about within DRC. According to Vuillemin, with its "picture box" program, IFES has been able to work with 800 trainers in DRC, who have in turn reached more than 180,000 people in most of the provinces in the west. Moreover, Vuillemin points out that the public resource centers have had an average of 150-170 visitors per day since 2000. Thus, there are bright spots that have inspired hope in the potential for democratization in the DRC.

Much as in the case of Burundi, these efforts are still in their infancy. Therefore, precise conclusions about the feasibility of democracy in the DRC will have to await the passage of time. According to Vuillemin, there has to be a generation-by-generation

[124] CNN.com, "African 'World War' Peace Signing," found online at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/07/30/congo.deal/index.html, June 30, 2002.
[125] Ibid.

evaluation in which the "seeds that are planted now will hopefully grow flowers in two to three generations."[126] Thus, international organizations need to keep their expectations tempered by the realities that face the DRC.

[126] Vuillemin (2002).

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Discussion

The evaluation of the IFES program in Bosnia-Herzegovina highlighted an approach to civil society and democratic promotion in an ethnically divided state in transition. The relative success of the IFES methodology in fostering civic activities, citizen involvement, local NGO development and cooperation among governmental authorities gives a strong indication about the value of such a program in helping a divided country unify in support of democratic progress. Most important, the examination of the program in BiH helped demonstrate the importance of maintaining focus on the two main principles that guide IFES's democratic development programs: bridging the gap between government and civil society and directly engaging the masses rather than just political, social or institutional elites. The analysis of the BiH program also helped confirm the results of USAID studies about the role of civic education in promoting the development of civil society in transitioning states.

The lessons learned in the BiH case were then applied to three other cases of deeply-divided societies in transition: Indonesia, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The case of Indonesia helped to demonstrate that open dialogue among international organizations and local officials, focusing organizational methods on specific elements of democratic promotion, directly involving citizens within the governmental processes in order to educate them, and maintaining realistic goals and tempered expectations all proved to be successful in aiding the democratic consolidation process. In contrast, because of continuing outbreaks of violence, relatively underdeveloped international support networks and very recent moves toward

democracy, Burundi and the DRC did not produce as concrete of a confirmation of the impact of IFES methodology. However, the progress that could be evaluated seems to support the relative worth of the IFES approach to democracy promotion through the fostering of civil society. Likewise, Burundi and DRC also helped to show how international organizations can assist in preliminary political development prior to a full transition to democracy.

One of the lessons that each of these four cases demonstrates is the importance of program continuity to the success of civil society promotion within a country. This implies long-term planning and commitment, which includes funding by donor organizations. International organizations attempting to assist democratic transition, and those donor agencies that help to fund them, need to commit to more than just a "quick fix." Instead, donor organizations must provide continued funding for promotional programs that are making progress within a country, and programs employed must pay attention to step-by-step detail and long-term goals. Without such a focus by donors and actors, even the best of programs will almost assuredly fall short of the desired results. This is one of the reasons that the IFES approach seems to work so well, for it has a cost-effective focus on sustainability. Unfortunately, reliance on outside funding that is not always provided threatens the ability of these programs to take root and succeed.

In the cases of BiH and Indonesia, the NGO communities were more "mature" in their development than in Burundi or the DRC. Likewise, the relatively high level of awareness of the international community about the conflicts in the Balkans and Indonesia, as contrasted to those in Africa, might help to explain the relative development of such support networks. For example, there was a difference in the way the media

treated conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and those in Africa. While scholars and policy makers might debate the reasons for these differences of coverage, the reality is that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Indonesia received far more international aid and intervention than the genocide occurring in Africa.[127] Thus, while the work in BiH and Indonesia was able to address problems that might renew ethnic or religious tensions, in some cases even working directly with ethno-religious groups to promote cooperation and civil activity, in Burundi and the DRC much work still needs to be done to ameliorate tensions and prevent ongoing clashes among ethnic groups.

As the failures in 1992 in Burundi and the relative uncertainty about the democratic promises in the DRC demonstrate, time and environment are both critical factors in guiding democratic assistance. IFES' programmatic attempts to nurture the democratic transition in these countries demonstrate that a comprehensive program has to be given a sufficient amount of time for development and implementation to be successful. Having only a year, IFES was unable to produce any significant moves towards democratic sustainability. Other complicating factors that exacerbate problems between groups must be addressed if democracy is to take root. As in the case of the DRC, for example, a large number of refugees might produce social and economic scarcity, which could undermine the newly established regime's ability to lead.[128]

These issues bring up perhaps one of the most obvious concepts to understand, but one of the hardest to accept, namely that institutions and organizations can only go so

[127] Oxfam recently did a comparison between international assistance to Kosovo with that of DRC. Their research found that in 1999, "donor governments gave just $8 per person in the DRC, while providing $207 per person in response to the UN appeal for the former Yugoslavia." Oxfam International, *A Forgotten War – A Forgotten Emergency: The Democratic Republic of Congo*, found online at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/drc/drc.htm. Also see Oxfam International, *An End to Forgotten Emergencies,* November 2000.

[128] Thomas Homer-Dixon, "The Myth of Global Water Wars," *Toronto Globe and Mail*, November 9, 1995, found online at http://www.homerdixon.com/pop/water_frames.htm.

far in guaranteeing peaceful cooperation and mutual respect for rights within a pluralist society. Where divisions are deep, and where leaders of various factions are unwilling to accept or embrace a democratic ideology, there is only so much that can be achieved by fostering civil society or promoting democracy. A population must be ready to enter into a democracy together, or reforms and programs will not make a difference. Burundi and DRC are testaments to this fact, as are the Catholic-Protestant "troubles" in Northern Ireland and the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East.

However, such a conclusion is often mistakenly understood to mean that institutions do not matter, or at best they are only marginally significant. This is simply not true, especially within the context of deep division. As the Bosnian and Indonesian cases show, historical cleavages within a society exacerbate the already difficult process of democratic transition. Even countries that do not have the problems of ethnic tensions often fail in making a full transition to democracy. Therefore, finding the right type of approach that will begin to bridge segmental divides among a population, getting people to trust groups with which they were once at war, and having education programs that can help to break down deeply held hostilities, are all extremely important. Without the right approach and methodology, international organizations run the risk of letting down the people they were trying to help, and failure in a deeply divided society (as shown in the aftermath of authoritarian regression in Burundi after aborted attempts at democratization in the early 1990s) can often mean horrific devastation. In this sense, institutions and organizations do matter. Worse yet, without sensitivity to the ethnic beliefs and the history of violence and tension, international organizations might fan the fires of smoldering hostility. Thus, even if a population is ready to embrace democracy, it is not a

case that any program will do. It must be the right approach for the context if democratic promotion is to succeed.

There are two elements guiding the IFES methodology that make it successful in the context of a deeply divided society. The first involves bridging the gap between government and civil society, or in the words of IFES President Richard Soudriette, "looking beyond elections and to the relationships of civil society, rule of law and good governance."[129] This is important because linking these sectors of political and public activity helps to establish networks of cooperation and dialogue among influential groups and actors, which helps to not only routinize the workings of a democratic polity but also ensures that elite actors will not so readily turn to the instrumental use of ethnicity in order to mobilize political support. Cooperation and dialogue help keep social and political elites playing by the rules of the game, and helps to eliminate the all-or-nothing nature of election results. This is important for democratic sustainability within a deeply divided context. Likewise, the promotion of civil society activities provides an additional check against the possible oppression of a democratic government. As William F. Buckley once noted, "The best defense against usurpatory government is an active citizenry."[130] Therefore, bridging the gap between government and civil society is an important reason why the IFES approach can be successfully applied to divided societies in transition to democracy.

Concomitantly, IFES does not stop at merely engaging elite actors in an attempt to inculcate and foster democratic activity. IFES combines the targeting of elites with a

[129] Richard Soudriette, Burundi Roundtable Discussion, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., August 6, 2002.
[130] William F. Buckley, as quoted by Cyber Nation International, found online at http://www.cyber-nation.com/victory/quotations/authors/quotes_buckley_williamf.html, 1999.

direct engagement of the mass citizenry. By shifting attention away from just elites and including an emphasis on reaching the people, the IFES program helps to widen the base of democratic support within a transitioning state. This not only strengthens the possibility of long-term sustainability, it also fosters continued dialogue on many levels within a society, thus widening the scope of networking and cooperation and breaking down hostilities that are often present in a deeply divided society undergoing democratic transition.

To be sure, IFES's methodology is only one path toward the goal of democratic promotion. The purpose of this essay was not to create a blueprint for international democratic promotion programs, nor was it to find "the one right way." To the contrary, the ultimate conclusion that should be drawn from each of the cases presented is that context is critical. If different solutions are more appropriate for different contexts, then organizations must be willing to adapt to meet that need. The IFES approach merely shows one way that international organizations interested in fostering democratic transition and consolidation might increase their chance at success.

Finally, implicit throughout this study is the idea that IFES is working toward breaking down the social dependency on "in-group, out-group" symbols within divided societies and attempting to establish more of a national identity for all people. Reflecting on the previous discussion of nationalism and ethnic identity, it is clear that symbols, narratives and communal identity can be both a unifying and dividing force. The goal for international organizations working in deeply divided societies, therefore, is to promote the type of civic nationalism that Ignatieff described, which is more inclusive than exclusive, more universal than specifically communal. Borrowing from the words of

Dixon Bailey, Program Administrator for IFES in Albania, "Democracy is not just a theory, but an attitude."[131] Democracy works because people can relate to the laws and procedures, making them relevant to their daily lives. It is this "democratic attitude" that must be developed if democracy in any form is to survive after its initial transition. A democratic attitude can also help to unify groups that were divided by war into a people working cooperatively toward social and political freedom.

It is interesting to note that IFES does not try to impose symbols on groups, nor does it try to strip historical identity from individuals. Rather, it places emphasis on helping to open up direct lines of communication among citizens, nongovernmental organizations and governmental officials so that they can begin working together in a cooperative manner. In this way, the IFES approach is to help citizens build new symbols of their own. As cooperation becomes patterned, new reference points for people to identify with become established. Therefore, by taking a nonpartisan approach to dealing with democratic transition in deeply divided societies, IFES is helping diffuse tensions by giving the people a chance to build a larger social mythology with which they can all identify—a political identity based on cooperation and inclusion, rather than hostility and violence. By fostering networks of cooperation and dialogue among elites and by directly engaging and empowering the people, the IFES methodology offers a cost-effective means of fostering a unified vision of the democratic state in deeply divided societies. Perhaps by breaking the bonds of the bounded community, international organizations can offer the people a feeling of transcendence and permanence by making them believe in the initial importance of the process to give their lives meaning.

---

[131] Dixon Bailey, Lecture on "Obstacles to the Democratic Process in Albania," Presented at the International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., July 23, 2002.

List of Abbreviations

BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina

BIP – Burundi Initiative for Peace

CCE – Center for Civic Education

CCI – Centers for Civic Initiatives

DAE – Division of Electoral Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

GAINs – *Gradjanska Aktivna Inicijativa* (Citizen Activist Initiatives)

GLJI – Great Lakes Justice Initiative

GOGs – *Grupa za Obuka Gradjana* (Voter Education Sessions)

GOI – Government of Indonesia

HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union

IFES – International Foundation for Election Systems

IHRLG - International Human Rights Law Group

IRI – International Republican Institute

LCF – Local Consultative Forum

MISAT – Ministry of Interior, Security and Territorial Administration of the DRC

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDI – National Democratic Institute

NGO – Nongovernmental Organization

OHR – Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina

OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PETA – Pre-Election Technical Assessment

PR – Proportional Representation

PSC – Polling Station Committee

PV – Preferential Voting

RS – Republika Srpska

SFOR – NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

SWARA – *Swara Wakil Rakyat* (Voice of the People's Representatives)

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

USAID/OTI – USAID Office of Transition Initiatives

References

Almond, G. A., "Separate Tables," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (November 1998).

Amnesty International, "Democratic Republic of Congo, Torture: A Weapon of War Against Unarmed Civilians," found online at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AFR620122001?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES/DEMOCRATIC+REPUBLIC+OF+CONGO, last updated on June 26, 2001.

Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (New York, London: Verso, 1991).

Baĉová, V., "The Construction of National Identity: On Primordialism and Instrumentalism," *Human Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 1. (January, 1998): 28-48.

Bailey, D., Lecture on "Obstacles to the Democratic Process in Albania," Presented at the International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., July 23, 2002.

Barry, R.L., Personal correspondence to Ed Morgan of the International Foundation for Election Systems, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Mission Head to Bosnia and Herzegovina. (April 30, 2001), Reproduced online at http://www.ifesbih.org/BarryLetter.htm.

Bennett, C., "How Yugoslavia's Destroyers Harnessed the Media," found online at http://www.pbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/bosnia/media.html, last updated 1995.

Bethke, K. and Dauer, H., Interview with Author, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., June 29, 2002.

Buckley, W. F., as quoted by Cyber Nation International, found online at http://www.cyber-nation.com/victory/quotations/authors/quotes_buckley_williamf.html, 1999.

Campbell, J., *The Power of Myth* (New York: Anchor Books, Random House, 1991).

Carothers, T., *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

CEPPS, *Zaire: Joint Pre-Election Assessment Mission, September/October 1996* (Washington, D.C.: Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, 1996).

CIA, *CIA World Factbook, 2001*. Found online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.

CNN.com, "African 'World War' Peace Signing," found online at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/07/30/congo.deal/index.html, June 30, 2002.

Collier, D. and Levitsky, S., "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," *World Politics* 49 (1997): 430-451.

Csagoly, P. "Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Politics of the Environment," *The Bulletin*, Vol. 7, No. 3. (Autumn-Winter, 1997): pp. 13-14.

Di Palma, G., *To Craft Democracies* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990).

Diamond, L., "Winning the Cold War on Terrorism: The Democratic Governance Imperative" (Institute for Global Democracy, Policy Paper No. 1), March 2002.

Donia, R. J. and Fine, J. V. A., Jr., *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

Donkin, M. "UN Optimistic Over Congo," *BBC News Online* (May 30, 2001), found online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1361000/1361053.stm.

Fischer, J. and Lansell, S.R., *IFES/OSCE: On-site Technical Assistance Mission: Bosnia and Herzegovina January-March, 1996* (Washington D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1996).

Gellner, E., *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).

Hann, C. and E. Dunn (eds.), *Civil Society: Challenging Western Models* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).

Heffner, R. (ed.), *Democracy in America* by Alexis de Tocqueville (New York: Mentor Books, 1984).

Horowitz, D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

Human Rights Watch, *Proxy Targets: Civilians in the War in Burundi* (New York, Washington, London, Brussels: Human Rights Watch, 1998).

Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *Stoking the Fires: Military Assistance and Arms Trafficking in Burundi* (New York, Washington, London, Brussels: Human Rights Watch, 1997).

Huntington, S., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth-Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

IFES, "Burundi: Building Civil Society and Promoting Reconciliation," IFES homepage, found online at http://www.ifes.org/reg_activities/africa.htm#Burundi, last updated July 2002.

IFES, "Supporting the Transition to Peaceful Democratic Governance in DRC," IFES homepage, found online at http://www.ifes.org/reg_activities/africa.htm#DRC, last updated July 2002.

IFES, *IFES BiH – Civic Education Project: Final Report, 2000-2001* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 2001).

IFES, "IFES in Indonesia," Bulletin of IFES Activities in Indonesia (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1999).

IFES/OSCE Electoral Code Working Group, *Bosnia and Herzegovina Activity Compendium January-March, 1996* (Washington D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1996).

Ignatieff, M., *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (New York: Henry Holt, 1997).

Kaplan, R., *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

Katz, R., Presentation of ideas at "Democracy Exchange: Ethnic Conflict and the Electoral Process" seminar, July 9, 2002, USAID Development Information Services, Washington, D.C.

Kernell, S., *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*, third edition, (San Diego: University of California Press, 1997).

Lemarche, P., Interview with Author, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., August 6, 2002.

Lijphart, A., *Power Sharing in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, 1985).

Lijphart, A., *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

Linz, J. and Stepan, A., (eds.) *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

Local Consultative Forum, *LCF Newsletter*, Vol. I, June 2002, pp. 1-7.

Mandelbaum, M., (ed.) *The New European Diasporas: National Minorities and Conflict in Eastern Europe* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2000).

Marks, D. K., *NGO Coordination and Development: Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, July-August 1997* (Washington D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1997).

Miller, J., et al, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Information and Technology Mission, May-September 1996* (Washington D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1996).

Morgan, D., "One Nation Under Tito," *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1999, p. A37.

Morgan, E., et al., *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Voter Education Program for 1996* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1996).

Nikolas, M. M., "False Opposites in Nationalism: An Examination of the Dichotomy of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Modern Europe," Masters Thesis for Monash University's Centre for European Studies, reproduced on line be *The Nationalism Project*, http://www.nationalismproject.org/articles.html, March 11, 1999.

O'Donnell, G. and P. C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

Ottaway, M. and T. Carothers (eds.), *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democratic Promotion* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).

Oxfam International, *A Forgotten War – A Forgotten Emergency: The Democratic Republic of Congo*, found online at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/ policy/papers/drc/drc.htm.

Oxfam International, *An End to Forgotten Emergencies,* November 2000.

Parkinson, E., Interview with Author, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., August 2, 2002.

Pilon, J. G., Interview with Author, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., August 5, 2002.

Pilon, J. G., "The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Political Reform: Lessons Learned and Best Practices," working paper, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., 2002.).

Pilon, J. G., *The Bloody Flag: Post-Communist Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Spotlight on Romania* (New Brunswick, London: Social Philosophy and Policy Center and by Transaction Publishers, 1992).

Przeworski, A., *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Putnam, R., *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).

Putnam, R., *Making Democracy Work* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).

Riedlmayer, A., "A Brief History of Bosnia-Herzegovina," as compiled for the *Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering Project*, found online at http://www.kakarigi.net/manu/briefhis.htm., summer 1993.

Saraswati, B. (ed.), *Interface of Cultural Identity Development* (New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, 1996), found on-line at http://ignca.nic.in/ls_03015.htm.

Sartori, G., "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (1970), pp. 1033-1053.

Schramm, M. L., Interview with author, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., July 1, 2002.

Schramm, M.L., F. Vassallo, and B. Dahl, *Republic of Indonesia: Pre-Election Technical Assessment, October 1998*, (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1998).

Silber, L. and A. Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997).

Sinclair, U., *The Jungle* (New York: Penguin Putnam, Inc. New American Library, 1906 and 1981).

Soudriette, R., Burundi Roundtable Discussion, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., August 6, 2002.

Tindemas, L., et al., *Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), pp. 23-24.

United Nations Development Programme, "Choosing Hope: A Case for Constructive Engagement in Burundi," *UNDP Report*, December 1998.

United States Agency for International Development, "Agency Objectives: Civil Society," Found online at http://www.usaid.gov/democracy/civ.html, last updated November 16, 2001.

USAID, "Program Highlights," *USAID Homepage*, Found online at http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/ cbj2003/highlights.html, lasted updated 2003.

USAID, "Approaches to Civic Education: Lessons Learned," Technical Publication Series, June 2002, Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID, Washington, D.C.

United States House of Representatives, "Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002," HR 2506, signed into law on January 10, 2002.

Vuillemin, C., Interview with Author, International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, D.C., July 30, 2002.

Wagner, S., *Summary of Public Opinion Preceding the Parliamentary Elections in Indonesia – 1999* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1999).

Weissman, S.R., "Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy," *Peaceworks*, No. 22, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. (July 1998).

Zimmerman, W., *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers* (New York: Random House, 1999).