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Characteristics of Election Systems

IFES

USAID

AEOBiH Election Course

PARTICIPANT MATERIALS
MODULE B

TAB ONE — **SCHEDULE**

TAB TWO — **EXERCISES AND LECTURES**

- ***A. Pre-Test (to be handed out in class)***
- **B. Outline Lecture No.1 (Overview of Election Systems)**
- ***C. Exercise No. 1 Worksheet (to be handed out in class)***
- **D. Outline Lecture No. 2 (Types of Election Formuale)**
- ***E. Exercise No. 2 Worksheet (to be handed out in class)***
- **F. Outline Lecture No.3 (Seat Allocation Calculation)**
- ***G. Quiz No. 1 (to be handed out in class)***
- ***H. Quiz Game (College Bowl) (to be done in class)***
- **I. Outline Lecture No. 4 (Effect of District Magnitude)**
- **J. Outline Lecture No. 5 (Ballots)**
- ***K. Exercise No. 3 Worksheets (to be handed out in class)***
- **L. Outline No. 6 (Voter Registration Systems)**
- ***M. Exercise No. 4 Worksheet (to be handed out in class)***
- **N. Outline No. 7 (Effect of Election Formulae on Political Parties)**
- ***O. Kalabashse Simulation Exercise (to be done in class)***

TAB THREE — **REFERENCE MATERIALS**

- **A. IDEA Handbook on Election System Design**
- **B. Sample Ballots**
- **C. ACE Materials**
  - **Electoral Systems**
    - a. Overview
    - b. Guiding Principles
    - c. Administrative Considerations
    - d. Cost Considerations
    - e. Social and Political Context

PARTICIPANT MATERIALS
MODULE B

TAB THREE **REFERENCE MATERIALS**

f. Historical Review
g. Practical Advice
h. Parliamentary Size

Boundary Delimitation

9. Overview
10. Guiding Principles
11. Electoral Systems that Delimit Electoral Boundaries
12. Designation of a Boundary Authority
13. Establishment of Criteria for Delimiting Districts
14. Equal Population
15. Geographic Criteria
16. Communities of Interest
17. Tasks Involved in Drawing Electoral District Boundaries
18. Information Required to Draw Electoral Boundaries
19. Steps in Electoral District Delimitation Process
20. Delimiting Voting Areas

Parties and Candidates

21. Historical Review
22. Social Influences versus Political Influences

TAB FOUR **ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANT READINGS**

A. Plain Language Writing
B. Comparing Democracies Chapter by Andre Blais and Louis Massicotte
C. Module B Public Speaking Materials
D. Module B Group Process Materials
E. Module B Negotiation Materials
F. Module B Media Information Materials

SCHEDULE

AEOBIH ELECTIONS COURSE
MODULE B: Characteristics of Various Election Systems

SCHEDULE: DAY ONE

8:30-9:00	Review Schedule, Objectives & Group Expectations
9:00-9:10	Pre-Test
9:10-9:55	Lecture No.1: Overview of Election Systems
9:55-10:45	Exercise No. 1(Purpose of Elections in Modern Society)
10:45-11:00	Coffee Break
11:00-11:45	Lecture No.2: Types of Election Formulae
11:45-12:45	Exercise No. 2 (Advantages and Disadvantages of Election Formulae)
12:45-13:45	Lunch
13:45-14:00	Reflection
14:00-14:30	Lecture No.3: Seat Allocation Calculation
14:30-15:30	Quiz No. 1 (Calculating Seat Allocations)
15:30-15:45	Coffee Break
15:45-16:00	Discussion
16:00-16:15	Answer Pre-Test
16:15-16:30	Reflection

AEOBIH ELECTIONS COURSE
MODULE B: Characteristics of Various Election Systems

SCHEDULE: DAY TWO

8:30-9:00	Discussion and Review of Schedule
9:00-10:15	Quiz Game (College Bowl)
10:15-10:45	Lecture No.4: Effect of District Magnitude
10:45-11:00	Coffee Break
11:00-11:15	Discussion
11:15-11:45	Read
11:45-12:00	Reflection
12:00-13:00	Lunch
13:00-13:30	Lecture No. 5: Ballots
13:30-14:15	Exercise No. 3 (Writing Instructions on Marking and Counting Ballots)
14:15-14:30	Coffee Break
14:30-15:00	Lecture No.6: Voter Registration Systems
15:00-15:45	Exercise No. 4 (Analysis of Voter Registration Systems)
15:45-16:15	Lecture No.7: Effect of Election Formulae on Political Parties
16:15-16:30	Discussion
16:30-17:00	Reflection

SCHEDULE: DAY THREE

AEOBIH ELECTIONS COURSE
MODULE B: Characteristics of Various Election Systems

8:30-9:00	Distribution of Roles for Simulation Exercise
9:00-10:30	Group Session No. 1
10:30-10:45	Coffee Break
10:45-11:00	Press Interviews No. 1
11:00-12:00	Group Session No. 2
12:00-12:15	Television Report/ Press Briefing No. 2
12:15-13:15	Lunch
13:15-15:15	Presentations to Constitutional Committee
15:15-15:30	Coffee Break
15:30-17:00	Presentations to Constitutional Committee
17:00-17:30	Press Conference or Briefing No. 3
17:30-18:00	Reflection and Evaluation

MODULE B
OUTLINES

Lecture No. 1. Overview of Election Systems

1. Over history freedom of citizens to choose their leaders (self-determination) has evolved to be the criterion for establishing legitimate governments.

2. International covenants and agreements impose elections as legally binding obligations on countries that have ratified them.

3. These standards may apply to countries that have not ratified the covenants where customary international law is applied.

4. The criteria used to determine whether elections are structured to permit self-determination have also evolved and are set forth in various international legal documents. Some of these standards have been voluntarily accepted by states.

5. Standards used to evaluate elections involve basic human freedoms (speech, assembly, freedom of association) as well as other requirements, such as the use of secret ballots.

6. Codes of conduct are a mechanism used to establish behavioral norms for various groups
   a. codes of conduct can be incorporated into legislation or not
   b. some groups have codes of conduct imposed by their professions (doctors, judges)

7. Elections **alone** are not enough to make a democracy endure.
   a. orderly of transfer of power
   b. accountability to citizens

   c. opposition parties and candidates (multi-party system)
   d. reduction of inequality

8. Elections are an inextricable part of representative democracy

a. election results are analyzed to measure condition of democracy
b. officials adopt policies that are based on voter appeal

9. Election system includes
   a. way votes are counted
   b. seat allocation calculation
   c. voter registration
   d. political parties
   e. election administration
   f. voter education
   g. review and resolution of grievances

10. No ideal election system exists. What works for one country may not for another. Need a minimum of these two things to qualify as a democracy
   a. election system meets international standards
   b. citizens actually choose their leaders
   c. leaders are responsible/ accountable to population

11. Election systems change infrequently, but may to respond to social changes in the country or to promote stability. (see Japan, Italy, Canada, New Zealand)

12. Election system is the set of rules used to determine how votes are cast and how seats are allocated.
   a. how votes are cast includes ballot and its structure

   b. how seats are allocated includes decisions about size of parliament and of the districts in which they will be elected
   c. each component of an election system has political consequences
13. Election professionals must understand election rules and their political consequences.
   a. professionals have specialized knowledge
   b. need to master basic information to communicate effectively with colleagues in BiH and elsewhere
   c. need to have information to carry out responsibility for educating public and correcting misinformation

14. Need to master definitions contained in the text.
    a. term election system used in lectures is broader than in text
    b. material in module appears difficult because it involves so many new terms and some of it is technical
    c. best way to approach the material is to think about the underlying principles and values of each component of the election system
    d. ask what problem each permutation in an election formula was meant to solve
    e. question whether problems can be solved outside the election rules.

MODULE B
OUTLINES

Lecture No. 2. Types of Election Formulae

1. Answer to question *who won* depends upon the election formula.
   a. Our definition of election formula is broader than the one used in the IDEA text.
   b. There are a number of favorable and unfavorable characteristics associated with different election formulas.
   c. Study of elections is not an exact science, despite attempt to quantify it and to produce theories and laws.
   d. This lecture will identify main election formulae and discuss the favorable and unfavorable attributes of each.

2. Oldest and most widely used method used to determine who won is **plurality** formula.
   a. Means person with the **most** votes won. (Could mean that someone who only got 40% of all votes could win).
   b. Need to distinguish between terms used (**simple majority, absolute majority and super majority**)
   c. Absolute majority is generally meant to require more than 50%; Super majority means at least 2/3 (66.66%).
   d. **Plurality** is also known as *First Past the Post* and also (but not as used in the IDEA text, *winner* take all).

3. The positive characteristics of **plurality election formula** are:
   a. Accountability of elected officials to public. *This attribute occurs because the plurality election formula generally is used in single-member districts.* Single-member districts means there is only one seat for the area defined as the district.
   b. Independent candidates have better chance to be elected where plurality election formula is used in a single-member district.
   c. One party majority governments are more frequently associated with plurality election formulas used in parliamentary elections. One party majority governments are said to be able to govern (enact legislation and programs) more easily and to be more stable.
   d. Removal of unresponsive officials is said to be easier where a plurality election formula is used in single-member districts.

4. The negative characteristics associated with the plurality formula are:
   a. Wasted votes are votes cast for a candidate or party that does not win. More wasted votes are associated with the plurality election formula because someone may win who has not received a majority of all the votes. This has consequences for electors who may be discouraged from voting.
   b. A party that has widespread support may not win any seats at all. This is an obvious consequence of the wasted vote syndrome.
   c. Minority parties and candidates are said to be disadvantaged. This is because the plurality election formula favors large, broadly based parties.
   d. May advantage political parties that are ethnically biased. This can happen where such parties are widely distributed throughout a country and are large. Or, it may also happen where there is a concentration of supporters in one geographical area.

5. The **majority election formula** solves the problem of a candidate or party winning without the support of over half of the population. The value underlying the majority election formula is that anyone who wins should receive at least half the votes. It strengthens the legitimacy of the leaders who are chosen.
   a. This formula was first used in the early 19th Century.
   b. The **majority election formula** also is used primarily in single-member districts, so it has the advantage of promoting geographic accountability.
   c. A disadvantage of the majority election formula is that no one may win a majority and further elections may be necessary. This is costly.
   d. The **majority election formula** is also known as the **Two-Round System**, because a second or perhaps third round of elections may be necessary for a winner to emerge.
   e. But an advantage of the majority election formula comes from the fact that cooperation and coalition building among parties and candidates that will probably take place between the first and second round of elections.
   f. Permutations of the **majority election formula** have been developed to address the disadvantage of cost associated with multiple rounds of elections.
      i. **majority run-off** limits the number of candidates participating in the second round
      ii. **majority-plurality** does not limit the number of candidates but allows whoever gets plurality of votes in the second round to win

iii. **alternative vote** combines two rounds of elections in one, by allowing voters to rank their candidates by preference **(All election formulae that allow voters a preference result have ballot counting procedures that require a transfer of votes)**. But note that the alternative vote can result in a candidate winning with less than majority support. There are no problems of wasted votes with the alternative vote.

6. The value underlying the **proportional representation election formula** is that each party should be awarded seats in proportion to the votes received. PR can only be used in a multi-member district. It was developed at the end of the 19th Century and has been used by 60% of the countries since.
   a. The **PR election formula** uses parties because it is used in multi-member districts where more than one seat is being contested. Cannot divide a single seat in a proportional manner.
   b. **PR election formula** uses **Party Lists or Single Transferable Vote**. Single Transferable Vote is a preferential vote, just like the Alternative Vote, but applied to multi-member districts.

7. The advantage of the **PR election formula** is that it is said to be the most fair. Thus, it allows smaller and minority parties a chance to be represented.
   a. promotes strong political parties (parties select candidates and their place on the list)
   b. promotes coalition governments that are said to have a broad political appeal
   c. does not have any wasted votes
   d. effective in societies that have deep linguistic and ethnic divisions

8. The disadvantages of the **PR election formula** are
   a. many small parties may win; some may not be democratic but may be extremist. They may polarize a country
   b. coalition governments result, which are thought to be less stable and more difficult to govern
   c. less geographic accountability
   d. political parties that are unresponsive may stay in power because they are part of a coalition
9. There are many permutations to the **PR election formula**, because there are five major components involved in it.
   a. district magnitude involves the question how many seats are being contested?

b. seat allocation calculation involves the question how many seats does a party get?
c. thresholds are always exclusionary. The higher the threshold the more difficult it is for smaller parties to gain a seat
d. preferences are related to how ballots are structured and counted
e. tiers are involved with mixed or parallel PR systems

10. The **mixed or parallel election formula** uses both plurality or majority election and PR election formulae.
10. The advantages of the **mixed or parallel system** are it combines accountability with proportionality
    a. may be corrective or not

12. The disadvantages are that it is complicated for voters.
    a. Where high threshold exists may eliminate the advantage to smaller parties of the PR election formula.
    b. May cause internal problems for political parties
    c. Complicated to administer

MODULE B
OUTLINES

Lecture No. 3. Seat Allocation Calculation

1. Answer to who won depends on the kind of election formula used: plurality, majority, PR.

2. **Seat allocation calculation** only applies where the PR election formula is used. It is concerned with how seats are distributed to parties.
   a. not every party wins a seat in an election using the PR election formula.
   b. before seats can be calculated, the number of seats being contested (district magnitude) must be known

3. There are two methods used to calculate seat allocation. The **largest remainder** and the **highest average** method.
   a. the **highest average method** of seat allocation uses different divisors in calculating seat allocation
      i. **D'Hondt** uses sequential whole numbers (1,2,3,4,5) and gives a bonus to larger parties
      ii. **Sainte-Lague** uses sequential odd whole numbers (1,3,5,7,9,11) and gives smaller parties more chance to gain a seat
      iii. Modified **Sainte-Lague** uses sequential odd whole numbers EXCEPT for the first (1.4, 3,5,7,9) and makes it more difficult for smaller parties to gain a seat, but not as difficult as the **Sainte-Lague.**
   b. the **largest remainder method** involves two separate calculations. First, a **quota** is used to establish how many seats a party won initially THEN the unallocated seats (the REMAINDER) are awarded based on the party with the largest remainder. The quota used determines the size of the remainder.
      i. the **Hare Quota** is the number of seats to be allocated within the district and produces the more proportional result.
      ii. the **Droop Quota** is the number of seats to be allocated within the district plus one and produces the less proportional result.

MODULE B
OUTLINES

Lecture No. 4. Effect of District Magnitude

1. **District Magnitude** answers the question how many seats will be allocated within a geographical district.

2. Two issues are related to **District Magnitude**. Designating the geographical areas called electoral districts and determining the number of persons to be elected within the electoral district..

3. The term district can be used to refer to administrative districts, electoral districts, designated polling area. Be certain to ask the meaning of the term when it is used.

4. The **district magnitude** in single-member districts is one. In multi-member districts it is greater than one.

5. Elections using the **PR formula** use either multi-member districts or tiers (different levels of electoral districts in one election to achieve proportional results).

6. **Mixed or parallel formulas** use tiers or a combination of single or multi-member districts, without the specific intent to achieve proportionality.

7. Where different election formulas are used for different elections, several electoral districts will need to be created.

8. How many persons should be elected in a district depends on the nature of the election.
   a. Presidential election, entire country may be one district.
   b. Municipalities may be subdivided into single-member electoral districts to provide accountability.
   c. **District magnitude** is usually discussed in connection with parliamentary elections.
   d. Two questions must be answered in connection with district magnitude
      i. how many persons should be elected in total for a parliament?
      ii. assuming the entire country is not one electoral district, how many persons should be elected in each electoral district? There is a trade-off between size and accountability.
      iii. related to these is the question how should those boundaries be established?

MODULE B
OUTLINES

9. Total parliament size effects political party representation, the legislative process and citizen perception of responsiveness.
   a. There is a formula for determining optimal parliament size, based on a country's active population of citizens that is included in the materials.

10. The kind of election formula used and the number of persons to be elected within a district are related.
    a. **Plurality and Majority election formulae** tend to be applied in single-member districts.
    b. Once a decision has been made to use single-member districts, the important issue is deciding on the electoral district boundaries.
    c. In multi-member districts, the issue is how many people are to be elected within each electoral district. This is referred to as **district magnitude.**
        i. the greater the **district magnitude** (the more people to be elected in an electoral district) the more proportional the results
        ii. One way to set **district magnitude** is to create and apply some "voter per representative" formula. This requires frequent adjustment of district boundaries to make sure the representative /population ratio remains equal.
        iii. More common is to use the existing administrative boundaries and assign a number of seats based on population. This method requires that the number of seats be changed periodically to reflect the changes in population.
        iv. Research into **district magnitude** shows that between three to seven seats per district produces representative results.
        v. Underlying values in choosing **district magnitude** of one versus more than one are the same as those involved in choosing **plurality/majority election formula** over **PR election formula**. Accountability versus representation.

11. Single-member districts require special attention to be paid to electoral boundaries, which must be **resized** often if the equality of votes is to remain. **Mixed and parallel election formula** also requires **resizing** electoral boundaries because both single-member districts and multi-member districts are used for one election.
    i. who should draw the boundaries
    ii. should parliament approve final boundaries
    iii. should general public be consulted

iv. how often should boundaries be redrawn
v. what criteria should be used in drawing boundaries
vi. should district boundaries be open to challenge in court

12. Most basic criterion in establishing district boundaries involves making sure the population is equal or approximately equal in each district.
13. Equal representation is fundamental to democracy and is necessary to prevent vote dilution.

14. Geographic factors must be taken into account. Include
    a. administrative boundaries (where coterminous, term used is communities of interest)
    b. natural boundaries, such as rivers, mountains
    c. remoteness of areas, population dispersal, accessibility to services, etc.
    d. contiguity is generally required

15. Criteria used to establish communities of interest are intended to create cohesive units
    a. shared racial or ethnic background
    b. common history or culture
    c. common religion or language
    d. similar socio-economic status
16. Certain countries prohibit diluting the strength of minority, ethnic or racial groups by redistricting. (USA, New Zealand)
17. Frequency of redistricting is contained in the law. Often is required to be reviewed after a census is taken.

MODULE B
OUTLINES

Lecture No. 5. Ballots

1.The final decision to be made in connection with designing a **PR list election formula** is the **ballot.** How the ballot is marked depends upon how the nature of the lists.

   a. open lists
   b. closed list
   c. free (panachage)

2. Which list is used is also directly related to how one counts the ballots to determine who won.
   a. cannot have single transferable vote with a closed list
3. Voter may vote for party or person (candidate)
   a. generally, in PR election formulae votes are cast for parties
   b. generally, in plurality/majority election formulae, votes are cast for persons
4. Deviation from these rules have been made to address certain problems
   a. the alternative vote as a way to resolve the costs involved in multiple elections where the majority formula is used.
   b. open lists to dilute the power of political parties in placing candidates on lists
5. How **ballots** are marked and designed has implications for voter education programs.
   a. **categorical ballots** are marked for only ONE candidate or party.
   b. in **PR election formula** this is a **closed list** and it offers the voter the least amount of choice
   c. in **plurality/majority election formulae, categorical ballots** are generally used
   d. **ordinal ballots** allow voters to rank candidates or to choose a candidate from among a party list
   e. **preferential voting** is the term reserved for **ranking candidates**, in either plurality/majority (alternative vote) election formulae or in a PR election formula (single transferable vote)
6. **Open list** allows voter to express a preference for a candidate within a party list and to vote for the party.
7. **Free list** or **panachage** allows voters the greatest amount of freedom by allowing them to cast as many votes as there are seats being contested and to vote across party lines.
8. The **underlying values** about which **ballot** (and which election formula)to choose are whether the voter's opinion about the candidate is more important than the opinion about a party. (How much trust is given to political parties.)
   a. the greater the importance given to choosing individual candidates, the less appealing the PR list
   b. the more importance is placed on accountability, the less appealing the PR election formula

c. the greater importance is given to having parliament be representative of the population as a whole, the less appealing the plurality/majority single-member district election formula

9. Other considerations related to ballots are:
   a. literacy of population; complicated ballots may not be understood and many votes may be invalidated
   b. cost of multiple ballots or lengthy ballots
   c. cost of counting ballots (complicated ballots require better trained personnel to count properly)
   d. there is a **trade-off** between the factors of choice, cost, administrative capacity, literacy of population
   e. cost of loss of public confidence in electoral process is real, but difficult to quantify

10. Issue of representation has not been discussed directly. It is inherent value in any election formula.
   a. what is the nature of representation
      i. geographical
      ii. diversity of population as whole
      iii. population whose interests being advocated by a political party

MODULE B
OUTLINES

Lecture No. 6. Voter Registration Systems

1.Most of the module has been spent determining *who won*, by analyzing the components of the election formulae.

2. No one wins unless the citizens who are entitled to vote are in fact do.

3. In Module A we saw that there is a binding legal obligation for states to make sure their citizens are allowed to vote and to stand for office.

4. **Voter registration** is the mechanism (process) used to satisfy a country's legal obligation to make certain that all its eligible citizens are able to vote.

- a. this involves identifying and communicating with the eligible voters and results in the creation of a **voter register or list**
  - i. A good **voter's list** will satisfy three requirements
    - a. all eligible citizens should be included
    - b. no eligible citizens should be excluded
    - c. no ineligible persons should be included
- b. where process of registration is flawed and the list is inadequate, it is questionable whether the election outcome reflects the will of the people
- c. countries whose elections are not conducted to allow the will of the people to be expressed in the choice of leaders are not considered to be democracies

5. Choice of a **voter registration** mechanism reflects certain underlying values, as it is part of the election system.

- a. **mandatory voter registration and mandatory voting** reflect the value that citizenship carries certain responsibilities, one of which is voting.
- b. **voluntary voter registration and voting** allows the citizen freedom to participate or not
  - i. passive registration
  - ii. active registration
  - iii. each reflects different underlying values

6. There is a relationship between **voter registration mechanism** and the **election formula.**

a. where single-member districts are used (plurality/majority/parallel) the voter registration mechanism must be designed to include persons who are eligible to vote in that specific district
b. this is also true where tiers are used

7. Efficient **voter registration mechanism** must be:
   a. comprehensive (everyone should be registered)
   b. inclusive (all groups are included and no discrimination exists)
   c. accurate (information is correct and current)

8. **Voter registration mechanism** will depend upon social reality
   a. mobility of population
   b. education and literacy of population
   c. available means of communication
   d. administrative infrastructure of country
   e. sensibility of population about privacy
   f. public trust in government institutions
   g. climate

9. **Voter registration** is one of the most expensive aspects of an election because it requires identifying and communicating with the entire population of eligible voters.
   where the process is flawed or the voter's list is inaccurate, there are serious problems
   i. voters are deprived of their vote
   ii. public trust in government is eroded
   iii. there is more friction between political parties

10. **Voter registration** mechanisms produce three different kinds of voter's lists
    a. **periodic list** (register voters anew just before each election)
    b. **continuous list** (a list that is continually updated and maintained)
    c. **civil registry** (a database of information about all citizens kept by the government from which a voter's list is created)

MODULE B
OUTLINES

11. Each kind of **voter's list** has advantages and disadvantages
    a. **periodic list** is usually accurate and current and it does not require using high technology
    a. where elections can be called at any time (Westminster model), the **periodic list** requires mobilizing many people on short notice to create the voter's list.
    b. **periodic list** is useful where
        i. the election administration infrastructure is not well developed,
        ii. where the population is mobile,
        iii. where citizens have concerns about privacy and
        iv. where there is little confidence in the government's ability to maintain lists
    c. **continuous list** is cost-effective, accurate and current; it requires no "spike" in costs before an election
    d. use of technology is associated with **continuous lists** to ensure that changes of residency, death, duplicate names and so forth are up to date which makes it expensive to maintain
    e. **continuous lists** can be maintained at local, regional or national level by the government or by an independent body such as an election commission.
    f. **civil registries** are cost-effective because it allows data on citizens to be shared by the government
    g. **civil registries are** accurate and do not require an "active" step to be taken by the citizens to register to vote.
    h. the disadvantages of **civil registries** are related to concerns that citizens have about privacy and their distrust of government maintaining databases containing citizen information.

    where government agencies are not cooperative and willing to share information, a **civil** registry may be inaccurate.

12. **Voter's lists** help build public confidence in the election process by reducing voter fraud.

13. **Voter's lists** can be used for special elections (where the election authorities conduct union elections, for example)

14. **Voter's lists** may be used to draw electoral district boundaries and to establish the location of polling stations.

15. **Voter's lists** can be used to establish whether parties or candidates meet threshold levels of support to stand for office.

16.**Voter's lists** can be used where an initiative or recall is allowed by law to determine whether a threshold level of public support exists.

17.**Voter's lists** can be used for non-election related purposes, such as developing a jury list, tracking persons who have defaulted on loans or other obligations, such as child support payments.

MODULE B
OUTLINES

Lecture No. 7. Effect of Election Formulae on Political Parties

1. We have been speaking about the components of an election formula as if by engaging in electoral engineering we can control the outcome. Can we?

2. In addition to the public, **political parties** are a **critical part of any election system**. They both affect the election formula and are affected by it.

3. Scholars distinguish between ***psychological*** and ***mechanical*** effects of an election formula on political parties.
    a. ***psychological*** is how citizens and political parties react to an election system before the elections
    b. ***psychological*** involves such things as strategic voting, coalition building
    c. ***mechanical*** is the application of the election formula and seat allocation formula to the votes cast

4. Do the incentives built into an election system for **political party behavior** actually predict how a party will act?
    a. studies show that they will over the long term, but not automatically
    b. political parties can misjudge citizen support
    c. political parties can sacrifice short term goals for longer-term objectives

5. Studies show that in elections using the **plurality formula**, new political parties are not formed often.
    a. supports general conclusion that **plurality election formula** promotes two-party system
    b. there is not a great deal of difference between the number of **political parties** standing for election where a **majority or PR election formula** is used

6. Studies show that **large district magnitude** combined with a **PR election formula** produce political parties that are more ideologically orientated

a. where a **preference ballot** is introduced, party cohesion is weakened

7. **Voters** also respond to the election system and the formula used
   a. may use **strategic voting** to avoid **wasted votes**
   b. where majority election formula is used, voters seem to use **strategic voting** for the first vote
   c. where the **PR election formula** is used, voters may use **strategic voting** where there is a high threshold where a small party is fielding candidates in a small district

8. The ***mechanical effects*** have been discussed earlier
   a. large parties have an advantage in virtually every election formula, but have **less** where a **PR election formula** is used
   b. **district magnitude** is the critical factor in determining the amount of bias in favor of large parties
   c. **plurality election formula** most frequently results in a majority government being elected in parliament
      i. where a **PR election formula** is used, the size of the threshold determines whether a majority government will be elected (if it is over 10% there is a thirty per cent likelihood that a one-party majority will be elected)
      ii. where a **majority election formula** is used, the likelihood of a one-party majority being elected is approximately 27 per cent
   d. the number of parties actually being elected is a affected by the size of a threshold (where it is 8% or more, it will decrease the number of parties being elected)
   e. the number of parties elected is greater where the electoral district is heterogeneous

9. Where the **plurality election formula** is used, it is possible for a party to win a majority of parliamentary seats without winning the most popular votes
   a. this can happen where the winning party is concentrated in less populated areas or in cases where the party has a high concentration of supporters (this is another example of wasted votes)
   b. this can happen due to a process called ***gerrymandering***

i. gerrymandering is different from malapportionment
ii. gerrymandering results from drawing district boundaries in such a way as to make sure there is a moderately high concentration of a party's supporters in the district
iii. ***malapportionment*** is the result of differences in population in electoral districts, resulting in vote dilution

10. It is possible to ensure minority or ethnic representation by creating electoral district boundaries in such a way as to concentrate specific groups instead of "reserving" certain seats for specified groups.

11. The relationship between an election system, the citizens and political parties is too complex to predict with any precision.

B

Zastupnički dom BiH - Sa teritorija Federacije BiH / Predstavnički dom BiH - Sa teritorije Federacije BiH / Представнички дом БиХ - Са територије Федерације БиХ

- ☐ 1 - STRANKA PRIVREDNOG PROSPERITETA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE
- ☐ 2 - HRVATSKA STRANKA PRAVA
- ☐ 3 - ŽENA BiH
- ☐ 4 - STRANKA ZA BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU
- ☐ 5 - BOSANSKA STRANKA
- ☐ 6 - LIBERALI BiH
- ☐ 7 - BOSANSKO HERCEGOVAČKA PATRIOTSKA STRANKA
- ☐ 8 - HRVATSKA DEMOKRATSKA ZAJEDNICA
- ☐ 9 - SDA
- ☐ 10 - GRAĐANSKA DEMOKRATSKA STRANKA BiH
- ☐ 11 - LIBERALNO BOŠNJAČKA ORGANIZACIJA BiH
- ☐ 12 - DEMOKRATSKA NARODNA ZAJEDNICA
- ☐ 13 - ZDRUŽENA LISTA BiH (SDP BiH, UBSD, HSS, MBO, REPUBLIKANCI)
- ☐ 14 - SREBROV VLADIMIR

Estonija

RIIGIKOGU VALIMISED

Hääletan kandidaadi nr. [redacted] poolt



5. märts 1995

Rumunija

MISCAREA PENTRU ROMANIA

1. GABRIEL SILVIU
2. CRISTINA IATAN
3. RUXANDRA RODICA DUMITRAȘCU
4. ANDREI VLAD VRANCEANU

UNIUNEA DEMOCRATA MAGHIARĂ DIN ROMANIA

1. ANTON NICULESCU
2. PETRU GALACZI
3. GHEORGHE KÖVÉR
4. DEZSÖ ZOLTAN ADORJAŃI

PARTIDUL UNITATII SOCIAL DEMOCRATE

1. SERGHEI
2. NICOLAE GHEORGHE
3. ION DUMITRU
4. ANANII HOROPCIUC
5. MARIA MINCU
6. CONSTANTIN HOTULETE
7. SILVIA GOLDENBERG
8. STANCA DACIANU
9. OCTAVIAN ISAR
10. MARIUS GRIGORESCU
11. HORIA DRAGOȘ MILITARU
12. IOANA MARCU
13. ALEXANDRU RUSOVICI
14. STELIAN DUMITRESCU
15. FLORICA DOBRE
16. PETRU AVRĂMOAIE
17. MARIAN VASILE
18. DINU BANDOLEA
19. CECILIA MANOLESCU
20. GABRIEL HOREA
21. RAISA VICOL
22. NAPOLEON POPESCU
23. ELENA BUDILEANU
24. CONSTANTA DINEA
25. SILVIA VIȘAN
26. AURELIA ȘTEFĂNESCU
27. MIRCEA CODREANU
28. MIRELA IVAN
29. CARMEN GRIGORAȘ

PARTIDUL DEMOCRAT AGRAR DIN ROMANIA

1. OVIDIU
2. CORNELIU GHEORGHE
3. NICOLAE ȘTEFAN
4. CONSTANTINA
5. IOAN IONESCU
6. AUREL BRAI
7. CONSTANTIN BACIU
8. IONEL TRIFAN DOCIU
9. DAN CONSTANTIN BADEA
10. NICOLAE RADULESCU BOTICĂ
11. CĂTĂLIN CĂCIUC
12. ION PANAIT
13. MIHAI CUCU DOGARU
14. FLOREA RONTEA
15. DAN CONSTANTINESCU
16. GHEORGHE SÎRBU
17. LEON MONDOCEA
18. NICULINA STATE
19. GHEORGHE GEORGESCU
20. NICOLAE VILĂEANU
21. CRISTINA RĂDUCU
22. DUMITRU BUDESCU
23. STANCA ALEXANDRA TUDOR
24. GRIGORIE CĂZĂNESCU
25. NICOLAE SAVU
26. OCTAVIAN ION MILEA
27. GHEORGHE ALEXANDRU SANDU
28. AUREL POPESCU
29. PETRE CHIRIAC
30. VALENTIN GEORGE
31. TEODOR HOLBAN
32. NICOLAE ȘTEFAN SOUCUP
33. RADU MARIAN VALEANU
34. IOANA VALERIA DRĂGAN
35. CRISTIANA GYEMANT
36. MARIN RADU

CONVENTIA SOLIDARITĂȚII SOCIALE

1. VICTOR CIORBEA
2. ION STAN
3. VLAD CONTESCU
4. MARIUS PETCU
5. SORIN COTOFANA
6. DORIN
7. IOAN ONIU
8. MIRCEA CREȚU
9. ALEXANDRU
10. MIRCEA COSTINEAN
11. NECULAI HANTU
12. ADRIAN BÎREA
13. ADELIA SPIREA
14. DAN MITREA
15. IRIMIA IONIȚĂ
16. DUMITRU- ALEX1
17. TOMA DUMITRU TUDOR
18. VIRGIL EUGEN TĂNĂSESCU
19. MARIA PETRE
20. MATILDA CONSTANTINESCU
21. MARIANA
22. ALEXANDRU MODRUJ
23. PAULA NICULESCU
24. TRAIAN IONESCU
25. DUMITRU
26. STELIAN PAUN
27. OCTAVIAN CATALIN BANU

Аграрная партия России

Региональная группа

Лапшин Михаил Иванович
Давыдов Александр Семенович
Заверюха Александр Харлампиевич
Зарубин Владимир Константинович
Мурадова Шамсият Асамудиновна
Черкаев Алексей Васильевич

Блок: Явлинский—Болдырев—Лукин

(Партия Российский христианско-демократический Союз—Новая демократия, Республиканская партия Российской Федерации, Социал-демократическая партия Российской Федерации)

Региональная группа

Явлинский Григорий Алексеевич
Лукин Владимир Петрович
Михайлов Алексей Юрьевич
Беляев Владимир Никитич
Фролов Андрей Николаевич
Бодренкова Галина Петровна

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(Молодежное движение в поддержку Народной партии Свободная Россия и Политико-экономическая ассоциация "Гражданский Союз")

Региональная группа

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Соколов Олег Владимирович
Миронов Владимир Николаевич
Смоляной Артем Станиславович
Лакшев Владимир Алексеевич
Мишин Сергей Анатольевич

Выбор России

(Политическое движение "Выбор России", Движение "Демократическая Россия", Партия "Демократическая инициатива", Крестьянская партия России)

Региональная группа

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Ковалев Сергей Адамович
Памфилова Элла Александровна
Селюнин Василий Илларионович
Воронцов Николай Николаевич
Нуйкин Андрей Александрович

Гражданский союз во имя стабильности, справедливости и прогресса

(Российский союз промышленников и предпринимателей, Всероссийский союз "Обновление", Российский социал-демократический центр, Ассоциация промышленников и предпринимателей России, Профсоюз работников лесных отраслей Российской Федерации, Профсоюз работников строительства и промышленности строительных материалов Российской Федерации, Движение "Ветераны войн—за мир")

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Бех Николай Иванович
Владиславлев Александр Павлович
Савицкая Светлана Евгеньевна
Фуга Николай Георгиевич
Сенчагов Вячеслав Константинович

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Говорухин Станислав Сергеевич
Богомолов Олег Тимофеевич

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Фролов Константин Васильевич
Губенко Николай Николаевич
Гришин Вячеслав Леонидович

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Семенов Виталий Иванович
Илюхин Виктор Иванович

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Чибураев Владимир Иванович
Баранов Станислав Михайлович

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Кобелев Виктор Васильевич
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Шохин Александр Николаевич
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Станкевич Сергей Борисович
Орлов Олег Игоревич
Можаев Борис Андреевич

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Федулова Алевтина Васильевна
Лахова Екатерина Филипповна
Гундарева Наталья Георгиевна

Российское движение демократических реформ

Собчак Анатолий Александрович
Федоров Святослав Николаевич
Басилашвили Олег Валерианович

ПРОТИВ ВСЕХ СПИСКОВ

Albanian

FLETEVOTIMI

Vula

PER ZGJEDHJET E KUVENDIT POPULLOR TE REPUBLIKES SE SHQIPERISE

Zona Nr. 11

Qendra e Votimit Nr. .....

Data e Zgjedhjeve 29 Qershor 1997

Per komisionin e votimit ..... (Zv. Kryetari) ..... (Sekretari) ..... (Kryetari)

EXAMPLE

VOTAT PER KANDIDATIN PER DEPUTET

+ − ×	Sigla	Kandidati për deputet (emri, atësia, mbiemri)	Subjekti elektoral
	PBSH	FRAN NDUE DAFA	E DJATHTA E BASHKUAR SHQIPTARE
	PA	MARASH HISKOLLAJ	P. AGRARE
	PAD	NIKOLLA MARK PRENGA	P. ALEANCA DEMOKRATIKE
	PBD	LUKE PJETER GJINI	P. BASHKIMI DEMOKRAT
	PBDNJ	MARIE HILE GJINAJ	P. BASHKIMI PER TE DREJTAT E NJERIUT
	PD	GJERGJ BINAK SOKOLI	P. DEMOKRATIKE
	PDK	PASHK NDUE SHYTI	P. DEMOKRISTIANE
	PLL	HYSNI HYSEN SHKJAU	P. LEVIZJA E LEGALITETIT
	PS	FRAN PJETER PJETRI	P. SOCIALISTE
	PSD	MUHAMET ISMAIL CENAJ	P. SOCIAL DEMOKRATE
		ZEF PASHUK MIRAKAJ	I PAVARUR

EXAMPLE

VOTAT PER SUBJEKTIN ELEKTORAL

+ − ×	Sigla	Subjekti elektoral
	PA	PARTIA AGRARE
	PAD	PARTIA ALEANCA DEMOKRATIKE
	PBD	PARTIA BASHKIMI DEMOKRAT
	PBDK	PARTIA BASHKIMI DEMOKRISTIAN
	PBDNJ	PARTIA BASHKIMI PER TE DREJTAT E NJERIUT
	PBK	PARTIA BALLI KOMBETAR
	PBSD	PARTIA BASHKIMI SOCIAL DEMOKRAT
	PD	PARTIA DEMOKRATIKE
	PDD	PARTIA E DJATHTE DEMOKRATIKE
	PDK	PARTIA DEMOKRISTIANE
	PKONS	PARTIA KONSERVATORE
	PLD	PARTIA LEVIZJA PER DEMOKRACI
	PLK	PARTIA LIDHJA KOMBETARE
	PLL	PARTIA LEVIZJA E LEGALITETIT
	PPD	PARTIA PROGRESIT DEMOKRATIK
	PR	PARTIA REPUBLIKANE
	PS	PARTIA SOCIALISTE
	PSD	PARTIA SOCIAL DEMOKRATE
	PUK	PARTIA UNITETI KOMBETAR

EXAMPLE

Pakistan

SAMPLE BALLOT

NA-184 KARACHI-II

SERIAL

NA-184 KARACHI-II

		احمد خان
		امتیاز صمد
		رحمت علی
		ریاض احمد
		سلیم شیخ
		عزیز علی
		فرحان احمد
		محمد اشرف

SAMPLE
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

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©

Njemačka

Stimmzettel

für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag im Wahlkreis 165 Esslingen am 2. Dezember 1990

Sie haben 2 Stimmen

hier 1 Stimme
für die Wahl
eines/einer Wahlkreisabgeordneten
Erststimme

1	**Hauser**, Otto Bundestagsabgeordneter Esslingen am Neckar, Betzgerstraße 32	CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
2	**Mosdorf**, Siegmar Landesgeschäftsführer Hechdorf, Weinbergstraße 44	SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
3	**Kehrer**, Thomas Rechtsanwalt Esslingen am Neckar, Brettachernweg 13	FDP/ DVP	Freie Demokratische Partei/ Demokratische Volkspartei
4	**Özdemir**, Cem Student Bad Urach, Lange Straße 16	GRÜNE	DIE GRÜNEN
6	**Donnerstag**, Dietmar Rechtsanwalt Stuttgart, Zabergäustraße 14	REP	Die REPUBLIKANER
9	**Brutzer**, Ulrich Rentner Karlsruhe, Lamprechtstraße 8	NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
10	**Daubner**, Stefan Auszubildender in der Altenpflege Esslingen am Neckar, Schulstraße 57	ÖDP	Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei

hier 1 Stimme
für die Wahl
einer Landesliste (Partei)
– maßgebende Stimme für die Verteilung der Sitze insgesamt auf die einzelnen Parteien –
Zweitstimme

	CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, Matthias Wissmann, Dr. Lutz Stavenhagen, Anton Pfeifer, Udo Ehrbar
2	**SPD**	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Dr. Hertz Däubler-Gmelin, Harald Schäfer, Hans Martin Bury, Wolfgang Roth, Dr. Lissel Hartenstein
3	**FDP/ DVP**	Freie Demokratische Partei/ Demokratische Volkspartei Dr. Helmut Haussmann, Georg Gallus, Martin Grüner, Dr. Wolfgang Weng, Dr. Olaf Feldmann
4	**GRÜNE**	DIE GRÜNEN Christa Vennegerts, Oswald Metzger, Ursula Ell-Simon, Dr. Thilo Weichert, Monika Knoche
5	**LIGA**	CHRISTLICHE LIGA Die Partei für das Leben Karl Siegfried Dörfler, Bettina Schaga, Ernst Jakisch, Wilhelma Schmidts, Marion Gerlhardt
6	**CM**	CHRISTLICHE MITTE Anny Stärk, Peter Bella, Michael Pietz, Erna Schönstein, Werner Keller
7	**DIE GRAUEN**	DIE GRAUEN Initiiert vom Senioren-Schutz-Bund „Graue Panther" e.V. (SSB-GP) Wolfgang Hellmer, Martha-Elisabeth Fischer, Margo Hüttgen, Walter Meyer, Dr. Ursula Körner
8	**REP**	DIE REPUBLIKANER Dr. Rolf Schlierer, Lea Thoma, Michael Herbricht, Arnold Brautigam, Dietmar Donnerstag
9	**NPD**	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands Jürgen Schützinger, Wolfraud Mussgnug, Dr. Michael Prench, Siegfried Hahs, Erwin Mußler
10	**ÖDP**	Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei Hella Hasse, Maria Opitz, Bernd Richter, Hermann Benkele, Herbert Alexander Gebhardt
11	**PDS/Linke Liste**	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus/Linke Liste Dr. Helga Bumke, ehemals Abteilungsleiterin im Finanzamt Bergheim, Dr. Heidi Knake-Werner, Dr. Günter Kohrer, Ilse Wenzkirch-Dean Rudow
12	**Patrioten**	Patrioten für Deutschland Dr. Helmut Böttiger, Edmund Bella, Bernd Schulz, Irene Bella, Karl Bauer

Kolumbija

Doble por aquí →|←

VOTO

FORMULA

PRESIDENTE Y VICEPRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA

(SEGUNDA VUELTA)

PRESIDENTE
ERNESTO
SAMPER PIZANO

VICEPRESIDENTE
HUMBERTO
DE LA CALLE

10

PARTIDO
LIBERAL COLOMBIANO

PRESIDENTE
ANDRES
PASTRANA ARANGO

VICEPRESIDENTE
LUIS FERNANDO
RAMIREZ ACUÑA

05

ANDRES PRESIDENTE

VOTO EN BLANCO

Doble por aquí →|←

Južnoafrička Republika

RSA 1994

Make your mark next to the party you choose.
Etsa letshwao pela mokgatlo oo o o kgethang.
Yenza luphawu ecaleni kwelicembu lakhethasho.
Endla mfungho ethelo ka vandla leri u ri hlawulaka
Baya letshwao go lebagana le lebaka la gago.
Yenza uphawu lukho eduze nehlangano oyikhethisha.

Plaas u merk langs die party van u keuse.
Dira letshwao la gago go lebana le phathi yee o e kgethago.
Kha vha ite luswaya phanda ha dzangano line vha khosha.
Yenza uphawu lwakho ecaleni kwegcla elo ukhethayo.
Owenze uphawu enkhaleni ewenduze kwendlangano oyikhethayo

PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA	PAC	
SPORTS ORGANISATION FOR COLLECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS AND EQUAL RIGHTS	SOCCER	
THE KEEP IT STRAIGHT AND SIMPLE PARTY	KISS	
VRYHEIDSFRONT - FREEDOM FRONT	VF-FF	
WOMEN'S RIGHTS PEACE PARTY	WRPP	
WORKERS' LIST PARTY	WLP	
XIMOKO PROGRESSIVE PARTY	XPP	
AFRICA MUSLIM PARTY	AMP	
AFRICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	ACDP	
AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT	ADM	
AFRICAN MODERATES CONGRESS PARTY	AMCP	
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS	ANC	
DEMOCRATIC PARTY - DEMOKRATIESE PARTY	DP	
DIKWANKWETLA PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA	DPSA	
FEDERAL PARTY	FP	
LUSO - SOUTH AFRICAN PARTY	LUSAP	
MINORITY FRONT	MF	
NATIONAL PARTY - NASIONALE PARTY	NP	
INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY - IQEMBU LENKATHA YENKULULEKO	IFP	

RSA 1994

Australija

Form C

(To be initialled on back by Presiding Officer before issue)

Commonwealth of Australia

BALLOT-PAPERS

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Referendums on Proposed Constitution Alterations

DIRECTIONS TO VOTER

Write "YES" or "NO" in the space provided opposite each of the questions set out below.

1. An Act to change the terms of senators so that they are no longer of fixed duration and to provide that Senate elections and House of Representatives elections are always held on the same day.

DO YOU APPROVE this proposed alteration? [ ]

2. An Act to enable the Commonwealth and the States voluntarily to refer powers to each other.

DO YOU APPROVE this proposed alteration? [ ]

25109/R4 C. J. THOMPSON, Commonwealth Government Printer R84/404

BALLOT PAPER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
VICTORIA
ELECTORAL DIVISION OF WILLS

Number the boxes from 1 to 22 in the order of your choice

☐	SAVAGE, Katheryne INDEPENDENT
☐	KARDAMITSIS, Bill AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY (ALP)
☐	KUHNE, Otto Ernest
☐	PHILLIPS, Richard
☐	KAPPHAN, Will INDEPENDENT
☐	RAWSON, Geraldine INDEPENDENT
☐	DELACRETAZ, John LIBERAL
☐	POULOS, Patricia
☐	DROULERS, Julien Paul INDEPENDENT
☐	FRENCH, Bill INDEPENDENT
☐	POTTER, F. C. INDEPENDENT
☐	MURRAY, John INDEPENDENT
☐	VASSIS, Chris INDEPENDENT
☐	CLEARY, Philip INDEPENDENT
☐	FERRARO, Salvatore INDEPENDENT
☐	GERMAINE, Stan THE FEDERAL PARTY OF AUSTRALIA
☐	WALKER, Angela AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION
☐	MACKAY, David DEMOCRATS
☐	LEWIS, Bob INDEPENDENT
☐	SYKES, Ian Grant INDEPENDENT
☐	KYROU, Kon INDEPENDENT
☐	MURGATROYD

Remember ... number <u>every</u> box to make your vote count.

Australian Electoral Commission AEC

You **may** vote in one of two ways

either

By placing the single figure 1 in one and only one of these squares to indicate the voting ticket you wish to adopt as your vote

A	B	C	D	E
☐ or	☐ or	☐ or	☐ or	☐ or
AUSTRALIAN WOMEN'S PARTY	LIBERAL		CALLTOAUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	NATIONAL PARTY

or

By placing the numbers 1 to 29 in the order of your preference

A	B	C	D	E
AUSTRALIAN WOMEN'S PARTY	LIBERAL		CALLTOAUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	NATIONALPARTY
☐ TURNBULL Mattie AUSTRALIAN WOMEN'S PARTY	☐ CRANE Winston LIBERAL	☐ DRAKE Tony	☐ JACKSON Don CALL TO AUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	☐ McANUFF Kevin NATIONALPARTY
☐ MUDFORD Kate AUSTRALIAN WOMEN'S PARTY	☐ PANIZZA John H LIBERAL	☐ ROBINSON Jean H	☐ LAURIE Marj CALLTOAUSTRALIA (FRED NILE)GROUP	☐ ANDERSON Lynley NATIONALPARTY
	☐ EGGLESTON Alan LIBERAL			
	☐ HUSTON Michael LIBERAL			
	☐ SIRNA Enzo LIBERAL			
	☐ THOMPSON Clare Helen LIBERAL			

Sample

AEC

You **may** vote in one of two ways

either

By placing the single figure 1 in one and only one of these squares to indicate the voting ticket you wish to adopt as your vote

A	B	C	D	E
☐ or	☐ or	☐ or	☐ or	☐ or
AUSTRALIAN WOMEN'S PARTY	LIBERAL		CALLTOAUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	NATIONAL PARTY

or

By placing the numbers 1 to 29 in the order of your preference

A	B	C	D	E
AUSTRALIAN WOMEN'S PARTY	LIBERAL		CALLTOAUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	NATIONALPARTY
☐ TURNBULL Mattie AUSTRALIAN WOMEN'S PARTY	☐ CRANE Winston LIBERAL	☐ DRAKE Tony	☐ JACKSON Don CALL TO AUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	☐ McANUFF Kevin NATIONALPARTY
☐ MUDFORD Kate AUSTRALIAN WOMEN'S PARTY	☐ PANIZZA John H LIBERAL	☐ ROBINSON Jean H	☐ LAURIE Marj CALLTOAUSTRALIA (FRED NILE)GROUP	☐ ANDERSON Lynley NATIONALPARTY
	☐ EGGLESTON Alan LIBERAL			
	☐ HUSTON Michael LIBERAL			
	☐ SIRNA Enzo LIBERAL			
	☐ THOMPSON Clare Helen LIBERAL			

AEC

SENATE BALLOT PAPER

WESTERN AUSTRALIA 1996

ELECTION OF 6 SENATORS

F	G	H	I	
AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHERIMMIGRATION	AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	THE GREENS (WA)	AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS	

F	G	H	I	Ungrouped
AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION	AUSTRALIANLABORPARTY	THE GREENS (WA)	AUSTRALIANDEMOCRATS	
HAYE [illegible] AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION	McKIERNAN Jim AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	CHAMARETTE Christabel THE GREENS (WA)	MURRAY Andrew JM AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS	BRADSHAW Craig INDEPENDENT
HAMMOND Robert K AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION	BISHOP Mark AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	CHAPPLE Robin THE GREENS (WA)	MILLAR Don AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS	MACKINTOSH Craig Alan INDEPENDENT
	BEAHAN Michael AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY		de [illegible]RUNTY Shirley AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS	COOPER Vin INDEPENDENT
	CRAWFORD Catherine AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY			WHITE Ros NATURAL LAW PARTY

You **may** vote **in one of two ways**

either

By placing the single figure 1 in one and only one of these squares to indicate the voting ticket you wish to adopt as your vote

A	B	C	D	E	F
or	or	or	or	or	or
C.I.R. ALLIANCE	THE AUSTRALIAN GREENS -VICTORIA	D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY	LIBERAL/ NATIONALPARTY	AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	AUSTRALIANS AGAINSTFURTHER IMMIGRATION

or

By placing the numbers 1 to 44 in the order of your preference

A	B	C	D	E	F
C.I.R. ALLIANCE	**THE AUSTRALIAN GREENS-VICTORIA**	**D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY**	**LIBERAL/ NATIONALPARTY**	**AUSTRALIAN LABORPARTY**	**AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION**
BORZATTI Will CIR ALLIANCE	**SINGER** Peter THE AUSTRALIAN GREENS -	**MULHOLLAND** John D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABORPARTY	1 **ALSTON** Richard K R LIBERAL	**RAY** Robert Francis AUSTRALIAN LABORPARTY	McCORMACK Denis AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION
McKAY Neil CIR ALLIANCE	ALEXANDER Karen THEAUSTRALIAN GREENS VICTORIA	CAHILL Paul D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY	**KEMP** Rod LIBERAL	COONEY Barney AUSTRALIAN LABORPARTY	SPENCER Robyn Mario AUSTRALIANS AGAINSTFURTHER IMMIGRATION
	1 LUCAS Helen THEAUSTRALIAN GREENS VICTORIA	ROWE Michael D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABORPARTY	**PATTERSON** Kay LIBERAL	**GILLARD** Julia AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	
		CREA Pat D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY	**ETTERY** Robert John NATIONAL PARTY	**RAYMOND** Melanie AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	
		CODY Matthew D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABORPARTY	**HEAD** Robyne L LIBERAL		
		DODD Christine D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY	FERNANOEZ Anthony LIBERAL G		

AEC

SENATE BALLOT PAPER

VICTORIA 1996

ELECTION OF 6 SENATORS

G	H	I	J	K	L	Ungrouped
DEMOCRATS	NATURAL LAW PARTY	REPUBLICAN PARTY/ AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTS GROUP		AUSTRALIAN SHOOTERS PARTY	CALL TO AUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	
G	H	I	J	K	L	Ungrouped
DEMOCRATS	NATURAL LAW PARTY	REPUBLICAN PARTY/ AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTS GROUP		AUSTRALIAN SHOOTERS PARTY	CALL TO AUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	
ALLISON Lyn DEMOCRATS	GRIFFITH Stephen NATURAL LAW PARTY	DALAL Ron REPUBLICAN PARTY OF AUSTRALIA	TOSCANO Joe	WOOD Colin F AUSTRALIAN SHOOTERS PARTY	COOK Ken CALL TO AUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	RASKOVY Steve INDEPENDENT
McLAREN John DEMOCRATS	MASON Maire NATURAL LAW PARTY	BERGEN Des AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTS GROUP	ROPER Steve	SAYERS Neville AUSTRALIAN SHOOTERS PARTY	CHAPMAN Christine CALL TO AUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	SMITH Maurie INDEPENDENT
LEVY Laurie DEMOCRATS				FLEGNER AUSTRALIAN SHOOTERS PARTY		GOOD Michael INDEPENDENT
WHITE Mark DEMOCRATS						GREEN Neil INDEPENDENT
						ABBOTT0 John M INDEPENDENT
						ARMSTRONG David INDEPENDENT

SENATE BALLOT PAPER

WESTERN AUSTRALIA 1996

ELECTION OF 6 SENATORS

F	G	H	I
AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHERIMMIGRATION	AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	THE GREENS (WA)	AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS

F	G	H	I	Ungrouped
AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION	AUSTRALIANLABORPARTY	THE GREENS (WA)	AUSTRALIANDEMOCRATS	
HAYE Richard AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION	McKIERNAN Jim AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	CHAMARETTE Christabel THE GREENS (WA)	MURRAY Andrew JM AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS	BRADSHAW Craig INDEPENDENT
HAMMOND Robert K AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION	BISHOP Mark AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	CHAPPLE Robin THE GREENS (WA)	MILLAR Don AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS	MACKINTOSH Craig Alan INDEPENDENT
	BEAHAN Michael AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY		de GRUNTY Shirley AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS	COOPER Vin INDEPENDENT
	CRAWFORD Catherine AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY			WHITE Ros NATURAL LAW PARTY

You **may** vote **in one of two ways**

either

By placing the single figure 1 in one and only one of these squares to indicate the voting ticket you wish to adopt as your vote

A	B	C	D	E	F
or	or	or	or	or	or
C.I.R. ALLIANCE	THE AUSTRALIAN GREENS -VICTORIA	D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY	LIBERAL/ NATIONALPARTY	AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	AUSTRALIANS AGAINSTFURTHER IMMIGRATION

or

By placing the numbers 1 to 44 in the order of your preference

A	B	C	D	E	F
C.I.R. ALLIANCE	**THE AUSTRALIAN GREENS-VICTORIA**	**D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABORPARTY**	**LIBERAL/ NATIONALPARTY**	**AUSTRALIAN LABORPARTY**	**AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION**
BORZATTI Will CIR ALLIANCE	**SINGER** Peter THE AUSTRALIAN GREENS -	**MULHOLLAND** John D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABORPARTY	1 **ALSTON** Richard K R LIBERAL	**RAY** Robert Francis AUSTRALIAN LABORPARTY	McCORMACK Denis AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION
McKAY Neil C.I.R. ALLIANCE	ALEXANDER Karen THEAUSTRALIAN GREENS VICTORIA	CAHILL Paul D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY	**KEMP** Rod LIBERAL	COONEY Barney AUSTRALIAN LABORPARTY	SPENCER Robyn Mario AUSTRALIANS AGAINSTFURTHER IMMIGRATION
	1 LUCAS Helen THEAUSTRALIAN GREENS VICTORIA	ROWE Michael D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABORPARTY	**PATTERSON** Kay LIBERAL	**GILLARD** Julia AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	
		CREA Pat D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY	**ETTERY** Robert John NATIONAL PARTY	**RAYMOND** Melanie AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY	
		CODY Matthew D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABORPARTY	**HEAD** Robyne L LIBERAL		
		DODD Christine D.L.P.- DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY	BERNANOEZ Anthony LIBERAL G		

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SENATE BALLOT PAPER

VICTORIA 1996

ELECTION OF 6 SENATORS

G	H	I	J	K	L	Ungrouped
DEMOCRATS	NATURAL LAW PARTY	REPUBLICAN PARTY/ AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTS GROUP		AUSTRALIAN SHOOTERS PARTY	CALL TO AUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	
ALLISON Lyn DEMOCRATS	GRIFFITH Stephen NATURAL LAWPARTY	DAVIS REPUBLICAN PARTY OF AUSTRALIA	TOSCANO Joe	WOOD Colin F AUSTRALIAN SHOOTERSPARTY	COOK Ken CALL TO AUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	RASKOVY Steve INDEPENDENT
McLAREN John DEMOCRATS	MASON Naire NATURAL LAW PARTY	BERGEN Des AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTSGROUP	ROPER Steve	SAYERS Neville AUSTRALIAN SHOOTERSPARTY	CHAPMAN Christine CALL TO AUSTRALIA (FRED NILE) GROUP	SMITH Maurie INDEPENDENT
LEVY Laurie DEMOCRATS				FLEGNER AUSTRALIAN SHOOTERS PARTY		GOOD Michael INDEPENDENT
WHITE Mark DEMOCRATS						GREEN Neil INDEPENDENT
						ABBOTTO John M INDEPENDENT
						ARMSTRONG David INDEPENDENT

BALLOT PAPER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

ELECTORAL DIVISION OF

BRAND

Number the boxes from 1 to 10 in the order of your choice.

☐	GENT, Alan	INDEPENDENT
☐	McCARTHY, Brian	INDEPENDENT
☐	GOODALE, Bob	THE GREENS (WA)
☐	McKERCHER, Mal	AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS
☐	ANDERSON, Leone L	INDEPENDENT
☐	GALLETLY, Clive Philip Arthur	INDEPENDENT
☐	REBE, Phil	AUSTRALIANS AGAINST FURTHER IMMIGRATION
☐	WA[illegible]N, Malcolm	[illegible] PARTY
☐	HEARNE, Penny	LIBERAL

Sample

Sample

Remember...number every box to make your vote count

Australian Electoral Commission AEC

BALLOT PAPER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

ELECTORAL DIVISION OF

CANNING

Number the boxes from 1 to 6 in the order of your choice.

- ☐ TWOMEY, Chris — THE GREENS (WA)
- ☐ GEAR, George — AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY
- ☐ ROBERTS, Patti — NATURAL LAW PARTY
- ☐ BLOOMER, Anthony Roy — AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS
- ☐ JOHNSTON, Ricky — LIBERAL
- ☐ DEVEREUX, Michael — INDEPENDENT

Remember...number every box to make your vote count

Australian Electoral Commission **AEC**

POSTAL BALLOT PAPER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

STATE OR TERRITORY

.....

ELECTORAL DIVISION OF

.....

Numberthe boxes from 1 to.....
in the order of your choice,

Fold the ballot paper, place it in the envelope addressed to the Divisional Returning Officer and fasten the envelope.

Remember...number every box to make your vote count.

Australian Electoral Commission. AEC

Australian Capital Territory
Referendum Ballot Paper

Write the number 1 in one box only

Please put the number '1' in one of the boxes below to show which electoral system you believe should be used to elect members to the Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly.

Leave the other box empty.

EITHER

A single member electorates system ☐

(as outlined in the Commonwealth' *Referendum Options Description Sheet)*

OR

A proportional representation (Hare-Clark) system ☐

(as outlined in the Commonwealth' *Referendum Options Sheet)*

Number one box only

Overview

The choice of electoral systems is one of the most important institutional decisions for any democracy, yet rarely is an electoral system consciously and deliberately selected. Often the choice is accidental, the result of an unusual combination of circumstances, of a passing trend, or of a quirk of history. The impact of colonialism and the effects of influential neighbours are often persuasive in choice of electoral systems. Yet in almost all cases the choice of a particular electoral system has a profound effect on the future political life of the country concerned. In most cases, electoral systems, once chosen, remain fairly constant as political interests congeal around and respond to the incentives presented by them.

If it is rare that electoral systems are deliberately chosen, it is rarer still that they are carefully designed for the particular historical and social conditions of a country. Any new democracy must choose (or inherit) an electoral system to elect its parliament, but such decisions are often affected by one of the two following circumstances:

- either political actors lack basic knowledge and information so that the choices and consequences of different electoral systems are not fully recognized or, conversely,
- political actors use their knowledge of electoral systems to promote designs which they think will work to their own partisan advantage.

In either scenario, the choices that are made may not be the best ones for the long-term political health of the country concerned, and at times they can have disastrous consequences for a country's democratic prospects.

The background to a choice of electoral system can thus be as important as the choice itself. One should not have the illusion that such decisions are made in a political vacuum. In fact, the consideration of political advantage is almost always a factor in the choice of electoral systems-sometimes it is the only consideration. At the same time, the choices of available electoral systems are often, in reality, relatively few. It is equally the case, however, that calculations of short-term political interest can often obscure the longer-term consequences of a particular electoral system and the interests of the wider political system. Consequently, while recognising the practical constraints, we attempt to approach the issue of electoral system choices in as broad and comprehensive a manner as possible.

The electoral system element of this publication is aimed in particular at political negotiators and constitutional designers in new, fledgling, and transitional democracies. However, as the crafting of political institutions is a critical task not only for new democracies but also for those established democracies seeking to adapt their systems to better reflect new political realities, the text also seeks to address the likely concerns of those persons in both emerging and established democracies who may be designing electoral systems. Given this target audience, we have necessarily had to simplify much of the academic literature on the subject, while at the same time address some of the more complex issues inherent in the area. If we appear to be sometimes overly simplistic and at other times unduly complex, the explanation will usually lie in our attempt to balance these two objectives of clarity and comprehensiveness.

While the context in which emerging and established democracies make constitutional choices varies enormously, the long-term purposes of most democracies are usually the same: to adopt institutions which are strong enough to promote stable democracy but flexible enough to react to changing circumstances. Both emerging and established democracies have much to learn from the experiences of the other. Institutional design is an evolving process, and we seek to distil the lessons learnt from the many actual examples of institutional design around the world.

Electoral Systems and Constitutions

Much constitutional design has occurred relatively recently: the world-wide movement towards democratic governance in the 1980s and 1990s stimulated a new urgency in the search for enduring models of appropriate representative government, along with a fresh evaluation of electoral systems. This process has been encouraged by the widespread realisation that the choice of political institutions can have a significant impact upon the wider political system-for example, it is increasingly being recognized that an electoral system can help to "engineer" cooperation and accommodation in a divided society. Electoral system design is now accepted as being of crucial importance to wider issues of governance, and as probably the most influential of all political institutions.

Through providing this detailed analysis of choices and consequences, and showing how electoral systems have worked throughout the democratic world, we hope to achieve two things:

- to expand knowledge and illuminate political and public discussions;
- and to give constitutional designers the tools to make an informed choice, and thereby avoid some of the more dysfunctional and destabilizing effects of particular electoral system choices.

At the most basic level, electoral systems translate the votes cast in a general election into seats won by parties and candidates. The key variables are 1. the electoral formula used (i.e., whether the system is [majoritarian] or proportional, and what mathematical formula is used to calculate the seat allocation) and 2. the district magnitude, not how many voters live in a district, but rather how many members of parliament that district elects.

Electoral system design relates strongly to the other more administrative aspects of elections dealt with on this web site such as the distribution of voting places (see Voting Operations), the nomination of candidates (see Parties and Candidates), the registration of voters (see Voter Registration), who runs the elections and so on-see Electoral Management Index. These issues are of critical importance, and the possible advantages of any given electoral system choice will be undermined unless due attention is paid to them. Electoral system design also affects other areas of electoral laws: the choice of electoral system has an influence on the way in which district boundaries are drawn (see Boundary Delimitation Index), the design of ballot papers (see Voting Operations), how votes are counted (see Vote Counting), along with numerous other aspects of the electoral process.

Summary of Electoral System Types

There are hundreds of electoral systems currently in use and many more permutations on each form, but for the sake of simplicity we have categorised electoral systems into three broad families:

- the plurality-majority,

- the semi-proportional, and
- the proportional.

Within these three we have ten "sub-families":

- First Past the Post (FPTP),
- the Block Vote (BV),
- the Alternative Vote (AV), and
- the Two-Round System (TRS) are all plurality-majority systems.

- Parallel systems,
- the Limited Vote (LV) and
- the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) are semi-proportional systems.

- List PR,
- Mixed Member Proportional (MMP), and
- the Single Transferable Vote (STV) are all proportional systems.

Every one of the 212 parliamentary electoral systems listed in The Global Distribution of Electoral Systems can be categorised under one of these ten headings, and this family tree, though rooted in long-established conventions, is the first to take account of all the electoral systems used for parliamentary elections in the world today, regardless of wider questions of democracy and legitimacy. We hope it offers a clear and concise guide to the choice among them.

The most common way to look at electoral systems is to group them by how closely they translate national votes won into parliamentary seats won; that is, how proportional they are. To do this, one needs to look at both the vote-seat relationship and the level of wasted votes. For example, South Africa used a classically proportional electoral system for its first democratic elections of 1994, and with 62.65% of the popular vote the African National Congress (ANC) won 63% of the national seats (see South Africa: Election Systems and Conflict Management). The electoral system was highly proportional, and the number of wasted votes (i.e., those which were cast for parties which did not win seats in the Assembly) was only 0.8% of the total. In direct contrast the year before, in the neighbouring nation of Lesotho, a classically majoritarian First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system had resulted in the Basotho Congress Party winning every seat in the 65-member parliament with 75% of the popular vote; there was no parliamentary opposition at all, and the 25% of electors who voted for other parties were completely unrepresented. This result was mirrored in Djibouti's Block Vote election of 1992 when all 65 parliamentary seats were won by the Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progr s with 75% of the vote.

However, under some circumstances, non-proportional electoral systems (such as FPTP) can accidentally give rise to relatively proportional overall results. This was the case in a third Southern African country, Malawi, in 1994. In that election the leading party, the United Democratic Front won 48% of the seats with 46% of the votes, the Malawian Congress Party won 32% of the seats with 34% of the votes, and the Alliance for Democracy won 20% of the seats with 19% of the votes. The overall level of proportionality was high, but the clue to the fact that this was not inherently a proportional system, and so cannot be categorized as such, was that the wasted votes still amounted to almost one-quarter of all votes cast.

For more information see Electoral systems and Constitution.

author *Reilly, Ben, Reynolds, Andrew*

es10

created 1997/10/08

modified 1998/09/09

Guiding Principles

Electoral system design should engineer a system that encompasses the following characteristics (these principles are elaborated in Design Principles):

1. Ensuring a representative parliament, see Ensuring a Representative Parliament

2. Making elections accessible and meaningful to the average voter, see Making Elections Accessible and Meaningful

3. Providing incentives for conciliation between previously hostile parties, see Providing Incentives for Conciliation

4. Foster the perceived legitimacy of the legislature and government

5. Help facilitate stable and efficient government, see Facilitating Stable and Efficient Government

6. Give rise to a system that holds the government and its representatives accountable to the highest degree possible, see Holding Government and Representatives Accountable

7. Encourages "cross-cutting" political parties, see Encouraging Cross-Cutting Political Parties

8. Helps promote a parliamentary opposition, see Promoting a Parliamentary Opposition

9. Is realistic concerning a country's financial and administrative capacity, see Cost Considerations

In Practical Advice for Electoral System Designers we elaborate on the following points that apply to electoral system design:

1. Keep it simple, but

2. Don't be afraid to innovate

3. Pay attention to contextual and temporal factors

4. Do not underestimate the intelligence of the electorate

5. Err on the side of inclusion

6. Acknowledge that the process by which an electoral system is chosen can be as important as the final result

7. Try to build legitimacy and acceptance for the system among all key actors

8. Try to maximize voter influence, but

9. Balance that against the need to encourage coherent political parties

10. Note that long-term stability and short-term advantage are not always mutually compatible

11. Don't think of the electoral system as a panacea for all ills, but

12. Conversely, don't underestimate its influence

13. Be mindful of the electorate's willingness to embrace change

14. Avoid being a slave to past systems

15. Assess the likely impact of any new system on societal conflict, and finally

16. Try to imagine unusual or unlikely contingencies.

author *Reynolds, Andrew, Reilly, Ben*

es20

created 1997/10/08

modified 1998/08/27

Administrative Considerations

Political institutions shape the rules of the game under which democracy is practised, and it is often argued that the easiest political institution to be manipulated, for good or for bad, is the electoral system. This is true because in translating the votes cast in a general election into seats in the legislature, the choice of electoral system can effectively determine who is elected and which party gains power. Even with exactly the same number of votes for parties, one electoral system might lead to a coalition government while another might allow a single party to assume majority control. The two examples below illustrate how different electoral systems can translate the votes cast into dramatically different results.

But a number of other consequences of electoral systems go beyond this primary effect. The type of party system which develops, in particular the number and the relative sizes of political parties in parliament, is heavily influenced by it. So is the internal cohesion and discipline of parties: some systems may encourage factionalism, where different wings of one party are constantly at odds with each other, while another system might encourage parties to speak with one voice and suppress dissent. Electoral systems can also influence the way parties campaign and the way political lites behave, thus helping to determine the broader political climate; they may encourage, or retard, the forging of alliances between parties; and they can provide incentives for parties and groups to be broad-based and accommodating, or to base themselves on narrow appeals to ethnicity or kinship ties. In addition, if an electoral system is not considered "fair" and does not allow the opposition to feel that they have the chance to win next time around, an electoral system may encourage losers to work outside the system, using non-democratic, confrontationalist and even violent tactics. And finally the choice of electoral system will determine the ease or complexity of the act of voting. This is always important, but becomes particularly so in societies where there are a substantial number of inexperienced or illiterate voters.

However, it is important to note that a given electoral system will not necessarily work the same way in different countries. Although there are some common experiences in different regions of the world, the effects of a certain electoral system type depends to a large extent upon the socio-political context in which it is used. Electoral system consequences depend upon factors such as how a society is structured in terms of ideological, religious, ethnic, racial, regional, linguistic, or class divisions; whether the country is an established democracy, a transitional democracy, or a new democracy; whether there is an established party system, whether parties are embryonic and unformed, and how many "serious" parties there are; and whether a particular party's supporters are geographically concentrated together, or dispersed over a wide area.

Electoral System Impact On the Translation of Votes Into Seats

Let us take a hypothetical election (of 25,000 votes contested by two political parties) run under two different sets of electoral rules: a plurality-majority First Past The Post system with five single member districts, and a List PR election with one large district.

Constuencies								Seats Won	
	1	2	3	4	5	Total	%	P-M	PR
Party A	**3000**	**2600**	**2551**	**2551**	100	10802	43	4	2
Party B	2000	2400	2449	2449	**4900**	14198	57	1	3
	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000	25000	100		

Key: P-M= Plurality-Majority system (FPTP), PR = Proportional Representation system.

In our example, Party A with 43% of the votes wins far fewer votes than Party B (with 57%) but under a Plurality-Majority system they win four out of the five seats available. Conversely, under a proportional system Party B wins more seats (three) against two seats for Party A. This example may appear extreme but similar constituency results occur quite regularly in plurality-majority elections.

In our second example the distribution of the votes is changed and there are now five parties contesting the election, but the two hypothetical electoral systems remain the same.

Districts								Seats Won	
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**Total**	**%**	**P-M**	**PR**
Party A	**3000**	**2000**	**2000**	200	50	7250	29	3	1
Party B	500	500	500	**3750**	500	5750	23	1	1
Party C	500	250	750	1000	**3000**	5500	22	1	1
Party D	750	500	1700	25	1025	4000	16	0	1
Party E	250	1750	50	25	425	2500	10	0	1
	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000	25000	100	5	5

Key: P-M= Plurality-Majority system (FPTP), PR = Proportional Representation system (using the Largest remainder method of seat allocation with a Hare quota).

In the second example five parties are competing. Under the PR system, every party wins a single seat despite the fact that Party A wins nearly three times as many votes as Party E. Under a FPTP system the largest Party (A) would have picked up a majority of the five seats with the next two highest polling parties (B and C) winning a single seat each. The choice of electoral system thus has a dramatic effect on the composition of the parliament and, by extension, the government.

author *Reynolds, Andrew*

es30

created 1997/10/08

modified 1998/08/27

Cost Considerations

The choice of electoral system has a wide range of administrative consequences, and is ultimately dependent not only on a nation's logistical capacity to hold elections, but also on the amount of money that the country can spend. Simply choosing the most straightforward and least expensive system may well be a false economy in the long run, since a dysfunctional electoral system can have a negative impact on a nation's entire political system and its democratic stability. The choice of electoral system will affect a wide range of administrative issues set out in the following paragraphs.

The Drawing of Electoral Boundaries (see Boundary Delimitation Index)

Any single-member district system requires the time-consuming and expensive process of drawing boundaries for small constituencies defined by population size, cohesiveness, "community of interest," and contiguity. Furthermore, this is rarely a one-time task since boundaries are regularly adjusted to reflect population changes. First Past The Post (FPTP), Alternative Vote (AV), and Two-Round System (TRS) systems provide the most administrative headaches on this score. The Block Vote, Single Non-Transferrable vote (SNTV), Parallel, Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP), and Single-Transferrable Vote (STV) systems also require electorates to be demarcated, but are easier to manage because they use fewer and larger multi-member districts.

At the other end of the scale, List PR systems are often the cheapest and easiest to administer. This is because they either use one single national constituency requiring no boundaries to be drawn, or they use very large multi-member districts that dovetail with pre-existing state or provincial boundaries. Transitional elections in Sierra Leone in 1996 had to be conducted under a national List PR system. The country's civil war and the consequent displacement of citizens meant that, even had they wanted to, electoral authorities did not have the population data necessary to draw smaller single-member districts.

The Registration of Voters (see Overview of voter registration)

Voter registration is the most complex, controversial, and often least successful part of electoral administration. This was demonstrated by the 1996 Zambian elections, where less than half the voting-age population was registered, despite the efforts of a high-profile registration campaign conducted by a private company. Any system that utilises single-member districts usually requires that all voters must be registered within the boundaries of the district. The natural movement of voters thus requires a continual updating of the electoral roll. This means that Parallel and MMP systems join FPTP, AV, and TRS as the most expensive and administratively time-consuming systems in terms of voter registration. The fewer, multi-member districts of the Block Vote, SNTV and STV make the process a little easier, while large-district List PR systems are the least complicated. The simplicity of regional List PR in this context was a contributing factor in its adoption in Cambodia's UN-sponsored transitional elections in 1993 and in South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, see South Africa: Election Systems and Conflict Management. It should be emphasised, however, that variations in electoral systems have only a minor impact on the often extremely high cost of voter registration, see Definition of methods of voter registration .

The Design of Ballot Papers

Ballot papers (see Voting Operations) should be as friendly as possible to all voters, to maximize participation and reduce spoilt or "invalid" votes. This often entails the use of symbols for parties and candidates, photographs, and colours; a number of interesting ballot paper examples are illustrated in this handbook. FPTP and AV ballot papers are often easiest to print and, in most cases, have a relatively small number of names. TRS ballots are similarly easy, but in many cases new ballots have to be printed for a second round of voting, thus effectively doubling the production cost. Similarly, Parallel and MMP systems usually require the printing of at least two ballots, even though they are both for a single election. SNTV, Block Vote, and STV ballots are slightly more complex than FPTP ballots because they will have more candidates, and therefore more symbols and photographs (if these are used). List PR ballot papers can span the continuum of complexity. They can be very simple, as in a closed list system, or quite complex as in a free list system such as Switzerland's, see Switzerland.

Voter Education (see Voter Education)

Clearly, the nature of and need for voter education, (see Voter Education Index) will vary dramatically from society to society, but when it comes to educating voters on how to fill out their ballots, there are identifiable differences between each system. The principles behind voting under preferential systems such as AV or STV are quite complex if they are being used for the first time, and voter education must address this issue, particularly if there are compulsory numbering requirements, as is the case in Australia, see The Alternative Vote in Australia. The same is true of MMP systems: after over 50 years of using MMP, many Germans are still under the misapprehension that both their votes are equal, when the reality is that the second "national PR" vote is the overriding determinant of party strength in parliament, see Germany: The Original Mixed Member Proportional System. By contrast, the principles behind categorical, single-vote systems such as FPTP or SNTV are very easy to understand. The remaining six systems in Table Five fall somewhere between these two extremes.

The Number and Timing of Elections

FPTP, AV, Block, SNTV, List PR, and STV electoral systems all generally require just one election on one day, see Parliamentary Size. However, Parallel and MMP systems essentially mix two (or more) very different electoral systems together, and therefore have logistical implications for the training of election officials and the way in which people vote. Two-Round Systems are perhaps the most costly and difficult to administer, because they often require the whole electoral process to be repeated a week or a fortnight after the first try.

The Count

FPTP, SNTV, and simple closed-list PR systems are easiest to count, see Vote Counting, as only one vote total figure for each party or candidate is required to work out the results. The Block Vote requires the polling officials to count a number of votes on a single ballot paper. The Parallel and MMP systems nearly always require the counting of two ballot papers. AV and STV, as preferential systems requiring numbers to be marked on the ballot, are more complex to count, particularly in the case of STV, which requires continual re-calculations of surplus transfer values and the like.

Primarily history, context, experience, and resources will determine the stresses, which any electoral system places on a country's administrative capacity. In the abstract, the table below offers some clues to the potential costs of various

systems. If equal weight is given to each of the six factors examined in the table (which, it must be said, is unlikely to be the case), a cursory glance at the totals for each system shows that List PR systems, especially national closed-list systems, are the cheapest to run and require fewest administrative resources. Next come FPTP and SNTV systems followed by the Block Vote, AV, STV, Parallel systems and MMP. According to our calculations, the system, which is most likely to put pressure on any county's administrative capacity, is the Two-Round System.

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Social and Political Context

Electoral system design consultants rightly shy away from the "one-size-fits-all" approach of recommending one system for all contexts. Indeed, when asked to identify their 'favourite' or 'best' system, constitutional experts will say "it depends" and the dependants are more often than not variables such as:

- What does the society look like?
- How is it divided?
- Do ethnic or communal divides dovetail with voting behavior?
- Do different groups live geographically inter-mixed or segregated?
- What is the country's political history?
- Are they an established democracy, a transitional democracy, or a re-democratising state?
- What are the broader constitutional arrangements that the legislature is working within?

When assessing the appropriateness of any given electoral system for a divided society, three variables become particularly salient:

- Knowledge of the nature of societal division is paramount-the nature of group identity, the intensity of conflict, the nature of the dispute, and the spatial distribution of conflictual groups.
- The nature of the political system, i.e., the nature of the state, the party system, and the overall constitutional framework.
- The process which led to the adoption of the electoral system, i.e. was the system inherited from a colonial power, was it consciously designed, was it externally imposed, or did it emerge through a process of evolution and unintended consequences? - see The Process of Choice.

The Nature of Group Identity

Appropriate constitutional design is ultimately contextual and rests on a nation's unique social nuances. Division within a society is revealed in part by the extent to which ethnicity correlates with party support and voting behavior. That factor will often determine whether institutional engineering can dissipate ethnic conflicts or merely contain them. There are two dimensions to the nature of group identity:

- one deals with foundations-is the society divided along racial, ethnic, ethno-nationalistic, religious, regional, linguistic, lines?
- while the second deals with how rigid and entrenched such divisions are.

Scholarship on the later subject has developed a continuum with the rigidity of received identity (primordialism) on one side and the malleability of constructed social identities (constructivist or instrumentalist) on the other.

Intensity of Conflict

A second variable, in terms of the nature of any given conflict and its susceptibility to electoral engineering, is simply the intensity and depth of hostility between the competing groups. It is worth remembering that, although academic and international attention is naturally drawn to extreme cases, most ethnic conflicts

do not degenerate into all-out civil war. While few societies are entirely free from multiethnic antagonism, most are able to manage to maintain a sufficient degree of mutual accommodation to avoid state collapse. There are numerous examples of quite deeply divided states in which the various groups maintain frosty but essentially civil relations between each other despite a considerable degree of mutual antipathy-such as the relations between Malays, Chinese and Indians in Malaysia. There are other cases (e.g., Sri Lanka)-where what appeared to be a benign inter-ethnic environment and less pronounced racial disputes nonetheless broke down into violent armed conflict- but where democratic government has nonetheless been the rule more than the exception. There are also cases of utter breakdown in relations and the 'ethnic cleansing' of one group by another typified, most recently and horribly, by Bosnia.

The Nature of the Dispute

Electoral system design is not merely contingent on social issues but also, to some extent, on cultural differences as well. The classic dispute is that of group rights and status in a multiethnic democracy-a system characterised both by democratic decision-making institutions and by the presence of two or more ethnic groups. This is defined as a group of people who see themselves as a distinct cultural community; who often share a common language, religion, kinship, and/or physical characteristics (such as skin colour); and who tend to harbour negative and hostile feelings towards members of other groups, see [1]. The majority of this paper deals with this fundamental division of ethnicity.

Other types of disputes often dovetail with ethnic ones, however. If the issue that divides groups is resource-based, for example, then the way in which the national parliament is elected has particular importance since disputes are managed through the central government allocation of resources to various regions and peoples. In this case, an electoral system, which facilitated a broadly inclusive parliament, might be more successful than one, which exaggerated majoritarian tendencies, or ethnic, regional, or other divisions. This requirement would still hold true if the dispute was primarily cultural, such as protecting minority languages and culturally specific schools. Other institutional mechanisms, such as cultural autonomy and minority vetoes, would be at least as influential in alleviating conflict.

Disputes over territory often require innovative institutional arrangements that go well beyond the positive spins that electoral systems can create. In Spain and Canada, asymmetrical arrangements for respectively, the Basque and Quebec regions, have been used to ease calls for secession, while federalism has been promoted as an institution of conflict management in countries as diverse as Germany, Nigeria, South Africa, and Switzerland.

Spatial Distribution of Conflictual Groups

When looking at different electoral options, a final consideration concerns the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, particularly their relative size, number, and degree of geographic concentration or dispersion. The geographic location of conflicting groups is often related to the intensity of conflict between them. Frequent inter-group contact from geographical intermixture may increase mutual hostility, but it can also act as a moderating force against the most extreme manifestations of ethnic conflict. Familiarity may breed contempt, but it also breeds a certain degree of acceptance as well. Intermixed groups are therefore less likely to be in a state of civil war than those that are territorially separated from each other. Conversely, territorial separation is sometimes the only way to manage the most extreme types of ethnic conflict-that which requires some type of formal territorial devolution of power or autonomy. In the extreme case of 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia, areas which previously featured highly intermixed

populations of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims are now predominantly monoethnic.

Understanding of the demographics of any ethnic conflict is particularly important for attempts at institutional remedies. The number and distribution of ethnic groups is a key variable for both the consociational and centripetal models of electoral engineering for divided societies. According to Lijphart, the optimal number of 'segments' for a consociationalist approach to work is three or four, and conditions become progressively less favourable as more segments (or groups) are added. The centripetal approach, by contrast, requires a degree of proliferation of ethnic groups (or, at least, ethnic parties) to present the essential preconditions for vote-pooling to take place. Chances for success will typically improve as the number of segments increase. Another factor is the relative size of ethnic groups: consociationalism favours groups of roughly equal size, although 'bicommunal systems', in which two groups of approximately equal sizes coexist, can present one of most confrontationalist formulas of all. For centripetalism the crucial variable is not size so much as the geographic concentration or dispersion of ethnic groups. When ethnic groups are geographically concentrated in one or two areas, any electoral strategy for conflict management should be tailored to the realities of political geography. Territorial prescriptions for federalism or other types of devolution of power will usually be a prominent concern, as will issues of group autonomy. Indigenous and/or tribal groups tend to display a particularly strong tendency towards geographical concentration. African minorities, for example, have been found to be more highly concentrated in single contiguous geographical areas than minorities in other regions. This means that a single ethnopolitical group will control many electoral constituencies and informal local power bases. This has considerable implications for electoral engineers: any system of election that relies on single-member electoral districts (such as the alternative vote favoured by centripetalists) will likely produce 'ethnic fiefdoms' at the local level. Minority representation and/or power sharing under these conditions would probably require some form of multi-member district system-particularly Proportional Representation (PR).

Contrast this with colonial settlements or labour importation such as the vast Chinese and Indian diasporas found in some Asia-Pacific-Singapore, Fiji, Malaysia; and Caribbean-Guyana, Trinidad, and Tobago-countries, in which ethnic groups are more widely inter-mixed and, consequently, have more day-to-day contact. Here, ethnic identities are often mitigated by other disputes, and electoral districts are likely to be ethnically heterogeneous. Therefore, centripetal electoral systems, which encourage parties to seek the support of various ethnic groups, (the alternative vote), may well break down inter-ethnic antagonisms and promote the development of broad, multi-ethnic parties. After a year-long review of their Constitution, Fiji has just adopted the Alternative Vote (AV) as part of a new, non-racial constitution for this very reason.

Another scenario is where there are so many ethnic groups that some types of electoral systems are naturally precluded. Such a social structure typically revolves around small, geographically-defined tribal groups-a relatively unusual composition in Western states, but common in some areas of central Africa and the South Pacific. This typically requires Single-Member Representation to function effectively. In the extreme case of Papua, New Guinea, there are several thousand competing clan groups speaking over 800 distinct languages. Any attempt at proportional representation in such a case would be almost impossible, as it would require a parliament of several thousand members (and, because parties are either weak or non-existent in almost all such cases, the list-PR system favoured by consociationalists would be particularly inappropriate). This dramatically curtails the range of options available to electoral engineers.

Nature of the State

Institutional prescriptions for electoral engineering need to be alert to the different

political dynamics that distinguish transitional democracies from established ones. Transitional democracies, particularly those moving from a deep-rooted conflict situation, typically have a greater need for inclusiveness and a lower threshold for the robust rhetoric of adversarial politics, than their established counterparts. Similarly, the stable political environments of most Western countries-where two or three main parties can often reasonably expect regular periods in office via alternation of power or shifting governing coalitions-are very different from the type of zero-sum politics which often characterise divided societies. This is one of the reasons that 'winner take all' electoral systems such as First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) have so often been identified as a contributor to the breakdown of democracy in the developing world: such systems tend to lock out minorities from parliamentary representation and, in situations of ethnically-based parties, can easily lead to the total dominance of one ethnic group over all others. Democracy, under these circumstances, can quickly become a situation of permanent inclusion and exclusion, a zero-sum game, with frightening results.

For this reason, many scholars see a need for some type of power-sharing government featuring all significant groups as an essential part of the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. The power-sharing model is usually associated with PR, as this is the surest way of guaranteeing proportional results and minority representation. It is instructive to note that almost all of the major transitional elections in recent years have been conducted under some form of PR. In fact, recent transitional elections in Chile (1989), Namibia (1989), Nicaragua (1990), Cambodia (1993), South Africa (1994), and Mozambique (1994) all used a form of regional or national list PR for their founding elections. Some scholars have identified the choice of a proportional rather than a majoritarian system as being a key component of their successful transitions to democracy. By bringing minorities into the process and fairly representing all significant political parties in the new legislature, regardless of the extent or distribution of their support base, PR has been seen as being an integral element of creating an inclusive and legitimate post-authoritarian regime.

There is also mounting evidence that while large-scale list PR is an effective instrument for smoothing the path of democratic transition, it is less effective at promoting democratic consolidation. Developing countries, in particular those which have made the transition to democracy under list PR rules, have increasingly found that the large, multi-member districts required to achieve proportional results also create difficulties with political accountability and responsiveness between elected politicians and voters. Democratic consolidation requires the establishment of a meaningful relationship between the citizen and the state, and many new democracies-particularly those in agrarian societies-have much higher demands for constituency service at the local level than they do for representation of all ideological opinions in the legislature. It is therefore increasingly being argued in South Africa, Cambodia, and elsewhere that the choice of a permanent electoral system should encourage a high degree of geographic accountability, by having members of parliament who represent small, territorially-defined districts who service the needs of their constituency, to establish a meaningful relationship between the rulers and the ruled. While this does not preclude all PR systems-there are many ways to combine single-member districts with proportional outcomes-it does rule out the national list PR systems often favoured by consociationalists.

Nature of Party System

The conventional wisdom amongst electoral scholars is that majoritarian electoral rules encourage the formation of a two-party system (and, by extension, one-party government), while Proportional Representation leads to a multi-party system (and coalition government). While there remains agreement that majority systems restrict the range of legislative representation and PR systems encourage it, the conventional wisdom of a causal relationship between an

electoral system and a party system is becoming dated. In recent years, FPTP has facilitated the fragmentation of the party system in established democracies such as Canada and India, while PR has seen the election of what look likely to be dominant single-party regimes in Namibia, South Africa, and elsewhere.

One of the basic precepts of political science is that politicians and parties will make choices about institutions such as electoral systems that they believe will benefit themselves. Different types of party systems will thus tend to produce different electoral system choices. The best-known example of this is the adoption of PR in continental Europe in the early years of this century. The expansion of the franchise and the rise of powerful new social forces, such as the labour movement, prompted the adoption of systems of PR that would both reflect and restrain these changes in society. More recent transitions have underlined this 'rational actor' model of electoral system choice. Thus, threatened incumbent regimes in Ukraine and Chile adopted systems which they thought would maximise their electoral prospects: a two-round runoff system which over-represents the former Communists in the Ukraine, and a unusual form of PR in two-member districts which was calculated to overrepresent the second-placed party in Chile. An interesting exception that proves the validity of this rule was the ANC's support for a PR system for South Africa's first post-apartheid elections. Retention of the existing FPTP system would almost undoubtedly have seen the over-representation of the ANC as the most popular party, but it would also have led to problems of minority exclusion and uncertainty. The ANC made a rational decision that their long-term interest would be better served by a system which enabled them to control their nominated candidates and bring possibly destabilising electoral elements 'into the tent' rather than giving them a reason to attack the system itself.

Overall Constitutional Framework

The efficacy of electoral system design should be judged in the broader constitutional framework of the state. This paper concentrates on elections that [constitute] legislatures. The impact of the electoral system on the membership and dynamics of legislatures will always be significant, but the electoral system's impact upon political accommodation and democratization more generally is tied to the amount of power beholden in the legislature and that body's relationship to other political institutions. The importance of electoral system engineering is heightened in centralised, unicameral parliamentary systems, and is maximised when the legislature is constitutionally obliged to produce an executive cabinet of national unity drawn from all significant parties that gain parliamentary representation.

Similarly, the efficacy of electoral system design is incrementally diminished as power is eroded away from the parliament. Thus, a number of constitutional structures will proportionately distract attention away from elections to the legislature and will require the constitutional designer to focus on the inter-relationships between executives and legislatures; between upper and lower houses of parliament; and between national and regional and local government. This is not to diminish the importance of electoral systems for these other institutions (how to elect presidents and federal legislatures); rather, it highlights how constitutional engineering becomes increasingly complex as power is devolved away from the centre. Each of the following institutional components of the state may fragment the focal points of political power and thus diminish the significance of electoral system design on the overall political climate:

- a directly elected president;
- a bi-cameral parliament with a balance of power between the two houses;
- a degree of federalism and/or regional asymmetrical arrangements.

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Historical Review

Liberal democratic elections can trace their lineage to ancient Athens and the Demos gathering in the town square but modern electoral system design is traced back to the mid to late 19th century in Western Europe. Until the First World War democratic parliaments were either elected using embryonic forms of list PR (much of Scandinavia and the Low Countries), the Two Round System (TRS) (France and Germany), or First Past The Post (FPTP) (Britain, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand). Australia was unique in her replacement of colonially inherited FPTP with the Alternative Vote (AV) in 1918, see The Alternative Vote in Australia.

The table below illustrates the spread and dispersion of electoral systems in nation states between 1945 and 1995 and is based on data from International IDEAs Handbook of Voter Turnout 1945-1997: A Global Report on Political Participation. This covers not merely 'democracies,' but all nation states that have experienced 'multi-party' competitive elections.

In 1945 80% of the 'democratic world' predominantly elected its parliaments by Proportional Representation (PR) methods. Most used forms of list PR but the Republic of Ireland and Malta used the Single Transferrable Vote (STV) form of PR. Only Britain, the U.S.A., Canada, and New Zealand elected their parliaments by FPTP. By 1950 Indian independence and the independence of two smaller Caribbean countries increased the number of FPTP systems to 6, but PR systems remained hegemonic with nearly three-quarters of the total. In 1950 Japan used Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV) and Germany had adopted Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) representation after the Second World War. In 1960, with increasing numbers of Caribbean and African states gaining independence from Britain, the number of FPTP cases rose, but PR still accounted for nearly two-thirds of all cases, while FPTP was merely a quarter.

The tide of colonial independence through the 1960's led many African states to experiment with multi-party elections, and the Anglophone African countries almost all used FPTP electoral systems. By 1970 a third of all countries were using single member district FPTP systems while the number using list PR had fallen to less than half. Between 1980 and 1995 the real growth systems were parallel systems and the French Two-Round system. By 1995 these two relatively rare systems made up nearly one-quarter of the electoral systems of over 150 nation states.

The Historical Evolution of Electoral System Use

	Plurality-Majority				Semi-PR		Proportional			
	FPTP	BV	TRS	AV	SNTV	PAR	LIST	MMP	STV	
1945	4 (13%)	0	1 (3%)	1 (3%)	0	0	(22 ((73%)	0	2 (6%)	30
1950	6 (14%)	1 (2%)	1 (2%)	1 (2%)	1 (2%)	0	30 (70%)	1 (2%)	2 (4%)	43

1960	17 (25%)	1 (2%)	1 (2%)	1 (2%)	1 (2%)	0	34 (59%)	1 (2%)	2 (4%)	58
1970	24 (33%)	3 (4%)	2 (3%)	2 (3%)	1 (1%)	2 (3%)	36 (49%)	1 (1%)	2 (3%)	73
1980	29 (32%)	4 (4%)	5 (5%)	2 (2%)	1 (1%)	4 (4%)	43 (47%)	1 (1%)	2 (2%)	91
1990	33 (31%)	5 (5%)	7 (6%)	2 (2%)	3 (3%)	6 (6%)	46 (43%)	2 (2%)	3 (3%)	107
1995	39 (25%)	9 (6%)	18 (12%)	2 (1%)	2 (1%)	18 (12%)	57 (37%)	6 (4%)	2 (1%)	153

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Practical Advice for Electoral System Designers

One of the clearest conclusions to be gleaned from the comparative study of electoral systems is simply the range and utility of the options available. Too often, constitutional drafters simply choose the electoral system they know best in new democracies. This is the system of the former colonial power if there was one-rather than investigating the most appropriate alternatives. The major purpose of this Web site is to provide enough knowledge for electoral system designers to make informed decisions. This does not mean we would necessarily advocate wholesale changes to existing electoral systems; in fact, the comparative experience of electoral reform to date suggests that moderate reforms, building on those parts of an existing system which work well, are often a better option than jumping to a completely new and unfamiliar system.

There is much to be learned from the experience of others. For example, a country with a First Past The Post (FPTP) system that wished to move to something more proportional while retaining the geographic link to constituents should consider the experience of New Zealand, which adopted a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation system in 1993, see The Alternative Vote in Australia. A similar country that wanted to keep single-member districts but encourage inter-group accommodation and compromise should look at the experience of Alternative Vote (AV) in the Oceania region, see Papua New Guinea. Any deeply-divided country wishing to make the transition to democracy would be well advised to consider the case of South Africa's 1994 List-PR elections, see South Africa: Election Systems and Conflict Management, and the multi-ethnic power-sharing government elected as a result. A country that simply wants to reduce the cost and instability created by a Two-Round System (TRS) should examine the Sri Lankan, see Sri Lanka: Changes to Accommodate Diversity, or Irish preferential vote option, Ireland: The Archetypal Single Transferable Vote System. In all of these cases, the change from one electoral system to another has had a clear impact upon the politics of that country.

Some practical guidelines for electoral system designers follow.

Keep It Simple

Effective and sustainable electoral system designs are more likely to be those that can be easily understood by the voter and the politician. Too much complexity can lead to misunderstandings, unintended consequences, and voter mistrust of the results.

Don't be Afraid to Innovate

Many of the successful electoral systems used in the world today themselves represent innovative approaches to specific problems, and have been proven to work well. There is much to learn from the experience of others.

Pay Attention to Contextual and Temporal Factors

Electoral systems do not work in a vacuum. Their success depends on a happy marriage of political institutions and cultural traditions. The first point of departure for any would-be electoral system designer should be to ask:

- what is the political and social context that I am working within?

The second question might be:

- am I designing a permanent system or one that needs to get us through a transitional period?

Do Not Underestimate the Electorate

While simplicity is important, it is equally dangerous to underestimate the ability of voters to comprehend and successfully use a wide variety of different electoral systems. Complex preferential systems, for example, have been used successfully in developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region (such as Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka, see Papua New Guinea, while the experience of many recent elections in new democracies has emphasised the important distinction between "functional" literacy and "political" literacy. Even in very poor countries, voters often have, and wish to express, sophisticated political preferences and choices.

Err on the Side of Inclusion

Wherever possible, whether in divided or relatively homogenous societies, the electoral system should produce a parliament that errs on the side of including all significant interests. Regardless of whether minorities are based on ideological, ethnic, racial, linguistic, regional or religious identities, the exclusion of significant shades of opinion from parliaments, particularly in the developing world, has often been catastrophically counter-productive.

Process is a Key Factor in Choice

The way in which a particular electoral system is chosen is also extremely important in ensuring its overall legitimacy. A process in which most or all groups are included, including the electorate at large, is likely to result in significantly broader acceptance of the end result than a decision perceived as being motivated by partisan self-interest alone. Although partisan considerations are unavoidable when discussing the choice of electoral systems, broad cross-party and public support for any institution is crucial to it being accepted and respected. The reform of the New Zealand electoral system from FPTP to MMP, for example, was preceded by a series of public plebiscites that served to legitimize the final outcome, see New Zealand: A Westminster Democracy Switches to PR. By contrast, the French Socialist Government's decision in 1986 to switch from their existing Two-Round System (TRS)to PR was widely perceived as being motivated by partisan reasons, and was quickly reversed as soon the government lost power in 1988.

Build Legitimacy and Acceptance among All Key Actors

All groupings that wish to play a part in the democratic process should feel that the electoral system to be used is "fair" and gives them the same chance as anyone else to be electorally successful. The paramount aim should be that those who "lose" the election cannot translate their disappointment into a rejection of the system itself, nor use the electoral system as an excuse to destabilize the path of democratic consolidation. In 1990 in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas lost control of the government but they accepted the defeat, in part because they accepted the fairness of the electoral system. Like South Africa, Sierra Leone and Mozambique were able to end their bloody civil wars through institutional arrangements that were broadly acceptable to all sides, see South Africa:

Election Systems and Conflict Management.

Try to Maximize Voter Influence

Voters should feel that elections provide them with a measure of influence over governments and government policy. Choice can be maximized in a number of different ways. Voters may be able to choose between parties, between candidates of different parties, and between candidates of the same party. They might also be able to vote differently when it comes to presidential, upper house, lower house, regional, and local government elections. They should also feel confident that their vote has a genuine impact on government formation, and not just on the composition of the parliament alone.

Balance Against Encouraging Coherent Political Parties

The desire to maximize voter influence should be balanced against the need to encourage coherent and viable political parties. Maximum voter choice on the ballot paper may produce such a fragmented parliament that nobody ends up with the desired result. There is widespread agreement among political scientists that broadly-based, coherent political parties are among the most important factors in the promotion of effective and sustainable democracy.

Long-Term Stability and Short-Term Advantage

When political actors negotiate over a new electoral system they often push proposals which they believe will advantage their party in the coming elections. However, this can often be an unwise strategy, particularly in developing nations, as one party's short-term success or dominance may lead to long-term political breakdown and social unrest. For example, in negotiations prior to the transitional 1994 election, South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) could have reasonably argued for the retention of the existing FPTP electoral system, which would probably have given them, as by far the largest party, a seat bonus over and above their share of the national vote. That they argued for a form of proportional representation, and thus won fewer seats than they could have under FPTP, was a testament to the fact that they saw long-term stability as more desirable than short-term electoral gratification.

Similarly, electoral systems need to be responsive enough to react effectively to changing political circumstances and the growth of new political movements. Even in established democracies, support for the major parties is rarely stable, while politics in new democracies is almost always highly dynamic. This means that a party that benefits from the electoral arrangements at one election may not necessarily benefit at the next.

Don't Think of the Electoral System as a Panacea for All Ills

While it is true that if one wants to change the nature of political competition the electoral system may be the most effective instrument to do so, electoral systems can never be the panacea for the political ills of a country. The overall effects of other variables, particularly a nation's political culture, usually have a much greater impact on democratic prospects than institutional factors such as electoral systems. Moreover, the positive effects of a well-crafted electoral system can be all too easily submerged by an inappropriate constitutional dispensation, the domestic dominance of forces of discord, or the weight of external threats to the sovereignty of the state.

But Conversely Don't Underestimate its Influence

While accepting that throughout the world the social constraints on democracy

are considerable, such constraints still leave room for conscious political strategies which may further or hamper successful democratization. Electoral systems are not a panacea, but they are central to the structuring of stability in any polity. Deft electoral system engineering may not prevent or eradicate deep enmities, but appropriate institutions can nudge the political system in the direction of reduced conflict and greater governmental accountability. In other words, while most of the changes that can be achieved by tailoring electoral systems are necessarily at the margins, it is often these marginal impacts that make the difference between democracy being consolidated or democracy being undermined.

The Electorate's Willingness to Embrace Change

Electoral system change might seem like a good idea to political insiders who understand the flaws of the existing system, but unless proposals for reform are presented in an appropriate way, the public may well reject tinkering with the system, perceiving reform to be nothing more than a case of politicians altering the rules for their own benefit. Most damaging are situations when the change is seen to be a blatant manoeuvre for political gain (as was the case in France in 1986, in Chile in 1989, and in Jordan in 1993, see Jordan - Electoral System Design in the Arab World and Chile: Proportionality or Majoritarianism ?. When the system alters so frequently the voters do not quite know where they are, as some have argued is the case in Bolivia, see Bolivia: Electoral Reform in Latin America.

Avoid Being a Slave to Past Systems

All too often electoral systems inappropriate to a new democracy's needs have been inherited or carried over from colonial times without any thought as to how they will work within the new political realities. Almost all the former British colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific, for example, adopted FPTP systems. In many of these new democracies, particularly those facing ethnic divisions, this system proved utterly inappropriate to their needs. It has been similarly argued that many of the former French colonies in West Africa that retained the use of the francophone TRS system, such as Mali in 1992, see Mali: A Two-Round System in Africa suffered damaging polarization as a result. Similarly, many post-communist regimes continue to utilize mandatory turnout or majority requirements inherited from the Soviet era, see Ukraine: Peril of Majoritarianism in New Democracy.

Assess Impact of Any New System on Societal Conflict

Electoral systems can be seen not only as mechanisms for choosing parliaments and presidents, but also as a tool of conflict management within a society. Some systems, in some circumstances, will encourage parties to make inclusive appeals for support outside their own core support base. Unfortunately, it is more often the case in the world today that the presence of inappropriate electoral systems serve actually to exacerbate negative tendencies which already exist; for example, by encouraging parties to see elections as "zero-sum" contests and thus to act in a hostile and exclusionary manner to anyone outside their home group. When designing any political institution, the bottom line is that even if it does not help to reduce tensions within society, it should, at the very least, not make matters worse.

Try to Imagine Unusual or Unlikely Contingencies

Too often, electoral systems are designed to avoid the mistakes of the past, especially the immediate past. Care should be taken not to overreact and create a system that goes too far in terms of correcting previous problems. Furthermore,

electoral system designers would do well to pose themselves some unusual questions to avoid embarrassment in the long run:

- What if nobody wins under the system proposed?
- Is it possible that one party could win all the seats?
- What if you have to award more seats than you have places in the legislature?
- What do you do if candidates tie?
- Might the system mean that, in some districts, it is better for a party supporter not to vote for their preferred party or candidate?

For further information see Creation and amendment process and Process of Electoral Reform.

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es70

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Parliamentary Size

How large should a country's representative assembly be? The question is not trivial. Assembly size has measurable effects on the representation of political parties. Especially, in smaller magnitude systems (such as single-member districts, but also small multimember districts) having more seats means more districts in which smaller parties with localized support have greater chances for representation. An assembly that is too small for the country may thus shut out important interests. Regardless of district magnitude, a small assembly may create a feeling of "distance" between representatives and voters, even voters who favor large parties. On the other hand, an assembly that is overly large may create an unwieldy legislative process and generate a need for more complex intra-assembly committee structures or encourage the delegation of more legislative authority to the executive branch. Thus the question arises of what is the "optimal" assembly size for a given country of a given population.

One of the most important activities of a legislator is communication. A legislator is engaged in communication with both constituents and other legislators. Obviously, there are other persons with whom legislators communicate and there are other activities in which legislators are engaged besides communication. Nonetheless, a crucial feature of the working life of a legislator is to perform the representation function-communicating with constituents-and to perform the lawmaking function in which a legislator must communicate with other legislators. Assembly sizes that are small for a given country will minimize communication channels among legislators, and hence streamline the lawmaking function, but at the expense of multiplying the communication channels with constituents. Conversely, assembly sizes that are large for a given country will reduce communication channels with constituents-hence, other things equal, "improving" representation"-but will make the lawmaking process less effective due to multiplication of communication channels involving other legislators. In between assemblies that are "too small" and those that are "too large" for a given country, there is an optimal size that minimizes the total number of communication channels.

Actual Assembly Sizes and Nations' Populations

The reasoning above would suggest that there would be a systematic relationship between assembly size and population. A study of actual assembly sizes for established democracies in the advanced industrial states revealed the following cube-root relationship between population and assembly size:

- $S = P1/3$

where S is the number of seats in the lower or sole house of the assembly, and P is the total population of the country. However, it was also found that for countries in the developing world, this appealingly simple relationship overpredicted the size of assemblies. The reason appears to be that what is relevant is not the total population, but the "active" population, Pa. The active population-that portion that can be assumed to be actually involved in market exchange and therefore in seeking political representation-can be estimated as:

- $Pa = PLW$,

where L is the literacy rate and W is the working-age fraction of the total population. Thus, if a country had a population of ten million, with a 90% literacy rate and 55% of the population of working age, its active population would be Pa = 10,000,000 x .90 x .55 = 4,950,000. If a country had a population of ten million, 55% of which was of working age, but its literacy rate was only 75%, then its active population would be Pa = 10,000,000 x .75 x .55 = 4,125,000. In developed countries, there is little difference between active and total population, but in developing countries, there may be a difference. When all countries with assemblies were investigated, the following relationship between active population and number of seats in the assembly was revealed:

- S = (2Pa)1/3

Thus to take our two examples above, the country with the active population of 4,950,000 would be predicted to have an assembly of 215 members, while the country with the active population of 4,125,000 would be predicted to have an assembly of 202 members.

Very few countries have assemblies that are larger than twice the size predicted by this equation and only a few have assemblies that are smaller than half the predicted value. So, the equation may be thought of as a useful predictor of the suitable size of a country's assembly, once the active population of the country can be ascertained.

A Theoretical Model

Now the question that remains is whether this relationship is purely empirical, or if it can be given a theoretical foundation. There is indeed a theoretical basis for the equation: The "communications channel" model, alluded to above, allows us to derive the relationship.

If S is the number of assembly seats and Pa the total active population, then the average constituency of one assembly member consist of Pa/S active citizens. Because the assembly member is both a sender and receiver of information, the total number of constituent communication channels, cc, is 2Pa/S.

Inside the assembly, every member communicates with S-1 other members, again in a dual capacity as both sender and receiver of information. He also monitors the channels connecting the other S-1 members to one another. The total number of channels inside the assembly, cs, is:

- cs = 2(s-1) + (S-1)(S -2)/2 = S2/2 + S/2 -1,

which may be simplified to S2/2 for any value of S large enough to be a realistic national assembly size (because the term, S/2 -1, will have negligible effect) . So the total number of channels making demands on the assembly member is:

- c = cs + cc = S2/2 + 2Pa/S.

The assembly size that is optimal is the one that minimizes the total number of communication channels for a given active population. That number may be determined by calculating the derivative dc/dS and making it zero:

- dc/dS = S- 2Pa/S2 = 0.

The result is 2Pa = S3, which then gives us the model:

- S = (2Pa)1/3

Obviously, as with any theoretical model, much detail is left out. Yet the empirical fit is quite good, and so the model tells us that we might expect pressures to change assembly size if a given country's assembly falls too far above or below the model's prediction. If a country were to set its assembly size according to this model, and to adjust its assembly size periodically according to the model as active population grows, pressures to change the size of the assembly would be less likely to result than if other methods are used, or periodic adjustments are not permitted.

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esc03

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Overview

file info

The term Boundary Delimitation is usually used to refer to the process of drawing electoral district boundaries. However, it can also be used to denote the process of drawing voting areas (also called polling areas, districts or election precincts) for the purposes of assigning voters to polling places. Occasionally, the term has been employed to describe the process of demarcating administrative boundaries such as state, county or municipality lines.

Because the focus of this project is on election administration, the Boundary Delimitation section of the Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project discusses only the delimitation of electoral districts and voting areas. Furthermore, because the delimitation of electoral districts is far more complicated and much more controversial than the delimitation of voting areas, the vast majority of this section will be devoted to the delimitation of electoral district boundaries.

Delimiting Electoral Districts

The periodic delimitation of electoral boundaries, or redistricting, is necessary in any representative system where single-member districts or uniformly small multimember districts are used. If electoral boundaries are not periodically adjusted, population inequities develop across districts.

Adjusting district boundaries can have major consequences not only for the legislators who represent the districts, but also for the individual and community constituents of the districts. Ultimately, election results and the partisan composition of the legislature are affected by the selection of district boundaries. But the importance of the redistricting process is seldom recognised outside of political circles.

Countries have adopted various methods for delimiting districts. In some, the choice of methods is simply a matter of historical tradition. In others, methods for delimiting districts have been borrowed from a colonial power or an influential neighbouring country. In still other countries, conscious decisions based on the geographic size of the country, its physical features, or its financial resources were made. Recently, countries have

taken their political and social context into account when making decisions on which redistricting practices to adopt. Clearly, there is a broad range of possibilities. Redistricting practices that work well in some countries will not work in others. Informed decision-making is the best approach to selecting or reforming a redistricting process.

Electoral Systems that Delimit Electoral Districts

The delimitation of electoral districts is most commonly associated with plurality or majority electoral systems. Both systems rely heavily, if not exclusively, on single-member districts. These districts must be redrawn periodically to reflect changes in the population.

Plurality and majority systems, however, are not the only types of electoral systems that require the periodic delimitation of electoral districts. One proportional representation system, characterised by the single transferable vote, also must delimit electoral districts occasionally. This is because the single transferable vote requires districts that are uniformly small in magnitude. Another electoral system, the "mixed" electoral system, also requires the delimitation of electoral districts. This is because a mixed system combines party list proportional representation with single-member districts.

The importance of the delimitation process varies, depending on the type of electoral system. Because plurality and majority systems can, and do, produce election outcomes that are disproportional with regard to the ratio of legislative seats to partisan votes, the delimitation process is very important. It is less important in mixed systems or proportional representation systems.

Structure and Rules for Delimiting Electoral Districts

Countries that delimit districts must establish a formal structure and a set of rules for carrying out the redistricting process. Because different sets of districts can produce different election outcomes, even if the underlying vote patterns remain constant, the choice of redistricting practices is important. Electoral legislation outlining the formal structure and rules for redistricting should address the following issues:

- Who will draw the district lines or boundaries? And who will have the ultimate responsibility for selecting the final redistricting plan?
- Should the persons who draw the districts be independent from the legislature?

- Should they be politically neutral?
- Should the legislature have any formal role at all in the process?
- Should some mechanism exist for public input into to the redistricting process?
- Should redistricting criteria be adopted for the line drawers to follow? If so, what should those criteria be?
- How often should districts be redrawn and how long should the redistricting process take?

Redistricting practices vary markedly across countries. In the United States, for example, legislators are usually responsible for drawing electoral district lines. Partisan politics and the protection of incumbent legislators play a large role in the redistricting process. By contrast, politicians in many Commonwealth countries have opted out of the redistricting process. The process is left to independent commissions with neutral redistricting criteria for guidance. The reasons for these differences are best explained by the social, political and cultural norms.

Tasks Involved in Drawing Electoral District Boundaries

Although redistricting rules vary markedly across countries, the tasks involved in drawing districts are generally very similar. Drawing district boundaries entails:

- allocating seats to sub-regions of the country, such as states or provinces
- creating a database minimally composed of maps and population data
- assigning geographic units to districts until all geographic units within the territory have been assigned
- summarising and evaluating the redistricting plan

This can be a complex, time-consuming and expensive process.

Delimiting Voting Areas

Most countries, regardless of the type of election system employed, delimit voting areas. Voting areas are contiguous geographic areas in which all the

voters are assigned to the same polling place or polling station.

Because voting areas are used for election administration purposes only, the boundaries of these areas tend to be less controversial, and the delimitation of these areas is usually left to the discretion of election administrators. However, because the data required and the tasks involved in the delimitation of voting areas are similar to those involved in drawing electoral district lines, the delimitation of voting areas is discussed under the Boundary Delimitation section.

Conclusion

The Boundary Delimitation section of the Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project discusses the types of electoral systems that require periodic electoral district delimitation and the advantages and disadvantages of various districting alternatives (see Delimiting Electoral Districts). It considers the formal structure and rules that countries use to conduct electoral district delimitation, or redistricting (see Structure and Rules for Delimiting Electoral Districts). It outlines each step of the district drawing process, from the creation of a redistricting database to describing and evaluating redistricting plans (see Tasks Involved in Drawing Electoral District Boundaries). In addition, the delimitation of voting areas for election administration purposes is discussed (see Special Considerations: Delimiting Voting Areas).

It is hoped that this discussion will help countries to make informed decisions on whether to delimit electoral districts and, if so, which boundary delimitation practices to adopt.

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Guiding Principles

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Because delimitation, or redistricting, practices vary greatly around the world, there are few universal principles to guide the delimitation process. Countries disagree on fundamental issues, such as how impartial and independent the process can and should be from the legislative and political concerns. But there are three generally accepted principles:

- Representativeness
- equality of voting strength
- reciprocity

Representativeness

Electoral district boundaries should be drawn such that constituents have an opportunity to elect candidates they feel truly represent them. This usually means that district boundaries should coincide with communities of interest as much as possible. Communities of interest can be defined in a variety of ways. For example, they can be administrative divisions, ethnic or racial neighbourhoods, or natural communities delineated by physical boundaries (such as islands). If districts are not composed of communities of interest, however defined, it may be difficult for a single candidate to represent the entire constituency.

Regardless of a representative's characteristics or political beliefs, however, a representative who performs constituency services and works to protect constituency interests in the legislature may be rewarded with re-election if the constituency views this as effective representation.

Equality of Voting Strength

Electoral district boundaries should be drawn so that districts are relatively equal in population. Equally populous districts allow voters to have an equally weighted vote in the election of representatives. If, for example, a representative is elected from a district that has twice as many voters as another district, voters in the larger district will have half the influence of

voters in the smaller district. Electoral districts that vary greatly in population--a condition referred to as "malapportionment"--violate a central tenet of democracy, namely, that all voters should be able to cast a vote of equal weight.

Reciprocity

The procedure for delimiting electoral districts should be clearly spelled out in legislation so that the rules regulating the process are the same, regardless of who is drawing the district boundaries. If the redistricting process is to be non-partisan, then all political parties must refrain from attempting to influence the outcome. If political concerns are permitted to play a role in the process, then all political parties must be given access to the process. If the legislature is to draw electoral district boundaries, then any political party that garners a majority in the legislature will have an opportunity to control the process. These rules must be clearly understood and must be acceptable to all major political parties and participants in the redistricting process.

Feedback

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Electoral Systems that Delimit Electoral Districts

file info

Traditionally, three broad categories of electoral systems have been described: plurality systems, majority systems, and proportional representation systems. The most important element that differentiates these electoral systems from one another is the means by which seats in the legislature are allocated:

- to candidates receiving a plurality of the vote
- to candidates obtaining a majority of the vote
- proportionally on the basis of votes cast for political parties or candidates

A recent addition to these three broad categories of electoral systems is the mixed electoral system, which combines elements of both proportional representation and plurality or majority voting systems.

Delimiting Districts: Plurality or Majority Systems

The delimitation of electoral districts is most commonly associated with plurality or majority electoral systems. Both systems tend to rely heavily, if not exclusively, on single-member electoral districts. These districts must be redrawn periodically to reflect shifts in the population. Both systems also share one fundamental element because of their reliance on single-member districts--the number of seats that a political party receives depends not only on the proportion of the votes it received, but also on where those votes were cast. Under plurality and majority systems, minority political parties whose supporters are not geographically concentrated usually obtain fewer seats than their proportion of the vote would suggest they are entitled. The multimember districts of proportional systems can rectify this distortion in the equation of seats to votes because the larger the magnitude of the electoral districts, the more proportional the results.

Delimiting Districts: Proportional Representation

There are two major types of proportional representation systems--the party list system and the single transferable vote. (The mixed member proportional system also produces proportional results, but this system will be discussed under the "mixed system" category.) The party list system is the far more common of the two. Under the party list system, electoral districts rarely, if ever, require delimitation. If electoral districts are employed, they are relatively large multimember districts whose boundaries generally correspond to administrative divisions. To accommodate shifts in population, the number of seats allocated to individual multimember districts is adjusted, rather than redrawing the boundaries of the districts.

The single transferable vote, used in Ireland and Malta, is the other type of proportional representation. Because voting is on the basis of candidates, not parties, these countries employ small multimember districts with only three to five members elected per district. Electoral district boundaries must therefore be redrawn periodically in these two countries.

Delimiting Districts: Mixed Electoral Systems

Mixed electoral systems are becoming increasingly popular. They employ both party list proportional representation and single-member electoral districts with plurality or majority vote requirements. The German electoral system is the prototypical mixed electoral system.

Because mixed systems incorporate single-member districts, the delimitation of electoral districts must occur periodically to adjust for shifts in the population. The importance of the delimitation process and the influence that district configurations have on the outcome of elections is dependent on whether party list seats are used to correct any distortions in the relationship between seats to votes produced by the single-member districts. In countries such as Germany, seats allocated under the party list system are used to compensate for any distortions in the seats-to-votes ratio produced at the electoral district level. Mixed systems that use party list seats in a compensatory manner are sometimes called Mixed Member Proportional systems because the election results are proportional.

In countries such as Russia, party list seats are not used to compensate for any disproportionality arising from elections in single-member districts. Rather, seats allocated to the parties under the party list component of the election are simply added to the seats won at the electoral district level. The partisan seats-to-votes ratio may therefore be distorted. In this type of mixed system, sometimes called a Parallel system, the district delimitation process is more important because it can have a more

pronounced effect on the partisan composition of the legislature.

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Electoral District Alternatives

file info

Two important factors to be considered when contemplating electoral districting alternatives are: (1) district magnitude and (2) the alignment of electoral district boundaries with existing administrative and/or political boundaries. District magnitude refers to the number of legislative seats assigned to a district[3]. A district can be either a single-member district or a multimember district, where the number of seats may range from two to one hundred or more. With regard to alignment, administrative divisions within a country can be used as electoral districts, or electoral districts can be specially drawn with little regard for administrative divisions, usually to meet equal population criteria.

These two factors form a matrix[4]. The first dimension, district magnitude, focuses on the issue of single-member versus multimember districts. The second dimension focuses on alignment or nonalignment of electoral districts with administrative or political boundaries.

Most single-member districts fall into the nonalignment category. The districts tend to be artificial pieces of geography that have no meaning outside the electoral context. Some single-member districts, however, particularly those in proportional representation countries, are small, highly distinctive communities. For example, a few small cantons in Switzerland form single-member districts.

Countries with multimember districts often use existing administrative divisions as electoral districts. Each district is assigned the appropriate number of legislative seats for its population, with individual districts having as few as two representatives and most districts having far more than two representatives. These countries usually employ some form of proportional representation. The more artificially constructed multimember districts are found in countries such as Ireland and Malta, which use districts that are uniformly small in magnitude because elections are conducted using the single transferable vote.

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Structure and Rules for Delimiting Electoral Districts

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Countries that delimit electoral districts must establish rules and a formal structure for carrying out the process. Because different sets of districts can produce different election outcomes, even if underlying voting patterns remain constant, the choices involved in the design of the redistricting process are important. Included among those decisions are the following:

- Who should draw the district lines?
- Who should decide on the final districting plan?
- Should the legislature have a role in drawing the districts or deciding on the final plan?
- Should the general public have input into the redistricting process?
- How often do districts need to be redrawn?
- How long will the redistricting process take to complete?
- Should formal criteria be established for line drawers to consider? If so, what criteria should be established?
- Should the plan be subject to challenge in the courts?

The task of drawing districts must be assigned to some boundary authority. The composition of the boundary authority and the degree of independence granted to this authority vary considerably from country to country. Traditionally, legislatures have been allowed to draw their own districts. Increasingly, however, countries are turning the process over to independent commissions. This is part of an international movement to eliminate "politics" from the redistricting process.

Reforms that have replaced legislatures with redistricting commissions have also included provisions for increased public access to the redistricting process and formal criteria for commissioners to consider

when drawing districts. These redistricting criteria are usually listed in the electoral laws of the country. The criteria often include factors such as equality of population, respect for regional and local administrative boundaries and other geographic features such as natural (physically-defined) boundaries, and recognition of communities of interest.

Countries usually have not adopted redistricting criteria pertaining to the actual outcome of the redistricting process--for example, fair representation for political parties or minority groups. This is because single-member districts, used by almost all countries that delimit electoral districts, cannot guarantee results that are proportional, or even minimal, for minority political parties or minority racial, ethnic, religious or special language groups in the population. A few countries, however, have adopted special provisions designed to modify the distorting effects of single-member districts and to ensure some degree of representation for minority groups. Mixed systems, of course, provide more proportional results by electing some seats by party list.

This section examines the choices countries have made for rules and a structure to carry out redistricting, including:

- the composition of the authority charged with drawing the district boundaries, the degree of independence from legislative or partisan considerations granted to that authority, and which entities have input into the selection of the final districting plan (see Designation of a Boundary Authority)
- the frequency of redistricting and the deadlines that have been established for completing the redistricting process (see Frequency of Electoral District Delimitation and Length of Time Permitted for the Delimitation Process)
- provisions for public input into the redistricting process (see Public Access to the Delimitation Process)
- various redistricting criteria (see Establishment of Criteria for Delimiting Districts)
- the role of the courts, if any, in the redistricting process(see Role of the Courts in Electoral District Delimitation)

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Designation of a Boundary Authority

file info

Countries that delimit electoral districts must designate a boundary authority and establish some machinery for carrying out the task of redistricting. The task assigned to the boundary authority is the same in all countries--divide the country into districts for the election of representatives.

The composition of the boundary authority and the degree of independence from the legislature or partisan concerns granted to this authority, however, vary considerably from country to country. Some countries allow legislators to draw their own districts. Other countries, in an attempt to remove "politics" from the process, assign the task of redistricting to an independent boundary commission. In some countries, redistricting is centralised under a single redistricting authority. In other countries, states or provinces draw their own districts, with or without a uniform set of rules. In many countries, the boundary authority is granted the power to choose the final districting plan. But in some countries with non-legislative boundary authorities, the legislature or the government must approve the final districting plan before it can be implemented.

The types of boundary authorities countries have established and the degree of independence countries have accorded these authorities cover a broad spectrum. At one end of the spectrum is the United States, where the redistricting process is very political and decentralised. The responsibility for drawing districts for the United States Congress rests individually with the fifty states. There are few limitations on the states, and the boundary authorities are almost always political entities, i.e., state legislatures.

At the other end of the spectrum are many of the Commonwealth countries, where politicians have opted out of the redistricting process and granted the authority to neutral or independent commissions. A central agency may draw districts for the entire country. If the central agency does not actually draw the districts, it establishes guidelines for regional commissions and oversees the redistribution process. The final decision as to which district boundaries should be implemented rests with the commission and not with the legislature.

This section will examine alternative approaches to the designation of a boundary authority. It will discuss the composition of the boundary authority, whether the authority should be partisan or non-partisan, and whether a central authority or regional authorities should perform the task of redistricting. Who has the authority to make the final decision as to which set of district boundaries are to be implemented will also be considered.

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Equal Population

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The most widely accepted rule for redistricting is that districts should be relatively equal in population. This is because representation by population is a central tenet of democracy, and, in countries that employ single-member districts, this rule translates into the principle of equal populations across districts. Equally populous districts are necessary if voters are to have an equally weighted voice in the election of representatives. If, for example, a representative is elected from a district that has twice as many voters as another district, voters in the larger district will have half as much influence as voters in the smaller district.

The degree to which countries demand population equality varies. The United States is unique in its adherence to the doctrine of equal population. No other country requires deviations as minimal as the "one person, one vote" standard that has been imposed by U.S. courts since the early 1960s. New Zealand comes closest to that strict standard, but deviations of up to five percent from the electoral quota are permitted.

In Australia, federal electoral districts must fall within 10 percent of a state's electoral quota, as forecast by population projections three and one-half years into the future. Australia aims for equality of population halfway through its seven-year redistricting cycle to avoid wide discrepancies at the end of the cycle. Australia's close attention to population equality is relatively recent. Thirty years ago, the practice of heavy rural loading--creating rural districts that were much smaller in population than urban districts--was quite common. (For more information on Australian redistricting practices, see the case study on Australia, Federal Redistribution in Australia.)

In Canada, the independent commissions charged with creating federal electoral districts are allowed to deviate by up to 25 percent from the provincial quotas. But since 1986, commissions have been permitted to exceed the 25 percent limit under "extraordinary circumstances." This provision was used to create five of the 295 seats in the Canadian House of Commons in 1987, and two of 301 seats in 1996. In 1996, one Quebec seat was created with a population 40.2 percent below the provincial average, and one Newfoundland district was created with a population

62.5 percent below the provincial average. (For more information on Canadian redistribution, see the case study on Canada, Representation in the Canadian Parliament.)

In Germany, as in Canada, districts are not to deviate from the electoral quota by more than 25 percent. It is not until a district deviates by more than 33 percent, however, that the law requires that a district be redrawn. The German legislature, which must approve any proposed federal redistricting plan before it can be implemented, often refrains from adopting district modifications recommended by the Electoral Districts Commission until a district deviates by 33 percent or more.

The United Kingdom allows even larger deviations in district populations. The original standard was set at 25 percent in 1944. But the standard was repealed only two years later. The current rule requires that constituencies be "as equal as possible," but this rule must be balanced against the principle of respect for local boundaries as much as possible. Equally populous districts can also be disregarded for "special geographic circumstances." Allowances for natural communities prompted English boundary commissioners in 1983 to leave the Isle of Wight with 95,000 electors as a single constituency, while respect for local London boundaries left suburban Surbiton with only 48,000 electors. Likewise, recognising the difficulties of island travel, the commissioners in Scotland granted the Western Isles (population 24,000) and Orkney and Shetland (population 31,000) their own representatives.

The degree to which a country adheres to strict equality of population is related to the significance attached to individual political equality. The United States is strongly committed to individual rights and equality, so perhaps it is not surprising that it developed the strictest population deviation standards of any country using single-member districts. Other countries, while recognising the importance of population equality, have chosen to balance this factor against other redistricting criteria perceived as equally valid. In the United Kingdom, respect for local administrative boundaries is given precedence over exact equality of number. In many African countries, the need to recognise individual tribes may take precedence over population equality. Each country must determine how much variation from the ideal of exact population equality will be tolerated to accommodate other redistricting goals.

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Geographic Criteria

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In many countries, the electoral laws specify that geography, or certain geographic factors, be taken into account when delimiting electoral district lines. Geographic criteria can be divided into two categories--criteria relating to geographic boundaries and criteria relating to geographic size and/or shape. A boundary authority may be asked to consider factors from either or both criteria.

Criteria Related to Geographic Boundaries

Respect for clearly established boundary lines is often specified as a criterion for those redistricting to consider when drawing electoral district lines. These boundaries can include administrative boundaries such as county and municipality lines and/or natural boundaries created by dominant topographical features such as mountain ranges, rivers or islands.

Geographic redistricting criteria such as respect for administrative boundaries and physically defined natural communities are a higher priority in some countries than in others. In the United Kingdom, for example, respect for local administrative boundaries and natural communities is the most important concept guiding boundary commissioners. Large population disparities are tolerated as a result.

Criteria Related to Geographic Size and Shape

Factors such as the remoteness of a territory, the sparseness of population, or geographic accessibility are sometimes listed as criteria to consider when drawing district lines. These factors are particularly important in countries which have large, sparsely populated territories, like Canada, Australia or Russia, or countries with islands or other isolated constituencies that are more difficult to serve.

Two other factors that are sometimes listed as redistricting criteria relate specifically to the geometric shape of a district--contiguity and compactness. Advocates of these criteria hold that districts should not be oddly shaped and that all pieces of a district should be inter-connected.

The latter criterion seems to have been taken for granted by redistricting authorities almost everywhere and is specifically mentioned as a rule in a number of countries. For example, many state constitutions in the United States list contiguity as a requirement for legislative districts. Recently, this issue has led to disagreements in some states in the United States as to whether a district connected by a single point is, in fact, contiguous.

The issue of district compactness, like contiguity, is often taken for granted and may or may not be specifically listed as a criterion to consider. When it is listed, compactness is rarely defined. Like contiguity, the issue of compactness has led to disagreements, and even court challenges, in a number of states in the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently ordered the redrawing of a number of oddly shaped "majority minority" congressional districts. Although the shape of these districts was not the basis for the Court's decision, the fact that the districts were not compact was considered evidence of an impermissible motive in creating the district boundaries. (For additional discussion of these court cases see Role of the Courts in Electoral District Delimitation.)

Feedback

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Communities of Interest

file info

Because of requirements that single-member districts be relatively equal in population, single-member districts often do not reflect distinct geographic communities as signified by municipal, county or other administrative boundary lines. This does not mean, however, that political representation has been divorced from the notion of "community" in countries that delimit single-member districts.

Many countries that delimit single-member districts continue to emphasise the importance of creating districts that correspond as closely as possible to pre-existing communities, defined as administrative divisions and/or "communities of interest." The rationale for recognising communities in redistricting is that electoral districts should be more than conglomerations of arbitrary, random groups of individuals. Districts should, as much as possible, be cohesive units with common interests related to representation. This makes a representative's job of articulating the interests of his or her constituency much easier.

Defining Communities of Interest

A "community of interest" is rarely defined by statute but it is generally thought of as a group of individuals united by shared interests or values. These shared interests may be the result of a common history or culture, a common ethnic background, or a variety of other ties that create a community of voters with distinct interests.

Although the perimeter of a community of interest may correspond to the boundaries of an administrative division, this is not necessarily the case. For example, a river may form a boundary between two administrative divisions, but the entire river valley may comprise a unified community of interest. In this instance, an electoral district that follows the administrative boundary would divide a community of interest.

In general, criteria related to communities of interest can be divided into three categories: (1) criteria related to administrative or geographic boundaries; (2) criteria related to common interests or common characteristics; and (3) criteria related to patterns of interaction. Criteria

related to administrative or geographic boundaries are discussed under Geographic Criteria (see Geographic criteria).

Some of the criteria related to common interests or characteristics are:

- Shared racial or ethnic background
- Common history and/or culture
- Common religion or language
- Shared socio-economic status

Some of the criteria related to patterns of interaction are:

- Transportation patterns
- Economic ties
- Communication networks (media markets)

Countries specifying that communities of interest be considered for redistricting have adopted a variety of approaches. Some countries regard communities of interest as the *basic* redistricting criterion, with all the other criteria subsumed below it as components of communities of interest. Other countries regard communities of interest more as a *residual* concept, filling holes left in a list of more specific redistricting criteria, such as the consideration of administrative boundaries and geographical features.

Despite the ambiguity inherent in the term "communities of interest," redistricters in many countries take communities of interest into account when drawing electoral boundaries. Redistricters knowledgeable about local conditions can sometimes identify communities of interest, but more often these communities are identified through a public hearing process.

Conclusion

Redistricting criteria inevitably conflict with one another. One possible means to resolve a conflict between criteria is to determine the most salient or most important "community of interest" in a given instance. Public hearings are essential to this process. For example, a redistricting plan that follows ethnic community boundaries rather than administrative boundaries may prevail if members of the public assert that the ethnic community boundaries are more relevant to them than administrative boundaries.

Feedback

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Tasks Involved in Drawing Electoral District Boundaries

file info

The process of drawing electoral district boundaries is time consuming and labour-intensive. The delimitation, or redistricting, process usually begins with an allocation of seats to sub-regions of a country, such as states or provinces. Seats are almost always allocated to regions on the basis of population. But under special provisions, certain regions may receive more or fewer seats than population alone would dictate.

Once seats have been allocated, the process of drawing district lines within a region commences. A redistricting database is created using population data and, in some countries, political data as well. Maps are collected. After all of the necessary information has been gathered, the process of assigning geographic units to electoral districts can begin. Each geographic unit--whether a county, city, town or village, or some smaller geographic census unit or voting area--is assigned to a specific district. After all geographic units in the region have been assigned, the plan is complete and ready to be evaluated.

The process for evaluating a redistricting plan depends in large part on the redistricting criteria that have been adopted. A statistical summary of population or other demographic data by district is straightforward as long as the requested data has been included in the redistricting database. The plan may require a more sophisticated or subjective assessment, as well, depending on the criteria adopted. For instance, are communities of interest intact? Do minority voters have an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice?

Computers can be used to make the drawing of district boundaries more accurate and efficient. Consultants can be brought in to assist in any aspect of the redistricting process. A decision on whether computers or consultants should be employed depends on the need for them and what they will cost.

This section discusses the information needed to conduct redistricting: population data, maps and political data (see Information Required to Draw Electoral Districts). It outlines steps in the line drawing process,

including the allocation of seats, the preparation of a database, the drawing of district boundaries, and the summary description of the plan for evaluation (see Steps in the Electoral District Delimitation Process). And it considers the possible use of computer technology and/or consultants (see Computer-Assisted Delimitation and Use of Consultants).

Feedback

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Information Required to Draw Electoral Districts

file info

Delimitation, or redistricting, requires the collection of several different types of information. The two essential pieces of information are population data and maps. The population data, which may be in the form of census enumeration data or voter registration data, provide the only means of creating districts that are relatively equal in population. The population data must be associated with a specific geographic area and must be as accurate and up-to-date as possible. Maps are needed to ensure that only contiguous geographic population units are assigned to districts.

A third piece of information that may or may not be utilised for redistricting is political data. Political data may consist of statistics on the political party affiliation of electors, if available, as well as election results--tabulations of votes for candidates and ballot measures from previous elections by voting area. Including political data in the redistricting database allows line drawers to produce a political profile of proposed districts and to predict, to some degree, the partisan implications of a redistricting plan.

Election results can easily be entered into the redistricting database if they are reported for the same geographic unit as the population data. This will likely be the case when the population units for redistricting are based on voter registration data. If, however, the population units are based on a census enumeration, the geographic units for population and political data may not be the same. In that case, census geography and election geography may have to be matched in some manner to create geographic units that can be associated with both population and political data.

In the United States, for example, electoral districts are usually created using census geography (census blocks or tracts), but election results are reported at the voting area (election precinct) level. These two units of geography--census blocks and election precincts--are not equivalent. States that wish to use political data in conjunction with population data must develop some method of matching political data with the

corresponding units of census geography.

Feedback

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Steps in the Electoral District Delimitation Process

file info

There are usually two phases in the electoral district delimitation process. The first phase is the allocation, or apportionment, of seats in the legislature to regional entities such as states or provinces. This is usually a very mechanical process, with the number of seats assigned to each state or province usually dependent on the relative population of that state or province. In countries that do not delimit single-member districts, reapportionment is the only step taken to equalize population across electoral districts.

In countries that do redistrict, the second phase of the process is usually the adjustment of the boundaries of current districts and/or the creation of new districts within the states or provinces themselves. In countries that do not allocate seats regionally, this is the only phase in the process.

Drawing electoral district boundaries is much less mechanical and much more time consuming than allocating seats. It proceeds in three stages:

- preparation of a redistricting database
- assignment of geographical units to districts until all units have been assigned and the boundaries of all districts established
- production of a summary description and maps for evaluating and implementing the redistricting plan

Feedback

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Special Considerations: Delimiting Voting Areas

file info

Voting areas are administrative units that are used only for conducting elections. They are contiguous geographic areas where all voters within the circumscribed territory are assigned to the same polling place. Voting areas are known by a variety of different labels, depending on the country. In Commonwealth countries, for example, they may be referred to as polling areas, voting or election districts, or election precincts.

Voting areas are necessary for the technical implementation of an election. A given territory must be subdivided in such a way as to enable voters to travel as conveniently as possible to a polling site and cast their ballots. In addition, assigning electors to voting areas allows election administrators to keep track of who is voting. This ensures that no one casts more than one ballot.

Most countries, regardless of the type of electoral system employed, delimit voting areas. Unlike electoral districts, where the type of electoral system determines how crucial delimitation is to the outcome of an election, the delimitation of voting areas has a minimal effect on election outcomes. Voting areas are used merely to collect votes; they are not used to translate votes into seats in a legislative or parliamentary body.

Because voting areas are used for election administration only, the delimitation of voting areas is not controversial and is normally left to the discretion of election administrators. Electoral laws or regulations, however, may specify certain criteria for delimiting voting areas.

Authority for Delimiting Voting Areas

The delimitation of voting areas is often performed by local election officials, but the delimitation may be carried out by federal election administrators. For example, the election commission in Ghana is responsible for drawing all political boundaries, from constituency (electoral district) boundaries to voting area boundaries.

In some countries, the same voting areas are used for all elections. In

other countries, different voting areas are created for different elections. For example, in the United States, county election officials delimit voting areas for all elections: federal, state, and local. In Canada, a federal agency, Elections Canada, draws voting areas for federal elections, while provincial election administration authorities draw voting areas for provincial and local elections.

Criteria for Delimiting Voting Areas

Election administrators usually consider the following criteria when delimiting voting areas, even if no criteria are specified by law:

- population size
- pre-existing administrative and electoral district boundaries
- convenience and accessibility for voters

Although voting areas differ dramatically in size of population--within a country as well as in different countries--there is a minimum and a maximum number of voters that can be efficiently and effectively served by a single polling site. It may not be feasible to establish a polling site for only a handful of voters. On the other hand, assigning too many voters to a single polling site can result in long lines of frustrated voters waiting to cast their ballots at an election. The optimal minimum and maximum numbers vary, depending on local conditions and available resources and technology.

Administrative and electoral district boundaries should be taken into account when creating voting areas because these boundaries determine who votes for a particular set of offices and candidates at an election. If the boundaries of voting areas cross administrative or electoral district boundaries, election administration will become more complex. Different ballot styles listing different offices and candidates will be needed for voters within a single voting area. Producing and disseminating several different ballot styles within a single voting area can be complicated and expensive.

Convenience and accessibility are also important factors to consider when drawing voting areas. The boundaries of a voting area should be drawn around a polling site that is centrally located, easy to travel to, and accessible to all eligible voters assigned the polling site. Factors such as the time needed to travel to the polling site and accessibility to public transportation should also be taken into account. Some countries, for example, specify by law the maximum distance that voters can be expected to travel to cast their ballots.

The Need to Redraw Voting Areas Periodically

Voting areas may need to be redrawn because of population changes or changes to administrative or electoral boundaries. For example, it may be necessary to redraw a voting area if the area's population has grown too large for a single polling site or, alternatively, the voting area has lost population and it is no longer cost effective to keep the polling site operational. After redistricting, a voting area may need to be redrawn to realign its boundaries with the boundaries of the new electoral districts. If not redrawn, a voting area may be divided between two or more districts, complicating election administration.

Many countries redraw voting areas on a regular basis, for example, after the redistricting of electoral districts or the completion of a voter registration campaign. Some countries redraw voting areas on an ad hoc basis, for example, whenever the voting areas become too large or too small.

Tasks of Delimiting Voting Areas

Two essential pieces of information for delimiting voting areas are:

- population data
- detailed local maps

Population data for delimiting voting areas usually consists of voter registration data. A reliable count of the number of eligible voters in the territory to be delimited is needed as well as information on the residential location of each voter. Accurate and up-to-date maps are also needed to delimit voting areas. The maps should clearly delineate local features and indicate the boundaries of administrative and electoral districts.

The first step in the process of delimiting voting areas is to obtain maps and mark relevant administrative and electoral boundaries. The next step is to generate a list of registered voters by location--by a street address, if possible. The number of voters on each side of the street, or at each location, is then counted and recorded on the map. After the voter counts have been recorded, election officials can begin to create or adjust voting area boundaries, tallying and re-tallying the counts with the assignment of each new piece of territory. Defining new voting area boundaries requires some experimentation to determine where boundaries must be moved to most closely match criteria such as population size and distance from a polling site. The process is similar to redistricting electoral boundaries, except that the territories involved are usually much smaller.

Conclusion

Voting areas are required to implement elections efficiently and effectively. Although the delimitation of voting areas is rarely a controversial process, it is an important one for the administration of elections.

Feedback

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Historical Review

file info

Draft Only

In the nineteenth century elections and political parties developed the form that is recognizable today. It was during that time that the franchise--the right to vote--steadily expanded in a number of (mainly European and North American) countries. See also Political Organisations.

There had, of course, been elections before that time, but the number of voters had usually been so small that candidates could appeal to them on a more or less individual basis, and without the necessity of party organizations. Also, there had been political parties before the nineteenth century, but normally they had consisted of factions within the legislature. It was only with the growth of electorates that the need arose for extra-parliamentary party organizations to help to run the new, extended election campaigns. The widening of the franchise also meant that it became more difficult for candidates to campaign as independents; a party label became a key to success at the polls.

The Spread of Democratization

Since the nineteenth century, democracy has spread in two main ways. First, it has spread within those countries that were already partly democratic. Second, it has spread to a large number of new countries. It is nevertheless a mistake to view the flow of recent history as a simple progress towards a democratic nirvana. Democracies have been destroyed as well as created. Noble experiments in popular self-government have been accompanied by the worst tyrannies in history, and by some of the most pernicious doctrines of all time--most notably those popularized in Hitler's Germany from 1933 to 1945.

Richard Katz cites statistics to illustrate the deepening of democracies within the countries from which democracy initially emerged. He shows that, even in countries where competitive elections already existed, it took a succession of developments during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to establish the principle of the United Nations of a universal right of adult citizens to the vote. In most countries, voting rights were

initially restricted to male property-owners. In Britain, a series of Reform Acts extended the franchise in 1832, 1867, 1884, 1918, 1928, and 1948. The percentage of the total population entitled to vote in some of the pioneering democracies is shown in the following table (the figures do not approach 100 percent since they include children as well as adults).

	1840	1900	1930	1950	1980
Belgium	-1	22	30	65	70
Britain	-4	16	66	68	75
France	-0.4	29	28	61	67
Netherlands	-4	12	51	56	72
Norway	-8	-9	57	66	74
Sweden	-7	-8	61	66	74

(Richard S. Katz, Democracy and Elections. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, table 13.3.)

As far as the geographical spread of democracy is concerned, Joshua Muravchik has traced 'a gradual and ragged advance of democracy.' (Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1991, p.73.) When 'modern democracy' was born in the United States in 1776, the right to vote was restricted to less than one million white males who, in some states, were also required to be property owners. It took some time for democratic constitutionalism to spread. Beside the developments in Britain and its (mainly white) Dominions, the revolutionary spasm in Europe in 1848 led to a spread of democracy in much of Europe. In Latin America, too, there was some notable democratic progress in the decades before the First World War.

After a shaky period between the two World Wars, democracy resumed its advance from the time of the defeat of Hitler and his allies in 1945. Not only was democracy restored in Germany, Austria, and Italy, but it was created in Japan. The widespread breakdown of colonial rule, most notably in India, led to the creation of a new wave of democracies, although in some newly-independent states, one party rule and military dictatorship became all too common. In Latin America, too, dictatorships destroyed

democracies in many countries in the 1960s and 1970s.

In the 1970s the emergence of democratic government in Portugal and Spain heralded what has come to be known as a 'third wave' of democratization. This includes the re-emergence of elective democracies in many Latin American, and some Asian and African countries, as well as the fall of the Soviet Union and its replacement by states committed to competitive elections. According to the New York research institute, Freedom House, 61 of 167 of the world's sovereign states, comprising about 39 percent of the world's population, lived in free, democratic states. (Muravchik, p. 80.)

The Development of Elections and Political Parties

The growth of political parties was, according to a conventional view of political scientists, a result of the spread of elections. Extra-parliamentary organizations became necessary to make elective democracy work. Political parties, at least those in Western democracies, came to fulfil at least six functions. These were:

- Structuring the vote:

Voters came to base their voting choices less on the qualities of individual candidates and more on the image of the party under whose label or banner they presented themselves.

- The integration and mobilization of the mass public:

Membership of political parties and participation in their activities came to provide an important form of civic involvement by citizens, and thus helped to strengthen civic values; political parties also played the main role in the organization of election campaigns.

- The recruitment of political leaders:

The selection of candidates for parliament and, if a party won office, for the top government positions was a party function.

- The organization of government:

When a party won power, it could normally expect its supporters in the legislature to vote on party lines to ensure that its policies were accepted.

- The formation of public policy:

Party organizations, especially their research departments, were a significant source of new policy ideas that then became government policy.

- The aggregation of interests:

In order to win votes, parties had to persuade voters to support them on a variety of issues. In this respect, parties differed from 'single issue' pressure groups.

It is vital to bear in mind that this list refers to the roles of parties belonging to multi-party systems. Organizations called 'political parties' also existed in non-democratic systems--the Nazi Party, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were examples. 'Parties' were prominent, too, in the one-party states common in Africa following independence from colonial rule. Non-democratic parties have sometimes fulfilled one or more of the above functions. Yet, they are essentially different from democratic parties: they are much closer to the apparatus of the state, and they do not have to compete against other parties in free and fair elections.

The Growth of Media-Centred Electioneering

Since the 1960s, observers have remarked ever more frequently on the gradual decline in the importance of political parties in competitive democracies. The 'decline of party' thesis need not mean that parties have become unimportant. However, it does suggest that they have become considerably less important than before. The decline of party is evident in their decreasing memberships in many countries. There is evidence too that voters are no longer as loyal to party labels as they once were; the qualifications and images of individual candidates have become more significant. This is especially the case in some countries with a majoritarian electoral system.

Social and technological reasons have been given for this apparent decline of party loyalties. When a high proportion of voters worked in factories, the divide in the work place between workers on the one hand, and owners and managers on the other hand, led naturally to a divide of political loyalties along class lines. While class loyalties remained the main basis of allegiance to political parties, voters were likely (it is argued) to remain loyal to a single party. However, social changes have meant that ever fewer people work in heavy industry. Class lines have fractured and, with them, automatic party loyalties. These social changes have affected much of the industrialized world. Ethnic factors are strong determinants of party allegiance in many developing countries and in some economically

ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANT
READINGS

Module B

Introducing Plain Language

Plain language is an approach to communication that begins with the needs of the reader. When you use plain language:

What you write is determined by your purpose for writing
How you write is determined by your audience's reasons for reading and their reading skills

Plain language matches the needs of the reader with your needs as a writer, resulting in effective and efficient communication. It is **effective** because the reader can understand the message. It is **efficient** because the reader can read and understand the message the first time.

Unless you write clearly and directly, with the needs of your audience in mind, your readers may be left with more questions than answers.

Difficult texts cause more:

- misunderstandings
- errors
- complaints
- enquiries
- staff time lost to problem solving.

There are many misconceptions about plain language. Plain language is not a simplified style of writing. It involves more than replacing jargon and complex language with shorter sentences and familiar words. Plain language looks at the whole message - from the reader's point of view. Clear writing, effective organization and inviting presentation are all keys to creating readable, informative documents.

PLAIN LANGUAGE WRITING:

- reaches people who can not read well or who don't have time to read well
- helps all readers understand information
- avoids misunderstandings and errors
- saves time, because it gets the job done well the first time.

Your Reader and Your Purpose

Plain language writing focuses on the needs of the reader. Instead of cramming in every bit of information the writer wants to share, the plain writer considers:

what needs the reader has
what information is essential
how it can be organized and expressed most clearly.

The focus on the reader is central to plain language writing. Everything - from the tone you use to your choice of vocabulary, from document style to document testing and revision - flows from the belief that you must write for the reader.

Putting the readers' needs first can be hard when you are used to writing from your own perspective. Ask yourself a series of questions that will help you focus your writing and get your message across most effectively.

Who is your audience?

Your document may have only one reader, for example a supervisor. Or, your document may have many readers. For example, they may be employees with different jobs who work in one department, or the general public.

Your audience may be made up of readers of all ages, or of one age group. A pamphlet for, teens for example, may be read by 13 to 19 year olds.

Your document may be read by someone waiting in line or by someone who is annoyed with you. Your reader may be very busy or emotionally upset.

Are you writing only for professionals? Is your document intended for working Canadians, seniors, or members of specific cultural groups? Is English or French their second language? Are their reading skills universally low or high?

Look at the characteristics most of your readers share. Decide on the most important audience for your document. Do some research to find out more about your readers.

An advantage to all this work early on in the writing process is that it can help you clarify how you should distribute your document.

Also remember that your readers are probably less familiar with your subject than you are. Keep this in mind as you write. It will help your decide what the reader needs to know instead of what you want to write.

Why are you writing this document?
Are you writing about something completely new? Give your reader all the background information needed to understand. Try to link the new information to things the reader may already know.

Are you trying to change peoples behavior? Make sure you mention how even small changes can bring benefits that are important to your reader.

Is the document a "how-to" text? Be sure it includes any background information needed to understand your instructions.

It may be hard to single out one purpose. But, a document with one primary focus is more likely to communicate its message effectively.

Here are some examples of the purposes documents can have:

- to report
- to ask
- to inform
- to influence
- to explain

What do you want to say
Focus on what your reader wants and needs to know. Don't try to say more than you have to. Your readers' needs and wants should determine what information gets the most emphasis in your document.

How will your reader use this information?
How people use your document will help you decide how to organize the information in it.

- Will your document be a quick reference tool?
- Will your reader find your document in a display?
- Is your reader supposed to do something after reading the document?
- Is the reader supposed to remember certain information?
- Is the reader supposed to agree with your point of view?

The answer to these questions affects how you present information. If you want your reader to come to a meeting, then the date and time of the meeting might be the first thing in the document. Information about the agenda and the other participants might be of secondary importance.

Try this:

Consider the characteristics of the readers in the following scenario.

> Their department has been undergoing some reorganization. Some people in their sector will be moving to a new sector. Some new people will be joining their sector and some others will be laid off.

You have been asked to write a note to staff explaining these changes. How will these characteristics affect what you write?

Organizing Ideas

Clear organized thinking produces clear, logical writing. Some communications problems may be solved by changing words or sentence structure, others involve the way words or thoughts are arranged. The organization of your document is an essential part of conveying your message clearly.

What does your reader most want to know? What is your main message or theme? Decide what information must be included and what can be left out. Then, divide your information into main and secondary points.

Develop a structure for your document that will make it easy and enjoyable to use. For example, chronological order might be the most logical approach for describing procedures.

If people already know something about the subject and you are sharing new information, start with the old, then introduce the new.

If you are describing something completely new, start with general information about the objectives or reasons for the new, then deal with the specifics.

Try including a good table of contents and clear headings throughout the document. In shorter documents, explain how you have organized the information in an "Introduction' instead of using a table of contents.

Here are a few ways to organize your information:

- from general to specific
- from specific to general
- from positive to negative
- step by step
- from most important to least important

Try this:

Use the following scenario.

> You have just come from a staff meeting at which people had a heated discussion about some office management problems. You were asked to write a memo to your supervisor right away, telling her about the problems and asking her to come to a meeting with the

group. You had some ideas about how the problem could be solved but the other people at the meeting didn't agree with you. You are worried that your supervisor will feel that your group is ganging up against her and that she will come to the meeting angry. You promised to circulate the note to everyone who attended the meeting.

How will you organize the information in the memo? Who is your "reader" - your supervisor or your co-workers?

How will your reader understand your organization and what the memo's purpose is?

Using Appropriate Words

Words are symbols for what we perceive with our senses. They communicate what we think, feel and do. The more complex the idea or thought, the more difficult it is to express it precisely in words.

Plain language writing emphasizes the use of the clearest words possible to describe actions, objects and people. That often means choosing a two-syllable word over a three-syllable one, an old familiar term instead of the latest bureaucratic expression and sometimes, several clearer words instead of one complicated word.

Your choice of words should be based on what will be clearer for your reader. If you're not sure, ask. Test out your document with some of the people who are likely to use it. To help you draft easy to understand documents, here are some guidelines on your choice of words.

Use Simple, Everyday Words

Use simple, familiar words instead of unfamiliar words.

Write as if someone is asking you what you mean. If you are writing for a diverse audience, sometimes you must be an interpreter as well as a writer.

Here are a few examples of simple words and phrases you might substitute:

Instead of:	**Use:**
accomplish	do
ascertain	find out
disseminate	send out, distribute
endeavor	try
expedite	hasten, speed up
facilitate	make easier, help
formulate	work out, devise, form
in lieu of	instead of
locality	place
optimum	best, greatest, most
strategize	plan
utilize	use

Cut out unnecessary words

Here is a sample list of some alternative words for common, wordy expressions:

Instead of:	Use:
with regard to	about
by means of	by
in the event that	if
until such time	until
during such time	while
in respect of	for
in view of the fact	because
on the part of	by
subsequent to	after
under the provisions of	under
with a view to	to
it would appear that	apparently
it is probable that	probably
notwithstanding the fact that	although
adequate number of	enough
excessive number of	too many

Avoid using jargon

Using jargon can cause problems because your reader may not understand it. Also be wary of trendy, fashionable expressions such as "level playing field", "downtime" and "touch base". The fact that they are trendy will also mean that they will soon date your writing. Avoid them.

Instead of:
You will receive reactivation and assistance consistent with your requirements.
Use:
You will get the amount of help you need.

Avoid or explain technical words

Whenever possible, avoid words that your readers do not know. Every occupation and interest group has special terms. These terms become a problem only when you can't distinguish between terms that are necessary work tools and terms that are jargon.

If you must use a technical term define it - either by giving a definition or by giving an example.

Glossaries are more difficult to use if they are placed at the end of a book or booklet. Try placing a box defining the words on the same page as where the word is first used.

Instead of:
Economic espionage may be defined as the illegal or clandestine acquisition of critical Canadian economic information and technology by foreign governments or their surrogates
-Canadian Security Intelligence Service Public Report, 1992
Use:
Economic espionage means foreign governments or their agents illegally obtaining critical Canadian economic and technological secrets.

Don't change verbs into nouns

Nouns created from verbs are hard for the reader to understand and give the sentence an impersonal tone. When you write a noun that is derived from a verb, see if you can turn it back into a verb.

Instead of:
The *requirement* of the department is that employees work seven and one-half hours a day.
Use:
The Department *requires* employees to work seven and one-half hours a day.

Instead of:
You will work on the *establishment* of goals for the hiring, training and promotion of

designated group employees.
Use:
You will *establish* goals for hiring, training and promoting employees from designated groups.

Avoid chains of nouns
Chains of nouns are strings of two or more nouns used to name one thing. They are often difficult for a reader to understand.

Noun chains take some effort to untangle. They lack connecting words such as **of, for, about, in** and the possessive,**'s**, that would clarify how the nouns relate to each other.

Instead of:
World population is increasing faster than world food production
Use:
The world's population is increasing faster than its food production.

Choose your words consistently
Be consistent in what you call something. Avoid using two or more names for the same thing.

Do not be afraid to repeat the same word or the same idea if it is important.

Use acronyms carefully
Acronyms are formed from the first letter of words which they represent. Remember that not everyone may know what the letters stand for. Put the acronyms in brackets the first time you use the proper term. Then you can use the acronym in the rest of your text.

Some acronyms like U.S.A. or R.C.M.P. may be so well known that they need no explanation.

But, when in doubt, spell it out.

Try this:

In the following examples, circle the words that you think would create problems for readers and then rewrite the sentence using the principles of plain language just reviewed.

1. Prior to completing the application the applicants should determine if their qualifications meet the requirements of the program.
2. The acquisition, operation and disposal of vehicles can be significantly improved.
3. In our present circumstances, the budgetary aspect is a factor which must be taken into consideration to a greater degree.
4. Timeliness of response, which usually depends on the proximity of rescue resources to incidents, is a critical factor in saving people in distress.
5. Where a cheque is tendered in payment, the name of the corporation must be entered on the face of the cheque.

Clear and Simple Sentences

Because sentences represent ideas, it is the sentence that builds the message for the reader. A clear message requires clear sentences.

Here are some guidelines:

Don't overload sentences.
Use active sentences.

- Keep sentences short.
- Keep sentences simple.

- Avoid ambiguity in your sentences.
- Emphasize the positive.
- Avoid double negatives.

Good writers build ideas from sentence to sentence. The simple, declarative sentence is the easiest way to process information. Sentences that differ from that simple structure may cause readability problems.

Write in the active voice

If you leave out the subject, the sentences are harder to understand. Using the active voice clarifies the sentence and the readers' understanding.

Instead of:
Citizenship cannot be renounced merely by making a personal declaration to this effect.
Use:
You cannot renounce your citizenship merely by making a personal declaration.

Instead of:
In early April, all applications will be reviewed by the committee.
Use:
The committee will review all applications in early April.

Keep it Short

Readers can only take in so much new information at one time. Some people recommend that sentences should average 15 words in length and that no sentence should be longer than 25 words. This rule is not hard and fast, however. Readers can understand longer sentences if they are well constructed and use familiar terms. A variety of sentence lengths make your writing most interesting.

Instead of:
This policy does not appear to be well understood by line management in the region, even though this group has primary responsibility for implementing the policy.
Use:
The regional managers who are most responsible for carrying out this policy do not seem to understand it well.

Instead of:
The parameters of your responsibility are included in the job description you received on your initial day of work at the association.
Use:
Your responsibilities are listed in your job description. You received your job description the first day you worked here.

Link your ideas

Don't shorten sentences by leaving out words such as **that, which,** and **who.** Use these words to link the ideas in a sentence and make the meaning clearer for your reader.

Instead of:
The driver of the truck passing by told the officer in the cruiser the car he saw hit the little girl in the intersection was red.
Use:
The driver of the truck told the officer in the cruiser that as he was passing by, he saw a red car hit the little girl in the intersection.

Avoid ambiguity

When a pronoun is used there should be no doubt as to which noun it represents.

Instead of:
Michelle researched and wrote the speech herself, which everyone thought was impressive.
Use:

Everyone was impressed with the speech that Michelle researched and wrote herself.

Adverbs and adverbial phrases also need to be placed properly to avoid confusion. If improperly placed, the adverbs **only, even, both, merely, just, also, mainly, in particular** and **at least** can cause confusion.

Instead of:
Supervisors and staff are required to both participate in orientation sessions and department seminars.
Use:
Supervisors and staff are required to participate both in orientation and in department seminars.

Emphasize the Positive
Positive sentences are inviting and encourage people to read on. Negative sentences can seem bossy or hostile. They can cause your readers to mistrust your words and often discourage people from reading on.

Instead of:
If you fail to pass the examination, you will not qualify for admission.
Use:
You must pass the examination to qualify for admission..

However, negative phrasing is appropriate for emphasizing dangers, legal pitfalls, or other warnings. You can also use negative phrasing to allay fears or dispel myths.

Avoid double negatives
It isn't enough to remember that a double negative makes a positive. We avoid writing, "I don't know nothing about it," if we mean that we know nothing about it. But, watch out for two or more negative constructions in a sentence.

Instead of:
He was not absent.
The procedure will not be ineffective.
It was never illegitimate.
Use:
He was present.
The procedure will be effective.
It was always legitimate.

Avoid unnecessary preambles
Unnecessary preambles can weaken or hide the point they introduce.

Here is a list of some unnecessary preambles:

- It is important to add that...
- It may be recalled that...
- In this regard it is of significance that...
- It is interesting to note that...

Try This

Review the following sentences. Identify the problem or issue from the point of view of clear and effective sentences. Then, rewrite the sentence.

1. Illiterate adults are not able to read most work written for adults. Most illiterate adults are,

however, adult thinkers. Nevertheless, they are often unable to carry out democratic tasks like voting. They are, however, fully capable of making decisions required for such tasks.

2. It is hoped that this directory will provide a valuable resource for all our business people.
3. At the same time, the economic approach pursued by this study to highlight the importance of volunteer work does not imply that organized volunteer work should be regarded as a commercial economic activity, as this term is normally not misunderstood.

Clear and Effective Paragraphs

Clear and simple are the goals for paragraphs to make sure you say what you really mean.

Limit each paragraph to one idea unless you are linking related points. If you are comparing old and new, for example, it makes sense to bring them together in one paragraph. Complicated information, or a discussion of several ideas, generally needs to be broken up into separate paragraphs to be easily understood.

Keep it simple

Sometimes you need to use a paragraph instead of just a few sentences to make your message clear. The clearest isn't always the shortest.

Instead of:
Plateauing or career blockage refers to structural barriers to career advancement arising due to a combination of age imbalances and a static or contracting workforce.
Use:
"Plateauing" or "career blockage" refers to the lack of opportunities for public servants to be promoted to the executive level. This problem arises because there is a large number of public servants who have many years to work before they retire and because the size of the public service is being reduced. For these reasons there are fewer openings available at higher levels.

Another way to break up blocks of information and draw the readers' attention to important elements is to use a question-and-answer format. This will help your reader, find information that is important to them.

Use transitions

A transition is a word, phrase, sentence or paragraph that shows the relationship between two or more parts of your writing. They help your writing move smoothly from idea to idea, sentence to sentence, section to section. Transitions help the reader understand the relationships that are familiar to you.

If you find that you have one or two favourite transition words, you may be trying to compensate for poorly organized text. Use transition words when you need them, but avoid overusing them.

Put parallel ideas in parallel constructions

Whenever a paragraph includes a series of similar items, make sure that all the items are in the same form. Describe each item using similarly constructed phrases. For example, use the same tense for all verbs that describe listed items.

Instead of:
Going on vacation?

Inform a neighbour of your departure...
your neighbour should pick up your newspapers...
small valuables should be stored...
use clock timers that activate lights...
before leaving, ensure all entries are secured...

Use:

sentences you use to present that information. A well written document can be hard to read if it is poorly laid out. How your document looks can make the difference between your message being understood or lost.

Spacing

- Keep paragraphs no more than four or five sentences.
- Leave space between paragraphs.
- Divide your documents into sections of related information.
- Don't print on every inch of space on your page.
- Be generous with margin space.
- Use left justified and right ragged margins.

Headings
Use clear and consistent style for headings and subheadings.

Highlighting

- Use boxes to separate key information from the rest of your text.
- Use bullets for point form lists.
- Use italics to emphasize a phrase or word.
- Underline titles.
- Use color or shaded areas to set text apart.

Table of contents
Make a table of contents for long documents. Use an Introduction section in shorter documents. This helps readers find the information they are looking for. It is especially helpful for people with low reading skills.

Type style and size
Choose a solid, plain typeface which is easy to read. Don't combine more than three different typefaces on the same page because it will give a busy, confusing appearance.

Make sure the typeface is big enough for your readers. Ten point is the minimum size to use. Consider that some people may prefer a larger type size. Twelve point is a good size for most writing.

Don't use all capital letters as they are harder to read.

A serif typeface makes text easier to read because it leads your eye from letter to letter. A sans serif typeface is good for titles because it draws your eye down into the body of the text. Some examples of serif fonts are:

- New York
- Palatino
- Times Roman
- Schoolbook
- Courier.

Color of ink and paper

- Use dark ink (blue or black) on light paper - white or cream.
- Avoid color combinations with low contrast like yellow on white.
- Avoid large passages of light print on a black background.

Graphics and Illustrations
Use graphics with caution. Make sure that they mean the same thing to your reader as they do to you. Ask people who would be using your document to look over the choice of graphics and illustrations. Don't

use too many graphics.

Place all graphics and illustrations as close as possible to the text they refer to. Place them on the page in a way that does not interrupt normal reading patterns.

Make sure all graphics and illustrations are clear and the captions are easy to read. Be wary of using charts to explain information. People with poor math skills can find charts hard to understand.

Try this:

Collect several samples of documents used within your organization. Look at the material and identify examples of effective and ineffective presentation of information. Compare these against the guidelines presented here.

Testing

It is important to get feedback from people who are likely to use your document. We often write documents which are more suitable for ourselves than for our readers. Make sure that you test what you write. Always have someone else read and comment on what you write. If you are preparing documents that will be widely circulated, conduct a field test among people who represent your audience. This process will tell you:

If your audience wants to read your work,

- if they can read it, or
- if they can make use of it.

If your draft does not pass the test, the results will give you valuable information on how to revise your work for your audience.

Try field testing

Ask several of the people whom you expect to read the document to assess its value. Ask them if it is something they would enjoy reading, if they would read it and if it makes sense to them. Once you have incorporated their comments, test your document with a larger group. The time and effort spent field testing is worth the effort. Only your readers can tell you if your writing is useful, relevant and readable.

Computer Packages.

If you use a word processing program to write, try using the available grammar and style software packages to ensure you have followed grammar rules. These grammar check programs can help you spot writing errors such as:

- incomplete sentences
- passive voice
- jargon
- long sentences and paragraphs
- negative sentences

Some also suggest changes to correct these problems. However, consider this a handy tool - don't use it as the final assessment of your writing. Ultimately the reader is the best judge.

Try this:

Choose a document or form that already exists in your area. Conduct a mini field test with several of the users of the document. Then, think about how you would revise the document based on the test results. If possible, incorporate your revisions.

B

"Module B"

Comparing Democracies

Elections and Voting in Global Perspective

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Pippa Norris
editors

SAGE Publications
International Educational and Professional Publisher
Thousand Oaks London New Delhi

SOURCE: United Nations Department of Public Information 1992 (television ownership, television sets 1994, radio ownership, radio sets 1994, number of national dailies, newspaper circulation, and illiteracy rates 1992); Butler, Penniman, and Ranney 1981 (year regular television broadcasts began, fair balance rules, and leader debate); United Nations 1994 (television sets 1970); Levush et al. 1991 (paid political ads, and free time to parties); Banks 1995 (television, radio, and newspaper for Taiwan); Fletcher 1991 (updating leader debate); Shidmore 1993 (updating paid political ads, free time to parties, fair balance rules, and leader debate), *Freedom Review* 26 (1995), 68 (press freedom).

CHAPTER

2

Electoral Systems

ANDRÉ BLAIS
LOUIS MASSICOTTE

Electoral rules have fascinated politicians and political scientists for decades, because they are commonly assumed to condition the chances of success of competing parties or candidates. This chapter covers one important set of electoral rules, namely, the electoral system, which defines how votes are cast and seats are allocated. Other sets of rules, such as those concerning the financing of political parties, the control of election spending, and the regulation of political broadcasting, are dealt with in other chapters.

We first document the great diversity of electoral systems presently existing among democracies. This raises the question of whether electoral systems matter, of what concrete effect they have on political life. The second section thus examines the political consequences of electoral laws. Once these consequences are known, we are in a position to tackle the crucial normative question of which is the best electoral system. The third section reviews the debate and identifies the major trade-offs involved in the choice of an electoral system.

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Diversity of Electoral Systems

Even scholars specialized in the field are amazed by the diversity and complexity of contemporary electoral systems. The rules that govern how votes are cast and seats allocated differ markedly from one country to another.

Selecting an electoral system is not a purely technical decision. It may have huge consequences for the operation of the political system. As discussed in the second section, applying two different formulas to the same distribution of votes will produce quite different outcomes in terms of members elected for each party.

To give a concrete example, let us look at the critical British election of 1983, the first election in a major nation where voters were passing judgment on the record of a neo-conservative government. As the ruling Tories were reelected with more seats than in the previous election, many observers concluded that Mrs. Thatcher's policies had been strongly endorsed. The fact is, however, that the actual vote for the Tories decreased slightly between 1979 and 1983, and the outcome of the election would have been quite different if Britain had had proportional representation.

The first necessary step for understanding the consequences of an electoral system is to have a good grasp of the kinds of electoral systems that exist, hence the need for classification.

Typologies of electoral systems can be based on the *electoral formula*, which determines how votes are to be counted to allocate seats, on *district magnitude*, which refers to the number of seats per district, or on *ballot structure*, which defines how voters express their choice (Rae 1967; Blais 1988). We follow the classical approach and describe electoral formulas first, while taking into account district magnitude and ballot structure.

There are three basic electoral formulas, corresponding to as many criteria of legitimacy as to what is required to be elected. Supporters of *plurality* are satisfied when a candidate gets more votes than each individual opponent, whereas others feel that one should be declared the winner only if he or she can muster more than half of the vote, that is, a *majority*. Advocates of *proportional representation* (PR) feel that political parties should be represented in Parliament in exact (or nearly exact) proportion to the vote they polled.

It is convenient to examine electoral formulas in chronological order (from the oldest to the more recent) and in the order of their complexity (from the simplest in its application to the most sophisticated). Although plurality in English parliamentary elections dates back to the Middle Ages and majority



Figure 2.1. A Typology of Electoral Systems (presidential)

began to be applied to legislative elections in the early 19th century, PR was imagined during the first half of the 19th century and began to be used for national legislative elections at the end of that century.

Before the First World War, Joseph Barthélemy (1912) confidently predicted that the day would come when PR would become as widespread as universal suffrage. So far, he has not been vindicated. The proportion of democratic countries using PR has remained more or less constant since the early 1920s, hovering around 60 percent. The only significant trend is the increasing popularity, lately, of mixed systems, where different formulas are used simultaneously in the same election.

Figures 2.1 and 2.2 outline, in some detail, the electoral systems that exist in the 53 countries covered in this book, for presidential and legislative (first Chamber) elections.[1] Readers are advised to refer to those figures for a better understanding of the typology offered in this chapter.

Plurality Systems

Plurality, also known as *first past the post*, outperforms all other options in terms of its pristine simplicity. To be elected, a candidate needs simply to have more votes than any other challenger.

The plurality rule is usually applied in single-member districts. Indeed, this is so often the case that we sometimes forget or overlook that it can be used in multimember districts as well. For example, in U.S. presidential elections, members of the electoral college are elected within each state on a winner-take-all basis (also known as the *bloc vote*), as the party slate that gets the highest number of votes in the state gets all the votes of that state in the electoral college. Under plurality rule, even when voters cast as many individual votes as there are members to be elected (and thus can split their ballot between parties if they wish), party cohesion usually allows the majority party to sweep all, or almost all, seats.

As the bloc vote normally results in the elimination of minority parties within each district, variants were imagined in the 19th century to allow for some minority representation within multimember districts using the plurality rule. One is the now-extinct *cumulative vote*, used in the State of Illinois until 1980, whereby voters were granted as many votes as there were members to be elected but were allowed to cumulate two or more votes on a single candidate: It was expected that supporters of the minority party in each district

uld focus their voting power on a single candidate to enhance their chances of securing at least one seat. The *limited vote*, still used for elections to the Spanish Senate, aims at a similar objective, though by the different device of granting each voter *fewer* votes than there are members to be elected (e.g., in Spanish provinces elect four senators, with each elector casting up to three votes for different candidates). Here the expectation is that the majority party will not be able to carry all seats if the minority party presents a single candidate. A variant of the limited vote is the *single nontransferable vote* (SNTV) used in Japan until 1994, where electors cast a single vote in a district electing between three and five members.

Cruder procedures for ensuring minority representation while keeping the plurality rule were common in Latin America before PR was introduced, and they still can be found. Post-Pinochet Chile has two-member districts, where the leading party gets both seats only if it polls twice as many votes as the second party (i.e., two-thirds of the vote if there are two parties).[2] Otherwise, one seat goes to each of the two leading parties. In the recently reformed Mexican Senate, the leading party in each of the four-member districts gets three seats, and the remaining seat goes to the strongest minority party.

Out of the 53 democracies covered by this book, 4 use the plurality rule for presidential elections (Figure 2.1) and 13 for legislative elections (Figure 2.2).

Other countries have provided for presidential election systems that incorporate the plurality rule with some qualifications. Uruguay has an original system, known as the *double simultaneous vote*, whereby each faction (*sublema*) within a party (*lema*) may present its own presidential candidate. Voters vote for a single candidate and so, implicitly, for the lema he or she belongs to. Votes for all candidates under the label of each lema are added: The leading lema is proclaimed the "winner," and the elected president is the candidate who gets the highest number of votes within that lema. This system ensures the election of the candidate who gets a plurality within the party that secures a plurality of the vote. Costa Rica requires on the first ballot a plurality representing at least 40 percent of the vote. Failing that, a runoff election is held. In Argentina, which did away with the electoral college in 1994, the candidate with a plurality of the vote is elected, provided that plurality is equal to at least 45 percent of the vote, or exceeds 40 percent of the vote coupled with a lead of at least 10 points over the strongest challenger. Failing that, a runoff is held.



Figure 2.2. A Typology of Electoral Systems (legislative)
NOTE: PR = proportional representation; STV = single transferable vote.



Figure 2.2. *Continued*

Majority Systems

With majority systems, we cross a small step toward greater complexity. Requiring a majority without further specification opens the possibility of having no winner at all if there is a single-round election, or to have a succession of indecisive ballots if no candidate is eliminated following each round. That problem is solved through one of the following three variants. In *majority-runoff* systems, a majority is required on the first ballot. If no candidate obtains a majority, a second and final ballot, known in the United States as a runoff, is held between the two candidates who got the highest number of votes in the first round.

This is the system used in 15 of the 25 countries with direct presidential elections (Figure 2.1); Mali and Ukraine use the same method for legislative elections (Figure 2.2). In *majority-plurality* systems (used for French legislative elections), there is no such drastic reduction in the number of contestants on the second ballot (although a threshold may be imposed for candidates to stand at the second ballot),[3] and the winner is the candidate who gets a plurality of the vote. Although one normally must have stood as a candidate on the first ballot to be allowed to compete at the second, there are past instances of major countries imposing no such requirement.[4]

As both formulas require the holding of a second round if no majority is reached on the first one, the *alternative vote* emerged as a less costly option whereby voters, instead of casting a vote for a single candidate, rank candidates in order of preference. First preferences are initially counted, and candidates winning a majority of these are declared elected. Second and lower preferences are taken into account only if no candidate secures a majority of first preferences. The candidate who got the smallest number of first preferences is eliminated, and second preferences expressed on his or her ballots are counted and "transferred" to other contestants. If this operation produces a winner, the contest is over. If not, the weakest candidate then remaining is eliminated and subsequent preferences on his or her ballots (which then means third preferences on transferred ballots and second preferences on untransferred ballots) are similarly transferred, and so on until eliminations and transfers produce a majority for one of the remaining candidates. As in all other majority systems, transfers may result in the final victory of a candidate who did not get the highest number of first preferences. The alternative vote is used in Ireland for presidential elections (Figure 2.1) and in Australia for elections to the House of Representatives (Figure 2.2).

...tional Representation

...definition, PR can be used only in multimember districts, because it is ...usly impossible to distribute a single seat among many parties, except ...hronological basis, an option that no legislature to our knowledge has ...ted.

...here are two major types of PR systems. With 24 countries, the *list system* ... far the most widely used type among the countries surveyed (Figure 2.2). ... other type, the *single transferable vote*, is in force only in Ireland.

List Systems

Devising a PR list system involves making five major decisions as to districting, formula, tiers, thresholds, and preferences for candidates. There are many different ways of combining these variables, which explains why no PR systems are exactly alike.

Districts. The first choice to be made concerns district magnitude. One option, which is the most conducive to accuracy of representation; is to have the whole country as a single electoral district. Israel and the Netherlands both have a single national constituency electing 120 and 150 members, respectively (Figure 2.2).

... vast majority (22) of PR countries covered in this book have opted for smaller districts, the boundaries of which generally correspond to administrative subdivisions. For example, the 350 members of the Spanish Congress of Deputies are elected in 52 electoral districts: Each of the 50 provinces constitutes an electoral district, as well as the African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The latter two are single-member districts in view of their small population. The number of seats in the provinces ranges from three in Soria to 34 in Madrid.[5] The resulting small district magnitude has repeatedly allowed the winning party to get a majority of seats with a plurality of votes.

The electoral formula. Second choice involves the method by which seats will be distributed *within each district.* The two basic options are *highest-averages* methods, which use a divisor, and the *largest-remainders* methods, which use quotas.

Highest-averages methods require the number of votes for each party to be divided successively by a series of divisors: Seats are allotted to the parties

TABLE 2.1 Distribution of Seats by the Three Highest-Averages Methods

Votes	*Blues (57,000)*	*Whites (26,000)*	*Reds (25,950)*	*Greens (12,000)*	*Yellows (6,010)*	*Pinks (3,050)*
			D'Hondt formula			
+						
1	57,000 A	26,000 C	25,950 D	12,000 I	6,010	3,050
2	28,500 B	13,000 G	12,975 H	6,000		
3	19,000 E	8,667 L	8,650			
4	14,250 F	6,500				
5	11,400 J					
6	9,500 K					
7	8,143					
Seats won	6	3	2	1	0	0
			Modified Sainte-Laguë formula			
+						
1.4	40,714 A	18,571 C	18,536 D	8,571 H	4,293	2,179
3	19,000 B	8,667 F	8,650 G	4,000		
5	11,400 E	5,200 K	5,190 L			
7	8,143 I	3,714	3,707			
9	6,333 J					
11	5,182					
Seats won	5	3	3	1	0	0
			Pure Sainte-Laguë formula			
+						
1	57,000 A	26,000 B	25,950 C	12,000 E	6,010 K	3,050
3	19,000 D	8,667 G	8,650 H	4,000	2,000	
5	11,400 F	5,200 L	5,190			
7	8,143 I	3,714				
9	6,333 J					
11	5,182					
Seats won	5	3	2	1	1	0

NOTE: The letters indicate the order in which seats are awarded to parties in a 12-member district.

that secured the highest resulting quotients, up to the total number of seats available. There are three such methods currently in use,[6] which differ by the sequence of divisors. The most widely known and used (15 countries; see

TABLE 2.2 Distribution of Seats by the Two Largest-Remainders Methods

	Votes Quota Dividend	*Seats Won*
	Hare quota	
Blues	57,000 ÷ 10,834 = 5.260	5
Whites	26,000 ÷ 10,834 = 2.400 (*)[a]	3
Reds	25,950 ÷ 10,834 = 2.395	2
Greens	12,000 ÷ 10,834 = 1.110	1
Yellows	6,010 ÷ 10,834 = 0.550 (*)	1
Pinks	3,050 ÷ 10,834 = 0.280	0
Total	10 (2)[b]	12
	Droop quota	
Blues	57,000 ÷ 10,001 = 5.699 (*)	6
Whites	26,000 ÷ 10,001 = 2.660 (*)	3
Reds	25,950 ÷ 10,001 = 2.595	2
Greens	12,000 ÷ 10,001 = 1.200	1
Yellows	6,010 ÷ 10,001 = 0.601	0
Pinks	3,050 ÷ 10,001 = 0.305	0
Total	10 (2)	12

a. Seats going to the parties with the largest remainders.
b. Total number of seats allocated through largest remainders.

Figure 2.2) is the *d'Hondt* formula, with divisors being 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on. The logical alternative is the *"pure" Sainte-Laguë* formula (also known as the odd-integer number rule), where divisors are instead 1, 3, 5, 7, and so on. In this pure form (which can be found in the mixed system of New Zealand), Sainte-Laguë normally produces a highly proportional distribution of seats, a feature that may explain why a *"modified" Sainte-Laguë* formula was devised, the single difference being that the first divisor is raised to 1.4 (instead of 1), a move that makes it more difficult for smaller parties to get a seat. The modified Sainte-Laguë formula is used in Denmark (in local districts), Norway, and Sweden. Of the three highest-averages methods, d'Hondt is acknowledged to produce a bonus for larger parties and pure Sainte-Laguë the most likely to produce a proportional outcome, with modified Sainte-Laguë falling in between.

Table 2.1 shows how seats would be allocated in a 12-member district under each of the three methods among the six following parties: Blues, 57,000 votes;

Whites, 26,000 votes; Reds, 25,950 votes; Greens, 12,000 votes; Yellows, 6,010 votes; Pinks, 3,050 votes, for a total of 130,010 votes.

In this case, each formula produces a slightly different outcome. The strongest party, the Blues, are better off under d'Hondt, whereas the second weakest party, the Yellows, manage to secure a seat only under pure Sainte-Laguë.

Largest-remainders (LR) systems involve two successive operations. First, the number of votes for each party is divided by a quota, and the resulting whole number corresponds to the number of seats each party initially gets. Second, seats still unallocated are awarded to parties that had the largest surpluses of unused votes (known as remainders) following division.[7] The only variations within the LR system concern the computation of the quota. The total number of votes polled in the district may be divided either by the number of members to be elected (a *Hare quota*) or by the number of members to be elected *plus one* (a *Droop quota*).[8]

LR-Hare is used in Colombia, Denmark, Costa Rica, and Madagascar, and LR-Droop in South Africa, the Czech Republic, and Greece (Figure 2.2).[9] Raising the divisor by 1 unit gives a lower quota. As a result, fewer seats normally remain unallotted after division, which slightly reduces the proportionality of the outcome.

Table 2.2 uses the same example as in Table 2.1 to illustrate how LR-Hare and LR-Droop work. The first step is to obtain a quota, which corresponds to the total number of votes (130,010) divided by 12 in the case of Hare and by 13 for Droop. Each party's votes are divided by the quota (10,834 for Hare and 10,001 for Droop), and unallotted seats go to the parties with the largest remainders. LR-Hare yields more proportional results (in our example, they are identical to those obtained under pure Sainte-Laguë) than LR-Droop.

Tiers. Although most PR countries covered in our book have settled for a single tier of districts (whether national or local), quite a few have added a second tier of distribution, generally to reduce distortions resulting from the allocation of seats in the first tier (Figure 2.2).

There can be two or even three tiers. Belgium has 30 arrondissements within its nine provinces. The Greeks have been the fondest practitioners of multiple tiers, and they currently have 56 local districts, 13 regional districts, and a single national one.

The distribution of seats at the higher tier can proceed in three basic ways. The first approach, found in the Czech Republic, necessitates a pooling at the

higher level of remainders from local districts. In the lower tier (i.e., in the basic electoral districts), party votes are divided by the quota. The higher tier where the seats unallocated in each district following division by the quota are grouped and distributed among parties on the basis of the collected remainders from each district. This procedure normally works to the advantage of the smaller parties insofar as it allows them to offset the wastage effect produced by the dispersion of their vote in local districts.

One implication of this technique is that the number of seats that are allocated at the higher tier(s) are not predetermined by the law. Indeed, it may vary from one election to the next, depending on the extent of party fractionalization—the more fractionalized the electorate in districts, the smaller the number of seats awarded at this initial stage—and on the quota used. As noted above, a Hare quota normally results in a smaller number of seats being allotted at the lower level than a Droop quota.

The second approach uses the higher tier as a corrective. In this case, a fixed number of seats are reserved for correcting at the higher level the distortion between votes and seats generated by the use of local districts with small magnitudes. Sweden, for example, is divided into 28 basic districts, which together elect 310 members. There are also 39 seats to be awarded at the national level to correct imbalances. The distribution of those 39 seats involves the following operations. First, the total number of seats, 349 (310 + 39), is distributed among parties on the basis of their total vote as if Sweden were a single national constituency. Next, the resulting seat allotment is compared with the actual distribution of 310 district seats. Whenever a party wins fewer seats in districts than it would be entitled to under the national computation, it gets the difference as national seats. Thus, imbalances created at the district level are corrected at the national level. This kind of corrective higher tier is used in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and South Africa. Belgium's *apparentement provincial*, through different procedures (which do not provide for a fixed number of corrective seats), and Austria's second and third tiers also have a corrective effect.

A third option is for members elected at the higher level to be selected independently of members elected in basic districts. Poland has 391 members elected in 52 districts under the d'Hondt rule. There is also a national constituency where 69 seats are distributed on the basis of national party totals under the d'Hondt formula, bringing the total size of the legislature to 460.

Multiple tiers normally reduce distortions, provided there is no threshold that prevents smaller parties from getting national seats. If such thresholds exist, a higher tier can serve to give a bonus to larger parties.

Thresholds. This brings us to a fourth dimension of PR, namely, the existence in quite a few PR countries of legal thresholds of exclusion. Politicians are rarely willing to follow a principle up to its full logical conclusion. As previous paragraphs make clear, there are plenty of ways, even in PR systems, to grant a "bonus" to stronger parties at the expense of the weakest. Whereas the effect of other techniques for dampening proportionality, like the d'Hondt rule or low district magnitude, is subtle and difficult to gauge except for trained electoral engineers, a threshold flatly states that political parties that fail to secure a given percentage of the vote, either in districts or nationally, are deprived of parliamentary representation or at least of some of the seats they would otherwise be entitled to.

Thresholds are fairly common. Only nine countries having list systems of PR do not impose any (Figure 2.3). Eight have local thresholds; five have national thresholds; and Greece, Poland, and Sweden combine local and national thresholds. The law may require a fixed percentage of the national or district vote, or a certain number of votes or seats at the district level, to be entitled to seats at the national level. Higher thresholds may be imposed on coalitions. The best-known threshold is the German rule, which excludes from the Bundestag any party that fails to obtain 5 percent of the national vote or to elect three members in single-member districts. Turkey goes the farthest by demanding 10 percent of the national vote to secure a local seat, followed by Poland with a national threshold of 7 percent for national seats.[19] All other countries require 5 percent or less of national or regional vote.

Thresholds send a clear and frank message that marginal parties are not considered suitable players in the parliamentary arena. As there is no logical reason to opt for a threshold of 1 percent rather than 10 percent, such thresholds are more vulnerable to constitutional and political challenges. When many parties fail by a hairbreath to reach the threshold, the total number of voters unrepresented may be as high as 51 percent, as occurred in the Russian elections of 1995.

Selection of candidates. Plurality and majority systems result in the election of an *individual,* whereas in PR, *seats* are distributed. This highlights the fact



Figure 2.3. A Typology of Thresholds in Proportional Representation Systems

that the chief preoccupation of proponents of PR is that each *party* gets a number of seats corresponding to the number of votes it polled. If election contests nowadays are basically fights between party organizations, PR certainly is the system that pushes this logic to its ultimate conclusion.

This can be seen by the prevalence in PR countries of the *closed list*, whereby voters are not allowed to express any preference for individual candidates and members are elected in the order specified on the party list. No less than 14 of our PR countries follow that method (Figure 2.2). In nine PR systems, voters may express a preference for one or more candidates within the party list they voted for. This can be done in various ways. Voters may vote for a party, and mark the name of one of its candidates (Belgium), or they may mark the name of a single candidate and have this vote counted as a party vote (Finland). *Panachage*, found in Switzerland, is the system that grants voters the highest degree of freedom, because they have as many votes as there are seats to be distributed in the district and may freely distribute those votes among candidates irrespective of the party they stand for.

The Single Transferable Vote

List systems of PR are frequently vilified for granting parties too much control over the selection of legislators. The single transferable vote (STV) is advocated as a form of PR that does away with party lists, thus giving voters more freedom. As in list systems, members are elected in multimember districts. However, candidates are grouped on a single ballot, to be rank ordered by voters as in the alternative vote. There is no obligation for voters to express preferences for the candidates of a single party, which makes it an instance of panachage.

Only first-preference votes are initially counted. A Droop quota is computed for the district. Candidates whose first-preference votes are equal to or greater than the quota are elected. Surplus votes cast for the winners (i.e., the number of votes in excess of the quota) are transferred to the other remaining candidates on the basis of second preferences. When all winners' surpluses have been transferred and seats remain unallotted, the weakest candidates are eliminated and their votes are similarly transferred to remaining candidates, until all seats are filled.

Although this system has been warmly advocated for over a century in Anglo-American circles (Lakeman 1974), Ireland is the single country cov-

in this book to use it for elections to the first chamber, and Australian ...tors are also elected by STV.

...ed Systems

It is technically possible to mix together different electoral systems to devise a hybrid, or mixed system. The notion of a mixed system is not always defined very precisely in the literature. We define a mixed system as a system where different formulas (plurality and PR, majority and PR) are used simultaneously in a single election.[11]

Mixed systems were sometimes dismissed as eccentricities, transitional formulas, or instances of sheer manipulation doomed to disappear. It may be time to revise such generalizations, as 11 of our countries (including Germany, Japan, Italy, and Russia) have mixed systems.

There are at least three ways of mixing PR with either the plurality or majority rules. The simplest way (which we propose to call *coexistence*) is to apply PR in some parts of the national territory, and either plurality or majority everywhere else. In French Senate elections, a majority-plurality system is used in departments having four seats or less, whereas PR prevails in departments where five senators or more are to be elected.

A second type of mixed system involves having two sets of members for the same national territory. Following the 1994 electoral reform, Japan offers an example of this kind of mixed system, which we propose to call *combination*. Starting with the next election, 300 members of the House of Representatives will be elected in single-member constituencies under first past the post. The other 200 will be elected in 11 regional constituencies by PR. The Russian system is of the same broad type, except that PR members account for half of the total and are elected in a single national constituency. Taiwan combines 125 members elected by the single nontransferable vote in 27 constituencies, with 36 members elected nationally by PR.[12]

In the Japanese and Russian systems, PR seats are not distributed so as to correct party distortions created by the operation of the plurality rule in single-member districts. Each half of House membership is selected independently of the other. The German system is the best example of a third type of mixed system, where PR seats are distributed in a *corrective* way, so as to compensate weaker parties that did poorly in single-member seats and to produce a Parliament where each party gets its fair share of seats. Thus, the

Bundestag includes 328 members elected by plurality in single-member districts, plus 328 PR seats in a single national constituency. Electors cast two votes, first for a candidate in their single-member district, second for a party.

The allocation of seats requires first the distribution, on the basis of second or "party" votes cast by electors, of 656 seats by PR (LR-Hare method). The results of such computation are compared with the actual distribution of the 328 constituency seats among parties. The other 328 seats are then awarded so as to make the final distribution of 656 seats fully proportional. In 1993, New Zealanders opted for a formula close to the German one. The Italian system of 1994 reaches the same corrective goal through more complex procedures.[13] Mexico provides for PR seats so as to ensure the presence of some opposition members in its Chamber of Deputies, and the ruling party normally sweeps the vast majority of single-member districts. All these cases mix plurality with some form of PR.

Hungary's system *combines* 176 members elected by majority in single-member districts with 152 members elected by straight PR d'Hondt in 20 regional districts, but corrects somewhat the distortions that remain by providing for 58 national seats to be distributed by PR on the basis of votes cast for candidates defeated at the other two levels. Ecuador's 72-seat Parliament has two sets of members: 12 national members are elected by straight PR (LR-Double quota) in a single national district for a term of 4 years. In addition, there are 60 members elected in provincial districts for a shorter term: Plurality prevails in the five single-member districts, 8 members are elected in two-member districts by the plurality rule with some possible representation for minorities, and the remaining 47 are elected by PR in districts having three members or more. This complex system involves both coexistence and combination.

A country may use the same system for elections at all levels, but it may also resort to different formulas for different levels. France, for example, uses majority-runoff for presidential elections, majority-plurality in single-member districts for legislative and departmental elections, majority-plurality in multimember districts for senatorial elections in smaller departments and for municipal elections in smaller municipalities, and PR d'Hondt for European and regional elections as well as for senatorial elections in larger departments. Larger municipalities elect councillors, generally in a single constituency, through a unique procedure: Half the seats are allotted to the list that secures an absolute majority of the vote on the first ballot (or a simple plurality on the

...nd), and the other half is distributed among all lists (including the leading) ...r PR d'Hondt.

Political Consequences of Electoral Systems

We may distinguish two types of consequences: those that take place before the vote and those that occur after. Following Duverger (1951), we may call the former *psychological* and the latter *mechanical*. Mechanical effects are those that directly follow from electoral rules. Psychological effects pertain to how parties and voters react to these rules: They may change their behavior because of their expectations about the mechanical effects of electoral systems and about how other actors will react. Psychological effects affect the vote; mechanical effects affect the outcome of the election, given the vote (Blais and Carty 1991).[14]

Psychological Effect

Electoral rules can affect the behavior of parties and voters. Concerning parties, two questions may be raised. First, does the number of parties contesting an election depend on electoral rules?[15] Blais and Carty (1991) look at 509 elections in 20 countries over more than a century and compare the number of parties running in plurality, majority, and PR systems. The average number is five, seven, and eight parties, respectively.[16] Elites thus refrain from forming new parties in plurality systems because they know it is more difficult for small parties to win seats. On the other hand, there are almost as many parties running in majority as in PR elections. This underlines the fact that majority elections are quite different from plurality ones, a point to which we return below.

Party leaders respond to the incentives created by electoral rules. The response, however, is not automatic. This is clearly illustrated by Gunther's (1989) thorough analysis of the effect of the electoral law on party elites in Spain. Spain has a PR system, but it contains many correctives that make it strikingly unproportional. The system should serve as a deterrent to schisms and an inducement to mergers among parties. Yet little of this has happened, partly because party leaders miscalculate their likely level of support and

partly because the maximization of parliamentary representation in the short run is less important than other political objectives. Gunther's analysis is a useful reminder that electoral rules only create incentives; they do not determine behavior. Over the long haul, however, these incentives do leave their imprint.

A second question is whether electoral rules affect party strategies. The question is examined by Katz (1980), who shows that PR and large district magnitude tend to make parties more ideologically oriented, whereas party cohesion tends to be weaker when voters are allowed to express preferences among candidates within the same party. In the latter case, as Katz explains, candidates must mount an independent campaign, and that weakens party attachments.

Turning to voters, the question that has attracted the most attention is the presence or absence of strategic or tactical voting in plurality systems.[17] Suppose there are three candidates in an election: A, B, and C. Consider voters who prefer C, then B, then A, and know C is not popular and has very little chance of winning. These voters have the choice of voting for their most-preferred candidate or of voting strategically for their second preferred, because that candidate has a better chance of defeating their least-liked candidate.

A number of studies have looked at how candidate viability affects the vote in plurality elections. Black (1978) and Cain (1978) have shown that the propensity to vote for a second choice is related to the closeness of the race (as indicated by the actual outcome of the election) in a district. Abramson et al. (1992) go a step further and show that the vote in American primaries reflects both preferences and perceptions of candidates' viability. Blais and Nadeau (1996) refine the analysis and apply a two-step procedure to the 1988 Canadian election. Around 20 percent of voters in that election were faced with the decision to vote sincerely or strategically, because they perceived their most-preferred party as less likely to win than their second-preferred one. Among these voters, around 30 percent did vote strategically for their second choice. The propensity to vote strategically increases as the intensity of preference for the first choice over the second decreases, as the perceived distance in the race between the first and second choices increases, and as the race between the second and third choices gets closer. Altogether, relatively few voters (around 6 percent) cast a strategic vote, but this is mainly because most of them do not face a strategic choice.

This raises the question as to whether strategic considerations play a role in PR or majority elections. We would expect thresholds in PR systems to

...duce some degree of strategic voting. If a voter's most-preferred party is ...ected to have fewer votes than the required threshold, he or she has to ...oose between voting for that party even though it has little or no chance of ...eing represented in Parliament and supporting another party that is likely to ...eet that threshold. The only piece of evidence we have on this is provided by Gunther (1989), who shows that sympathizers of small parties are less likely to vote for those parties in smaller districts, with high effective thresholds.[18] An even more intriguing question, which has not been examined in the literature, is whether voters in PR systems hesitate to vote for parties that are perceived to have no chance of being part of the government.[19]

In two-ballot majority elections, the issue is whether voters express their pure preferences on the first ballot, knowing that they will be able to have another say in the second ballot. There is little doubt that the vote on the first ballot does not merely reflect preferences; strategic considerations play a role. In the French legislative election of 1978, for instance, a substantial number of RPR supporters voted UDF in those constituencies where the UDF had won in the previous election and was thus more likely to defeat the left (Capdevielle, Dupoirier, and Ysmal 1988, 29).[20] We should also note an intriguing pattern established by Parodi (1978): The electoral coalition that gets the more votes on the first ballot tends to lose votes on the second. The exact reason why this occurs has not been elucidated.[21] It is an interesting case of voters reacting to the collective signal given on the first ballot.

The Mechanical Effect

The electoral law determines how votes are to be translated into seats. The most direct issue regarding the mechanical effect of electoral systems thus pertains to the relationship between the proportion of votes a party gets and the proportion of seats it wins in the legislature. Two subsidiary questions concern the outcome of the election: the number of parties that get represented in the legislature and the presence or absence of a parliamentary majority.

Votes and Seats

Rae's (1967) seminal book is the starting point.[22] Rae regressed seat shares against vote shares under PR and under plurality-majority formulae. He finds the regression coefficient to be 1.07 for PR and 1.20 for plurality-majority. All systems give an advantage to stronger parties but that bias is much less

pronounced in PR systems. The average bonus to the strongest party is 8 percentage points in plurality-majority systems, and only 1 point under PR.

Unfortunately, that specific line of inquiry has not been pursued in a cross-national perspective. Some studies have looked at specific countries and refined the analysis by incorporating other factors such as the concentration of the vote (Sankoff and Mellos 1972, 1973) and the relative performance of parties in constituencies of different sizes (Spafford 1970), but we do not have updated and revised estimates of the basic seat-vote relationship in various types of electoral systems.

Taagepera (1986) proposes a radically new perspective to the issue. His starting point is the cube law of plurality elections, formulated at the beginning of the century, according to which the ratio of seats won by two parties equals the cube of the ratio of their votes. Taagepera shows that the most appropriate exponential is not necessarily three but rather the logarithm of the total number of votes divided by the logarithm of the total number of seats. He extends the model to PR elections, in which case the exponential depends on district magnitude as well as on total numbers of votes and seats.

Taagepera's work constitutes a major improvement. It is elegant and has the great advantage of proposing a model that can be applied to all electoral systems. For plurality elections, Taagepera is very persuasive in showing that his model outperforms the cube law. It is not clear, however, that it does a better job than the models proposed by Spafford or Sankoff and Mellos. We still lack a systematic comparative evaluation of these various approaches.

With respect to PR elections, Taagepera and Shugart (1989, chap. 11) stress the decisive effect of district magnitude. Rae (1967) had already shown that district magnitude strongly affects the degree of proportionality of PR. He did not, however, take into account the presence of supradistrict adjustment seats or legal thresholds. Taagepera and Shugart devise a complex procedure for computing a measure of effective magnitude that incorporates all of these elements.

The Number of Parties in Parliament

Duverger (1951) claimed that the plurality rule favors a two-party system, and the majority rule (with second ballot) and PR are conducive to multipartyism. He also argued that only the relationship between plurality rule and a two-party system approached a true sociological law. Riker (1986) concludes that Duverger was basically right. There is an association, but only a prob-

...ween PR and multipartyism. In Riker's view, the relationship ...ality and a two-party system is much stronger. He points out only ... India and Canada, and proposes a revised law accounting for ...eptions. This is not very compelling, however, because the ...isons supporting the law is very small[23] and because Britain can ...aracterized as a two-party system, at least as far as the distribution ...oncerned.

...es the question of how to count parties. One simple method is to ... number of parties represented in the legislature. Unfortunately, no ... compared electoral systems on that criterion. Attention has focused ...ting the "effective" number of parties, which weights parties accord... their electoral strength.

...most popular measure is the one proposed by Laakso and Taagepera ..., where N equals 1 divided by the sum of squared vote shares. Molinar ... proposes an index giving special weight to the largest party. As Lijphart ...b, 69) shows, both measures have their merits and limits, and they yield ...lar results in most instances.

Lijphart (1994b) compares the effective number of parliamentary parties ...various systems (see this volume, Table 1.4). The average is 2.0 in plurality, ...8 in majority, and 3.6 in PR systems. Within PR systems, the only important factor is the effective threshold. Within the sample examined by Lijphart, the effective threshold varies from 1 to 13 percent; the number of effective parties is ...duced by 1 when the threshold is over 8 percent.

...nally, Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) look at how electoral systems mediate the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the number of parties. Ordeshook and Shvetsova use both a simple count of parties and the "effective" number of parties as their dependent variable and report that the former is "not only the more behaviorally meaningful . . . but also the more predictable measure" (1994, 121). They find that the relationship between number of parties and ethnic heterogeneity increases with district magnitude; however, "the superiority of the interactive model appears to derive solely from the fact that single-member district states not only have fewer parties on average but also are more heterogeneous than their PR counterparts" (1994, 119).

Is There a Parliamentary Majority?

The ultimate objective of an election is to determine who will govern. A crucial question in parliamentary systems is whether the election allows the

formation of a one-party majority government. Clearly, parliamentary majorities are infrequent in PR systems. Blais and Carty (1987), in their study of 510 elections in 20 countries, report that 10 percent of PR elections produced such a majority. Lijphart (1994b), who examines elections in 27 countries between 1945 and 1990, finds a majority in 20 percent of the cases. He also shows that the probability of a one-party majority government in a PR system hinges very much on the effective threshold. It is about nil when that threshold is very small but reaches 30 percent when the effective threshold is 10 percent, as in Spain.

Parliamentary majorities, either natural or manufactured,[24] are much more frequent in plurality elections. Blais and Carty (1987) indicate that 69 percent of plurality elections in their sample produced one-party majority governments. Lijphart reports a much higher proportion—93 percent—partly because he includes India, which had many two-member districts in the 1950s.

What about majority elections? Lijphart (1994b) examines France and Australia; he finds a parliamentary majority in half of the cases. The same proportion is reported by Blais and Carty (1987), who consider many more cases. The latter study includes, however, multimember majority systems; the proportion drops to 27 percent when these are excluded. On this criterion, the single-member majority system is closer to PR than to plurality.

In plurality systems, one-party majorities are normally won by parties that secure a plurality or a majority of the votes. It is possible, however, for a party that comes second in terms of votes to obtain a majority of the seats. This was the case, for example, in two successive elections (1978 and 1981) in New Zealand. This may occur for two reasons. Either votes for the winning party are concentrated in less-populated districts, or votes for the losing party are too highly concentrated (and wasted) in some districts (Massicotte and Bernard 1985; Taylor and Johnston 1979).

The Debate Over Electoral Systems

Which is the best electoral system? Analysts and practitioners have debated the issue for more than a century. The debate has touched on every dimension of electoral systems—the ballot, the constituency, and the formula. As we have seen in the first section, there is a wide range of options available, especially if we take account of the possibility of combining these options in various ways.

The debate has focused mainly on the choice of an electoral formula, and it is thus logical to start with that dimension. We then turn to the debate over the constituency and the ballot. Our review is confined to the most important arguments advanced to support or oppose a given option.[25]

As we show, a good case can be made for almost any electoral system. This is so because there are alternative visions of democracy, and because electoral systems are meant to accomplish not one but many objectives, which entail trade-offs.[26] That the debate remains unsettled may account for the recent popularity of mixed systems.

The Formula

The dominant debate in the literature has been between plurality and PR systems. The basic argument in favor of the plurality rule is that it produces one-party majority government, whereas PR is advocated because it produces broad and fair representation.

Why is one-party majority government such a good thing, according to proponents of the plurality rule? For two main reasons. The first is stability. One-party majority governments are believed to be more stable, and government stability is perceived to enhance political stability. There is little doubt that one-party majority governments are more stable than coalition governments typically found in PR systems. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that most coalition governments in PR systems are reasonably stable (Laver and Schofield 1990, chap. 6). The most difficult question concerns the relationship between government and political stability. The jury is still out on this question. Powell (1982) finds no relationship, whereas Blais and Dion (1990) note that among nonindustrialized countries, democracy breaks down more often in PR systems with low government stability. More research is needed on this important topic to sort out the specific effect of electoral systems versus other factors such as presidentialism (Stefan and Skach 1993).

The second virtue that is claimed for one-party majority government is accountability. Accountability stems from decisiveness. An election is decisive when it has a direct and immediate effect on the formation of government (Powell 1989, 1993; Strøm 1990, 72-4). It is easier for voters in a plurality system to get rid of a government they do not like; they just throw the rascals out and replace them with a new government. In a PR system, the fate of a government is decided only partly and indirectly by voters. A party may lose

support but still remain as a member of a coalition government, because the composition of government depends on deals among the parties.[27] One-party majority governments are more accountable than their coalition counterparts.

For advocates of PR, the two key words are fairness and responsiveness. Almost by definition, PR is fair because it is intended to give each party a share of seats more or less equal to its share of votes. That principle is, of course, qualified by the use of small districts and/or legal thresholds. Moreover, the distribution of seats in the legislature may be fair, but the distribution of cabinet seats in government is surely much less fair.[28] Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that PR leads to fairer representation than the plurality rule.

PR also allows for a greater diversity of viewpoints to be expressed in the legislature and in government, because more parties are represented in both. Parties in plurality systems must, of course, be sensitive to different perspectives if they want to attract enough votes to win, but the mere fact that more parties get to argue their positions in a PR system should make governments more aware and concerned about the diversity of opinions.

PR is especially advocated for societies with deep ethnic or linguistic cleavages. The argument is that in such societies it is imperative that minority groups be fairly represented within political parties, in Parliament, and in Cabinet and that only under PR can that goal be achieved (see Cairns 1968; Lijphart 1977; Sisk 1994). Critics reply that PR can induce the formation of narrow ethnic parties that appeal to ethnic cleavages to maximize support (Tsebelis 1990).

The choice between plurality and PR is thus mostly about what is deemed to be more important: accountability and (perhaps) stability, on the one hand, fairness and responsiveness, on the other.

There is a third option—majority rule. The arguments in favor of majority rule have not been as systematically articulated.[29] There are, we believe, two basic reasons for advocating it. First, the majority principle is at the very heart of democracy (Spitz 1984). In a direct democracy, the majority wins, and in a representative democracy, most decisions are made by legislators through the majority rule. It would thus seem natural to apply the same logic to the selection of representatives.

The second argument in favor of majority rule is that it offers a reasonable degree of both responsiveness and accountability. It allows the presence of many parties, fewer than does PR but more than the plurality rule. It often

the formation of coalition governments, but the process of coalition building tends to be more open than under PR. Coalitions are more likely to be formed before the election, or at least before the second ballot, and last well after the election, because of the electoral cost involved in changing government partners. Compared with the situation under PR, voters have a more direct say in which coalition will form the government, and parties and governments are more accountable, although less than under strict plurality rule. The majority rule should thus appeal to those who wish to obtain a mixture of responsiveness and accountability. The majority rule is, however, much less satisfactory with respect to fairness. In fact, it is in majority systems that disproportionality between seat shares and vote shares can be the greatest.[30]

The Constituency

The main debate here is about the virtues and vices of single- and multimember districts. That debate overlaps, to some extent, the one over plurality and PR systems, because the latter entail multimember districts and the former (as well as majority systems) usually resort to single-member districts.

Supporters of single-member districts claim that the single-member type gives voters a closer relationship with their representatives and maximize accountability, because district representatives can be held responsible for defending constituency interests. That responsibility is diluted among many representatives in multimember districts.

Single-member districts have at least one important drawback. They have to be modified on a regular basis to maintain populations of relatively equal size. This may make for artificial units of no particular relevance to citizens and raises all the problems involved in designing and redesigning districts (Baker 1986; Balinski and Young 1982). Multimember districts need not be of the same size. They can be made to correspond to sociological or administrative boundaries and are thus more congruent for voters (Niemi, Powell, and Bicknell 1986). Their boundaries can remain intact even if their population increases or decreases because it is possible to change the number of members to be elected in the district.

The alleged advantage of multimember districts is that they ensure a better representation of various groups, especially minority ones. There is much evidence, in particular, that women tend to be better represented in multimem-

ber districts, because parties strive for an overall balance (Welch and Studlar 1990; Rule 1992, 1994; Rule and Norris 1992; see also chap. 7 in this volume). The consequences of multimember districts are less certain, however, for groups that are territorially concentrated. In the United States, in particular, blacks and Hispanics do better under single-member districts (Rule 1992; Welch and Herrick 1992; Davidson and Grofman 1994), especially because the Voting Rights Act encourages the creation of districts where racial minorities predominate.

The choice between single- and multimember districts is thus one of competing values, mainly the advantage of having accountable individual representatives versus the benefit of having a more representative and responsive legislature.

The Ballot

How voters are allowed to express their preferences depends to a great extent on the kind of electoral formula that is used. Consequently, the debate over voting procedures takes different forms in plurality, majority, and PR systems. Before reviewing these debates, one general observation should be made. Everything else being equal, it seems likely that the more information the ballot reveals about voters' preferences, the more accurate the representation of preferences is likely to be. Thus, a system that allows voters to express degrees of preferences is preferable to one that does not. At the same time, however, such a system may be less simple for voters, and there may be a trade-off between simplicity and the amount of information that voters are asked to provide.

The Ballot in Plurality Systems: One or Many Votes?

In single-member plurality systems,[31] voters are typically asked to indicate which candidate they prefer. There are other possibilities. Voters can be asked to rank order the candidates or to vote for as many candidates for which they approve. The latter approach, approval voting, has been advocated by Brams and Fishburn (1982).

There are two major reasons for supporting approval voting. First, it provides voters greater flexibility in expressing their preferences; voters are not forced to choose only one candidate. It thus yields a more accurate

measure of preferences, without undue complexity. Second, it ensures the candidate with greatest overall support is elected. It makes it impossible, in particular, for an extremist to squeeze in as the winner when there are two moderate candidates, something that can occur in a standard plurality election (Brams and Fishburn 1988, 277-8).

The main objection to approval voting is that it may increase the number of parties and reduce the probability of a one-party majority government. The reason is that when voters have to vote for one candidate in a plurality election, they are induced to vote strategically for parties that have a chance of winning and not to support parties that appear to be weak. Although strategic voting may well occur under approval voting (Niemi 1984), the incentive for voters not to support weak candidates is not as strong: They may vote for both their preferred weak candidate and their second choice. As a consequence, more parties are likely to get votes and seats, and one-party majority government is likely to be less frequent.

For those who are firm believers in the virtues of one-party majority government, then, approval voting is not likely to be very popular. When such considerations are not crucial, for the election of a president, for instance, it has greater appeal. Approval voting can also be used for majority and PR elections, where it does not have the same disadvantage (one-party majority governments are unlikely anyway).

Majority Rule: The Alternative Vote Versus Multiple Ballots

Under majority rule, a candidate must obtain more than 50 percent of the votes to win. It is possible that no candidate meets that condition and that no one is elected. As noted in the first section, there are two ways to proceed when this occurs. The first is to resort to multiple ballots. The second approach is to have voters rank order the candidates (the alternative vote).

The case for the alternative vote is that it provides richer information about voters' preferences; it conveys information about how they react to each candidate.[32] The procedure is somewhat more complex for voters but it is less costly because they vote only once. The case for two ballots is that it allows voters to reconsider their choice and to compare more systematically the two or three "serious" candidates that remain on the second ballot. Citizens are also faced with a simpler task, simply to choose one candidate on each ballot.

PR Systems: Can Voters Express Their Preferences Among Candidates?

The basic principle of PR is that seats should be distributed among parties according to their vote shares. This assumes that people vote for parties or lists of candidates. The problem with closed-list PR is that voters are not allowed to express preferences among individual candidates. Critics claim that this is an important shortcoming. Proponents reply that it is preferences among parties that really matter. The bottom line here is the importance to be attached to the representation of opinions about candidates versus those about parties. It is possible, however, to allow voters to express their opinions about candidates in a PR system, through either panachage or preferential voting in a list system or the single transferable vote.

The single transferable vote allows voters to rank order candidates and thus grants them maximum freedom to express their preferences. It is a more complex procedure, but it provides richer information about voters' preferences. It has two drawbacks. First, it can be applied only if there are relatively few members to be elected in each district. Otherwise, there would be too many candidates to be rank ordered by voters. But small districts entail a lower degree of proportionality in party representation. Second, it induces candidates of the same parties to compete against each other, hindering party cohesion (Katz 1980). The single transferable vote is thus an appealing option only for those who are willing to accept only a modest degree of proportionality and relatively uncohesive parties.

The other approach is to keep the list system but to allow voters to indicate their opinions about candidates through panachage or preferential voting. This is a simpler procedure, and it can be used in large districts, thus ensuring a high degree of proportionality in party representation. However, panachage and preferential voting have the same detrimental effects on party unity. They entail the coexistence of two simultaneous contests, one among parties and one among candidates within the same party.

The debate over electoral systems highlights the role of competing values and trade-offs in deciding which rules best serve democracy. At least two basic questions need to be addressed. First, which preferences should be represented? The issue is the relative importance to be attached to preferences about parties and candidates. The case for list PR, in particular, rests very much on the assumption that top priority should be given to parties. The greater the

...nce given to individual candidates, the less appealing list PR becomes. ...which is the best way to ensure that the elected follow public opinion? ...pproach is to focus on the make-up of legislatures and of governments. ...ssumption is that representatives are more likely to be in accordance ...public opinion if they resemble those they represent. This is the funda...tal belief underlying support for PR. A second view is to focus on ...slators' and governments' incentives. The assumption is that repre...tatives will follow public opinion if they think they will not be reelected ...they do not and that we should devise a system that makes it easy to get rid of a government that does not do a good job. This is the reasoning of advocates of the plurality rule.

Notes

1. Data for this chapter are drawn from Blais and Massicotte (1996, Forthcoming). The main sources were Inter-Parliamentary Union (1993), updated by the annual *Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and Developments*, published by the Inter-Parliamentary Union; *Keesing's Record of World Events*; and Blaustein and Flanz (n.d.). We also relied on the electoral laws of many countries as well as on many other sources, all of which are listed in Blais and Massicotte (1996, Forthcoming).

2. Some analysts (see, especially, Jones 1995; Cox 1995) characterize the Chilean system as PR d'Hondt. It is true that the system works exactly as PR d'Hondt would. It is also true, however, that the law does not refer to PR nor to d'Hondt nor to highest averages. Furthermore, the rule that applies in the great majority of instances is simple plurality: The two leading parties each get one seat. It seems to us that a system in which only one or two parties can get elected can hardly be described as PR.

3. The threshold for standing at the second ballot in French legislative elections is now 12.5 percent of the electorate.

4. The examples are German presidential elections under the Weimar Republic and French legislative elections in the 1930s (Lakeman 1974).

5. Those figures are from the 1996 election. See *El Pais* (Madrid), March 5, 1996.

6. There is a fourth highest-averages method, known as the Imperiali rule. In Belgian municipal elections (the only occasion where this method is used), the divisors are 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and so on. This rule works strongly in favor of larger parties (Van den Bergh 1955).

7. Largest-remainders and highest-averages methods are normally considered mutually exclusive. However, in South Africa, the first five seats unallotted after division are distributed to the parties with the largest remainders, whereas the d'Hondt highest-averages method is used for the remaining seats.

8. Strictly speaking, this should be called a *Hagenbach-Bischoff quota* rather than a Droop quota, as the latter is a Hagenbach-Bischoff quota increased by one. The difference is so minute that Lijphart (1992) has proposed to select the shortest name to refer to these two quotas. A few Latin American countries resort to a so-called double quota system, whereby the first quota serves

as a threshold, and the second is used for allocating seats among the parties that crossed the threshold. We classify those systems on the basis of the second quota.

9. We leave aside the Imperiali quota, where the total number of votes is divided by the number of seats *plus two*. This method was used in a single country (Italy) and was dropped in 1993.

10. In Turkey, in districts returning at least five members, the party getting the most votes is awarded a bonus seat, with the rest of the seats awarded under d'Hondt. The system not only disadvantages weak parties but also advantages the strongest of all.

11. Geographical conditions may necessitate, in a country where PR is the rule, the election of a handful of members in single-member constituencies. This occurs in Switzerland and Finland. In our view, such cases should not be considered as instances of mixed systems, a label that should be used only when the proportion of members elected under a different system is more than 5 percent of the total.

12. South Korea is sometimes erroneously *considered* a mixed system because it combines members elected by plurality in single-member districts with members elected at the national level. However, the latter are elected in proportion to the total of *seats* won by each party in local districts, not on the basis of votes. We consider that both sets of members are elected by plurality.

13. Three-quarters (475) of members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected by plurality in single-member districts, and the other 155 are elected by straight PR in a single national constituency and subsequently reallocated between 26 regional constituencies. However, PR seats are allocated to parties not on the basis of their total vote, but on the basis of "amended" party totals that include only votes cast for candidates defeated in single-member districts and for winning candidates in excess of what they needed to win—that is, a plurality of one over their strongest opponent. In other words, only votes wasted at the local level are considered for PR purposes, with the result that parties that do poorly in single-member districts are likely to get some correction under PR.

14. We focus, as does the literature, on legislative elections held in parliamentary systems. There have been few studies of the effect of electoral rules on presidential elections (see, however, Shugart and Carey 1992, and Shugart 1995). Little attention has been given to potential interaction effects between electoral systems and other institutional variables. It is quite possible, for instance, that the consequences of electoral rules are quite different in parliamentary and presidential systems.

15. Grumm (1958) has argued that the causal direction was reversed, that multipartyism caused PR. Riker (1986, 27) shows that the evidence refutes that hypothesis.

16. The numbers refer to single-member districts in the case of plurality and majority systems.

17. We leave aside the question of whether proportional representation fosters voter turnout, which is examined in chapter 8 in this volume.

18. The *legal* threshold is the minimum number of votes a party, at the national or district level, that is required by the law for a party to be entitled to seats.

19. The 1994 German election is quite interesting in that respect. As the FDP seemed not certain to get the 5 percent of the votes it needed to get represented in the Bundestag, a number of CDU-CSU supporters appear to have decided to vote for the FDP to help it reach the threshold. This is a rare instance of a party benefiting from its apparent weakness. But the reason CDU-CSU supporters voted strategically for the FDP is that the CDU-CSU needed the FDP to form a government. We may suppose that if the CDU-CSU could have formed a single-party majority government, such strategic voting would not have taken place. In this case, German voters voted at least partly on the basis of their perceptions of which parties were most likely to form the

government. In a PR election, then, voters may form expectations about which coalitions are likely to be formed after the election, may have preferences about these coalitions as such rather than about the various parties, and may vote partly on the basis of these expectations and preferences. Unfortunately, we know very little about these strategic calculations.

20. We should note that strategic voting is inferred here from the nonconcordance of party identification and vote. This inflates the amount of strategic voting because voters may vote for a party that is not the one they feel attached to because of the issues of the campaign, party leaders, or local candidates. The fact that the number of parties does not tend to diminish over time in France suggests that strategic voting on the first ballot is limited.

21. A similar pattern seems to take place in plurality elections. In Canada, at least, the front-runner at the beginning of a campaign tends to lose votes during the campaign (Johnston et al. 1992, 21).

22. Many authors dealt with this issue before Rae. Rae was the first to examine it in a systematic fashion.

23. Furthermore, one of the few cases supporting the law, the United States, has other institutional features, presidentialism and primaries, that could account for the presence of a two-party system.

24. A natural majority occurs when a party gets a majority of both votes and seats. A manufactured majority is one where a party obtains a majority of seats without having a majority of votes.

25. For a more elaborate review, see Blais (1991) and Dunleavy and Margetts (1995).

26. For a cogent exposition of the trade-offs, see Dunleavy and Margetts (1995).

27. As a Belgian party leader once put it, "Voters redistribute cards among players [parties], but it is the latter who play cards."

28. This problem is sometimes solved by a requirement that the executive mirrors party strength in the legislature (Austrian *Länder*) or by a decision to build government coalitions, including more parties than is mathematically necessary to command a majority in the legislature (Switzerland).

29. See, however, Fisichella (1984) and Blais (1993).

30. It is in France, for instance, that the index of proportionality tends to be the lowest (Rose 1984b, 75). This occurs, however, because only first-ballot votes are taken into account.

31. We confine ourselves here to single-member plurality systems and do not consider the single nontransferable or limited vote. Lijphart, Pintor, and Sone (1986) show that in their consequences these systems lie somewhere between single-member plurality and proportional representation.

32. This could also be obtained under multiple ballots through the use of approval voting.

C

MODULE B

PUBLIC SPEAKING

PRESENTATION SKILLS

WHO

Who is your audience?
What are their expectations?
Why do they want this presentation?
What do they need to know?
What do they already know?
What level of detail is necessary?
What level of technological knowledge does the audience have?
What will the audience do with the information after this presentation?
What do they know about you?

DO NOT WASTE YOUR TIME AND YOUR AUDIENCE'S TIME BY PRESENTING INFORMATION ALREADY KNOWN, OR THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN. ALWAYS ASK IS A PRESENTATION NECESSARY OR WILL SOME OTHER FORM OF COMMUNICATION, SUCH AS A WRITTEN REPORT BE BETTER?

WHAT ARE YOUR EXPECTATIONS

Why are you doing this presentation?
What do you want to happen?
If you are only presenting because you have been asked to, find out why!
Are you communicating information or ideas?
What do you want your audience to do with the information?

WHAT TO PRESENT

The information you want to communicate and the group wants to know.

Prioritize Your Information

Authored by Linda Edgeworth (I believe)
Antonia Doyle summarized

List your main points
Don't overload with information
What is essential for people to know?
Pick Key Ideas, Give Handouts for the rest.
Give Handouts at the end of the meeting

Stick to Time Limits (5-15 minutes maximum)

WHAT TO PRESENT

Leave Time For Questions & Answers

ORGANIZE INFORMATION

Tell Audience Why You Are Giving Presentation
Don't Present Your Conclusions: Show Audience Your Reasoning
- How I Perceived Problem
- How I Defined and Analyzed Problem
- What Alternatives I Saw
- What My Criteria Were For Evaluating Alternatives
- Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Alternative
- Conclusions

Always Present All Sides of An Issue, Not Just Your Own Point of View

ALLOW AUDIENCE TO GET INVOLVED

Leave Time For Questions and Discussion
If You Ask For Questions At the Beginning, You Must Be Prepared to Change Your Presentation to Incorporate Them

WHEREVER POSSIBLE USE VISUAL AIDS

DON'T READ OR MEMORIZE

Practice In Front of Someone
Visualize Yourself Giving Your Presentation
See Yourself Getting Nervous, Making Mistakes
See Yourself Correcting Mistakes

FACE YOUR AUDIENCE, USE EYE CONTACT, USE A PLEASANT SPEAKING VOICE

DON'T PUT A PODIUM BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR AUDIENCE

USE POSITIVE BODY LANGUAGE

Don't Fiddle With Your Hair
Don't Tug At Your Skirt, Pants, Belt
Put Your Body Weight on The Balls of Your Feet
Lean Forward A Bit
Be Aware of How You Move
When Not Using Them, Put Your Hands At Your Side
Maintain Good Posture

BE AWARE OF YOUR AUDIENCE

Are they yawning, slouching, whispering, rattling papers

DON'T BE AFRAID TO LET PEOPLE KNOW THAT YOU ARE NERVOUS

Be Open and Honest
It's OK To Be Silent For A While, If You Get Lost
It's OK To Stop And Think
Ask Your Audience To Be Patient With You

DRESS APPROPRIATELY

Don't Wear Jewelry That Will Distract From Your Words
If You Are Sitting At A Dais, Don't Wear A Skirt So Short That You Will Be Uncomfortable, Tugging At It

HUMOR

Use Humor To Make A Point If You Can
Don't Use Off Color Jokes, Racist Jokes, or Sexist Jokes
Laugh At Yourself If You Make A Mistake

D

COMMON PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN MEETINGS

Multi-headed Animal Syndrome: Everybody is going off in different directions at the same time.

Confusion between process and content: Are we talking about how to discuss the topic or what topic to discuss?

Personal Attack: Attacking individuals instead of discussing ideas.

Traffic Problem: Difficulty leaping into the conversation and getting a chance to participate.

Unclear roles and responsibilities: Who is supposed to be doing what?

Manipulation by group leader: Rubber-stamp meetings and abuse of process power to achieve personal objectives.

Data overload: Having to hold onto to too many ideas in your head at one time.

Repetition and wheelspinning: Going over the same old ideas again and again and again.

Win/lose approaches to decision making: Partial solutions, compromise, polarization and low commitment.

Confused objectives and expectations: Why did you call the meeting and what is the group supposed to be doing?

Unresolved questions of power and authority: Do we have the power to make this decision?

Problem Avoidance: Everything is fine. There are no problems.

General negativity and lack of challenge: There is nothing we can do about it,so why try?

Communication problems: Not listening to or understanding what others are saying or making faulty assumptions.

Poor meeting environments: Can't hear, can't see, too stuffy, etc.

Personality conflicts: Lack of openness and trust, underlying tension, racism, sexism.

MODULE B
NEGOTIATION SKILLS

12 Winning Strategies:
Managing Conflict Successfully

1. Choose time & place carefully
2. Change behaviors, not people
3. Agree on something
4. Use "I"-language
5. Think where you went wrong
6. Criticize with precision
7. When someone attacks...agree
8. Bow out for a while
9. Have more conflicts
10. Find the third option
11. Agree on the future
12. Work it out on paper

Adapted from "How to Turn Heat Into Light," an article by Jimmy Calano and Jeff Salzman from March 1988 Working Woman magazine.

F

Module B

Media Information

CHAPTER V.

Training Your Spokesperson

It is tremendously important to develop good media relations skills. To build public support for your cause, your spokesperson must be able to communicate effectively when interviewed.

One must understand the interview process. While it may appear to be simply a straightforward exchange of information between the interviewer and the interviewee, it is also an exercise in control. When being interviewed, your challenge is to limit the information presented, and to shape it in a way that conveys your organization's view of the issues.

The following exercises have been designed to give you an advantage in interview situations—to help you truly "win." With a little practice, you should be able to:

- develop better working relations with the press;
- face interviewers with enhanced confidence and control;
- more clearly express your views of the key issues.

From: Promoting Voting: A Citizen's Guide to Media (League of Womens Voters)

Some good techniques for getting that extra time you need include:

- rephrasing the question;
- discussing issues surrounding the question before actually answering it;
- providing background information on the history of the issue while formulating your answer.

Keep your answers succinct, putting the most important idea at the beginning. Never try to build to your final point by using three or four facts. This technique may be effective in a courtroom, but doesn't work with reporters. Begin with your strongest point, then support it.

D. The Ultimate Answer Techniques

Since controlling the interview is a matter of emphasizing areas of conversation, it is a good idea to develop and practice the conversational transitions that make change easily possible. Developing transitions can include:

- "Bridging" to your answer—"You mentioned the low rate of voter turnout across the state, and it reminds me that..." The "you mentioned" transition is always good because it unifies your thoughts with something the interviewer has said.
- "Follow-up" prompting the next question—You can invite a new topic without waiting for an invitation by saying something such as, "That reminds me..." or "Have you ever found yourself in a situation where..." This will prompt the interviewer to move to the topic you want to discuss.
- Put a "star" in the reporters' notebooks—Although as the interviewee, you will not and should not be in complete control of the interview, through directness, a positive approach and the establishment of legitimacy, you should be able to highlight your positions clearly and succinctly leaving no doubt in the interviewer's mind as to what your key points are.

Television/Radio/ Print Interviews

Television Interviews

"The pre-interview"—usually the reporter, host or producer will "pre-interview" you. This establishes what is expected of you and the direction the interviewer intends to take. It is your chance to tell the interviewer which points you'd like to discuss. You're expected to make your suggestions in three or four sentences, so get right to the point.

The Interview

- Use your time to best advantage.
- Know who the show's audience is, as well as the current climate of opinion.
- Make your answers clear.
- Make sure your answers are relevant and interesting.
- Use vivid language, examples, anecdotes and statistics.
- When preparing, take into account the program's format and place in the schedule.
- Phrase your answers so they are aimed at your audience (rather than beneath them or over their heads).
- Prepare answers in 30- or 60-second "sound bites" to assure succinctness and to maximize the chances they will be excerpted on the news.

Be personable, enthusiastic and energetic.

Follow-up

Did you leave anything hanging with the interviewer? Do you need

to provide more information?

- Are there any other topics you can suggest for additional coverage?
- How can you improve your relations with the interviewer?

B. Radio Interviews

1. Pre-interview

Follow the pre-interview suggestions in the previous section. Consider interview length and program format.

2. The Interview

Remember that radio relies on voices to convey information. Stations are increasingly doing interviews by phone rather than in the studio, particularly if the interview is to be edited for later usage. If you're called for a phone inter-

view, ask the reporter whether your responses will be taped or transmitted live. If they are to be taped, ask to call the reporter back within a few minutes. Use the time to prepare your answers.

3. *Follow-up*
Use the same techniques as outlined in the TV interview section.

C. Print Interviews

1. *Preparation*
Print interviews are fundamentally different from broadcast interviews. Generally, print reporters will spend more time with you and cover more topics. It is a challenge to limit and focus your comments.

Learn as much as you can about how the interview will be used. Where and when will the story run? Is the reporter from news, business or features? Research the reporter's background and style.

2. *The Interview*

a. Respond with accurate information. Think your answers through. Feel free to rephrase or clarify your initial statements.

b. Don't assume that the reporter is well informed about the topic. Provide background information that will enhance the interviewer's understanding of the subject.

c. Don't consider anything you say to be "off-the-record" simply because you've said it is. Say only what you would want printed and keep confidential data to yourself.

d. Don't hesitate to ask the reporter to double-check facts and quotes with you after the interview.

e. Encourage the reporter to call you for clarifications or further information.

f. Some reporters will remember to send you a tearsheet (a copy of the article containing the interview or information you provided) if you request it. But it's safer to pick up a copy yourself.

g. Don't be discouraged if you are not quoted in a story. The reporter may decide to use specific interview information for background purposes only, and weave the story around selected responses. Keep a positive attitude. The interview gave you an opportunity to get to know the reporter better, and may be a sign that you're considered a good source of information.

III. Appearance of Confidence

What To Wear for TV Appearances

Wear conservative colors and clothing—don't wear white (which creates a harsh glare on camera) or distractingly vivid patterns.

For men, a dark suit without a vest or a solid sport coat is appropriate. A light blue (or another pale solid color) shirt will complement the suit. A tie with either stripes or a small pattern is fine.

For women, keep it simple. A solid-color tailored suit or dress works

est. A more colorful blouse or scarf ıay be added as an accent. Avoid 'earing a dress with lots of flowing ıbric or ruffles at the neckline. Stay way from flashy or heavy jewelry, nd remember that the microphone ıill be affixed to the dress or jacket ıpel.

ı The Studio

- Be concerned about your comfort. Ask for needed adjustments in lights or seating.
- Act as if you're on camera every ment. Sit still and in a natural manner. Crossed legs or ankles present a neater, more relaxed appearance. Avoid unconscious movements, such as touching your face, fixing your hair or straightening your glasses.
- Don't gesture with your hands—it's too distracting.
- Practice your interview posture in the mirror or with a friend until you're comfortable.
- Assume all microphones are on, and don't say anything you wouldn't want heard on-air.
- Di ct your attention to the person cı ıducting the interview. The cameramen will get the shots they need of you.
- Ignore surprising noises or distractions.
- Be yourself. Give your personality a chance to come across. Talk in your normal conversational tone. Concentrate on speaking clearly and concisely, with credibility.
- Be enthusiastic and energetic. Since television is a visual medium, success depends on style as well as substance.
- After the interview, remain seated until the interviewer or producer tells you you're off the air and can leave.



Module B

Media Information

CHAPTER VI.
The Press Conference

Press conferences should only be used for truly newsworthy information. Don't hold a press conference if the information is better suited to a press release with phone follow-up. The key to a successful, and meaningful, press conference is *important* news. If you invite the media when there really isn't a good reason, they're likely to remember and may not attend future press conferences even when you have newsworthy information to release.

The Notification Process

To notify reporters about a press conference:

- Send media alerts out three to five days in advance. When you've got breaking news to announce, call press contacts.

A Media Alert (also referred to as a "Media Advisory") alerts the media to a press conference or any other event your organization will be holding. It should describe: what the event is about; where it's to be held (including name of the location, street address, room name and number); when the event will take place (day, date and time); who the speaker will be; and who the press contact is (with phone number).

Scheduling

- Schedule the event with media deadlines and competing events in mind. Mornings or early afternoon are usually the best times to accommodate television re-

From: Promoting Voting: A Citizen's Guide to Media (League of Women's Voters)

porters and crews who are busiest in the late afternoon editing stories for the evening broadcasts.

- Make phone calls the day before and the day of the event to urge attendance and gauge expected turnout.

Site Selection

Logistics are a key element of a successful press conference. Site arrangements should be carefully planned and executed:

- If your organization has adequate on-site space, you may want to hold the event there. If your headquarters isn't suitable, select a public place which can be used gratis or for a minimal fee. Another option is to select a location that relates to the topic of the press conference. For example, if you're announcing that your organization will soon mount a registration campaign at a fast-food chain, break the news at one of the chain's outlets.
- Choose a location that will be large enough to accommodate the media, including TV camera crews and photographers.
- Check the site for electrical outlets so you will be able to plug in your audio/visual equipment, and so crews will be able to plug in theirs.
- Set up a podium which can hold several microphones.
- Have chairs for reporters, namecards for speakers and an easel for charts or graphs.

Visual Aids

Visuals will enliven the presentation and provide TV crews and photographers with a broader range of images to shoot. Visuals should be:

- Displayed prominently near the front of the room for easy reference by the speakers.
- Clean and simple. Since visuals may only be seen on TV for a few seconds, viewers must be able to get the point right away.
- Colorful charts and graphs are ideal vehicles for illustrating your

points. They are also useful for visualizing your organization's goals and achievements.

Press Materials

Have an adequate supply of press kits on hand for reporters attending the press conference. Be sure to mail kits after the event to those who did not attend. Kits should include:

- The speaker's statement
- Press release
- Photograph and biography of speaker
- Fact sheet
- Copies of charts or graphs used in the presentation

Before the press conference, review the issues with the speaker in a run-through. Ask the speaker questions that are likely to be asked by reporters covering the press conference.

Encourage members of your organization to attend the event to provide additional information to the press if needed, as well as moral support for your speakers.

Helpful Hints

Some other useful hints to consider when hosting a press conference:

- Double-check the event site one hour before the event to make sure everything is properly set up.
- Have a media sign-in sheet at the entrance. This will give you a record of who attended, and will facilitate follow-up efforts.
- Start the press conference on time—the media don't like to be kept waiting.
- Limit the event to 30 - 45 minutes. This allows time for the speaker's statement, and a question-and-answer period.
- Have either your organization's leader or public relations person introduce the speaker.
- If budget allows, consider serving light refreshments.

Press Conferences Can Be A Gamble

Even if you've planned your organization's press conference very carefully, there's a chance that the media won't show up. What do you do then? Almost every PR professional has had this happen. Sometimes it's simply a matter of elements beyond your control. Coverage of a breaking news story—

a fire at City Hall or an explosion at a nuclear power plant—will always preempt coverage of a press conference.

Even if you are not sure of the reason for non-attendance, don't be disheartened. Contact the media by phone. Don't quiz them about why they didn't attend, just let them know about the issues that were covered. Try to arrange interviews with your spokesperson, and send all the invited journalists press materials.

Press conferences are a gamble. Consider carefully whether taking such a risk is the best way to announce your organization's news.