



PUBLIC OPINION IN  
KYRGYZSTAN  
1996

Hugh W. Olds, Jr.



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# **I** **N T R O D U C T I O N**

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This report analyzes the opinion environment in Kyrgyzstan – the views of the public on political and economic developments, independence, government, civil society and organizations, and information sources. Findings are based on the IFES nationwide opinion survey fielded in Kyrgyzstan in November-December 1996. The *Executive Summary* consists of major findings providing an overview of the survey data. The *Interpretation and Forecast* section discusses the data in terms of their meaning and future implications. *The Setting* provides an overview of important developments in Kyrgyzstan since independence. The presentation of the survey results, organized thematically, reports opinion on the following subjects:

- Conditions in the Country
- Economic Reform
- Independence
- Government
- Civil Society
- Information Access

The *Appendix* includes the full question text and the marginal results in tabular form with comparisons, where applicable, to data from an IFES-sponsored nationally representative public opinion survey fielded July 15 to August 2, 1995.

The current IFES-sponsored survey was fielded in Kyrgyzstan between November 30 and December 12, 1996. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with a sample of 1,494 adults (18 years and older), which included oversamples in Naryn (100), Issyk-Kul (140) and Talas (90) *oblasts*. The sample was of a stratified random probability design (the margin of error is  $\pm 2.5\%$  for this kind of sample). RCIOM-INFOREX, a research organization in Kyrgyzstan conducted the fieldwork and data processing; QEV Analytics, a Washington-based research firm, developed the weights and conducted the tabulations. The design of the sample and the weighting ensured that respondents represent the adult national population of Kyrgyzstan and, therefore, the findings accurately reflect the opinions and attitudes of the public in Kyrgyzstan.

The analysis was written by Hugh W. Olds, Jr., a thirty-year veteran of research and international polling with the U.S. Information Agency; the formatted report and tables were prepared by Rakesh Sharma; and editorial assistance was provided by Elehie Natalie Skoczylas, Monica Neal, and Christopher S. Siddall.

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## **E** xecutive Summary

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The IFES survey fielded in Kyrgyzstan between November 30 and December 12, 1996, shows a public:

**“ *dissatisfied with conditions in the country* ”**

Widespread dissatisfaction with the country's overall and current economic situations is tempered by half who believe their country is ultimately headed in the right direction. Ethnic Russians living in the country are much more pessimistic than ethnic Kyrgyz about the direction in which Kyrgyzstan is headed. Young people, on the other hand, are more optimistic than their elders on this question. Two-thirds of the public pessimistically thought the bad economic situation would continue through the following six months.

**“ *ambivalent about the type of economy they want and dissatisfied with the direction and pace of economic reforms* ”**

Half say they “want to return to a state-controlled economy”; however, half are also willing to work “toward a free economy with small but steady reforms.” In either case, sizeable majorities are dissatisfied with the direction economic reforms are taking and think they are being implemented too slowly. These inconsistencies may reflect the anxieties and frustrations of people who remember having higher standards of living before independence and who desperately want to leave their current hardships behind them as soon as possible.

**“ *receptive to privatization and foreign investment* ”**

Large majorities favor letting citizens own land and allowing them to buy and sell land, provided the use of land is regulated by law, but they oppose permitting foreign companies to acquire land. A large majority would welcome or allow investments in Kyrgyzstan by foreign companies. Young adults appear most open to privatization and foreign investments.

**“ *supportive of independence and either proud or content to be citizens of Kyrgyzstan* ”**

Sizeable majorities think independence was “good for the people,” and they feel either proud or content to be citizens, although a large majority says the quality of life since independence has worsened. Russians are considerably less likely than Kyrgyz to say independence was good.

**“ *disappointed with their government* ”**

Although many Kyrgyzstanis believe their national government can improve their lives significantly, they do not think the Cabinet of Ministers and the *Jorgorku Kenesh* (parliament) are responding to

the needs and concerns of the people. Many doubt that the courts, the office of the public prosecutor, and the militia are treating people with fairness and justice. Reasons range from the perceived lack of economic progress to corruption in government and the government's lack of respect for individual rights. Many are dissatisfied with the government's protection of personal freedoms.

**" *identifying Western countries and Japan as models for development***

The public most frequently names the United States, Germany, and Japan as models for Kyrgyzstan's *economic* development and the United States and Germany as models for *political* development.

**" *strongly supportive of civil rights and freedoms, but hedging when it comes to a need for order and discipline in society***

Most people say it is very important to have the right to criticize their government publicly, to practice their religion freely, to express their opinions without fear of punishment, and to have their private property protected by law. Yet, when order and discipline are believed to be needed in society, a majority of Kyrgyzstanis agree that limiting the political and civil rights of the people is necessary. They do not agree, however, that it is necessary to have a dictatorship to establish order and discipline in society.

**" *believing that Kyrgyzstan is a democracy***

A majority of Kyrgyzstanis believe their country is a democracy, though half are dissatisfied with the level of freedom they think they have. Young people are more likely than their elders and Kyrgyz are considerably more likely than Russians to say Kyrgyzstan is a democracy. The public identifies democracy more in terms of personal rights and freedoms than in terms of material success.

**" *expressing confidence in elections as an instrument for change***

A majority also believes people can change the situation in Kyrgyzstan by participating in elections. Half believe that voting gives them a chance to influence decisions made in their country. Russians are much less likely than Kyrgyz to believe this. Although a majority are dissatisfied with the electoral system, people are evenly divided over whether the election laws need to be reformed. Those who favor reform ask primarily for strict monitoring of election campaigns and effective election-law enforcement.

“ ***ambivalent about the role of political parties and non-governmental organizations***

Majorities think the ideal number of parties to have in Kyrgyzstan is two or more and further believe it is important to have at least two political parties competing in elections. Young people are more likely than their elders to support a multi-party system. Few people, however, settle on any one party as best representing the views and interests of the people (the Communist Party leads with 12%; other parties are in single digits). Most Kyrgyzstanis say political parties should have the right with other organizations to nominate candidates for parliament, but only a minority would support party-affiliated candidates.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) do not fare much better – only half of the public believe such organizations are necessary. The only NGOs majorities say they would join are those that help people in need or protect the environment. A majority does not even think NGOs exist in their communities.

“ ***satisfied with the current state of ethnic relations***

The public is committed to the protection of minority rights, and most people say current relations among the ethnic groups are good. Similarly, large majorities among Kyrgyz, Russians, and other ethnic groups believe relations are good. Even in Osh *oblast*, where Kyrgyz and Uzbeks clashed in 1990, most say relations are good.

“ ***dissatisfied with the fight against crime***

A large majority expresses dissatisfaction with the fight against crime; a majority is *completely* dissatisfied. Many pessimistically think the perceived bad state of law and order in Kyrgyzstan will either stay the same or worsen.

“ ***lacking in information and seeing censorship in the domestic media***

Three-quarters – up considerably from half of the public in 1995 – think they lack information about economic reforms and political developments in Kyrgyzstan. Majorities believe domestic TV, radio, and newspapers are to some degree under government control.

## **I** NTERPRETATION AND FORECAST

Generally, Kyrgyzstanis are pessimistic about current conditions: They are dissatisfied with the country's overall situation, which they attribute to economic hardships, and the current economic situation, which they do not expect to improve in the near future. Yet, half of the public believes the country is going in the right direction and a third think young people can expect a quality of life better than their parents enjoyed. It is this hope, that ultimately life will be better despite the current hardships, that gives Kyrgyzstanis a positive sense of purpose for their country's future.

Despite this positive outlook, a fairly large majority is also dissatisfied with the direction economic reforms are taking. Some economic progress took place in 1996, but not enough to affect most of the people. Frustrated over poor economic conditions, people appear inconsistent on economic issues (willing to return to a state-controlled economy, but also supportive of market reforms). The public is committed to private property, but would not grant this right to foreigners. Most would welcome foreign investment, apparently on the assumption that investment will result in economic development. Taken altogether, the data show people tired of their current hardships and willing to try just about anything to improve their lot in life.

Despite a feeling held by most people that life in Kyrgyzstan has worsened since independence, a fairly large majority believes that independence was good for the country. Most say they are either proud or content to be citizens of Kyrgyzstan, and they believe they have a culture and way of life worth protecting from foreign influences. This too shows public confidence in the future.

It is in the realm of government that people harbor the most distrust. Majorities do not believe the executive and legislative branches of the national government are responsive to their needs and concerns, nor do they feel that local government, which is under the executive branch of the national government, is responsive. Moreover, they think the judicial system also fails them. They see corruption in government and consider it serious. They do not regard government as a major protector of human rights and freedoms. More people than in 1995 feel that government authorities do not respect individual rights.

People hope that if their country would look abroad, it would find models for its political development in the democratic West. Kyrgyzstanis most often name the United States and Germany as models to follow.

Despite their negative attitude toward government, many people believe Kyrgyzstan is primarily

a democracy, which they see mainly in terms of personal rights and freedoms. They view as very important the right to criticize their government publicly, to worship freely, to express opinions without fear of punishment, and to have legal protection for private property. Although a majority is willing to limit people's civil rights to establish order and discipline in society, most people are unwilling to pay the price of dictatorship for this purpose.

A majority is dissatisfied with the electoral system. What people appear to want in particular are better enforcement of the current laws, better monitoring of elections, and equal and fair conditions for all candidates – factors that have been lacking in recent elections. On a positive note, a majority believes the people can change the situation in Kyrgyzstan by participating in elections.

As in other former Soviet countries, political parties do not yet play an important role in the political life of Kyrgyzstan. Although active and registered to participate in elections, most parties are small and have few followers. More people are likely to follow a strong personality than a weak party. Yet, majorities want a multi-party system for competition in elections. A large majority – seven in ten – say they would not join a political party, nor any other non-governmental organization (NGO), except for charitable organizations that help people in need or organizations that seek to protect the environment.

Most of the public describes current ethnic relations as good and believes that the rights of minority ethnic groups should be protected. Beneath this surface calm, however, lie undercurrents of unhappiness. Even on issues in this survey, differences between majority Kyrgyz and minority Russians often stand out. Kyrgyz are much more likely than Russians to say the country is headed in the right direction. Russians are much more likely than Kyrgyz to believe the quality of life for young people will be worse than for their parents. Russians may feel alienated in the sense that they do not have much of an effect on the direction of the country. They are much less likely than Kyrgyz to agree that voting gives people a chance to influence decision-making. Finally, Russians are considerably less likely than Kyrgyz to say independence from the Soviet Union was a “good thing.”

Most people say they lack information on what is going on in Kyrgyzstan, both economic and political, and see the domestic media as controlled by the government. The government exerts considerable influence over the media, but opposition views get reported, notably in the publication *Res Publica*. Electronic media remain largely in government hands, and most of the small private electronic media are entertainment oriented, which may explain in part the lack of

information. People outside the cities get most of their information from television, and they complain about its quality. Television is the most accessible medium, with TV sets reportedly in 90% of households. It is the main source of information for about 60% of the population. When program quality is poor or entertainment oriented, it is understandable when people complain about the lack of solid news.

Half the print media are state owned and half are private, and they include a plethora of small, weak newspapers that appear sporadically. As of late 1995, there was no country-wide daily newspaper. Only a handful of publications boast a circulation large enough to make them financially viable. The government has indirect influence over most publications. The only printing company is government owned, and the government is the only supplier of newsprint (although one opposition paper has its own source of supply). It is likely that many journalists and their publishers practice self censorship, not wishing to antagonize government authorities.

This survey shows a people dissatisfied with many aspects of life in Kyrgyzstan, but hopeful for the future. Kyrgyzstanis believe in their independence, their culture, democracy, elections, personal freedoms, ethnic rights, economic reforms that bring progress, and the direction in which their country is ultimately going. The basic problem people have is with their government – its perceived lack of respect for their rights and freedoms, its perceived failure to respond to their needs and concerns and to treat them with fairness and justice, and its inability to provide rapid economic progress.

## **T H E S E T T I N G**

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Often called the “island of democracy” in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is surrounded by much larger, less democratic, and less reform-minded countries: Kazakstan to the north, Uzbekistan to the west, Tajikistan to the south, and China to the south and east. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan became an independent republic in 1991. Its 1993 Constitution stipulates that the country is a democracy with substantial civil rights for its citizens. Kyrgyzstan belongs to the Commonwealth of Independent States, the successor organization to the Soviet Union, and in March 1996 signed a four-nation cooperation accord which brings Kyrgyzstan into a somewhat closer relationship with Belarus, Kazakstan, and Russia.

Askar Akayev, a physicist and former head of Kyrgyzstan’s Academy of Sciences, has been president since before independence, when the country’s Supreme Soviet elected him in 1990. A protégé of ex-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and friend of the eminent Soviet dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov, Akayev supported Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin against the unsuccessful coup attempt by hard-line Communists in Moscow in August 1991. In October 1991, Kyrgyzstan was the first country in former Soviet Central Asia to hold an election for the presidency; Akayev ran unopposed for president and won with 95 percent of the vote.

An ardent economic reformer, Akayev moved Kyrgyzstan to be the first Central Asian country to establish its own currency. He also encouraged privatization of state-owned companies and welcomed foreign investment. In 1993, as the country struggled with economic hardship and the euphoria of independence wore off, Akayev called for a referendum on confidence in his presidency, in which he received a 95 percent endorsement from the voters. By 1994, as economic conditions worsened, Akayev felt the need to claim more powers for the presidency to give him more control over the economy and stamp out corruption. In September, he dissolved the entire 323-member parliament, necessitating new elections, which were held in February 1995 and were marked by procedural violations. Efforts to have another referendum, this time to extend Akayev’s term in office for another five years, failed, and the president and the new parliament compromised by moving the next presidential election up 10 months to December 24, 1995.

Opposition political parties protested on the grounds that the new date did not give their candidates sufficient time to gather the 50,000 verifiable signatures necessary for registration and to conduct a presidential campaign. Nevertheless, the election took place as scheduled, and Akayev won 72 percent of the vote against two opponents. Thus, while the presidents of other

neighboring countries were extending their terms of office by referendums, Kyrgyzstan had the first contested presidential election in former Soviet Central Asia.


Shortly after his re-election, Akayev called for a referendum on a draft law outlining amendments to the Constitution that would strengthen presidential power at the expense of parliament. The referendum, held on February 2, 1996, under questionable legal circumstances, was approved overwhelmingly. Meanwhile, a Constitutional Court was sworn in the preceding June, and in 1996 a judicial reform program was implemented to improve the quality of the judiciary.

# C ONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY

*Widespread dissatisfaction with conditions is attributed to the current economic situation, which is considered bad and unlikely to improve in the near future. Yet, half the public feels Kyrgyzstan is ultimately headed in the right direction.*

## \* Direction Kyrgyzstan is Headed

Kyrgyzstanis appear ambivalent as to the direction their country is headed. Asked whether they think Kyrgyzstan is moving in the right or wrong direction, half say it is headed in the right direction, but a sizeable number (42%) believes it is going either in the wrong direction (35%) or nowhere at all (7%) (Table 1 in Appendix).



The Kyrgyz ethnic group, representing a majority of the country's estimated 4.5 million population, is much more likely than Russians, who compose about a fifth of the population, to say the country is going in the right direction (57% to 35%)<sup>1</sup> (Figure B on next page). Moreover, residents in the Kyrgyz-populated small towns and rural areas are also more likely than residents in largely Russian-inhabited Bishkek, the capital and largest city in Kyrgyzstan, to say this about their country (52%-54% to 36%).

Additionally, young people (ages 18-25) are more likely than seniors over 65 to say Kyrgyzstan is headed in the right direction (59% to 37%). The most educated (some university and above) also feel this way, compared to the least educated (less than secondary) (53% to 39%).

**Figure B. Direction Kyrgyzstan is Headed (in percent)**

	<b>Nationwide</b>	<b>Kyrgyz</b>	<b>Russian</b>
<i>(Sample Sizes)</i>	<i>(1494)</i>	<i>(812)</i>	<i>(323)</i>
Right direction	50	57	35
Wrong direction	35	30	45
Nowhere at all (volunteered)	7	5	9
"Do you think our country is headed in the right direction or the wrong direction?" (IFES December 1996 Survey)			

Others who believe the country is headed in the right direction include the following:


- Those who believe Kyrgyzstan is a democracy (60% to 35% who do not);
- Those who think conditions since independence are better (74% to 45% who say they are worse);
- Those who are satisfied with the direction of economic reforms in Kyrgyzstan (67% to 43% who are dissatisfied); and

Those who are satisfied with the country's overall direction (71% to 42% who are dissatisfied).

**\* Dissatisfaction with the Overall Situation**

There is broad consensus on dissatisfaction with the country's overall situation. A large majority (71%) is dissatisfied with the situation (25% are very dissatisfied), a proportion that is virtually unchanged since an IFES survey in July 1995 (74% were dissatisfied). Only a quarter of the public (27%) in the current survey are satisfied (Table 2 in Appendix). Dissatisfaction pervades almost all population subgroups – and Kyrgyz and Russians are equally dissatisfied (Figure C next page).

Figure C. Satisfaction with Conditions



When probed as to the reasons for their dissatisfaction, nearly half (46%) attribute it to economic problems, chiefly the low standard of living (30%) (Table 3 in Appendix). Ever since attaining independence in 1991, a perceptibly lower standard of living in Kyrgyzstan has been a bone of public contention. Prior to independence, Kyrgyzstan's predominantly agricultural economy depended heavily on trade with the rest of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 resulted in a breakup in the USSR's planned economy that disrupted these trade ties and contributed to the economic ills (particularly rapid inflation and rising unemployment) experienced by former Soviet republics such as Kyrgyzstan.<sup>2</sup>

**\* Economic Situation**


Kyrgyzstanis are displeased not only with their country's overall situation, but equally unhappy about Kyrgyzstan's current economic situation. Three-quarters (73%) say the economic situation is bad (Table 4 in Appendix). Russians are slightly more likely than Kyrgyz to say the situation is bad (84% to 72%). Although the economy improved in 1996 and moderate growth occurred in most sectors, it was not enough to affect the attitudes of most people about the perceived direness of their personal economic situations.

To illustrate the hardship faced by most Kyrgyzstanis, a large majority (79%) agrees with the statement, "It is very hard for my family to have enough money to buy food each month." Six in ten agree "completely" (58%, up from 41% in 1995) (Table 5 in Appendix). Older Kyrgyzstanis (over age 65) are more likely than younger adults (ages 18-35) to agree strongly (79% to a range

of 45%-55%). The level of hardship is particularly poignant for pensioners, the unemployed, and government employees whose salaries are in arrears.<sup>3</sup>

Nor is the outlook optimistic about the economic future: two-thirds pessimistically believed that the situation in six months would be the “same as now” (36%) or “worse” (29%). Only a quarter (23%) thought it would be “better than now” (Table 6 in Appendix). Again, Russians tended to be slightly more pessimistic than Kyrgyz (74% to 62%).<sup>4</sup>


**Figure D. Expected Economic Situation in Six Months**



### \* Quality of Life

Regarding the quality of life young people today may expect compared to that of their parents, the public is equally divided between those who say the quality of life will be better than (32%) or the same as (12%) their parents and those who say it will be worse (43%) (Figure E on next page; Table 7 in Appendix).

**Figure E. Quality of Life of Young People**



Russians are decidedly more pessimistic than Kyrgyz in this respect. Russians are much more likely than Kyrgyz to believe that the quality of life for young people will be worse than for their parents (54% to 38%).

**Figure F. Quality of Life Young People May Expect (in percent)**

	<b>Nationwide</b>	<b>Kyrgyz</b>	<b>Russian</b>
<i>(Sample Size)</i>	<i>(1494)</i>	<i>(812)</i>	<i>(323)</i>
Better than parents	32	38	24
Same as parents	12	11	9
Worse than parents	43	38	54

# E

## CONOMIC REFORM

---

*People are ambivalent about the type of economy they want and dissatisfied with the direction and pace of economic reforms, yet receptive to privatization and foreign investment.*

Under President Askar Akayev, Kyrgyzstan has been committed since independence to the introduction of economic reforms, including the development of a market economy. The government has enacted laws on privatization, joint ventures, and foreign trade and investment. With help from the International Monetary Fund in May 1993, Kyrgyzstan was the first of the Central Asian countries to introduce its own currency (the *som*), the “ultimate symbol of independence,” and to leave the instability of the ruble zone. By 1994, the Kyrgyz *som* was by far the most stable of the local currencies in Central Asia.<sup>5</sup>


Moreover, with his country sandwiched between its much larger and more authoritarian neighbors – Kazakstan to the north, Uzbekistan to the west, Tajikistan to the south, and China to the south and east – President Akayev reportedly sees economic strength based on ties with the West as Kyrgyzstan’s major hope for maintaining its position in Central Asia and avoiding economic thralldom. The road to economic strength, he feels, lies in expanded trade, economic reform and a free economy.<sup>6</sup>

Yet, the introduction of economic reforms and a new currency and the transition to a market economy in general have not been without severe economic consequences in the short run. The dissolution of the Soviet Union disrupted trade, and introduction of the *som*, for example, caused disruptions throughout Kyrgyzstan’s economy.

### \* State Control vs. a Free Economy

People thus appear to be divided with respect to economic reforms and the pace in implementing them. Asked if the country should “develop an economy with limited state control” or “return to an economy basically controlled by the state,” half of the public opts for returning to a state-controlled economy, an opinion unchanged since the 1995 survey (Table 8 in Appendix). Four in ten say they favor an economy with limited state control (up slightly from 31% in 1995) (Figure G next page).

Figure G. Preferred Economic System



Opinion differs by age and education:

- Older Kyrgyzstanis (over age 55) favor returning to a state-controlled economy by a margin of 3 to 1 (63% to 20%), while young people (ages 18-25) are evenly divided between returning to a state-controlled economy and developing an economy with limited state control (45% to 46%).
- The most educated are more likely than the least educated to favor an economy with limited state control (46% to 28%), but like the young people, the most educated are also evenly divided between favoring an economy with limited state control (46%) and returning to a state-controlled economy (48%).

Regarding the pace of economic reforms with respect to economic development, half (52%) of the public favors working “toward a free economy with small but steady reforms” (down from 62% in 1995). A quarter say they want to “get to a free economy as rapidly as possible.” Only about one out of six (14%) would “not pursue a free economy at all” (Table 9 in Appendix). Again, opinion differs by age and education:

- Adults (under age 56) are more likely than older individuals to favor working toward a free economy with small but steady reforms (51%-56% to 34%-43%).
- The educated (secondary and up) are more likely than the least educated to favor this pace (52%-56% to 38%).

On the other hand, when asked if economic reforms in Kyrgyzstan are being made “too rapidly, at about the right speed, or too slowly,” a majority (59%, up slightly from 53% in 1995) says

reforms are being implemented too slowly. A quarter of the population thinks reforms are proceeding too rapidly (10%) or at about the right speed (15%)<sup>7</sup> (Table 10 in Appendix). People in Bishkek appear more likely than those in the smaller towns and rural areas to say reforms are being made too slowly (72% to 58%).

Nearly seven in ten (68%) say they are dissatisfied with the direction economic reforms are taking in Kyrgyzstan (24% are completely dissatisfied; see Table 32 in Appendix). Russians appear slightly more dissatisfied than Kyrgyz (76% to 65%).

**Table H. Opinion on Direction of Economic Reforms (in percent)**

	<b>Nationwide</b>	<b>Kyrgyz</b>	<b>Russian</b>
<i>(Sample Size)</i>	<i>(1494)</i>	<i>(812)</i>	<i>(323)</i>
Satisfied	24	30	21
Dissatisfied	68	65	76
<small>"As I read the following statements, please tell me whether you are completely satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or completely dissatisfied with each of them: Direction of Economic Reforms." (IFES December 1996 Survey)</small>			

Moreover, those who favor returning to a state-controlled economy are slightly more dissatisfied with the direction of economic reforms than those who favor developing an economy with limited state control (72% to 62%).

### \* **Meaning of a Free, Market Economy**

Defining what it means to live in a free, market economy (i.e., how will things be different living in a market economy compared to how things were in the past), half of the public (48%) cites favorable developments such as free trade, getting what one has earned, living better, and enjoying material and economic successes with personal rights and freedoms (Table 11 in Appendix).

A quarter of the public on the other hand, emphasize such negative aspects as inflation, unemployment, society divided between rich and poor, instability, uncertainty about the future, competition, and the belief that life was better before (the dissolution of the USSR) (Table 11 in Appendix).

## \* Land Ownership

A vast majority (86%) agrees that citizens should have the right to own land as private property; two-thirds (68%) agree “completely.” Only one in ten (12%) disagrees (Table 12 in Appendix). Opinion differs by age, ethnicity and education:

- Young people (ages 18-25) are more likely than those over 65 to agree strongly (71% to 53%);
- Kyrgyz are more likely than Russians to agree strongly (74% to 60%); and
- The most educated appear slightly more likely than the least educated (88% to 74%) to agree that citizens should have the right to land ownership.

Although a smaller majority than those who want to privatize land, six in ten (62%) agree that citizens should have the right to treat land as a commodity; that is, to be able to buy and sell it. Four in ten agree strongly, but a third (35%) of the public disagree. (Table 12 in Appendix) Like Russians (in Russia) and other peoples of the former Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstanis do not necessarily link the right to use land with the right to dispose of it entirely as one wishes.<sup>8</sup> But young adults (ages 18-35) are more likely than those over 65 to support the right to buy and sell land (64%-68% to 43%). Meanwhile, President Akayev wants constitutional changes that would give farmers the right to buy and sell land. At present, they can only buy and sell their rights to the use of land.<sup>9</sup>

This broad endorsement of privatizing land, however, does not mean that the government should not regulate its use. Virtually the same vast majority (87%) that favors the right to own land also agrees that the use of land, even land held in private hands, should be regulated by law.

Public support for the right of people to own land does not extend to foreigners. Apparently protective of their natural resources, a large majority does not want foreign companies to purchase and own land in Kyrgyzstan (83%, up from 70% in 1995). Only one in ten (12%, down from 21%) would let foreign companies have this right. (Table 13 in Appendix) Large majorities in all subgroups are adamantly negative on this issue.

## \* Foreign Investment

Despite the strong opposition to foreign ownership of land, three-quarters of the people (73%, virtually unchanged since 1995) say they either would welcome foreign investments to any extent (12%) or with some limitations (43%), or would allow foreign investments but not encourage them (18%). A fifth (18%) would prohibit foreign investments altogether (Table 14 in Appendix). Opinion differs among important population subgroups:


- People under age 46 are more likely than those over 65 (58%-62% to 28%) to welcome investments;
- Russians appear only slightly more likely than Kyrgyz (63% to 53%);
- People in Bishkek are more likely than people in the smaller towns and rural areas (76% to 49%-59%);
- The most educated are more likely than the least educated (64% to 36%); and
- People who are satisfied with the direction of economic reforms appear more likely than those who are not (65% to 53%) to welcome foreign investments.

# I N D E P E N D E N C E

*People support their independence and are either proud or content to be citizens of Kyrgyzstan.*

A sizeable majority (69%) believes that the declaration of independence in 1991 was a “good thing” for the people of Kyrgyzstan (17% say it was “very good”). A fifth (22%) say independence was bad for Kyrgyzstan (5% say “very bad”) (Table 15 in Appendix).

**Figure I. Declaration of Independence**



Kyrgyz are considerably more likely than Russians to consider independence a good thing (81% to 46%).

**Figure J. Opinion on Independence** (in percent)

	<b>Nationwide</b>	<b>Kyrgyz</b>	<b>Russians</b>
<i>(Sample Size)</i>	<i>(1494)</i>	<i>(812)</i>	<i>(323)</i>
Good	69	81	46
Bad	22	13	39
"In your opinion, was the declaration of independence of Kyrgyzstan a very good thing, a somewhat good thing, a somewhat bad thing or a very bad thing for the peoples of Kyrgyzstan?" (IFES December 1996 Survey)			

Others who believe Kyrgyzstan's independence was a good thing include the following groups or individuals:

- Those who think the country is headed in the right direction (44% to 21% who say it is going in the wrong direction);
- Those who believe Kyrgyzstan is a democracy (77% to 57% who do not);
- Those who favor developing an economy with limited state control (81% to 63% who favor returning to a state-controlled economy); and
- Those who are satisfied with the direction of economic reforms (82% to 64% who are dissatisfied).

On the other hand, people in Bishkek, many of whom are Russians, are *less* likely than people in all the other cities and in the rural areas to say independence was a good thing (48% to a range of 70%-78%). Older Kyrgyzstanis (over 65) also appear less likely than people under age 46 to say independence was good (56% to 70%-74%).


**\* Quality of Life since Independence**

Although many people think independence was good, an even larger majority (78%, up from 69% in 1995) believes that life in Kyrgyzstan since independence from the Soviet Union has *worsened*. Only one in five says life has improved (10%) or stayed the same (8%) (Table 16 in Appendix). Young people (ages 18-25) appear *less* likely than people over age 55 to think life has worsened (70% to a range of 87%-92%).

**\* Identification with Kyrgyzstan**


Most people, when asked to describe their feelings about being citizens of Kyrgyzstan, say they are either proud (36%) or content (40%). Considerably fewer describe themselves as being indifferent (14%), not content (5%), or even ashamed (3%). These proportions are virtually unchanged since the 1995 survey (Table 17 in Appendix; Figure K next page).

**Figure K. Feelings about Kyrgyzstani Citizenship**



Russians express views on this question that are considerably different from Kyrgyz opinions. They are more indifferent (28% to 8% of the Kyrgyz), and only one Russian in ten is proud to be a citizen of Kyrgyzstan (12%), compared to half of the Kyrgyz who are proud. The same holds true for people in largely Russian-inhabited Bishkek, compared to those in the other cities, towns, and rural areas (14% to a range of 35%-42% proud and 33% to 7%-18% indifferent).

Figure L. Kyrgyz and Russian Feelings towards Citizenship




In addition to their feelings of pride and contentment, most Kyrgyzstanis (71%, up slightly from 65% in 1995) agree with the statement that “the people of Kyrgyzstan have a culture and way of life which deserves to be protected against foreign influences” (47% agree “completely,” up from 32%). A quarter of the public disagrees (Table 18 in Appendix). Kyrgyz appear slightly more likely than Russians to agree on this point (76% to 65%), and rural people appear slightly more likely than people in Bishkek to agree strongly (50% to 39%).

*Disappointed with their government, Kyrgyzstanis believe it does not respond to their “needs and concerns,” nor do they believe the justice system treats people with “fairness and justice.” Many perceive the government as corrupt, unresponsive to the rights of individuals, and lacking in the protection of personal freedoms.*

**\* Interest in Politics and Government**

Kyrgyzstanis are divided as to their professed interest in matters of politics and government. Barely a majority (53%) expresses interest (40% somewhat interested and 13% very interested). About half (47%) say they are not too interested (30%) or not interested at all (17%). The level of interest was somewhat higher in 1995 (60% interested to 40% uninterested) (Table 19 in Appendix). In the current survey, the university-educated (68%) and those with a technical education (53%) are more likely than people with less than a secondary education (36%) to express interest in politics and government.


**Figure M. Interest in Politics and Government**



**\* Government and the Improvement of People’s Lives**

Kyrgyzstanis by a margin of more than 2 to 1 believe that it is possible for the national government in Bishkek “to improve significantly the lives of its citizens through its policies and actions” (64% possible to 26% not possible). In the 1995 survey, the data suggest that the people were more divided (40% possible to 45% not possible) (Table 20 in Appendix). Interestingly, Russians are more likely than Kyrgyz (76% to 62%) and people in Bishkek are more likely than those in the next largest cities (200,000 to 500,000 population), towns (less than 50,000 population) and rural areas (79% to 53-64%) to answer this question affirmatively.

**Figure N. Government Improvement of Citizens’ Lives**



Although many people believe the national government can improve their lives, they do *not* think that its two important branches, the Cabinet of Ministers and the *Jogorku Kenesh* (parliament) in Bishkek, are indeed “responsive to the needs and concerns of the people.” Two-thirds say the Cabinet of Ministers is either not very responsive (44%) or not at all responsive (22%) to people’s needs. Six in ten similarly believe the *Jogorku Kenesh* is unresponsive: either not very responsive (41%) or not at all responsive (19%) (Figure O next page; Table 21 in Appendix).

Figure O. Responsiveness of Branches of Government



Question: "Thinking of the various national and local governments, in your opinion, how responsive is each to the needs and concerns of the people. Are they very responsive, somewhat responsive, not very responsive, or not responsive at all?" (IFES December 1996 Survey)


Generally, all population subgroups have similar opinions regarding the nonresponsiveness of these branches, with the exception that people in Bishkek are more likely than those in rural areas to consider the *Jogorku Kenesh* unresponsive to people's needs and concerns (73% to 57%).

In February 1996, the Constitution was amended by referendum to define the roles of the two-house parliament and to strengthen the presidency substantially. The president and the executive branch now dominate the government. While the parliament and judiciary still show some independence, they are now fairly weak in practice, leaving most of the power in the government to the executive branch.<sup>10</sup> With a weakened parliament, people will likely hold the executive branch more responsible for meeting their needs and concerns in the future. Data from the current survey suggest that this may be the case: Slightly more people (66%) believe the Cabinet of Ministers is unresponsive to their needs and concerns than feel this way about the *Jogorku Kenesh* (60%).

**\* Local Government**

Kyrgyzstanis likewise believe that their local governments are not responding to their needs and concerns. Two-thirds say local government bodies are either not very responsive (38%) or not responsive at all (29%). (Figure P next page; Table 21 in Appendix) Again, these findings are almost equally reflected among all population subgroups.

Figure P. Responsiveness of Local Governments



These findings are especially disturbing in light of the belief Kyrgyzstanis have that local officials have more power now than they had before independence. Six in ten hold this opinion (up from 49% in 1995), whereas only about three in ten think they have either the same amount of power (13%) or less power (14%, down from 28%) (Table 22 in Appendix). Russians are much more likely than Kyrgyz to believe local officials have more power now (77% to 56%). People in Bishkek are also more likely than those in the smaller towns and rural areas to hold this view (80% to 56%-58%).

Kyrgyzstanis are almost equally divided over whether people running things in local communities and governments now are pretty much the same people who ran things before independence or are *not* the same people (45% say the same people, up from 38% in 1995 to 43% not the same people, up from 20%) (Table 23 in Appendix). The most educated are more likely than the least educated to believe the same people are running local governments (54% to 38%). It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of local government officials are not elected, but appointed by the President.<sup>11</sup> People have little ability to change their local governments.

\* **“Fairness and Justice”**

Just as Kyrgyzstanis see both national and local governments as unresponsive, so do they view the justice system.

The system continues to operate under Soviet-era laws and procedures, although a new criminal code is under consideration. The principal organs of the system are the Ministry of Internal Affairs for general crime, the Ministry of National Security for state-level crime, and the Public Procurator’s Office for both types of crime. These organs have inherited their personnel and infrastructure from their Soviet predecessors and appear to be under the full control of the executive branch of the national government. Executive domination of the judiciary has made assurances of due process problematic, according to the U.S. State Department’s 1996 Human Rights report on Kyrgyzstan.

Major legal cases and problems that attracted public attention in 1996 included the arrest, trial and convictions of a journalist and of two campaign workers employed by an opposition candidate in the presidential election of December 1995 who were charged with slandering the President under criminal rather than civil statutes. (They were accused of handing out leaflets saying Akayev was ethnically Kazak instead of Kyrgyz.) Although they received suspended sentences, they were held for months without bail before their trials. Other problems included the local “elders” courts, which gave harsh sentences beyond their mandate, including in one case the death penalty by stoning. These courts are supposed to handle petty disputes and are not authorized to try major crimes or impose punishment other than small fines. In addition, ethnic Chechens were reportedly arrested, detained, and severely beaten by the police in a “crackdown on Chechen criminals” in 1996.<sup>12</sup>

Given this notoriety, it is not surprising that more than six in ten or more of the public say they either do not have very much confidence or that they have none at all in the courts (42% not very much; 21% none at all), the Public Prosecutor’s Office (40% not very much; 21% none at all), and the militia (34% not very much, 47% none at all) “to treat people with fairness and justice.” Lack of confidence in these organs of the justice system has increased since 1995 by 6-10 percentage points, (Table 24 in Appendix) mostly concerning confidence in the militia. Younger adults (ages 26-45) appear more likely than those over 65 to lack confidence in the Courts (67%-69% to 50%).


The Ministry of National Security, which handles state-level crimes, appears to be the only organ of the justice system to retain a degree of public confidence. A bare majority expresses a great deal (17%) or a fair amount (36%) of confidence in this ministry. A third of the public say they lack confidence in this successor to the KGB (Table 24 in Appendix).

With the court system effectively under the executive branch of government, public opinion leans in favor of independent courts. About half of the public (46%) says courts should be completely independent. Four in ten would assign the courts to the executive (13%) or legislative (29%) branches (Table 25 in Appendix). People in Bishkek are considerably more likely than people in rural areas (and somewhat more likely than people in small towns) to let the courts be completely independent (66% to 40% in rural areas and 51% in small towns). In addition, the most educated are more likely than the least educated to favor complete independence for the courts (57% to 29%). On the positive side, the government began to reform the judicial system in 1996.

**\* Corruption in Government**

A large majority of the public believes that official corruption is either very common (47%) or somewhat common (33%). Only one in ten thinks it is rare or volunteers that it is non-existent. This represents little change since 1995 (Table 26 in Appendix).

**Figure Q. Frequency of Corruption**




Opinions differ by ethnicity and education:

- Russians appear more likely than Kyrgyz to believe corruption in government is common (89% to 77%), and hold these views more strongly than Kyrgyz (Russians 55% very common to Kyrgyz 43%).
- University- and technical-school-educated individuals are more likely than the least educated to say corruption is common (85%-89% to 63%; very common 52% to 35%).

An even larger majority of the public (86%, up from 78% in 1995) believes the problem of official corruption is serious (59% say it is very serious). Very few (7%) think it is not serious (Figure R next page; Table 27 in Appendix).

**Figure R. Seriousness of Corruption**



Opinions on the seriousness of corruption differ by ethnicity, place of residence and education:

- Russians are much more likely than Kyrgyz (73% to 51%) to say it is very serious;
- People in largely Russian-inhabited Bishkek are more likely than people in the smaller towns and rural areas (77% to 53%-61%) to agree; and

- University- and technical-school-educated individuals are more likely than those with a secondary education or less (65%-68% to 46%-48%) to say the problem is very serious.

### \* Government and Respect for Individual Rights

Given their generally low regard for government, it is not surprising that Kyrgyzstanis do not see it as a major protector of human rights and freedoms. When asked if government authorities respect the rights of individuals, six in ten (62%, up from 50% in 1995) respond that this happens only a little (42%) or not at all (20%). Only three in ten (down from 42%) believe that individual rights are respected somewhat (28%) or a great deal (3%) (Table 28 in Appendix). Practically all subgroups have similarly negative feelings regarding the respect of government authorities for individual rights.

In fact, two-thirds of the public say they are dissatisfied with the government's protection of personal freedoms and liberties. A quarter (27%) are "completely" dissatisfied. Only three in ten (28%) express some degree of satisfaction (Table 32 in Appendix). Again, all subgroups are almost equally dissatisfied with the government on this issue.

Clearly, it follows that when people are asked how much information they have about their rights with respect to the authorities, three-quarters respond that they either do not have very much (46%) or have none at all (27%). Only a quarter say they have either some information (21%) or a great deal (4%). In 1995, two-thirds either strongly agreed (31%) or agreed somewhat (36%) that they did not have enough information about their rights with regard to the authorities. A quarter disagreed (Table 29 in Appendix). The most educated appear *less* likely than other education subgroups to say they do not have very much information about their rights or none at all (60% to 75%-77%).

### \* Models for Development

Half of the people name the United States (20%), Germany (16%), or Japan (15%) as foreign countries that could serve as models for Kyrgyzstan's *economic* development. The remaining half either express no opinion (13%), choose no country (2%), or pick myriad countries, none of which is chosen by more than 6 percent of the public. Very few (2%) choose Russia (Table 30 in Appendix).

Three in ten pick the United States as a model for Kyrgyzstan's *political* development. One in ten (10%) chooses Germany. Two in ten (22%) express no opinion. Again, no more than 6 percent of the respondents choose any other single country. Very few pick Uzbekistan (4%) or Russia (3%), or choose no country at all (3%)<sup>13</sup> (Table 31 in Appendix).

## CIVIL SOCIETY


*Although strongly supportive of civil rights and personal freedoms, the public hedges when it comes to a need for order and discipline in society; people believe Kyrgyzstan is a democracy and express confidence in elections as an instrument for change, yet they are ambivalent about the role of political parties and NGOs; they are satisfied with the current state of ethnic relations, but not with the fight against crime.*

### \* Personal Freedoms and Rights

With little perceived support from government for individual freedoms and rights, half (48%) of the Kyrgyzstani public profess dissatisfaction with the level of political and civic freedom in society. But nearly as many respondents say they are satisfied (42%). These findings are practically unchanged since 1995 (Table 32 in Appendix). Population subgroups express few differences on this issue.


Six in ten Kyrgyzstanis (62%) believe it is *very* important that people have the right to criticize their government publicly. Seven in ten think it is very important for people to be able to practice their religion freely. A nearly equally large majority (73%) believes it is very important for people to have the right to express their opinions without fear of punishment, and even more people (79%) say it is very important that the private property of individuals is protected by law (Figure S on next page; Table 33 in Appendix). These latter three opinions prevail across the board among practically all population subgroups. In regard to the people's right to criticize their government publicly, however, inhabitants of the capital city of Bishkek are less likely than those in the next largest cities (50,000-500,000 population) and rural areas to believe it is very important (49% to 67%-74%).

**Figure S. Percent Citing Importance of Certain Rights**



But when order and discipline are perceived as being needed in society, Kyrgyzstanis appear willing to limit people's civil rights. A majority of the public (57%) agrees with the statement, "In order to establish order and discipline, it is necessary to limit the political and civil rights of the people" (31% agree completely). Four in ten disagree. These findings are almost unchanged since 1995 (Table 34 in Appendix).

**Figure T. Limiting Rights to Establish Order?**



Opinions differ among population subgroups:

- Kyrgyz are considerably more likely than Russians to agree with this statement on limiting rights (66% to 42%).
- People in the smaller towns and rural areas are more likely (considerably more likely in the case of rural dwellers) than those in Bishkek to agree (55%-64% to 39%).
- The most educated are much more likely than the least educated to *disagree* with this statement (51% to 25%).


Yet, the situation reverses when "dictatorship" is mentioned. A majority (56% up from 43% in 1995) disagrees with the statement, "In order to establish order and discipline, it is necessary to have a dictatorship" (33% disagree completely). Four in ten agree (down slightly from 46% in 1995) (Table 34 in Appendix). The situation also reverses for ethnic groups, but only slightly: Russians are slightly more likely than Kyrgyz (62% to 52%) and people in Bishkek are slightly more likely than rural dwellers (62% to 51%) to disagree with the statement.

On the other hand, opinion differs more widely by age and education. Younger people (ages 18-25) are considerably more likely than those over 65 (65% to 52%); and those with at least a secondary education are also much more likely than the least educated to disagree with the statement about dictatorship (53%-64% to 34%).

**\* Democracy**

By a 2-to-1 margin, people believe Kyrgyzstan is primarily a democracy (60% to 27%; 13% express no opinion), though as indicated above, half are dissatisfied with the level of freedom they think they have (Figure U on next page; Tables 32 and 35 in Appendix).

**Figure U. Views on Kyrgyzstani Democracy**



Opinion differ among age and ethnic groups and place of residence:

- Young people (ages 18-25) are more likely than seniors over 65 (65% to 44%) to believe that Kyrgyzstan is primarily a democracy;
- Kyrgyz are considerably more likely than Russians (67% to 44%) to say so; and
- People in the next largest cities (200,000-500,000 population) and in rural areas are also more likely than those in Bishkek (63%-73% to 48%) to view Kyrgyzstan as primarily a democracy.

**Figure V. Is Kyrgyzstan Primarily a Democracy? (In percent)**


	<b>Nationwide</b>	<b>Kyrgyz</b>	<b>Russian</b>
<i>(Sample Size)</i>	<i>(1494)</i>	<i>(812)</i>	<i>(323)</i>
Yes	60	67	44
No	27	23	36

"Do you think that Kyrgyzstan is primarily a democracy or is primarily not a democracy?" (IFES December 1996 Survey)

Those who do not see Kyrgyzstan as a democracy were asked if they think Kyrgyzstan is moving towards becoming a democracy or not. They divide on this question (14% of the public say Kyrgyzstan is becoming a democracy; 11% say it is not; 73% were not asked) (Table 36 in Appendix). To sum up, 60 percent say Kyrgyzstan is a democracy and an additional 14 percent say it is becoming a democracy.

Asked which country is more democratic, Kyrgyzstan or Russia, a third of those surveyed say Russia is (up from 24% in 1995). Another third volunteer that either both countries are equally democratic (23%) or neither is democratic (10%). A fifth believe that Kyrgyzstan is more democratic than Russia (virtually unchanged since 1995). Fourteen percent express no opinion (Table 37 in Appendix).

**Figure W. More Democratic: Kyrgyzstan or Russia?**



Opinion tends to vary among age, educational, and ethnic groups:

- Young people (ages 18-25) are more likely than those over 55 to say Russia is more democratic (43% to 18%-23%); and
- Those with at least a secondary education are more likely than those with less to say Russia is more democratic (36%-37% to 15%).
- Kyrgyz tend to be slightly more likely than Russians to say Kyrgyzstan is more democratic (22% to 12%).
- About a third of Kyrgyz (36%) and a third of Russians (34%) respond that Russia is more democratic.

Definitions of what it means to live in a democracy vary. A majority (57%) sees it in terms of personal rights and freedoms: observance of rights (35%); freedom for all (12%); living in a "legal society," presumably where the rule of law is respected (7%); and feeling like a real person (3%). Fewer define democracy as material success (6%) or freedom of entrepreneurship (4%). Others see democracy as defending society ("social defense," 5%), providing certainty about the future (3%), or providing power to the people ("public power," 2%) (Table 38 in Appendix).

### \* Electoral Reform

The Constitution mandates presidential and parliamentary elections every five years. The president has a two-term limit, and he was re-elected to a second term in December 1995 in a multi-candidate election. A new parliament was elected in February 1995 in an election that was practically a free-for-all that confused voters and led to a 43 percent turnout. There were 1,400 candidates for a new 105-seat *Jogorku Kenesh*; only 161 candidates represented 12 registered political parties (the rest stood as independents).<sup>14</sup>

The December 1995 presidential election was marked by irregularities such as moving it up 10 months from its regularly scheduled date; this prevented opposition candidates from obtaining sufficient signatures to qualify for the race and gave them insufficient time to campaign. Three opposition candidates were deregistered immediately prior to the vote. Moreover, the rule on equal time in the media was relaxed as the election approached, so the president could dominate the news.<sup>15</sup>

In February 1996, a referendum was held on a draft law to make amendments to the Constitution, which redistributed power within the government. The referendum itself violated the Constitution at that time and the law on referendums. The draft law was complicated and detailed; the media made little effort to explain it to the public. Voters were faced with only two choices: Either approve the amendments wholly or reject them wholly. The result was high voter apathy and a low turnout. Reminiscent of Soviet-reported election returns, the turnout was reportedly 98

percent, with 95 percent approving the referendum. Ballot stuffing was rampant, according to the U.S. State Department's Human Rights report. Most of those who actually voted, however, probably supported the referendum.<sup>16</sup>

With these examples of elections in mind, a majority of the people (57%) say they are dissatisfied with the electoral system (28% are completely dissatisfied) (Table 32 in Appendix). Yet, people are evenly divided over whether the election laws are in need of reform. As many say the laws need reform as say they do not need reform (38% each). A quarter express no opinion (Table 39 in Appendix). Opinion differs by place of residence and education:

- People in Bishkek are more likely than those in the next largest cities (200,000-500,000 population), smaller towns and rural areas (53% to 25%-38%); and
- The most educated are more likely than the least educated (49% to 26%) to say the election laws need reform.

Generally, among those who favor reforming electoral procedures, most ask for strict monitoring of election campaigns (9%), effective election law enforcement (3%), equal and fair conditions for all candidates (2%), more information on candidates (2%), and riddance of corruption (2%). Very few ask for fully changing the law (2%) or changing the people (presumably who are involved in the electoral process, 2%). Six in ten were not asked this question (Table 40 in Appendix).

#### \* Public Confidence in Elections as Instruments for Change

A majority of the public (56%, up from 49% in 1995) believes the people of Kyrgyzstan can change the situation in their country by participating in elections. About a third (36%, unchanged since 1995) do not agree (Table 41 in Appendix). Those who believe Kyrgyzstan is a democracy are more likely than those who do not to say that by participating in elections, people can change the country's situation (61% to 48%). And those who are satisfied with the direction of economic reforms are more likely than those who are dissatisfied to say participation in elections can effect change (68% to 51%).

Half of the people agree (17% agree completely) with the statement, "Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decisions made in our country." Slightly fewer (43%) disagree (Table 42 in Appendix). Kyrgyz are much more likely than Russians to agree (58% to 39%). People in the largely Kyrgyz-inhabited smaller towns and rural areas are also more likely than inhabitants of Bishkek to agree with the above statement (54%-56% to 36%). Again, those who believe Kyrgyzstan is a democracy and those who are satisfied with the direction of economic reforms are more likely than those who do not believe (60% to 42%) and those who are dissatisfied (71% to 44%), respectively, to agree that voting gives people a chance to influence decisions.

**Figure X. Voting Lets Me Influence Decision-Making in Kyrgyzstan (in percent)**


	<b>Nationwide</b>	<b>Kyrgyz</b>	<b>Russian</b>
<i>(Sample Size)</i>	<i>(1494)</i>	<i>(812)</i>	<i>(323)</i>
Agree	51	58	39
Disagree	43	35	57

"Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decisions made in our country." (IFES December 1996 Survey)

**\* Representation in Parliament**

A small majority (55%, up from 45% in 1995) cannot name the Deputy who represents them in the *Jogorku Kenesh* (parliament). About four in ten (43%), however, say they know the name of their Deputy (Table 43 in Appendix).

**Figure Y. Knowledge of Deputy's Name**




Russians are considerably less likely than Kyrgyz to know the names of the Deputies who represent them (77% to 43%). People in Bishkek are also much less likely to know the name of their representative in parliament than are people in the smaller towns and rural areas (84% to 42%-57%).

There is broad dissatisfaction with the Deputies. Six in ten say their Deputy in the *Jogorku Kenesh*

represents them poorly (61%, up considerably from 41% in 1995). A third of the public say they are represented very poorly. Only a fifth (18%, down from 25%) believe they are well represented. Another fifth (22%) of the public express no opinion (Figure Z on next page; Table 44 in Appendix). Both Kyrgyz (58%) and Russians (60%) alike believe they are represented poorly.

**Figure Z. Performance of Deputy**



Six in ten also believe the job of Deputy in the *Jogorku Kenesh* should be part-time, with the Deputies living part of the year in their districts (61%, down slightly from 66% in 1995). A quarter of the public (up slightly from 19%) say the job should be full-time, with the Deputies living in Bishkek (Table 45 in Appendix). Kyrgyz (64%) and Russians (67%) believe almost equally that the job of Deputy should be part-time.


Most Kyrgyzstanis say such non-government organizations as political parties (79%, virtually unchanged from 75% in 1995) and community organizations (79%, unchanged from 1995) should have the right to nominate candidates for the legislature. Two-thirds, however, would also give this right to local governments (65%, up from 54%); a quarter would not. Only 53 percent would let the president of the country nominate candidates to the legislature (up from 41%); about a third (36%, down slightly from 43%) object (Table 46 in Appendix). Russians are more likely than Kyrgyz to say these organizations, except for the president, should have the right to nominate candidates for the legislature (77%-89% to 64%-77%). University- and technical-school-educated individuals are more likely than the least educated to favor letting political parties have the right to nominate candidates (83%-87% to 67%).

### \* Role of Political Parties

A majority (57%, up from 48% in 1995) believes two or more political parties would be the ideal number of parties to have in Kyrgyzstan. A third of the people say several parties would be the ideal number (up from 24%), while a quarter say either two parties (14%) or many

(10%, down slightly from 16%) would be ideal. On the other hand, three in ten say either no parties (4%) or one party (25%, unchanged since 1995) would suffice (Table 47 in Appendix).

Figure AA. Ideal Number of Political Parties




Opinion varies among age and educational subgroups:

- Support for a multi-party system decreases slightly with age – definite majorities of those under 45, but a half of older adults support a multi-party system;
- A third of seniors (33%) prefer a single-party system; and
- The most educated are more likely than the least educated to favor a multiparty system (41 % to 20%).

A majority of the people (58%) think it is important for Kyrgyzstan to have at least two political parties competing in elections; a quarter (23%) say it is very important. Three in ten, however, think it is either not very important (19%) or not at all important (12%) (Figure AB next page; Table 48 in Appendix).

Figure AB. Importance of Parties



On the issue of competitive elections, opinions vary among population subgroups:

- Young people are much more likely than seniors (63% to 38%) to believe two or more competing parties are important;
- Kyrgyz appear slightly more likely than Russians (63% to 52%) to favor competing political parties; and
- University- and technical school-educated are more likely than the least educated (62%-69% to 41%) to think it is important for at least two parties to compete in elections.

Moreover, those who believe Kyrgyzstan is a democracy also appear more likely than those who do not see the importance of having at least two parties competing in elections (66% to 54%).

Despite this support for a multi-party system, few identify with any *one* party or movement that they think *best* represents the views and interests of the people. In fact, four in ten either pick none (17%), refuse to answer (4%) or express no opinion (17%). Among the rest, more than one in ten (12%) chooses the Communist Party. Fewer choose the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (6%), Asaba (5%), or Erkin Kyrgyzstan (5%). The remaining 15 parties or movements are chosen by 4 percent or less (usually) of the public (Table 49 in Appendix). Kyrgyzstanis over age 65 are more likely than young adults (ages 18-35) to choose the Communist Party (27% to 6%-9%). A quarter of the least educated express no opinion.

Political parties do not yet appear to play an important role in Kyrgyzstani political life. A small majority of respondents (54%, down slightly from 60% in 1995) say they would be more likely not to support a candidate for the legislature who was affiliated with a political party, preferring one who was not affiliated, or independent. Three in ten (29%, up very slightly from 24%) would support a party-affiliated candidate (Table 50 in Appendix). There are practically no substantive differences among major population subgroups on this question.


### \* Non-Governmental Organizations

A small majority (54%, up from 46% in 1995) believes it is possible for citizens to unite into groups or form organizations without the permission of the government. About four in ten (37%) do not think so (Table 51 in Appendix). Half of the people (52%) believe such organizations are necessary (13% say they are essential). Four in ten, however, say they are either not very necessary (29%) or not necessary at all (12%) (Table 52 in Appendix). Young people (ages 18-25) are more likely than seniors over 65 to consider these organizations necessary (58% to 41%). On the other hand, Russians are much more likely than Kyrgyz to say such organizations are unnecessary (55% to 35%), and people in Bishkek are more likely than people in the other cities, towns and rural areas to feel this way (59% to 33%-40%).

A bare majority (53%) of people would not give their "time to work for a non-governmental organization without receiving any pay." Four in ten (42%) say they would (Table 53 in Appendix). Older Kyrgyzstanis (over 65) are much more apt than young people to refuse to give their time (76% to 51%). The least educated are also more likely than the most educated to refuse (63% to 46%).

From a list of various types of non-governmental organizations, majorities say they would consider joining only two types of organizations: ones that help people in need (67%) or environmental protection organizations (59%). On the other hand, majorities say they would not consider joining five types of organizations: religious organizations (67%), women\*s organizations (58%), youth organizations (59%), ethnic organizations (61%), or political parties (69%). People divide over joining an educational organization (50% no, 46% yes) (Figure AC next page; Table 54 in Appendix).

Figure AC. Percent who would join particular NGOs



Among the more important subgroup differences by age, ethnicity, and place of residence are the following:

- Young adults (ages 18-35) are more likely than the other age subgroups to join a youth organization (42%-71% to 2%-24%);
- Russians are much less likely than Kyrgyz to join a political party (87% to 65%); and
- People in Bishkek are less likely than people in the other cities, towns and rural areas to join a political party (88% to 60%-71%).

Opinions also differ by education:


- The most educated are more likely than the least educated to join an organization that helps people in need (71% to 55%), an environmental protection organization (63% to 44%), and an educational organization (60% to 26%);
- The university-educated are less likely than those with less than a secondary education to join a religious organization (54% to 77%); and
- Those with less than a secondary education are less likely than the university-educated to join a youth organization (57% to 78%).

By almost a 2-to-1 margin (61% to 33%), people say they do not know of any such organizations existing in their communities (Table 55 in Appendix). Russians are much less likely than Kyrgyz to know about the existence of such non-governmental organizations in their communities (78% to 58%). People in Bishkek are also less likely than those in the other cities, towns and rural areas to know about the existence of such organizations (79% to 44%-64%).

**\* Ethnic Relations**

A large majority of the public (83%) describes current relations among ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan as good (Table 56 in Appendix). Large proportions of Kyrgyz (85%), Russians (79%), and other ethnic groups (83%) say current relations are good. In Osh oblast, where Kyrgyz and Uzbeks clashed in 1990, most people (83%) say relations among ethnic groups are good.<sup>17</sup>

**Figure AD. State of Ethnic Relations, by demographic groupings**



Question: "How would you describe current relations among ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan: very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?" (IFES December 1996 Survey; Sample Sizes: Total 1494, Kyrgyz 812, Russians 323)

In addition, a huge majority (89%) says it is important that the rights of minority ethnic groups are protected; two-thirds say it is very important (Table 33 in Appendix). There is broad consensus among all ethnic groups, including Kyrgyz, who compose more than half of the population, on the importance of protecting ethnic rights. Yet, as a minority, Russians are more likely than Kyrgyz to consider protecting minority ethnic rights to be very important (75% to 62%).

Six in ten confidently expect the current level of ethnic relations will be maintained for a very long time (30%), will stay the same for three to five years (12%), or will change for the better in three to five years (17%). Very few (4%) expect relations to change for the worse in three to five years. About four in ten say it is either too difficult to predict what relations will be like among ethnic groups (33%) or express no opinion (4%) (Table 57 in Appendix).


There were reports of ethnic unhappiness, however, in 1996. According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights report, Russians and Uzbeks complain about being proportionately under-represented in government and allege that a “ceiling” exists in government employment that precludes their advancement beyond a certain level. The representation of ethnic Kyrgyz at high and intermediate levels of government is said to be proportionally much greater than the percentage of ethnic Kyrgyz in the general population. Moreover, the appointment of ethnic Kyrgyz to key positions in the judicial system has led non-Kyrgyz to charge that the system is arbitrary and unfair, and that the courts treat Kyrgyz more leniently than members of other ethnic groups. Non-Kyrgyz ethnics, who constitute about 40 percent of the population, often allege discrimination in hiring, promotion, and housing. They complain that government officials at all levels reportedly favor ethnic Kyrgyz.<sup>18</sup>

### \* Crime and Law and Order

A large majority of respondents (84%) say they are dissatisfied with the fight against crime in Kyrgyzstan. A majority (55%, up from 49% in 1995) are *completely* dissatisfied. Only 14% say they are satisfied (Table 32 in Appendix). All major population subgroups are almost equally dissatisfied with the fight against crime.

Six in ten pessimistically say law and order will either stay the same (37%) or get worse (22%) in the next year. These proportions are virtually unchanged since 1995. Three in ten believe law and order will improve (30%, up from 23%) (Table 58 in Appendix).

Figure AE. Law and Order situation



Opinion differs by ethnicity, place of residence, and education:

- Russians tend to be less optimistic than Kyrgyz about law and order (36% of Kyrgyz say situation will improve, 22% of Russians). Among Russians, half believe conditions will stay the same (53% will remain the same; 16% will worsen), while among Kyrgyz opinion divides among those who say stay the same (33%) and worsen (22%).
- In Bishkek, the prevailing opinion is that the situation with law and order will remain the same (60%), while in rural areas a third expect the situation to improve (32%, only 18% share this view in Bishkek); and
- The most educated appear more likely than the least educated to be pessimistic (64% to 49%).

### \* Other Social Concerns

Three-quarters of the people say they are dissatisfied with the social welfare system (77%, down slightly from 83% in 1995) and the quality of health care (73%, down from 80%). Slightly more than a third express complete dissatisfaction with both. Only a quarter of the public say they are satisfied with health care, and only one in five is satisfied with social welfare (Table 32 in Appendix). All major population subgroups appear to be almost equally dissatisfied with both the social welfare system and the quality of health care.

Compared with public dissatisfaction with social welfare and health care, considerably fewer individuals – barely a majority (53%, down from 60% in 1995) – express dissatisfaction with the quality of the educational system. About four in ten (43%, up from 35%) say they are satisfied (Table 32 in Appendix). Kyrgyz appear to be more satisfied than Russians with the educational system (46% to 34%).

*The public believes information about political and economic developments is lacking and perceives that most communications media are under government control.*

## \* Availability of Information

Three-quarters of the public say they lack information about the economic reforms and political developments underway in Kyrgyzstan. This represents a considerable increase since 1995, when only half said they lacked information about economic reforms and about four in ten (44%) lacked information about political developments. In the current survey, those who lack information about economic reforms say they either have not very much information (58%, up from 38% in 1995) or absolutely nothing (19%). Those who lack information about political developments say they either have not very much (53%, up from 33%) or absolutely nothing (21%). Only small minorities feel they have information about economic reforms (22%) and political developments (24%) (Tables 59 and 60 in Appendix).

## \* Sources of Information for Learning about Events in Kyrgyzstan

**Television.** Regular TV viewers divide their attention almost equally between Kyrgyzstani TV programs (in Kyrgyz and Russian) and Russian Federation TV programs (in Russian). About half say they "regularly" watch either Kyrgyzstani TV programs in Kyrgyz (25%) or in Russian (28%). Another half (49%) of regular viewers say they watch Russian Federation TV. Very few (8%) say they watch other international TV programs regularly (63% say they "never" watch them) (Table 61 in Appendix).

As might be expected, of those who say they watch TV "regularly" or "sometimes," Kyrgyz are considerably more likely than Russians to watch Kyrgyzstani TV programs in Kyrgyz (69% to 10%). But both Kyrgyz and Russians watch Kyrgyzstani TV in Russian equally (58% to 56%). Russians, however, watch Russian Federation TV much more often than do Kyrgyz (87% to 62%).

Of those who say they *ever* watch Russian-language TV programs, young adults (ages 18-35) are more likely than seniors over 65 to do so; in fact, all age subgroups below age 66 are more likely than those over 65 to watch programs in Russian (77%-90% to 57%-59%).

The most educated appear more likely than the least educated to watch Kyrgyzstani TV in Kyrgyz regularly or sometimes (55% to 40%), but they are *much* more likely than the least educated to watch Kyrgyzstani TV in Russian (67% to 41%) and Russian Federation TV (74% to 48%).

**Radio.** Most Kyrgyzstanis say they never or rarely listen to the radio, no matter whether the broadcasts are Kyrgyzstani programs in Kyrgyz (69%) or in Russian (66%), Russian Federation radio programs (73%), or international radio programs (86%). Regular listeners and those who listen sometimes each constitute less than a fifth of the public for each of these types of programs. Very few listen to international radio programs, either regularly (4%) or sometimes (7%) (Table 61 in Appendix).

Of those who listen to the radio regularly or sometimes, Kyrgyz are considerably more likely than Russians to listen to Kyrgyzstan radio programs in Kyrgyz (41% to 4%). Russians are slightly more likely than Kyrgyz to listen to Kyrgyzstan radio in Russian (39% to 31%). Russians are much more likely than Kyrgyz to listen to Russian Federation radio programs (46% to 19%).

**Newspapers and Magazines.** Sizeable majorities say they rarely or never read Kyrgyzstan newspaper and magazine articles in Kyrgyz (61%), Russian Federation newspaper and magazine articles in Russian (73%), and other international newspaper and magazine articles (88%). People are more evenly split concerning Kyrgyzstan newspaper and magazine articles in Russian: Half read them regularly (25%) or sometimes (27%), and half read them rarely (18%) or never (30%) (Table 61 in Appendix).

As noted above, in watching Kyrgyzstan TV programs and listening to Kyrgyzstan radio programs in Russian, both ethnic groups are more or less on par. But for Kyrgyzstan newspaper and magazine articles in Russian, Russians are more likely than Kyrgyz to read these articles regularly or sometimes (65% to 47%). As might be expected, Russians are more likely than Kyrgyz to read Russian Federation newspaper and magazine articles (39% to 20%), but the main finding here is that both groups rarely or never read these articles (76% for Kyrgyz, 61% for Russians).


Regarding differences among age subgroups, adults under age 46 are more likely than those over 65 to read Kyrgyzstan newspaper and magazine articles in Kyrgyz (40%-45% to 21%) or Russian (52%-57% to 34%). Young people (ages 18-25) are also more likely than adults over 55 to read articles from the Russian Federation press (34% to 15%-16%), but again the central finding is that people in all age subgroups rarely or never read these articles (65% for young people, 71% for the other age subgroups).

Among educational subgroups, the most educated are more likely than the least educated to read Kyrgyzstani newspaper and magazine articles in Kyrgyz (49% to 24%) and more likely than all the other educational subgroups (less than secondary, secondary, technical) to read articles in Russian (70% to a range of 29%-55%). The most educated are also more likely than the other subgroups to read Russian Federation newspaper and magazine articles (43% to 13%-26%), but again majorities in each subgroup rarely or never read these articles (56% for the most educated, 73% for technical,

79% for secondary, and 83% for less than secondary).

**Other Means of Communication.** The public says it rarely or never pays attention to leaflets (89%), posters (87%), or speeches or public meetings (77%). However, when it comes to word-of-mouth communications among friends, family or neighbors, a large majority regularly (52%) or sometimes (32%) relies on this medium to learn more about events in Kyrgyzstan (Table 61 in Appendix). On this issue, there are differences among population subgroups.


**Figure AF. Regular Sources of Information**



### \* Perceptions of Censorship

Generally, the Kyrgyzstani public believes domestic communications media are controlled by the government while international media are free of control. Majorities believe domestic TV (64%), domestic radio (62%), and domestic newspapers (57%) are to some degree under government control. A quarter of the public say these media are completely controlled. Half think domestic magazines are controlled (20% say completely), while the other half either believe they are free (27%) or express no opinion (23%) (Table 62 in Appendix). The most educated are more likely than the least educated to believe domestic TV (70% to 53%), domestic radio (68% to 49%), and domestic newspapers (64% to 46%) are government controlled.

Figure AG. Government Control of Domestic Media



A 1992 law calls for freedom of the press and mass media, but, according to the U.S. State Department's Human Rights report, it also provides guidelines proscribing publication of certain information, including the propagation of "false information" or violations of the privacy or dignity of individuals. A constitutional amendment makes the dignity of presidents or former presidents inviolable.


Although there are fully independent newspapers and magazines in the country, as well as a few hours of independent television broadcasting and some independent radio stations, the government continues to influence media coverage through subsidies, especially in electronic media. Almost all electronic media and a significant portion of print media are government supported.

There have been no overt efforts to interfere with the press in 1996. Yet, two print journalists are still barred from practicing their profession under a sentence for slander passed in 1995. And the conviction of two campaign workers (representing an opposition candidate) and a journalist

for criminal slander during the December 1995 presidential election campaign signify that limits exist to freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan<sup>19</sup>.

By comparison with attitudes about the domestic media situation, half of the public thinks international media are completely or somewhat free of government control. About three in ten think they are completely free. The other half either believe international TV, radio, and newspapers are either controlled (23%-27%; only 7%-9% say completely) or express no opinion (23%-27%). Three in ten express no opinion about international magazines, and only a fifth of those surveyed think they are controlled (Table 62 in Appendix). Adults under age 46 are more likely than seniors over 65 to believe the international media are free of control (50%-60% to 28%-32%). The above findings reflect the image of the international mass media and do not necessarily represent the reputation enjoyed by any one media source among its regular audience (See Table 61 in Appendix for exposure to international media sources).

**Chart 28. Government Control of International Media**



## **M**ethodological Note

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The survey was designed and sponsored by the International Foundation for Election Systems. Questions were developed by David Jodice, Christopher S. Siddall, IFES Deputy Director of Development and New Initiatives, IFES Project Manager in Almaty Anthony Bowyer, and Elehie N. Skoczylas, Senior Research Analyst for IFES.

RCIOM-INFOREX, a leading survey research organization in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, was contracted for the translation of the questionnaire, selection of the sample, the conduct of fieldwork and data processing.

All aspects of fieldwork were managed by RCIOM-INFOREX. Between November 30 and December 12, 1996, face-to-face interviews were conducted with a sample of 1494 adults (18 years and older) representative of the national adult population. The sample included oversamples in the Naryn (100), Issyk-Kul (140) and Talas (90) *oblasts*. The sample design used a stratified, multi-stage random probability approach; the allocation of interviews was carried out according to population distribution. The design and the subsequent weighting (for the oversample) ensured that respondents represented the national adult population (18 years and older) of Kyrgyzstan. Interviews were conducted at the home of respondents; respondents were assured that their answers would remain fully confidential

The margin of error for the sample is +/-2.5 percentage points for the total sample; sampling error is larger for population subgroups. In addition to sampling error, practical difficulties of conducting a survey may introduce other sources of error in the results.

Tabulations and weighting were conducted by the Washington-based firm QEV Analytics.

<sup>1</sup>The ethnic breakdown in this survey is: Kyrgyz, 54%; Russian, 22%; Uzbek, 14%; Ukrainian, 2%; others, 1% or less. Population estimates according to the U.S. Department of State are as follows: Kyrgyz, 59.7%; Russians, 16.2%; Uzbeks, 14.1%; and the rest Ukrainians, Tajiks, Kazaks, Tatars, Germans, and others. U.S. Department of State, "Kyrgyz Republic Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996," January 30, 1997.

<sup>2</sup>Richard B. Dobson, "Kyrgyzstan in a Time of Change—A Report on Ten Focus Groups in (Spring) 1994," USIA Office of Research R-Report (R-3-94), October 1994, pp. i, 1; and "Privatization and Free-Market Reforms Elicit Mixed Reactions Among Kyrgyz and Uzbek Publics," USIA Opinion Research Memorandum (M-214-93), September 22, 1993, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Department of State, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup>By comparison, a nationally representative USIA survey in Kyrgyzstan in February 1993 found that four-fifths of the public described the economic situation as either fairly bad (51%) or very bad (31%). Only 13% said it was good. When asked about the economic situation over the next 12 months, two-thirds said they expected it to remain the same (25%) or worsen (39%). A fifth (22%) said it would improve. Dobson (M-214-93), *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 11-12.

<sup>5</sup>Lynda Maillet, "New States Initiate New Currencies," *Transition*, June 9, 1995, pp. 44, 46.

<sup>6</sup>Janet Guyon, "Kyrgyzstan's Akayev Plans to Continue Westernization," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 30, 1996.

<sup>7</sup>In the 1993 USIA survey, only 20% said reforms (defined as privatization—developing private property and private enterprise) were being carried out too slowly; 32%, too rapidly; 9%, at about the right pace; and 12% said they should not be done at all. Three in ten (28%) expressed no opinion. *Op. cit.*, pp. 3-4, 13.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 5. In the 1993 USIA survey, three-quarters (77%) agreed that citizens should be allowed to own land (45% agreed "completely"), but far fewer (45%) felt that they should be permitted to buy and sell land freely.

<sup>9</sup>Guyon, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup>U.S. Department of State, *op. cit.* For a study on President Akayev's efforts to consolidate more power in the presidency, see Bruce Pannier, "The Shrinking Shores of Central Asia's 'Island of Democracy'," *Transition*, April 5, 1996, pp. 56-60; and Naryn Aiyp, "With Overwhelming Voter Approval, Referendum Bolsters Executive Power," *Transition*, April 5, 1996, pp. 59, 64. These articles provided much of the information for the section on *The Setting*.

<sup>11</sup>U.S. Department of State, *op. cit.*

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*; Bruce Pannier, "Kyrgyzstan's Democratic Glow Dims," OMRI Analytical Brief #140, May 31, 1996.

<sup>13</sup>A second group of USIA-sponsored focus group discussions in October 1994 (in three Kyrgyzstani cities) found that participants admired Turkey for being a Muslim country with a secular state, but most often cited Japan and the United States as models for their economy. They also named the U.S. most often as a model for how a government should be organized and as a model of how diverse peoples can live together in harmony. Despite their affinity for Muslim countries, Russia, and other CIS countries, participants tended to view them as *negative* models — that is, of how *not* to organize the economy and the state. “Kyrgyzstanis Look to Turkey, Japan, and the U.S. for Models,” USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction Opinion Analysis (M-58-95), April 6, 1995, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup>“Central Asian Republics,” Asia 1996 Yearbook, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, p. 108.

<sup>15</sup>Pannier, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-60; U.S. Department of State, *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup>Aiyp, *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 64; U.S. Department of State, *op. cit.*

<sup>17</sup>These findings contrast sharply with earlier reports of growing alienation between modernized “russified” urban elites and rural Kyrgyz tribes, between the “russified” North advancing toward a market economy and the poor, agricultural Kyrgyz- and Uzbek-inhabited South, and between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks over control of the agricultural resources situated along the Fergana Valley, with bitterness remaining from the inter-ethnic violence that erupted in Osh in 1990. Nadia H. Youssef, “The Demographics of Ethnicity,” paper prepared for EMTEN, November 1994, pp. 50-55. In discussions on ethnic relations in the USIA-sponsored focus groups in 1994, most participants’ descriptions of nationality relations as “so-so,” “fair,” or “good” were considered as having been made “tactfully.” Dobson, *op. cit.*, p. 8. The clashes in Osh between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks resulted in considerable property damage and more than 200 people killed. Pannier, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>18</sup>U.S. Department of State, *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup>The two campaign workers and journalist were given one-year suspended sentences in April 1996 and then released; U.S. Department of State, *op. cit.*



# APPENDIX:

## Tables, Questions and Data



**T**ABLE 1. DIRECTION OF COUNTRY

Q-1. Do you think our country is headed in the right direction or the wrong direction?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Right Direction	50%
2. Wrong Direction	35%
3. Headed nowhere at all (volunteered only)	7%
4. Don't Know/No Response	8%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 2. SITUATION OF COUNTRY

Q-5. Thinking about our country's situation overall, are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with it?

**Question text in 1995** — "Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Kyrgyzstan today — would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or very dissatisfied?"

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	11/26/96 - 12/16/96
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Very satisfied	1%	4%
2. Somewhat satisfied	20%	23%
3. Somewhat dissatisfied	48%	46%
4. Very dissatisfied	26%	25%
5. Don't Know/No Response	5%	2%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

**T**ABLE 3. REASONS FOR SATISFACTION/DISSATISFACTION

Q-6. Please tell me why you said you are (satisfied/dissatisfied) with our country's situation today? (**Open-End Response**).

Date of Fieldwork		December 1996	
(Sample Size)		(1494)	
Reasons Satisfied		Reasons Dissatisfied	
1. Moving in the right direction	5%	1. Ineffective leadership	5%
2. Stability, peace	4%	2. Imperfect legislation	2%
3. Free business	4%	3. Low standard of living	30%
4. Free contacts with foreign countries	1%	4. Breakdown of economy	4%
5. Democratic rights	1%	5. Unemployment	11%
6. Better living conditions	1%	6. Economic Reforms	1%
7. All right so far	7%	7. No social defense	4%
8. Other	2%	8. Instability, uncertainty	2%
9. Don't know/no response	2%	9. Corruption of authorities	1%
NOT ASKED	73%	10. Increase of crime	3%
		11. Dissatisfied by all	4%
		12. Other	2%
		13. Don't know/no response	2%
		NOT ASKED	29%
<b>Total</b>	100%	<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 4. CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION

Q-7. How would you describe the current economic situation in our country — is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Very good	1%
2. Somewhat good	22%
3. Somewhat bad	50%
4. Very bad	23%
5. Don't Know/No Response	4%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 5. ATTITUDES TOWARDS ECONOMIC SITUATION

Q-21a. Please tell me whether you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or completely disagree with the following statement:

"It is very hard for my family to buy enough food each month."

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995		December 1996			
(Sample Size)	1995 (1194)		1996 (1494)			
	<i>Completely Agree</i>	<i>Agree Somewhat</i>	<i>Disagree Somewhat</i>	<i>Completely Disagree</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>Total</i>
"It is very hard for my family to buy enough food each month."						
1995	41%	33%	20%	5%	1%	100%
1996	58%	21%	16%	4%	1%	100%

**T**ABLE 6. ECONOMIC SITUATION IN NEXT 6 MONTHS

Q-8. In your opinion, how will the economic situation of Kyrgyzstan change in the next six months? Will it be better than it is now, will it be the same as it is now, or will be worse than now?

**Question text in 1995** — “Will the economic situation in Kyrgyzstan in a year be better than it is now, remain the same, or get worse?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Better than now	25%*	23%
2. Same as now	26%*	36%
3. Worse than now	34%*	29%
4. Don't know/no response	15%*	12%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

\*1995 measured prediction of economic satisfaction in a year

**T**ABLE 7. QUALITY OF LIFE OF YOUNG PEOPLE COMPARED TO PARENTS

Q-9. Please compare the quality of life of young people today (with the quality of lives their parents had)? Will their lives be better than their parents, the same as their parents, or worse than their parents?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Better than parents	32%
2. Same as parents	12%
3. Worse than parents	43%
4. Don't know/no response	13%
<b>Total</b>	101%

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**TABLE 8. ATTITUDES ON PRIVATIZATION**

Q-13 When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop an economy with little state control, or should we return to an economy basically controlled by the state?

**Question text in 1995** — “Should Kyrgyzstan strive for an economy free of any state control, or should we return to a system in which the state controls the entire economy?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995*	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Little state control	31%*	39%
2. Return to a state-controlled economy	51%*	51%
3. Neither (volunteered in 1995)	7%*	--
4. Don't know/no response	11%*	11%
<b>Total</b>	100%*	101% <b>U</b>

\*Differences in question wording should dictate caution in any trend analysis.

**TABLE 9. PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS AND TYPE OF ECONOMY**

Q-14. Another question concerning economic development of our country. Should we work toward a free economy with small but steady reforms, should we get to a free economy as quickly as possible, or should we not pursue a free economy at all?

**Question text in 1995** — “When it comes to our economic development, should we work toward a free economy with steady but smaller reforms, or should we get to a free economy as quickly as possible?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995*	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Small, but steady reforms	62%*	52%
2. As rapidly as possible	27%*	26%
3. Not pursue free economy	--	14%
4. Other (volunteered)	--	1%
5. Don't know/no response	11%	8%
<b>Total</b>	100%	101% <b>U</b>

\*Questionnaire in 1995 only had options above.

**T**ABLE 10. PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS

Q-15. In your opinion, are the economic reforms in Kyrgyzstan being made too rapidly, at about the necessary speed, or too slowly?

**Question text for 1995** — “In your opinion, are the economic reforms in Kyrgyzstan being made too rapidly, with appropriate speed, or too slowly?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996*
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Too rapidly	9%	10%
2. About the right speed	17%	15%
3. Too slowly	53%	91%
4. Other (volunteered)	11%*	--
5. Don't know/no response	11%	16%
<b>Total</b>	101% <b>U</b>	100%

\*Questionnaire in 1996 does not include *Other* option.

**T**ABLE 11. MEANING OF FREE MARKET ECONOMY

Q-16. What does it mean to you to live in a free or market economy? I mean, how life in the free-market economy will be different from life in the past? (**Open-End Response**).

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
Free trade	17%
You get what you've earned	11%
To live better	9%
Material and economic success	8%
Life is hard and will be even better	7%
It was better before	6%
Unemployment, inflation, high prices	5%
Personal rights and freedoms	3%
Division of society between rich and poor	3%
Instability, uncertainty about the future	2%
Competition	1%
Market economy is not needed	2%
Other	5%
Don't know/no response	22%
<b>Total</b>	<b>101% U</b>

**T**ABLE 12. PRIVATE PROPERTY

Q-10. As I read each of the following statements, please tell me whether you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or completely disagree with it:

- a. Citizens should have the right to own land as private property
- b. Citizens should have the right to buy and sell land
- c. The use of land, even land held in private hands, should be regulated by law

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996					
(Sample Size)	(1494)					
	Completely Agree	Agree Somewhat	Disagree Somewhat	Completely Disagree	Don't Know	Total
Citizens should have the right to own land as private property	68%	18%	8%	4%	2%	100%
Citizens should have the right to buy and sell land	41%	21%	18%	17%	3%	100%
The use of land, even land held in private hands, should be regulated by law	67%	20%	6%	4%	3%	100%

**T**ABLE 13. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF LAND

Q-11. Should foreign companies be allowed to purchase and own land in Kyrgyzstan, or not?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Yes	21%	12%
2. No	70%	83%
3. Don't know/no response	9%	5%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

**TABLE 14. ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT**

Q-12. Considering the investments made by foreign companies in Kyrgyzstan, should we welcome investments to any extent; welcome investments with some limitations; allow, but do not encourage investments; or prohibit investments?

**Question text in 1995** — “Consider the investments made by foreign companies in Kyrgyzstan: should we welcome these investments, allow with limitations, allow without encouragement, or prohibit them?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Welcome investments to any extent	14%*	12%
2. Welcome investment with some limitations	46%*	43%
3. Allow, but do not encourage investments	16%*	18%
4. Prohibit investments	11%*	18%
5. Don't know/no response	13%*	10%
<b>Total</b>	100%	101% <b>U</b>

\*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis.

**T**ABLE 15. EFFECT OF KYRGYZSTAN'S INDEPENDENCE ON ITS PEOPLE

Q-17 In your opinion, was the declaration of independence of Kyrgyzstan a very good thing, a somewhat good thing, a somewhat bad thing or a very bad thing for the peoples of Kyrgyzstan?

**Question text in 1995** — "Was the declaration of Independence of Kyrgyzstan a very good thing or a very bad thing for Kyrgyzstan?"

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Very good	34%*	17%
2. Somewhat good	-	52%
3. Somewhat bad	-	17%
4. Very bad	19%*	5%
5. Neither (volunteered in 95)	34%*	--
5. Don't know/no response	13%	8%
<b>Total</b>	100%*	99% <b>U</b>

\*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis.

**TABLE 16. QUALITY OF LIFE SINCE INDEPENDENCE**

Q-18. Since Kyrgyzstan became independent of the Soviet Union, has our life here improved, stayed about the same or become worse?

**Question text in 1995** — “Thinking about the country overall — has life in Kazakstan improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse since achieving independence?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Improved	9%	10%
2. Stayed about the same	19%	8%
3. Worsened	69%	78%
4. Don't know/no response	4%	3%
<b>Total</b>	101% <b>U</b>	99% <b>U</b>

**TABLE 17. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING A KYRGYZSTANI**

Q-22. What are your feelings about being a citizen of Kyrgyzstan — proud, content, indifferent, not content, or ashamed?

**Question text in 1995** — “What are your feelings about saying you are a citizen of Kyrgyzstan: proud, content, indifferent, not content, ashamed?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Proud	35%	36%
2. Content	39%	40%
3. Indifferent	19%	14%
4. Not content	3%	5%
5. Ashamed	2%	3%
6. Don't know/no response	1%	2%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

**TABLE 18. ATTITUDES TOWARD NATIONALITY**

Q-21b. Please tell me whether you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or completely disagree with the following statement:

- b. "The people of Kyrgyzstan have a culture and a way of life which deserves to be protected against foreign influences."

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995			December 1996		
(Sample Size)	(1194)			(1494)		
	Completely Agree	Agree Somewhat	Disagree Somewhat	Completely Disagree	Don't Know	Total
b. "The people of Kyrgyzstan have a culture and a way of life which deserves to be protected against foreign influences."						
1995	32%	33%	20%	8%	7%	100%
1996	47%	24%	16%	8%	5%	100%

**T**ABLE 19. INTEREST IN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Q-19. How much are you interested in matters of politics and activities of government — are you very interested, interested somewhat, not too interested or not interested at all?

**Question text in 1995** — “To begin with, how interested are you in matters of politics and government: are you very interested, fairly interested, not too interested, or not interested at all?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Very interested	18%	13%
2. Somewhat interested	42%	40%
3. Not too interested	22%	30%
4. Not interested at all	18%	17%
5. Don't know/no response	1%	j
<b>Total</b>	101% U	100%

**T**ABLE 20. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IMPROVES LIVES OF CITIZENS

Q-20. In your opinion, is it possible or not possible for the national government in Bishkek to improve significantly the lives of our citizens through its policies and actions?

**Question text in 1995** — “Do you believe that today’s officials in Bishkek — whoever they may be — are capable of making any real improvements in you circumstances, or not?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Possible	40%	64%
2. Not possible	45%	26%
3. Don't know/no response	16%	11%
<b>Total</b>	101% <b>U</b>	101% <b>U</b>

**T**ABLE 21. RESPONSIVENESS OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Q-45. Thinking of the various national and local governments, in your opinion, how responsive is each to the needs and concerns of the people. Are they very responsive, somewhat responsive, not very responsive or not responsive at all?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996					
(Sample Size)	(1494)					
Levels of Government	Very Responsive	Somewhat Responsive	Not Very Responsive	Not At All Responsive	Don't Know	Total
1. Cabinet of Ministers	3%	23%	44%	22%	8%	100%
2. <i>Jogorku Kenesh</i>	5%	27%	41%	19%	8%	100%
3. Local Governments	4%	25%	38%	29%	4%	100%

**T**ABLE 22. POWER OF LOCAL OFFICIALS

Q-28. In your opinion, do local officials have more power or less power now compared with before Kyrgyzstan obtained independence?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. More power	49%	61%
2. Less power	28%	14%
3. About the same (Volunteered)	5%	13%
4. Don't know/no response	18%	11%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

**T**ABLE 23. COMPOSITION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Q-29. Does it seem to you that the people who run things in your community (local organ of power) are pretty much the same people who were running things even before Kyrgyzstani independence, or are your local officials not the same people?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Same people	38%	45%
2. Not same people	20%	43%
3. Some new, some old	35%*	--
4. Don't know/no response	8%	13%
<b>Total</b>	101% U	101% U

\*This option not available on 1996 questionnaire.

**T**ABLE 24. CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Q-52. I would like to ask you about several organs of the justice system. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to treat people with fairness and justice. Do (insert name) treat people with a great deal of fairness and justice, a fair amount, not very much or none at all?

**Question text for 1995** — “I am now going to ask you about several institutions in the justice system. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to treat people with fairness and justice: a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all.”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995		December 1996			
(Sample Size)	(1194)		(1494)			
	<i>A Great Deal</i>	<i>A Fair Amount</i>	<i>Not Very Much</i>	<i>None At All</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>Total</i>
1. The courts						
1995	8%	34%	35%	19%	4%	100%
1996	9%	25%	42%	21%	4%	101% U
2. The public prosecutor's office						
1995	8%	33%	35%	19%	5%	100%
1996	7%	28%	40%	21%	5%	101% U
3. The militia						
1995	4%	22%	33%	38%	3%	100%
1996	3%	14%	34%	47%	2%	100%
4. Committee of National Security						
1995	11%	42%	23%	10%	14%	100%
1996	17%	36%	22%	12%	14%	101% U

**T**ABLE 25. INDEPENDENCE OF COURTS

Q-53. In your opinion, should our country's courts be assigned to the executive branch, the legislative branch or should the courts be completely independent of the other two branches of government?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Executive	13%
2. Legislative	29%
3. Completely Independent	46%
4. Don't know/no response	12%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 26. FREQUENCY OF CORRUPTION

Q-30. How common, in your opinion, in Kyrgyzstan is official corruption — very common, somewhat common, somewhat rare or very rare?

**Question text for 1995** — “How common is the problem of official corruption — is it very common, fairly common, fairly rare (uncommon), or very rare (uncommon)?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Very common	44%	47%
2. Somewhat common	32%	33%
3. Somewhat rare	6%	7%
4. Very rare	4%	1%
5. No corruption (Volunteered)	—	j
6. Don't know/no response	15%	10%
<b>Total</b>	101% U	98% U

**T**ABLE 27. SERIOUSNESS OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

Q-31. In your opinion, how serious is the problem of official corruption — is it very serious, somewhat serious, not too serious or not serious at all?

**Question text for 1995** — “And how serious is the problem of official corruption, meaning how much does it matter — is it very serious, fairly serious, not too serious, or not serious at all?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Very serious	53%	59%
2. Somewhat serious	25%	27%
3. Not too serious	6%	6%
4. Not serious at all	2%	1%
5. None (Volunteered)	--	<b>j</b>
6. Refused (Volunteered)	--	1%
7. Don't Know/No Response	13%	6%
<b>Total</b>	99% <b>U</b>	100%

**TABLE 28. RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS**

Q-25. How much do government authorities respect the rights of individuals in Kyrgyzstan — a great deal, somewhat, a little, or not at all?

**Question text for 1995** — “How much respect is there for individual civic rights now in Kyrgyzstan: a lot, some, a little, none at all?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Great deal	11%*	3%
2. Somewhat	31%*	28%
3. A little	34%*	42%
4. Not at all	16%*	20%
9. Don't know/no response	9%*	7%
<b>Total</b>	101% U	100%

\*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis.

**TABLE 29. INFORMATION ABOUT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS**

Q-27. How much information do you have about your rights with regard to the authorities? Do you have a great deal, some, not very much or none at all?

**Question text for 1995** — “Please tell me whether you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or completely disagree with the following statement:

“I don’t have enough information about my rights with regard to the authorities.”

**1995 DATA**

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995
(Sample Size)	(1194)
1. Completely agree	31%
2. Agree somewhat	36%
3. Disagree somewhat	19%
4. Completely Disagree	5%
5. Don't know/no response	9%
<b>Total</b>	101% U

**1996 DATA**

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Great deal	4%
2. Some	21%
3. Not very much	46%
4. None at all	27%
5. Don't know/no response	3%
<b>Total</b>	101% U

**T**ABLE 30. MODELS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Q-38. Which foreign country, if any, do you think could be a model for Kyrgyzstan's *economic* development?  
(Open-end response)

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. United States	20%
2. Germany	16%
3. Japan	15%
4. Switzerland	6%
5. Turkey	5%
6. China	3%
7. South Korea	2%
8. Sweden	2%
9. Russia	2%
10. England	2%
11. France	2%
12. None	2%
13. Other	23%
14. Don't know	13%
<b>Total</b>	<b>113%* U</b>

\*Multiple responses allowed

**T**ABLE 31. MODELS FOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Q-38. Which foreign country, if any, do you think could be a model for Kyrgyzstan's *political* development? (Open-end response)

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. United States	31%
2. Germany	10%
3. Japan	6%
4. Switzerland	4%
5. Turkey	3%
6. China	2%
7. Sweden	1%
8. Russia	3%
9. England	3%
10. France	2%
11. Uzbekistan	4%
12. Nothing at all	3%
13. Other	28%
14. Don't know	22%
<b>Total</b>	122%* U

\*Multiple responses allowed

**TABLE 32. SOCIO-POLITICAL BAROMETER**

Q-32. As I read the following statements, please tell me whether you are completely satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or completely dissatisfied with it.

**Question text from 1995** — “Please tell me whether you are completely satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied, or completely dissatisfied with each of the following.”

For each topic, the statement on the ques. follows the year. If the statement on ques. was the same both years, only years are listed.

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995			December 1996		
(Sample Size)	1995 (1194)			1996 (1494)		
	<i>Cmpltly Stsfd</i>	<i>Smwht Stsfd</i>	<i>Smwht Distsfd</i>	<i>Cmpltly Distsfd</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>Total</i>
1. Economic Reforms						
1995 (Not asked)	NA	NA	NA	NA	--	—
1996 (The direction of economic reforms)	4%	24%	44%	24%	4%	100%
2. Social Welfare						
1995 (The social welfare protections of the people)	3%	11%	41%	42%	4%	99% U
1996 (The social welfare protections of the people)	2%	18%	39%	38%	2%	99% U
3. The level of political and civil freedoms						
1995	5%	31%	35%	16%	14%	101% U
1996	8%	34%	32%	16%	9%	99% U
4. Human Rights						
1995 (Observation of human rights)	4%	25%	37%	27%	7%	100%
1996 (Protection of personal freedoms and liberties by the gov.)	5%	23%	38%	27%	8%	101% U
5. The fight against crime						
1995	2%	11%	34%	49%	3%	99% U
1996	3%	11%	29%	55%	2%	100%
6. The quality of health care						
1995	2%	15%	39%	41%	2%	99% U
1996	3%	23%	38%	35%	1%	100%
7. Our electoral system						
1995	5%	25%	29%	31%	11%	99% U
1996	5%	30%	29%	28%	7%	100%
8. Educational System						
1995 (Our education, science and culture)	5%	30%	36%	24%	5%	101% U
1996 (The quality of our educational system)	9%	34%	31%	22%	4%	99% U

**T**ABLE 33. POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS

Q-55. How important is it to provide the following rights and freedoms? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996					
(Sample Size)	(1494)					
	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Not Important	Don't Know	Total
1. The rights of minority ethnic groups are protected?	66%	23%	6%	3%	2%	100%
2. The private property of individuals is protected by law?	79%	18%	3%	j	1%	101% U
3. People have the right to publicly criticize the government?	62%	22%	11%	4%	1%	100%
4. People can freely practice their religion?	70%	19%	8%	3%	1%	101% U
5. People have the right to express their opinions without fear of punishment?	73%	20%	4%	2%	1%	100%

**T**ABLE 34. ORDER AND DEMOCRACY

Q-54. For the next two statements, please tell me whether you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or completely disagree with each one.

a. "In order to establish order and discipline, it is necessary to limit the political and civic rights of the people."

b. "In order to establish order and discipline in society, it is necessary to have a dictatorship"

**Question text from 1995** — "In order to establish order and discipline, is it necessary to limit the political and civic rights of the people? Do you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or completely disagree?"

**Question text from 1995** — "In order to establish order and discipline in society, is it necessary to have a dictatorship? Do you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or completely disagree?"

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995		December 1996			
(Sample Size)	(1194)		(1494)			
	Completely Agree	Agree Somewhat	Disagree Somewhat	Completely Disagree	Don't Know	Total
a. Limit political and civil rights						
1995	13%	40%	27%	10%	10%	100%
1996	31%	26%	23%	17%	3%	100%
b. Necessary to have a dictatorship						
1995	15%	31%	23%	20%	11%	100%
1996	21%	19%	23%	33%	5%	101% U

**T**ABLE 35. IS KYRGYZSTAN A DEMOCRACY

Q-33. Do you think that Kyrgyzstan is primarily a democracy or is primarily not a democracy?

Questions text for 1995 — “Would you say the Kyrgyzstan is a democracy , or is it not a democracy?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Democracy	56%	60%
2. Not a democracy	21%	27%
3. Don't know/no response	23%	13%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

**T**ABLE 36. MOVEMENT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

Q-34. (Ask those who see it as not a democracy): Is Kyrgyzstan moving toward becoming a democracy or not?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Becoming a democracy	14%
2. Not becoming a democracy	11%
3. Don't know/no response	2%
NOT ASKED	73%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 37. COMPARING DEMOCRACY IN KYRGYZSTAN AND RUSSIA

Q-35. Which country is more democratic, Kyrgyzstan or Russia?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Kazakstan	22%	20%
2. Russia	24%	34%
3. Both are equally democratic (volunteered)	24%	23%
4. Neither (volunteered)	18%	10%
5. Don't know	13%	14%
<b>Total</b>	100% <b>U</b>	100% <b>U</b>

**T**ABLE 38. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY

Q-36. What does it mean to you to live in a democracy? (Open-End Response).

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
Observance of rights	35%
Freedom for all	12%
To live in a legal society	7%
Material success	6%
Social defense	5%
Freedom of entrepreneurship	4%
To feel yourself a person	3%
Certainty about the future	3%
Public power	2%
Other	6%
Don't know/no response	19%
<b>Total</b>	102% <b>U</b>

**T**ABLE 39. ELECTION LAWS IN NEED OF REFORM

Q-39. Thinking about the election law of our country, does it seem to you that it is in need of reform or is not in need of reform?

**Question text for 1995** — “What is your overall opinion of the election laws of Kyrgyzstan — does it seem to you that they are in need of reform or not in need of reform?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Need reform	33%	38%
2. Not need reform	24%	38%
3. Don't know/no response	43%	24%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

**T**ABLE 40. REFORMS NEEDED

Q-40. (If in need of reform): What sort of reform would you like to see? (Open-End Response).

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
Strictly monitor campaigns	9%
Law should be effective and observed	3%
Equal and fair conditions for all candidates	2%
More information on candidates	2%
Get rid of corruption	2%
Fully change the law	2%
Change people	2%
Other	4%
Election system should be independent	q
Change elected body formation	q
not asked	61%
Don't know/no response	12%
<b>Total</b>	99% U

**T**ABLE 41. INFLUENCE OF CITIZENS THROUGH ELECTIONS

Q-41. Do you think the people of Kyrgyzstan can actually change the situation in this country by participating in elections?

**Question text for 1995** — "Can the people of Kyrgyzstan actually change the situation in the country by participating in elections, or is this not possible?"

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Yes	49%	56%
2. No	36%	36%
3. Don't know/no response	14%	8%
<b>Total</b>	99% <b>U</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 42. INFLUENCE OF VOTING

Q-46. Please tell me whether you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or completely disagree with the following statement:

"Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decisions made in our country."

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Completely agree	17%
2. Agree somewhat	34%
3. Disagree somewhat	30%
4. Completely disagree	13%
5. Don't know/no response	7%
<b>Total</b>	101% <b>U</b>

**T**ABLE 43. KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE

Q-42. Do you happen to know the name of the Deputy to the *Jogorku Kenesh* who represents this area or not?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Yes	48%	43%
2. No	45%	55%
3. Don't remember/no response	7%	25%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

**T**ABLE 44. REPRESENTATIVE REPRESENTS VIEWS OF CONSTITUENTS

Q-43. How well does your Deputy in the *Jogorku Kenesh* represent your interests before the government in Bishkek very well, somewhat well, somewhat poorly or very poorly?

**Question text for 1995** — “How well does the deputy of the *Jogorku Kenesh* from this area represent your views and interests before the government in Bishkek: very well, fairly well, fairly poorly, very poorly?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Very well	3%	2%
2. Somewhat well	22%	16%
3. Somewhat poorly	21%	29%
4. Very poorly	20%	32%
5. Don't know/no response	33%	22%
<b>Total</b>	99% U	101% U

**T**ABLE 45. RESIDENCE OF REPRESENTATIVE

Q-44. Should the job of Deputy of the *Jogorku Kenesh* in Bishkek be a full-time job in the parliament with the Deputies living in Bishkek or should it be a part-time job with the Deputies living part of the year in their districts?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Full-time job	19%	25%
2. Part-time job	66%	61%
3. Don't Know/No Response	15%	14%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

**T**ABLE 46. NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES

Q-47. Which of the following organizations should have the right to nominate candidates for the legislature? (Read list, circle all that are mentioned)

**Question text for 1995** — “Which of the following listed organizations should be given the opportunity to nominate candidates for election to the *Jogorku Kenesh*”

Date of Fieldwork		July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)		(1194)	(1494)
a. Political Parties	Yes	75%	79%
	No	15%	14%
	Don't Know	10%	7%
b. Community Organizations	Yes	78%	79%
	No	13%	12%
	Don't Know	10%	9%
c. Local Governments	Yes	54%	65%
	No	29%	26%
	Don't Know	18%	8%
d. President	Yes	41%	53%
	No	43%	36%
	Don't Know	15%	11%

**T**ABLE 47. IDEAL NUMBER OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Q-49. What do you think would be the ideal number of political parties for Kyrgyzstan — none, one, two, several or many?

**Question text for 1995** — “What do you think would be the ideal number of political parties to have — none, one, two, several, or as many as we have today?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. None	6%	4%
2. One	25%	25%
3. Two	8%	14%
4. Several	24%	33%
5. Many	16%	10%
6. Don't know/no response	22%	14%
<b>Total</b>	101% U	100%

**T**ABLE 48. IMPORTANCE OF COMPETITION AMONG PARTIES

Q-50. How important is it for Kyrgyzstan to have at least two political parties competing in an election — very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Very important	23%
2. Fairly important	35%
3. Not very important	19%
4. Not at all important	12%
5. Don't know/no response	11%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**TABLE 49. PARTY PREFERENCE**

Q-51. Which **ONE** of the political parties or social movements listed on this card (**Show Card**) best represents the views and interests of people like you? (**Interviewer: Circle ONE Response Only, First Mention**).

**Question text for 1995** — “Which of the political parties or social movements listed below best represents the views and interests of people like you?” (Multiple responses accepted)

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Asaba	5%	5%
2. Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan	4%	6%
3. Erkin Kyrgyzstan	4%	5%
4. Ata-Mekhen	4%	4%
5. Communist Party	10%	12%
6. Republican People Party	3%	3%
7. Social Democratic Party	2%	2%
8. Association of Social Democrats	1%	j
9. Organization of Cossacks	1%	j
10. Ashar	1%	2%
11. Democratic Movement People's Unity	2%	3%
12. Human Rights Movement	2%	3%
13. Kok-Jarr	j	j
14. Ailene (Environment)	1%	1%
15. Kyrgyzstan Youth Union	5%	4%
16. Women's Congress	3%	3%
17. Slavonic Fund	3%	2%
18. Women's Committee	3%	4%
19. Muslim Women's Movement (Jerr-Aene)	2%	1%
20. Other	j	1%
21. None	35%	17%
22. Refused	–	4%
23. Don't know/no response	17%	17%
<b>Total</b>	108%* U	99% U

\*Multiple responses allowed.

**T**ABLE 50. IMPORTANCE OF PARTY AFFILIATION

Q-48. If an election were held tomorrow, would you be more likely to support a candidate for the legislature who was affiliated with a political party or an independent candidate?

**Question text for 1995** — “Would you be more likely or less likely to support a candidate for the *Jogorku Kenesh* who was affiliated with a political party?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. With a party	24%	29%
2. Independent	60%	54%
3. Other (volunteered)	--	7%
4. Don't know/no response	16%	10%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

\*1995 questionnaire did not contain *Other* response

**T**ABLE 51. CIVIL SOCIETY

Q-56. In your opinion, do the citizens of Kyrgyzstan have the possibility to unite into groups or form organizations without the participation of the government?

**Question text for 1995** — “Is it possible for citizens to form groups to improve their communities without government involvement?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Possible	46% *	54%
2. Not possible	33% *	37%
3. Don't know/no response	22% *	9%
<b>Total</b>	101% U	100%

\*Differences in question wording dictates caution in any trend analysis

**T**ABLE 52. NECESSITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Q-57. And how necessary are such organizations in your opinion — essential, necessary, not very necessary or not necessary at all?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Essential	13%
2. Necessary	39%
3. Not very necessary	29%
4. Not necessary at all	12%
5. Don't know/no response	8%
<b>Total</b>	101% <b>U</b>

**T**ABLE 53. JOINING NGOS

Q-58. Would you give your time to work for a non-governmental organization without receiving any pay?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Yes	42%
2. No	53%
3. Other (volunteered)	1%
4. Don't know/no response	4%
<b>Total</b>	100%

## T ABLE 54. TYPES OF NGOS

Q-59. Which of these non-governmental organizations (**Show Card**) — if any — would you consider joining? (**Circle all that apply**).

**Question text for 1995** — “What kind of groups of citizens would you consider joining, if any?”

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996	
(Sample Size)	(1494)	
	Yes	No
1. An education organization	46%	50%
2. A religious organization	28%	67%
3. An organization which helps people who are in need	67%	29%
4. A women's organization	38%	58%
5. A youth organization	38%	59%
6. An environmental protection org.	59%	37%
7. An ethnic organization	31%	61%
8. A political party	24%	69%
9. Any other organization	2%	12%

**T**ABLE 55. NGOs IN COMMUNITY

Q-60. Do you know of any such groups which exist in your community?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Yes	33%
2. No	61%
3. Don't know/no response	6%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 56. RELATIONS AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS

Q-23. How would you describe current relations among ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan: very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Very good	15%
2. Somewhat good	68%
3. Somewhat bad	13%
4. Very bad	2%
5. Don't know/no response	2%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 57. PROSPECTS FOR RELATIONS AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS

Q-24. In your opinion, will current relations among ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan stay the same for a very long time, stay the same for 3-5 years, change for the better in 3-5 years, change for the worse in 3-5 years, or are relations between ethnic groups too difficult to predict?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Stay the same for a very long time	30%
2. Stay the same for 3-5 years	12%
3. Change for the better in 3-5 years	17%
4. Change for the worse in 3-5 years	4%
5. Relations between ethnic groups are too difficult to predict	33%
6. Don't know/no response	4%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 58. LAW AND ORDER

Q-26. How will law and order in Kyrgyzstan change in the next year? Will it get worse, improve, or stay the same?

**Question text for 1995** — “Will the condition of law and order in the Republic improve, get worse, or stay the same over the next year?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. Improve	23%	30%
2. Get worse	25%	22%
3. Stay the same	38%	37%
4. Don't know	14%	11%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

**TABLE 59. INFORMATION ABOUT ECONOMIC REFORMS**

Q-3a. How much information do you feel you have about the *economic* reforms underway in Kyrgyzstan? Do you have — a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or absolutely nothing?

**Question text in 1995** — “Is the information you get about the so-called free market reforms underway in Kyrgyzstan — fully sufficient, somewhat sufficient, somewhat insufficient, or fully insufficient?”

Comparable 1995 responses are in parentheses

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. A great deal (fully sufficient)	10%*	3%
2. A fair amount (somewhat sufficient)	33%*	19%
3. Not very much (somewhat insufficient)	38%*	58%
4. Absolutely nothing (fully insufficient)	12%*	19%
5. Don't know/no response	6%*	2%
<b>Total</b>	99% <b>U</b>	101% <b>U</b>

\*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis.

**TABLE 60. INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Q-3b. And, how much information do you feel you have about *political* developments underway in Kyrgyzstan? Is it — a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or absolutely nothing?

**Question text in 1995** — “Is the information you get about the political developments of the Republic fully sufficient, somewhat sufficient, somewhat insufficient, or fully insufficient?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1194)	(1494)
1. A great deal (fully sufficient)	11%*	4%
2. A fair amount (somewhat sufficient)	39%*	20%
3. Not very much (somewhat insufficient)	33%*	53%
4. Absolutely nothing (fully insufficient)	11%*	21%
5. Don't know/no response	6%*	2%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

**TABLE 61. SOURCES OF INFORMATION**

Q-2. I am now going to read you a list of sources of information you might use to learn more about events in Kyrgyzstan. As I read each one, please tell me if you use it regularly, sometimes, rarely or never.

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996					
(Sample Size)	(1494)					
Sources of Information	Regularly	Some-times	Rarely	Never	Don't Know	Total
1. Kyrgyzstan TV programs in Kyrgyz	25%	26%	17%	32%	j	100%
2. Kyrgyzstan TV programs in Russian	28%	31%	21%	20%	j	101% U
3. Russian Federation TV programs	49%	16%	18%	16%	1%	100%
4. Other international TV programs	8%	9%	16%	63%	3%	99% U
5. Kyrgyzstan radio programs in Kyrgyz	17%	13%	12%	57%	1%	100%
6. Kyrgyzstan radio programs in Russian	14%	18%	18%	48%	1%	99% U
7. Russian Federation radio programs	12%	14%	19%	54%	2%	101% U
8. Other international radio programs	4%	7%	11%	75%	2%	99% U
9. Kyrgyzstan newspaper & magazine articles in Kyrgyz	18%	21%	14%	47%	1%	101% U
10. Kyrgyzstan newspaper & magazine articles in Russian	25%	27%	18%	30%	1%	101% U
11. Russian Federation newspaper & magazine articles	10%	16%	22%	51%	2%	101% U
12. Other international newspaper & magazine articles	2%	7%	10%	78%	3%	100%
13. Leaflets	1%	6%	11%	78%	3%	99% U
14. Posters	2%	8%	15%	72%	3%	100%
15. Speeches or other public meetings	5%	17%	21%	56%	2%	101% U
16. Friends, family or neighbors	52%	32%	10%	6%	j	100%

**T**ABLE 62. NEWS MEDIA INDEPENDENCE FROM GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Q-4. I am now going to read you a list of sources of news which are generally available. As I read each one, please tell me if you consider it to be completely free of government control, somewhat free, somewhat controlled by the government, or completely controlled by the government.

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96				
(Sample Size)	(1494)				
Source of News	<i>Completely Free</i>	<i>Somewhat Free</i>	<i>Somewhat Controlled</i>	<i>Completely Controlled</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
1. Domestic TV	10%	19%	36%	27%	7%
2. International TV	28%	22%	18%	9%	23%
3. Domestic Radio	8%	16%	36%	26%	14%
4. International Radio	27%	22%	16%	8%	27%
5. Domestic Newspaper	12%	21%	33%	24%	9%
6. International Newspaper	28%	22%	16%	7%	27%
7. Domestic Magazine	9%	18%	30%	20%	23%
8. International Magazine	29%	21%	13%	6%	31%

## Demographics

**T**ABLE 63. SEX

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Male	48%
2. Female	52%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 64. EMPLOYMENT

D-1. What is your current employment situation? Are you ...

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Self-employed	10%
2. Employed full-time at one job	24%
3. Employed part-time at one job	4%
4. Employed at two or more part-time jobs	2%
5. A housekeeper/housewife	11%
6. A student/apprentice	5%
7. A pensioner or invalid	18%
8. Not employed	26%
9. No response	j
<b>Total</b>	99% U

**T**ABLE 65. OCCUPATION

D-2. What is your occupation?

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
Skilled Worker	17%
Non-skilled Worker	7%
Clerk	22%
Specialist	7%
Leader	2%
Peasant	12%
Teacher	13%
Public Health Worker	6%
Businessman	5%
Small Businessman	5%
Military man	1%
Other	3%

**T**ABLE 66. MARITAL STATUS

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Married	68%
2. Single and never married	17%
3. Divorced	6%
4. Widowed	9%
5. Refused	j
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 67. DEPENDENTS

D-4. Do you have any children?

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Yes	78%
2. No	22%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 68. NUMBER OF CHILDREN

D-5a. (If has children): How many children do you have?

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
None	22%
1	15%
2	22%
3	15%
4	10%
5	7%
6	3%
7	3%
8	2%
9	1%
10	1%
More than 10	j
<b>Total</b>	101% U

**TABLE 69. CHILDREN LIVING WITH PERSON**

D-5b. (If has children): How many of your children live with you?

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
No children	22%
0	9%
1	21%
2	21%
3	14%
4	8%
5	4%
More than 5	3%
<b>Total</b>	102% U

**TABLE 70. ETHNIC HERITAGE**

D-6. What is your main ethnic heritage?

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Kyrgyz	54%
2. Russian	22%
3. Ukrainian	2%
4. Uzbek	14%
5. Tatar	1%
6. Korean	1%
7. German	1%
8. Other	6%
<b>Total</b>	101%U

**T**ABLE 71. IMPORTANCE OF ETHNICITY

D-7. Which is of more importance to you, your ethnicity or your citizenship?

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Ethnicity	30%
2. Citizenship	31%
3. Equally important (volunteered)	32%
4. Does not care about either (volunteered)	6%
9. Don't know/no response	1%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 72. LANGUAGE

D-8. What language do you speak at home? (Record below and code).

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Kyrgyz	47%
2. Russian	29%
3. Other	14%
4. Kyrgyz and Russian	5%
5. Kyrgyz and Other	2%
6. Russian and Other	2%
7. Other combinations	1%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 73. BELIEF IN GOD

D-9. Do you believe in God?

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Yes	88%
2. No	10%
3. Don't know/no response	3%
<b>Total</b>	101% U

**T**ABLE 74. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

D-10. Are you a member of a religion? [If Yes] Which one?

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96		
(Sample Size)	(1494)		
Member of Religion	Religious Affiliation		
Yes	55%	1. Islam	47%
No	41%	2. Orthodox	7%
Don't know	4%	3. Other Christian	2%
		4. Judaism	j
		5. Buddhism	j
		6. Other	j
		7. None	j
		9. Don't know/no response	45%
<b>Total</b>	100%	<b>Total</b>	101% U

**T**ABLE 75. AGE

D-12. What is your age?

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
18 - 24	22%
25 - 34	25%
35 - 44	23%
45 - 54	11%
55 - 64	9%
65+	10%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 76. EDUCATION

D-13. What is the highest level of education you have received?

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. Less than 4 years at school	4%
2. Completed primary, less than 7 years	4%
3. Some secondary, less than 10 years	4%
4. Completed secondary technical school, 7-8 years	3%
5. Completed high school, 10-11 years	25%
6. Professional, technical school, 10-11 years	10%
7. Specialized technical education	25%
8. Some university	4%
9. University or higher	19%
10. Post-graduate education	j
11. No Response	j
<b>Total</b>	<b>98%U</b>

**T**ABLE 77. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

D-14. Would you describe the financial position of your family as ...

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1494)
1. high	1%
2. moderate/high	10%
3. moderate	57%
4. moderate/low	19%
5. low	13%
6. Don't know/no response	j
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 78. LANGUAGE OF INTERVIEW

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1500)
Kyrgyz	55%
Russian	45%
<b>Total</b>	100%

**T**ABLE 79. SES BY OBSERVATION

Date of Fieldwork	11/30/96 - 12/12/96
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. high	3%
2. moderate/high	29%
4. moderate/low	52%
5. low	15%
6. Not discernable	1%
<b>Total</b>	100% <b>U</b>