
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# PUBLIC OPINION IN AZERBAIJAN 1998

Design and Analysis by Steven Wagner QEV Analytics

Survey Implemented by The International Foundation for Election Systems

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# **NTRODUCTION**

This report presents the results of a survey of public opinion conducted in Azerbaijan during October and November, 1998. Interviews were conducted shortly after the October 11 Presidential election (from October 20 – November 13), with a sample of 1000 randomly selected adults (18+ years of age). In keeping with the standard practice of the IFES survey research program, this survey was intended in so far as possible to be nationally representative of the entire adult population of Azerbaijan. What this means, practically, is that every adult citizen of Azerbaijan had the same chance of being selected for participation in the survey. Great effort was made to conduct interviews in all regions of the country (although some regions had to be excluded for security reasons), in both cities and rural areas, in both the Azeri and Russian languages. These measures were intended to keep to a minimum any population being systematically excluded from the survey.

This survey is a pioneering effort for two reasons: it is the first authentically national survey of public opinion in the country's history, and it is the first survey to focus on attitudes toward the political and economic transition occurring in Azerbaijan. As such, this survey provides a baseline against which future surveys can be judged, and therefore is an important contribution to social science research in Azerbaijan, quite apart from the results of particular questions. On the other hand, there is a disadvantage to being the first; it is not until future surveys replicate the sample characteristics and results to key questions that we can attest there is no distortion of general public opinion inherent in these results, notwithstanding the efforts expended to avoid such distortion.

The survey questionnaire was written by IFES. It drew heavily upon the questionnaires of IFES surveys conducted in other NIS Republics, repeating questions which had proved fruitful. Sample design and interviewing were accomplished by the private firm SIAR of Baku, which was selected by means of a competitive bid process and after interviewing the principals. SIAR has substantial experience conducting marketing research in Azerbaijan. But since marketing research focuses on those in the money economy and usually on urban populations, the challenge this project posed to SIAR was to conduct an appropriate number of interviews in rural areas. SIAR utilized an existing network of experienced interviewers and supervisors, but this team was augmented by new hires, whom SIAR principals trained.

There are many practical difficulties in accomplishing a nationally-representative survey in a country such as Azerbaijan, but two merit special mention. The first is the fluidity of the population and the absence of reliable census data. The internal migrations and emigration, caused by the war and by economic hardship, have been huge. The distribution of our interviews throughout the country is based on our best guess of the local population. Official statistics, for example, do not acknowledge that 41 percent of the national population resides in and around Baku, yet that's where 41 percent of our interviews were conducted. The second problem — doubtless related to the first — is that 2 of 3 persons selected for participation in the survey in Baku refused to participate. We assume this refusal rate is higher among those who are not permanent residents in Baku and may be there unofficially.

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We can not compensate for the practical impact of these methodological considerations, because there is no systematic distortion of the results which we can detect and quantify. We do not know if the aggregate results would have been different had we completed interviews with those in Baku who refused the survey. But we do know that the results of most questions from Baku do not differ in substantial and unexpected ways from the results obtained outside of Baku. Having observed the results of questions concerning satisfaction with government authorities, it is also clear that most respondents were not unwilling to be critical of the government. We encourage readers to consider for themselves, based on their knowledge of the country, whether the results might have been different without these difficulties.

A word of explanation about our approach to the analysis and presentation of the results from this survey in Azerbaijan. Polls measure discrete opinions, values, perceptions or behaviors of the population being studied. And often the responses to individual questions are quite illuminating. But a population cannot be understood principally by their individual responses to numerous survey questions. In a large survey, such as this survey now before us, the sheer number of questions can easily obscure the forest by the number of trees.

For this reason, IFES seeks to derive meaningful generalizations about the Azerbaijani population by examining the patterns of responses to key questions and aggregating the data through techniques of statistical analysis. In this way, we intend to reveal the most important, the most politically relevant opinion constituencies in Azerbaijan, identified by their common and distinct combinations of responses to a variety of questions.

This survey questionnaire was designed to serve several information-gathering purposes. But the core purpose was to assess public opinions on a set of fundamental principles related to the political and economic evolution of the Azerbaijan nation. Namely, IFES sought to assess:

- the public's degree of political liberalism, measured by their embrace of democracy;
- the public's degree of economic liberalism, measured by their embrace of a market oriented economy;
- the public's degree of satisfaction with the performance of government at various levels, including officials' responsiveness to public opinion and respect for individual rights;
- the extent of public satisfaction with the circumstances of their country today, measured by various questions on the economy and the situation in Azerbaijan in general;
- the relative degree of public aversion to or enthusiasm for societal change (this is measured by questions concerning one's reaction to actual societal changes afoot in Azerbaijan today; change aversion should not be taken to be opposition to political and economic reform, it is reflective of the general impact of change on the quality of life);
- the extent of information consumption and awareness of public policy issues.

IFES' experience in conducting now more than a dozen surveys in republics of the former Soviet Union is that these six indicators, when combined, yield a robust portrait of the public opinion landscape, at least insofar as the political and economic evolution of the nation is concerned. Doubtless subsequent national surveys will probe any one of these areas more deeply than we were able to, or will identify additional dimensions of the opinion climate which are fruitful. Still, we have found this combination of opinions to yield valuable insights.

The IFES research strategy is to avoid dependence on any single question when measuring these fundamental dimensions of public opinion. This survey asked, for example, nine questions concerning democracy (as a concept) and political liberty, including an open-ended question, "what does it mean to you to live in a democracy" (an open-ended question is one which does not impose response options on the respondents, but instead records their verbatim response, including the response, "I have no idea"). These questions were drawn from the IFES core questionnaire, which consists of generic questions concerning political and economic values, honed through our repeated surveys in the former Soviet Union.

These multiple questions on a single, fundamental aspect of public opinion — such as attitudes toward democracy — are then combined, utilizing the statistical technique of factor analysis. Factor analysis confirms the legitimacy of combining various questions into a single measure, (we call these composite or multi-question measures the IFES "opinion indicators"), and then generates a score for each respondent, indicating where they fall along the scale of, for example, favorability or aversion toward democracy. Of our six "IFES indicators," four were defined in this way by factor analysis; one (intellectual engagement) was created more simply by counting the incidence of don't know responses to selected key questions or the expression of disinterest to others concerning awareness; one (change aversion) is a simply a typology created through the cross-tabulation of two questions.

In the final analytic step, the respondents are grouped according to the similarity of their scores on these six IFES indicators, using the technique of cluster analysis. Cluster analysis groups respondents based on the similarity of their responses. But the outcome of the analysis - in terms of the number of groups which cluster analysis creates - is specified at the beginning of the process. In the case of this survey in Azerbaijan, we settled on four as the number of groups we wanted to define. Of course, a larger number of groups could have been selected, but we felt this would not have improved the clarity of our findings. By experimenting with different outcomes in terms of the number of groups which cluster analysis defines, we can find the ideal number of groups which has the greatest explanatory power, bearing in mind that simplicity in statistical analysis is still considered a virtue.

# EY CONSTITUENCIES IN AZERBAIJAN

# Fig 1. Key Constituencies in Azerbaijan

Figure 1 illustrates the four key constituencies which emerge from this analysis. A detailed description of the indicator components upon which this categorization is based follows the description of these constituencies.

# **Pro-Government Democrats (33%)**

- Second highest level of pro-democratic opinion (98%);
- Second highest level of economic liberalism (88% pro-market);
- Overwhelmingly of the opinion that Azerbaijan is already a democracy (74%);
- Large majority (85%) satisfied with the performance of government;
- Most are satisfied with the situation in Azerbaijan today;
- The only constituency not change averse (meaning they welcome the change actually occurring in Azerbaijan as beneficial to the quality of life;
- Highly engaged intellectually;
- Relatively few low income respondents.

This is the largest of the four constituencies and a substantial minority of the Azerbaijani population. It is the base of popular support for the government, in that this constituency is the only one of the four which is unambiguously satisfied with the activities of the government. This is good news for the future of democratic reform in Azerbaijan: the most pro-government constituency is one of the most pro-democratic (on the other hand, there is no substantial anti-democratic, anti-market constituency to which an anti-reform government could appeal for support). The members of this constituency are generally prospering economically — which shows that the link between economic prosperity and satisfaction with government applies the world over. It is also likely that this constituency's economic success has yielded an enthusiasm for change. Persons in this constituency tend to be information consumers.

### Pro-Democracy Critics (24%)

- Highest level of pro-democratic opinion (100%);
- Highest level of economic liberalism (100% pro-market);
- Plurality says Azerbaijan not a democracy, not becoming one (so say 45%);
- Highest incidence of dissatisfaction with government (92%);
- Majority very dissatisfied with situation in Azerbaijan;
- Change averse (53% say change is occurring and making things worse; again, this does not mean they are anti-reform in principle);
- Intellectually engaged, most are information consumers;
- High incidence of low income respondents.

This, the second largest constituency, represents the base of the democratic opposition to government in Azerbaijan. Part of this opposition may well be due to political circumstances: this constituency is the most liberal, yet the most likely to say Azerbaijan is not a democracy and not in the process of becoming one. Part of the opposition arises from economics: very few in this constituency have not experienced food shortages. The prevailing sense among this constituency is that Azerbaijan is deteriorating.

# Controlled-Economy Democrats (23%)

- Overwhelmingly pro-democratic, though more moderately so than previous two constituencies (36% are very pro-democratic, versus 43% of the national population);
- Most economically illiberal (81% opposed to market economy);
- Plurality (43%) says Azerbaijan not a democracy, not becoming one;
- Overwhelmingly dissatisfied with performance of government (73%);
- Highly dissatisfied with situation in Azerbaijan today;
- Most change averse;
- Most intellectually engaged;
- Highest incidence of "impoverished intellectuals."

This substantial constituency proves that democratic sentiments and support for a market economy do not necessarily go hand-in-hand in the reality of public opinion, even if the link is indivisible in principle. This constituency is also a potential source of opposition to the current government, as was the previous constituency, but opposition from this quarter is less daunting because of an aversion to market reforms. A significant portion of this constituency consists of the best-educated of Azerbaijani society who are trapped in low paying government jobs (doctors, teachers, scientists, engineers), by virtue of its investment in specialized education. Because this class is largely precluded from participation in the new economy, economic change in Azerbaijan has meant a loss of status and income.

## **Disengaged Skeptics (20%)**

- Divided on democracy (majority is moderately pro, only 1% are strongly pro);
- Divided on market economy (52% are economic liberals, versus 68% of the national population);
- Plurality don't know whether Azerbaijan is a democracy (while 29% say it is a democracy and 29% say it is not one and not becoming one);
- Evenly divided on performance of government (59% pro-government);
- Huge majority (82%) dissatisfied with situation in Azerbaijan;
- Half say change is not occurring (or don't know if change is occurring);
- Least intellectually engaged constituency;
- Highest incidence of low skill, low education, low income stratum.


This, the smallest of the four constituencies, is highly significant, in that it embraces most of the opposition to democracy. The goal of creating a democratic Azerbaijan seems to enjoy very broad support in the country (although this statement should be tempered by the fact that many say Azerbaijan is already a democracy). The modest opposition to democracy is centered not among an ideologically committed constituency seeking a return to the old system, but rather quite the opposite: an economically vulnerable constituency with many pensioners and low-skill workers which is substantially out-of-touch with current events in Azerbaijan. Indeed, this may be the problem: this constituency may include many anti-democrats precisely because they are unaware of the fact that democracy is the new orthodoxy and stated objective of the national government.



The constituencies elaborated upon in the preceding section were defined by clustering persons with similar scores on the following six opinion indicators. These six opinion indicators are themselves condensations of several or many individual survey questions.

# I. Political Liberalism & Attitudes toward Democracy

A very distinctive feature of Azerbaijani public opinion is the breadth of support for democracy and of politically liberal sentiments. Our summarization of responses to four questions on democracy and political liberalism finds that 43 percent are very "pro-democratic," 47 percent are somewhat "pro-democratic," and just 10 percent score as anti-democratic — meaning a huge 90 percent are favorably disposed toward democracy.



#### Fig 2. Sentiments toward Democracy

The first of the component questions concerned whether Azerbaijan should strive to be a democracy. Fully 87 percent responded in the affirmative, accepting democracy as the appropriate goal. Just 7 percent said Azerbaijan should not strive to become a democracy, and 7 percent said they didn't know (Question 66).

In the second of our democracy scale questions, a substantial 72 percent said that being a democracy promotes solutions to economic problems, rejecting the alternative that democracy creates obstacles to finding such solutions (the opinion of 2%, question 70). Fifteen percent (15%) said that being a democracy would not make a difference to economic performance.

The same number (71%) said that democracy benefits the people generally, rather than "just a few at the top" (the opinion of 21%, question 71). Finally, 65 percent rejected the proposition that it is necessary to limit the political and civil rights of the people in order to establish order and discipline in society (question 73). Forty-eight percent (48%) strongly disagreed with this proposition, while 31 percent agreed (15% strongly).

These questions sought to measure public acceptance of the most prevalent criticisms of democracy; namely, that it is an inefficient system of government which impedes the resolution of economic crises or the maintenance of good order in society, or that democracy camouflages a new spoils system for some elite. These criticisms obviously have little resonance in Azerbaijan today.

Skeptics might respond to these findings that the people of Azerbaijan have little immediate experience with authentic democracy, so they cannot know what democracy actually is. Yet we asked in an open-ended format what it meant to live in a democracy (question 69), and a very modest 14 percent said they didn't know, indicating that 86 percent at least thought that they were able to articulate some conception of democracy.

What does it mean to you to live in a democracy?	
	(n=1000)
Freedom/Independence	35%
Providing the law	19%
To live well, prosper	15%
Happiness/normal life	10%
Freedom of speech	8%
Work provision	5%
Freedom of thinking	3%
Religious freedom	1%
Social welfare	1%
Anarchy	1%
Other	1%
DK/NR	14%

Fig 3. Meaning of Democracy

As is typical in other IFES surveys in the region, it is not the negative conceptions of democracy in Azerbaijan which are troubling. Only 10 respondents (1%) said democracy entails anarchy, while a mere 3 respondents (<1%) said it leads to a proliferation of political parties presumably a bad thing. These were the entire extent of negative comments (which is why this question was not included in our democracy scale because the responses were so skewed toward the positive).


What is striking about the way Azerbaijanis conceive of democracy is the extent to which it is seen to imply economic prosperity. Fifteen percent (15%) said democracy means living well or living in prosperity; 10 percent said democracy means living in happiness or "normal conditions;" 5 percent said it means an absence of salary conflicts. These responses suggest the

possibility that a very significant minority of 30 percent is prone to disappointment if progress toward democracy does not lead to improvement in economic conditions. It is certainly in the interest of a stable and durable public support for democracy that it not be linked to shortterm economic performance.

The majority of responses to this question cited freedom in general (35%) or in a specific arena (speech, 8%; thinking 3%; religion 1%). Other conceptions of democracy included the fair application of the laws (19%), and a surprisingly small number cited social welfare protections (1%).

While the survey included several questions concerning voting in principle, these were not included in constructing the political liberalism scale. There seems to be very broad agreement in Azerbaijan about the efficacy of voting, which means these questions do not discriminate well between the politically liberal and the illiberal. In other countries, this lack of a correlation between the benefits of voting and political liberalism is attributable to a substantial constituency of anti-government democrats which dismisses voting as being too susceptible to government manipulation. This is not the case in Azerbaijan: there, instead of a group of democrats opposed to voting, we find that even a majority of anti-democrats concede that voting empowers.






More specifically, 71 percent agree with the proposition that voting gives people a chance to influence decision-making in Azerbaijan (24% disagree, question 72). Seventy-eight percent (78%) agree that government officials who must be elected will be "more concerned with doing what the people want" (17% disagree, question 74). And 76 percent agree that government officials who must be elected will be more respectful of the rights of the people (19% disagree, question 75). Apparently whatever apprehensions the anti-democrats have about the system of democracy, it does not arise from a contempt for voting. On the other hand, discussing the virtues of the ballot will not woo anti-democrats — they seem to be already generally aware of the virtues.

The fact that Azerbaijan has had elections — that the conduct of elections is a stated feature of government policy — means that supporters of the government will be generally inclined to perceive voting as a good thing by extension, which may account for the breadth of popular endorsement of voting in principle. But this endorsement of voting in general is different from an authentic understanding of what free and fair elections actually consist of. The only practical experience of elections the public has had comes from those elections actually held in Azerbaijan, and there may be a tendency among the public to perceive any and all elections as consistent with democracy.

A question concerning the ideal number of political parties did not do a good job in Azerbaijan of discriminating between the politically liberal and illiberal, although it has served this purpose well in other countries of the former Soviet Union. The results do indicate that the proper role of political parties in a democracy is not widely appreciated in Azerbaijan. While only 5 percent said there should be no parties, 25 percent said there should be just one party. This response varies from 19 percent among the most politically liberal (pro-democracy) to 58 percent among the least liberal (anti-democracy). Thirteen percent (13%) said there should be two parties; 35 percent "several parties;" 14 percent "many parties." So a majority of 62 percent think a multi-party system is ideal (question 98). More on political parties to follow.



In order to provide some frame of reference for public attitudes regarding the political evolution toward democracy, we included questions concerning public perceptions of the current democratic status of Azerbaijan. A plurality of 44 percent report that Azerbaijan is already "primarily" a democracy (question 67). As we have seen, this response is especially prevalent among "Pro-Government Democrats." An additional 14 percent are of the opinion that while Azerbaijan is not a democracy, it is in the process of becoming one (question 68). This leaves a considerable minority of 30 percent which asserts that Azerbaijan is not a democracy and is not becoming one; 12 percent "don't know" the democratic status of Azerbaijan. The perceptions that Azerbaijan is a democracy or is becoming one are especially prevalent among the politically liberal, while the politically illiberal are mostly of the opinion Azerbaijan is not on the road to democracy. Is this simply wishful thinking?

Fig 6. Azerbaijani Democracy, by Sentiment towards Democracy "Would you say that Azerbaijan is primarily a democracy today, or is it not primarily a democracy?" Pro-Govt. Democrats

11%

6%

■ Is/Is Becoming a Democracy ■ Not Becoming a Democracy

39%

32%




**Pro-Democracy Critics** 


**Disengaged Skeptics** 

Don't Know

Although democracy enjoys very broad support in Azerbaijan, the market economy is much more controversial. This is not overly surprising, given the current conditions of economic adversity in Azerbaijan. A majority (59%) describe the current economic situation as "bad;" 35 percent say it is "good" (question 21). But at least there is a fair degree of optimism about economic prospects for the future: a modest 16 percent expect the economy to worsen over the next year; 29 percent expect it will improve; 29 percent expect it will be about the same in a year's time as it is now (question 22).




"How would you describe the current economic situation in Azerbaijan today?" "And 12 months from now, do you expect the economic situation in Azerbaijan will be better than it is now, will be worse than it is now, or will it be about the same as it is now?"



We sought to gauge economic distress (at least partially) with this question: "Please tell me if you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely with this statement — 'there are many times during the year in which my family is not able to buy all of the food it needs to eat' (question 27)." Six-in-ten (62%) agree completely, and 21 percent agree somewhat, meaning 84 percent (with rounding) experience food shortages during the


year. This question is not specific as to whether these food shortages result from a lack of supply or a lack of money. In either case, it reveals the seriousness of the economic distress experienced by many Azerbaijanis. But readers should also note that while there is a clear correlation between responses to this question and income or socio-economic status level, many "middle class" or economically comfortable respondents agree with this proposition, indicating that some of the response may be driven by rising expectations (as in, "we can't afford to buy the sorts of food we desire to consume," as distinct from nutritional requirements).


As was done to achieve our scale of political liberalism, several questions concerning the market economy were combined using factor analysis to yield a score of economic liberalism. We find 21 percent to qualify as the most economically liberal (that is, supportive of a market economy), while 47 percent are more liberal than not, 25 percent are more illiberal (anti-market) than not, and 7 percent score as the most illiberal.



#### Fig 8. Economic Ideology

The first question from which this scale was drawn concerns whether the goal of Azerbaijan should be to achieve an economy "with little government control" (the preference of 46%), or an economy "basically controlled by the government" (the preference of 45%, question 23). Of course, the former was the preference of all of the most economically liberal.





Despite this disagreement concerning goals, 85 percent say that economic reforms are necessary (question 24), and a plurality (46%, question 25) say that economic reforms are being pursued "too slowly." Just 4 percent are of the opinion that current economic reforms are occurring "too quickly." Azerbaijani citizens may not agree on where they should be going economically, but they want to get there faster.


Part of the ambiguity about the direction of economic reforms arises from the perception of many Azerbaijanis that a free market economy benefits "just a few people at the top" (so say 48%), while 43 percent say a market economy is beneficial to most people (question 26; this is the second of the questions used to create the scale of economic liberalism).

On the other hand, 84 percent of respondents believe that Azerbaijani citizens should be able to own, buy, or sell land, revealing that whatever desire exists for a centralized, controlled economy, this desire is mitigated by an endorsement of property rights (question 29). On another dimension of economic liberalism, a narrower majority of 66 percent agree that foreign firms have the right to open businesses in Azerbaijan; 29 percent disagree this right exists (question 30). Openness to foreign investment does not extend to land ownership: Azerbaijanis are overwhelmingly against allowing foreign firms to purchase or own land in Azerbaijan, by the margin of 87 percent to 11 percent (question 31).

This survey finds that 30 percent of the Azerbaijani adult population is unemployed and looking for work (question 113). Thirty-nine percent (39%) of our sample are currently employed, 15 percent are pensioners, 4 percent are students, and 11 percent work at home (farmers and the self-employed are included in the employed figure). The centrality of the government's role in the economy as a provider of employment is revealed by the 23 percent who report they are government officials and the 13 percent who report that they or their spouse work for a government-owned factory or farm (questions 114, 115).


Public Opinion in Azerbaijan 1998 Steven Wagner

One of the most important economic issues for the future of Azerbaijan is the manner in which revenues from oil extraction are to be distributed to the citizens. Seventy-three percent (73%) believe revenues from the development of Azerbaijan's vast oil resources ought to shared with all citizens, 24 percent say that Azerbaijan's oil wealth belongs to the government — a clear indication of the public's desire for profit-sharing.



#### 2.1 The Relationship between Political and Economic Liberalism

Many people in Azerbaijan express pro-democratic sentiments. Yet the market economy is much more controversial, so clearly a significant number of "democrats" must necessarily be unsympathetic toward economic liberalization. While this is true, in Azerbaijan the size of the politically liberal/economically illiberal constituency is considerably smaller than in other countries of the former Soviet Union in which IFES has conducted surveys.



#### Fig 11. Political-Economic Liberalism Convergence


Fully 62 percent of the Azerbaijani population scores as both politically and economically liberal, while 28 percent are politically liberal but economically illiberal. This means roughly one democrat in three is generally opposed to market-oriented reforms.


# 3. Satisfaction with the Performance of Government

Respondents were asked to gauge their degree of satisfaction with 13 categories of government activity (questions 33-45). Four separate questions assessed the perceived responsiveness of various branches of government to "the needs and concerns of the public" (questions 46-49). These questions (with the exception of questions 43, 45, 48) were combined into a single measure of satisfaction with the performance of government generally. Note well that no question in this survey specifically asked the respondents' opinion of, or satisfaction with, any particular government official. And satisfaction with the delivery of these specific government services is but one dimension of the public's relationship with their government.

Factor analysis confirms that these numerous questions can be legitimately combined into a single measure. This finding results from a consistency of responses: individuals tend to respond to each of the items in the same way, whether positively or negatively.

Overall, 48 percent score as satisfied with government performance, of whom 14 percent are intensely satisfied. Fifty-two percent (52%) are dissatisfied, of whom 21 percent are intensely dissatisfied. As we have seen, most of those who are satisfied with government fall into the "Pro-Government Democrats" constituency, with the balance being found among "Disengaged Skeptics."





The government activity with which respondents are most satisfied is the system of elections (63% satisfied, 30% dissatisfied). This is followed by the fight against crime and the moral character of the national leadership, with which over half are satisfied. A plurality is satisfied with the extent of political and civil freedom. Majorities are dissatisfied with the quality of water provided by authorities, the moral character of the people (these latter two were not


included in the satisfaction scale), the implementation of land reform, the implementation of economic reform, the quality of education, respect for the rights of citizens, opportunities for citizens to influence government, social welfare protections and, lastly, the quality of health care — the source of greatest dissatisfaction (75% dissatisfied, 24% satisfied).


Please tell me how satisfied you arewith each of the following activities?	n=	1000
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
The system of elections	62%	30%
The fight against crime	56%	38%
The moral character of leaders of the country	52%	35%
The extent of political and civic freedom	50%	40%
The moral character of the people	42%	50%
The quality of the water provided by authorities	42%	55%
The implementation of land ownership reforms	40%	44%
The implementation of economic reforms	39%	48%
The quality of the educational system	38%	57%
Respect for the rights of citizens by govt.	37%	56%
The opportunity of citizens to influence the actions of government	27%	59%
The quality of health care	24%	75%
The social welfare protection of the people	21%	74%

Figure 13. Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction

Of the various branches of government we tested, the president was reported to be the most responsive to the needs and concerns of the people, with 81 percent saying he is very or somewhat responsive. Rayon Governors came next, followed by the Cabinet of Ministers and the Milli Mejlis (which 56% graded as responsive).








# 4. Perceptions of the Current Situation in Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is certainly a country in flux, and its citizens are experiencing the current social environment in widely different ways. Some are flourishing in this new environment, and these folks are clustered in the "Pro-Government Democrats" constituency. Others are finding times quite difficult, as was revealed by the economic questions, particularly the one regarding adequacy of access to food. But the economy is not the only arena in Azerbaijan creating dislocations.

At the most general level, 41 percent are satisfied with the situation in Azerbaijan today, while 58 percent are dissatisfied (question 15). But 28 percent are very dissatisfied while only 4 percent are very satisfied, so there is a considerable disparity in intensity of sentiment on this question. The same is true for respondents' quality of life: 46 percent rate the quality of their life as good but only 3 say it is very good; 54 percent say their quality of life is bad, and 24 percent say it is very bad (question 11).

The perception prevails widely that since Independence there are now greater possibilities for individual economic activity than before (question 19). And 89 percent say there is greater religious freedom now than before Independence (4% say there is less, question 18). But the observance of individuals' legal rights has deteriorated since Independence, in the view of 50 percent (22% report this is better than before Independence, question 20). Overall, 51 percent report the quality of life in Azerbaijan has gotten worse since Independence, while a substantial minority (31%) say it has gotten better (question 17).

To say the least, there are emerging classes of winners and losers in Azerbaijan's social, political and economic evolution. Summarizing the results of these various questions, 39 percent are intensely dissatisfied with the state of their country, 30 percent are somewhat dissatisfied, 23 percent are somewhat satisfied, and 9 percent are intensely satisfied.



#### Fig 15. Overall Satisfaction with Conditions in Azerbaijan

The most frequently cited problem confronting Azerbaijan today is the Nagorno-Karabakh territorial issue (named by 49% as the most important problem facing the country today, question 16). Twenty percent (20%) cited unemployment (not surprising in a country with 30% unemployment according to this survey); 10 percent cited generic economic issues; 8 percent cited problems related to welfare and social concerns; 4 percent the refugee situation. Various political problems of corruption, conduct of the elections, and the insufficiency of democracy were cited by a total of 4 percent.

In your opinion, what is the single biggest problem Azerbaijan faces as a country - that is, the problem which is of most concern to you?	n=1000
Karabakh problem	49%
Unemployment	20%
Economic problems	10%
Social problems/weifare	8%
Refugee problems	4%
Absence of democracy	2%
Corruption	1%
Elections	1%
Other	4%
Don't know	2%

#### Figure 16. Single Biggest Problem Facing Azerbaijan


While the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh caused tremendous disruptions to Azerbaijani society, our survey found a fairly modest impact in terms of displaced persons. Eighty percent (80%) tell us they lived in their current place of residence prior to the war. Fifteen percent (15%) moved since the war, but not because of the war. Five percent (5%) relocated because of the war (question 119).

#### 5. Perspectives on Change

In many surveys throughout the world — including in the United States — a people's relative enthusiasm for, or aversion to, change has been found to color their responses to many policyspecific questions. This experience lead us to include some basic questions regarding perceptions of change in defining our key Azerbaijani constituencies.

A majority of 63 percent contend there are indeed "many changes occurring" in Azerbaijan today (while 31% perceive few if any changes and 7% "don't know," question 12). However, just over a third of that 63 percent who perceive change to be occurring regard it as unambiguously good. Nearly as many say change is occurring yet making things in Azerbaijan worse overall (26% of the total sample say change is occurring and it is making things better; 23% overall say change is occurring and it is making things worse; question 13) (Figure 17 next page).


Fig 17. Effect of Changes in Azerbaijan "These changes which you sense, are they mainly making life in Azerbaijan better or mainly making life in Azerbaijan worse?"



And yet, more people say change is occurring in Azerbaijan too slowly (24%) than say it is occurring too rapidly (12%, question 14). Twenty-six percent (26%) say change is occurring at the right pace (the 31% which said in the previous question that no change was occurring were not asked this follow-up question, but the percentages reported here are based on the entire sample).

## 6. Information Consumption & Media Habits

When creating a typology of the population of a developing country, such as we have done here with the "Key Constituencies," it is important to recognize that some significant portion of that population is going to be removed from current events and national affairs by disinterest, poor education, or geographic remoteness. So between the ideologically committed pro-democracy and anti-democracy factions lies a potentially large population of the intellectually disengaged.



In Azerbaijan, this population was not found to be particularly large in comparison with other nations of the region. We simply counted the incidence of "don't know" responses to 22 key questions, and based our intellectual engagement scale on the result (included are three questions asking persons to rate their own level of awareness about developments in Azerbaijan). A large minority of 21 percent — our most engaged category — neither responded "don't know" once nor rated their own level of information as poor. Another 46 percent are clearly attentive to national affairs, while 19 percent are modestly engaged and 15 percent are the least engaged. Those less engaged tended to cluster in the "Disengaged Skeptics" constituency.

On the individual questions concerning awareness of developments in Azerbaijan, only 2 percent report having a "great deal" of information on economic developments, and 30 percent "a fair amount" of information. Half (50%) rate their extent of economic information as "not very much," and 14 percent as "none at all" (question 28). On the political front, 8 percent have a "great deal" of information, 39 percent have "a fair amount," 40 percent have "not very much" information about political developments, and 12 percent have "none at all" (question 51). But the public's level of interest in politics is much higher than its level of information: 53 percent are very or somewhat interested in matters of politics and government, versus 26 percent which is "not too interested," and 20 percent which is "not interested at all" (question 50).

As a source of news and information, foreign television received via satellite is utilized nearly as often by the Azerbaijani public (42% use this news source "often") as is Azerbaijani State TV programs (57% use this source "often;" questions 52-64). Domestic private TV programming is watched "often" by 29 percent. Twenty-eight (28%) often read newspapers. Radio is the third most utilized medium for news. Asked to identify sources of news and information which are free of government control, foreign TV and domestic private TV were most frequently cited (question 65).

Fig 19. Sources of information book often	
"Now I am going to read to you several sources of information you might use to get informationplease tell me if you use the source often, sometimes, or never."	n=1000
Discussions with family, friends	62%
Azerbaijani state TV	57%
Foreign TV received directly in Azerbaijan	42%
Azerbaijani private TV	29%
Azerbaijani newspapers	28%
Azerbaijani private radio	19%
Azerbaijani state radio	18%
Foreign Azeri-language radio	15%
Foreign TV within Azerbaijan	14%
Azerbaijani magazines	5%
Foreign newspapers	5%
Other foreign radio	4%
Foreign magazines	3%

#### Fig 19. Sources of Information Used 'Often'

# EMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PUBLIC


We have gone to some lengths to explain the distinct opinion constituencies which exist in Azerbaijan today. Readers will have noted that little has been said thus far about demographic characteristics of the Azerbaijani public, in the context of accounting for political and economic values. This is because we have found demographic characteristics to be generally poor predictors of attitudes related to political and economic liberalism.

Strictly speaking, demographics characteristics relate to the density, distribution, and vital statistics (births and deaths) of a population. In survey research, the term has come to mean those physical characteristics of the individual which are either immutable (sex, race, ethnicity, age at a particular point in time) or other personal characteristics which are unlikely to change (education, marital and family status, socio-economic status). In general, these characteristics do not predict an individual's orientation toward the most important developmental issues in a country such as Azerbaijan. This having been said, there is one exception.

In the Republics of the former Soviet Union, there are three characteristics of the population which are very distinctive in comparison with other nations of the world: the first is the very high rates of literacy, even in situations of great poverty; the second is the presence of significant ethnic minorities (Russians) which are distinctly less enthusiastic about their nations' independence than the titular ethnicity; the third is the inversion of the normal relationship between education and income — and this latter is highly significant for the political development of the these nations.

What this inversion means is that there exists throughout the former Soviet Union a large constituency of persons who are both very well educated and poor, disrupting the world-wide correlation between income and education. In fact, in most of the former Soviet Republics these are the "best and the brightest," an extremely valuable human capital, critical to the successful development of their countries. These persons undertook training to achieve high prestige positions such as doctors, teachers, engineers and scientists. And unfortunately, these occupations generally still have one sole source employer, namely the government. Hence these persons are barred, because of their investment in advanced education and skills development, from participating in the new economy, at least for the moment.

In order to isolate this cluster, we have combined the interviewer's ranking of the respondent's socio-economic status (question 8), with the respondent's reported education level (question 112), self-described income level (question 131), and experience with food shortages (question 27). What emerges is that there are four distinct socio-economic groups in Azerbaijan, and these groups do in fact have some unique political identity. In general, economic status has no effect on attitudes toward democracy, but it is critical to satisfaction with the government and with the situation in Azerbaijan generally.



# Fig 20. Demographic Grouping of Azerbaijani Public

# I. Highly-Educated Poor (19%)

- Highest rate of full-time employment (44%);
- Exclusively professional or government official;
- Most completed higher education;
- All have experienced food shortages;
- Second lowest level of self-described Socio-Economic Status (50%);
- Dissatisfied with performance of the government;
- Dissatisfied with situation in Azerbaijan;
- Change averse;
- Disproportionately male;
- Oldest cohort;
- Lowest level of religious affiliation.

#### 2. Satisfied Middle Class (16%)

- Second highest income;
- Most attended high school but not college;
- All report no experience with food shortages;
- Mostly skilled laborers and government officials;
- Most satisfied with the performance of government.

# 3. The Prosperous Class (31%)

- Highest level of observed Socio-Economic Status;
- All experienced food shortages;
- One third attended college;
- Government officials and skilled laborers;
- Highest rate of state enterprise employment.

# 4. The Bottom Rung (34%)

- Lowest educational achievement, majority having some or completed high school;
- Lowest self-described Socio-Economic Status (75%);
- Highest proportion of unskilled laborers;
- Lowest rate of full-time employment;
- Highest rate of pensioners (21%);
- All experienced food shortages;
- Majority dissatisfied with government.

Regarding other characteristics of the population, the migration into Baku is chronicled by this survey. Forty-one percent (41%) of our survey sample came from Baku, but just 17 percent are from Baku originally (questions 6 & 121).

Azerbaijan is the most homogeneous former Soviet Asian Republic IFES has yet surveyed, with an 89 percent "titular" ethnic majority of Azeris; 4 percent are Russian (question 120). Seventy-one percent of the survey sample is married with children, while four percent are married without children (questions 116 & 117). Seventeen percent (17%) have never been married; 6 percent of those surveyed are widowed; 2 percent are divorced.




Fig 21. Nationality

Twenty-four percent of our sample was under 30 years of age, highlighting the young average age of the Azerbaijani population. Fourteen percent were 60+ years of age (question 111).

# THER ISSUES

#### The 1998 Presidential Election


Seventy-three percent (73%) of those surveyed report they voted in the October II Presidential elections, compared with 43 percent who recall voting in the 1995 elections for the Milli Mejlis (questions 99 & 76). This level of participation is generally consistent with official accounts of the 1998 election turnout. The Central Election Commission (CEC) reported an aggregate vote of 3,291,336, as follows:

President H. Aliyev	2,554,104	(78%)
Etibar Mamedov	389,399	(12%)
Nazamei Suleymanov	270,665	(8%)
Others	66,281	(2%)
None	10,887	(<1%)

There are no reliable official population statistics which reflect the emigration of perhaps 700,000 Azerbaijanis since the last census, nor the migration into Baku, although a census is now underway. A rough but reasonable estimation of the voting age population is 4.5 million, which, if correct, results in a 73 percent election participation, given the above results, as the survey found. This assumes a national population of about 7 million, and that the voting age population is 64 percent of the national population.

Respondent scores on the political liberalism and economic liberalism scales do not seem to affect likelihood of participating in the elections. But one's degree of satisfaction with the performance of the government does affect likelihood of voting, ranging from 85 percent participation among the most satisfied to 53 percent among the least satisfied. Obviously this effect is beneficial to the government, since its critics are less likely than its fans to actually vote. Coincident with this government satisfaction effect, there is also a significant variation in the voting behavior between the various key constituencies. While a high of 84 percent among the "Pro-Government Democrats" voted, a low of 59 percent among "Pro-Democracy Critics" turned out — fewer than the 65 percent of "Disengaged Skeptics" who reported they voted. Clearly the boycott had some impact among the most liberal critics of the government.

Voters and non-voters differ widely in their perceptions about the elections. While 80 percent of voters said the elections were conducted fairly and honestly, only 39 percent of non-voters believe that (question 100). Similarly, 60 percent of voters believe that the vote count was done either "completely honestly" or "pretty honestly," while only 28 percent of non-voters believe this to be true (question 101). Notice, however, the decline in the number of those confident in the vote count, compared to the conduct of the voting: 17 percent of both voters and non-voters endorsed the election itself (as fair and honest) but not the vote count. Onein-five (21%) non-voters say the vote count was "not honest at all." Forty-eight percent of those who voted in the 1995 elections say those elections were either "completely" or "mostly" fair (question 78). Sixty-seven percent (67%) of 1995 voters report those elections were administered well (question 77).



The Central Election Commission (CEC) receives high marks from 1998 voters: 69 percent say the CEC performed its work well, but one-third of non-voters say they don't know how well (or poorly) the CEC performed (question 102). Seventy-eight percent (78%) of voters believe the CEC did a good job of telling people how to go about voting (question 103). Interestingly, almost half (44%) of those who didn't vote in the election say the CEC performed well in this area (however, 32% of non-voters said the CEC performed this function poorly). Most voters had sufficient information about the political parties in order to make their vote decision: three-fourths say the information was sufficient while only 8 percent say it was insufficient (question 105). However, 53 percent of those surveyed admit they do not know the name of the Deputy who represents them in the Milli Mejlis (question 79).

Respondents gave four main reasons for not voting (question 104). Thirty percent (30%) were not at their permanent place of residence and 23 percent said they were unable to get to the polling place. Twenty-three (23%) percent believe that voting will not change anything and 21 percent say they already knew what the results would be. Of those who did vote, 67 percent believe they had a duty as a citizen to do so while 58 percent voted because they wanted to have a voice in the future of the country. Fifty-six percent voted because they liked one of the candidates (question 106, multiple responses were accepted).

## Azerbaijanis Endorse a Multiple Political Party System

Azerbaijan has numerous political parties, most of which are not well known to the people. Forty-six percent (46%) say they have heard "a great deal" or "a fair amount" about the political parties; 52 percent have heard little or nothing about Azerbaijan's political parties (question 82). The party with which the greatest number of people are familiar is the President's Yeni Azerbaijan Party at 91 percent. Nearly as many (87%) are familiar with the People's Front Party. Eighty-three percent (83%) are familiar with the Azerbaijan Milli Istakal Party; 79 percent are familiar with the Musavat Party; 65 percent are familiar with the Azerbaijan Communist Party. No other party is familiar to more than 50 percent of the public (questions 84 - 95).

When asked to identity the two political parties which best represent the interests "of people like you," 39 percent named the Yeni Azerbaijan Party; 27 percent named the Milli Istakal Party; 13 percent named the Musavat Party; and 12 percent named the Azerbaijan Communist Party (question 96 & 97). No other party obtained more the 10 percent. Note that in the case of the People's Front Party, familiarity does not breed esteem.

A significant number, but nonetheless fewer than half (48%), consider the various political parties to have distinct policy identities; 35 percent say the parties have not evidenced significant differences in how they would solve the nation's problems (question 83). In the view of IFES, the lack of a distinct policy identity is a major impediment to the development of a broad public following for the political parties of Azerbaijan.

## **Ethnic Relations**

As noted, Azerbaijan is an ethnically homogeneous Republic, with an 89 percent Azeri majority (question 120). A very large majority (83%) rate relations between ethnic groups as "good," while 16 percent characterize relations as "bad" (question 109). Yet a resounding 93 percent majority say that all ethnic groups should enjoy the same rights as citizens (question 110).

Seventy-four percent (74%) are proud to be citizens of Azerbaijan, and 82 percent say their identity as a citizen is more important than their ethnic identity (question 122 & 123).

# The Role of Religion in Azerbaijani Society

Just as Azerbaijan is an ethnically homogeneous country, it is also religiously homogeneous, with an 89 percent Islamic majority; 4 percent are Russian Orthodox, 6 percent have no religious affiliation (question 126). While almost all (96%) believe in God, religion plays an important role in the lives of far fewer, 49 percent (questions 125 & 127).

# URVEY METHODOLOGY

Great care was taken in the conduct of this survey in Azerbaijan to achieve an authentically representative sample of the national adult population, in conformance with the best practices of international survey research. What this goal means in a practical sense is that every adult throughout the country had an equal probability of being selected as a participant in the survey. Interviews were conducted throughout the country, in both urban and rural settlements. The number of interviews conducted in any one region were proportional to the population residing in that region, according to our best estimation. Households and respondents within households were randomly selected within those settlements according to protocols established with the survey contractor, SIAR/Baku. These protocols insured that interviewers did not select respondents by convenience. Interviews were conducted in Azeri or Russian, at the preference of the respondent.

There are two practical impediments to the execution of such a survey project in Azerbaijan. The first is that we precluded interviewing in areas adjoining the Nagorno-Karabakh region, out of our concern for the security of our interviewers. The second impediment is the migration of the country's population in reaction to hostilities earlier this decade and to economic difficulties. As a consequence of this migration and emigration, reliable census figures are not available, and so we cannot know with confidence whether the distribution of the survey sample precisely reflects the distribution of the population throughout the country — a critical condition for the representativeness of the sample.

Our best estimation is that Azerbaiajn has a population of about 7 million persons, having experienced an emigration of perhaps 700,000. Of that number, we estimate that 2.8 million reside in the metropolitan area of Baku, which has grown as the result of a migration of persons escaping the war or looking for economic opportunities.

IFES sponsored a visit of survey consultant Steven Wagner to Azerbaijan last summer to interview potential contractors for the conduct of interviewing. During that trip, five firms were invited to submit proposals, and SIAR-Baku was selected as the result of IFES' evaluation of these competitive bids.

The questionnaire was designed by IFES consultant Steven Wagner, drawing substantially on the IFES "core questionnaire" of survey questions used successfully in other nations of the former Soviet Union. Country-specific questions were developed in consultations with the U.S. Embassy in Baku, the U.S. AID mission, and other observers of Azerbaijani society. The questionnaire was reviewed extensively with the contractor, then translated by the Contractor into Russian and Azeri. Both translations were then back translated into English by IFES/Washington, in order to confirm the quality of the rendering of the English questionnaire.

A pretest of the survey was then conducted by SIAR-Baku on October 16 - 17, in order to expose difficulties with the intelligibility and administration of the questionnaire (a pretest

consists of conducting a limited number of interviews, in and around Baku). As a result of the pretest, revisions were made to the questionnaire.

Interviewees were trained in the administration of this questionnaire by SIAR/Baku. The training process was held on October 23 for Baku, Sumgayit, Gajikabul, Ganja, Zagatala, Siyazan, Shamakhi, Lenkoran and Imishli interviewers. On October 24, training was held for Apsheron, Gazakh, Kurdamir, Barda, Guba and Sheki interviewers. On October 27, instructions were carried out for the rest of the regions (Salyan, Sharur, and Nakhchivan).

The fieldwork started on October 24, 1998, shortly after the October 11 Presidential election. The last interview was completed on November 13, 1998. In total, 1000 valid interviews were conducted (the distribution of interviews by region is presented in the following table). The number of interviewers involved in the study was 32. All of the questionnaires passed through a review by the supervisor, and 32 percent of the interviews (randomly selected) were confirmed by brief in-person reinterview to confirm that the original interview took place, and that key questions were answered as indicated.

The most significant problem to emerge in the conduct of fieldwork was the number of refusals to participate in Baku and Sumgait. In Baku, where 410 interviews were completed, 894 refused to participate; in Sumgait, where 60 interviews were completed, 105 refused to participate. Elsewhere refusals rates were quite modest.

Data entry of the survey results was accomplished by the contractor in Baku, and the data file was transmitted to Steven Wagner for analysis which is presented here.

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REGIONS	TOTAL INTERVIEWS	URBAN	RURAL	
Baku	410	410	0	11
Sumgait	.60	60	0	2
Absheron	20	0	20	1
Hajikabul	10	0	10	1
Genje	60	60	0	3
Gazakh	30	10	20	1
Sheki	50	10	40	2
Guba	40	10	30	1
Lenkeran	40	10	30	1
Shamachi	30	10	20	1
Nakhchivan	20	20	0	1
Sharur	40	0	40	1
Salyan	30	10	20	1
Imishli	30	10	20	1
Barda	40	10	30	1
Kurdamir	40	10	30	1
Zagatala	30	10	20	1
Siyazan	20	0	20	1
TOTAL	1000	650	350	32

# **Distribution of Regions within Zones**

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Zone	Code	Region	CODE
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
Eastern	01	Baku	01
		Sumgayit	02
		Apsheron	03
		Hajigabul	04
Western	02	Ganja	05
		Gazakh	06
North-Western	03	Sheki	07
		Zagatala	08
North – Eastern	04	Guba	09
		Siazan	10
			<b>B</b> ay and the second se
Center	05	Shamakhi	11
		Barda	12
		Kurdamir	13
South - Western	06	Nakhchivan	14
		Sharur	15
			BAR DONE

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# Public Opinion in Azerbaijan 1998 Steven Wagner

South - Eastern	07	Salyan	16
	<u>·</u>	Lenkoran	17
South	08	Imishli	18

# **APPENDIX: TOPLINE DATA**

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Q6. Kind of Settlement	(n=1000)
Baku	41%
Cities of 200,000-499,999	12%
Cities of 50,000-199,999	3%
Cities of 20,000-49,999	8%
Towns of less than 20,000	1%
Rural Settlements	35%
Total	100%

Q7. Language of Interview	(n=1000)
Azeri	91%
Russian	9%
Total	100%

Q8. SES	(n=1000)
High	1%
Moderate/High	6%
Moderate	47%
Moderate/Low	29%
Low	15%
Indeterminate	2%
DK/NR	1%
Total	101%

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Q9. Sex	(n=1000)
Male	49%
Female	51%
Total	100%

Q10. How many people live in this house, including you?	(n=1000)
1-3	24%
4-6	65%
7-9	10%
10+	2%
Total	101%

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Q11. How would you describe the overall quality of your life today?	(n=1000)
Very good	3%
Fairly good	43%
Fairly bad	30%
Very bad	24%
DK/NR	\$
Total	100%

Q12. Do you feel that there are many changes occurring in Azerbaijan today, or do you feel there are not many changes occurring in Azerbaijan today?	(n=1000)
Many changes are occurring	63%
Not many changes are occurring	31%
DK/NR	7%
Total	101%

Q13. [ASK IF SENSE CHANGES IN Q12] These changes which you sense, are they mainly making life in Azerbaijan better or mainly making life in Azerbaijan worse?	(n=1000)
Better	26%
Worse	23%
Both equally (Volunteered)	14%
DK/NR	6%
NOT ASKED	31%
Total	100%

Q14. [ASK IF SENSE CHANGES IN Q12] And are these changes in Azerbaijan occurring too rapidly, too slowly, or at about the correct pace?	(n=1000)
Too rapidly	12%
Too slowly	24%
At about the correct pace	26%
DK/NR	7%
NOT ASKED	31%
Total	100%

Q15. When you think of the overall situation in Azerbaijan today, would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?	(n=1000)
Very Satisfied	4%
Somewhat Satisfied	37%
Somewhat Dissatisfied	30%
Very Dissatisfied	28%
DK/NR	1%
Total	100%

Q16. In your opinion, what is the single biggest problem Azerbaijan faces as a country – that is, the problem which is of most concern to you? [OPEN ENDED]	(n=1000)
Karabakh problem	49%
Unemployment	20%
Economic problems	10%
Social problems/welfare	8%
Refugee problems	4%
Absence of democracy	2%
Corruption	1%
Elections	1%
Other	4%
Don't know	2%

Q17. Thinking back, how has the quality of life in Azerbaijan changed since independence: has the quality of life improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse, since independence?	(n=1000)
Improved	31%
Stayed the same	16%
Gotten worse	51%
DK/NR	3%
Total	101%

Q18. Since independence, is there now greater freedom for religious expression in Azerbaijan, is there less freedom of religious expression, or is it the same as before independence?	(n=1000)
Greater freedom	89%
Less freedom	4%
Same as before independence	5%
DK/NR	. 1%
Total	99%

Q19. Since independence, are there now greater possibilities for individuals to undertake new economic activities, are there fewer possibilities, or is the situation the same as before independence?	(n=1000)
Greater possibilities	65%
Fewer possibilities	24%
Same as before independence	6%
DK/NR	6%
Total	101%

Q20. And finally, since independence, are government officials more likely to observe the legal rights of individuals, less likely to observe the legal rights of individuals, or has there been no change since independence?	(n=1000)
More likely	22%
Less likely	50%
No change	21%
DK/NR	7%
Total	100%

Q21. How would you describe the current economic situation in Azerbaijan today?	(n=1000)
Very good	2%
Somewhat good	33%
Somewhat bad	32%
Very bad	27%
DK/NR	6%
Total	100%

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Q22. And twelve months from now, do you expect the economic situation in Azerbaijan will be better than it is now, will be worse than it is now, or will it be about the same as it is now?	(n=1000)
Will be better than it is поw	29%
Will be worse than it is now	16%
Will be about the same	29%
DK/NR	26%
Total	100%

Q23. When thinking about our economic future, should our country strive to develop a free or market economy - that is, an economy with little government control - or should we strive for an economy which is basically controlled by the government?	(n=1000)
Economy with little government control	46%
Economy basically controlled by the government	45%
DK/NR	9%
Total	100%

Q24. In your opinion, is it necessary or not necessary for Azerbaijan to undertake reforms in its economy?	(n=1000)
Necessary	85%
Not necessary	7%
DK/NR	9%
Total	101%

Q25. Are economic reforms in Azerbaijan currently being made too quickly, too slowly, or at about the correct pace - or are no economic reforms being made?	(n=1000)
Too quickly	4%
Too slowly	46%
At about the correct pace	20%
No economic reforms are occurring	19%
DK/NR ·	12%
Total	101%

Q26. In your opinion, would having a free or market economy in Azerbaijan - that is, an economy with little government control - benefit most of the people or would this benefit just a few people at the top?	(n=1000)
Benefit most of the people	43%
Benefit just a few people at the top	48%
DK/NR	9%
Total	100%

Q27. Next, I am going to read to you a short statement: Please tell me if you agree completely with this statement: "There are many times during the year in which my family is not able to buy all of the food it needs to eat."	(n=1000)
Agree completely	62%
Agree somewhat	21%
Disagree somewhat	13%
Disagree completely	4%
DK/NR	\$
Total	100%

Q28. How much information do you feel you have about economic developments in Azerbaijan - a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?	(n=1000)
A great deal	2%
A fair amount	30%
Not very much	51%
None at all	14%
DK/NR	3%
Total	100%

**Q29 - Q31.** I am going to read you several statements. Again, please tell me whether you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree completely with each statement.

	(n≕1000)
Q29. "All citizens should have the legal right to own, buy, and sell land."	
Agree completely	68%
Agree somewhat	16%
Disagree somewhat	6%
Disagree completely	8%
DK/NR	3%
Total	101%
Q30. "Foreign firms have a right to open businesses in Azerbaijan."	
Agree completely	30%
Agree somewhat	37%
Disagree somewhat	14%
Disagree completely	15%
DK/NR	5%
Total	101%
Q31. "Foreign firms should be allowed to purchase and own land in Azerbaijan."	
Agree completely	5%
Agree somewhat	6%
Disagree somewhat	10%
Disagree completely	76%
DK/NR	3%
Total	100%

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Q32. As you know, Azerbaijan is a country with great oil reserves and other natural wealth. Some people say that the oil belongs to all Azerbaijani citizens, and that money made from the sale of oil should be shared with all citizens. Others say the oil belongs to the government of Azerbaijan, and the money made from the sale of oil should go to the government. Which of these views do you agree with more?	(n=1000)	
Agree most with first (oil belongs to people)	73%	
Agree most with second (oil belongs to government)	24%	
DK/NR	4%	
Total	101%	

Q33-Q45. Please tell me how satisfied you are - completely satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied - with each of the following activities:	Very Stsfd	Smwht Stsfd	Smwht Disstsfd	Very Disstsfd	DK/NR	Total
33. The implementation of economic reforms	11%	28%	22%	26%	13%	100%
34. The social welfare protections of the people	6%	15%	23%	51%	4%	99%
35. The extent of political and civil freedom	12%	38%	21%	19%	11%	101%
36. Respect for the rights of citizens by the govt.	9%	28%	27%	29%	8%	101%
37. The fight against crime	20%	36%	17%	21%	6%	100%
38. The quality of health care	· 5%	19%	23%	52%	2%	101%
39. The system of elections	28%	34%	12%	18%	7%	99%
40. The quality of the educational system	7%	31%	24%	33%	4%	99%
41. The implementation of land ownership reforms	13%	27%	20%	24%	16%	100%
42. The opportunity of citizens to influence the actions of government	6%	21%	26%	33%	14%	100%
43. The moral character of the people	8%	34%	25%	25%	8%	100%
44. The moral character of leaders of the country	18%	34%	16%	19%	14%	101%
45. The quality of the water provided by authorities	18%	24%	13%	42%	3%	100%

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Q46-Q49. Thinking of the various levels of national and local government, in your opinion how responsive are the following to the needs and concerns of the public:	Very Responsive	Somewhat Responsive	Not Very Responsive	Not At All Responsive	DK/NR	Total
46. Cabinet of Ministers	37%	21%	16%	14%	11%	99%√
47. Milli Mejlis	37%	19%	15%	18%	11%	100%
48. Rayon Governors	42%	24%	11%	16%	8%	101%
49. President	66%	15%	4%	7%	7%	99%

Q50. How interested are you in matters of politics and government - are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?	(n=1000)
Very interested	15%
Somewhat interested	. 39%
Not too interested	26%
Not at all interested	20%
DK/NR	1%
Total	101%

Q51. How much information do you feel you have about political developments in Azerbaijan - a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?	(n=1000)
A great deal	8%
A fair amount	39%
Not very much	40%
None at ali	12%
DK/NR	1%
Total	100%

Q52-Q64. Now I am going to read to you several sources of information you might use to get information about events here in Azerbaijan. For each, please tell me if you use the source often, sometimes, or never.					
use the source often, sometimes, or never.	Often	Sometimes	Never	DK/NR	Total
52. Azerbaijani State TV Programs	58%	32%	10%		100%
53. Azerbaijani Private TV Programs	29%	20%	51%		100%
54. Foreign Language TV Programs within Azerbaijan	14%	25%	61%		100%
55. Foreign Language TV Programs received directly	42%	25%	33%		100%
56. Azerbaijani State Radio Programs	18%	27%	55%		100%
57. Azerbaijani Private Radio Programs	19%	15%	66%		100%
58. Azeri Language Radio Programs from other countries	15%	24%	61%	-	100%
59. Other Radio Programs from other countries	4%	14%	82%		100%
60. Azerbaijani Newspapers	28%	• 36%	37%		101%
61. Newspapers from other countries	5%	13%	. 82%		100%
62. Azerbaijan Magazines	5%	16%	79%		100%
63. Magazines from other countries	3%	9%	87%		99%-⁄
64. Discussions with friends, family, and neighbors	62%	26%	12%		100%

Q65. Thinking about the sources of news which are widely available to most people in Azerbaijan- TV, radio, newspapers, magazines- are there any of thee sources of news which you consider to be mostly free of government control? (Multiple responses possible)	(n=1000)
Azerbaijani state TV programs	7%
Azerbaijani private TV programs	42%
Foreign language TV programs broadcast within Azerbaijan	12%
Foreign language TV programs received directly	41%
Azerbaijani state radio programs	2%
Azerbaijani private radio programs	21%
Azeri language radio programs from other countries	30%
Other radio programs from other countries	16%
Azerbaijani newspapers	20%
Newspapers from other countries	26%
Azerbaijani magazines	. 2%
Magazines from other countries	21%
No sources	10%
DK/NR	12%

Q66. In your opinion, should Azerbaijan strive to be a democracy or should it strive to something other than a democracy?	(n=1000)
Should strive to be a democracy	87%
Should not strive to be a democracy	7%
DK/NR	7%
Total	101%

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Q67. Would you say that Azerbaijan is primarily a democracy today, or is it not primarily a democracy?	(n=1000)
Azerbaijan is a democracy	44%
Azerbaijan is not a democracy	43%
DK/NR	13%
Total	100%

Q67. [IF NO TO Q66] Is Azerbaijan moving toward becoming a democracy or is it not?	(n=1000)
Becoming a democracy	14%
Not becoming a democracy	30%
DK/NR	12%
NOT ASKED	44%
Total	100%

Q69. What does it mean to you to live in a democracy? [OPEN ENDED]	(n=1000)
Freedom/Independence	35%
Providing the law	19%
To live well, prosper	15%
Happiness/normal life	10%
Freedom of speech	8%
Work provision	5%
Freedom of thinking	3%
Religious freedom	1%
Social welfare	1%
Anarchy	1%
Other	1%
DK/NR	14%

Q70. Does being a democracy promote the solution of our economic problems, or does it create obstacles to the solution of our economic proglems, or does it not make a difference?	(n=1000)
Promotes solutions	72%
Creates obstacles	2%
Doesn't make a difference	15%
DK/NR	12%
Total	100%

Q71. In your opinion, does being a democracy benefit most of the people or does being a democracy benefit just a few people at the top?	(n=1000)
Benefit most of the people	71%
Benefit just a few people at the top	21%
DK/NR	8%
Total	100%

Q72 - Q75. Again, I am going to read to you several statements. As before, please tell me whether you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree completely with each statement I read:

	(n=1000)
Q72. "Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision- making in our country."	
Agree completely	40%
Agree somewhat	31%
Disagree somewhat	10%
Disagree completely	14%
DK/NR	6%
Total	101%

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Q73. "In order to establish order and discipline in society, it is necessary to limit the political and civic rights of the people."	
Agree completely	15%
Agree somewhat	16%
Disagree somewhat	17%
Disagree completely	48%
DK/NR	5%
Total	101%
Q74. "When government officials must be elected by the people in order to keep their position in government, they will be more concerned with doing what the people want."	
Agree completely	50%
Agree somewhat	28%
Disagree somewhat	9%
Disagree completely	8%
DK/NR	6%
Total	101%
Q75. "When government officials must be elected by the people in order to keep their position in government, they will have more respect for the rights of the people."	
Agree completely	51%
Agree somewhat	25%
Disagree somewhat	11%
Disagree completely	8%
DK/NR	6%
Total	101%

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Q76. As you may recall, election were held in November, 1995, to elect Deputies of the <i>Milli</i> <i>Mejlis</i> . Did you happen to vote in those elections?	(n=1000)
Yes	43%
No	51%
DK/NR	6%
Total	100%

Q77. [IF VOTED] What was your overall impression of how those elections were administered: very well, fairly well, fairly poorly, or very poorly?	(n=1000)
Very well	6%
Fairly well	23%
Fairly poorly	7%
Very poorly	4%
DK/NR	9%
NOT ASKED	51%
Total	100%

Q78. From what you have heard about the 1995 elections for the <i>Milli Mejlis</i> , how honest and fair were these elections: completely, mostly, partially, or were they not honest and fair at all?	(n=1000)
Completely	7%
Mostly	19%
Partially	20%
Not honest and fair at all	17%
DK/NR	38%
Total	101%

Q79. Do you happen to know the name of the Deputy of the <i>Milli Mejlis</i> who represents this area?	(n=1000)
Yes	40%
No	53%
DK/NR	7%
Total	100%

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Q80. How much have you heard or read about the Central Election Commission of Azerbaijan?	(n=1000)
A great deal	7%
A fair amount	27%
Not very much	33%
Nothing at all	31%
DK/NR	2%
Total	100%

Q81. [[IF AWARE OF CEC] Which of the following two statements is closest to your view about the	
Commission:	(n=1000)
The Central Election Commission of Azerbaijan is a completely neutral body, guided in its work by the law	42%
The Central Election Commission of Azerbaijan makes decisions which favor particular candidates	27%
DK/NR	1%
NOT ASKED	31%
Total	101%

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Q82. Thinking of all the parties and movements that are currently in existence, how much have you read or heard about political parties in general - a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?	(n=1000)
A great deal	9%
A Fair amount	37%
Not very much	45%
Nothing at all	7%
DK/NR	2%
Total	100%

Q83. Some people say that the various political parties have significant differences in how they would solve the country's problems. Others say there are not significant differences between the parties in how they would solve the country's problems. Which of these views is closer to your own.	(n=1000)
Significant differences between parties	48%
No significant differences between parties	35%
DK/NR	17%
Total	100%

Q84-95. Next, I am going to read to you names of some political parties in Azerbaijan. As I read to you each name of a political party, please tell me if you are familiar with that party or not.	Familiar	Not Familiar	DK/NR	Total
84. Ana Vatan	47%	51%	2%	100%
85. Peoples Front Party [Halq Gabhasi]	87%	11%	1%	99%-⁄
86. Azerbaijan Liberal Party	44%	54%	3%	101%
87. Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Owners	25%	72%	3%	100%
88. Azerbaijan Democratic Party	40%	56%	3%	99%.
89. Azerbaijan <i>Milli Istiqlal</i>	83%	16%	2%	101%
90. Musavat Party	79%	19%	2%	100%
91. Yeni Azerbaijan Party	91%	9%	1%	101%-⁄
92. ADIP, Karimov Faction	14%	81%	5%	100%
93. ADIP, Kuvbanli Faction	13%	82%	5%	100%
94. Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan	35%	61%	4%	100%
95. Azerbaijan Communist Party	65%	33%	2%	100%

Q96. Which one of the political parties or movements I just read to you best represents the views and interests of people like you?	(n=1000)
Ana Vatan	1%
People's Front Party [Halq Gabhasi]	5%
Azerbaijan Liberal Party	1%
Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Owners	1%
Azerbaijan Democratic Party	1%
Azerbaijan Milli Istiqlal	17%
Musavat Party	6%
Yeni Azerbaijan Party	33%
ADIP, Kyrimov Faction	\$
ADIP, Kuvbanli Faction	☆
Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan	1%
Azerbaijan Communist Party	7%
None of these	28%
Total	101%

Q97. Which one of the political parties or movements is second best at representing the views and interests of people like you?	(n=1000)
Ana Vatan	1%
People's Front Party [Halq Gabhasi]	4%
Azerbaijan Liberal Party	2%
Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Owners	1%
Azerbaijan Democratic Party	1%
Azerbaijan Milli Istiqlal	9%
Musavat Party	6%
Yeni Azerbaijan Party	6%
Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan	1%
Azerbaijan Communist Party	7%
None of these	64%
Total	102%

Q98. What do you think is the ideal number of political parties to have in Azerbaijan: none, one, two, several, or many?	(n=1000)
None	5%
One	25%
Тwo	13%
Several	35%
Many	14%
DK/NR	8%
Total	100%

Q99. As you know, Azerbaijan just conducted an election for President. Were you able to vote in this election, or did some circumstance prevent you from voting?	(n=1000)
Voted	73%
Did not vote	. 27%
Total	100%

Q100. Based on what you saw and heard about the Presidential elections this month, how fair and honest were these elections?	(n=1000)
Completely fair and honest	37%
Somewhat fair and honest	32%
Somewhat unfair and honest	7%
Completely unfair and honest	12%
DK/NR	12%
Total	100%

Q101. And what about the counting of the votes: was the counting of the votes completely honest, generally pretty honest, not so honest, or not honest at all?	(n=1000)
Completely honest	27%
Generally pretty honest	25%
Not so honest	11%
Not honest at all	12%
DK/NR	25%
Total	100%

Q102. Overall, how well did the Central Election Commission perform its work during the election- very well, fairly well, fairly poorly, or very poorly?	(n=1000)
Very well	20%
Fairly well	40%
Fairly poorly	. 11%
Very poorly	10%
DK/NR	19%
Total	100%

Q103. Overall, how well did the Central Election Commission do in explaining to the people how to go about voting – very well, fairly well, fairly poorly, or very poorly?	(n=1000)
Very well	24%
Fairly well	45%
Fairly poorly	13%
Very poorly	7%
DK/NR	11%
Total	100%

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Q104. [NON-VOTERS ONLY] On this card are a number of reasons some people have given for why they did not vote. For each statement please tell me if it was a reason why you did not vote.	(% mentioning reason) (n=267)
I was not able to get to the polling place to vote	23%
I tried to vote, but I was not allowed to	2%
Polling place was not open when it was supposed to be	☆
I felt like I was being told what to do	27%
I did not have enough information about the candidates	4%
I did not like any of the candidates	8%
Process of voting was too confusing	2%
I did not know where the polling place was	3%
I did not receive an invitation (or notice ) to vote	12%
I am disappointed with the leadership of the Republic	9%
Voting wouldn't change anything	23%
I was not on the voter registry	3%
I was not at my place of permanent residence	30%
I already knew what the results were going to be	21%
I was afraid that people would find out how I voted	
The line was too long and I could not wait	1%

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Q105. [VOTERS ONLY] In your opinion, was the information you had about the candidates or parties sufficient to make a choice between the candidates for President?	(n=1000)
Information was sufficient	55%
Information was limited but I could not make a choice	10%
Information was not sufficient	<b>6%</b>
DK/NR	2%
NOT ASKED	27%
Total	100%

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Q106. [VOTERS ONLY] On this card are several reasons why individuals voted. Please take this card and tell me the reason or reasons that you voted.	(% giving reason) (n=733)
I liked one of the candidates	56%
I felt I had a duty as a citizen to vote	67%
I am a supporter of one of the political parties	24%
I wanted to have a voice in the future of my country	42%

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Q107. [VOTERS ONLY] Did you encounter any of the following when you voted (please just tell me yes or no for each problem I read to you).	(% citing problem) (n=733)
The ballot was confusing	3%
Election officials at the voting place tried to tell me for whom to vote	5%
Election officials at the voting place were not helpful	8%
I felt that my ballot was not kept secret	2%
The polling place was not convenient	3%
The polling place was not well equipped	3%
Groups of people voting together without a secret ballot	4%
Know of cases where people voted on behalf of family members	7%
Campaigning on behalf of candidate on election day	3%
Someone had already voted for me	1%
Money or things offered to voters to vote a certain way	☆

Q108. On this card is a list of qualities which any President of a country might or might not have. Please take this list and indicate the three qualities which you think are the most important for a President to have.	(% mentioning quality) (n=1000)
Protects his own interests and those of his family	14%
A person with traditional values	28%
A strong leader who can get things done	77%
Has close ties to Russia	19%
Has close ties to Iran	2%
Promotes tolerance between all people of Azerbaijan	34%
Cares about the needs of people like you	38%
Protects the cultural heritage of the Azeri people	37%
Honest and trustworthy	43%
Preserves the old system	11%

Q109. How would you describe current relations among the nationalities and ethnic groups in Azerbaijan – are relations very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?	(n=1000)
Very good	73%
Somewhat good	<b>9%</b> .
Somewhat bad	15%
Very bad	1%
DK/NR	2%
Total	100%

Q110. Some people say that the members of all nationalities and ethnic groups in Azerbaijan should have the same rights as citizens. Others say that the rights as citizens should be different for members of certain ethnic groups or nationalities. Which of these views is closer to your own?	(n=1000)
All nationalities and groups should have the same rights as citizens	93%
Rights as citizens should be different for certain groups	6%
NR	1%
Total	100%

Q111. In what year were you born?	(n=1000)
1933 or before (65+)	14%
1934-1943 (55-64)	11%
1944-1953 (45-54)	16%
1954-1963 (35-44)	26%
1964-1973 (25-34)	21%
1974-1980 (18-24)	12%
Total	100%

Q112. What is the highest level of education you received?	(n=1000)
No formal education	3%
Some or completed primary	7%
Some or completed secondary, or vocational/technical training	52%
Some higher education	9%
Completed university or higher	29%
NR	\$
Total	100%

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Q113. What is your current employment situation? As I read to you the possible answers, please tell me which one applies to you personally.	(n=1000)
Employed full-time at one job	30%
Employed part-time at one job	4%
Employed at more than one job	1%
Self-employed, including farmer	4%
Work in the home only	11%
Student	4%
Pensioner	15%
Unemployed, looking for work	30%
NR	☆
Total	99%.

Q114. (If not homemaker or student) What kind of work do you do? (For Pensioners: What kind of work did you do?) Once again, as I read to you the possible answers, please tell me which one applies to you personally.	(n=1000)
Professional (lawyer, doctor, engineer)	11%
Business manager or executive	1%
Government official or military	23%
Skilled laborer, industrial	11%
Other skilled laborer (including tradesman)	6%
Collective farmer	3%
Independent farmer	1%
Unskilled laborer, industrial	5%
Unskilled laborer, agricultural	5%
Other	8%
NR	10%
NOT ASKED	16%
Total	100%

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Q115. Do you or your spouse work for a factory or farm owned by the state?	(n=1000)
Yes	13%
No	86%
DK/NR	1%
Total	100%

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Q116. What is your marital status? Are you currently married, single and never married, divorced, or widowed?	(n=1000)
Currently married	75%
Single and never married	17%
Divorced	2%
Widowed	6%
DK/NR	
Total	99%√

Q117. Do you have any children? [IF YES] How many children do you have?	(n=1000)
Yes	78%
No	22%
Total	100%

Q119. Was this place your home before the war, or as a result of it, did you move here?	(n=1000)
This was my home before the war	80%
I moved here as a result of the war	5%
I moved here, but not as a result of the war	15%
Total	100%

Q120. What is your nationality?	(n≂1000)
Azeri	89%
Azeri Jewish	\$
	2%
Lezgin Russian	4%
Talish	2%
Tatar	☆
	1%
Ukrainian Other	2%
Total	100%

Q122. Which of the following best describes your feelings about saying you are a citizen of Azerbaijan - proud, content, indifferent, not content, or ashamed?	(n=1000)
Proud	74%
Content	15%
Indifferent	4%
Not content	2%
Ashamed	3%
DK/NR	2%
Total	100%

Q123. We all are a part of many groups, including a nation and an ethnicity. Which group membership do you feel is the strongest: your citizenship in a nation, or your ethnicity?	(n=1000)
Citizenship	82%
Ethnicity	6%
These are equally important (Volunteered)	5%
None of these is important (Volunteered)	2%
DK/NR	5%
Total	100%

Q124. Are you a member of the following:	(n=1000)
A. Veterans Group	
Yes	8%
No	91%
B. Labor Collective	
Yes	17%
No	82%
C. Civic Group	
Yes	2%
No	97%

Q125. Do you believe that there is a God?	(n=1000)
Yes	97%
No	3%
DK/NR	☆
Total	100%

Q126. Do you belong to a church or a religious group? [IF YES] To which church or religious group do you belong?	(n=1000)
Islam/Muslim	89%
Russian Orthodox	4%
Other Christian	1%
Jewish	☆
Do not belong to any religion	6% .
DK/NR ·	\$
Total	100%

Q127. Do your religious beliefs or your religious leaders play an important role in the way you live your life, or not?	(n=1000)
Yes	49%
No	47%
DK/NR	4%
Total	100%

Q128. [IF YES TO Q127] Do your religious beliefs or your religious leaders play an important role in how you raise your children, or not?	(n=1000)
Yes	36%
No	3%
No Children, Not asked	61%
Total	100%

Q129. [IF YES TO Q127] And finally, do your religious beliefs or your religious leaders play an Important role in how you came to have your political opinions, or not?	(n=1000)
Yes	24%
No	22%
NOT ASKED	47%
DK/NR	7%
Total	100%

Q130. Do your religious beliefs or your religious leaders play an important role in the life of your community, or not?	(n≕1000)
Yes	36%
No	45%
DK/NR	20%
Total	101%

Q131. How would you describe the income level of your household?	(n=1000)
High	☆
Moderate/High	3%
Moderate	34%
Moderate/Low	25%
Low	37%
DK/NR	☆
Total	99%√

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