Date Printed: 11/03/2008

JTS Box Number: IFES_4

Tab Number: 22

Document Title: Civil Society and Local Government in Twenty Districts in Ghana: Surprises,

Document Date: 1998

Document Country: Ghana

IFES ID: R01614



IFES

International Foundation for Election Systems

IFES International Foundation for Election Systems
1101 15th STREET, N.W. • THIRD FLOOR • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 • (202) 828-8507 • FAX (202) 452-0804 • WWW.IFES.ORG

CIVIL SOCIETY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY DISTRICTS IN GHANA: SURPRISES, PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES

IFES Project ECSELL Baseline Assessment

March 1998

Stephen L. Snook
Joseph R. A. Ayee
Kwame Boafo-Arthur
Ernest Aryeetey

This project has been made possible through funding from the United States Agency of International Development.
Any person or organization is welcome to quote information from this report if it is attributed to IFES.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Executive Summary

Under its Cooperative Agreement number 641-0133-A-00-4028-00 with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES) is launching a project to support the consolidation of democratic governance in Ghana. The project will be active in twenty districts, two per region, in a first cycle from 1998 to 1999. In a second cycle from 2000 to 2001 the project will enter another set of districts to total nearly one-third of Ghana's 110 districts reached.

In support of the consolidation of democratic governance in Ghana, Project ECSELL (Enhancing Civil Society Effectiveness at the Local Level) is designed to increase the rate and quality of local civic participation in public policy making and to improve local government responsiveness to constituent needs. The overall aim of Project ECSELL is to support the consolidation of democracy in Ghana. The specific goal is threefold:

> (1) To improve the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) to meet their set objectives; (2) to enhance the capacity of CSOs to advocate on behalf of their membership in the shaping of public policy; and (3) to improve the responsiveness of local governments to the needs of their communities.

To achieve this goal the project will provide two related forms of assistance: (1) training in the context of issues and action to transfer management skills to District Assembly officials and local level civic leaders and to help them develop a collaborative problem-solving relationship; and (2) grants to civic groups to help them implement the new managerial techniques in pursuit of their institutional goals, and to enhance their ability and willingness to go to their District Assemblies and advocate the interests of their membership.

In preparing to launch Project ECSELL in pursuit of these objectives, IFES conducted field research in September, October and November 1997. This work provided the data for the following baseline assessment of civil society and the District Assemblies in 20 districts in Ghana.

IFES has found that (1) the identified civic groups seem more dynamic and engaged than expected; (2) the District Assemblies seem less unresponsive than feared; and (3) relations between the two sets of actors seem surprisingly good.

2. Introduction

Overview of Civic Groups and Local Government in Ghana

Ghana's political history is one of fluctuation between democratic and authoritarian rule. The consensus interpretation in the academic literature is that civil society played the key role in the restoration of democracy under the Third and Fourth Republics. In 1978-1979 and 1988-1992 civil society successfully confronted the authoritarian state demanding democratic change.

The coups that overthrew the First, Second and Third Republics all led to periods of repression by authoritarian military regimes during which civil society disengaged from the state. Each of the different non-democratic regimes created state-sponsored civic groups to attract support, and praised and rewarded the independent civic groups that cooperated with it and denounced and harassed the civic groups in opposition.

In addition to creating a generally poor climate of state-civil society relations, Ghana's repeated coups have also disrupted attempts to establish effective local government. Each new regime that came to power immediately abolished (either constitutionally or through military force) the political structures put in place by the predecessor regime, including and especially the structures of local government.

At the outset the IFES assessment team expected to find in the 20 districts into which it was going generally poor relations between moribund civic groups disengaged from unresponsive District Assemblies.

Civil Society Defined

IFES defines civil society to consist of *all organized domestic non-governmental bodies exclusive of groups formed solely to seek economic profits or political power.* This definition excludes international NGOs, political bodies, political parties and individual business firms.

Selection of Districts

IFES selected 20 districts in Ghana following two criteria: (1) that there be no other donor democracy and governance project in that district, and (2) that the district be accessible by relatively good roads.

Selection Criteria for Interviewing CSOs

The CSO leaders who were interviewed were selected according to one of three criteria. First, their organization may have been listed as an "identifiable organization" on the government register of organizations active in each district. Second, the CSO could have been selected by word of mouth, by being mentioned by knowledgeable informants or leaders of other CSOs. Third, the consultants were instructed to identify as many women's groups as possible.

Thus a group could have been selected for an interview simply because its membership was mostly women.

Selection Criteria for Inviting CSOs to Participate in Project ECSELL

The assessment team tried to identify CSOs that possess six of ten specified characteristics adapted from USAID criteria. The team tried to locate in each district proportionate numbers of USAID's four categories of CSOs. Finally, the team sought to identify as many women's groups as possible.

Some CSOs whose leaders were interviewed have not been invited to participate in Project ECSELL because they do not meet sufficient of the USAID criteria, or because they are so well established that they do not need USAID/IFES assistance.

In follow up visits to the districts IFES staff members found that the consultants missed some important groups. Thus some groups with leaders who were not interviewed have been invited to participate in the project.

Advocacy is the most crucial function to a democracy that a dynamic civil society provides. Unfortunately, IFES has found that advocacy groups are rare in the 20 districts, forming only 4.8% of the sample. A disproportionately large number of advocacy groups have therefore been asked to participate in the project.

Most of the groups in the IFES sample have formed around economic concerns. Professional and trade associations make up 57.9% of the sample. One knowledgeable informant suggested it is not surprising that economic based associations would be the most prevalent CSO, given the inadequacy of social services in Ghana. Economic based associations function to enhance income generation through such means as collective purchasing to lower costs. They provide their members with services such as burial insurance that are not otherwise available. But can small-scale local-level economic groups predominant in the districts play an advocacy role within a dynamic and democratic civil society? IFES is proceeding under the assumption they can.

IFES found that the women's groups in the sample are disproportionately disengaged from the local policy-making process. Thus a disproportionately large number of women's groups have been asked to participate in Project ECSELL.

Terms of Reference

IFES recruited thirteen expert consultants as members of the Baseline Assessment Team. Of these, ten consultants were Ghanaians. The team was divided into two units. A field research unit of ten consultants was charged with collecting the data. An analysis unit of three consultants was charged with analyzing the data and producing this report.

Terms of reference: field research unit

The two objectives of the field research unit were: (1) to identify in each district civic groups possessing the established criteria, and (2) to collect primary information from civic leaders representing a minimum of eight different groups per district, from a minimum of eight District Assembly officials, from the highest-ranking traditional authority (chief), and from community leaders in two towns neighboring the district capital. To this end the field research unit identified and interviewed the leaders of 209 civil society organizations and selected the ones that would most benefit from training and modest grants to enhance their effectiveness and their advocacy role. They interviewed 113 District Assembly officials consisting of Presiding Members, District Assembly(wo)men, heads of decentralized departments, District Budget Officers, District Coordinating Directors, and District Chief Executives, among others, and verified they would benefit from training to increase the responsiveness of their District Assemblies. The team members interviewed the highest-ranking traditional authority (chief) in each district. Finally, they conducted *durbars* (town meetings) in two separate communities near each district capital.

Terms of reference: analysis unit

The objective of the analysis unit was to assess the state of civil society organizations in the districts in which Project ECSELL will be active, the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of the District Assemblies in those districts, and the nature of the relationships between the two sets of actors. The members of the analysis unit have (1) reviewed the existing relevant academic literature and reports from government institutions and donors; and (2) analyzed the data collected by the field research unit in order to produce the following report.

Specifically, the analysis unit has analyzed state-society relations in Ghana over time, with special emphasis on the period 1978 to present, and described the issues over which various civil society organizations have engaged the state, and the outcomes of those engagements. The members of the analysis unit have assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the identified civil society organizations in the 20 districts with special attention to their capacity to mobilize and manage resources, the relative transparency and responsiveness of their leadership, and their capacity to plan and effectively carry their plans to fruition. Finally, the members of the analysis unit have produced a detailed typology of the Ghanaian civic groups in the sample.

Drawing on the findings presented below the members of the analysis unit have made practical recommendations for strengthening the advocacy role of local level civic organizations and similar recommendations for enhancing the responsiveness of District Assemblies. By strengthening local civic organizations while facilitating their constructive engagement with district governments, the end of project status in the first 20 districts will be a more collaborative relationship between more effective civic groups advocating their interests to more responsive District Assemblies resulting in an improved capacity to resolve local problems at the local level. Project ECSELL will thus contribute to the consolidation of democratic governance in Ghana.

Statistical Methods

IFES devised a standard questionnaire that the field research team used in the interviews. IFES coded all the answers to close-ended questions and coded all groups interviewed by content of women members, by number of members, by size of budget, and by region. IFES analyzed the results for simple frequencies, for strength of correlation using the Pearson's r method, and for strength of association using the Kendall's tau-b method (see Appendix IV for details).

Key Findings

Two important caveats are in order. First, because IFES interviewed the leaders of civic groups and not the members, IFES is *assuming* that the responses of the leaders reflect the views of their membership. Second, because IFES did not draw a random sample of civic groups, it is improper to infer from the findings anything about the general population of civic groups in Ghana. Therefore any conclusions the reader wishes to make about "civil society in Ghana" *assume* that the findings reflect the larger reality.

The civic organizations that IFES identified are stronger than expected, but not as strong as might be hoped for. Almost 84% of them operate with inadequate funding, with 50% relying on a single source of funding, with 79% of them unable to borrow money, and 64% of them receiving no funds from the national government, the donors, or the District Assembly Common Fund.

There is much to be positive about, however. The general level of political participation is very high. About 72% of the CSO leaders interviewed represent groups they claim have been actively involved in promoting democracy in their districts. A full 80% of the CSO respondents lead groups they say are concerned about issues of social justice. However, the leaders of women's groups and northern groups say they do not engage as much in promoting democracy or exhibit as much concern about issues of social justice as do the leaders of the men's groups and southern groups in the sample.

One welcome finding is that the CSOs sampled in the districts where Project ECSELL will be active are already internally democratic. The executive officers of 93% of the groups are elected. In 82% of the CSOs five or more people participate in making key decisions. The CSOs are trying to broaden their base of support as well. Three-quarters conduct membership drives. Two-thirds cooperate with other CSOs in activities of mutual interest. However, only half of the CSOs that IFES will be working with mobilize nonmembers for community activities.

CSO leaders in the sample are of a mixed mind about the performance of their District Assembly. About 83% could name at least one function they felt their District Assembly performs well, but 82% were also able to name at least one function they think it performs poorly.

It is disappointing to see that only about 45% of the CSOs identified go to their District Assemblies to advocate, while 54% do not (about 1% of the respondents either said they did not

know, or did not answer the question). However, 55% of the CSO leaders report they are consulted by their District Assembly. When asked to characterize relationships with their District Assemblies, a surprising 57.4% of CSOs said they were good. A full 97% of the CSO leaders rated their organization as independent from government and 93% reported never having been interfered with by their District Assembly. Nearly 70% of the CSO leaders said they believe that Ghana's government is performing better today than in 1992.

Ghana's District Assemblies do not function as well as they could in meeting the needs of their communities. Four out of five (82.8%) of the civic leaders interviewed could name at least one function their District Assembly performed poorly. Nearly half (49.6%) of the District Assembly officials interviewed rated the mixed system of elected and non-elected Assembly members as ineffective. However, there is cause for optimism. Fully 72% of the local government officials interviewed felt that their District Assembly does a good job at performing the hardest of all government functions: collecting taxes. Fully 87% of the District Assembly officials felt that their District Assembly is performing better than in 1992, and 76% believe that their relations with the central government are cooperative.

So there is much to be optimistic about in terms of the overall activism of the civic groups and their relationship with and the responsiveness of their District Assemblies.

Key findings for civil society organizations

- The number of advocacy groups in the sample of 209 is very small; most leaders interviewed represented either professional or trade associations.
- An overwhelming majority of the CSO leaders interviewed headed groups that are internally democratic, meaning they elect their officers and have methods for learning their members' opinions.
- An overwhelming majority of groups face needs that are greater than their financial means.
- The majority of CSO leaders report good relations with, independence from, cooperation with and no interference from the District Assemblies.
- About 45% of the CSOs go to their District Assemblies with some regularity to advocate their interests; about 56% report being consulted by their District Assemblies.
- The majority of CSO leaders say their groups cooperate with other groups, conduct membership drives, and mobilize outside support.
- The strong majority of the leaders reported their groups are concerned about issues of social justice and that they actively promote democracy.
- Groups with higher percentages of women members are less likely to promote democracy and be concerned about issues of social justice.
- Groups located in the North are less likely to promote democracy and be concerned about issues of social justice, but are more likely to cooperate with other CSOs.
- The strong majority of CSO leaders believe relations with their District Assemblies are good and cooperate with their District Assemblies.

- Four out of five CSO leaders can name at least one function that their District Assemblies perform well, and one function they perform poorly.
- A clear majority believes Ghana's government has improved since 1992.

Key findings for District Assemblies

- A majority of the 113 government officials interviewed report good relations with CSOs .
- A majority claim to solicit CSO views on major decisions.
- A majority believe relations with the central government are good.
- A majority rate the mixed system of elected and non-elected assemblymen as ineffective.
- Nearly the same majority report that, in their district, relations between the elected and non-elected members are good.
- A majority believe their District Assembly is effective at collecting taxes.
- A majority believe their District Assembly is performing better than in 1992 .

The statistical test for strength of association and correlation of variables yielded two main results:

- Desirable attributes tend to go together. Desirable attributes such as the tendency of a CSO to go to local government to advocate its members' interests *correlate* strongly with other desirable attributes such as the tendency to be consulted by the local government. Other desirable attributes such as the promotion of democracy by a group tend to be *associated* with the characteristics of powerful CSOs such as a large membership. Large membership correlates and/or is associated strongly with nearly all the attributes that IFES wishes to promote.

- The women's groups interviewed do not participate in the democratic political process as much as their male counterparts. There is a very strong negative *correlation* and an equally strong negative *association* between a group actively promoting democracy and the proportion of women members. Similarly, women tend not to compete for senior executive posts of groups that are not 100% women.

Focus Groups

After the field research unit had returned and the transcripts of their interviews were read and basic frequencies calculated, IFES staff members went back to the districts with the initial findings and organized separate focus groups for the CSO leaders and DA officials interviewed in each district. Participants in the 40 focus groups confirmed the basic findings reported below. In addition, the participants indicated what types of training they most need. These two pieces of information from the focus groups enable IFES to be confident that the findings are reliable and to see how to program Project ECSELL.

In the workshops, emphasis should be placed on creating understanding and fostering a non-confrontational atmosphere to promote interaction between the government and civil society participants. The workshops should provide an opportunity for the leaders of CSOs and local government officials to develop relationships that will carry over and provide the permanent channels of communication between civil society and local government required by a healthy democracy.

Programming Project ECSELL

Participatory Training for Advocacy and Responsiveness

IFES is advised to undertake training using participatory methods. The training should be designed to enhance CSO effectiveness and advocacy on the one hand and District Assembly (DA) responsiveness on the other, and to foster a collaborative problem-solving relationship between the two sets of leaders. The following training topics are recommended:

Education for democracy: In order to prepare the two sets of actors for a collaborative working relationship, IFES should conduct a "Civic Education" workshop for CSO leaders and in a separate venue an "Orientation in Decentralized Government" workshop for DA officials.

Facilitating dialogues: In a single venue IFES should, early on and then periodically, facilitate dialogues between CSO leaders and DA officials to foster a collaborative relationship in which they can identify local issues and agree to work together to develop and implement joint strategies to address the problems. These workshops should also serve to support institutionalized mechanisms for civic-government communications such as joint boards, citizen advisory committees, public hearings, etc.

Enhancing planning skills: IFES should conduct separate workshops to train CSO leaders and DA officials in strategic planning.

Enhancing financial management skills: IFES should conduct separate workshops on managing finances strategically, applying for bank loans, and grant writing for CSO leaders; and financial management and tax collection for DA officials.

Coalition and constituency building: The results detailed below reveal a strong correlation between the size of a group and participation in the policy process. IFES can safely assume that training in constituency and coalition building will have a significant impact on CSO participation in local level policy making. IFES should make training in constituency and coalition building a priority.

Enhancing managerial skills: IFES should conduct management and leadership training and training in communications skills. The emphasis should be on participatory management methods. IFES should combine the two sets of participants in a single venue for these exercises. This will afford an opportunity for using participatory methods such as role reversal that not only will transfer management, leadership and communications skills but through game playing will foster warmer relations between the civic leaders and District Assembly officials.

Enhancing skills in conflict resolution: Both civic leaders and District Assembly officials alike wish to improve their skills in conflict resolution. Since these skills are important for both sets of actors, this workshop should combine the participants in a single venue.

Exit strategy: It is important for IFES to prepare the participants for its withdrawal from each district. International and national NGOs active in each district should be invited to participate and perhaps help plan for IFES's exit.

Grants for CSO Organizational Effectiveness

IFES will award USAID grants to high-performing CSOs to increase their organizational effectiveness. Grant proposals should be awarded according to criteria that include but are not limited to: (1) the soundness of the proposal; (2) evidence the grant will contribute to strengthening the advocacy capacity of the applicant CSO; and (3) evidence that the applicant CSO is a viable organization having an elected leadership, a constitution, a trained financial officer, methods of learning the opinion of the membership and a transparent system of financial accounting.

Measuring Results

In fulfillment of its responsibility to monitor and evaluate project impact, IFES is advised to use the panel study method with control groups. Following this method, each district would be treated as a separate panel and the opinion of each participant tracked over time. To strengthen the analysis through comparison, consideration should be given to pairing each Project ECSELL district with a control district possessing similar demographic characteristics. A similar sample of CSO leaders could be drawn in each control district and their opinions likewise tracked over time.

Being able to track changes in individual opinion while monitoring changes in participants' opinion compared to the baseline data of their own original views and the views of the control groups in the paired districts will permit a high degree of confidence in the resulting indicators of project impact. Content analysis of responses in follow up one-on-one interviews will provide the qualitative reasons why.

Given the complexity of the task of evaluating impact of such a broad-ranging project, and the sophistication of the methodology involved, IFES should engage a specialist to assist in developing a Project ECSELL monitoring and evaluation capacity. Without violating the confidentiality of individual respondents IFES should make the data available and encourage external institutions and interested researchers independently to monitor and evaluate project impact as well.

3. Methodology

In support of the consolidation of democracy in Ghana, Project ECSELL (Enhancing Civil Society Effectiveness at the Local Level) is designed to increase the rate and quality of civic participation in local policy making and to improve local government responsiveness and effectiveness. The aim of Project ECSELL is to enhance the performance of Ghanaian democracy.

In preparing to launch Project ECSELL in pursuit of these three objectives, IFES conducted field research in September, October and November 1997. The fieldwork provided the data for the following baseline assessment.

IFES recruited thirteen expert consultants as members of a Baseline Assessment Team. Of these, ten consultants were Ghanaians. The team was divided into two units. A field research unit of ten consultants was charged with collecting the data. An analysis unit of three consultants was charged with analyzing the data and producing this report.

Terms of Reference of the IFES Baseline Assessment Team

Terms of reference: field research unit

The two objectives of the field research unit were (1) to collect primary information from the leaders of civil society organizations (CSOs), from District Assembly officials, and from the local traditional authorities, and (2) to identify CSOs with which IFES might work in each district. The field research unit was divided into pairs. Each pair was assigned two regions to survey, two districts within each region to visit, and a list of initial contacts within each district. Each pair was provided with a vehicle and a driver. Each field research pair:

- identified and interviewed the leaders of civil society organizations that likely would benefit significantly from training and modest grants to enhance their advocacy role;
- identified and interviewed District Assembly Presiding Members, District Assembly(wo)men, heads of decentralized departments, District Budget Officers, District Coordinating Directors, and District Chief Executives who would benefit from training to increase the responsiveness of their District Assemblies.;
- identified and interviewed the most powerful traditional authority (chief) in each district;
- conducted "durbars" (town meetings) in two separate communities near each district capital; and,
- submitted transcripts of their interviews.

Selection Criteria for Interviewing CSOs

The CSO leaders who were interviewed were selected according to one of three criteria. First, their organization may have been listed as an "identifiable organization" on the government register of organizations active in each district. Second, the CSO could have been selected by word of mouth, by being mentioned by leaders of other CSOs. Third, the consultants were instructed to identify as many women's groups as possible. Thus a group could have been selected for an interview simply because its membership was mostly women.

CSO selection criteria for participation in Project ECSELL

The assessment team identified civic groups in each district that possess six or more of the following ten characteristics:[1]

1. an identifiable and self-aware constituency;
2. a self-conscious mission that is both credible and compelling to its membership;
3. a leadership that represents its membership and is firmly linked to it;
4. a leadership with formal methods such as general meetings or informal methods such as social contacts or private visits that it uses to discover and confirm the members' opinions;
5. a leadership with the desire to develop an action strategy based on members' interests either to mobilize untapped human capital and other resources; to elicit services from the District Assembly; or to influence government policy as it pertains to their issues of interest;
6. a dependable (however small) financial base to fund its activities, and a willingness on the part of the leadership to learn how to maintain accurate financial records;
7. sufficient autonomy from the state that the organization can credibly endeavor to influence the state without being (or becoming) captive to it;
8. a leadership that displays willingness to work with other like-minded CSO groups toward specific goals;
9. a leadership that shows willingness to mobilize or recruit unorganized non-member citizens who share a common interest to solve a common problem; and,
10. a willingness on the part of the leadership to engage local government leaders and lobby hard for the interests of their membership.

The field research unit also sought to identify an equal proportion of the four functional types of CSOs categorized by the USAID/Ghana mission:

- Professional or trade associations: These are CSOs for which affiliation is based primarily on occupation, such as the various agricultural processors, tailors and dressmakers, and local hairdressers associations.
- Advocacy groups: These are CSOs whose primary role is to advocate on behalf of a constituency, for example Action on Disability in Development (ADD), and the Club for the Aged and Disabled in Rural Environs (CADRE).
- Service providers: These are CSOs whose primary role is to provide services to the community, such as the Christian Mothers Association.
- Community development organizations: These are CSOs whose primary role is to contribute to the development of the community, such as the various youth associations in the districts.

[1] Adapted from "Civil Society and Democratic Development: A CDIE Evaluation Design Paper." Harry Blair, Gerardo Berthin, Gary Hansen, Joel Jutkovitz, Heather McHugh, Malcolm Young. USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, Washington DC (1993).

Terms of reference: analysis unit

The objective of the analysis unit was to assess the state of civil society in the districts in which Project ECSELL will be active, the overall effectiveness of the District Assemblies in those districts, and the nature of the relationships between the two sets of actors. The members of the analysis unit have (1) reviewed existing literature, including the relevant academic literature and reports from government institutions and donors; and (2) analyzed the information collected by the field research unit in order to produce the following report that:

- analyzes state society relations in Ghana over time, with special emphasis on the period 1988 to present;
- describes the issues over which various civil society organizations have engaged the state, and the outcomes of those engagements;
- identifies instances in which civil society organizations have engaged the government and successfully brought about the changes they sought, and the instances of failure, and analyzed the successes and failures for key commonalities;
- identifies geographic areas and socioeconomic sectors where relations between civil society organizations are notably good, and those where relations are notably bad, and analyzed these areas and sectors for key commonalities;
- identifies the characteristics of civil society organizations that regularly engage with local government and have met or are meeting with success in resolving local problems, and analyzed these two sets of organizations for key commonalities;
- assesses the strengths and weaknesses of identified civil society organizations overall, with special attention to their capacity to mobilize and manage local resources, the relative transparency and responsiveness of their leadership, and their capacity to plan and effectively carry their plans to fruition;
- produces a typology of Ghanaian CSOs; and,
- makes practical policy recommendations for strengthening Ghanaian civil society in its theorized role of promoting and consolidating democratic governance, and similar recommendations for strengthening District Assemblies.

Field Visits: Procedures and Methods

IFES selected 20 districts in Ghana following two criteria: (1) that there be no other donor democracy and governance project in that district, and (2) that the district be accessible by road (see Appendix I for a list of the districts).

IFES defined civil society to consist of *all organized domestic non-governmental bodies exclusive of groups formed solely to seek economic profits or political power.* This definition excluded international NGOs, political bodies, political parties and individual business firms (see Appendix III for a list of CSOs interviewed).

Data collection

IFES produced a protocol or questionnaire for the field research unit (see Appendix II for the questionnaire). In September 1997 ten consultants collected the data for this report. They interviewed the highest-ranking chief in each district. They visited a total of 60 communities, of

which 20 were district capitals. They interviewed a total of 113 district government officials and the leaders of 209 civil society organizations.

Tables 1 and 2 show the distributions of the two types of respondent. The category "South" comprises the nine districts that the consultants visited in Western, Central, Eastern, Greater Accra, and southern Volta regions. The category "Central" comprises the five districts visited in Brong Ahafo, Ashanti, and northern Volta regions. Finally the category "North" refers to the remaining six districts visited in Northern, Upper East, and Upper West regions.

Table 1: Distribution of Local Government Officials

Region	Frequency	Percent
South	49	43.4
Central	32	28.3
North	32	28.3
Total	113	100

A plurality of DA officials (43.4%) and CSO leaders (44.5%) were interviewed in the South. This is explained by the fact that nine of the 20 districts (45%) are in the South.

Table 2: Distribution of Civil Society Leaders

Region	Frequency	Percent
South	93	44.5
Central	63	30.1
North	53	25.4
Total	209	100

Fewer CSOs (53) were contacted in the six districts of the North than in the five districts of the Central zone (63). This is probably because the North is the most sparsely populated part of Ghana. The lower density of people living in the North likely translates into fewer organizations located there.

Focus groups

From mid-October to mid-November 1997 IFES conducted follow-up focus groups in each district capital, one for CSO leaders and representatives of the neighboring communities, and a second for District Assembly officials. IFES presented the initial research findings to the groups and asked the participants to confirm or refute the findings. IFES then asked the participants to add any important information and to identify any important CSOs the field research unit might have missed. Finally, IFES asked the participants to come to consensus and

agree on the first, second and third most important type of training their institutions need. This question was open-ended; participants were not given a list from which to choose.

Analysis of the data

USAID/Ghana categorizes CSOs as being one of four possible types: professional or trade associations, advocacy groups, service providers, and community development organizations. By the USAID typology the frequencies of the types of CSOs that IFES interviewed are displayed in Table 3.

Table 3: Frequency of CSOs by USAID Typology

Type of CSO	Frequency	Percent
Professional or Trade Associations	121	57.9
Advocacy Groups	10	4.8
Service Providers	41	19.6
Community Development Organizations	37	17.7
Total	209	100

What is striking is that even though the consultants sought them out, very few organizations in the sample have as their primary function advocacy. Far and away the most common CSOs found in the 20 districts are those organized on the basis of occupation. Since advocacy is theorized to be one of the most important functions of a strong civil society, a key goal of IFES will be to enhance the advocacy role of CSOs that have formed for other purposes.

IFES found that nearly all of the 209 organizations contacted, no matter their main reason for existing, perform more than one of USAID's four functions. Thus the analysis unit developed a different categorization of CSOs for a more fine-grained picture of the types of groups interviewed. IFES has identified eight broad types:

- Trade unions: Organizations that represent the interests of the workers (as opposed to the owners and management) of a particular sector. An example is the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) in the transportation sector.

- Professional or trade associations: Defined slightly differently from the USAID categorization to exclude (and categorize separately) agricultural producers and processors, these are CSOs for which affiliation is based primarily on non-agricultural occupation such as tailors and dressmakers, artisans, and local hairdressers associations.

- Student or Youth Groups: Associations made up primarily of young people such as the Akuse Youth Association.

- Religious Groups: Service providers formed under the auspices of a religious body such as the Muslim Women's Association and the Christian Mothers' Association.

- Service Providers: Non-religious service providers such as the Federation of Disabled People.

- Farmers or Fishermen's Associations: Groups representing Ghana's primary producers of foodstuffs such as the Nadowli Sheabutter Association and the Cooperative Fisherman's Service Centre of Axim.

- Community Development Associations: Non-religious groups that seek to further the development of their communities such as the Onyasana Community Cooperative Society.

- Processors' Associations: Groups organized around the processing of agricultural produce such as the Tonteya Sheanut Processors' Association and the Chorkor Fish Smokers' Association.

Table 4: Frequencies of CSOs by IFES Typology

Type of CSO	Frequency	Percent
Trade Unions	9	4.3
Professional or Trade Associations	50	23.9
Student or Youth Groups	16	7.7
Religious Associations	12	5.7
Service Providers	54	25.8
Farmers or Fishermen Associations	26	12.4
Community Development Associations	31	14.8
Processors Associations	11	5.3
TOTAL	209	99.9

(Note: percentages in tables do not always equal 100% because of rounding).

IFES coded all the close-ended questions and coded all groups interviewed by content of women members, by number of members, by size of budget, and by region. IFES analyzed the results for simple frequencies, for strength of correlation using the Pearson's r method, and for strength of association using the Kendall's tau-b method (see Appendix IV for details of the statistical results).

An important caveat is in order. The following analysis operates on two assumptions. First, because IFES interviewed the leaders of CSOs and not the members, IFES is *assuming* that the responses of the leaders reflect the views of their membership. Second, because IFES did not draw a random sample of CSOs, it is improper to infer from the findings anything about the general population of CSOs. Any reader of this report who draws a conclusion about "civil society in Ghana" is *assuming* the findings reflect the larger reality.

4. Civil Society in Ghana's Transition to Democracy: A Theoretic and Historical Overview

Theorizing Civil Society in Transitions to Democracy

Civil society is a complex concept. The complexity emanates, among other reasons, from the fact that different writers stress different aspects of civil society, whether material, organizational or ideological (Bratton, 1994: 52-53).

Civil society in political theory

Crawford Young traces the long definitional and operational evolution in political theory of the concept of civil society from Hobbes to Gramsci (Young, 1994: 33-37). The Briton Hobbes did not use the term civil society explicitly. His social theory envisioned a pact between society and the sovereign giving unlimited power to the sovereign to use to protect society as a whole from itself. Writing one hundred years later his countryman Locke also did not clearly distinguish between civil society and society at large, and likewise maintained a clear distinction between state and society. But in direct disagreement with Hobbes, Locke defined government legitimacy and the right to govern as *dependent on the consent of the governed.*

Continental Europeans construed civil society more abstractly. Hegel defined it as representing a "moment in the process of the formation of the state." Marx, who is said to have stood Hegel on his head, conceptualized civil society in terms of material and economic relations, as the state's "antithetical and foundational moment." Gramsci's later conceptualization, while influenced by Marx, perceived civil society somewhat differently as "the locus of formation of ideological power, as distinct from political power strictly understood, and of the process of the legitimization of the ruling class" (all quotations are from Bobbio, 1997: 40).

Importance of civil society in a democracy

If, as theorized by Locke, regime legitimacy (the effective power to govern) depends on the consent of the governed, then in the modern state associational groups that advocate policy change must be included in the policy making process or the regime cannot survive. Today only the most brutally repressive regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein in Iraq govern without the consent of the governed.

Political theorists since Alexis de Tocqueville have described civil society as the bedrock of democratic governance. Today's mature democratic regimes are all based heavily on popular consent, that is, public opinion routinely expressed through a myriad of means including opinion polls, town meetings (electronic or otherwise), elections, and the advocacy of the associations of civil society.

Civil society in Africa

Since the end of the Cold War, in Africa as elsewhere in the world, civil society has come to life in countries previously ruled by unfettered authoritarian regimes. Since 1990 large numbers and varieties of African civic groups have effectively advocated change on a wide range of social, political, economic and environmental issues. Sweeping political transformations have

been the result, as in Benin, Malawi, and South Africa (Harbeson et. al., 1994). Even the authoritarian regimes that have successfully held out against change in such countries as Cameroon, Gabon and Kenya, and those that have backslid such as Zambia, have been forced to recognize that, in Africa as elsewhere, popular acceptance of government "is manufactured by institutions of civil society" (Bratton, 1994: 59).

Civil society in the transition to democracy

Contemporary democratic theory holds that during the process of democratic change the relationship between the state and civil society is the key determinant of the type of regime that emerges. Karl (1991) gives one of the most parsimonious statements of this thesis. Though taken from evidence drawn exclusively from transitions in Latin America, her model successfully explains Ghana's transition to democracy.

According to Karl's model the type of regime that a political transition produces is determined by two variables: whether during the period of change the power of the political elite is in the ascendant, or that of civil society; and whether compromise or force is the dominant strategy employed by the leaders of the two sides. Competitive multiparty democracy results when the power of civil society is ascendant compared to state power *and* compromise is the dominant strategy of both sets of players. In game theoretic terms, the engagement of the state and civil society at the moment of democratic change is a classic Prisoners Dilemma.

To further complicate matters, contemporary scholarship indicates that the successful passage from authoritarian rule to viable representative democracy involves not one but two transitions in sequence (O'Donnell, 1996). First is the organization and conduct of transparent and credible multiparty elections producing new representative institutions and a popularly elected government. If as in Cameroon and Kenya the elections are not transparent and credible, the new regime may exhibit the same authoritarian tendencies of its predecessor.

What is the key to the first transition? By Karl's model it lies in the relationship between the state and civil society during the period of change: the *strength* of the ruling regime vis-à-vis civil society and the *strategy* that the respective sets of leaders employ. To get to democracy the power of civil society must be in the ascendant in comparison with the state, *and* the leaders of civil society and the ruling regime must *both* employ strategies of compromise. If these conditions are not met, the regime that results from the transition will be something less than representative democracy, as in Panama and Chad.

In theoretic compatibility with Karl, O'Donnell furthermore rightly cautions that the organization and conduct of transparent and credible elections is not a sufficient condition for robust representative democracy to emerge. The democratic institutions produced by the first transition must become *consolidated*, or the new regime may revert to illiberal authoritarianism, as has happened in Zambia and Peru.

What is the key to the second transition? The most recent literature (Chazan and Rothchild, 1992; Harbeson et. al., 1994) indicates that, once again, it is the role of civil society. What role exactly does civil society play in consolidating democratic governance? Diamond

(1996) argues that civil society does two things. First, it *provides the state its power.* How does it do this? By obeying the law, paying their taxes, and not engaging in disobedient behavior, civil or otherwise, people lend the government its legitimacy, and thereby provide the state its power. The term is important. The *lending* of legitimacy implies that the people's support for their government is provisional, and may be withdrawn if the government does not meet Aristotle's minimal definition of good government, namely that government is good to the extent that it meets the aspirations of the people.

Second, civil society *limits state power.* How does it do this? The organizations of civil society define and defend the boundaries of private life into which the state may not penetrate. For example, legal bar associations act to preclude the state from reaching into the home, from expropriating property, from arbitrarily arresting people, from extra-legal killing, and from committing other violations of basic civil liberties and human rights.

A third and equally important function of a democratic civil society is to convey the concerns and views of ordinary citizens to government as a normal activity. It is no accident that all democratic polities provide for freedom of assembly and the right of citizens to petition their government for the redress of grievances. Elections may furnish the most dramatic and exciting moments of democratic politics, but most of democratic political activity occurs quietly between elections. By aggregating the interests of their members and communicating them to government, *the organizations of civil society provide the institutional structures through which people's viewpoints are advocated as a matter of routine.*

State-Civil Society Relations in Ghana Since 1969

Ghana's political history is a turbulent one, so it is not surprising that the academic literature on Ghana has consistently characterized relations between civil society and the state as antagonistic (Chazan, 1983; Nugent, 1996). Ghana's political history since 1969 can be seen as a cycle of short-lived democratic republics being overthrown by the military, leading to state repression of civil society, and years later a resurgence of civil society leading to the reinstitution of democratic rule.

State repression of civil society

Historically, in the immediate aftermath of a coup in Ghana, when the new authoritarian regime's grip on power was still uncertain but its resolve firm, the regime used state power to force civic associations into silence, if not compliance. This was the case with the Acheampong-led regime in the years after the military overthrow of the 1969-1971 Second Republic of Dr. Kofi Busia. It was again the case with the Rawlings-led regime in the years after the military overthrow of the 1979-1981 Third Republic of Dr. Hilla Limann.

Civil society confrontation of the state

As the years went by in both authoritarian interludes in Ghana, civic associations gradually gained ascendancy and began to unify to confront the state demanding change. The authoritarian regimes' legitimacy was thereupon threatened. As the resurgence of civil society gained strength, regime resolve weakened.

In the first case, in the late 1970s mounting civil unrest including general strikes led to the transition from the Acheampong-Akuffo military regime through the brief-lived Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) regime led by Jerry Rawlings to the Third Republic. In 1981 the Third Republic was overthrown by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), also headed by Jerry Rawlings.

In the second case of mounting civic confrontation of the state, in the latter half of the1980s growing vocal opposition by civic groups led to compromise and the transition from the PNDC regime to the Fourth Republic. In a climate of heightened contention in 1978-1979 and again in 1986-1992, the leadership of both state and civil society nevertheless maintained their willingness to compromise. A negotiated democratic transition therefore ultimately ensued, as Karl's model would predict.

Transitions to Democracy in Ghana: the Third and Fourth Republics

Since gaining independence from Britain in 1957 as sub-Saharan Africa's first independent state, Ghana has undergone five successful military *coups d'état:* in 1966, 1972, 1978, 1979, and 1981. Ghana has also undergone three constitutional transitions from authoritarian rule to multiparty democracy: in 1969, 1979 and 1992. There have been no fewer than six regime changes in Ghana (the 1978 coup replaced one military regime with another) in the first 35 years of the country's existence. Civil society played a key role in the reinstitution of democracy in 1979 and 1992.

Civil society and the establishment of the Third Republic

In 1978 Ghana's civil society organizations began to confront the corrupt and inept Acheampong military regime over its plan to institute permanent authoritarian corporatism, the so-called UNIGOV proposal. When the regime conducted a patently fraudulent referendum to engineer popular approval of the government plan, the public uproar and spreading civil unrest was severe enough to spark a palace coup.

The successor head of state, General Frederick Akuffo, put Ghana on a timetable for a return to multiparty democracy. The regime drafted a Constitution that was approved by popular referendum in early 1979. Political parties were allowed to form, select candidates and begin to campaign. But Akuffo gave such lenient treatment to Acheampong and his former top-ranking military cronies that enough of the junior officer corps became sufficiently outraged to back the bloody coup of June 4, 1979 that brought young Air Force Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings to power as leader of a puritanically moralist regime.

Rawlings became Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that assumed state control. In a bizarre conjunction of state violence and peaceful change the regime executed high-ranking military officers including three former heads of state while conducting the multiparty elections on schedule. On behalf of the AFRC Rawlings turned over power to the duly elected government of Hilla Limann as prescribed in the Constitution that September, an act for which Rawlings was named BBC Man of the Year.

The Third Republic was ill starred. Beset by internal conflicts within the governing party and indecision at the top, faced with lack of foreign investment and a global economic downturn, the Limann government proved unable to put an end to the endemic corruption and the chronic economic crisis that plagued Ghana. On December 31, 1981, after only 27 months in office, the Limann government was overthrown in a second coup led by Jerry Rawlings that without bloodshed brought Ghana's Third Republic to an end.

Civil society under the PNDC

The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) which assumed power under the chairmanship of Rawlings initially pursued the twin goals of simultaneously establishing a command economy in Ghana and a direct or popular democracy along the lines of Libya or Cuba or Sandinista Nicaragua. PNDC delegations were dispatched to the socialist and Communist countries to appeal for aid, but all returned disappointed. Assistance from this direction was not forthcoming.

Ghana suffered severe drought in 1983. This was compounded by the influx of one million Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria that same year. With the infrastructure in severe disrepair, faced with the prospect of complete economic collapse, and nowhere else to turn, Rawlings defied the radical ideologues of the PNDC and signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Exercising leadership at no small personal risk Rawlings pragmatically sacrificed ideology and accepted the conditions of structural adjustment in exchange for desperately needed infusions of capital. Under active threat of coups from both right and left as a result, the PNDC goal of establishing a command economy in Ghana was abandoned by 1984.

Rawlings remained committed however to establishing a popular democracy, and relations between civil society and the state therefore deteriorated under early PNDC rule. The intellectuals and junior military officers who dominated the higher councils of the early PNDC regime displayed a youthful revolutionary zeal and antagonistic impatience with the existing institutions of civil society. The hegemonic, repressive, militant radicalism of the PNDC during its first years in power caused Ghana's civic groups to disengage from the state, producing a "culture of fear" (Drah 1993: 90) or "culture of silence" (Nugent, 1996: 163) for much of the 1980s.

Decentralization under the PNDC

Shortly after the 1981 coup the PNDC created the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) with the mandate to search for a "true" participatory form of democracy. By the mid-1980s, consistent with policies being recommended by the donor community, the PNDC began to decentralize. It increased the number of administrative districts from 65 to 110. In 1984 the regime instructed the NDC to learn public opinion on how the districts should be governed.

From a series of seminars and memoranda submitted by individuals and various civil society organizations over the course of three years, the NDC recommended in 1987 that the PNDC establish District Assemblies as the highest political and administrative structures in each

district. The District Assemblies were to consist of a decentralized bureaucracy fused to a representative body. In contradiction of the regime's known opposition to "the empty token of the ballot," the NDC recommended that the members to the District Assemblies be elected by secret vote. In accordance with the regime's opposition to political party activities, however, the NDC recommended that the elections be on a non-partisan basis. The NDC further recommended that 30% of the District Assembly representatives should be appointed. On the strength of these recommendations, the regime decreed the District Assemblies into being in PNDC Law 207.

In 1987 the PNDC conducted a voter registration exercise. From late 1987 through 1988 elections were held, and the District Assemblies were formed.

Civil society and the establishment of the Fourth Republic

The PNDC decision to establish elected District Assemblies sparked the rejuvenation of civil society. Though it was by no means certain at the time, the creation of elected District Assemblies was the first step in a PNDC retreat from instituting popular direct democracy toward what would become a full-fledged transition back to multiparty democracy in Ghana.

It should be noted that in a 1993 document entitled "The Stolen Verdict" Ghana's main opposition party the National Patriotic Party (NPP) has dated the rejuvenation of civil society to 1988, when at the annual J.B. Danquah Memorial Lectures the NPP's future 1992 presidential candidate Professor A. Adu-Boahen condemned PNDC rule. The NPP today claims the lectures cracked open the culture of silence. It is probably more accurate to date the rejuvenation of civil society from the period 1984 to 1986 when the NCD, in its search for a "true" democracy, allowed civil society to speak out for the first time since the coup.

The disintegration of the Soviet bloc beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 further intensified civic demands for democratic change in Ghana. On August 1, 1990 a new civic association, the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) formed with the objective of campaigning for the restoration of democratic rule. The MFJ was promptly endorsed by the student group NUGS. On September 4, 1990 NUGS attacked the government's continued incarceration of political opponents and the existence of oppressive laws in the country.

With the District Assemblies in place by 1989, facing intensifying demands for democratic change, the PNDC took up the task of designing national political structures. As a first step the regime asked the NDC to gather the opinion of civic leaders and the general public. In 1990 the NCD invited select civic leaders, PNDC activists and traditional chiefs to quasi-public hearings held in all ten regions of Ghana to present their points of view. The fact that invitation to the hearings was restricted led many to believe the PNDC was excluding known opponents from having a voice in deciding the future structure of Ghana's political system. The Ghana Bar Association (GBA), the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS), the Christian Council of Ghana (CCG), the University Teachers Association of Ghana (UTAG), and the Catholic Bishops Council (CBC) all attacked the hearings as a sham.

The NDC submitted its report to the PNDC government the following year in March 1991. The report stated that Ghanaians were generally in favor of the presidential system of

government, and preferred a national Parliament to be comprised of legislators elected in multiparty political contests. On May 17 the PNDC issued a law establishing a nine-member Committee of Experts to make proposals for a draft Constitution. The committee submitted its report on July 31. It now remained to be seen whether the PNDC would reverse its longstanding opposition to political parties.

Shortly after the fracture of the Soviet Union into fifteen countries in 1991 the Ghana Bar Association convened an emergency meeting on June 11 and renewed its call on the PNDC to set a clear timetable for a return to constitutional rule. On July 2, 1991 the Ghana Union Traders Association (GUTA) organized about 1,000 traders to protest against tax increases. That same year the Catholic Bishops Council published a document titled "The Catholic Church and Ghana's Search for a New Democratic System" that was highly critical of the vagueness surrounding a fixed date for a return to constitutional democracy.

The Flawed Transition of 1992

In this climate of mounting civic pressure the PNDC decreed Law 253 creating a Consultative Assembly to draft a Constitution. The members of the Consultative Assembly were nominated by the PNDC. They deliberated on the proposals submitted by the Committee of Experts, and drew up a draft Constitution during the latter half of 1991.

The Constitution was overwhelmingly approved in a national referendum in the spring of 1992. The PNDC then reversed itself in a major concession to popular opinion and decreed PNDC Law 281 that simultaneously set the conditions under which political parties would be permitted to reform and proscribed them from the local level.

The first core goal of the PNDC to create a command economy was abandoned under economic duress in 1983 with the signing of an agreement with the IMF, an act the radicals of the PNDC opposed as a fatal concession to global imperialist capitalism. The second core goal of establishing a "true" participatory democracy was abandoned in 1992 with the lifting of the ban on political party activities on May 18, 1992. That summer the PNDC converted itself into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and nominated Jerry Rawlings for President.

That same summer, with USAID funding, IFES conducted an assessment of the existing voter register and pronounced it flawed. The Interim National Electoral Commission refused to conduct a new voter registration, but did agree to remove so-called ghost voters from the existing register, which had been constructed for the 1987-1988 District Assembly elections.

The emergence of a free press

Action by civic associations led to the emergence of an independent media in Ghana just before the ban on political activities was lifted. Article 162(3) of the 1992 constitution of Ghana provides that: "there shall be no impediments to the establishment of private press or media; and in particular, there shall be no law requiring any person to obtain a license as a prerequisite to the establishment or operation of a newspaper, journal or other media for mass communication or information." However, translating this constitutional article into practice in a time of political

transition proved problematic. Various civic organizations including religious groups and the Independent Media Corporation of Ghana (IMCG) applied to the newly established Frequency Board for frequencies on which to broadcast. The Frequency Board acted on none of the applications. The IMCG then went ahead and established a private radio station called Radio Eye, which started operating without a license. The police forcibly seized their equipment and closed the station down.

Despite the crackdown, an independent media was being born in Ghana. By 1997 three television and six radio stations were on the air and nearly two dozen independent newspapers were publishing in Accra.

The elections of 1992

In 1992 Jerry Rawlings won election as President in an ill-organized first round of voting. Convinced the results were due to massive fraud, the opposition boycotted the subsequent elections for Parliament. The result was a flawed transition to an elected single-party government that inaugurated Ghana's Fourth Republic.

Civil society under the Fourth Republic

With the opposition in boycott, state-civil society relations did not improve under the single party NDC government that headed the first Parliament of Ghana's Fourth Republic. A significant confrontation occurred following March 1, 1995 when the government imposed a 17% Value Added Tax (VAT). On May 11 a group called the Alliance for Change (AFC) composed of a cross section of opposition parties successfully mobilized urban dwellers in Accra to protest. Contrary to the constitutional right of freedom of assembly enshrined in Article 21(1)(d) which guarantees freedom of assembly including freedom to take part in processions and demonstrations, pro-government supporters allegedly made up of former PNDC militants attacked the protesters. Four demonstrators were reported killed. The public outcry that followed led to the withdrawal of VAT. The incident has never been officially investigated.

The actions of civic groups in opposition to the military regime in 1978-1979 and again in 1986-1992, the establishment of the brief-lived Radio Eye leading to the birth of an independent media, and the violent demonstrations that led to the withdrawal of VAT, all illustrate one thing. Civil society has played and is continuing to play a crucial role in the reestablishment and consolidation of multiparty democracy in Ghana.

USAID and the Elections of 1996

In a tense climate of boycott following the flawed elections of 1992 Ghana's opposing political leaders took stock. In early 1994 the newly established permanent Electoral Commission of Ghana brought all registered political parties together to meet to air their grievances and to lend voice to the formulation of the rules and procedures that would govern first a new voter registration exercise and then the 1996 elections themselves. The forum came to be called the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC). The donors were invited to attend. In the first IPAC meeting the United States pledged $10 million in support of voters registration and the 1996 general elections.

From 1994 to 1996 in monthly IPAC meetings the parties and the Electoral Commission proposed a total of 52 suggestions for changes to the electoral process. Of these, 27 requests would have required a change in the law, and thus were beyond the Electoral Commission's authority. Of the remaining 25, the Electoral Commission initiated 21 in their entirety. The remaining four suggestions were initiated partially. The political parties participated deeply in the process of constructing the checks and balances in the electoral process. That they did so went a long way toward insuring that the results of the election would not be disputed.

In late 1994 IFES signed a cooperative agreement with USAID to implement Project STEP (Supporting the Electoral Process). Working with the Electoral Commission, Project STEP helped educate the voting population on the procedures and responsibilities of registering and voting by supporting the cost of producing and printing posters and airing radio and TV spots. IFES helped train a cadre of registration and poll workers in the proper methods and procedures to ensure the integrity of the registration process and the registry. A total of 60,000 registration officials were trained for the registration exercise, while 20,000 presiding officers were trained to serve on election day. Project STEP trained over 80,000 party agents to serve during the voter registration exercise and 136,000 candidate agents to serve on Election Day. IFES also helped procure computer hardware for the Electoral Commission and materials for the voter registry and voter identification cards.

Unlike in 1992 the 1996 elections were held on a single day, December 7. The stakes were enormous. Dire predictions borne of anxiety and fear that Ghana would explode were being shrilled in certain quarters. But in a climate of peace and calm, of a total 9.2 million registered voters of an estimated population of 18 million Ghanaians, 7.2 million turned out, 78.3% of those registered. The losing candidates accepted the results.

In 1997 USAID and IFES conducted a post-election survey of political attitudes in Ghana -- the first survey of its magnitude ever conducted in Africa. No fewer than 92% of all Ghanaians said they believed the elections were honest. Only 15% said they believed the Electoral Commission was not neutral. Seventy percent said they are satisfied with their level of political freedom. This is strong evidence that the 1996 elections were a giant stride toward the consolidation of democracy in Ghana.

Conclusion

From 1986 onward a congruence of domestic events later influenced by changes in the international system brought on by the end of the Cold War emboldened civil society organizations in Ghana to confront the ruling PNDC regime for democratic change. The struggle involved various social forces acting individually or in concert with like-minded forces.

The process by which Ghana is undergoing the transition to multiparty democratic governance under the Fourth Republic is consistent with Karl's theoretic model. In the late 1980s the power of Ghana's civil society began to rise in relation to the power of the ruling regime. Throughout the period of transition both civic leaders and the PNDC leadership consistently

demonstrated willingness to compromise. As Karl's model would predict, the presence of an ascendant civil society and a pervading spirit of compromise led Ghana through peaceful reform to the reestablishment of constitutional democracy in 1992, and then onward to multiparty democracy in 1996.

The political history of Ghana has followed a pattern since 1969. The strength and assertiveness of civic groups has waxed and waned according to the advent of authoritarianism and the length of time that the authoritarian regime was in power. Following each coup the new authoritarian regime used state power to compel Ghana's civic groups into silence. But each time, gradually, after some years, civic groups began to reassert themselves. Two times civil society confronted the state with demands for democratic change, leading to the establishment of the Third and now Fourth Republic.

In conducting credible and transparent elections in 1996, Ghana successfully finished traversing the first of O'Donnell's two theorized transitions to institutionalized democracy. The nation is now embarked on the second "longer and more complex" transition to consolidated democratic governance, but there is the possibility that Ghana, like Zambia and other countries where democratization has faltered, "may regress to authoritarian rule, or... stall in a feeble, uncertain situation" (O'Donnell 1996: 95).

A key purpose of the new IFES project will be to help ensure this won't happen. Having in cooperation with USAID through Project STEP provided valuable assistance in helping the Ghanaian people pass through the first transition -- the conduct of transparent and credible elections in 1996 -- IFES is now preparing to assist the Ghanaian people traverse the second transition to consolidated democratic rule.

5. Decentralization and the District Assemblies in Ghana's Transition to Democracy: A Theoretic and Historical Overview

The legacy of Ghana's coups

Ghana's five successful coups and three transitions back to democratic rule in 41 years of independence means it has existed under seven different regime types: three of them military and now four of them democratically elected. Whether military or democratic all the successor regimes save the last have followed the same pattern in addressing the question of governance at the local level.

First, the inherited structures of local government were abolished, whether by decree or constitutionally. Development administration units typically absorbed the responsibilities and finances of these institutions. Second, a law was enacted directing all government activities within a region or district to be coordinated by a very senior political or administrative official, exclusively responsible to the center. Third, popular councils were created (either elected or selected) to advise the district executive. All district projects were to be approved at the regional level, and beyond that at the center. This pattern, repeated through five of Ghana's six regime changes, led to discontinuity in local government as each new regime in effect erased what the previous regime had done and started over.

The exception is the sixth regime change, when the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) transformed itself into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and was elected as a political party in 1992, and reelected in 1996. Although Ghana's regime once again changed from authoritarianism back to democratic rule, because the key figures of the PNDC era (most notably President Rawlings) remained in power, the local government structures created by the PNDC were not altered under the Fourth Republic.

Decentralization under the (P)NDC

In the late 1980s the PNDC, in common with the governments of many developing countries, adopted a package of reforms aimed at decentralizing Ghana's political system. In 1988 the PNDC increased the number of districts from 65 to 110 and devolved 86 functions to the District Assemblies, which became the political and administrative authorities in the districts.

In pursuit of decentralization the PNDC was accepting a number of propositions that are at the heart of the international policy debate concerning the relationship between the modern state and its citizens. By the late 1980s the concept of governance had entered the development lexicon (World Bank, 1989; Hyden and Bratton, 1992). Ideas of how to improve governance focused on local politics and strategies for decentralization. By moving government closer to the people, decentralization was expected to result in improved governance, which in turn was expected to create an enabling environment that would unleash economic growth.

In Ghana and other African countries, decentralization programs have been implemented mainly for three reasons. First, decentralization was seen as a key element in the process of

democratization generally, and of participatory approaches to development particularly. Second, decentralization was regarded as a means of slimming down ineffective central administrations -- shrinking the social welfare state -- through programs of cutting state expenditures by shedding certain functions and transferring the costs of others to their users. Finally, decentralization to democratic local government units was expected to improve governance through increased government responsiveness and greater accountability. This in turn would give rise to a number of benefits not attained under previously tried centralized forms of government, especially improved economic performance (Mawhood, 1983; Smith, 1985; Rondinelli et. al., 1989; Conyers, 1989; Olowu and Wunsch, 1990).

Explicit and implicit objectives of decentralization

Decentralization has two aspects: the legal framework of decentralization and the levels to which powers are actually decentralized.[2] Effective decentralization does not automatically transpire just because legislation has established a decentralized system. For decentralization to succeed as it can, local officials must be given the opportunity to gain the management and planning skills necessary to assume their new roles and responsibilities.[3]

This has not been the case in Ghana, and has led to a number of problems. These include poor contract management resulting in poor construction works, overpayments, corruption, and in some instances misappropriation. Others are low generation of local revenue; high expenditures on recurrent costs such as the operation and maintenance of official vehicles; inappropriate and unsustainable projects; payment of huge sitting allowances for District Assembly representatives; poor monitoring of revenue collection; and late preparation of budgets.[4]

---

[2] Government publications that deal with these aspects include the 1992 Constitution (Chapters 8 and 20); PNDC Law 207, 1988 which has been repealed by the Local Government Act (Act 462), 1993; the Civil Service Law (PNDC Law 327), 1993; Legislative Instrument (LI) 1514, 1991, which has been replaced by LI 1589, 1994; District Assemblies Common Fund Act (Act 455), 1993; the National Development Planning Commission Act (Act 479), 1994; the National Development Planning (System) Act, (Act 480), 1994 and the Legislative Instruments of 1988/89 that created the 110 District Assemblies (DAs). In addition to these, there are five administrative regulations, viz., the Financial Memorandum (Section 81) of Local Government Act, (Act 54), 1961; Financial Administrative Decree (FAD), SMCD 221, 1979; the Financial Administration Regulation (FAR), LI 1234, 1979; bylaws of the 110 District Assemblies; Legislative Instruments of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD); and Model Standing Orders for Municipal and District Assemblies, 1994).

[3] The MLGRD's two publications, *From the Centre to the Grassroots* and *Local Government Information Digest*, have excerpts from selected speeches on the decentralization policy as well as the activities and operation of the DAs. Three publications evaluate the operations of the District Assemblies: *Ghana - Vision 2020: The First Step: 1996-2000* (1995), which while acknowledging the critical development role being played by the District Assemblies as a result of their proximity to the people, is unhappy about their limited funding and poor caliber of personnel; the MLGRD's *Ghana - The New Local Government System* (1996) which traces the history of local government in Ghana and describes the structure of the new local government, planning, budgeting and financial systems, and identifies the implementation problems (aptitude and attitude of personnel, logistics, financial, and constitutional problems) that face decentralization in Ghana today. Thirdly, the annual Auditor General's Report on the District Assemblies provides a more dispassionate assessment.

[4] Studies on decentralization in Ghana during the pre- and post- 1988 period include Nsarkoh, 1964; Saaka, 1978; Harris, 1983; Warren and Blunt, 1983; Ayee, 1986; 1990; 1991; 1992; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997a; 1997b; Crook, 1994; Haynes, 1991; and Nkrumah, 1990; 1991; 1992.

The government of Ghana has been able to articulate the explicit objectives of decentralization such as empowerment, participation, accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness, decongestion of the national capital and the checking of the rural-urban drift. However, the government has not been able to indicate the *implicit* objectives, that is, what one might call the politics of decentralization; for instance, using decentralization as an instrument for mobilizing support for specific objectives. Knowledgeable respondents indicated to the assessment team members that within the national government there is no agreed upon definition of decentralization and no common vision of the desired end-state of decentralized government in Ghana. Different ministries interpret and implement decentralization differently.

The status of decentralized government in Ghana

The lack of a shared vision of what decentralization means leads to a number of problems.[5] For purposes of analysis they can be separated into four broad categories:

(1) The lack of a clear definition of decentralization, including articulation of the envisioned end-state, lack of discussion of the different aspects of decentralization, and unclear delineation of the roles and responsibilities and the proper relationship between central and local government under the new system.
(2) The lack of a clear understanding on the part of DA officials of the role of decentralization in development, including its general role as a tool for national development and its impact -- positive and negative -- on the achievement of specific objectives, such as institutional performance, responsiveness, accountability, popular participation, and the management of development at the regional and local levels.
(3) Improper attitudes for successful decentralization among District Assembly officials, especially the divided loyalties on the part of administrators who are assigned to work in the districts but are hired, fired, paid and promoted by the central government.
(4) Inadequate evaluation mechanisms of the decentralization program, and thus an inability to make needed adjustments and corrections.

Administrative versus political decentralization

Decentralization in Ghana has emphasized administrative rather than political decentralization. Administrative decentralization involves merely shifting the workload from a central government ministry or agency headquarters to its own field offices without transferring

[5] Current problems include (i) the disparity between the 86 functions assigned the DAs and the material and human resources at their disposal; (ii) the pervasive and dominant role of the District Chief Executive (DCE) to ensure central government control; (iii) the double allegiance of 22 line ministries, government departments and organizations, which are to operate under the DAs, and yet whose staff continue to be recruited, promoted, paid and dismissed by the central government; (iv) the lack of proper definition of the role of the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCC), which are to coordinate the DAs, but in practice monitor and control their activities; (v) conflicts between the DCEs and Members of Parliament (MPs); (vi) non-partisan nature of the DAs which has proved difficult to enforce because of the highly politicized role of the DCE and MP; (vii) the inability of the Ministry of Local Government to effectively coordinate the decentralization program because of impotency in issuing guidelines to other sector ministries; (viii) poor local revenue generation and mobilization; (ix) corruption and misappropriation of funds; (x) routinely over-optimistic revenue estimates; (xi) high expenditures on recurrent expenditure, such as maintenance of official vehicles, (xii) late preparation of plans and budgets; and (xiii) lack of coordination of activities between the DAs, donors and CSOs.

to the staff the authority to make decisions locally or to exercise discretion in carrying out national policy. Political decentralization, on the other hand, involves the creation of semi-autonomous and independent geographical entities with policy making and revenue raising powers over which central authorities exercise little or no direct control.

Decentralization of responsibilities in Ghana is being carried out with considerable hesitation, and in most cases, with little decentralization of decision-making powers or relocation of qualified personnel. It often increases the workload of central government officials rather than decreasing it, as they are called upon to manage more responsibilities directly and indirectly throughout the country.

In short, the administrative capacity of the newly created local bodies in Ghana has not been strengthened prior to the transfer of new functions and responsibilities upon them. Worse, their decision-making power has been left unclear.

District Assembly authority over areas of concern to civil society

The legal framework of decentralization contained in the Local Government Act 462 stipulates that District Assemblies should coordinate, integrate and harmonize with the development programs promoted or carried out by non-governmental organizations in their district. With all their organizational woes District Assemblies are expected to act in cooperation with the civic groups in their area in performing the 86 functions that Ghana's District Assemblies are expected to perform.[6] Mandated to cooperate with local non-governmental organizations, Ghana's District Assemblies clearly have responsibility for coordinating with civic organizations. They have the responsibility for providing services of vital interest to Ghana's organizations of civil society.

[6] These include the provision of vital services such as public health care and public education, collecting taxes, registering births and deaths, providing garbage disposal, public sanitation, street repair, and the supply of water.

6. Civil Society in 20 Districts in Ghana: Findings and Recommendations

Prior to the commencement of the IFES assessment mission very little was known about state-civil society relations at the local level in Ghana. The consensus in the academic literature was that at the national level in Ghana "it has been difficult for civil associations to stand up to state and regime and get away with it," (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994: 144). Based on this view, the IFES assessment team in setting out believed that the civic groups they would find in the 20 districts would prove to be ineffective in meeting their set objectives, that they seldom would advocate the interests of their members to local government, that they would generally be disengaged from the policy making process, and that relations with their District Assemblies would be poor. Stated contrarily in positive and falsifiable terms, the working hypothesis to be tested in this section is that *the CSOs in the sample promote democracy and actively represent their interests to the District Assemblies, are themselves internally democratic, and are broad-based and have adequate resources to achieve their aims.*

Do CSOs promote democracy and advocate their interests?

Thirty-five percent of Ghanaians polled in the 1997 USAID/IFES national survey of public opinion said that they do not know what it means to live in a democracy. Against this background, IFES was interested to know how many civic leaders would say their groups acted to promote democracy. Knowing as it did at the outset of the existing high levels of uncertainty about the meaning of democracy, IFES also asked the CSO leaders it interviewed if their groups are concerned about issues of social justice. Finally IFES asked them if their groups ever went to the District Assembly to advocate the views of their members. IFES thus probed the 209 civic leaders contacted in the 20 districts about three issues:

1. promotion of democracy;
2. concern about issues of social justice; and,
3. advocacy of interests.

Promotion of democracy: A major finding by this study is that almost three-quarters (72.2%) of the local CSO leaders interviewed claimed their groups have acted to promote democracy in their districts. This compares favorably to the finding in the 1997 USAID/IFES survey that only two-thirds (65%) of all Ghanaians were able to offer an opinion of what it means to live in a democracy.

Table 1: Promotion of Democracy

Response	Frequency	Percent
Yes	151	72.2
No	53	25.4
Don't know/no response	5	2.4
TOTAL	209	100.0

Out of 209 respondents, 151 (72.2%) answered "yes" to the question: "In the past, has your organization acted in the district to promote democracy in Ghana?" Only 53 (25.4%) answered in the negative. The wide variety of means through which the CSOs in the sample promote democracy (as enumerated below) and the large 72.2% majority that do so augurs well for the nation's efforts at democratic consolidation. CSO activities to promote democracy include:

1. advising members to get involved in politics and also to exercise their franchise;
2. attending rallies and other democratically oriented education programs for organized groups;
3. attending briefing sessions organized by the Electoral Commission (EC) and the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE);
4. participating in education programs organized for the electorate by the EC and the NCCE especially in the villages;
5. encouraging members to interact with officials of District Assemblies (DAs), especially the local assembly members in order to advise and also to make the wishes and expectations of the members of CSOs known by the assembly;
6. participating in DA sessions as observers;
7. affluent CSOs (e.g. GPRTU) released vehicles on polling day to convey voters, officials, and voting materials to polling centers in some districts;
8. educating their members on the need to ensure peaceful elections at all times;
9. educating members on their civic rights, duties and obligations;
10. presenting memoranda to the Consultative Assembly that drew up the 1992 Constitution;
11. taking custody of election materials in the absence of a functional police station;
12. involvement in the supervision and management of the elections;
13. inviting the EC and NCCE officials to visit members and educate them on political tolerance, and how to vote; and,
14. organizing educational programs on the rights of children.

What must be of concern to stakeholders in the quest for democratic consolidation are the reasons offered by some of the 25.4% of the 209 leaders whose groups do not actively promote democracy:

1. Their organizations are apolitical and since the promotion of democracy is necessarily a political activity, any such activity would conflict with their long-term objectives.
2. Partisan political activity associated with democracy tends to polarize. To maintain cohesion within their organization, political discussions and activities geared towards the promotion of democracy are kept at a minimum.
3. Political activity is dangerous.

Gender analysis revealed a significant negative correlation and a significant negative association between a group actively promoting democracy in its district and the proportion of women in that group. The more women there are in a group in the sample the lower the likelihood of that group promoting democracy.

The gender gap can probably be attributed to the lingering effects of traditional cultural values in Ghana (Apter, 1963; Nukuya, 1982; Brown, 1997). In the past in many of Ghana's

traditional cultures women were restricted to the private sphere, the home and hearth, where they were expected to remain virtuous mothers and wives engaged exclusively in nurturing and child-rearing. Politics was held to be a dirty and dangerous activity in which women had no business.

Another significant and discouraging finding is the strong negative correlation and negative association between the promotion of democracy and a group's geographical location. Of the 209 CSO leaders interviewed on the question of promoting democracy, significantly fewer leaders in the North said their groups promote democracy than CSO group leaders in the South.

This too can probably be explained as a downstream effect of a historical legacy. Under the British colonial regime, the North of Ghana was left under indirect rule and for all intents and purposes was treated as a reservoir of menial labor. Few schools were built in the North, and compared to southern Ghanaians, few northerners were educated (Austin, 1964). This led to a situation upon independence of a general detachment of the North from the nation as a whole. Nkrumah and now Rawlings have tried to reverse this condition through policies intended to integrate the North into the national structure, but success in this regard is widely viewed as still incomplete. Northern culture remains different from Southern culture, and Northerners less engaged in the democratic political process.

Analysis of the sampled CSOs also revealed a significant correlation and a significant association between the promotion of democracy and an organization having a large membership. The larger the group, the greater the likelihood of that group promoting democracy.

Concern about issues of social justice: The findings of the field work, as Table 2 indicates, show that a significant number of the identified CSOs are concerned about issues of social justice.

Table 2: Concern about issues of social justice

Response	Frequency	Percent
Very	167	79.9
Somewhat	18	8.6
Not very	19	9.1
Don't know/no response	5	2.4
TOTAL	209	100.0

Four out of five of the 209 respondents, 167 or 79.9% indicated that their groups are very concerned about social justice. Only 8.6% and 9.1% respectively were somewhat concerned or not very concerned. There is cause for optimism that fully 88.5% of the CSO leaders sampled claimed their groups are somewhat or very concerned about issues of social justice.

Many of the CSOs engage in arbitration of cases among their members. They also intercede where necessary to withdraw cases from the courts. Some of the groups have fought against the imposition of higher taxes. The concern for social justice compelled the Manya

Krobo Youth Association to petition the President of Ghana to effect changes in the Manya Krobo District.

Gender analysis revealed that, as in the case of promotion of democracy, there is a significant negative correlation and a significant negative association between a group in the sample expressing concern about justice and the proportion of women in that group. The more women there are in a group, the less likely that group is to be concerned about issues of social justice. This is likely due to the lingering cultural attitude that women do not belong in the public sphere.

There is also a significant negative correlation and a significant negative association between concern about justice and a group's geographical location. CSO leaders in the northern portion of the sample expressed concern for justice less frequently than CSO leaders in the southern portion. This is likely the result of the unique history of the North. Northerners may feel less of a stake in the national system because they have benefited from it less.

Nevertheless many northern groups expressed concern about issues of social justice, especially issues involving the physically disabled and crime. Expressions of the former came from the Ghana Association of the Blind in Nadawli District and the Federation of Disabled Persons, as well as Action on Disability and Development in the Upper East and Upper West Regions.

Concern about crime centered on the explosive issue of cattle rustling. Cattle rustling was alleged by many informants to be perpetrated by a syndicate controlled by local rich individuals and supported by people in high authority. The police are believed to set free cattle thieves who get arrested. Accused cattle rustlers brought before the law courts are thought often to be treated leniently. However, civic groups seem to have taken no action.

Advocacy by CSOs to their District Assembly: The advocacy role of civil society is crucial to a democracy. In a democracy, aside from opinion polls, it is primarily through civic organizations that organized popular opinion is heard between elections.

CSO leaders were asked whether they ever went to their DA to advocate either the formulation of government policy or the passage of a piece of legislation.

Table 3: CSO advocates interests to DAs

Response	Frequency	Percent
Yes	93	44.5
No	113	54.1
Don't know/no responses	3	1.4
TOTAL	209	100.0

It is discouraging to note that fully 113 CSO leaders (54.1%) replied that they did not go to their District Assembly to advocate, while only 93 (44.5%) responded in the affirmative. Although

some CSOs in the sample interact with their District Assemblies, a majority of them do not. Table 4 shows wide variation by category of group. Three-quarters (75.0%) of trade unions go to the District Assembly to advocate, while less than one-fifth (16.7%) of religious groups do.

Table 4: Advocacy by CSOs at the District Assembly

	Types of CSOs							
Willing to Advocate	Unions	Trade Groups	Youth Groups	Religious Groups	Service Providers	Farmers & Fishermen	CDOs	Total
Yes	8.5% (75.0%)	38.0% (56.3%)	5.6% (33.3%)	4.2% (16.7%)	23.9% (40.5%)	7.0% (20.8%)	12.7% (28.1%)	99.9%
No	1.8% (25.0%)	18.6% (43.8%)	7.1% (66.7%)	13.3% (83.3%)	22.1% (59.5%)	16.8% (79.2%)	20.4% (71.9%)	100.1%
Total	10.3% (100%)	56.6% (100.1)	12.7% (100%)	17.5% (100%)	46.0% (100%)	23.8% (100%)	33.1% (100%)	

(Note: Upper figures are row percentages. Figures in parenthesis are column percentages. Totals do not always equal 100% because of rounding).

To the extent that they do not go to their District Assemblies to advocate their interests, a majority of CSOs in the sample are in fact disengaged from the state. This certainly has contributed to the lack of coordination of government program implementation in the districts. To address this issue Project ECSELL must build on the experiences of the CSOs that go to get their views heard in local government. What about them is different from the 54.1% that are disengaged from the process? IFES must translate the majority of CSOs that don't go to their District Assembly into a majority of CSOs that do.

Analysis of the responses to the questions probing for promotion of democracy, concern about social justice, and advocacy of members' concerns resulted in the following findings:

- The identified CSOs strongly promote democracy in their districts. Seven out of ten (72.2%) promote democracy either in the district or among their members, or both. Women's and northern groups unfortunately do not promote democracy as actively as the men's groups and the southern groups in the sample do, most likely for cultural and historical reasons.

- The CSOs in the sample are concerned about issues of social justice. Almost nine out of ten (88.5%) of the leaders say their groups are.at least somewhat concerned, and four out of five (79.9%) say they are very concerned about issues of social justice. Women's and northern groups in the sample show less concern for social justice than the men's groups and southern groups do, most likely for the reasons already indicated.

- Disappointingly, only a minority of the CSOs (44.5%) go to their DA to advocate their interests. Well over half (54.1%) have never gone to their District Assembly to represent the opinions of their members.

These findings should be judged on the whole to be encouraging. A solid majority of CSOs in the sample promote democracy and are concerned about issues of justice, but a significant majority of the sampled CSOs do not go to local government to press their views. IFES must factor into its programming the disappointing but predictable findings that the women's and

northern groups in the 20 districts where it will be working have a lower propensity to promote democracy and a lower concern for issues of social justice, and that the majority of CSOs in the 20 districts do not advocate their interests to local government.

Are CSOs internally democratic?

Alexis de Tocqueville was the first political theorist explicitly to discuss how integral civil society is to a healthy democracy, and the reasons why. Civil society functions as a vast "school of democracy" in which the members of civic organizations learn how to be democratic. It is in their various civic associations that the citizens of a democracy learn the norms of democratic behavior. Furthermore, being internally democratic confers moral authority on CSOs to lead or teach unaffiliated citizens the ethos of democratic governance.

It is therefore very important for the health of Ghana's democracy for its CSOs to practice internal democracy. The following issues were probed in the interviews with the 209 civic leaders contacted in the 20 districts.

1. method for the selection of leaders;
2. nature of the CSOs' decision making process; and,
3. how opinions of members are elicited.

Selection of officials: Key among any indicator of a civic group's practice of internal democracy must be how its leaders are selected. Table 5 reveals that out of the 209 CSOs surveyed, 194 (92.8%) elect their officials. Only 10, or 4.8%, have non-elected officials. This is a positive and important indication of a high level of internal democracy in the identified CSOs.

Table 5: Selection of officials

Response	Frequency	Percent
Elected	194	92.8
Non-elected	10	4.8
Don't know/no response	5	2.4
TOTAL	209	100.0

The tenure of elected executive members -- president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer -- varies from CSO to CSO. While some hold office for two years, others have three or four year tenures. Usually the election process starts with nominations from members seconded by other members. Voting is done either by secret ballot or by the raising of hands. Some CSOs that conduct elections by secret ballot ask the District Electoral Officer to oversee the election. The type of voting is associated with the size of membership. CSOs with smaller membership usually vote by raising hands.

In only ten (4.8%) of the CSOs in the sample are officials appointed. Some of the criteria for appointment include age, lineage and the person's contribution to the organization.

Gender analysis revealed that no women serve in executive positions in 42 CSOs, or one-fifth (20.1%) of those interviewed, as Table 6 reveals. Groups that have four or more women executives are predominantly women's organizations such as bakers and hairdressers associations. There were 38 CSOs whose executive members were entirely women. The membership of these groups was made up of women.

A total of 39 CSOs in the IFES sample are entirely male, and 40 are entirely female. This can be explained by the fact that certain professions such as the construction trade and driving buses are male preserves, while others like hairdressing and the retail marketing of agricultural produce are the preserves of women. The median proportion of women members of all CSOs sampled is 38%.

The number of groups in the sample having 100% women (40) approximates the number of groups having an executive composed entirely of women (38). The number of groups in the sample that are all men (39) approximates the number (42) having an all-male executive.

Table 6: Elected officials of CSOs who are women

Number of Women	Number of CSOs	Percentage
0	42	20.1
1	24	11.5
2	26	12.4
3	21	10.1
4	12	5.7
5-14	13	6.2
All	38	18.2
Don't know/no response	33	15.8
TOTAL	209	100.0

In organizations such as the various tailors and dressmakers associations where women members outnumber or equal the men, the majority of the executives tend to be women. CSOs with between five and 14 women on their executives tend to be located in either the district or regional capital. In such cases there tends to be nominees from each local community on the executive. The treasurers of organizations having at least one woman executive tend to be women. Content analysis of the interview transcripts revealed that women are believed to be more trustworthy than men in handling money.

An open decision-making process: To serve their theorized function as schools of democracy CSOs must have open decision making processes to ensure transparency, accountability, and the fostering of faith of the members in the group. Content analysis of the interview transcripts revealed that although the executives make most decisions, for the most part every major executive decision is subject to ratification by members at a general meeting. In nearly all cases decisions are the outcome of participatory deliberations by many members of the organization. When there are major decisions to be made, in 62.8% of the organizations the executive

members of are the key persons involved. About 19% of the CSO leaders indicated that *all* members of their organization are involved in making major decisions.

If it is a pressing matter, deciding a major issue is typically accomplished by calling an emergency meeting. If it is not an emergency, important issues are usually discussed at regularly scheduled meetings with the membership. In some instances, when there is an emergency to be addressed, the executive meets and decides and then refers the matter to the general membership. At times, the executive makes major decisions in consultation with the relevant traditional authorities.

In the only about 4% of the CSOs the executive makes all the major decisions of the organization without consulting the membership. Nearly all of the CSOs in the sample take the views of the membership into account in the decision-making process.

Table 7: Number of persons making decisions

Response	Frequency	Percent
Fewer than five	34	16.3
Five or more	173	82.8
Don't know/no response	2	1.0
TOTAL	209	100.1

Only 16.3% or 34 out of the 209 CSOs whose leaders were interviewed have fewer than five people making decisions. As many as 173 or 82.8% have five or more persons involved. This finding is partially explained by analysis of association, which revealed a signification relationship between the number of executives making decisions and the size of a group. Bigger groups have more executives. Nevertheless decision making in the large majority of sampled CSOs is not arbitrary.

Eliciting opinion from the members: An internally democratic organization must have some means of eliciting opinions and suggestions from the general membership or it is not internally democratic. Content analysis of the interview transcripts revealed that the processes for obtaining such opinions among the surveyed CSOs are of two kinds: formal and informal.

Informally, members and the executive frequently consult each other outside formal meetings. The executive tends to encourage informal interaction with a view to eliciting opinions from members because it is known that not all members are good public speakers. Though they may have very good suggestions, some members may not be able to articulate them through the formal mode of general meetings. In most cases, however, opinions of the membership are learned at formal meetings where suggestions are subjected to general debates before their acceptance or rejection.

Analysis of the responses to the three questions probing for internal democracy result in the following findings:

- The vast majority, almost 93% of the CSOs elect their leaders. In most cases, officials are nominated at delegate conferences and then approved at general meetings of all members. In some instances, the CSOs invite the District Electoral Officer to oversee their elections. The tenure of elected executive members -- president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer -- varies from CSO to CSO. While some hold office for two years, others have three or four year tenures.

- A strong majority of the CSOs (82.8%) have an open decision making process, with five or more people participating in key decisions.

- Nearly the same proportion of the CSO leaders indicated that their organization has at least one mechanism for learning the opinion of the members.

In addition nearly all of the CSO leaders claimed their organizations have written constitutions (but very few could produce them). Nearly all of the CSO leaders claimed their organizations have some form of financial management system (but upon inspection these usually proved merely to be a ledger of membership dues). Nevertheless, nearly all of the identified CSOs claim to be constituted and to be financially accountable to their members, if only to a limited degree. These positive indications of internal democracy are encouraging.

Are CSOs broad-based?

It is important for civic groups to have a broad constituent base. The following factors were taken into consideration in ascertaining the degree to which CSOs may be said to be "broad-based":

1. size of membership;
2. conduct of membership drives;
3. mobilization of outside volunteers for specific activities; and,
4. cooperation with other organizations.

Being broad-based implies coverage of a wide range of constituents, which also implies the offering of services to many people. Content analysis of the transcripts shows that some of the local CSOs are not only broad-based, but are equally multifaceted in focus. Most CSOs in the sample perform more than one of the four USAID functions. It is very common to see professional associations advocating the interests of their members, advocacy groups providing services, and service providers engaging in community development.

Size of membership: The size of the membership of certain CSOs is circumscribed by the nature and orientation of the group. For instance, the size of garage associations is restricted to mechanics and their apprentices. The size of a CSO may be determined by its location. Associations in populous areas have more members than in less populous areas; thus groups in the North tend to have fewer members than groups in the South.

Some CSOs are national in scope while others are not. While some CSOs have links with a national association (e.g. GPRTU, Government Pensioners, GNAFF), others by their

nature are district based. A typical example of the latter is the Dadematseimei Union of Asesewa in the Manya Krobo District of the Eastern Region. It is a farmers group in the district without any links to a national body. The Bakers Association of Asokwa in Ashanti is another case in point. It counts twelve members. In comparison, the Ghana National Association of Farmers numbers over a million.

The mixture of local and national data explains a statistical finding. The median number of members for the 209 CSOs interviewed is 60, but the average number is 10,500. Clearly the few groups among those interviewed with huge national memberships pulled the average up, that is, skewed the mean.

It would generally be expected that the larger a CSO the greater its influence is likely to be. The data shows considerable variation in the membership sizes of organizations. CSOs with a greater social orientation are far more likely to be large than those CSOs with purely economic motives. For the latter, most have fewer than 50 members. For the former, membership of several thousand is quite common.

The participation of women in the sampled CSOs is higher in those organizations with smaller memberships. Table 8 shows that of the 11.9% of the groups in the sample that number ten or fewer members, 35.8% are women. At the other extreme groups within the 151-200 member range, comprising 6.2% of the sample, have only 4.0% women members. The higher proportion of women in groups of under a hundred may be due to the fact that women tend to be more interested in associations that empower them economically (economic associations tend to be smaller), and much less so in those that are mainly for community affairs (socially-oriented organizations tend to be larger).

Table 8: Size of membership

Size of group	Percent of sample	Percent women members
10 & below	11.9	35.8
11-20	17.5	11.9
21-30	17.5	9.7
31-40	8.5	5.1
41-50	6.2	7.4
51-100	14.7	13.1
101-150	4.5	4.0
151-200	6.2	4.0
201 & above	13.0	9.1
TOTAL	100.0	100.1

Statistical analysis produced the following findings. A group with many members tends:

1. to have a smaller percentage of women;
2. to have a larger overall budget;
3. to have less money per member;

4. to get consulted by the District Assembly; and,
5. to be located in the South.

Conduct of membership drives: A viable and dynamic CSO intent on sustaining its existence must engage in membership drives. As Table 9 (below) shows, 74.6% or 156 of the leaders interviewed claim to conduct membership drives to broaden their membership base, while only 23.4% representing 49 out of the total say their groups conduct no membership drives.

Table 9: Conduct of membership drives

Response	Frequency	Percent
Yes	156	74.6
No	49	23.4
Don't know/no response	4	1.9
TOTAL	209	100.0

Content analysis revealed one major explanation for the conduct of membership drives is that many of the CSOs depend on membership dues as their main source of income. In these cases it is necessary to conduct membership drives to widen the financial base of the organization.

In instances where membership confers certain advantages such as loans from the banks or funding agencies it becomes relatively easier to entice members to the organization. For instance, members of the GPRTU benefit from government guaranteed loans for the purchase of vehicles.

Farmers associations in the various districts help each other by engaging in collective farming, the hiring of bullocks for the plowing of members' farms, etc. Hairdressers and tailors associations typically help their members by collective purchasing to reduce costs.

Some associations engage in serious membership drives because of competition with other associations for membership by the same group of people. For instance, the GPRTU competes with the Ghana Co-operative Transport Association and Progressive Transport Owners Association for the membership of drivers.

In organizations that possess licensing powers, for example the Ghana Distillers Association, membership is compulsory. All distillers in Ghana must obtain a license from the Association before operating.

Mobilization of outsiders for specific activities: Part of the importance of a healthy civil society to any democracy lies in the ability of CSOs to mobilize people to carry out voluntary activities. Thus, one of the yardsticks for assessing how broadly-based the sampled Project ECSELL CSOs are should be their propensity to mobilize non-members to engage in activities that are beneficial to society at large. About half of the CSOs in the sample mobilize outside support for public activities.

Table 10: Mobilization of outside support

Response	Frequency	Percent
Yes	104	49.8
No	101	48.3
Don't know/no response	4	1.9
TOTAL	209	100.0

While 49.8% of the civic leaders surveyed claimed that they mobilize outside support for community activities, 48.3% claimed no such mobilization. This finding is consistent with the 1997 USAID/IFES survey of public opinion that found that 51% of Ghanaians say they volunteer more than one day per month on community projects.

Some groups mobilize the members of other CSOs for communal labor. For instance, one civic leader in New Edubiase in Ashanti Region claimed his group often mobilized the members of the 31 December Women's Movement, the National Youth Council, the Market Women's Association and GPRTU for communal labor such as general cleaning, building of schools, and the construction of improved public latrines.

Some forms of mobilization are overtly political. One leader in the sample said his group once mobilized people to seize the market in order to remove the District Chief Executive. Many respondents reported their groups mobilized nonmembers to protest against tax increases by the District Assembly.

Cooperation with other organizations: Civic groups can amplify their influence on policy making by forming coalitions. The existence of coalitions of CSOs is thus important for an influential civil society. IFES can be pleased to know that among the CSOs in the districts in which it will be active there is already a high level of cooperation. This is a foundation upon which IFES can work to build coalitions of CSOs.

Table 11: Cooperation with other organizations

Response	Frequency	Percent
Yes	137	65.6
No	67	32.1
Don't know/no response	5	2.4
TOTAL	209	100.1

Of the CSO leaders interviewed 65.6% said their groups cooperate with other CSOs to undertake some of the following activities:

1. communal cleaning of the community including the weeding of water courses where there are no pipe borne water systems;
2. communal labor for the construction of schools, markets and public latrines;
3. tree planting (afforestation); and,
4. tax protests.

A large majority of the CSOs IFES interviewed cooperate with other groups for common purposes. This high level of cooperation among the CSOs augurs well for Project ECSELL efforts to build coalitions of CSOs and strengthen grassroots democracy in Ghana.

In summary, on the question of how broadly based the sampled CSOs are, this report submits four findings:

- The CSOs have relatively large memberships, with a median of 60 members.
- Seventy-five percent of the participant CSOs conduct membership drives.
- Only half of the CSOs mobilize outside support for a community activity. The other half do not.
- Two-thirds of the CSOs cooperate with other CSOs in their district.

There is thus strong evidence that the CSOs identified for this assessment are broadly based.

Do CSO have adequate resources?

Promotion of democracy, advocacy, the practice of internal democracy, and a broadly based membership are not sufficient conditions for organizational effectiveness. The organizations of civil society in a healthy democracy must also have adequate resources. The CSOs in the sample do not have adequate resources.

The four issues considered under this heading are as follows:

1. number of sources of funding;
2. ability to borrow money;
3. access to external sources of funding; and,
4. sufficiency of budget to meet objectives.

Number of sources of funding: A financially self-sufficient organization is able to carry out its projects. If, however, an organization is bereft of financial resources, the attainment of set objectives becomes a problem. The number of sources of funding a CSO enjoys is important. There are many advantages to be had from multiple sources of income, mainly that a decline in any single source of income does not cripple the organization.

Only a slim plurality (49.8%) of the CSOs surveyed have more than one source of funding. A discouragingly high 46.7% rely on only one source.

Table 12: Number of sources of funding

Response	Frequency	Percent
One source	98	46.7
More than one source	104	49.8
Don't know/ no response	7	3.3
TOTAL	209	100.0

Nearly all the CSOs with only one source of funding depend on membership dues, which typically are paid monthly. Additional sources of funding for those CSOs that have them include donations, proceeds from enterprises, harvests, appeal for funds, and fees charged on those absent from meetings. The GPRTU has the most consistent and most effective means of internal funding of their operations. The organization charges 10% commission per passenger fare, paid by drivers before they leave their respective stations.

Correlation analysis indicated that among the CSOs in the sample, service providers and community development organizations tend to have more than one source of funding. Such groups have fewer members, tend to mobilize support outside their membership, and receive funds from external sources. Trade and professional associations and advocacy groups tend to have only one source of funding.

Table 13: Sources of funding

Sources	Percent
Dues/subscriptions and levies	77.7
Levies/donations	10.1
NGOs/government agencies	2.1
Fund raising for specific projects	2.6
Missions (churches, etc)	3.7
Don't know/no response	3.7
TOTAL	99.9

Fully 77.7% of the CSOs sampled receive funding from membership dues, subscriptions and special levies. Only 2.1% receive funds from international NGOs or government agencies.

Ability to borrow money: As Table 14 indicates, CSOs that are able to borrow money are few. Only 18.2% or 38 of the number surveyed borrow. Nearly four out of five CSOs, 79.4% or 166 of those interviewed do not borrow money from any source. This finding is consistent with the 1997 USAID/IFES national survey finding that nine out of ten Ghanaians have never borrowed money from formal credit sources such as a bank.

Table 14: Ability to borrow money

Response	Frequency	Percent
Yes	38	18.2
No	166	79.4
Don't know /no response	5	2.4
TOTAL	209	100.0

The sources of loans among the 38 CSOs that have borrowed vary. NGOs (including churches) form the main source. Members, patrons and executives of the association are another. Well-wishers outside the association also form an important source. Usually borrowed funds are in the form of soft loans that are paid back very quickly. Few groups borrow from banks.

Following the IFES typology of CSOs, Table 15 (below) shows the types of CSOs that have borrowed money.

Table 15: Types of CSOs that have borrowed funds

Type of CSO	Number of CSOs	Percent
Unions	1	2.6
Professional/Trade Associations	9	23.7
Student/Youth Groups	2	5.3
Religious Groups	3	7.9
Service Providers	7	18.4
Farmer/Fishermen Associations	9	23.7
Community Development Associations	8	21.1
Processors' Associations	0	0.0
TOTAL	38	102.7

Professional, trade, farmers, fishermen and community development associations comprise 26 of the 38 CSOs, over two-thirds (68.5%) of the groups in the sample that borrow.

Access to outside funding: If adequacy of resources is an important aspect of organizational capacity, then, like access to more than one source of funding and the ability to borrow money, access to outside sources of funding such as grants from donors or the Common Fund is important to the health of a civic organization.

Table 16: Receives outside funding:

Response	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	59	28.2
No	134	64.1
Don't know/ no response	16	7.7
TOTAL	209	100.0

Only 28.2% of the CSOs interviewed receive outside sources of funding. A high 64.1% receive no outside funding at all.

Content analysis revealed that many of the CSOs in the North receive external funding, although there were not enough in the sample to make the correlation significant. This can be explained by the fact that the North is generally perceived as economically deprived. There is a high concentration of foreign development agencies in the North such as the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Charity Project of UK, the Department for International Development (DFID), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and the Red Cross. There is also a high level of Ghanaian government expenditure in the North. Furthermore, there are fewer Ghanaians in the North. The lower population density and higher concentration of assistance explains the slightly greater rate of external funding received by the northern CSOs in the sample.

The national government provides funding to CSOs. The National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI), for example, funds some organizations in the sample.
Some CSOs receive external funding from the District Assembly Common Fund. Common Fund grants are typically used in building new schools, constructing roads, and digging wells or bore holes.

The more an organization depends on its own resources, the more financially self-sufficient it can be said to be. By this logic, because majorities of the CSOs neither borrow funds (79.4%) nor receive funds from outside sources (64.1%) it can be argued that the CSOs in the sample are generally financially self-sufficient. But this is not the case.

Sufficiency of budget to meet objectives: Nearly half of the CSOs in the sample (46.7%) have only one source of funding, 79.4% do not borrow money, and 64.1% receive no outside funding. But as Table 17 shows the great majority (83.7%) of CSOs have budgets that are insufficient to achieve their set objectives.

Table 17: Budget is sufficient to meet objectives

Response	Frequency	Percent
Yes	10	4.8
No	175	83.7
Don't know/ no response	24	11.5
TOTAL	209	100.0

Budget size may be determined by several factors such as the resources available or mobilized; resources or funds expected either from internal or external sources; and the nature of projects to be implemented. Most of the CSOs sampled (83.7%) have budgets that are inadequate to meet their set objectives. This does not augur well for their long-term prospects.

A total of 79 CSO leaders of the 209 could not give their annual budget, or claimed their organization had no budget. Of the remaining 130 CSOs the minimum annual budget given was ¢24,000. Table 18 shows the distribution of budgets of the 130 CSOs whose leaders reported a figure. About 21% of the CSOs had annual budgets above ¢2,000,000, and 14.6% had budgets under ¢100,000.

Table 18: Distribution of annual budgets

Annual Budget	Number of CSOs	Percent
Under 100,000	19	14.6
101,000-200,000	24	18.5
201,000-500,000	24	18.5
500,000-1,000,000	24	18.5
1,001,000-2,000,000	12	9.2
Above 2,000,000	27	20.7
TOTAL	130	100.0

Annual budgets of above ¢2,000,000 were reported by 27 group leaders in the sample (20.7%). Within this, as was the case with the number of members, a minority skewed the mean. The average budget reported was ¢2.4 million while the median was ¢249,000.

About 80% of the CSOs operate a financial management system. Financial management involves mainly maintaining a dues and subscription register with or without a bank account. The remaining 20% do not have any financial accounting system. Despite the large proportion that suggested that they have some financial management system in place most CSO leaders acknowledged weaknesses in their operations. Indeed as many as 59% indicated that they were interested in learning about financial management. Only 41% of the CSO leaders interviewed indicated that their organization needed no training in financial management.

The findings on CSO resources are as follows:

- Only a slim plurality (49.8%) has more than one source of funding, while 46.7% of sampled CSOs rely entirely on a single source.
- Four out of five CSOs (79.4%) are unable to borrow money.
- Two-thirds (64.1%) of the CSOs sampled receive no funding from the national government, the donors, or the Common Fund.
- The budget of four out of five (83.7%) CSOs is inadequate to meet their objectives.

Conclusion and Recommendations

IFES expected to find the CSOs in the 20 districts to be exhausted, apathetic, disengaged and moribund. This has not proven to be the case. There is a great variety of types and sizes of very active civic groups in the districts. Civic involvement in the local policy process, though carried out by less than a majority (44.5%) of CSOs, gives IFES a solid base upon which to build.

Most of the groups in the sample are formed for economic concerns. Professional and trade associations are far and away the most prevalent CSOs found in the 20 districts. Their prevalence is due in part to the fact that they function to enhance income generation and provide social services to members such as burial insurance not otherwise available in Ghana. IFES is therefore challenged to show that the small-scale local-level economic groups in the districts can fill the advocacy role of a dynamic democratic civil society.

The hypothesis tested in this section was *that the CSOs in the districts are working actively to promote democracy and actively represent their interests to the District Assemblies, are themselves internally democratic, and are broad-based and have adequate resources to achieve their aims.* There are four findings and recommendations that result.

- Findings on the promotion of democracy and advocacy: Substantial majorities of the CSOs in the sample work to promote democracy (72%), and are concerned about issues of social justice (80%). Unfortunately the majority (54%) do not go to their District Assemblies to advocate the interests of their members. A majority does get consulted by the District Assemblies (55%). Seven out of ten CSO leaders believe Ghana's government is performing better now than in 1992.
  Recommendation: The CSOs are already promoting democracy, and are participating in the political process to a great degree. IFES should encourage this, and should focus its efforts on enhancing CSO involvement in the policy process at the local level. IFES should concentrate its efforts on working with the 54% of the CSOs who don't go to their District Assemblies to advocate, and help them develop the ability and willingness to start. IFES should pay particular attention to encouraging the women's and northern groups with which it will work to engage in the democratic process.

- Findings on internal democracy: The Project ECSELL CSOs are internally democratic. A full 93% of them elect their leaders, and 82% have five or more people making key decisions. The majority of them are bound by a constitution, have means of learning the opinion of their members, and have at least a rudimentary system of financial accounting.
  Recommendations: IFES does not need to be concerned with inculcating a democratic and participatory ethos among CSOs in the 20 districts in which it will be active. It should not relax this standard, however. These aspects of internal democracy should all be maintained as criteria to receive a USAID grant. IFES should support the high level of internal democracy that already exists in the districts by transferring technical skills to increase the organizational effectiveness of the CSOs. To this end IFES should concentrate on training CSO leaders in financial management, strategic planning, participatory leadership methods,

conflict resolution, and other related forms of human resource and organizational development.

- Findings on the constituent base of CSOs: Based on the sample the CSOs in the districts can be deemed sufficiently broad based for the purposes of the project. The median membership in the sample is 60 and the mode is 50. Three out of four CSOs conduct membership drives, and two out of three cooperate with other groups. However, only half of the CSOs are involved in mobilizing nonmembers for community activities.
  Recommendations: Here again IFES can take heart that it will start work with a solid foundation to build on. There is already a high propensity among the CSOs to conduct membership drives to increase their base, and almost as high a propensity to cooperate with other CSOs in activities of mutual interest. Only half of the CSOs undertake the mobilization of outside support for community activities, however. This should not be a direct objective of IFES, but should nevertheless be attended to in the context of other training. IFES should concentrate its energies on helping groups form into networks within the district and across districts. IFES must develop a strategy to overcome the low level of participation of women in the political process and in the decision making positions of the CSOs. Finally, the findings indicate that the size of group is positively and strongly related with nearly all the group attributes that IFES seeks to promote. The model predicts that if the CSOs grow in size, they should begin participating more actively in the policy process. Helping groups grow and join networks should increase the proportion of CSOs going to the District Assembly to advocate their interests. Helping CSOs grow and form networks should be a major priority of Project ECSELL. For this reason IFES training should help the participant CSOs improve upon their already solid efforts to build coalitions and constituencies.

- Findings on adequacy of CSO resources: Although a few of the sampled CSOs are financially self-sufficient, seven out of ten of them are not. This finding is in line with what the assessment team expected. With few exceptions CSO income is inadequate to meet organizational goals. Fully 84% of the CSO leaders indicated that their budget was not adequate to achieve their aims. The likelihood of a change in this situation is small. Four out of five CSOs are unable to borrow money. Three out of five of them depend entirely on one source of income, usually membership fees, and have never received money from the national government, donors, or the Common Fund.
  Recommendations: Project ECSELL's grant-making function can have an impact in the 20 districts if it is implemented wisely. Because the total amount budgeted for grants is modest compared to the needs, and every penny must count, training the CSO leaders to manage money becomes critical. The CSO leaders should be taught basic skills in accounting, the basic concepts of cost-benefit analysis dealing with discount rates and the time value of money, and how to combine these skills in strategic budgeting. IFES should also help the CSO leaders learn how to apply for commercial bank loans and how to write grant proposals to the government and the donors. It is quite certain that a large proportion of the grant requests from CSOs will be for income generating activities. IFES must inform the District Assemblies of each grant, for tax purposes, because grants used to generate income to CSOs must also generate revenue to the District Assemblies.

7. Twenty District Assemblies in Ghana: Findings and Recommendations

As seen in Chapter 2 state-civil society relations have been characterized in the literature on Ghana as generally uneasy, uncooperative and non-reciprocal. From this point of view, much is made of the fact that in the past CSOs that cooperated with (or were co-opted by) the government were praised by the various regimes as "nationalistic," "patriotic" and "accommodating" while those that tried to maintain their autonomy and spoke out against government policy were branded as "saboteurs," "anti-revolutionaries," "reactionaries," "nation-rackers" and "agents of neo-colonialism." The presumed sour relationship between CSOs and the state is thus said to be attributable to the hegemony seeking and proprietary interests of the authoritarian regimes in Ghana. At the outset the IFES assessment team suspected that poor state-civil society relations said to exist at the national level would be present at the local level as well. Stated contrarily in positive and falsifiable terms, the working hypothesis to be tested in this section is: *the relationship between District Assemblies and civil society organizations in the sample is good and is characterized by consultation and collaboration; CSOs enjoy autonomy from the state; the District Assemblies are effective at performing their key functions and meeting constituent demands; and relations between the District Assemblies and the national government are good.*

Are state-civil society relations good?

IFES probed the DA officials and CSO leaders on two topics:

1. the quality of relations between CSOs and their DAs; and
2. whether the relationship is characterized by consultation and collaboration.

Quality of the relationship: The data show that the generally pessimistic view of poor state-civil society relations in Ghana does not describe the situation that IFES has found on the ground. There are good relations between the District Assemblies (DAs) and the CSOs that IFES will be working with in all 20 districts. When CSO leaders and DA officials were asked to describe the relationship between them, 57.4% of the 209 CSO leaders and 74.3% of the 113 DA officials responded that the relationship was good. IFES should be encouraged knowing that only 15.3% of the CSO leaders and 4.4% of the DA officials said that the relationship was poor.

Table 1: CSO-DA relationships

Asked of civic leaders

Response	Frequency	Percent
Good	120	57.4
Average	36	17.2
Poor	32	15.3
No relations	21	10.0
TOTAL	209	100.0

Asked of local government officials

Response	Frequency	Percent
Good	84	74.3
Average	13	11.5
Poor	5	4.4
Don't know	11	9.7
TOTAL	113	100.0

Consultation and collaboration: The surprisingly good state-civil society relations in the 20 districts are characterized by some degree of consultation and collaboration.

Table 2: CSO is consulted by DAs (asked of civic leaders)

Response	Frequency	Percent
Often	43	20.6
Sometimes	73	34.9
Never	90	43.1
Don't know/no responses	3	1.4
TOTAL	209	100.0

When asked if their organization was ever consulted by the District Assembly, 73 CSO leaders (34.9%) said sometimes and 43 (20.6%) said often. However, 90 (43.1%) replied that their organization was never consulted by their DAs.

DA consultation of CSOs varied greatly by type of CSO. Almost two-thirds (62.5%) of the union leaders in the sample said their organizations were often consulted by the District Assembly. However, three quarters (76.5%) of the leaders of religious CSOs said their organization was never consulted.

CSO officials were asked to name activities in which their organization has cooperated with their District Assembly.

Table 3: Instances of cooperation of the CSO with the DA (asked of civic leaders)

Response	Frequency	Percent
One or more	154	73.7
None	51	24.4
Don't know/no responses	4	1.9
TOTAL	209	100.0

In all 73.7% of the CSO leaders sampled identified one or more activities in which their organization cooperated with the District Assembly, while only 24.4% said their organization did not cooperate with their District Assembly in any activity.

District Assembly officials were asked whether or not they consulted with civic leaders before making a major decision. Table 4 shows the results.

Table 4: DA solicits CSO views (asked of local government officials)

Response	Frequency	Percent
Often	46	40.7
Sometimes	47	41.6
Never	11	9.7
Don't know/no responses	9	8.0
TOTAL	113	100.0

The 113 DA officials were asked whether they solicited the views of CSOs when formulating policies and programs. Forty-six (40.7%) said often and 47 (41.6%) said sometimes. Only 9.7% (11) of the 113 officials said they never consulted civil society organizations, compared to 43.1% of civic leaders who claimed that their group has never been consulted by local government. This is a large discrepancy. It is possible that District Assembly officials do in fact seek to consult with civic leaders, but that the proportion of civic leaders they reach is small. It is equally possible that the 43.1% of the CSOs that do not get consulted by their DA belong to the same 54.1% of disengaged civic groups that don't go to their DA to advocate. The disparity in responses between the level of relationship and consultation may show that the relationship between the DAs and CSOs is superficial and has concealed and muted the adversarial relationship presumed in the literature to have existed between the two for a long time.

It is possible that state-civil society relations at the local level are better than at the national. In any event it is clear that state-civil society relations in the districts where Project ECSELL will be active are, as some theorists would expect, simultaneously cooperative and confrontational. In the words of Bratton (1989: 418):

> Just as we require a framework that enables us to account for citizen engagement as well as disengagement, we need to leave room for engagement between state and (civil) society that may be congruent as well as conflictual.

The findings support this theoretical view of state-civil society relations. The findings contradict the view held by some scholars that the relationship between civil society organizations and the state is unceasingly confrontational. For instance, Chabal (1986: 15) views civil society as "a vast ensemble of constantly changing groups and individuals (who have) ...acquired some consciousness of their externality and *opposition* to the state." Bayart (1989: 111) asserts that civil society is "society in its relation to the state ... insofar as it is in *confrontation* with the state or, more precisely, as the process by which society seeks to 'break' and counteract the simultaneous 'totalization' unleashed by the state"(emphases added).

Majorities of local government officials and civic leaders in the 20 districts that comprise the IFES project area agree that the relationships between the District Assemblies and the CSOs are good. However, although a strong majority of 73.7% of the CSOs cooperate with their District Assemblies on at least one activity, 43.1% are never consulted by the District Assembly at all.

IFES can look forward in implementing Project ECSELL to benefiting from the general consensus on both sides that overall, and contrary to conventional wisdom, in the 20 districts state-civil society relations are good. Project ECSELL is entering a promising environment.

The findings on the question of state-civil society relations are as follows:

- The quality of relations between CSOs and their DAs is good according to 57.4% of the CSO leaders and 74.3% of the DA officials.

- The relationship is characterized by DA *consultation* with CSOs. Eighty-two percent of DA officials said they consult with CSOs often or sometimes. However, fully 43.1% of CSOs are never consulted by the DA. The DA-CSO relationship is characterized by *collaboration.* When asked to name an activity in which their CSO cooperates with the DA, fully 73.7% of the CSO leaders could name at least one.

Do District Assemblies permit CSO autonomy?

IFES queried CSO leaders about the autonomy of their organization from local government. CSO leaders were asked two questions:

1. How did they rate the independence of their CSO from the DA?
2. Had the DA ever interfered with their CSO?

Independence of CSOs from DAs: One hundred eighty-four CSO leaders (88.0%) responded that their organizations were very independent of their DA. Only two respondents (1.0%) said their groups were not very independent of local government.

Table 5: Independence of CSOs from DAs

Response	Frequency	Percent
Very	184	88.0
Somewhat	20	9.6
Not very	2	1.0
Don't know/no response	3	1.4
TOTAL	209	100.0

A total of 97.6% of the CSO leaders believe their groups have freedom of action. This is consistent with the 1997 USAID/IFES national survey of Ghanaian opinion that revealed 58% of the entire Ghanaian population feel they are able to form a group without "government participation," 66% believe that CSOs are needed by their communities, only 14% believe that the government does not respect their individual rights, and as many as 75% are satisfied with their level of political freedom.

Interference by DAs: When asked whether the DAs ever interfered with their organizations, 195 (93.3%) of the CSO leaders replied there had never been any such instance. Only 9 (4.3%) reported interference. Table 6 (below) shows the results.

Table 6: Interference in CSOs by DAs

Response	Frequency	Percent
Yes	9	4.3
No	195	93.3
Don't know/no response	5	2.4
TOTAL	209	100.0

The findings on the question of CSO autonomy from DAs is as follows:

- An even 88.0% of CSO leaders rated their organization as "very independent" from local government. An additional 9.6% rated their organizations as "somewhat independent." Fully 97.6% of the CSOs in the sample feel independent from local government.

- Only 4.3% of the CSO leaders reported interference by their DA. Ninety-three percent of the CSOs have never been interfered with by local government.

About nine out of ten of the CSOs thus enjoy both autonomy, and freedom from government interference. This bodes well for the success of Project ECSELL.

Are District Assemblies effective?

IFES queried local government officials on four issues relating to District Assembly performance:

1. overall effectiveness of DA performance since 1992;
2. DA effectiveness at collecting revenue;
3. the quality of relations among DA personnel; and,
4. the overall effectiveness of the DA system.

District Assembly performance since 1992: The performance of the DAs since their inception in 1988 has been the subject of debate and controversy. While government officials have applauded the contributions of the DAs in the development of their communities, scholars like Ayee (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) and Crook (1994) have found their performance to be poor, particularly in the formulation and implementation of locally oriented development policies.

DA officials were asked to rate the performance of their own District Assembly since 1992. As many as 99 (87.6%) of the 113 rated their DAs as performing more effectively, while only 3 (2.7%) said less effectively.

Table 7: Rating by DA officials of DA performance since 1992

Response	Frequency	Percent
More effective	99	87.6
Same	6	5.3
Less effective	3	2.7
Don't know/no response	5	4.4
TOTAL	113	100.0

The results displayed in Table 7 could be discounted as boasting. When CSOs leaders were asked to name functions their DA performs well, 170 (81.3%) were able to name at least one, but 173 (82.3%) were also able to name at least one function their District Assembly performs poorly. Only 29 (13.9%) responded their DA performed no function well, but even fewer, 11, or 5.3% said their District Assembly performed no function poorly. The perception by CSOs of their District Assemblies is thus mixed.

Table 8: Rating of DAs by CSO leaders

Functions the DA performs well

Response	Frequency	Percent
One or more	170	81.3
None	29	13.9
Don't know	10	4.8
TOTAL	209	100.0

Functions the DAs perform poorly

Response	Frequency	Percent
One or more	173	82.8
None	11	5.3
Don't know	25	12.0
TOTAL	209	100.0

A clear majority of the CSO leaders in the 20 districts believe their DAs perform at least one thing well. This gives IFES a base to build on.

Effectiveness of DAs in collecting revenue: Tax collection is perhaps the most difficult of all government functions. It is the *sine qua non* of all government functions, for no government can function without revenue.

Tax collection has been the Achilles heel of the DAs. The Minister of Local Government and Rural Development has complained that the DAs have proved ineffective at generating resources locally, and over-reliant on proceeds from the District Assemblies Common Fund.

IFES wished to know how District Assembly officials rate their performance in the collection of taxes. A strong majority (82.3%) rated their DA as somewhat or very effective, as Table 9 shows.

Table 9: DA effectiveness in tax collection

Response	Frequency	Percent
Very effective	63	55.8
Somewhat effective	30	26.5
Not effective	11	9.7
Don't know/no response	9	8.0
TOTAL	113	100.0

The DA officials' responses to the questions on DA performance since 1992 and on DA effectiveness in tax collection contradict the commonly held view that Ghana's District Assemblies are ineffective, particularly at raising revenue. It is understandable why the responses by government officials would be high. The officials were literally being asked to assess themselves. Some may have been boasting. Others may have feared that a negative comment would somehow reach their superiors and result in sanctions. The authors are not certain that all the answers provided to these two questions represent honestly held opinions.

Quality of relations among appointed and elected DA personnel: Whether a District Assembly merely carries out orders from the central government or exercises the policy-making powers of a truly decentralized government as it should is determined in part by the extent to which the elected assembly(wo)men possess the relevant expertise and acumen. The effectiveness of a decentralized government therefore depends greatly on the caliber of the elected representatives. Since the inception of the DAs in 1989, however, the caliber of DA elected members has been a contentious issue. It is widely acknowledged that the appointed members of DAs are more capable legislators than their elected counterparts. Indeed, the justification for the presence of appointed members in the DAs is to make up for the dearth of expertise among elected members.

IFES queried government officials about the quality of the relationship between the elected and the appointed members of the District Assembly. Two out of three of the respondents said that the relations were good. Only one out of ten thought they were poor.

Table 10: Quality of relationships among DA personnel

Response	Frequency	Percent
Good	75	66.4
Average	24	21.2
Poor	13	11.5
Don't know/no response	1	0.9
TOTAL	113	100.0

Effectiveness of the DA mixed system of government: District Assemblies consist of elected and appointed members. As shown above these two groups get along fairly well in the 20 districts

comprising the Project ECSELL project area. IFES wished to know how effectively the DA officials thought this system is working overall.

Table 11: Rating of effectiveness of DA system by DA officials

Response	Frequency	Percent
Very effective	27	23.9
Somewhat effective	29	25.7
Not effective	56	49.6
Don't know/no response	1	0.9
TOTAL	113	100.1

The data reveal no consensus among government officials in the 20 districts on whether the mixed system of elected and appointed DA members works well. Fifty-six (49.6%) respondents judged the system somewhat or very effective, but an equal number (56 respondents) judged it not effective at all.

The findings on the question of District Assembly effectiveness are:

- Opinion on DA performance is positive, though perhaps biased because DA officials were asked to rate their own DA's performance. Nine out of ten DA officials (87.6%) felt their DA is performing better than in 1992. However, four out of five CSO leaders (82.8%) could name at least one function their DAs performed poorly.

- Four out of five DA officials (82.3%) believe their DA is effective at collecting taxes.

- According to two-thirds of the DAs interviewed (66.4%) the quality of relations among elected and appointed DA personnel is good. Only 11.5% believed relations were poor.

- Almost half of the DA officials (49.6%) felt that the DA system is not effective. However, nearly one-quarter (23.9%) believed that the DA system performs very effectively.

IFES should view these findings as positive. Majorities of officials in the 20 District Assemblies with which it will be working believe the effectiveness of their District Assembly is improving. Furthermore, relations between the elected and the appointed officials are good. However, a near majority of DA officials believe that the mixed elected-appointed system overall performs ineffectively.

Are central-local government relations good?

Every decentralized government has to find a balance between local autonomy and central control. For the sake of political stability, there must be coordination of development projects and harmony between local and national aspirations. Consequently, a good relationship must exist between the local government units and the central government. To find out whether this rapport exists in the districts where IFES will be active, DA officials were asked to describe

the relationship between the national government and their District Assembly. Eighty-six (76.1%) reported that the relationship is one of cooperation while only 15 (13.3%) described it as one of interference.

Table 12: Central government relationship with the DA

Response	Frequency	Percent
Cooperation	86	76.1
Neutrality	8	7.1
Interference	15	13.3
Don't know/no response	4	3.5
TOTAL	113	100.0

Here once again the DA respondents may not have given their honest opinion. They may have rated the relationship with the central government as cooperative because they feared the confidentiality of the interviews would be compromised, and that expressing a contrary view would risk official sanction.

The view by the majority of DA officials of the central-local government relationship as cooperative contradicts the view of Ayee (1994) who argues that in Ghana the relationship is not yet a partnership, but rather is still a principal-agent problem. The government in Accra (the principal) still tries to maintain tight control by treating the District Assemblies as agents of (that is, under) central authority. The interpretation of the powers of the DAs rests with the central government, particularly the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD). Any act of a DA that the central government considers irreconcilable with the law is declared illegal. All bylaws of the DAs are approved either by the MLGRD or the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) -- regional administrative bodies chaired by centrally-appointed Regional Ministers. The President has the power to dissolve or suspend any defaulting DA in the "public interest." Such encumbrances do not advance the devolution of decision making to the DAs.

Coordinated government and party politics

One way democracies achieve harmony between local and national government is through political parties. Political parties aggregate and homogenize opinion. Party ideologies produce consistency in program proposals across all levels of political office. Party platforms are shared at every level of government where the parties are contesting seats. But in Ghana political parties are proscribed from local politics. The known lack of coordination between national and local government in Ghana brings to the fore the issue of the strengths and weaknesses of Ghana's nonpartisan form of local politics.

Two reasons for excluding partisan politics from the DAs have been given by the PNDC government and the Committee of Experts that drafted the 1992 Constitution. First, it was argued that in the past, elected governments of Ghana cynically exerted undue influence on local government bodies to win political advantage. Second, the nonpartisan nature of the District Assemblies facilitates the mobilization of the people, and is more conducive to consensus formation, factors that are crucial to development at the grassroots (Republic of Ghana, 1991).

These reasons may not be convincing enough. In Ghana's current nonpartisan decentralized system, the chief executive of the central government in the district, the District Chief Executive (DCE) continues to exert undue influence over the DAs. Aside from the DCE, the central government has a wide array of human and material resources with which to cajole and otherwise influence the DAs. One doubts whether the DAs have been able to facilitate the "mobilization of the people" as the government has claimed it would, since most (if not all) DCEs have complained of apathy on the part of the people living in their districts.

It is important to identify some of the advantages and disadvantages of partisan politics in local government.

Advantages of nonpartisan politics in local government

1. Nonpartisan politics does not suffer from one key disadvantage of partisan politics. In partisan politics, policy proposals tend to be formed in party meetings rather than in open government council. True debate can be stifled by the presence of party whips. Party politics can thus deprive the public of ideas and opinions of merit.
2. The savagery with which partisan election campaigns are often conducted may discourage able individuals from standing for office, and thus deprive the district of their services (Ayee, 1992).
3. Nonpartisan politics permit candidates of the same party to stand against each other. In partisan elections, through primaries, political parties reduce the number of member candidates for any given seat to one. This deprives the nation of many able voices. Under nonpartisan politics, on the other hand, candidates from the same party can run against each other.

Advantages of partisan politics in local government

1. In the complex society of today, opinion needs to be organized to be effective. Ordinary individual opinion cannot possess the width of specialized knowledge nor the weight to command attention. By aggregating interests parties produce both the specialized knowledge and the weight of numbers needed to effect policy.
2. The involvement of major parties in local government tends to increase the national significance of local government. Effective decentralized government is still a goal in Ghana, not yet a reality. Local government does not yet have a clear relation with national government. The key to making local government more effective and to linking it more firmly to national politics may lie in letting parties compete in local elections.
3. By successfully contesting elections at every level of government, politicians rise through the ranks of their parties. In countries with partisan local politics, most Members of Parliament come to office having risen through the ranks of their parties, and thus enter office already knowledgeable of Parliamentary procedures. Partisan politics thus strengthens a nation's top leadership by seasoning.
4. In Ghana many currently registered parties have little support. In partisan politics at the local level, parties with no grassroots support are soon identified as such and die off.

Partisan local level politics thus sharpens the focus of the national political discourse by eliminating unrepresentative parties from the debate.

5. Effective agenda setting is possible in democratic government only if there is consistency of points of view. Without some form of party discipline this may be difficult to achieve. Party organization ensures a definition of policy and its aims. Political parties provide focal points for local affairs (Ayee, 1992). Partisan candidates for District Assemblies running as members of a political party would have manifestos and platforms to guide them. Currently, as nonpartisan candidates, District Assembly(wo)men are elected on the basis of their personal popularity and seldom for the force of their ideas. Thus many elected representatives in the District Assemblies come to office with little or no idea what to do.

In short, Ghana's non-partisan local government elections produce local governments full of people with no formal agenda, while through lack of party affiliations it fails to link local politics to the national. One is tempted to believe that there is a place for partisan politics in Ghana's local government. Indeed, as is widely reported in the media, in actual practice Ghana's District Assemblies are not free from partisan politics.

Conclusion and Recommendations

At the start of the assessment mission IFES believed that relations between District Assemblies and civic groups would be poor; that civic groups would have little autonomy; that DA performance would be mediocre at best; and that relationships between District Assemblies and the national government would be strained. Stated positively and falsifiably, the working hypothesis for this section of the assessment was: *the relationship between District Assemblies and civil society organizations is good and is characterized by consultation and collaboration; CSOs enjoy autonomy from the state; the DAs are effective at performing their key functions and meeting constituent demands; and relations with the national government are good.*

There are three findings and recommendations that result from the test of this hypothesis.

- Findings on state-civil society relations: The quality of relations between CSOs and their DAs is good according to 57.4% of the CSO leaders and 74.3% of the DA officials. The relationship is characterized by DA consultation with CSOs and CSO cooperation with DAs. Fully 73.7% of the CSOs cooperate with their DA. Four out of five DA officials (82.3%) said they consult with CSOs often or sometimes, but 43.1% of the CSOs have never been consulted by their DA.
  Recommendations: IFES does not need to facilitate good state-civil society relations in the 20 districts. The relations are already surprisingly good. IFES should focus on changing the relationship to one of collaborative problem solving through facilitated dialogues.

- Findings on DA effectiveness: Opinion on DA performance is positive. Nine out of ten DA officials (87.6%) felt their DA is performing better than in 1992. However, four out of five CSO leaders (82.8%) could name at least one function their DAs performed poorly. Four out of five DA officials (82.3%) believe their DA is effective at collecting taxes. According to

two-thirds of the DAs interviewed (66.4%) the quality of relations among elected and appointed DA personnel is good. But almost half of the DA officials (49.6%) felt that the DA system is on the whole ineffective.
Recommendations: IFES should focus efforts on improving DA effectiveness by training in basic human resource and organizational development skills. This should include the same types of training offered the CSOs: financial management, strategic planning, leadership training, communications, and conflict resolution. To this should be added training in enhanced revenue collection and in policy analysis.

- Findings on central-local government relations: Eighty-six DA respondents, which is 76.1% of the sample, reported that the relationship between their DA and the central government is one of cooperation, while only 15 (13.3%) described it as one of interference.
Recommendations: Even if relations between the national government and District Assemblies are, as characterized by the local government officials, one of cooperation, *coordination* between the levels of government remains a problem. IFES should work closely with the Ministry of Local Government (MLG), the institution directly concerned with Ghana's decentralization program and with training Ghana's local government officials. IFES should also work closely with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), the government body directly concerned with educating Ghanaians in the rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenship. Project ECSELL should be seen as an opportunity to develop and field-test a comprehensive training program for Ghana's local government officials and for local CSOs. Once perfected, the curricula generated by Project ECSELL should be available as a permanent resource for the MLG to use in training local government officials and for the NCCE to use in its civic education programs. Finally, IFES should also work closely with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to find ways of improving coordination between central and local government through the *ex officio* members of the District Assemblies: the Members of Parliament with whom NDI works. With the help of NDI, through Project ECSELL Members of Parliament can learn more about the problems facing their constituencies, and can take appropriate action at the national level.

8. Focus Groups in 20 Districts: Findings and Final Recommendations

Findings

IFES conducted 40 focus groups, two in each of the 20 districts, one for CSO leaders and one for District Assembly officials. IFES presented the initial research findings to the groups, and asked the participants to confirm or refute the findings. IFES then asked the participants to add any important information the field research unit missed. Finally, IFES asked the participants to come to consensus on the first, second and third most important type of training they need. This question was open-ended; participants were not given a list from which to choose.

Table 1. Frequencies of types of training requested in 40 focus groups.

CSO first choice		**DA first choice**	
Civic education	6	Strategic planning	6
Financial management	4	Financial management	4
Management training	3	Communications	4
Coalition & constituency building	3	Management training	3
Advocacy skills	2	Tax collection	1
Leadership training	1	Decentralized gov't. orientation	1
Conflict resolution	1	Conflict resolution	1
CSO second choice		**DA second choice**	
Financial management	7	Financial management	7
Management training	5	Communications	5
Coalition building	3	Management training	3
Civic education	2	Decentralized govt orientation	2
Leadership training	1	Tax collection	1
Policy analysis	1	Policy implementation	1
Development planning	1		
CSO third choice		**DA third choice**	
Coalition building	6	Communications	6
Financial management	3	Strategic planning	4
Management training	2	Financial management	3
Civic education	2	Tax collection	1
Advocacy skills	2	Policy implementation	1
Leadership training	2	Development planning	1
Strategic planning	1	Leadership training	1
Communications	1	Development administration	1

The focus group participants confirmed the main findings in the previous chapters. They also listed the types of training they need. These results are invaluable to IFES. First, IFES is able to have confidence in the validity of the findings of this report. Second, since the focus group participants collectively agreed on the first, second and third most important types of training they require, IFES is able to program Project ECSELL with confidence.

Final Recommendations

Training to fill the performance gaps identified by the Project ECSELL participants themselves is clearly an appropriate intervention. Based on the data in Table 1 (above) and the analysis in the preceding chapters, this report makes the following recommendations for designing and implementing Project ECSELL.

Structuring Project ECSELL

IFES must now translate into action the findings given in the preceding chapters. In converting Project ECSELL from paper into practice, IFES should make its intervention as appropriate as possible by following the principles of capacity building and sustainability. Specifically, IFES should work in partnership with Ghanaian NGOs and the relevant Ghanaian government bodies.

Ghanaian NGO partners: To maximize the effectiveness of the training, trainers should be fluent in the local languages of the districts. To meet this need, and to build institutional capacity, IFES should form a partnership with one or more Ghanaian NGOs to provide the skilled trainers needed.

Host government partners: To ensure the sustainability of Project ECSELL, and to multiply its effects, IFES should work closely with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and the Ministry of Local Government (MLG). Since IFES will be developing and field-testing a comprehensive set of training curricula, these curricula should be developed in partnership with both state bodies and left with each as a permanent resource. Furthermore, the NCCE has officers in each district. The NCCE district officers should all be participants in the DA workshops. Training curricula should remain with each NCCE district officer for use in training CSOs not reached by Project ECSELL. This will ensure sustainability and multiply project effects.

Participant observers: Quantifying project impact will be a particular challenge for IFES. The participant observer methodology is appropriate to tackle this problem. IFES is advised to hire a project participant observer resident in each district. This person would have seven duties: (a) to conduct advance logistics prior to each workshop; (b) to serve as an assistant trainer in CSO workshops; (c) to monitor CSO application of new skills and their rate of advocacy; (d) to monitor District Assembly action in response to CSO advocacy, (e) to monitor CSO use of grants; (f) to serve as a resource person between workshops available to participants to clarify points in the training that were not understood; and (g) to work as a partner with the NCCE officer in each district. Using this methodology, together, the IFES participant observers and the NCCE district officers can jointly provide the key data for determining project impact.

Programming Project ECSELL

The results of the baseline assessment revealed low participation by women in politics, and low participation by women in the CSO executive bodies. Project ECSELL should focus special attention on women participants. IFES should work closely with the NCCE to develop a separate program to increase women's participation in the political process. In each training segment, or workshop, IFES should pay particular attention to involving the women participants. Fifty percent of the CSO participants should be women.

In the workshops, emphasis should be placed on creating understanding and fostering a non-confrontational atmosphere to promote interaction between the government and civil society participants. The workshops should provide an opportunity for the leaders of CSOs and local government units to develop relationships that will carry over and provide the permanent channels of communication between civil society and local government required by a healthy democracy.

The following workshop topics are recommended:

Civic education: The focus group participants indicated that civic education was the first-ranked first choice and the fourth-ranked second and third choices for CSO leaders. Orientation in decentralized government was the sixth-ranked first choice and the fourth-ranked second choice of DA officials. In order to prepare the two sets of actors for a collaborative working relationship, IFES should conduct a "Civic Education" workshop for CSO leaders and in a separate venue an "Orientation in Decentralized Government" workshop for DA officials.

Facilitating dialogue: The baseline assessment results indicate that the relationship between civic groups and local governments in the districts are fairly good. Project ECSELL provides an opportunity to translate these good relations into a collaborative problem-solving relationship. IFES should facilitate a dialogue between CSO leaders and DA officials in the context of issues and action.

Enhancing planning skills: Strategic planning ranked high in CSO leaders' second and third preferences, and was the first-ranked first preference and second-ranked third preference of DA officials. Although the topic is the same, because their planning needs are different, IFES should conduct separate workshops to train CSO leaders and DA officials in strategic planning.

Enhancing financial skills: Financial management was the second-ranked first preference, highest-ranked second preference, and second-ranked third preference of CSO leaders, and the second-ranked first preference, first-ranked second preference, and third-ranked third preference for DA officials. In addition, DA officials expressed their need for training in enhanced revenue collection as their fifth-ranked first preference, fifth-ranked second preference, and fourth-ranked third preference. It is important for CSO leaders to learn how to write solid grant proposals.

Therefore IFES should conduct separate workshops on financial management and grant writing for CSO leaders and financial management and tax collection for DA officials.

A second facilitated dialogue: It is important early into Project ECSELL that the CSO leaders and the DA officials engage in another facilitated dialogue to review their progress in developing a collaborative relationship for the aim of resolving community problems. Such a session would also present the participants with an opportunity to revisit topics from previous workshops. Further, it is important to let international and national NGOs active in each district know about Project ECSELL. These NGOs (for example, Technoserve and Plan International) should be invited to attend this workshop. The NGOs may decide, based on what they hear in the workshop, to provide supporting technical assistance to participant CSOs. They may wish to help IFES manage its grants program in the district. They will in any case learn of IFES's planned exit date and be able, if they wish, to take up slack when IFES exits from the 20 districts in 1999.

Coalition and constituency building: The results from the baseline assessment revealed a strong correlation between the size of a group and general levels of political participation. IFES can assume that training in constituency and coalition building will have a significant impact on CSO participation in the political process. Since these activities are not of interest to DA officials, they should receive separate training in policy analysis.

Enhancing participatory managerial skills: Management and leadership training and training in communications skills all ranked high as the first, second and third preferences of both CSO and DA leaders. Since these skills are important for both, IFES should combine the two sets of participants in a single venue. This will afford an opportunity for participatory exercises (such as role reversal) which not only will transfer management, leadership and communications skills, but will foster warmer relations between CSO leaders and DA officials.

Enhancing skills in conflict resolution: Both CSO leaders and DA officials would like to improve their skills in conflict resolution. Since these skills are important for both, this workshop should combine the two sets of participants in a single venue. This again would afford an opportunity for participatory exercises that will transfer skills and continue to build warm relations between CSO leaders and DA officials.

Facilitated dialogue as an exit strategy: It is important for IFES to prepare the participants for its withdrawal from each district. The need for this preparation furnishes an opportunity for a third and final facilitated dialogue in which participants would review progress toward achieving goals. International and national NGOs active in each district should be invited to attend the final workshop too, to listen and help plan for IFES's exit.

The Role of Credit Facilities

The second essential activity of Project ECSELL is to award grants to high-performing CSOs. In the award of these grants, IFES should seek organizations whose scope of activity extends beyond the narrow confines of their membership, that is, groups that are broad based. Special consideration should be given to women's organizations. Special consideration should

also be given to organizations that collaborate with other organizations in seeking solutions to local level problems. The award of grants should be restricted to organizations that contribute to their own activities, whether in cash or in kind.

Grant proposals should be awarded according to criteria that include but are not limited to: (1) the soundness of the proposal; (2) evidence the grant will contribute to strengthening the advocacy capacity of the applicant CSO; and (3) evidence that the applicant CSO has an elected leadership, a constitution, a trained financial officer, methods of learning the opinion of the membership, and a system of accounting to the membership annually.

Measuring Results

Given the scope of its geographic coverage and the complexity of the basic issue it addresses, IFES faces a serious challenge in measuring project impact. To meet this challenge, the panel study methodology should be used. IFES should develop a questionnaire for measuring the opinions of the Project ECSELL participants on the key issues dealt with in the preceding chapters. The questionnaire should be administered periodically to measure the effect of training. Each district should be treated as a separate panel. The opinions of participants would be tracked over time. Changes in the proportion of opinion compared against the baseline data would indicate positive or negative impact. Analysis by type of respondent would provide the qualitative reasons why.

To strengthen the analysis through comparison, consideration should be given to pairing each Project ECSELL district with a control district possessing similar demographic characteristics. A similar sample of CSO leaders should be drawn in each control district and their opinions likewise tracked over time. Being able to track changes in individual opinion while monitoring changes in participants' opinion compared to the baseline data of their own original views and the views of the control groups in the paired districts will permit a high degree of confidence in the resulting indications of project impact. Content analysis of responses in follow up one-on-one interviews will provide the qualitative reasons why. Given the complexity of the task of evaluating impact of such a broad-ranging project, and the sophistication of the methodology involved, IFES should engage a specialist to assist in developing a Project ECSELL monitoring and evaluation capacity.

WORKS CONSULTED

Apter, D. (1963). Ghana in Transition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Ayee, J.R.A. (1992) "Decentralization under Ghana's Fourth Republican Constitution", *Verfassung Und Recht In Ubersee* (University of Hamburg, Germany), Vol. 4: 394-406.

Ayee, J.R.A. (1994). *An Anatomy of Public Policy Implementation: The Case of Decentralization Policies in Ghana*, Avebury, Aldershot.

Ayee, J.R.A. (1995). "Financing Subnational Governments in Ghana: the District Assemblies' Common Fund", *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn): 292-306.

Ayee, J.R.A. (1996). The Measurement of Decentralization: The Ghanaian Experience, 1988-92", *African Affairs*, Vol. 95, No. 378 (January): 31-50.

Ayee, J.R.A. (1997a). "The Adjustment of Central Bodies to Decentralization: The Case of the Ghanaian Bureaucracy", *African Studies Review*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (September): 37-57.

Ayee, J.R.A. (1997b) "Local Government Reform and Bureaucratic Accountability", *Regional Development Dialogue*, (UNCRD, Nagoya, Japan), Vol. 18, No. 2 (Autumn): 86-104.

Austin, D. (1964). Politics in Ghana: 1946-1960, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Bamberger, M. (ed) (1987). *Readings in Community Participation*, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Batley, R.A. and Stoker, G. (1991). *Local Government in Europe: Trends and Developments*, Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Bayart, J.-F. (1986) "Civil Society in Africa" in Chabal, P. (ed*). Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Blair, H., G. Berthin, G. Hansen, J. Jutkovitz, H. McHugh, and M.Young. (1993). "Civil Society and Democratic Development: A CDIE Evaluation Design Paper." USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, Washington, DC.

Boafo-Arthur, K. (1997). "The International Community and Ghana's Transition to Democracy", in K.A. Ninsin (ed), *Transition to Democracy in Ghana*, CODESRIA, Dakar.

Bobbio, N. (1997). *Democracy and Dictatorship*, Polity Press, England.

Bratton, M. (1989). "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa", *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 3: 410-417.

Bratton, M. (1994). "Civil Society and Political Transitions in Africa", in Harbeson, J.W., Rothchild, D. and Chazan, N. (eds), *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, Lynne Rienner, Colorado: 51-82.

Brown, C. K. (1997). Women in Public Life in Ghana, Frederick Ebert Stiftung, Accra.

Chabal, P. (ed.) (1986). *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Chazan, N. (1983). An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969- 1982, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

Chazan, N. (1992) "Africa's Democratic Challenge: Strengthening Civil Society and the State", *World Policy Journal*: 279-307.

Crook, R.C. (1994). "Four Years of the Ghana District Assemblies in operation: decentralization, democratization and administrative performance", *Public Administration and Development*, Vol. 14: 339-364.

Conyers, D. (1989). "The Management and Implementation of Decentralized Administration", in Commonwealth Secretariat, *Decentralized Administration in Africa: Policies and Training*, Commonwealth Secretariat, London.

Diamond, L. (1989). "Beyond Autocracy: Prospects for Democracy in Africa" in *Beyond Autocracy in Africa*, Carter Centre, Emory University: 19-25.

Diamond. L. and M. F. Plattner (eds.) (1996). *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London.

Drah, F.K. (1993). "Civil Society and the Transition to Pluralist Democracy", in Ninsin, K.A. and Drah, F.K. (eds), *Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic*, Woeli, Accra: 72-115.

Drah, F.K. (1997). "Civil Society and Good Governance", (mimeo).

Flanders, S. (1995) "More power to local authorities", *Financial Times*, 6 October 1995

Fowler, A. (1996) "Strengthening Civil Society in Transition Economies - From Concept to Strategy: Mapping an Exit via a Maze of Mirrors" in Andrew Clayton (ed), *NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy in Transitional Societies*, INTRAC Publications, Oxford: 12-35.

Ghana, Republic of (1991) *Report of Committee of Experts (Constitution) on Proposals for a Draft Constitution of Ghana*, GPC, Tema.

Ghana, Republic of (1992). *Constitution of the Republic of Ghana*, GPC, Tema.

Ghana, Republic of (1993). *Local Government Act, (Act 462)*, GPC, Tema.

Ghana, Republic of (1995). *Ghana: Vision 2020 - The First Step*, GPC, Tema.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1994). "Associational Life, Civil Society and Democratization in Ghana" in Harbeson, et. al. (eds), *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, Lynne Rienner, Colorado: 125-148.

Harris, D. (1983) "Central Power and Local Reform: Ghana during the 1970s", in Mawhood, P. (ed) *Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa*, Wiley, Chichester.

Haynes, J. (1991). "The PNDC and Political Decentralization in Ghana, 1981-1991", *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (November): 307-317.

Hyden, G. and Bratton, M. (eds.) (1992). *Governance and Politics in Africa,* Lynne Reinner, Boulder, Colorado.

Jorgensen, L. (1996). "What are NGOs doing in Civil Society?" in Andrew Clayton (ed), *NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy in Transitional Societies*, INTRAC, Oxford: 36-54.

Karl, T.L. (1991). "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America", in Rustow, D.A. and Erickson, K.P. (eds.) *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives,* Harpercollins, New York: 163-191.

Keane, J. (1997). "Democracy and the Decline of the Left", An Introduction to Bobbio, N. (1997), *Democracy and Dictatorship*, Polity Press, England.

Luckham, R. (1996) "Crafting Democratic Control over the Military: A Comparative Analysis of South Korea, Chile and Ghana", *Democratization*, Vol. 3, No.: 215-245.

Mayo, M. and Craig, G. (1995). "Community participation and empowerment: the human face of structural adjustment or tools for democratic transformation" in Craig, G. and Mayo, M. (eds), *Community Empowerment: A Reader in Participation and Development*, Zed Books, London.

Mawhood, P. (ed) (1983). *Local Government in the Third World: the Experience of Tropical Africa*, Wiley, Chichester.

Ninsin, K.A. and Drah, F.K. (eds.) (1993). *Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic*, Woeli Publishing Services, Accra.
Nkrumah, S.A. (ed) (1990). *Ghana's Local Government Law - Issues of Implementation*, A Report on the annual workshop on decentralization in Ghana, School of Administration, Legon.

Nkrumah, S.A. (ed) (1991). *Financing District Development and Administration under a Decentralized Framework*, A report on the annual workshop of decentralization in Ghana, School of Administration, Legon.

Nkrumah, S.A. (ed) (1992). *Decentralized Administration under the Fourth Republic*, A report on the annual workshop on decentralization in Ghana, School of Administration, Legon.

Nsarkoh, J.K. (1964). *Local Government in Ghana*, Ghana Universities Press, Accra.

Nugent, Paul (1996). Big Men, Small Boys, and Politics in Ghana, Accra, Asempa Publishers.

Nukunya, G.K. (1982). The Traditional System Among the Ewes, Universities of Ghana Press, Accra.

O'Donnell, G. (1996). "Delegative Democracy," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.) (1996). *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, pp. 94-108.

Riedel, J. and Schmitz, et. al. (1988). *Small Scale Manufacturing and Repair Activities in the Urban Area of Techiman/Ghana*, Munich, Weltforum Verlag, IFO-Institute for Economic Research, Africa Studies No. 115.

Rondinell, D.A. et. al. (1989). "Analyzing Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: A Political Economy Framework", *Development and Change*, Vol. 20: 57-87.

Rothchild, D. (ed). *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery*, Lynne Rienner, Colorado.

Rustow, D.A. and Erickson, K.P. (eds.) (1991). *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives,* Harpercollins, New York.

Saaka, Y. (1978). *Local Government and Political Change in Northern Ghana*, University Press of America, Washington.

Smith, B.C. (1985). *Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State*, Allen and Unwin, London.

Smith, B.C. (1996). "Sustainable Local Democracy", *Public Administration and Development*, Vol. 16: 163-178.

Steel, W.F. (1977). *Small-Scale Employment and Production in Developing Countries: Evidence from Ghana*, Praeger, New York.

USAID/IFES. (1997). *Public Opinion in Ghana: 1997.* International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, DC.

Valenzuela, J.S. (1992). "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions", in Scott, M. et. al., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, University of Notre Dame, Indiana: 57-104.

Warren, D.M. and Blunt, P. (1984). "Decentralization in Ghana: The Impact of Organizational Effectiveness of Management Training among District and Regional-level Officials", *Journal of Contemporary Studies*, Vol. 3, Nos 1/2 (October): 35-50.

Wunsch, J. and Olowu, D. (ed) (1990). *The Failure of the Centralized State*, Westview, Boulder, CO.

World Bank, (1989). *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Young, C. (1994). "In Search of Civil Society" in Harbeson, J.W. et. al. (eds), *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, Lynne Rienner, Colorado: 33-50.

APPENDIX 1

List of Regions, Districts and Their Capitals Visited

Region	District	Capital
Ashanti	Kwabre Sekyere	Agona
	Adansi East	New Edubiase
Brong Ahafo	Berekum	Berekum
	Tano	Bechem
Central	Abura-Asebu-Kwamankese	Dunkwa
	Ewutu-Efutu-Senya	Winneba
Eastern	Suhum-Kraboa-Coaltar	Suhum
	Manya-Krobo	Odumase-Krobo
Greater Accra	Ga	Amasaman
	Dangme East	Ada
Northern	Tolon-Kumbungu	Tolon
	East Dagomba	Yendi
Upper East	Kassena-Nankani	Navrongo
	Bongo	Bongo
Upper West	Wa	Wa
	Nadawli	Nadowli
Volta	South Tongu	Sogakope
	Jasikan	Jasikan
Western	Nzema	Axim
	Sefwi Wiawso	Wiawso

APPENDIX II

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY OFFICIALS

Sex:
Title:
Name:
District Capital:
Region:

A self-conscious mission that is both credible and compelling to its membership.

1. Is this your full time occupation?
2. What are the objectives of your organization?
3. Is your organization registered?
4. (if yes) With whom?
5. In what ways do your members contribute to achieving your objectives?
6. How are your members able to suggest new ideas?

An identifiable and self-aware constituency.

7. Could you describe the membership or constituency of your organization? (Probe: types of people, examples: garagists, farmers, hairdressers, etc.)
8. About how many members do you have?
9. About how many of your members are active?
10. About how many of your members are women?
11. (if members) Whereabouts do your members reside? (Prompt: district? Village? Wider area?).
12. (if constituency) How far does your organization reach?

A leadership that in fact represents its membership and is firmly linked to it.

13. How are officials selected in your organization?
14. How many of your officials are women?
15. If there is a major decision to be made, who are the key persons involved?

A leadership with the desire to learn how to poll its membership to discover and confirm the members' interests.

16. How do you learn the interests and opinions of your membership?
17. Can you describe an instance of this happening?

A leadership with the desire to develop an action strategy based on members' interests either to mobilize untapped human capital and other resources; to elicit services from the state; or to influence state policy as it pertains to their issues of interest.

18. Does your organization have an action plan or strategic plan?
19. (if yes to either) May I see copies of these documents?

20. (if no to both) How far along in achieving your objectives is your organization, would you say far along, well along, or just beginning?

A dependable (however small) financial base to fund its activities, and a willingness on the part of the leadership to learn how to maintain accurate financial records.

21. Do you operate a financial management system? (Prompt with "books" or "ledgers").
22. (if yes) Could you show me your financial register?
23. (if no) Would your organization be interested in learning about financial management?
24. What are your sources of funding? (Prompt with "revenue" or "income").
25. Does your organization ever borrow money?
26. (if yes) From where?
27. What is your annual budget?
28. Is this sufficient to meet your objectives?

Sufficient autonomy from the state that the organization can credibly endeavor to influence the state without being (or becoming) captive to it.

29. Thinking about the relationship between your organization and the District Assembly, would you say it is generally good, poor, or average?
30. How independent is your organization from the District Assembly, would you say very independent, somewhat independent, or not independent at all?
31. Could you tell me in what types of activities does your organization cooperate with the District Assembly?
32. Has the District Assembly ever interfered with your organization? (Prompt: for example by putting too many regulations on your activities).
33. (if yes) How?
34. Does your organization have ties with any political party?

A leadership that displays willingness to work with other like-minded CSO groups toward specific goals.

35. Are there other organizations like yours around here with which your organization cooperates?
36. (if yes) What is the nature of the cooperation?
37. (if yes) Could you name the other organizations?

A leadership that shows willingness to mobilize or recruit unorganized non-member citizens who share a common interest to solve a common problem.

38. Does your organization ever conduct membership drives?
39. Has your organization ever mobilized support outside your current membership for a particular activity?

A willingness on the part of the leadership to engage local government leaders and lobby hard for the interests of their membership.

40. Has your organization ever gone to the District Assembly to advocate either the formulation of a government policy or the passage or defeat of a piece of legislation?

41. (if yes). To whom did you go? (Probe for point of contact -- unit of local government, local government official, etc.).
42. (if yes) Please describe the outcome.
43. (if no) Can you think of a circumstance when your organization would be willing to go to the District Assembly to lobby? (Prompt: for example, if the District Assembly were preparing to levy a tax that would affect your members).
44. How often does the District Assembly consult your organization, would you say often, sometimes, or never?
45. (if other than never) Could you describe an instance of this happening?
46. What training would you say your organization most needs to improve its effectiveness?
47. Of those you named, which are the three most pressing needs?

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

48. In what ways has external funding such as the Common Fund or donor assistance helped organizations such as yours in this district?
49. Has external funding ever caused conflict between organizations or groups in this district?
50. (if yes) How was the conflict resolved?
51. Where do businesses hereabouts go to borrow money?
52. How do the people in this district invest and save?
53. Are there problems with the formal sources of credit in this District?
54. Are there problems with the informal sources of credit?
55. Thinking about the availability of credit in this District and the number of organizations needing credit, do you think there is enough, not enough, or just about enough credit available?

DEMOCRATIC ADVOCACY QUESTIONS

56. How concerned is your organization about issues of social justice, would you say very concerned, somewhat concerned, or not very concerned? (For example: if you knew of an employer who wasn't paying the minimum daily wage, would your organization take a stand?).
57. In the past, has your organization acted in the District to promote democracy in Ghana?
58. What is the District Assembly supposed to do?
59. Of the things you mentioned, in your opinion, which does the District Assembly perform well?
60. Which does it perform poorly?
61. Does your Member of Parliament visit here during recess often, sometimes, seldom, or never?
62. (if other than never) What did the people talk about with the MP the last time he was here?
63. Thinking back five years to 1992, would you say government is working for the people more effectively now than then, about the same, or less effectively?
64. Why is that?

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DISTRICT ASSEMBLY OFFICIALS/MEMBERS

Sex:
Title:
Name:
District Capital:
Region:

1. What are the top three objectives of your District Development Plan?
2. How many of those have you met?
3. Overall, how effective is the District Assembly, would you say very effective, somewhat effective, or not very effective?
4. On the whole, how effective is the District Administration, would you say very effective, somewhat effective, or not very effective?
5. We've defined civil society organizations as any voluntary nongovernment organization that is not a political party or a business firm. With this in mind, could you name the CSOs that are very active in this district?
6. How would you describe the relationship between the District Assembly and the CSOs you just named, would you say it is good, average, or poor?
7. Would you say the District Assembly solicits the views of the CSOs in this District often, sometimes, or never?
8. (if other than never) Can you give me an example of this happening?
9. How would you describe the relationship of the central government to this District Assembly, would you say there is cooperation, interference, or is the relationship pretty much neutral?
10. (if interference) Could you describe an example of this happening?
11. Could you describe the major constraints facing your District Assembly?
12. Under the current system of government, some offices are elected while other offices are appointed. Overall, how effectively would you say this system works, would you say very effectively, somewhat effectively, or not very effectively?
13. How well do the appointed officials and the elected officials in this District work together, would you say very well, somewhat well, or poorly?
14. How effective is the collection of local taxes in this District, would you say very effective, somewhat effective, or not very effective?
15. Thinking back five years to 1992, would you say the District Assembly is working for the people more effectively now than then, about the same, or less effectively?
16. Why is that?
17. Local government leaders have been receiving a lot of training lately. Who in this District Assembly has received training? (Probe: How many of these are Assemblymen?).
18. What types of training does your District Assembly require to be more effective?
19. Who in this District Assembly could make best use of this training?

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHIEFS

1. What CSOs are active in your traditional area?
2. What do you *expect* that the District Assembly *should* do for your community?
3. What is the District Assembly *in fact* doing?
4. Of the things you mentioned, which does the District Assembly perform well?
5. Which does it perform poorly?
6. In your opinion, how can local government be improved?
7. Thinking back five years to 1992, would you say the District Assembly is working for the people more effectively now than then, about the same, or less effectively?
8. Why is that?

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE VILLAGE DURBARS

Name of village:
Region:
Approximate number in attendance:

(Take attendance)

1. What organized groups are present?
2. Are there Unit Committee members present?
3. Is the District Assemblyman present?

(For the CSOs. Ask each in turn)

4. I'd like to ask the leader of each organized group: what are the objectives of your group?
5. Does your group cooperate with any groups in other villages?
6. How does the Unit Committee help your organization to realize its objectives?
7. How does the District Assembly help your organization to realize its objectives?

(For the Chief and sub-chiefs)

8. Thinking back five years to 1992, would you say the District Assembly is working for the people more effectively now than then, about the same, or less effectively?
9. Why is that?

(For the Unit Committee members)

10. Now I'd like to ask the Unit Committee members to tell me: What problems does the Unit Committee face in trying to help the organizations in this village?

(For the District Assemblyman)

11. Now I'd like to ask the District Assemblyman to tell me: What problems does the District Assembly face in trying to help the organizations in this village?

(For the women present)

12. Now I'd like to ask the women who are here: What are the concerns of the women in this village?
13. Are there any women's groups here in this village that are addressing these concerns?
14. (if yes) Could you name them please?

(For all present)

15. What are the main problems faced by this village?
16. If you had to pick one as the most important problem, what would it be?

APPENDIX III

List of Civil Society Organizations Interviewed

1. Action on Disability and Development, Wa
2. Ada Hairdressers Association
3. Ada Salt Winners Cooperative Union
4. Adansi Praso Akpeteshie Distillers and Retailers Cooperative Society
5. Adansi Praso Carpenters Association
6. Adansi Praso Rice Growers Association
7. Adesa Cultural Troupe, Amasaman
8. ADRA, Wa
9. Agona Hairdressers and Beauticians Association
10. Agona Market Women Association, Afigya Sekyere
11. Agona Muslim Youth Association, Afigya Sekyere
12. Agona Pensioners Association
13. Akadigri Facilitators Association, Bongo
14. Akpeteshie Distillers and Retailers Association, Wiamoase
15. Akplabanya Youth Association, Ada
16. Akplabanya Fish Processors Association, Ada
17. Akplbanya Canoe Fishermen Association, Ada
18. Akrampa Project, Effutu-Awutu-Senya
19. Akuse Youth Association, Odumase Krobo
20. Anaafonisi Development Association, Bongo
21. Ananoore Development Association, Bongo and Bolgatanga
22. Anglican Young People's Association, Wiawso
23. Anongtaaba Facilitators Association, Bongo
24. Asesewa Distilleries Association, Manya Krobo Dist.
25. Asesewa Gari Processors Association, Manya Krobo Dist.
26. Asesewa Tailors and Dressmakers Association, Manya Krobo Dist.
27. Asokwa Bakers Association, Adansi East Dist.
28. Asokwa Farmers Association, Adansi East Dist.
29. Asokwa Peace Network, New Edubiase
30. Asokwa Tailors and Dressmakers Association, Adansi East Dist.
31. Association for the Advancement of Women (Axim branch)
32. Axim Catholic Youth Association
33. Axim Chorkor Fishsmokers Association
34. Axim Youth Association
35. Bakers Association, Tefle, Sogakope
36. Bay 5 Fishmongers Union, Navrongo
37. Beauticians and Hairdressers Association, Jasikan
38. Bechem Bureau for Rural and Urban Mobilization
39. Bechem Centre for Economic and Social Initiatives
40. Bechem Farmers Council
41. Bechem Hairdressers and Beauticians Association
42. Bechem Market Women Association

43. Bechem Moslem Youth Association
44. Beer bar keepers Association, Wiawso
45. Berekum Tailors and Dressmakers Association
46. Berekum Women Farmers Association
47. Buem Youth Association, Jasikan
48. Butchers Association, Bongo
49. Butchers Association, Sefwi Wiawso
50. Carpentry Production Cooperative, Nadowli
51. Cattle Dealers Association, Navrongo
52. Centre for Development of People, Wa
53. Christian Mothers Association, Axim
54. Christian Mothers Association, Bongo
55. Christian Mothers Association, Nadowli
56. Christian Mothers Association, Navrongo
57. Christian Mothers Association, Yendi
58. Civil Servants Association, Berekum
59. Coaltar Akpeteshie Distillers and Retailers Society
60. Coaltar Development Association
61. Coaltar Presbyterian Women's Fellowship
62. Cocoa, Coffee and Sheanut Association, Berekum
63. Cocoa, Coffee and Sheanut Sub-Comm. Of GNAFF
64. Collaborative Community Forestry Initiative, Bongo
65. Concern Citizens Association, Berekum
66. Concerned Citizens Association of Axim
67. Cooperative Fishermen's Service Centre, Axim
68. DadeMatseimei Union, Asesewa , Manya Krobo Dist.
69. Dagbon Youth Association, Yendi
70. Denkyira Development Association, Dunkwa
71. District Council of Labour of TUC, Nzema East
72. District Council of Labour of TUC, Wiawso
73. Dunkwa Artisans Union
74. E.K. Band, Tolon
75. Ebony Youth Club, Odumase Krobo
76. Effutu Small Scale Business Association
77. Ewe- Ada Atsofo Union, Ada
78. Federation of Disabled Persons Association, Navrongo
79. G.P.R.T.U. of Kasseh, Ada
80. Garages Association, Sefwi Wiawso
81. Gbugbaliga Cashew Association, Yendi
82. Ghana Association for the Blind, Suhum
83. Ghana Association of the Blind, Bongo
84. Ghana Association of the Blind, Nadowli
85. Ghana Caterers Association, Asokwa, Adansi East Dist.
86. Ghana Cocoa, Coffee and Sheanut Farmers Association, Jasikan
87. Ghana Cocoa, Coffee, Sheanut Farmers Association, Dunkwa
88. Ghana Cocoa, Coffee, Sheanut Farmers Association, Wiawso

89. Ghana Govt Pensioners Association, Winneba
90. Ghana Hairdressers and Beauticians Association, Winneba
91. Ghana National Assoc. Of Garages
92. Ghana National Assocation of Farmers and Fishermen, New Edubiase
93. Ghana National Association of Garages, Jasikan
94. Ghana National Association of Garages, Kasseh, Ada
95. Ghana national Association of Garagists, Winneba
96. Ghana National Association of Teachers, Dunkwa
97. Ghana National Tailors and Dressmakers Association, Jasikan
98. Ghana National Tailors and Dressmakers Association, Wa
99. Ghana Registered Nurses Association, Nadowli
100. Ghana Union Traders Association, Suhum
101. GNAT, Agona Afigya Sekyere
102. GPRTU of Agona
103. GPRTU, Dunkwa
104. GPRTU, Sogakope
105. Habitat for Humanity, Agona Ashanti
106. Hairdressers and Beauticians Association, Berekum
107. Hairdressers and Tailors Association, Nadowli
108. Islamic Education Unit, Yendi
109. Islamic Youth Organization, Jasikan
110. Jasikan Bakers Association
111. Jasikan Queen Mothers Association, Okadjakrom
112. Jasikan Small Scale Carpenters Association
113. Kasena-Nankana Muslim Women Association, Navrongo
114. Kasena-Nankena Muslim Youth Association, Navrongo
115. Kojo Ashong Cooperative Farmers Union, Amasaman
116. Kyekyewere Animal Farmers Association, Afigya Sekyere
117. Kyekyewere Farmers Association, Afigya Sekyere
118. Kyekyewere Hairdressers Association, Afigya Sekyere
119. Kyekyewere Tailors Association, Afigya Sekyere
120. Kyekyewere Weavers Association, Afigya Sekyere
121. Lebginsim Union, Yendi
122. Liberty Youth Association, Madina, Amasaman.
123. Local Council of Churches, Berekum
124. Local Council of Churches, Dunkwa
125. Local Council of Churches, Suhum
126. Local Ghana National Association of Teachers, Wiawso
127. Madina Traditional Caterers Association, Amasaman
128. Madina Youth Association, Amasaman
129. Manya Krobo Youth Congress, Odumasi Krobo
130. Marfo Krom Farmers Association, Suhum Dist.
131. Marfo Krom Gari Processors Association, Suhum
132. Marfo Krom Unit Committee
133. Marfo Krom Village Health Care Sub-Comm., Suhum Dist.
134. Market Women's Association of Bongo

135. Methodist Agric. Program, Wa
136. Moslem Women Association, Akuse
137. Muslim Association, Wiawso
138. Mwinibunu Cooperative Sheabutter Produce Society, Wa
139. Nadowli Distillers and Retailers Association
140. Nadowli Sheabutter Association
141. National Council on Women and Development, Winneba
142. New Edubiase GNAT
143. New Edubiase Women's Club
144. North-West Development Agency, Wa
145. Nyame wo Ho Hairdressers Association, Sefwi Wiawso
146. Nzema Anyunlohole (Progressive) Cooperative Distillers Union
147. Odebikese Movement, Winneba
148. Onyasana Community Cooperative Society, Amasaman
149. Peace and Love Partners Organization, Bongo
150. Physically Disabled Association, Nadowli
151. Pokuase - Amasaman Dressmakers and Tailors Association
152. Presbyterian Church, Agona Afigya Sekyere
153. Progressive Voluntary Organization, Berekum
154. Rural Women's Association, Navrongo
155. Sambu Amasachina, Yendi
156. Seamstress and Tailors Association, Agona Ashanti
157. Sefwi Amafie Youth Association
158. Sefwi Wiawso Youth Association
159. Self-Employed Rural Workers Association, Amasaman
160. Small Scale Carpenters Association of TUC, Winneba
161. Sogakope Cattle Farmers Association
162. Sogakope Cooked Food Sellers Association
163. Suhini Women's Group, Tolon
164. Suhum Bakers Association
165. Suhum Landlords and Tenants Association
166. Suhum Photographers Association
167. Suhum Tailors and Dressmakers Association
168. Suntaa Nuntaa Rural Development Program, Wa
169. Tailors and Dressmakers Association of Dunkwa
170. Tailors and Dressmakers Association, Akuse, Odumase Krobo
171. Tailors and Dressmakers Association, Sogakope
172. Tailors and Dressmakers Association, Winneba
173. Tailors and Dressmakers Association, Yendi
174. Tailors and Hairdressers Association, Axim
175. Tefle Parent-Teacher Association, Tefle, Sogakope
176. Tefle Pensioners Association, Sogakope Dist.
177. Tefle Pig Farmers Association, Sogakpe Dist.
178. Tefle Students and Youth Union, Sogakope
179. Tefle Women's Association, Tefle Sogakope
180. Tolon Farmers Association

181. Tolon Tractor Operators Association
182. Tolon Youth Association
183. Tono Lake Fishermen's's Association, Navrongo
184. Tonteya Sheanut Processors Association, Tolon District
185. Tosuko Cooperative Distillers Association, Dabala, Sogakope
186. Town Development Association, Asokwa, Adansi East Dist.
187. Tutugu Agro-Forestry Association, Tolon
188. Upper Denkyira Beekeepers Association / Club for the Aged and Disabled
189. Upper Denkyira Tertiary Students Association, Dunkwa
190. Upper Telania Women's Association, Navrongo
191. Wa Hairdressers Association
192. Wiamoase Market Women Association
193. Wiamoase Agona Maize Growers and Sellers Association
194. Wiamoase Area Agro-Forestry and Rural Development
195. Wiamoase Artisans Organization (Masons)
196. Wiamoase Carpenters Association
197. Wiamoase Chemical Sellers Association
198. Wiamoase Cola Dealers Society
199. Wiamoase Farmers Award Winners Association
200. Wiamoase Hairdressers and Beauticians Association
201. Wiamoase Seamstress and Tailors Association
202. Wiamoase Tomato Growers Association
203. Wiamoase Vegetable Growers Association
204. Winneba Cooperative Fishermen's Society
205. Woetsonya Farmers Association, Akuse, Odumase Krobo
206. Worawora Development Association,
207. World Neighbours, Navrongo
208. Wumpini Women's Group, Tolon
209. Youth Action Group Against Poverty, Navrongo

APPENDIX IV

1. Descriptive Statistics (CSOs):

In Table 1 (below), the first three rows are interval variables: number of members (any number possible from one to infinity), percent of women members (any number possible between 0 and 100), and amount of annual budget in cedis (any number possible from one to infinity). The first column reports the variable, that is, the item on the questionnaire. The second column reports the mean, the third column the standard deviation, the fourth column the median, the fifth column the mode, and the sixth column the range.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of CSOs. N=209.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Mode	Range
Number of members	10,551	99,483	60	50	4 to 1 million
Percentage of women members	46	37	38	100	0 to 100
Amount of annual budget (in cedis)	24,850,470	175,834,185	240,000	***	20k to 1.2b

Mean:

The mean or average can be misleading. There was no group in our sample with the "average" budget of ¢24.9 million. One group reported an annual budget of ¢21 million while the next highest reported an annual budget of ¢30 million. The average size of the groups we interviewed is 10,551 members, but there was no group of 10,551 members in our sample. One group reported having 10,000 members, while the next highest reported having 25,000 members. Likewise the "average" group consisted of 46% women, but again the "average" group does not exist. Two groups reported having 45% women and, in the next highest category, one group reported having 47% women.

Standard Deviation:

This statistic is the number which, when both added to and subtracted from the mean gives the upper and lower bound between which about 65% of all observations fall. In the case of percentage of women members the standard deviation is within 9 percentage points of the mean, while in the case of number of members and amount of annual budget the standard deviation is *higher* than the mean. This indicates that the range of these three variables is large.

Median:

This statistic is simply the middle number between the highest and lowest observations. The median number of members is 60, but the average number is about 10,500. This indicates that a few groups with huge memberships pulled the average way up. Likewise the average budget for the groups we interviewed is about ¢24.9 million, but the median is a hundredth of that: ¢240,000. As in the case of membership, this means that a few groups with huge budgets skewed the average. Finally, the average

percentage of women members is 46%, but about two-thirds of all groups fell between the wide range of 9% and 55%. Therefore, to describe the groups we interviewed a better statistic to use than the average is the median for these three variables.

Table 2: Comparison of mean and median

Variable	Mean	Median
Number of members	10,551	60
Amount of budget	¢24,851,000	¢240,000
Percent of women	46%	38%

Mode:

The mode in Table 1 reports the most often cited number. There was no mode for annual budget. This means no two groups reported having the same budget. Interestingly, for percent of women members the mode is 100%. Of the 209 groups we interviewed, 40 groups had 100% women while 39 had 100% men. The remaining 130 groups had varying mixtures of men and women members.

Range:

This column in Table 1 reports the lowest and highest figures given in the interviews. The relationship between the mean, median, and the standard deviation indicates an extreme range of values. This is borne out in this column. The number of members ranged from 4 members in the smallest group to 1 million members in the largest group. The percent of women members ranged from zero to 100%, while the amount of annual budget ranged from ¢20,000 in the least well-funded group to ¢1.2 billion in the most well-funded group.

Frequency and Percent:

Tables 3 and 4 (below) have three columns. The first column reports the variable. The second column reports the frequency. The frequency refers to the number of observations. For example, in Table 3 under the variable "Selection of Officials" 194 of the 209 CSO leaders interviewed reported that their organizations elect their officers, 10 reported their organizations do not elect their leaders, and 5 respondents could not (or would not) say how their officials are selected. The third column reports what percent of the respondents interviewed the frequency represents.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of CSOs. N = 209.

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Number of respondents by zone		
Southern	93	44.5
Central	63	30.1
Northern	53	25.4
Type of Organization		
Professional	121	57.9
Advocacy	10	4.8
Service provider	41	19.6
Community development organization	37	17.7
Selection of officials		
Elected	194	92.8
Non-elected	10	4.8
Don't know or no response	5	2.4
Numbers of persons making decisions		
Fewer than five	34	16.3
Five or more	173	82.8
Don't know or no response	2	1.0
How opinion of members is learned		
Meetings or other methods	191	91.4
No method	13	6.2
Don't know or no response	5	2.4
Number of sources of funding		
One source	98	46.9
More than one source	104	49.8
Don't know or no response	7	3.3
Does organization ever borrow?		
Yes	38	18.2
No	166	79.4
Don't know or no response	5	2.4
Budget is sufficient for needs		
Yes	10	4.8
No	175	83.7
Don't know or no response	24	11.5

Table 3 (cont.)

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Relationship with District Assembly		
Good	120	57.4
Average	36	17.2
Poor	32	15.3
No relations	21	10.0
Independence from District Assembly		
Very	184	88.0
Somewhat	20	9.6
Not very	2	1.0
Don't know or no response	3	1.4
Activities cooperating w/ District Ass'y		
One or more	154	73.7
None	51	24.4
Don't know or no response	4	1.9
Interference by District Assembly		
Yes	9	4.3
No	195	93.3
Don't know or no response	5	2.4
Cooperates with other CSOs		
Yes	137	65.6
No	67	32.1
Don't know or no response	5	2.4
Conducts membership drives		
Yes	156	74.6
No	49	23.4
Don't know or no response	4	1.9
Mobilizes outside support		
Yes	104	49.8
No	101	48.3
Don't know or no response	4	1.9
Goes to DA to advocate interests		
Yes	93	44.5
No	113	54.1
Don't know or no response	3	1.4

Table 3 (cont.)

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Consulted by District Assembly		
Often	43	20.6
Sometimes	73	34.9
Never	90	43.1
Don't know or no response	3	1.4
Receives outside sources of funding		
Yes	59	28.2
No	134	64.1
Don't know or no response	16	7.7
Concerned about social justice		
Very	167	79.9
Somewhat	18	8.6
Not very	19	9.1
Don't know or no response	5	2.4
Has promoted democracy		
Yes	151	72.2
No	53	25.4
Don't know or no response	5	2.4
Functions the DA performs well		
One or more	170	81.3
None	29	13.9
Don't know or no response	10	4.8
Functions the DA performs poorly		
One or more	173	82.8
None	11	5.3
Don't know or no response	25	12.0
Government performance since 1992		
Better	146	69.9
Same	19	9.1
Worse	35	16.7
Don't know or no response	9	4.3

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of District Assembly Officials. N=113.

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Number of respondents by zone		
Southern	49	43.4
Central	32	28.3
Northern	32	28.3
Relationship with CSOs		
Good	84	74.3
Average	13	11.5
Poor	5	4.4
Don't know or no response	11	9.7
District Assembly solicits CSO views		
Often	46	40.7
Sometimes	47	41.6
Never	11	9.7
Don't know or no response	9	8.0
Central gov't relationship with DA		
Cooperation	86	76.1
Neutrality	8	7.1
Interference	15	13.3
Don't know or no response	4	3.5
Rate elected/non-elected gov't system		
Very effective	27	23.9
Somewhat effective	29	25.7
Not effective	56	49.6
Don't know or no response	1	0.9
Elected/non-elected relations in district		
Good	75	66.4
Average	24	21.2
Poor	13	11.5
Don't know or no response	1	0.9
Effectiveness of tax collection		
Very effective	63	55.8
Somewhat effective	30	26.5
Not effective	11	9.7
Don't know or no response	9	8.0

Table 4 (cont.)

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Performance of DA since 1992		
More effective	99	87.6
Same	6	5.3
Less effective	3	2.7
Don't know or no response	5	4.4

2. Pearson's R

This section reports the findings from correlation analysis, a statistical test in which every variable was correlated against every other variable. Only the significant findings are reported.

The first column of Table 5 reports the two variables tested for correlation. The second column reports Pearson's r. This statistic can fall anywhere between –1.0 and 1.0. The closer to –1.0 or to 1.0 the number, the stronger the correlation between the two variables.

The strongest correlation coefficients fall around plus or minus 0.25, not impressive by the standards of physics, but in line with many published findings in the social sciences. The third column reports the alpha. This tells us how confident we can be in the significance of the correlation. An alpha of 0.01 tells us that we can be 99% confident. An alpha of 0.001 tells us that we can be 99.9% confident that the correlation reported is significant.

The fourth column interprets the findings. We would like all CSOs to be strong, that is, to have many members and large budgets. We would like all CSOs to be internally democratic, that is, to elect their officials and to have some method for learning the opinion of their members. We would like all CSOs to be trying to grow through membership drives and the mobilization of outside support. We would like all CSOs to have good relations with their district assemblies, to be independent of (autonomous from) them, not to be interfered with by them, to cooperate with them, to go to them to advocate their interests, and to be consulted by their district assemblies whenever major decisions are being made. Finally we want all CSOs to demonstrate concern about issues of social justice and to act to promote democracy in their districts.

For the most part, "good things go together." Each desirable attribute is associated with at least one other desirable attribute. Thus, groups that conduct membership drives also tend to mobilize outside support. Groups that go to their district assembly to advocate their interests tend to get consulted by their district assembly. Groups that actively promote democracy tend to be concerned about issues of social justice. Yet there are two disturbing findings. The first is the significant negative correlation between northern groups and the promotion of democracy. The second is the significant negative correlation between percentage of women members on the one hand and, respectively, concern about justice and the promotion of democracy.

Table 5: Correlation Analysis.

Variables	R	Alpha	Interpretation
Type of CSO			**Service providers and dev't org's tend**
Number of sources of funding	0.3071	0.001	to have more than one source of funding
Mobilization of support	0.3136	0.001	to mobilize support outside their membership
			Professional and advocacy groups tend:
			to have only one source of funding
			not to mobilize outside support
Zone (north, central, or south)			**Groups in the north tend:**
Number of members	-0.2421	0.01	to have fewer members
Promotion of democracy	-0.3664	0.001	not to promote democracy
			Groups in the south tend:
			to have more members
			to promote democracy
Percentage of women			**A group with more women members tends:**
Number of members	-0.2340	0.01	to have fewer members
Concern about social justice	-0.3140	0.001	not to be concerned about social justice
Promotion of democracy	-0.3606	0.001	not to promote democracy
Number of members			**A group with many members tends:**
% of women members	-0.2340	0.01	to have a smaller percentage of women
Annual budget	0.2993	0.001	to have a larger overall budget
Per capita budget	-0.2894	0.01	to have less money per member
Consultation by District Ass'y	0.2315	0.01	to get consulted by the District Assembly
Zone (north, central, south)	-0.2412	0.01	to be located in the south
Selection of officials			**A group which elects its officials tends:**
Cooperation with DA	0.2408	0.01	to cooperate with the District Assembly
Belief DA performs well	0.2542	0.01	to believe the District Ass'y performs well
# of sources of funding			**A group with more than one source tends:**
type of CSO	0.3071	0.001	to be a service provider or development org.
Number of members	-0.2431	0.01	to have fewer members
Mobilization of support	0.2563	0.01	to mobilize support outside its membership
Receipt of "outside" funding	0.2416	0.01	to receive funds from external sources

Table 5 (cont.)

Variables	R	Alpha	Interpretation
Amount of annual budget			**A group with a large annual budget tends:**
Number of members	0.2993	0.001	to have more members
per capita budget	0.3102	0.001	to have a large per capita budget
Relations with District Ass'y			**A group with good relations with DA tends:**
Cooperation with the DA	0.4779	0.001	to cooperate with the District Assembly
Consultation by District Ass'y	0.2770	0.01	to get consulted by the District Assembly
Cooperation with the DA			**A group that cooperates with the DA tends:**
Selection of officials	0.2408	0.01	to elect its officials
Relations with the DA	0.4779	0.001	to have good relations with the District Ass'y
Advocacy of interests at DA	0.2863	0.01	to go to the DA to advocate its interests
Consultation by District Ass'y	0.4062	0.001	to get consulted by the District Assembly
Conducts membership drives			**A group that holds membership drives tends:**
Mobilization of support	0.2597	0.01	to mobilize support outside its membership
Mobilization of support			**A group that mobilizes outside support tends:**
type of CSO	0.3136	0.001	to be a service provider or development org.
Number of sources of funding	0.2563	0.01	to have more than one source of funding
Conduct of membership drives	0.2597	0.01	to conduct membership drives
Promotion of democracy	0.2976	0.001	to promote democracy in its district
Advocacy of interests at DA			**A group that advocates its interests tends:**
Cooperation with the DA	0.2863	0.01	to cooperate with the District Assembly
Consultation by District Ass'y	0.3870	0.001	to get consulted by the District Assembly
Consultation by the DA			**A group that gets consulted by the DA tends:**
Number of members	0.2315	0.01	to have more members
Relations with the DA	0.2770	0.01	to have better relations with the District Ass'y
Cooperation with the DA	0.4062	0.01	to cooperate with the District Assembly
Advocacy of interests at DA	0.3870	0.001	to go to the DA to advocate its interests
belief government is improved	0.3125	0.001	to believe that gov't has improved since 1992
Receipt of "outside" funding			**A group that receives external funds tends:**
Number of sources of funding	0.2416	0.01	to have more than one source of funding

Table 5 (cont.)

Variables	R	Alpha	Interpretation
Belief DA performs well			**A group that believes DA does well tends:**
Selection of leaders	0.2542	0.01	to elect its officials
Concern about social justice	0.2410	0.01	to be concerned about social justice
belief government is improved	0.4057	0.001	to believe that gov't has improved since 1992
Belief gov't is improved			**A group that believes gov't is better tends:**
Consultation by District Ass'y	0.3125	0.001	to get consulted by the District Assembly
belief the DA performs well	0.4057	0.001	to believe the District Ass'y performs well
Concern about social justice			**A group concerned about justice tends:**
% of women members	-0.3140	0.001	to have a small percentage of women
Promotion of democracy	0.4413	0.001	to promote democracy in its district
Promotion of democracy			**A group that promotes democracy tends:**
Zone (north, central, or south)	-0.3641	0.001	to be located in the south
% of women members	-0.3606	0.001	to have a small percentage of women
Mobilization of support	0.2976	0.001	to mobilize support outside its membership
Concern about social justice	0.4413	0.001	to be concerned about social justice

3. Kendall's Tau-B

Kendall's tau-b tests for strength of association between variables. In this procedure we took the *characteristics* of groups (e.g. amount of budget, number of members, percentage of women, region) and tested for the strength of association between each characteristic and all *attributes* of groups (e.g. selection of officials, relations with local government, promotion of democracy, etc). Only the significant findings are reported.

The first column of Table 6 reports which characteristics and which attributes tested as being strongly associated. The second column reports the value of tau-b. This statistic can range from –1.0 to 1.0. Whether the value is positive or negative indicates positive or negative association. The closer to plus or minus 1, the stronger the association. The third column reports the t-value. This is a test for statistical significance. All the t-values reported here are significant at alpha 0.025. This means we can be at least 97.5% confident that the association between the group characteristics and attributes is strong. The fourth column interprets the results. Kendall's tau-b confirmed the Pearson's r findings of a significant negative relationship between content of women in an organization and the location of a group in the north on the one hand, and the propensity to promote democracy. Kendall's tau-b also revealed the strong association between the size of a group's membership and a greater variety of ways in which it is engaged with local government than the Pearson's r method revealed. There are two lessons we should draw from this. (1) IFES will have to work extra hard to persuade the northerners and the women we will be working with to participate in the political process. (2) The bigger IFES can help groups become the more likely they will be to cooperate with, be consulted by, and advocate their interests before their district assemblies.

Table 6: Measure of Strength of Association.

Variables	Tau-b	t-value	Interpretation
Type of CSO			**Service providers and dev't org's tend:**
Selection of officials	-0.1572	-2.016	not to elect their officials
Mobilization of support	0.2137	3.317	to mobilize outside support
Receipt of "outside" funding	0.1825	2.847	to receive funds from external sources
			Professional and advocacy groups tend:
			to elect their officials
			not to mobilize outside support
			not to receive funds from external sources
Zone (north, central, or south)			**Groups in the north tend:**
Selection of officials	-0.1598	-2.073	not to elect their officials
Cooperate with other groups	0.1625	2.657	to cooperate with other CSOs
Receipt of "outside" funding	0.1432	2.099	to receive funds from external sources
Promotion of democracy	-0.2097	-3.037	not to promote democracy in their districts
			Groups in the south tend:
			to elect their officials
			not to cooperate with other CSOs
			not to receive funds from external sources
			to promote democracy in their districts
Percentage of women			**A group with more women members tends:**
Mobilization of support	-0.1393	-2.097	not to mobilize outside support
Concern about social justice	-0.1900	-2.759	not to be concerned about social justice
Promotion of democracy	-0.1940	-2.842	not to promote democracy in its district
Number of members			**A group with many members tends:**
Selection of officials	0.2036	2.814	to elect its officials
Cooperation with DA	0.1791	2.702	to cooperate with the District Assembly
Interference by District Ass'y	0.1465	-2.108	not to be interfered with by the District Ass'y
Conduct of membership drives	0.1492	2.161	to conduct membership drives
Advocacy of interests at DA	0.1604	2.473	to go to the DA to advocate its interests
Consultation by District Ass'y	0.1535	2.520	to get consulted by the District Assembly
Promotion of democracy	0.1809	2.940	to promote democracy in its district
Amount of annual budget			**A group with a large annual budget tends:**
Number of sources of funding	0.1951	2.499	to have more than one source of funding
Advocacy of interests at DA	0.2084	2.760	to go to the DA to advocate its interests
Concern about social justice	0.1981	2.647	to be concerned about social justice

4. Summary of data

The next section examines groups by *characteristic* (type of CSO, content of women, region, number of members, and size of budget). It then summarizes the key findings by saying, "in looking at groups with these different characteristics, which have the attributes we desire?" Here you can see that of all characteristics, "many members" is correlated with and/or associated with the greatest number of the attributes we want our CSOs to have.

Table 6: Summary of Data by Characteristic of Group.

Characteristic	Attribute	Statistical test	
		Correlation	Association
Service providers And development Organizations	Have more than one source of funding	x	
	Receive external sources of funding		x
	Elect their officials		x
	Mobilize support outside their membership	x	x
Women's groups	Have fewer members	x	
	Don't mobilize outside support		x
	Are unconcerned about justice	x	x
	Do not promote democracy	x	x
Northern groups	Have fewer members	x	
	Cooperate with other CSOs		x
	Receive funds from external sources		x
	Do not promote democracy	x	x
Groups with many Members	Have a smaller percentage of women	x	
	Have larger annual budgets	x	
	Have less money per member	x	
	Tend to be located in the south	x	
	Go to the DA to advocate their interests		x
	Cooperate with their District Assembly		x
	Are consulted by their District Assembly	x	x
	Are not interfered with by their DA		x
	Elect their officials		x
	Conduct membership drives		x
	Promote democracy		x
Groups with large annual budgets	Have many members	x	
	Have a large per capita budget	x	
	Have more than one source of funding		x
	Go to the DA to advocate their interests		x
	Are concerned about social justice		x

Finally, Table 7 does the opposite. It lists the various *attributes* we believe desirable in a CSO (internally democratic, significant resources, many members, competent at coalition building, competent at constituency building, good relations with local government, concerned with social justice, and a propensity to promote democracy). The section then summarizes the key findings by saying, "if we want to find groups with the following desirable attributes, what characteristics should we look for?" Once again "many members" occurs frequently.

Table 7: Summary of Data by Attribute.

Attribute	Characteristic	Statistical Test	
		Correlation	Association
Internally democratic (officials are elected)	professional and trade		x
	Advocacy		x
	many members		x
Access to resources			
(a) Large annual budget	many members	x	
(b) More than one source of funding	service provider	x	
	development org.	x	
	few members	x	
(c) Receives funds from external sources	service provider		x
	development org.		x
	Northern		x
Has many members	mostly male members	x	
	Southern	x	
Competent at coalition building (cooperates with other CSOs)	Northern		x
	many members		x
Competent at constituency building (conducts membership drives)	many members		x

Table 7 (cont.)

Attribute	Characteristic	Statistical Test	
		Correlation	Association
Good relations with local government			
(a) Cooperates with the District Assembly	Many members		x
(b) Gets consulted by the DA	Many members		x
(c) Is not interfered with by the DA	Many members		x
(d) Goes to the DA to advocate	Many members		x
Performs role of bolstering democracy			
(a) Is concerned about issues of justice	Mostly male members	x	x
	large annual budget		x
(b) Promotes democracy in the district	Southern	x	x
	Mostly male members	x	x
	Many members		x

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Stephen L. Snook, Ph.D., is Project Manager for the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) in Ghana, a position he has held since May 1997.

Joseph R.A. Ayee, Ph.D., is the Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana, Legon.

Kwame Boafo-Arthur, Ph.D., is a Lecturer at the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana, Legon and presently a Fulbright Scholar at the University of California at Los Angeles.

Ernest Aryeetey, Ph.D., is the Director of the Institute of Social Science and Economic Research at the University of Ghana, Legon.