


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
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## Guinea Pre-Election Technical Assessment December 7-21, 1997

May 1998

Prepared by Annette Bickel and Hilary Whittaker  
IFES Consultants

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## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the presidential election in December 1998, Guinea will enter its second cycle of elections since the start of its transition to multi-party democracy in 1992. Previous elections on all levels have been characterized by poor organization and administration, manipulation of the process by government officials, extreme political polarization and confrontation leading to violence and wide-spread charges of electoral fraud.

The need to overcome these difficulties in an atmosphere characterized by continuing internal political confrontation, the presence of large numbers of refugees from civil conflicts in neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia, and ever-decreasing voter participation rates puts Guinea at something of a political cross-roads.

### Election Date

According to the terms of the Guinean *Loi Fondamentale*, or constitution, passed in 1991, presidential election are to be held every five years. The first presidential elections in Guinea's transition to multi-party democracy was held on December 19, 1993. On January 4, 1994, the Supreme Court presented the official elections results in favor of General Lansana Conté, who was sworn in on January 29, 1994.

The Guinean Constitution states that the next election for president must be held at least 30 days before the end of President Conte's current term of office to allow for an orderly transition. Therefore, voting in the second presidential election must happen on or before December 30, 1998. All three sets of elections that Guinea has organized since its transition (municipal, presidential and legislative) have thus far been held on a Sunday. While it is the president's responsibility to officially set and announce the exact date of the election, given the sequencing stated in the law, it appears likely that the next presidential poll will take place no later than the last Sunday in the month of December, which is December 27, 1998.

### Readiness

The Government of Guinea (GOG) has, through the conduct of the presidential election in 1993 and parliamentary and local elections in 1995, acquired adequate multi-party voting experience with which to implement procedurally correct elections. However, intensive training and technical assistance will continue to be needed at all levels of the administration to align divergent interpretations and applications of election regulations. Given improved systems, expanded training for all election actors, and to a lesser degree, commodities assistance, the GOG should be able to conduct free and fair elections.

Beyond these essential issues of systems and process, genuine democracy depends on an informed electorate. Guinea, however, still does not have an effective voter/civic education program to disseminate information about democracy and the elections process. Nor does there appear to be much governance experience among opposition leaders.

The real question for the future of multi-party democracy in Guinea concerns the extent to which the President and key appointees may be willing to risk their jobs by registering all possible voters, letting them vote freely, and honoring their choice of national leader. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) team recommends that a program of sustained technical assistance and civic education be undertaken, and that the election process be continuously monitored.

### **Priority Assistance Areas**

#### ***Government of Guinea (GOG)***

Guinean law clearly states that it is the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior and Decentralization (MID) to conduct elections. In previous elections, the National Assembly has created a National Electoral Commission or CENI to oversee elections operations of the MID. According to all sides of the political equation in Guinea, the results of the CENI have been, at best, mixed. As of late 1997, President Conté did not appear inclined to request that an independent election commission be established. Although the National Assembly has expressed support for the idea of an independent commission, it seems doubtful that it will be able to pass legislation to create one during its April 1998 session.

Therefore, in order to directly support the upcoming election, the donor community should position itself to work through the MID and its administrative committees in charge of the election. In the absence of an independent election commission, the GOG should be encouraged to try alternatives which could provide a degree of transparency to its administration of the election. For example, expansion of the inter-ministerial election coordinating and working committees to include representatives of the political parties, the media and selected civic groups could provide a welcome element of transparency to the process. Donors should also be ready to coordinate efforts with an independent commission, in the event that one is set up.

#### ***Civil Society***

An informed voting citizenry is an essential element in the establishment of a democratic system. The most effective way to reach and inform the public is through citizen coalitions which already have organizational structures and communications channels in place. These coalitions include both political parties, which disseminate partisan messages, and non-aligned non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which can disseminate important non-partisan governance and electoral information.

The upcoming presidential election poses a significant opportunity to increase public involvement in the election process through the use of the MID's service for coordination of non-governmental organizations, known as SACCO (*Service National d'Assistance aux Coopératives et de Coordination des Interventions des ONG*), which has registered nearly 700 organizations to operate in Guinea. When funds are available, this agency produces a newsletter and has expressed interest in using it to promote civic education. Intensive voter/civic education could begin by building on this existing relationship between the ministry and NGOs to create a mechanism for the development and dissemination of voter/civic education materials. Such arrangements have been used to great success in other African countries such as Ghana.



## II. INTRODUCTION

A two-member IFES technical assessment team traveled to the Republic of Guinea from December 7-20, 1997. Funding for this activity was awarded to IFES by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS). Team leader Hilary Whittaker is an international election systems specialist who evaluated US election assistance in Guinea in 1995. Ms. Whittaker was joined by Annette Bickel, a political scientist who lived and worked in Guinea from 1986 to 1993.

This assessment was conducted in response to a request made to IFES and to the USAID Center for Democracy and Governance by the USAID Mission in Conakry, Guinea. Assessment objectives were determined by IFES, based on the Foundation's prior experience in Guinea, its discussions with USAID officials in Conakry and Washington, and its review of USAID/Guinea's governance and democracy assistance strategy. In mid-1997, democracy and governance was elevated from a *special objective* to a *strategic objective* in the mission's seven-year (1998-2005) planning framework. Of the four intermediate results articulated in USAID's strategic planning exercise, the IFES consultation most directly relates to Intermediate Result #3 devoted to the fostering of conditions for a *more representative political processes*.

The IFES mission's objectives were to:

1. Review the legal framework for the 1998 presidential elections.
2. Assess the level of governmental and non-governmental planning for the 1998 elections.
3. Determine the extent of information sharing between stakeholders.
4. Prepare a report on the team's findings with recommendations for pre-election, election, and post-election support activities.
5. Develop a technical assistance proposal for submission to USAID.

Arriving in Guinea, the IFES team met first with the USAID/Guinea democracy and governance program officer and democracy and governance (DG) team members. The DG team raised a series of specific issues that they considered as worthy of follow-up: the potential for the establishment of a national election commission; the national assembly's stance on proposed legislation on dual citizenship; and a general census of the international donor community in Conakry and its intentions to support the presidential election in particular and participatory democracy and good governance in general. In addition, USAID asked the IFES team to provide recommendations for the general design of USAID/Guinea's democracy and governance programs.

The IFES team collected sufficient information to fulfill each of the mission objectives. The team was also able to provide much of the additional analysis requested by

USAID/Guinea. The recommendations put forth in this report are intended for the 1998 presidential election and beyond.

### III. BACKGROUND

#### The 1990s--Guinea's "Elections Decade"

Since the 1990 constitutional referendum, the Republic of Guinea has organized three sets of national elections. December 1991 municipal elections determined leaders of the state-created decentralized units. The new municipal districts (*communes*) elected mayors, and the rural districts (*communautés rurales de développement*) chose presidents. These local-level elections took place prior to the legalization of political parties. All candidates ran as independents. Creation of political parties during 1992-93 was accompanied by widespread confusion among the population and within the political class, resulting in increasing civil unrest. National assembly elections were scheduled for December 1992, only to be postponed indefinitely by President Lansana Conté. President Conté then reversed the constitutionally-mandated election sequence, calling for the organization of a presidential election by the end of 1993, prior to national assembly and local elections. Forty-five political parties were officially registered by September 1993.

Guinea's first multiparty presidential election was held on December 19, 1993. In spite of a competent international technical assistance effort and a well-intentioned and dedicated core group of national administrators, the election was haphazardly organized and conducted under a cloud of national and international controversy. In the face of spiraling confusion and increasingly limited prospects for a credible election, the US-based International Republican Institute suspended its planned election observation.

Immediately prior to the election, President Conté refused a formal request by a cross-section of Guinea's religious, political, and civil society leaders to postpone the election to allow for more complete preparations. The President's refusal, coupled with the harassment of citizens and politicians, logistical shortcomings, inaccuracies in the voting list, and incomplete distribution of necessary election documents to the voters and to the voting stations, damaged the credibility of the process. Whatever credibility remained was shattered by the Guinean government's overt manipulation of the final results of the first round of the election, awarding President Conté an outright majority of the votes and avoiding a run-off.

Among the eight presidential candidates, the incumbent "won" 51.7% of the official vote count. In naming his cabinet, President-elect Conté drew solely from his own party supporters. The national assembly elections, scheduled to follow on the heels of the presidential election, were repeatedly postponed. The elections were finally conducted on June 11, 1995. Twenty-one political parties fielded candidates. According to Guinean and international observers, the national assembly elections were better organized and considerably less controversial than the presidential contest. However, according to government figures, voter participation dropped from approximately 75% in the 1993 election to 62%. Some international organizations estimated the participation at 50% or lower.

Guinea's National Assembly is home for 114 deputies representing thirty-eight constituencies. Thirty-eight of those deputies were elected on a first-past-the-post basis in the respective constituencies. The remaining 76 delegates, selected on a proportional basis from national party lists, are essentially "at-large" deputies. Today, Guinea's National Assembly includes two parliamentary "families": a presidential majority of 75 deputies, the PUP-PCN (*Parti pour l'Unité et le Progrès - Parties de la Convention Nationale*); and a 39-member opposition group, the CODEM (*Coordination de l'Opposition Démocratique*). (President Conté was the PUP's consensus choice as its presidential candidate in 1993.) The PUP bloc is one vote short of the 2/3 majority required to amend Guinea's Constitution. Twelve of the thirteen members of the National Assembly's executive committee are PUP delegates. Eight of the Assembly's delegates are women.

### U.S. Supported Election Assistance Since 1991

The Guinean government's attitude toward international election assistance has varied since such assistance began to be discussed in 1991 and 1992. IFES established a good working relationship with the Ministry of the Interior and Security (MINTS) through the implementation of its USAID-financed technical assistance program in 1993. Unfortunately, the political environment did not allow for the thorough and participatory organization process that IFES originally set out to support. When President Conté even refused to acknowledge the recommendations of Guinea's traditional, religious, and political leaders to postpone the 1993 elections, IFES and other international assistance providers knew that there remained little working space in which a positive contribution could be made.

The withdrawal of the USAID-financed International Republican Institute international observer mission, highly-critical USAID-sponsored assessments of Guinea's electoral record, and official USG comments contributed to a gradual hardening of the GOG's attitude towards democracy and governance programming over the two years following the presidential election. The GOG reaction to some USAID-supported activities was less than enthusiastic. For example, a high-level research team engaged by USAID in 1994 to assess democratic governance in Guinea never acquired the necessary permission to travel outside of the capital. At the same time, in Conakry they were impeded in their efforts to gather information and materials. Guinea/US relations showed signs of strain into 1995. A USAID mission tasked with the evaluation of prior democracy assistance efforts was not received by the MINTS.

IFES representatives visited Guinea on repeated occasions between 1994 and 1996. Most of these were inexpensive one-person rapid assessments by a staff member who was traveling to other countries in the sub-region. The Foundation also sent a three-member team to Conakry in mid-1995 to assess preparations for the legislative elections, to perform a review of the election law, to determine the capacity of the national election commission, and to offer programming recommendations to USAID and the USG democracy and governance team. The team recommended parallel assistance to the election commission

and the MINTS, feeling that the mere establishment of a commission was a significant step forward by the Guinean authorities and President Conté. Unfortunately, that logic was not accepted by the full USG democracy and governance team in Conakry, due to their concern regarding the limited independence of the election commission. Frosty Guinea/US government relations contributed to the rejection of the assistance strategy proposed by the 1995 IFES team.

Discussions between the USG and the Guinean government on the subject of democracy and governance assistance have struck a much more positive chord over the past two years. The election of the National Assembly through a process that, although fraught with problems, was considered as a positive step by many in the Guinean and international communities, coupled with the all-business attitude prevalent among the membership of the National Assembly, fostered an increasing optimism. The extra-constitutional creation of the post of prime minister, and its assignment to a respected international Guinean functionary, signaled to many that Guinea was embarking on a long-awaited period of tangible and positive economic, social, and political change.

During 1996 and 1997, Guinean civil society became increasingly active across the country, undertaking small-scale rural development and empowerment programs. Through the post-legislative election period, the general population's expectation of change increased. Most of these expectations have yet to be met. Popular frustration is again on the rise. Even so, the December 1997 IFES mission found that there remains space in which assistance organizations can--and should-- maneuver.

IFES' December 1997 arrival in-country was well-timed. The team was received by government and non-government interlocutors alike. Their first contact with the Guinean government was a meeting with the Minister of Interior and Decentralization's (MID) office director (*chef de cabinet*). In their MID meeting, IFES discovered that government planning for the 1998 presidential election was already underway. In fact, on the day prior to the team's arrival, USAID received its copy of the official MID request for technical election assistance distributed to representatives of the international diplomatic and development community in Conakry.

The MID official informed the team that top Guinean officials in charge of planning were outlining steps to be taken over the coming year in preparation for the presidential elections. The group included several experienced MID advisors who collaborated with IFES in 1993. They had developed a guidebook and a work calendar starting with the revision of the electoral lists, beginning on December 5, 1997. The draft time line (*chronogramme*) of activities featured considerable procedural detail for the initial list revision task, incorporating the various legal deadlines. However, the remainder of the time line and the guidebook lacked sufficient detail necessary for implementation.

## The Government of Guinea and Election Administration

In 1996, the MINTS was divided into two ministries: the Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD). MATD was assigned responsibility for the election preparations that had previously rested with MINTS. As the result of a subsequent reorganization on October 21, 1997, the MATD was reformulated as the Ministry of the Interior and Decentralization (MID). Zainoul Abidine Sanoussi, formerly Guinea's Ambassador to Japan, was appointed as the new Minister of the Interior and Decentralization. His office director, Pascal Condé, is a long-time member of the ministry's bureaucracy, and is very familiar with past USAID-supported election assistance activities in Guinea. The MID retains primary election organization and management responsibilities.

Prior to the 1993 presidential election, an election coordination committee was established within the MINTS. This structure was a composite of five sub-commissions. Overseeing the day-to-day operations of the committee was a senior MINTS civil servant. The minister had the final say on all technical and financial decisions. The following chart presents the structure and the personalities involved in the 1993 committee.

MINTS Election Coordination Committee--circa 1993	
Minister of the Interior and Security	Alseny Rene Gomez
Coordinator	Ahamadou Dieng
Rules and Disputes	Amadou Baïlo Diallo
Logistics	Kader Sangaré
Finance	Sékou Diaby
Communication	Ibrahima Sory Diabaté
Security	(Name not available)

Arriving in Guinea in December of 1997, the IFES team discovered the MID convening planning meetings to discuss the 1998 election. The old MINTS coordination committee had become the Interministerial Electoral Coordination Committee (IMECC). The committee's membership was expanded slightly. Most of the 1993 committee members are part of the 1997 committee.

MID Interministerial Election Coordination Committee--circa 1997	
Minister of the Interior and Decentralization	Zainoul Abidine Sanoussi
National Director of Decentralization	Abdoulaye Douma Diallo

MID Interministerial Election Coordination Committee--circa 1997	
Coordinator	Pascal Condé
Rules and Training	Amadou Baïlo Diallo
Logistics	Kader Sangaré
Finance	Sékou Diaby
Communication	Ibrahima Sory Diabaté
Security	(Name not available)
Special Counsellor to Rules and Training Sub-Committee.	(Vacant)

The new focal point for election assistance within MID is Abdoulaye Douma Diallo, the National Director of Decentralization (replacing Mamadou Bâ Tounkara). Mr. Diallo is a former prefect for the districts of Mali, Labé and Dinguiraye in the Fouta Djallon. He occupied his posts in the Fouta during the elections of 1993 and 1995. From that experience, he gained valuable first-hand knowledge of the ins and the outs of local level election administration.

During previous assistance and assessment missions, IFES' primary interlocutor was the Election Rules and Training sub-committee, formerly the Rules and Disputes sub-committee. The IFES team feels that this relationship remains key. Ahmadou Baïlo Diallo, MID judicial counselor, is the head of this important sub-committee. He was supported by Ahmadou Dieng, the former National Election Coordinator for the MINTS. Following the 1995 legislative elections, Mr. Dieng retired from the Guinean civil service and teamed up with Kalil Fofana, the former president of the National Electoral Commission, to form a small election consultancy group. IFES was saddened to learn of Mr. Dieng's untimely death on February 19, 1998. It is unclear if his position on the IMECC will be filled.

The Regulations and Training sub-committee finalized the first draft of the election calendar on December 12, 1997. A copy of the calendar was shared with the IFES team for its reaction. The team's comments resulted in several changes to the calendar. The sub-committee considered additional recommendations discussed over the course of the IFES visit prior to the team's departure from Guinea.

The Finance sub-committee prepared a general budget for the election. Using that document as a guide, the Minister contacted members of the international diplomatic and development communities to communicate GOG's financial and material needs. The MID held up to IFES the GOG's self-financing of the voter registration process as an excellent display of MID/GOG good faith. The MID and the IMECC count on donor financing for training, printing, equipment, computers, vehicles and commodities--particularly fuel and

election materials and supplies. According to Mr. Condé, Minister Sanoussi plans to convene a follow-up meeting with potential donors to discuss the IMECC's and GOG's needs in greater detail.

As of December 1997, IFES felt that the MID was on track with its budgeting and planning processes, and that it was conceivable that all could be in place in time for December 1998 elections. The IFES team noted that the MID officials contacted showed a commitment to improving Guinea's election administration, drawing from the 1993 and 1995 elections. There remain numerous procedural and political loose ends, and divergent interpretations of regulations, that will require special attention. Even so, IFES was encouraged to find a team of election organizers within the MID who are cautious about entertaining new procedural ideas, but who do not rule them out.

### **The National Electoral Commission Experiment**

Guinea's national election commission (*Commission Nationale des Elections--CNE*) was established by decree D/93/196/PRG/SGG on October 6, 1993. Its creation was not a home-grown government initiative, but a government action taken in response to pressures being brought to bear on the government from inside and outside of the country. As of mid-1993, domestic political pressures had built to an especially critical level in reaction to what was popularly perceived as the government's total control of the election process.

The powers of the CNE were heavily circumscribed and its existence was authorized for a specific, limited term to conclude as soon as the official presidential election results were proclaimed. National and international Guinea watchers, who considered the CNE to be nothing more than confused window-dressing to draw attention away from government preparations for the election, were shocked by the Commission's eleventh-hour boycott of the December 1993 presidential election. The boycott was predicated on President Conte's refusal to acknowledge civil society's mid-December 1997 call to postpone the election in the interest of national security. With that act, the CNE gained substantial standing and respect inside and outside of the country. The Commission remained in place through the 1995 legislative elections. Unfortunately, and in spite of a dynamic core membership, the CNE remained a prisoner of its limited mandate. Lacking institutional support, the CNE's existence was that of an ad-hoc monitoring body, rather than the organizational force desired by the political opposition, Guinean civil society, and much of the international community.

President Conte's public statements since 1995 illustrate his categorical refusal to consider the establishment of a professional election administration authority outside of the immediate government structure. His 1997 discourse has reinforced this view. To date, he has offered no indication of setting up even a weak CNE like that of 1993-1995.



The election commission debate is further complicated by a legal disagreement between a number of prominent decision makers as to the technical steps for commission creation. The individuals interviewed by the IFES team in December 1977 agreed that to be effective in Guinea, a permanent CNE requires, among other things, legal standing. One camp maintains that the formulation, mandate, and standing of an autonomous commission can be established by a decree. Those who disagree do so on the grounds that the institutionalization of a commission's authority necessitates a revision of Guinea's *Loi Fondamentale*. Such a revision requires the support of two-thirds of the National Assembly, an unlikely outcome while the President remains opposed to the idea of a CNE.

A 1995 IFES technical team performed a thorough review of Guinea's election law and related legislation. The team's legal specialist reached the conclusion of the first camp--that an autonomous body could be created and afforded all necessary power and standing without revising the *Loi Fondamentale*. Still, IFES considers that it is highly unlikely that the PUP-PCN will act contrary to the President's wishes by permitting a draft election commission bill to make it onto the floor of the Assembly for consideration.

#### IV. FINDINGS

##### Guinea's National Assembly and the Political Parties

The balance of power in the National Assembly is heavily tilted towards PUP-PCN (*Parti pour l'Unité et le Progrès - Parties de la Convention Nationale*), which supports the President. The PUP-PCN exercises tight control over public resource allocation. Five of the most active parties in the opposition have coalesced to form the CODEM (*Coordination de l'Opposition Démocratique*). Their stated intention is to field a single opposition candidate in the presidential election. If coalition members can continue to find ways to work together and maintain a united front around a single candidate, CODEM could prove a significant force in Guinean politics and pose a serious challenge to President Conté. Until recently, such cohesion has eluded the opposition.

Guinean political actors (either parties or individuals) are prone to hyperbole and rhetoric, as is the case in most transitional societies. Leaders of the Guinean political class have shown themselves adept at inflaming and misleading public opinion through their statements, and at times inciting supporters to violence. The IFES team noted that, since the 1995 elections, the Guinean majority and opposition, although at times vitriolic in their message and tone, exhibits an expansion of their understanding of legislative systems and political strategies. National Assembly leadership chafes (usually privately--and occasionally publicly) at being beholden to executive decisions about the National Assembly budget and campaign and election procedures. Opposition Assembly delegates, and some of their majority colleagues, seek greater independent legislative authority through a less "presidential" system, featuring an organic balance of powers between the government, the Assembly, and the judiciary.

The opposition delegates, and some majority delegates--not least of all the Assembly president--have focused on the establishment of an autonomous, professional election commission. To date, the government has refused to entertain this discussion on the floor of the Assembly, even when it has been presented as an agenda issue for the Assembly's legislative sessions in 1996 and 1997. Recent interviews with President Conté and other government leaders indicate that, if anything, the resolve not to establish an election commission is stronger than ever.

The CODEM representatives voiced to IFES their chief election administration concern, the management of the revision of the voter registration list. This critical process, that had only begun at the time of the IFES team's visit, was reported to have concluded in early 1998. The opposition leaders indicated that they believe that it is essential that the opposition participate in the revision of electoral lists and the final distribution of the revised lists. The revision process was coordinated by the GOG's local administrative arm: the prefects/mayors, the sub-prefects, and the village/neighborhood chiefs.

The team found that independent checks on the process were not in place for monitoring the revision. Any review of a voter registry is highly labor-intensive, and as such, subject to human error. Illiteracy is prevalent in rural Guinea. There is a limited number of people who know the rural populations well and are capable of verifying the accuracy of the voters registry.

IFES noted that the participatory and public intent of registry revision is not enhanced by traditional methods for the handling of information. The team took a day trip to Kindia, an important factory town and transportation hub north of Conakry. In Kindia, IFES visited some of the neighborhoods to see how the revision process was being implemented. In each case, they found that the revision materials were stored in the home of the neighborhood chief. The chief's control of access to the materials was not unusual. However, he also determined what information to release to the public in regard to the revision exercise. It is reasonable to question whether or not the chiefs are above politics. In one case, the team noted that a 1993 campaign poster for President Conté occupied a prominent position in the central courtyard of the neighborhood chief's home.

Opposition representatives interviewed by the team raised a number of concerns above and beyond the accuracy of the voters registry. "Access" was a popular topic. Both the candidates' accessibility to the population and the access of the candidates and parties to the national and private media. Each of these access issues can be considered from two perspectives, security and resources.

In the run up to the 1993 and the 1995 elections, candidates and parties were unable to campaign in all areas of the country due to the existence of de facto "no-go" areas. Travel to these areas required political figures to place their personal security at risk. Evidence from those periods suggests willful fueling of political and ethnic tensions through the use of misinformation and/or bribes of goods, services, or cash. Misdeeds were reported to have been committed by both majority and opposition supporters and leadership. In areas free of the potential for "political" violence, candidates and activists still found it difficult to circulate in the interior of the country and organize meetings and rallies without interference from officials of the government or of the political party prevalent to the area.

The second aspect of the access discussion involves the availability of financial and logistical resources for national campaigning and the engagement of media time. The opposition carries a popular refrain, accusing the majority of using the state coffers to its political advantage. Little if any progress has been made in determining rules, regulation, and guidelines for Guinean political party and campaign financing and auditing. As in its neighboring countries, the hourly movements of Guinea's president are treated as hard news for the state-run radio and television. The opposition classifies most of this coverage as "campaigning" rather than news. It should be noted that during the political campaign period, radio and television antenna-time is allotted to the contesting parties and candidates in accordance with legal regulations.

Opposition political leaders expressed two key concerns about the security and transparency of the vote counting process. First, they suggested the need for the use of tamper-resistant self-sealing envelopes for the transmission of the local, regional, and national results to discourage post-count adjustment of the results and to raise public confidence in the results transmission process. Second, they recommended that opposition party supporters be included as members of the voting station staffs. In past elections, the political parties had the opportunity to assign one supporter to each of the voting stations as an observer of the proceedings. The election law specifies that voting station staffs be appointed by the local prefects. Since the prefects are ultimately appointed by Guinea's executive branch, the opposition maintains that the 1993 and 1995 voting station staffs were biased toward the government and the majority. Therefore they recommend that the opposition have an opportunity to have supporters assigned as poll workers.

### **The Media and Civil Society**

Since 1992, government officials have promised that legislation allowing for the establishment of private radio and television was forthcoming. Decision makers responsible for the interpretation of Guinea's fundamental law on press freedom take the conservative position that that which is not expressly permitted is forbidden. Once again, the National Assembly failed to consider such legislation in its October 1997 session. Despite the variety of reforms instituted to date by the Third Republic, the *Radio Télévision Guinéenne* (RTG) continues to function as a propaganda organ. It is inward, self-taught and tightly controlled.

Until 1991, the state exercised complete control of Guinea's television station, its radio station, and the print media. In 1992, the government approved the establishment of rural radio stations (*radio rurale*). These regional stations broadcast outside Conakry in local languages. The central government's and RTG's authority over the programming content is considerably less than that exercised over the national radio and TV. Programming is less focussed on the president's movements and utterances, and more focused on topics of regional and local interest. Radio is the only information medium that reaches the rural areas because of the expense of television and newspapers and the high illiteracy rate.

A significant change since the first presidential election is the evolution of independent print media. Visitors to Conakry note a wide variety of newspapers representing the full range of the political spectrum. In 1992, privately published news sheets first began to circulate in Conakry. While there have been several incidents involving jail terms and fines for editorial coverage deemed overly critical, a movement that began as satirical broadsheets has developed into 10-to-12 page weekly publications using colored ink, photographs and containing political, social and economic coverage, as well as sports and features. In five newspapers bought on the street from roving vendors during IFES's December visit, there were 150 articles in all and 18 advertisements. Over the past few years, the scope of coverage has broadened and the quality of reportage has

improved. These newspapers are still expensive, usually costing GNF1000, about US\$1. The print media's effectiveness is hampered by its limited circulation and the low national literacy rate.

The mere fact that these publications exist stands in stark contrast to pre-1990s Guinea. However, IFES' media interlocutors maintain that the print media's existence does not reflect the acceptance of free expression on the part of the government. Unexplained damage to property and detention or expulsion of individuals associated with the independent and international media is not unheard of.

The IFES team sat in on a CODEM press conference and was impressed with the quality of the questions posed by attending journalists. Yet, in a country where literacy is so low, the market for print media is tiny compared to the size of the market for the electronic media, especially radio. So long as decisions regarding the licensing of private radio stations are delayed, state-controlled radio continues to hold a monopoly. National independent electronic media would provide an expanded platform for news, information, and alternative viewpoints. More importantly, the presence of independent electronic media would enhance the accountability and quality of Guinea's state-controlled radio and television providers.

Over the past six years, IFES has witnessed a steady expansion in the number of civil society organizations, and in the scope of their activities. This IFES team's limited time on the ground prevented it from making contact with a wide range of groups. Two of the organizations with which the team met spoke at length about their intention to address the need for "civic and moral" education to overcome the pervasive distrust permeating Guinean society. The *Syndicat Libre des Enseignants et Chercheurs de Guinée--SLECG* (one of Guinea's two teachers' unions), the Episcopal Conference, and the *Organisation des Droits de l'Homme--ODH* (a national human rights organization) saw their involvement in the election process as a means to achieve their common civic and moral education objective. The leaders of these organizations noted that they have few resources to fund members' travel to attend training sessions and/or work on election day. Therefore, for them--and for other groups that IFES has been in contact with in the past--material and financial assistance exists as a prerequisite to active participation.

### **The Question of Nationality**

As in many sub-Saharan nations, the nationality issue gives rise to heated debate. The response to the question, "Who is Guinean?" can have far-reaching impact, contingent on the guidance promulgated by the National Assembly and/or decreed by the government. Not only could the response determine who can or cannot vote, but also who can or cannot run for office, who can or cannot be an economic operator, and so forth. To date, the handling of the issue by the Guinean administration and the Guinean political class has been uneven. In analyzing past situations, one can conclude that the nationality issue has

been dangerously and willfully misused by both the majority and the opposition. On more than one occasion that willful misuse has threatened to bog Guinea down in the deadly mire of ethno-nationalism.

A word figuring with increasing prominence in Guineans' vocabulary is "diaspora." The Guinean diaspora numbers an estimated two million people, who fled Guinea during the regime of Sekou Touré (1958 - 1984). Among them were many of the Peul ethnic group who fled persecution after the so-called *Peul complot* in 1970. Many others left to avoid harsh political and economic conditions and to seek a better life elsewhere. After Sekou Toure's death in 1984 and the establishment of a military government headed by General Lansana Conté, there was a call from the government for all Guineans abroad to return to aid in Guinea's reconstruction. The return of numerous highly educated, politically aware Guineans accelerated the cultivation of an indigenous political opposition. At the time of the first presidential elections, General Conté's major opponents, Alpha Condé, Mamadou Bâ, and Siradiou Diallo, held dual citizenship.

Guinea's nationality issue has gained importance due to the impact of civil wars in neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone. Over the past eight years, these conflicts on Guinea's southern border sent waves of refugees northward in search of peace and assistance. Many of these refugees could be technically classified as returnees, returning to their ethnic homelands after living outside Guinea for generations. By 1992, the population of many areas exceeded carrying capacity. Population pressures on available land and resources raised concerns as to the potentially destabilizing impact of the refugees. Complicating the situation was the language barrier. Many of the "returnees" spoke Krio (from Sierra Leone) or Liberian English and were no longer able to communicate in an indigenous Guinean language or French.

Unfortunately, the plights of the diaspora and the refugees have been misused for political gain. President Conté, in his public comments, refers to the diaspora as the source of many of Guinea's woes. The blame for economic downturns and security problems are reflexively laid at the feet of Guineans abroad. The strategy is working. The IFES team and previous IFES missions have noted an increasing tendency on the part of the Guinean population to express disdain for those who were abroad or those who remain abroad. Many Guineans who have returned to Guinea over the past few years admit to the perplexing challenges of reintegration. At the same time, IFES has had contact with many Guineans abroad who sincerely want to return to Guinea to share what they have learned abroad with the population. However, events in Guinea and the transcripts of government and political speeches and meetings denigrating the diaspora cause them to think twice and stay away. In Guinea, the negative image painted of the diaspora has been extended to the refugees. In doing so, the government is coming close to galvanizing public opinion against non-Guineans in general. The cessation of hostilities in Sierra Leone and Liberia bodes well for Guinea and for the refugees.

The National Assembly, in its fall 1997 session, and following 20 months of study, voted on a President Conté's proposal that Guineans be prevented from holding two passports. In the original proposal, a Guinean with dual citizenship was to be allowed three months to choose which nationality s/he wanted to maintain. A commission set up to study this question recommended that the prohibition on dual citizenship be limited to individuals running for national office. This version of the proposal was passed by the National Assembly in November.

The new law requires candidates to surrender their non-Guinean passport(s) within six months (by May 1988). The genesis for this new law appears to most Guinea watchers as politically-motivated. Like other opposition leaders, the leading opposition candidate for president, Alpha Condé, holds dual (French and Guinean) citizenship. The enactment of this law means that opposition leaders who wish to present themselves as presidential candidates lose their ability to easily relocate to another country if they feel their safety jeopardized by remaining in Guinea.

### **International Organizations**

The IFES team met with representatives of the international diplomatic and development communities to share perspectives on Guinea's upcoming elections. Overall, there is interest in supporting continued democracy and governance programming in Guinea. At the time of the team's mission, the international community was waiting on the MID and the Guinean government to clarify assistance needs. A meeting took place with the government in March 1998. The meeting, and others like it, will prove pivotal in assuring a coordinated response from the donor and assistance communities.

*Fondation Friedreich Ebert (FFE)* . The German Friedreich Ebert Foundation has a well-established presence in Guinea. FFE has supported activities around Guinea's previous elections. The Foundation is considering the provision of assistance to civil society in areas that have not been fully addressed by other donors. Resident Representative Ulrich Storck discussed potential areas of collaboration with IFES. FFE's work to date with the rural radio system, political parties, the National Assembly, Guinean journalists, and other group makes such a collaboration an attractive program option for IFES. In discussions with the IFES team, Mr. Storck enumerated several areas of particular interest for FFE:

- ▶ Analysis of how a national election commission might function productively with MID, and not compete with it – possibly following the *observatoire* system used in Senegal;
- ▶ Dissemination of accurate election information to the general population and the provision of qualified international professionals to facilitate related roundtable discussions;
- ▶ Collaboration with Guinean human rights associations to provide strategies for the prevention of election-related violence;
- ▶ Training of poll worker trainers;

- ▶ Expansion of current civic information program using the state-owned radio at the national and regional levels to improve coverage and accuracy of material;
- ▶ Publication of a voters guide;
- ▶ Training for journalists in elections coverage; and
- ▶ Analysis of the election code.

*Canadian Embassy.* Since 1993, the Guinean government has benefitted from substantial Canadian election-related material and human resource assistance. Canada stands ready to assist as appropriate in the organization of the 1998 elections. Souleymane N'Diaye, the Canadian Embassy's Director of Development, Cooperation and Commerce, oversees the elections portfolio. Mr. N'Diaye suggested a number of activities that could be considered for some element of Canadian support, in coordination with other international groups:

- ▶ Voter education--the promotion of election participation at all levels;
- ▶ Poll worker training;
- ▶ Clarification of constituency delimitation and early dissemination of polling station locations;
- ▶ Development of an alternative to polling stations on military bases;
- ▶ Improved reporting of election results from the polling station to the constituency, to the regional, and finally to the national levels.
- ▶ Expanded access of political parties and other groups to election results at the counting and tabulation levels.

*European Commission (EC).* The European Commission supported the building of the computerized voters register in 1993 and 1995. The EC was also one of the few international donors to provide support to the election commission in 1995. For 1998, the EC has the capacity to offer considerable assistance. At the time of the team's visit, they highlighted two areas of assistance: financial assistance and commodity provision. Given these areas, and the EC's desire to minimize the in-house management requirements of their election assistance, they are interested in exploring opportunities for collaboration with IFES.

*United Nations Development Program (UNDP).* The UNDP office in Conakry provided office equipment, transportation, staff support, and occasional technical specialists to the Ministry of the Interior for the 1993 and 1995 elections. Its technical assistance activities in 1993 were undertaken in coordination with the IFES program.

As of December 1997, the Guinean government had yet to make a formal request to the UNDP for assistance with the presidential elections. Since 1995, the UNDP initiated a number of activities designed to promote democratic governance throughout the Guinean administration and the private sector:



- ▶ Institutional development projects providing managerial training to decentralize administration and reduce corruption;
- ▶ Support for gender integration across all aspects of economic and social development; and,
- ▶ Small enterprise training projects.

UNDP hopes to continue implementing these and related activities. In the short term, they may investigate how some of Guinea's requested election assistance could be provided via these current initiatives. Once they have a request for assistance from the Guinean's, the UNDP will look to coordinate its efforts with IFES and other international organizations, as was the case in the past.

## V. GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE ASSISTANCE IN DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

### Key Assumptions

The IFES team identified three overarching conclusions to be considered by the designers of future DG programming in Guinea. The recommendations offered in the final section of this report have been structured with these conclusions in mind.

#### 1. *Working with and through GOG offers the most direct approach to encouraging the continued reform of Guinea's election administration.*

A successful administrative body cannot exist in a vacuum. As demonstrated in the 1993 legislative elections, the creation an election commission alone does not guarantee good elections. The institution responsible for running the election requires the support of a well-conceived legal, administrative, and logistical framework. The framework should provide the administrative body with legal standing and autonomy--the ability to make and enforce policy; financial standing and autonomy--an approved budget and the ability to access funds in a timely manner; clear internal operating procedures; and internal and external audit requirements--to exhibit public accountability. In addition, the election administration must communicate its decisions and activities publicly at frequent intervals.

The quality of this framework offers a good indication of the will of the national decision makers to organize a transparent process. The goodwill and transparency of the election authority will be exhibited through its organization of an inclusive process that demystifies the elections, reaching out to and engaging election stakeholders including government agencies, political parties, civil society, the media, the general population, and the international community. Within a responsive framework and with the intention and the commitment to perform in an accountable fashion, any form of election authority--an independent commission or a government ministry--can stage an election event producing a result accepted by the winners and losers.

Not unlike many of its neighboring nations, the Guinean administration was modeled on the French administrative and legal model. Guinea's election system, featuring central government control of election administration, reflects the defining characteristics of the French system. Guinea's administrative and legal systems are undergoing a gradual transformation and customization to respond to today's needs and realities. Middle-age educated-elite Guinean decision makers, particularly those educated regionally or in Europe, tend to resist modification to the system in place. Over time, IFES has been able to continue to debate the pluses and minuses of autonomous election administration with Guinean officials and opinion leaders. It is important to continue to support this dialogue, and to keep the Guinean administration engaged. Since 1993, IFES observed that the quality of the dialogue improved when the discussion focused on professional and autonomous--versus independent--election administration.

The IFES team was impressed by the groundwork that the MID Election Coordination Committee had managed to put into place. IFES felt that the committee's efforts exhibited that the will to improve Guinea's election system exists within the MID. The quality of its supporting framework remains a cause for concern. IFES is keenly aware of the historical fact that the presence of good-faith Guinean partners has not guaranteed the organization and conduct of open and transparent elections.

The IFES team was unable to determine if the majority party and the Guinean president and his government possess the will to foster participatory, competitive, democracy. The organization of a good election implies that someone or some group will win and others will lose. It remains to be seen if key administration incumbents are prepared to organize a process that could result in the election of a new president and, by extension, the appointment of a new administration team. Pressures exerted from within the Guinean administration and from within the political class to control the election outcome through fraudulent control of registration lists and vote counts remain a real threat to the integrity of the process.

This election warrants not only assistance, but careful monitoring of the entire process from current registration efforts through to final vote proclamation. As long as the MID and key GOG power-brokers can be considered as good faith partners, international assistance providers should actively seek to support democracy and governance programming for the GOG while continuing to support activities and programs directed at civil society and other entities outside of the government structure.

**2. *Empowerment of civil society is critical to effective elections and democratic governance.***

An informed and empowered civil society facilitates effective democracy and good governance. Strife among ethnic and geographic groups may be diffused, and national stability enhanced through representative national participation on vital issues. According to the Guinean service that tracks non-governmental organizations, there are some 680 private volunteer groups in Guinea. Seventy-eight of the PVOs are foreign/international. Some national groups have memberships as small as 25 people. Other groups, such as the professional and human rights associations, and agricultural and health organizations, are considerably larger.

The opportunity to play a role in the election education process should be extended to as many civic organizations as possible, starting with those that have organized and active memberships and that are publicly viewed as non-partisan. For example, the IFES team was told on multiple occasions that the religious organizations and the unions appear to enjoy a balanced reputation around the country.

**3. *National and local governance can be improved by encouraging active citizen participation.***

Many of the challenges faced at this point in Guinea's gradual transition to competitive multi-party democracy can be addressed through communication. The provision of information to the population can go a long way toward enhancing their understanding of the democratic process and its impact on their day-to-day lives. To date, Guinea's democratic transition has gained limited traction in the interior of the country. The IFES team met with, or was informed about, a number of national and international NGOs that are focusing their efforts at the grassroots level. This is slow but important work. It can be accelerated when conducted with the support and collaboration of a willing administration.

Guinea can benefit from programming addressing the linkages between an election process and the conduct of daily life in villages and towns across the country. To be successful, this programming should extend far beyond the election event, focusing on the development of a functional relationship between the population and its elected representatives. For example: What is the responsibility of a delegate to the national assembly, or a regional or local representative toward his or her constituents? How can a community or a region make its needs known? What are the steps that can be taken by constituents to encourage accountable representation? Gradually, an understanding will develop that the elected work for the populations that they represent--and not the reverse. A complementary component of this programming could focus on the responsibilities of Guinean citizens under the nation's laws. For examples: What do the laws really say? How are they enforced? How can they be changed--and by whom? How do laws protect the local farmer, herder, businessperson, or craftsperson?

Knowledge and understanding will help the population, the government, and the political class move beyond the mistrust permeating Guinean society.

### **Technical Assistance Recommendations**

The identification of Guinea's technical assistance needs for the December 1998 presidential election was the central purpose of the December 1997 IFES mission featured in this report. However, it is crucial that the needs identified not be considered exclusively of those of a more mid- and long-term quality related to, among other things, legal reform and institutional development.

It is clear to IFES that the need for such reforms, with an emphasis on the organization of an inclusive process for their design, debate, and adoption, is very real. It was also clear to the IFES team that the prospect for substantive reform in pre-presidential-election Guinea is remote.

Legal reform and institutional development should be maintained as mid-to- long-term objectives for USAID DG programming. The conduct and outcome of the presidential election will undoubtedly have an impact on the national assembly and local elections that should take place in 2000. Progress toward a professional election

administration and a more involved civil society prior to, and through, December 1998 would be a notable step in the appropriate direction.

The political and social environment of a nation in transition can evolve radically in a short time, and with little warning. This evolution, negative or positive, has an impact on planning and on the identification and prioritization of technical assistance needs. The recommendations offered below reflect the needs brought to the attention of the IFES team in December 1997, approximately one year prior to the presidential elections. Through direct communication with MID authorities in April 1998, IFES has verified that these needs remain relevant.

*Technical Elections Assistance:* Qualified elections specialists should be made available to the MID Election Coordination Committee (ECC) through December 1998. The ECC seeks assistance in facing today's challenges of organizing the 1998 presidential elections, with an effort to transfer technical and management skills in the process. The specialists, in close collaboration with their ECC counterparts, could provide technical advisory services in one or more of a variety of areas.

- ▶ Election taskline review/revision.
- ▶ Election procedure revision/updating.
- ▶ Election form review/revision.
- ▶ Election material dispatch, warehousing, and recovery plan development/review.
- ▶ Training manual review/revision for ECC staff, administrative commissions, election workers, party poll watchers, and vote tabulation workers.
- ▶ Training design.
- ▶ Election commodity technical specification development and vendor identification.
- ▶ Information pack design for national and international observers.
- ▶ Technical election handbook design and production schedule development.

*Communications and Media Assistance:* Communication planning is often overlooked in the rush to develop civic and voter education materials. A well-planned election will fail in practice if no one is aware of what is supposed to happen when, not to mention why, how, with whom, and so on. Qualified communications specialists could have an impact extending beyond the election process. Beyond addressing the communications needs of the ECC, technical assistance could be addressed directly at Guinean media practitioners.

- ▶ Preparation of a plan for the development of an inter-party advisory committee (IPAC) modeled on the Ghanaian IPAC to be implemented by the MID ECC. The IPAC structure could grant the political parties access to, and an increased understanding of, the work of the ECC in preparing for the elections, as well as a potential active role in the revision or redesign of campaign and election procedures.

- ▶ Assessment of communications between the national, regional, and local ECC representatives and recommendation of appropriate approaches for the establishment of a reliable top-to-bottom network for information dissemination.
- ▶ Preparation of a format for regular communications between the ECC and the national and international press.
- ▶ Organization of a roundtable--or a series of workshops--for the national press on topics such as political reporting, election reporting, coverage of national, regional, and local government.
- ▶ Assessment of donor coordination efforts and recommendations for a format for regular communications between the ECC and the international assistance and diplomatic communities to enhance a coordinated assistance effort and timely information exchange.
- ▶ Provision of technical training to media practitioners, building on other programs organized over the past several years by USIS and others. Training would not only be beneficial for journalists, but also for the owners of print media outlets. A business-savvy management could find ways to increase advertising, streamline production, and reduce or stabilize the cost of newspapers. A more professional media community could, among other things, accelerate the revision of the communications law to allow for private radio.

*Civic and Voter Education:* Both forms of programming are necessary in Guinea. Civic education activities are considered to be mid-to-long term initiatives, including but not limited to school programs, adult education, and distance learning. Voter education activities focus on the election and its associated events: voter registration, the political campaign, pursuit of grievances, and the immediate post election period from the declaration of the election results to the swearing-in of the newly elected. Working with the ECC and NGOs, civic and voter education specialists could:

- ▶ Design a national voter education program utilizing appropriate media tools as determined by the ECC, the national communication oversight body, and qualified local civil society organizations.
- ▶ Prepare a voter education program in key local languages.
- ▶ Support the publication and distribution of voter and citizen guides to the election process.
- ▶ Coordinate with ECC counterparts to design and animate special information workshops for target populations to learn about the election process from the election organizers, i.e. political parties, journalists, national NGO representatives, the international community, election monitors/observers.
- ▶ Coordinate the production of voter and civic education materials in *susu*, *malinke*, *pulaar* and *kissi* with a primary emphasis on radio programming for transmission by the national and rural radio stations.
- ▶ In coordination with qualified local NGOs, assist the appropriate GOG ministries with the continued development of a national civics curriculum. This curriculum should be tailored for use in formal and non-formal settings.

- ▶ Design teacher/instructor training for the civics curriculum.

*Technical Workshops:* Like earlier teams that traveled to Guinea, the 1997 IFES team was confident that space remains for dialogue on technical approaches to the form and organization of Guinea's future elections. Contingent on the situation on the ground at the time, and on the workshop topic, some technical workshops could be organized during the run up to the 1998 presidential election. It should be considered that these sessions could result in last-minute technical alterations to the format for the 1998 election.

- ▶ Election code and election instruction review.
- ▶ Election administration.
- ▶ Local NGOs and civic education.
- ▶ Issue-based advocacy.
- ▶ Citizen and voter identification.
- ▶ Representation mechanics.
- ▶ Constituency delimitation--reconciling administrative and electoral boundaries.
- ▶ Decentralization of election administration.
- ▶ Effective election monitoring.
- ▶ Political parties and the election process.
- ▶ Interest groups and the political process.
- ▶ Political party and campaign financing.

*Legislative Training and Support:* The National Assembly continues to indicate an interest in receiving a variety of assistance in order to build its internal capacity. Qualified specialist(s) could address the needs raised by Assembly members and staff during their conversations with IFES. A different series of technical workshops from those listed above could be considered.

- ▶ Organization of technical workshops on: staff development; legal research and drafting; public finance and budgeting skills; negotiation and conflict resolution skill development; constituent outreach; effective collaboration with the executive and judicial branches of government; internal budgeting and financial management.
- ▶ Recommendation for communications plan, including review/revision of regulations governing media coverage of the Assembly.
- ▶ Provision of office equipment and training in its use.
- ▶ Material and equipment support of the documentation center initiated with French and European Union and other international contributions in 1996.

## Annexes



**Annex 1: Schedule of Meetings**

*Sunday, December 7, 1997*

A. Bickel arrives in Guinea.

*Monday, December 8, 1997*

Initial briefing: Julie Harrold, Democracy and Governance Officer, USAID

Kanda Diallo, Economist

Christina Lee, Princeton Fellow, Natural Resource Management

Gillian Lyon, Education Officer

Marie Claude Traore, Documentation

*Tuesday December 9, 1997*

Work session with J. Harrold

Meet CLUSA project manager Ben Lentz

H. Whittaker arrives

*Wednesday, December 10, 1997*

Briefing with H. Whittaker and J. Harrold

Meeting with Aide-Justice-Femmes (NGO) Aissatou Poreko Diallo

Meeting with Pam Callen, USAID Deputy Director, and Madiodio Niasse, USAID-  
Abidjan Strategic Planner

Meeting with Abdoulaye Douma Diallo, National Director of Decentralization,  
Ministry of Interior and Decentralization; and M. Dieng, Political Counselor  
to the Minister

*Thursday, December 11, 1997*

Meeting with Louis Nigro, DCM, US Embassy

John Flynn, Director, USAID

Patrick Murphy, Political and Economic Officer, US Embassy

Peter Piness, Public Affairs Officer, USIS

Julie Harrold, D&G Officer, USAID

Discussion with Tibor Nage, American Ambassador

Meeting with Pascal Condé, Chef du Cabinet, Ministry of the Interior

Doumba Diallo, National Decentralization Director

Mamadou Barry, President, Election Finance Commission

Ahmadou Baïllo Diallo, President, Election Rules and Training Commission

Fofana M'Balou, Public Liberty and Judicial Affairs

Meeting with Mamadou Cissé, Director, National Service of Cooperative Assistance  
and Coordination of Non-governmental Organizations

*Friday, December 12, 1997*

Meeting with Mouctar Diallo, Political Assistant, US Embassy

CODEM Press conference

Meeting with Siradiou Diallo, PRP

Mamadou Bhoy Bâ, UNR

Facinet Beavogui, RPG

Mohamed Sako, PDG/AST

Dr. Aliou Diallo, UNR

Mohamed Diane, RPG

Yaya Keita, PRP

Sy Savane, PRP

Meeting with Alpha Boubacar Diallo, Africare

*Sunday, December 14, 1997*

Meeting with Terry Tapsoba, PSI

Team meeting to work on report outline

*Monday, December 15, 1997*

Meeting with Robert Sara, Vicar of Conakry

Meeting with Aminatou Barry Camara, Secretary General, Ministry of Plan and  
Cooperation

Meeting with Ulrich Storck, Friedrich Ebert Foundation

Meeting with Electoral Commission at MID

Meeting with Abdoulaye Fogo Balde, Abbass Touré, Dorembouya El Hadj Bandig,  
Islamic League

Meeting with Peter Piness, American Cultural Center

Daniel Fathimbe, Assistant and Press Correspondent, Sierra Leone

Meeting with Madiodio Niasse, Regional Social Science Advisor, USAID

*Tuesday, December 16, 1997*

Meeting with Abou Cheri Camara, Prefet, Kindia

Djenabou Sylla Diallo, Secretary General for Administrative Affairs

Moustapha Barry, Sou-Prefet, Damakanya

Election officials, Quartier Tafory, Kindia central

*Wednesday, December 17, 1997*

Meeting with Dramane Camara, Principal Economist, USAID

Aissatou Diallo-Bah, Economist

Jamilah Sow, Program Assistant, Women's Affairs

Meeting with Fatou Keira, Executive Director, COFEG

Debriefing at US Embassy

Meeting with Souleymane Sy Savane, SLECG

A. Bickel departs

*Saturday, December 20, 1997*

H. Whittaker departs

## Annex 2: Guinea Contact List

<i>Guinea Contact List. December 1997</i>	<i>Contact</i>	<i>Telephone</i>	<i>Fax</i>	<i>Location</i>
<b>Political Parties</b>				
Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinée (party led by Alpha Condé)	Facinet Beavogui, Deputy Mohamed Diané	46.50.49 46.50.25		Medina - after UNHCR, the Marines' house and PAM; on your left in the back
Union pour la Nouvelle République	Mamadou Bah President, CODEM (opposition)	41.12.05		on Corniche Sud, after the Palais du Peuple
Parti du Renouveau et du Progrès	Siradiou Diallo	41.23.76		on end of alley next to Canadian embassy
Union pour le Progrès de la Guinée	Jean Marie Doré	46.30.96		route de Donka, first street after hospital, on your right
Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès (party led by Lansana Conté)	Aboubacar Somparé, President du groupe PUP/PCN	41.12.04 41.23.95		after the bridge, bear left. Across from Zairian restaurant before USAID
Assemblée Nationale	Aboubacar Sidiki Nabé, Directeur des Relations Internationales et du Protocole	41.10.78/ 9		Palais du Peuple
CODEM	Yaya Keita	41.12.05		

<i>Guinea Contact List. December 1997</i>	<i>Contact</i>	<i>Telephone</i>	<i>Fax</i>	<i>Location</i>
<b>Non-Governmental Organizations</b>				
Islamic League	El Hadj Mamadou Saliou Sylla, Secrétaire Général	41.23.38		one block from US embassy across from port
Archbishop of Conakry	Robert Sara			across from and after marché Niger, near the Mahatma Ghandi school
Femmes-Justice- Aide	Aissatou Poreko Diallo			
Coordination des ONG Féminines de Guinée (COFEG)	Fatou Keira,	44.27.77	B.P. 2176	2 <sup>nd</sup> floor, Immeuble Kebe, facing the BICI-GUI on Avenue of the Republic
Africare	Jonathan Ladinit Lori Dutrielle Alpha Boubacar Diallo	41.31.10		Corniche Sud
Syndicat libre des Enseignants et Chercheurs de Guinée SLECG	Souleymane Sy Savane, Secrétaire Général Adjoint	46.55.97	B.P. 572, Conakry	on main autoroute, facing the University of Conakry
Population Services International (PSI)	Terry Tapsoba Dr. Kekoura Camara, Conseiller spécial	41.32.15		
National Cooperative Business Association (CLUSA)	Benjamin Lentz Représentant Résident			Coyah

<i>Guinea Contact List. December 1997</i>	<i>Contact</i>	<i>Telephone</i>	<i>Fax</i>	<i>Location</i>
	Cathy Tilford, Director			on corniche on left going north before Dixon Port
	Peace Corps			
<b>Donors</b>				
PNUD	Aissatou Diallo-Bah, Economiste; Boubou-Dramane Camara, Principal Economiste; Jamilah Diallo-Sow, Assistante Principale au Programme	41.15.58	41.24.85	Sony Building, Avenue de la Republique
Fondation Fredrick Ebert	Ulrich Storck, Représentant Résident; Salemoussa Soumah, Coordinateur;	44.31.75		downtown on street running parallel to and south of Avenue de la Republique
ACDI	Suzanne Marchand	46.23.95		
GTZ	Jorge Dux	41.33.90 41.31.61		
CEE	Guy Petitpierre, Délégué; Sybil Bickar (élections)	46.49.42		

<b>Guinea Contact List. December 1997</b>				
	<i>Contact</i>	<i>Telephone</i>	<i>Fax</i>	<i>Location</i>
Coopération Française	Hélène Roy, Conseiller, Coopération administratif, Infrastructures et Assistance technique	44.23.45 44.31.27		
<b>Government of Guinea</b>				
Ministry of Interior and Decentralization	Pascal Ignace Condé, Chef du Cabinet	44.44.15		between Novotel and central cathedral
	Abdoulaye Douma Diallo, Directeur national pour la Décentralisation; Alkaly Camara, Directeur National Adjoint	41.15.10  45.17.74		diagonally across from US Embassy, 3 <sup>rd</sup> floor
	Direction Nationale des Libertés publiques et Affaires juridiques - Fofana M'Balou, Directeur National Adjoint	40.28.68	B.P. 5023	

<i>Guinea Contact List. December 1997</i>	<i>Contact</i>	<i>Telephone</i>	<i>Fax</i>	<i>Location</i>
	Service d'Assistance aux Coopératives et de Coordination des interventions des ONG (SACCO) - Mamadou Cissé, Directeur	46.28.95		right after carrefour Constantine on the right as you head towards the airport
	Abou Cheri Camara, Préfet, Kindia; Djenabou Sylla Diallo, Secrétaire Général chargé des affaires administratives et juridiques	61.02.81  61.07.92		préfecture offices, main roundpoint, after camp, Kindia
Ministry of Communications	Radio Rurale, Bashir Bah, Directeur			
	RTG - Tafsir Diallo, Chef Division Information; Fatoumata Kaba, Journaliste	44.20.23 44.14.15 41.14.10		near the military camp
Ministry of Cooperation and Plan	Aminatou Camara, Secrétaire Général			two blocks east of central cathedral, 4 <sup>th</sup> floor

<i>Guinea Contact List. December 1997</i>	<i>Contact</i>	<i>Telephone</i>	<i>Fax</i>	<i>Location</i>
<b>US Government</b>				
USAID	John Flynn, Director; Pam Callen, Directrice Adjointe; Julie Harrold, DG Officer; Madiodio Niasse, Regional Social Science Advisor	41.21.63 41.21.29	41.19.85	Corniche Nord, behind the SuperBobo
US Embassy	Louis John Nigro, DCM; Patrick Murphy, Political and Economic Officer; Moctar Diallo, Assistant Political Officer	41.15.20	41.15.22	
American Cultural Center	Peter Piness, Public Affairs Officer	41.36.78 46.14.24	41.29.21	Corniche Sud, next to Japanese Embassy



### **Annex 3: Annotated bibliography (in chronological order)**

#### **Guinean legal code:**

Décret Portant Code Electoral, Partie réglementaire, December 23, 1991.

Loi Organique Portant Statut de la Magistrature, December 23, 1991.

Loi Organique Etat d'Urgence et Etat de Siège, December 23, 1991.

Loi sur la liberté de la presse, December 23, 1991.

Loi Organique Portant Code Electoral, Partie législative, December 23, 1991.

Loi Organique Relative aux Lois de Finances, December 23, 1991.

#### **Code de Conduite pour les Partis politiques, International Commission of Jurists, Conakry, le 13 Octobre 1993.**

Overwhelming emphasis on avoiding violent confrontation, especially along ethnic lines. Copy of document is unsigned, but after press conference with CODEM, reference was made to a code of conduct for the political parties so presumably their representatives have agreed to this statement.

#### **Official guidelines distributed to electoral authorities:**

"Guide des Scrutateurs," Ministère de l'Intérieur et de la Sécurité, December 8, 1993.

"Guide des Observateurs des Elections," Ministère de l'Intérieur et de la Sécurité, no date.

"Guide pour les Elections Présidentielles et Législatives," Ministère de l'Intérieur et de la Sécurité, no date.

These IFES-designed training guides and forms were printed under government auspices too late for use in the 1993 presidential elections. However, they were used during the 1995 legislative elections, and administration officials who were familiar with the brochures appreciated both their informative Content and clarity.

#### **"IFES Report: Presidential Elections in Guinea, December 1993," Tom Bayer, March 1994.**

Detailed chronicle of the dramatic unfolding of Guinea's presidential elections. IFES had three technical assistants/observers in Conakry working with the Ministry of the Interior election commission during the period from September 8th through the end of December 1993.

#### **"Guinea: Presidential Election Report," International Republican Institute, March, 1994.**

Critical analysis by three-person team of electoral environment from perspective of this organization, which decided against participating as observers on account of actions on the part of government authorities deemed to be flagrant manipulation of procedure. Revealing account of how the authority and role of national election commission, named to appease rising civil unrest, was undermined. Raises issue of donor country support.

#### **"Memorandum to US Ambassador and USAID Director and Program Supervisor on Trip Report, Pre-Legislative Evaluation," Thomas Bayer, IFES, July 13, 1994.**

Organized as answers to specific questions on the adequacy of pre-legislative election preparations, which were initially to be held five months later. Memorandum's situation analysis is sufficiently detailed as to provide a basis for comparison with current preparations for 1998 elections.

**"Democratic Governance in Guinea: An Assessment," Sheldon Gellar, Bob Growlsema, Mamadou Kanté, and Mary Reintsma, Associates in Rural Development, December 19, 1994.**

Assessment applying institutional analysis methodology to evaluate democratic governance in state and civil society institutions in Guinea. It identifies two major constraints on the political process: the absence of political dialogue and the *tutelle* mentality, and sketches out a strategy for USAID to address them.

This comprehensive (173 pages) report provides valuable background on the historical, political, social, and economic dimensions of Guinean society. It is strongest on the overview of Guinea's political and social history and the structure of the present state apparatus. The assessment of civil society, especially the union movement, and the treatment of traditional cultural institutions is far less analytical as the four-person team was not permitted to travel outside of Conakry.

**"Dispositions pratiques applicables aux Elections Législatives du 11 Juin 1995," Ministère de l'Intérieur et de la Sécurité, Mai, 1995.**

Detailed instructions on campaigning and voting procedures controlling public political expression. Brochure states composition of voting station officers but without mention of their respective roles and responsibilities. Confirms limited role of national election commission and political parties.

**Chronogramme des Opérations Préparatoires aux Législatives du 11 Juin 1995, dated May 25 1995.**

This planning calendar contained 20 steps which were to be achieved in the nine-week period leading up to the date of the elections (April 3-June 11, 1995). (Oddly, the date on the schedule is only three weeks before the election itself.)

It should be compared to the Dec. 1997 planning calendar prepared by the Ministry of the Interior for the next presidential elections, which lists 44 steps that start over a year ahead of time.

**"Guinea: A Report on the Legislative Elections: June 11, 1995," The African-American Institute, no date.**

The AAI fielded a 16-member observer mission to Guinea from May 27-June 15, 1995 that was able to circulate widely throughout the country. Good summary of earlier election experience forming backdrop to 1995 election of new national assembly. Detailed break-down of direct and proportional votes by party. Moderate tone of this nuanced report helps its conclusions come across clearly and forcefully since they are without polemic.

**"Observatoire international de la démocratie en Guinée, Elections législatives, 11 juin 1995," Commission Internationale de Juristes, Geneva, le 13 juin 1995.**

After having visited more than 1000 voting stations and counting offices, pronouncement of favorable opinion that elections were "relatively free, fair and transparent." Statement raises directly the issue of ethnic tolerance, recommending civic education measures.

**National Assembly President's Speech, Opening of 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, October 7, 1996.**

Address raises issues of NA's right to confirm the nomination of the new Prime Minister, the impact of the Government's failure to submit its budget to the NA on time, and the unclear balance of power between elected and appointed officials (viz. parliamentary deputies and prefectural authorities).

**"IFES Guinea Trip Report," October 6-19, 1996, Thomas Bayer, January 1997.**

Update since last IFES trip (March 1995) of ministerial changes, national assembly activity, and review of governance issues with members of judiciary, communications officials, donors, and non-governmental organizations. Proposes 26 recommendations concerning democracy and governance issues, the legal and electoral systems and voter registration, but does not prioritize or sequence suggested actions.

**"Guinea Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1996," US Department of State, January 30, 1997.**

Abuses which have been documented. Leaves little doubt that there are others that remain undocumented.

**"Final Report of the DG TDY Team to Guinea," Elizabeth Hart, USAID/G; Tom Bayer, IFES; Madiodio Niasse and Moussa Okanla, USAID/REDSO; April 1997.**

Programmatic report of four-person team with significant prior experience in Guinea. Lays out strategy for work on Democracy and Governance. Argues that because executive power is still so controlling, there is little room to maneuver politically. Therefore, the approach centers on development of democratic practices on local level through existing community organizations and linkages to local government bodies.

The piece sketches out a framework of assumptions and risks underlying four "intermediate results" which contribute to the strategic DG objective. The writing is dense and addresses an internal audience. Further clarification of the thematic links would widen accessibility of the document.

**News Clippings from 2/8/96-10/20/97**

These document the military rebellion in February 1996 which was followed by a shakedown in Conté's administration and creation of the post of prime minister. In a Sept. 29, 1997 interview with President Conté by Africa No. 1 (a radio station out of Gabon) reprinted in the *Indépendant*, Conté dismisses the idea of an independent electoral commission which is supported by the president of the National Assembly, El Hadj Boubacar Diallo.

**Rapport de la Commission sur l'examen de la proposition de loi relative à la double nationalité, National Assembly, November 20, 1997.**

The commission recommended the following changes in the law which President Conté had originally proposed: holding twin citizenship be prohibited to Guineans who want to run for national office (and not to all Guineans); cession of foreign citizenship must be filed publicly six months before they become candidates (and not three months after the law is passed).

#### **Annex 4:     Consultant Biographies**

**Annette Bickel** obtained a double Masters degree in Philosophy and Political Science from Johns Hopkins University in 1981. After becoming a licensed arborist, she joined the Peace Corps and served as a forester in Guinea from 1986 through 1990. She continued to work in Guinea Office from 1991 to 1993 as the Chief Technical Advisor on a women's income generation project for the International Labor Office. Returning to Baltimore in 1993, she has worked as a consultant on rural development issues in Africa and Asia for the World Bank, the International Labor Office, the Food and Agricultural Organization, World Learning, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation while obtaining an MBA degree from the University of Maryland.

**Hilary Whittaker** has coordinated both partisan and non-partisan election campaigns at the U.S. state, regional and local levels, and has been a management advisor to Governors and their staffs across the United States. In 1991 she led an IFES team of constitutional, electoral law, and voting systems experts to consult with the transitional government of Mali and perform a pre-election assessment that led to an extensive program of technical assistance and training. Subsequently, she led another team on a pre-election assessment in Comoros resulting in a concentrated civic education program. As an independent consultant, she helped set up absentee voting at the Malian Embassy in Washington. For IFES, she designed fair election practices, training and directives for the Congo Referendum and Togo Presidential and Legislative elections, 1992-94. She participated in an African-American Institute evaluation, recommending a program of technical assistance for Uganda's Constituent Assembly elections; and acted as an IFES technical monitor and international observer at the 1993 legislative elections in Morocco. More recently, Ms. Whittaker evaluated the strategies and performance of the African-American Institute under the USAID Africa Region Electoral Assistance Fund program 1992-94, and helped the Electoral Commission in Ghana set up a new public education program with an extensive set of materials and public involvement activities for its 1995-96 Registration, Exhibition, and Get-Out-The-Vote drives.

Ms. Whittaker has directed Red Cross and Peace Corps programs in France, Morocco, Togo, Sierra Leone, and Mali; was a Training Officer in India; and management consultant in Iran, Greece, Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, Botswana, Liberia, Senegal and The Gambia for the Peace Corps and the Association of Junior Leagues of America. She has directed development, population census, education, business, health, computerization, and emergency assistance programs in Europe, Asia, and Africa for USAID, Peace Corps, the American Red Cross, and League of Red Cross Societies.



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