


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**PRE-ELECTION TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
FEBRUARY 1999**

*A Report by the
International Foundation for Election Systems*

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INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA PRE-ELECTION TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT

February 1999

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Scope of Work	1
B. Methodology	1
II. BACKGROUND	2
A. Country Background	2
B. Political Background	2
C. Elections Background	3
D. Bougainville Background	4
III. ELECTION SYSTEM OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA	6
A. Organizational Structure of Electoral Commission	6
B. Legal Framework for Elections	8
C. Voter Enrolment (Registration)	9
D. Election Official Training	11
E. Voter Education	13
F. Ballot Access	13
G. Ballot Design Issues	14
H. Election Operation Issues	15
I. Counting and Tabulation	18
J. Election Appeals	19
K. Electoral Commission Budget Analysis	20
IV. BOUGAINVILLE ELECTIONS	21
A. Electoral History	21
B. Legal Developments Concerning Governmental Structure and Elections	23

C.	Major Issues Facing Proposed Elections	24
1.	Election Timetable and Preparations	24
2.	Command Structure for Elections	25
3.	Voter Enrolment (Registration)	26
4.	Time Period for Elections	27
5.	Voter Education	28
6.	Recruitment/Training of Officials	30
7.	Absentee Voting	31
8.	International Monitoring	32
9.	Domestic Monitoring	33
10.	Communication and Transportation Issues	34
11.	Security Issues	35
12.	Counting and Tabulation	36
V.	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	37
A.	Papua New Guinea Electoral Issues	37
	Control	37
	Uniformity	38
B.	Bougainville Elections	38
	Planning and Control	38
	Transparency and Inclusiveness	39
C.	Conclusions	40
VI.	ATTACHMENTS	42

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

Assistant Returning Officer (ARO) - The chief election officer for a given electorate in a province.

Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) - A government set up by Bougainville rebel leaders in the early 1990's.

Bougainville Reconciliation Government (BRG) - A new government comprising members of all factions in the Bougainville crisis that, with the blessing of the Papua New Guinea Parliament, was scheduled to take administrative and legislative control of the province on 1 January, 1999. Plans called for direct elections for this government to be held as soon as feasible.

Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) - The military arm of the Bougainville Interim Government.

Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG) - A government set up in 1995 by pro-Papua New Guinea leaders and recognized (until 1 January, 1999) as the lawful government by the Papua New Guinea Parliament. However, it often has been at odds with the national government.

Electorate - A district within a province from which one member of Parliament is elected. Also known as an "open electorate."

Enrolment - The Papua New Guinea term for voter registration.

Interpreter - A member of a polling team.

Office of Bougainville Affairs - A government department in Port Moresby reporting directly to the prime minister and responsible for federal administration of Bougainville province.

Presiding Officer (PO) - The chief election official of a polling team.

Resistance Force - Paramilitary units initiated to fight against the Bougainville Revolutionary Army.

Returning Officer (RO) - The chief election official of a province.

Scrutineer - An election observer representing a candidate.

Scrutiny - The official counting of ballots and determination of results.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people contributed time and resources to planning this technical assessment and to making the assessment visit successful and, it is hoped, beneficial. IFES staff members Mary Lou Schramm, Jessica Hunter, Du Tran, and Deepika Dayal provided valuable guidance, support, and assistance in planning the visit, coordinating with the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission, and reviewing and editing this report. John Norris of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives provided much insightful background information on the Bougainville situation prior to the visit. Ambassador Arma Jean Karaer played a critical role in generating interest in international assistance to the Electoral Commission. Her Deputy Chief of Mission, Alan Latimer, deserves special praise for helping with logistics, arranging meetings with key players, accompanying the IFES specialist on initial meetings and briefings, and providing him with Embassy staff support. Andrew Trawen of the Electoral Commission was tremendously helpful in orienting the IFES specialist to Papua New Guinea, arranging his transportation, and facilitating much of the assessment visit work plan. Commissioner Reuben Kaiulo and his management team were invaluable in providing the information and documents needed to make the assessment successful. Their candid and timely responses to numerous questions and requests are especially appreciated. Bougainville's Mathias Pihei put himself at the disposal of the IFES specialist while on the island; the Bougainville portion of the visit could not have been nearly so constructive and informative without his assistance. Thanks also go to Dan Stearn, who volunteered his time to proofread and provide editorial advice on the draft of this report.

Finally, IFES wishes to thank the US Department of State and US Agency for International Development for providing the support that has made this project possible.



I. INTRODUCTION

A. Scope of Work

The International Foundation for Election Systems' (IFES) Pre-election Technical Assessment was conducted at the invitation of the Electoral Commission of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea with funding provided by the U.S. Department of State through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Prior to the beginning of the assessment visit, IFES staff had several communications with the Electoral Commissioner and his Deputy to determine the parameters of the assessment and of future IFES assistance in Papua New Guinea. A major factor in determining the focus of the visit was the arrival of an electoral assessment team from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). Every attempt was made to avoid duplication in the efforts of these two assessments. The conclusion of these negotiations produced an IFES analysis that included a general appraisal of the Electoral Commission structure and functions with a special focus on the elections planned for the province of Bougainville by July 1999.

The scope of work for the IFES assessment included examination of the following topics:

- The role and function of the Electoral Commission as it pertains to election planning for the province of Bougainville;
- The current electoral laws and other codes and regulations as well as laws covering the various government entities in Bougainville;
- Ballot design, distribution, collection, and security;
- Anti-fraud and anti-corruption procedures;
- Role, training, and duties of pollworkers and election officials;
- Mechanics of the election process and procedures at polling places;
- Vote counting, certification, and reporting of results, including contest resolution and appeals procedures;
- International/domestic observation preparation and acceptance; and
- Potential for civic and voter education/information.

B. Methodology

IFES fielded an election administration specialist to conduct an onsite assessment of the electoral processes in Papua New Guinea and Bougainville province in November-December 1998. The mission had the following objectives:

- Assess voter registration, election administration, and voter education needs; and
- Provide recommendations to the PNG government and the donor community for actions to take to improve these areas, strengthen the administration of elections, and create a safe and transparent election process, especially in the province of Bougainville.

The IFES consultant reviewed background information on PNG including the constitution and election laws, reports on the 1997 election, the *Lincoln Agreement* on Bougainville, and a report by John Norris of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, who had recently returned from Papua New Guinea and Bougainville. In PNG the consultant conducted interviews with U.S. embassy representatives, the Electoral Commission and other election officials, the attorney general's office, representatives of the United Nations and AusAID, and key players in the Bougainville political and government factions and the peace process there. Onsite meetings were held in the capital city of Port Moresby and in Bougainville province. A complete listing of meetings may be found in attachment A.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Country Background

Papua New Guinea was an area of many and varied tribal cultures until European colonization came near the end of the 19th century. Part of the area was under German control and part under British control until 1905 when Britain transferred its colonial administration to Australia. At the outset of World War I, Australia took over control of the German areas; it administered the whole country, first under a League of Nations mandate and then a United Nations trusteeship, until the 1970s. In 1973, Papua New Guinea became self-governing and on September 16, 1975, achieved full independence. While it maintains its independence, it continues to receive significant financial and technical aid from Australia.

B. Political Background

Papua New Guinea is a constitutional monarchy with the Queen of England as nominal head of state. All legislative power is vested in a unicameral parliament that elects a prime minister as the country's chief executive. Parliament also elects a governor general to represent the Queen.

There are currently 109 seats in Parliament. Nineteen seats belong to representatives elected at-large from the nineteen provinces. The remaining 90 seats are elected from districts, known as "electorates," within the provinces and from the National Capital District. The electorates are to be roughly the same size, although practically no reapportionment has taken place since independence. Currently, the largest province -- Morobe -- has nine electorates, and the smallest -- Manus -- has one.

There is little stability to the political landscape in Papua New Guinea. Even though parliamentary elections are held only every five years, there have been seven prime ministers since independence. By the original constitution, a prime minister was subject to a parliamentary vote of no confidence at any time. However, such votes became so regular that a constitutional amendment was passed in 1990 to prohibit no-confidence votes during the first 18 months of a prime minister's term. This instability is due in large measure to the weakness of the political party system, manifested by a penchant for members of parliament to change parties and for parties to alter alliances. The progression from a land of unrelated village cultures to an independent country with a parliamentary democracy was a relatively fast one. As a result, political allegiance is more often given to members of one's clan rather than to a specific, party-related political ideology. According to one native author:

The Papua New Guinean's loyalty is firstly to his parents, then his immediate relatives, then, in order, the clan, the village, the tribe, the district, the region, the occupational identity., and the nation-state Papua New Guinea comes last. That's right, last of all! (Yauka Liria, quoted in *The Sandline Affair*, by Sean Dorney.)

Adding to the lack of sustainable ideology is the institutionalized practice of providing financial rewards in return for allegiance from members of one's family, clan, or region. All members of Parliament receive funds for projects in their areas. Abuse of these funds (e.g., giving money to family members for no legitimate social welfare product or service) is prohibited, and abusers are punished by removal from office and/or imprisonment. However, abuse is so prevalent that numerous legislators have been arrested and removed from office. While these factors would suggest that Papua New Guinea's political equilibrium is perpetually destined for collapse, democracy has actually thrived during its 23-year history -- a fact on which Papua New Guineans look with pride.

C. Elections Background

Elections began in the early 1950s when Papua New Guineans were given the right to elect a small number of representatives to their colonial government. The first election to the Parliament of the newly independent country was held in 1977. In addition to the national elections held every five years, there are local government elections and, quite often, by-elections. These by-elections are held to replace members of parliament who have resigned or been removed from office. Prior to 1995, provincial government elections were also held. In that year, the constitution was altered to remove these governments from the electoral process and place them under the control of the central government and the at-large member of parliament elected from each province.

Virtually all elections are administered by a central Electoral Commission, which also has authority for conducting voter registration (called "enrolment") and proposing changes in electoral boundaries. Elections were conducted according to the "Organic Law on National Elections" until 1997, when a new "Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections" was passed. Contrary to the change in titles, the major impact of the new law was to remove all references to the conduct of provincial elections, since these elections had been

stripped away by the 1995 constitutional change. (The new electoral law has now become one of the legal obstacles to preparation for new elections in the province of Bougainville.)

The electoral calendar starts with a voter registration period which normally ends upon the ceremonial signing of a writ of election by the governor general. Following the writ is a short candidate certification period, then an election period lasting from one day to two weeks, and finally a "return of the writ," i.e. certification of the winner. The last part of this calendar is a period for disputing the results.

Candidates for Parliament are elected in a "first-past-the-post" or simple plurality system. Since requirements for running are few, Papua New Guinea elections commonly see a large field of candidates for any parliamentary seat. In 1997, an average of 22 candidates ran for each of the 109 parliamentary seats; for one seat, the ballot contained 61 names. Ballot access is equally easy for party candidates and independents; as a consequence, independent candidates far outnumber those allied with parties. Since the "wantok" system of clan cohesiveness and loyalty remains strong through most of the country -- and since political parties are weak and ever-changing -- there is a definite tendency toward "favorite son" voting that often produces winners with very small percentages of the total vote. In the 1997 elections, several winners had less than ten percent of the popular vote; in one case a candidate was elected with less than six percent. In fact only thirteen percent of that year's winners had a mandate of more than 30 percent of the voters.

Once elected, it is not uncommon for a winner to be lured from one party or coalition to another while the process of forming the government (i.e. an alliance of members able to elect a prime minister) occurs.

D. Bougainville Background

"Bougainville" is the name given to one large and several small islands at the northern tip of the Solomon Island chain (hence its legal but seldom-used name of "North Solomons province"). The province is about 35 miles across at its widest point and stretches about 140 miles. There are three main towns in the province: Buka in the north, Arawa in the center, and Buin near the southern tip.

For many of the 170,000 Bougainvilleans, cultural and political affinity has always been more with the Solomons than with the rest of Papua New Guinea. In fact, Bougainvilleans declared independence thirteen days before the rest of Papua New Guinea was granted independence in 1975. This move was never recognized, and after months of unrest, the secessionist movement was defeated. But it was never entirely extinguished.

In 1969, an Australian company established a copper mine at Panguna in central Bougainville. For a variety of reasons, the mine quickly became the dominant feature of the Bougainville economic, social, political and environmental landscape. On one hand, the mine brought employment, wealth, schools, hospitals, and modern infrastructure to the province. On the other, it brought environmental degradation, uprooting of residents and landowners, and great

controversy over the distribution of profits. The latter issues were contributing factors to the secessionist movement of the '70s, and though stifled at that time, they boiled beneath the surface. In 1988 they erupted in sabotage and arson directed toward the mine and, before long, toward the Papua New Guinea government. Led by Francis Ona, the anti-mine forces soon launched a full-scale rebellion and guerilla war that lasted -- with only a few short respites -- for nine years.

During the course of the insurrection, the rebels established the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and its political wing, the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG). In a 1995 effort to quell the rebels and win support from the citizens, the national government facilitated the establishment of the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG). While the BTG was seen by the rebels as a puppet of the national government, it wasn't long before friction developed between BTG members and "Waigani" (the suburb of Port Moresby that houses Parliament). Other players whose presence impacted the ongoing struggle were the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (the government's army), the Papua New Guinea police, the BRA's community police, and the "Resistance" (an anti-rebel paramilitary force). The years of fighting resulted in at least 3,000 deaths -- some put the figure at 20,000 -- and displacement of about a third of the population.

In 1997, the Bougainville crisis caused the downfall of the national government headed by Sir Julius Chan. In the infamous "Sandline Affair," Chan and his cabinet secretly hired a British mercenary outfit, Sandline Ltd., to capture and/or kill the rebel leaders and to reopen the mine. Soon after the plot was uncovered, the commander of the Defence Force, embittered by the usurpation of his authority by foreign hired guns, arrested the mercenary leaders and demanded the resignation of the prime minister. While he did not officially resign, Chan stepped aside as prime minister while inquiries into the matter were conducted. He was then turned out of office by the voters in June 1997.

Later in 1997, a truce and then a cease-fire were arranged, and on 23 January 1998, a full-fledged peace treaty was signed at Lincoln University in Christchurch, New Zealand. The signatories included members of the national government, the BTG, BRA, BIG, and Resistance. The Lincoln Agreement called for elections to be held for a new Bougainville Reconciliation Government. By the tenets of this and subsequent agreements, the Transitional Government was scheduled to expire on 31 December, 1998, and be replaced by the Reconciliation Government. As soon as workable, the membership of the new government is to be determined by direct election. The date for these elections remains undecided.

In addition to the presence of humanitarian and economic development projects run by various Australian, New Zealand, and Commonwealth agencies, two significant international groups are taking part in the reconciliation and rebuilding process. The Peace Monitoring Group is composed of about 300 unarmed military and civilian volunteers from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Vanuatu. Their mandate is to (1) monitor and report on cease-fire compliance, (2) promote the peace process, (3) provide the citizenry with information about the peace process, (4) provide assistance with restoration and development projects, and (5) assist with development and training of local police. A four-member United Nations Observer Mission also has recently

established a headquarters in Bougainville. Its main functions are to (1) facilitate the peace process by monitoring the Lincoln Agreement implementation, (2) observe the activities of the Peace Monitoring Group, and (3) chair the Peace Process Consultative Committee. Both groups appear to be generally accepted and viewed positively by the Bougainville citizenry and especially by BIG/BRA members, who lobbied diligently to gain the UN presence as part of their attempt to "internationalize" their struggle.

III. ELECTION SYSTEM IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

A. Organizational Structure of Electoral Commission

The Electoral Commission itself is just one person who is appointed by the head of state on the advice of a four-member appointments committee chaired by the prime minister. The current commissioner, Reuben Kaiulo, has been in office since 1991 and has served under four prime ministers. His office consists of Deputy Electoral Commissioner Andrew Trawen and four assistant commissioners, all of whom are appointed by the commissioner. Each is in charge of a major area of the overall operation. Finally, there are a Director of Political Party Registration and an Internal Auditor, both of whom report directly to the commissioner. The commissioner also serves as chairman of the Electoral Boundaries Commission. An organizational chart of the Electoral Commission may be found in attachment B. The current organizational structure was adopted in 1994.

The entire electoral machinery is centralized in and directed from the commission's Port Moresby office. All provincial election workers ultimately report to the commissioner, even though some are not directly employed by the commission.

There are five functional areas within this organizational framework:

Programmes and Research Branch -- This division has a wide variety of functions concerning election planning and analysis:

- Recommending changes to election laws and regulations;
- Developing election timetables;
- Analyzing boundary issues and recommending boundary changes;
- Coordinating the process of writing and returning election writs (the documents which officially call the elections into being and, in turn, certify the winners);
- Writing training manuals;
- Compiling election statistics; and
- Compiling data used in court cases involving disputed elections.

Operations Branch -- This division is responsible for all aspects of voter registration, or "enrolment," and the actual conducting of all elections. The division currently has 24 employees; these include the Assistant Commissioner for Operations, eight employees in the data processing section, thirteen field personnel, and two office assistants. The field

operation is coordinated by five area managers, each with his own field office in a different region of the country. These in turn supervise the work of eight provincial officers, who are direct employees of the commission, and several temporary electoral agents who are directly employed by other governmental units (usually the provincial government) and are in essence loaned to the commission during election periods. These provincial officers, known as "returning officers," are the chief election officers for the provinces.

Information and Education Branch -- This division, with four full-time employees, is responsible for election officer training, voter education and information, staff development, and some aspects of personnel record keeping. Through its information and training officer, it also serves as the media relations arm of the election operation. In the 1997 national elections, this was a highly visible function, producing almost daily press releases from the Electoral Commission. An abstract of the more salient parts of these releases is found in attachment C.

Finance and Administration Branch -- This division is tasked with preparing the Electoral Commission's budget, controlling the distribution of funds, making all payments, and keeping all finance, expense, and personnel records. The budget, discussed in greater detail below, covers all expenses from the commission offices to the polling place level.

Political Party Registry -- This division, with just a director and secretary, is responsible for certifying parties to appear on the ballot. The office was created in anticipation of Parliament passing a law related to political party organization, certification, and function, but such a law has never come into being. Since the party certification process occurs for only a short period prior to the election, the office has no specified function during non-election periods. In these times, the director performs whatever tasks are assigned to him by the electoral commissioner.

Findings

The overall structure of the commission appears to serve the electoral process well. An added plus is the low turnover of the central office staff, most of whom have been there for between ten and twenty-five years. This provides a depth of understanding and institutional memory that is important to an efficient operation. But there are several areas that appear problematic. Perhaps foremost is the lack of ultimate control by the commission over all election officers in the field. At the provincial level, the returning officer is the key figure who organizes the election, hires the pollworkers, establishes the polling places, and handles the election-period logistics for his province. Those officers who are not direct employees play a significant role but are not totally answerable to the commission. This has led to many problems in the past, such as unauthorized expenditures and the hiring of inadequate pollworkers. Such problems will likely continue until the commission is given complete hiring and firing responsibility over these individuals.

A second systemic problem concerns the production and use of pollworker training materials. Development of these materials appears split between the Programmes and Research Branch and the Information and Education Branch. (Indeed, in 1997, each branch developed election official manuals.) A further problem voiced by the Assistant Commissioner for Information and Education is that his office is expected to organize and provide all field training, but the Operations Branch is supposed to handle all field issues.

A third problem is the sheer size and scope of the Operations Division. The fact that the two most critical aspects of an election system -- voter registration and election administration -- both come under one department means that neither gets the full attention it deserves.

A fourth problem is the lack of a clear-cut mission for the Director of Political Party Registration. As long as this area has the limited scope that it has now, it would appear that this office should take on a more comprehensive role.

Recommendations

(1) The commission should take the necessary steps, organizationally and financially, to bring all provincial returning officers under its direct control.

(2) The Operations Branch should be split into two branches, one in charge of voter enrolment and the other in charge of election administration, with an assistant commissioner for each. An alternative arrangement could be to divide the Branch into two divisions, each with a director who reports to the assistant commissioner.

(3) The commissioner should consider delegating to one division clear and complete responsibility for development of training materials. The concern of the Assistant Commissioner of Information and Education that training should be delivered by the Operations Branch should also be addressed. An even better solution to the problem of providing training may be to give the Information and Education Branch sufficient funding to hire experienced trainers during the election run-up period.

(4) The party registration functional area should have its duties expanded, or it should be put under another assistant commissioner.

B. Legal Framework for Elections

The commission operates under the legal framework of the Papua New Guinea Constitution and the Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections. In addition to these documents, which were created by Parliament, the commission operates under a set of election regulations. These regulations are proposed by the Electoral Commission but must be approved by the National Executive Council (similar to the cabinet). (Copies of these regulations were unavailable during the assessment visit.)

The commission is responsible for the following elections:

- National (Parliament)
- Local-level Government (of which there are two types: urban and rural)
- National Capital District Landowners
- Industrial (union)
- University of Papua New Guinea (elections are for president, vice-president, and board members).

Major changes in the legal mission of the Electoral Commission occurred in 1995 and 1997. In 1995, the constitution was amended to essentially eliminate separately elected provincial governments. Under the new provisions, the winner of a provincial seat -- the at-large seat -- in the parliamentary elections automatically becomes the governor of the province, unless he refuses to serve in that capacity. As a result, a new organic law was passed in 1997 that removed all references to provincial elections. The new law made other minor modifications, such as changing the time periods for candidate certification and removing a provision that allowed unregistered citizens to vote, but the procedural aspects of conducting elections remained largely the same.

C. Voter Enrolment (Registration)

Voter enrolment is perhaps the most critical -- and criticized -- element of Papua New Guinea elections. While the law describes a fairly straightforward system for enrolment, the 1997 elections showed that the system is not working as intended. The following excerpt from the Commonwealth Observer Group's report on its mission during the 1997 elections (attachment D) is indicative of the many problems encountered:

The one consistent complaint concerned the Common Roll. It was alleged that there was both under-registration in particular areas and overall over-registration. We were told of "ghost-names", double registration and dramatic increases in the size of the Common Roll in particular electorates. In one electorate the numbers on the roll had increased by over 50 percent since the 1992 General Election. Voters insisted that they had registered but had been turned away at the polling booths because their names were not on the Roll. The figures alone suggest that in some parts of the country investigation by the Electoral Commission and an examination of registration procedures are both merited.

A thorough examination of the enrolment regulations and process was conducted by a team from the Australian Election Commission just prior to the IFES assessment visit, so this section will provide only a brief overview of some of the issues involved.

While Papua New Guinea has compulsory enrolment, no one is ever punished for not enrolling. Enrolment is available to citizens of voting age (18) who have lived for the past six months or more in the electorate for which they are enrolling. To enrol, a citizen must complete a "claim for enrolment" (see attachment E) providing name, residence, occupation, and sex. The claim must be witnessed by a qualified voter. All new enrolments and modifications must be entered in the Electoral Commission's enrolment database. In some regions, the returning officer has computer capabilities and performs the data entry locally. He then provides a diskette of the new information to the Electoral Commission. In others, enrolment update forms are provided directly to the Electoral Commission for data entry there. The resulting database is then used to create master printouts of every individual enrolled in each electorate. After a public review period which allows for modification and correction, final printouts are produced and delivered to the appropriate provincial offices. Now called the "Common Roll," these printouts are then used in conducting the elections. Each Common Roll contains the names of all enrollees for that electorate, organized by village (see attachment F for examples of the Common Roll).

Findings

The data processing arm of the Electoral Commission's Operations Branch appears to be competent at organizing, updating, and printing the Common Roll, and its director provided detailed flow charts of its operation. However, the enrolment process in the field and the format of the final product appear disorganized and lacking in any meaningful uniformity. Several practices were found that are questionable at best:

- While some regions require individuals to fill out a claim form (as the law mandates), many use village chiefs or enumerators to add and delete citizens from enrolment, apparently without the knowledge of those citizens.
- One election official responsible for the enrolment process seemed unfamiliar with the existence of claim forms.
- Without claim forms or update sheets, it is impossible for the Electoral Commission to monitor the accuracy of data entry in the field.
- Organization of the names on the Common Roll is left largely to the discretion of the provincial election official. In some cases, they are organized by last name, in some cases by first name, in some cases by family grouping, and in some cases chronologically according to when they were added to the database.

Recommendations

(1) A greater degree of uniformity throughout the whole enrolment process should be mandated and enforced by the Electoral Commission. Uniformity at all costs does not serve the purposes intended, and the assertion by some that different regions require different methods should be accepted. But the arbitrariness of enrolment methods in Papua New Guinea has endangered the whole electoral system and must be brought under control.

(2) The Electoral Commission should not allow the enrolment of any citizen who does not complete a witnessed claim for enrolment. Such claim forms should be readily available for public inspection. Preferably, originals should be kept by the returning officer with copies provided to the Electoral Commission in Port Moresby.

(3) All provincial offices can benefit from computers equipped with the necessary software to allow voter enrolment data entry. These computers can be directly linked with the Electoral Commission so that proper supervision of the process and instant turnaround for list production can be performed. If such a computer network is not feasible, then the Electoral Commission should explore the purchase of optical scanning equipment and the use of scannable enrolment forms. Under this system, all enrolments would be processed at the commission's Port Moresby headquarters.

(4) To the best degree possible, organization of the names on the Common Roll should be standardized. At the very least, each Common Roll should have the names organized uniformly throughout. It is understood that some variation to fit local situations (such as those locations where few voters have or use last names) should be allowed on an "as required" basis.

(5) A unique numerical identifier should be assigned to every voter in the country. This number system should be the basis of the entire registration system.

(6) The Electoral Commission should give serious consideration to establishing a voter card system. (Such a system was tried in one area in 1992 but, for unknown reasons, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.) Such a system would make it much easier to find individuals on the rolls and prevent those not on the rolls from voting.

(7) As an overall goal, the Electoral Commission should, during the period between now and the 2002 national election, establish as its highest priority retooling of the enrolment process and production of Common Rolls and should use whatever resources are available to it toward this end.

D. Election Official Training

In 1997 training was conducted in several rounds. From January to March, Electoral Commission staff provided one-week training sessions to returning officers and to selected assistant returning officers. These sessions were held in regional sites throughout the country. The primary material for this training was a three-ring binder containing a collection of documents and manuals from the past several years. A second round of training at regional sites was held in April and May and attempted to include all returning officers and assistant returning officers as well as some presiding officers (the chief officer in charge of a polling team). The training document for this round appears to be one entitled "Polling Place Management Procedures." This document, prepared by the Information and Education Branch, is a condensed and reformatted version of a returning officer's manual. This latter manual was written by the Assistant Commissioner for Programmes and Research and contained information on the most

recent law and procedural changes. (It appears that it may have been used in some of these sessions.) According to the Assistant Commissioner for Information and Education, the manual and the training itself were offered with the proviso that the assistant returning officers do what they think best. The assistant returning officers were then responsible for providing 1½ day training sessions to presiding officers and other pollworkers. The training was evidently not mandatory, but those not attending were not permitted to serve as presiding or assistant officers. The Polling Place Management Procedures manual was presumably used in these sessions. There was apparently no monitoring by Electoral Commission staff of the pollworker sessions.

The fifteen-page Polling Place Management Procedures manual is divided into four sections: Preparation, Election Procedures, Voting Procedures, and Election Returns. The section on processing regular voters covers half a page.

The Assistant Commissioner for Education and Training believes that the training at the pollworker level was uneven, as there were some less-than-qualified returning officers conducting the training and some less-than-qualified pollworkers being trained. (Pollworkers are selected by the returning officers, so the Electoral Commission has little oversight.)

Findings

In his press statements in the run up to the 1997 election, the Electoral Commissioner repeatedly publicized the many rounds of training that were provided to election officials throughout the country. While implementation of an extensive training schedule was laudable, the arbitrary and non-uniform practices that occurred in many places suggest that such training did not adequately reach those for whom it is most important, the pollworkers. A standardized and comprehensive manual was clearly lacking. The three sets of training documents that were used had numerous flaws in design and content. (It was also exceedingly difficult to determine what training materials were used when and by whom.) Finally, the Electoral Commission appears to have little direct control over hiring, training, or supervising pollworkers.

Recommendations

- (1) A comprehensive set of training materials should be drafted by a training expert. Such a set may include (a) a comprehensive manual for returning officers, (b) a more succinct and directed version for presiding officers and other pollworkers, (c) a booklet for pollworkers that discusses how to handle specific situations, and (d) a manual for those workers involved in ballot counting (no such manual seems to exist).
- (2) A training specialist should develop and provide workshops for those who will be involved in training pollworkers.
- (3) The Electoral Commission should develop and implement a training schedule that places more emphasis on pollworker training.

(4) The Electoral Commission should make provisions for direct involvement by its staff or those employed by it to provide direct oversight on pollworker training. Every effort should be made to ensure uniformity of the training agenda and training methods.

E. Voter Education

The Information and Education Branch works primarily with Papua New Guinea NGOs to provide information to voters. These include Catholic and other church organizations and women's councils. In 1997, much information concerning the elections -- including deadlines for registering, method of checking the rolls, and deadlines for filing as a candidate or party -- was disseminated through press releases by the press spokesman (see attachment C). Material from the releases was intended to be carried by the three main Papua New Guinea newspapers, the one television station, and various radio stations. To supplement these releases, the commissioner participated on several occasions in a popular radio call-in show on a Port Moresby radio station. The Electoral Commission also sponsored a 44-page voter education book directed at young people. This guide, called "Vote for the Future," was written by Yauka Liria and published by Oxford University Press. The degree and method of its dissemination is unknown.

Findings

Use of press releases was a valuable tool in the dissemination of voter information. The guide for young people is extremely well written and should be a worthwhile resource for years to come. Beyond these, however, there does not appear to be a systematized approach to providing voter education throughout the country.

Recommendation

A short-term voter education specialist is needed to develop and begin implementation of a strategic plan for voter education. This plan should take into account the wide variation in literacy, availability of broadcast and print media, and other cultural variables in the disparate parts of the country.

F. Ballot Access

Unlike many emerging democracies, Papua New Guinea suffers from too much ballot access rather than too little. As discussed earlier, the number of candidates for a single parliamentary seat ranged up to 61 in the 1997 elections and winners averaged about twenty percent of the vote. The number of candidates increases with every national election. Any qualified citizen is able to become a candidate simply by filling out a certification form and paying a filing fee of about US\$480. Access is equally available to party-endorsed candidates and to independents. (Three out of every four candidates in the 1997 national elections ran as independents.) The result is that practically none of the members of Parliament carry a true mandate from their constituents. The media, the political observers, and the Electoral Commissioner all seem to be aware of the problem, but no one has produced a solution. If the Parliament of Papua New Guinea is to truly

represent the wishes of the voters, a solution must be found that will provide those elected with more of a popular mandate than they now have.

Recommendations

The Electoral Commission should urge the Parliament to establish a commission to explore ballot access alternatives that would provide for greater popular support of elected representatives. Some sample alternatives are listed below:

- Increasing the filing fee.
- Requiring independent candidates to obtain a reasonable number of petition signatures in order to qualify for the ballot.
- Re-introducing the preferential voting system (wherein voters indicate first, second, and third choices) that was in use before independence.
- Establishing a percentage threshold that a losing candidate must attain in order to be eligible to run in the next election.
- Providing some sort of incentive for would-be candidates to run on party labels, such as a waiver of the filing fee. This could provide the added advantage of strengthening parties.

G. Ballot Design Issues

Papua New Guinea ballot papers are mandated to carry pictures and names of the candidates and, where the candidate is a party nominee, an adjoining smaller picture of the party leader and name of the party. Regulations allow pictures to be deleted from the ballot paper if there are more than 15 candidates, but in 1997 the electoral commissioner chose, for the convenience of illiterate voters, to print pictures on all ballots. Candidates are listed in an order determined by lot. For the first time in 1997, ballots were printed with serial numbers and were designed so that a serial number stub would remain on the ballot pad after the ballot paper had been torn away at its perforation and handed to the voter. Although a decision was made in 1997 to print ballots "in-house," that proved unworkable and the tradition of using private printers was continued. (Copies of ballots may be found in attachment G.)

Findings

Ballot papers are well designed and easy to read and mark. Instructions for marking the ballot are visible and understandable. The commissioner's decision to print candidate pictures, regardless of the resulting size of the ballot, was a positive one and should be continued. The ballots are water-marked to protect against fraudulent copying, and the use of serial numbers provides an additional and valuable safeguard.

H. Election Operation Issues

Elections may be held on one day only or for up to two weeks, depending on the area. In most instances, a specific polling location will only be open for one day. Then, the polling team staff will move on to another village. Through this arrangement, one polling team may be responsible for several different polling places.

The election process begins when the governor general issues a writ. The writ announces when polling will begin and end and the date by which the results must be determined. Actual locations and days of polling must be published in the country's *National Gazette* and in a newspaper circulated in the electorate. Once publication occurs, polling must adhere to the schedule "as far as possible." If conditions force a variance from the schedule, the election officials must take action to ensure adequate publicity of the change. An election cannot be challenged on the basis of failure to observe a polling place schedule.

There are many reasons why voting is conducted on different days at different places. Papua New Guinea is dotted with many small inaccessible villages. These villages are not large enough to support a full-fledged day of voting nor to field sufficient qualified individuals to serve as pollworkers. A centrally-located polling place often cannot serve nearby villages due to lack of roads. Also, the budget does not allow for the sheer numbers of pollworkers that would be required to attempt a one-, two-, or three-day national election. Finally, electoral violence is enough of a "tradition" in some parts of the country that security forces must be employed; they would be spread too thin if too many polling places were operating on the same day. As a result, many polling teams travel by road, helicopter, or boat from one small village to another over a several-day period. Voting must start on a Saturday, and it cannot take place on a Sunday or holiday. The polls are to open at 8 a.m. and close at 6 p.m. However, various provisions in the law allow the presiding officer to stray from these times.

A polling team is composed of the presiding officer (PO), the assistant presiding officer (APO), at least one poll clerk, one or more doorkeepers, and where desired, an "interpreter." (An interpreter, according to the law, is hired to "interpret any matter he is required to interpret." In practice, this individual is used to perform a variety of tasks.) All these individuals are hired by the returning officer for the province, or by the assistant returning officer for the electorate.

Each candidate may have one representative, known as a "scrutineer," in the polling place; this person must be appointed in writing by the candidate. Scrutineers may not assist voters.

In national elections, voters are permitted to vote in any polling place within their electorate. Each polling team has the certified list of voters for the whole electorate.

The voting process is thus: When a voter enters the polling booth (Papua New Guinean for "polling place") s/he is asked to state her/his name. The PO may ask other questions to determine the voter's eligibility. Once the voter is found on the certified list of voters (the Common Roll), the poll clerk checks that there is no indelible ink on the voter's fingers, partially marks through the voter's name on the certified list, and then marks through the next consecutive

number on a sex tally sheet. The PO then applies indelible ink to the small finger of the voter's left hand and hands the voter a ballot that the PO has initialed on the back. The voter then retires to an unoccupied compartment, marks her/his ballot, folds it so that the initials of the PO can be seen, and deposits it in the ballot box. While voters are told to mark ballots with an "X", the law allows for acceptance of a ballot marked with other than an "X" if the voter's intent is clear. All incidents, objections to or variance from established procedures, as well as complaints from scrutineers, are to be noted in a "memo book."

The law makes provision for assistance to disabled or illiterate voters, for replacement of spoiled ballots, and for allowing those whose names have already been marked through to cast a provisional ballot. The law also lays out the procedures for absentee, or "postal," balloting.

The law formerly allowed voting by a voter whose name was not on the certified list but claimed to be eligible to vote. Known as "sectional voting," this practice was removed in 1992, but continued in a *de facto* manner through the use of "supplementary rolls." These were rosters developed after the end of enrolment and even on election day that included citizens who appeared eligible but could not be found on the rolls. The practice of supplementary rolls was largely curtailed in the 1997 national election.

Findings

The Organic Law appears straightforward and fairly comprehensive in its elucidation of polling place procedures, and the manuals provided to returning officers and presiding officers appear to follow the law. (Two major exceptions to this are that the application of indelible ink and the keeping of a sex tally are never mentioned in the law.) However, there was a wide variety of complaints concerning polling place activities in the 1997 national election. Most of these complaints were presented in the report of the Commonwealth Observer mission for that election (attachment D.) The observers found, or were told, of several problematical practices:

- Polling places did not open on time.
- Presiding officers did not have adequate supplies of ballot papers.
- Would-be voters whose names were not found were allowed to vote.
- Would-be voters whose names should have been found were turned away.
- Polling teams, disgruntled due to errors in their certified list, reverted to using the list from the 1992 election.
- Voters were successful at removing the indelible ink from their fingers and then voting again.
- Voting compartments or screens were not used.
- Polling places closed before 6 p.m. or closed at 6 p.m. even though voters were still in line.

- Rather than processing voters on a first-come-first-served basis, all voters were gathered together and they came up and voted one by one as their names were called off the list.
- Polling places were understaffed.

Many of these problems were verified in interviews during this assessment visit. In 1997, one election official in Bougainville was forced to fly to his returning officer's headquarters one hundred miles away to obtain more ballot papers when supplies in his area ran out. There were many anecdotal reports of repeat voting by individuals adept at removing the indelible ink on their fingers. Newspapers carried several stories during the election period of civic leaders turned away at the polls because their names could not be found on the rolls.

Certainly, these problems did not appear in all polling places. But the issue of *uniformity* of procedures looms large here. Rigid uniformity does not serve the democratic process well -- local situations sometimes require a common sense variance from standard procedures. But the weight of evidence from the 1997 elections strongly suggests that lack of uniformity and adherence to stated procedures created significant problems and undermined citizens' faith in the electoral system. As such, the Electoral Commission must take steps to enforce procedural standards and, where valid and verifiable complaints are lodged, remove non-compliant pollworkers.

Recommendations

- (1) Variance from polling times and places should only be allowed with prior approval from the Electoral Commission except in situations where the Electoral Commission is not reachable.
- (2) All voters should be processed on a first-come-first-served basis. In its training, the Electoral Commission should impress upon returning officers and presiding officers that calling people to vote in the order that their names appear on the rolls will not be permitted.
- (3) The Electoral Commission should take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that each polling team has sufficient ballot papers, or easy access to them, to last through the election period.
- (4) The Electoral Commission should recommend to Parliament that voters must be assigned to a unique polling place or area. The law that permits a voter to go to any polling place in the electorate should be repealed.
- (5) The Electoral Commission may wish to recommend that some form of conditional voting -- for those who believe they are on the rolls but whose names cannot be found -- be permitted.
- (6) The Electoral Commission should continue use of serial numbering of ballots and may consider recommending to Parliament that the requirement that the presiding officer initial each ballot be abolished.

(7) If allegations that voters are becoming adept at removing the indelible ink from their fingers are correct, the Electoral Commission should explore other types of inking systems, such as silver nitrate.

I. Counting and Tabulation

Upon completion of voting at its last polling place, the polling team must seal all ballot boxes containing marked ballots and deliver them to a regional collection point (usually a police station). From there, the boxes must be delivered to a counting center. There is normally one counting center for each province.

The returning officer, or in his absence the assistant returning officer, is responsible for supervising the counting. Counting is typically performed by the presiding officers from the various polling teams. The counting, known as "the scrutiny," is to begin upon completion of all voting in the electorate.

Each candidate may appoint one representative, or "scrutineer," to observe the counting.

Ballots are first checked to determine whether they are valid or invalid. Invalid ballots are known as "informal ballots." A ballot is to be deemed informal if (1) it does not have the presiding officer's initials or mark on the back, (2) it has no vote indicated or the intent of the voter is unclear, or (3) it has something written on it by which the identity of the voter can be determined. Valid ballots are separated into piles by candidate and counted. Postal ballots that are deemed acceptable are then counted, as are any special ballots.

Once the count of valid ballots is completed, the returning officer will seal all ballots, publicly declare the results, certify on the writ of election the name of the winning candidate, and return the writ to the Electoral Commission.

Recounts may be requested by candidates who lose by 0.25 percent or less. Recounts are conducted by the returning officer, but he may involve the Electoral Commission in the process.

Findings

The main issue of concern about ballot counting is timing. The results of the vote at specific polling places are never announced; in fact, they are often never determined. The returning officer must, on his accounting sheet, enter the results from each ballot box, but most ballot boxes contain the ballots of multiple polling places. In many parts of the country, this secrecy surrounding the vote of a particular village is intentional. If a village does not vote the way it is expected to, supporters of the loser may see this as justification for payback. (Revenge for perceived wrongs is highly institutionalized in Papua New Guinea society.) Organized violence against that village may result. However, the Electoral Commission has come under criticism in the past for waiting too long to announce the results of the elections, prompting losers to accuse the commission of "cooking" the results. As a compromise, results of the 1997 elections were

tallied and announced as soon as a polling team finished with all its polling places and delivered the ballot boxes to the counting center. This produced still more criticism -- partial results were made public while voting for the office was still being conducted in other parts of the region.

Another issue of concern is the transport of ballot boxes. There appears to be a tradition in some parts of the country of stealing ballot boxes while they are en route to collection points or counting centers. While the Electoral Commission downplays the frequency of this practice, incidents are widely reported in the press. On-the-spot counting and declaration of results would eradicate the problem but may increase the likelihood of revenge violence.

Recommendations

(1) The Electoral Commission may consider asking Parliament to amend the Organic Law by providing explicit directions for (a) the transport and security of ballot boxes, and (b) the disposition and retention of ballots after an election.

(2) More counting centers should be established to prevent extended transport of ballot boxes. This provides a measure of security for the ballot boxes and allows the ballots to be counted closer to the town or village where they were cast.

J. Election Appeals

Electoral losers may appeal the outcome to the National Court (which, when handling election appeals, is known as the Court of Disputed Returns). The grounds for which an election may be appealed are limited by law to allegations that the winning candidate committed or attempted to commit bribery or undue influence. However, in practice there appear to be numerous acceptable grounds for disputing elections. According to the law, the decision of the National Court is final, but, once again, there appear to be numerous cases of losers appealing the decision to the Supreme Court.

In most cases of disputed elections, the Electoral Commission is responsible for providing all evidence and documentation related to the election. Legal counsel is appointed for the commission but much of the preparation for trial is done by commission staff.

Findings

Appeals of election outcomes are rampant in Papua New Guinea. Since the 1997 national elections were held, eighty-eight petitions contesting the results have been filed. Of these, forty went to trial. In at least five cases, the court ruled in favor of the petitioner and the original winner was turned out of office.

Although the commissioner stated that only one petition charged wrongdoing on the part of election officials, the actual number appears much higher. An analysis by Professor John Nonggorr of all 88 filings found that 26 percent of all allegations of wrongdoing were made against the Electoral Commission, and 74 percent were made against the winning candidate.

Four petitions still remain to be heard. The commissioner has privately and publicly decried the "rush to petition" and blames it in part on a procedural change in 1997 that allowed petitions to be filed in the provinces. (The former law required all filings to be made in person in Port Moresby.)

K. Electoral Commission Budget and Expenditures

The budgeting process for electoral operations involves several steps: submission by the commission in September of a detailed proposed budget for the coming fiscal/calendar year; evaluation and recommendation by the Department of Treasury and Corporate Affairs; passage of the budget by Parliament in December; and finally, reworking of the budget to meet the limits set by Parliament.

The Electoral Commission regularly receives four to six million Kina (1 Kina = US\$0.48) less than what is requested. In 1997, the Electoral Commission asked for K30 million and received K23 million. In 1998, it asked for K12.3 million and received K6 million. And for 1999, the request for K11.6 million was met with approval for K8 million. For 2000, the Electoral Commission plans to request about K5 million.

An analysis of the budget submitted for 1999 shows that over half the projected expenditures will occur in the field. These expenditures are necessary to conduct numerous by-elections resulting from parliamentary vacancies. A summary budget breakdown follows:

1999 Proposed Budget

<u>Item</u>	<u>Cost (in 000's of Kina)</u>
Salaries and Wages	990 (9%)
Travel	86 (1%)
Utilities	224 (2%)
Materials and Supplies	128 (1%)
Staff Car Transport and Fuel	126 (1%)
Consultants	225 (2%)
Property Rental	181 (2%)
Maintenance	131 (1%)
Staff Education and Training	172 (1%)
Benefits, Pensions, etc.	659 (6%)
Disputed Returns Resolution	700 (6%)
Local Level '98 Elections	100 (1%)
National By-elections	6,600 (57%)
Local By-elections	300 (3%)
Unpaid Election '97 Expenses	200 (2%)
Boundaries Commission	700 (6%)
Other	78 (1%)

TOTAL	K 11,600

Included in the 1999 budget is an item to link computers in each of the provinces with the Electoral Commission office in Port Moresby.

Expense payments from the provinces are based on requests filed by provincial returning officers. These requests are supposedly based on the budget given to the province by the Electoral Commission.

A significant portion of the overall budget is spent on travel costs, including staff travel, election official training travel, and pollworker travel. This is reflected in the "National By-elections" line item in the budget on the previous page. These costs are due in large part to the remoteness of many of the villages and polling places. In many areas, access is available only by boat, airplane, or -- most costly of all -- helicopter. An example of these costs can be found in the budget estimate for conducting two by-elections this coming year in Enga province. According to the estimate, pre-election travel and subsistence for various election personnel will cost over K70,000 while the travel costs associated with polling will top K290,000. These travel costs are 28 percent of the total cost estimate for planning and conducting the elections in Enga province.

Findings

There appeared to be many complaints from the field that pollworkers from June 1997 had still not been paid as of December 1998. These claims were countered by Electoral Commission staff who responded that many returning officers hired extra workers without authorization. Travel costs -- for commission staff, field officers, and pollworkers -- consume an inordinate amount of the Electoral Commission's overall budget. If alternatives could be found to reduce these costs, the savings could be used to fund additional staff and polling personnel that appear to be needed.

IV. BOUGAINVILLE ELECTIONS

A. Electoral History

Although fighting raged on and off throughout the 1990s, two elections for the national Parliament were held in Bougainville. In the 1992 election, turnout was fairly high and there were no election-related deaths, according to Electoral Commission staff.

In 1997, the election picture was not so positive. The Electoral Commission and the provincial returning officer, Mathias Pihei, knew early on that it would be a troublesome election. The Revolutionary Army had begun a campaign, called "Operation Stopim Election," with the intent of encouraging people to boycott the elections. (By this time, the secessionists saw themselves as no longer part of Papua New Guinea and therefore saw no reason to participate in a Papua New Guinea national election.) In anticipation of trouble, the returning officer cut the number of polling places from the 1992 total of 152 to only 95. This move was made in part to enhance the ability of Papua New Guinea police to provide security to the polling teams. According to Mr. Pihei, "where the security situation improved, additional polling places were added."

Voting was conducted in all three electorates of Bougainville: North, Central, and South. The election commenced on 14 June and ended on 26 June. Ballot counting ran from 30 June to 2 July.

Due to the on-going crisis, little updating had been done to the list of registered voters. By the time the election started, it contained 85,000 voters. How many actually lived in the electorate in which they were registered is unknown, but estimates of the eligible population provided by Mr. Pihei put that figure at 52,000.

South Bougainville. While this area was considered to have "acute security problems," the same twenty polling places used in 1992 were used again in 1997. Although the Common Roll contained over 30,000 names for this electorate, the estimated eligible population was only 16,500. Just shy of 11,000 turned out over the three-day voting period. The winner, Michael Laimo of the People's Democratic Movement, won the parliamentary seat rather handily with 43 percent of the vote.

Central Bougainville. This area, the stronghold of rebel forces, experienced the most electoral strife. Polling places were cut from seventeen to five, and turnout was only 2,640 of an estimated eligible population of 10,300 and a voter roll with 28,200. The greatest problems were in Arawa, the former provincial capital, where voting was scheduled to run three consecutive days. Voting started at the Arawa polling place at 8 a.m. on the first morning. By 9 a.m. the Bougainville Revolutionary Army had begun firing on the polling place; their fire was returned by government troops. The firefight went on for over six hours. Those already inside the polling place were permitted to vote and then sent home. At 4 p.m., officials were instructed to close the polling place. Fearing a repeat of the violence, officials chose not to open the polling place on the second and third days. (A petition filed after the election by a losing candidate citing the closing of the Arawa poll as proof of election official chicanery was turned down by the court.) Two people died from electoral violence in central Bougainville. The winner, independent Sam Akoitai, garnered 19 percent of the vote -- only 115 more votes than his nearest competitor.

North Bougainville. While this area was thought to be the calmest, since it was largely controlled by government-leaning forces, it also experienced its share of troubles. The number of polling places was reduced from 115 to 70 in order to beef up security. Still, one person, a Resistance commander, was killed in election-related violence. Turnout was relatively strong; almost 21,000 votes were cast from a Common Roll of 26,800 and an estimated eligible population of 25,000. Michael Ogio won with 25 percent of the vote.

Provincial. In the province-wide election, veteran Papua New Guinea politician John Momis won a landslide victory with 52 percent of the vote. Momis, running on the Melanesian Alliance Party ticket, is a well-respected priest who is considered the father of the Papua New Guinea Constitution. Prior to the election, Momis had been kidnapped by rebel leaders while campaigning and was held for ten days. Even the Electoral Commissioner got involved in the case, pleading publicly for the BRA to release him. The circumstances of his kidnapping, release, and its effect on the voting are open to debate.

B. Legal Developments Concerning Governmental Structure and Elections

The Lincoln Agreement of January 1998 called for "free and democratic elections on Bougainville to elect a Bougainville Reconciliation Government before the end of 1998." (See attachment H.) That timetable had already proved unworkable by the middle of the year. Various legal and procedural obstacles have stood in the way of the Bougainvillean push for a democratic peace.

The Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG), while promoted and endorsed by the Papua New Guinea government when it was created in early 1995, soon found itself outside the country's constitution. In late 1995, Parliament passed constitutional amendments that did away with appointed and elected provincial governments, and 1997 changes to the election law removed all references to the conducting of provincial government elections. But Parliament also passed a series of acts that exempted Bougainville from the new constitutional reforms until the end of 1998. Additionally, a successful move to include all four members of Parliament from Bougainville in the new provincial government structure ran afoul of other parts of the constitution. But once again, plans were devised by which Parliament would provide yet another Bougainville exemption.

In the summer and fall of 1998, the attorney general ruled that Bougainville was, by extension, also exempt from the new election laws and that the much-anticipated elections for the Reconciliation Government should be run under the old election laws or some portion thereof that would be appropriated for the yet-to-be-written Bougainville constitution. While the situation was anything but clear, there did seem to be a pathway to the establishment of a new, directly-elected Bougainville government.

For most of the puzzle parts to fall into place, Parliament had only to vote another extension of the Bougainville exemptions in early December 1998 followed by another exemption package vote in February 1999. All factions seemed ready to support this action -- until the time to vote arrived. While only a few members voted against the measures, most of the government opposition members refused to come to the chamber to vote. Needing absolute majorities, the measures failed. Prime Minister Skate then promptly adjourned Parliament until July 1999, thus providing no opportunity for legislative reconsideration. Welcome to the Land of the Unexpected. Suddenly, there was no legal basis for any kind of Bougainville government to exist beyond 31 December other than one operated directly by Parliament. And there was certainly no legal basis for the Electoral Commission to conduct any Bougainville elections other than local-level (municipal) elections. As such, Bougainville would come under all parts of the current constitution and the current organic laws on national and local-level governments and elections. Under this framework, the incumbent holder of the provincial seat in the Papua New Guinea Parliament, John Momis, would have become governor and leader of the provincial government on 1 January, 1999. But when the new year began, the prime minister's cabinet suspended the nascent government to keep it from taking power. Momis is now challenging the cabinet's action in court.

Since December's parliamentary inaction, confusion has reigned over the status and future of a government of, by, and for the people of Bougainville. There followed a flurry of visits by members of parliament, government administrators, and Australian and New Zealand VIPs to Bougainville to try to assure the citizens and the factional leaders that (1) this vote was somebody else's fault, (2) commitment to peace and reconciliation remained strong, and (3) some way would be found to circumvent this legal roadblock and get the move toward a directly-elected government back on track.

As of this writing, it appears that the former opponents BTG and BIG have combined forces to create a new interim reconciliation government, draw up a new constitution, draft new election boundaries, and call for direct elections in the spring of 1999. A provincial congress with seventy-nine members has been proposed by the Bougainville leaders, composed of both elected and appointed representatives from the various factions, community governments, and church and women's groups. While none of these actions appear to have any legal basis under current Papua New Guinea law, it remains to be seen whether the national government will intercede or will find some legal means that will allow it to look the other way while Bougainvilleans go on about their most serious business.

C. Major Issues Facing Proposed Elections

1. Election Timetable and Preparations

There is no consensus among all parties involved, including the Papua New Guinea government, the BTG, the BRG, foreign advisors, and staff from the Electoral Commission, as to *when* elections could take place on Bougainville. The time needed to put into place the proper legal mechanisms that must precede an election of this sort plus the time needed to organize a free and fair election varies from two months to over a year, depending on the respondent.

Findings

Interestingly, the two people interviewed who appeared most enthusiastic about conducting an early election -- and most unaware about the preparations necessary to conduct a free and fair election -- were BTG leader Gerard Sinato and BIG leader Joseph Kabui. These are the two politicians with the most to gain, and the most to lose, in the election. Both remain confident that their philosophy is the will of the people and that their supporters will win. It is this perception that makes the proper conduct of the election most critical. Someone, i.e. some philosophy about Bougainville's future, will lose. And if there is a public perception that the election was rigged, stolen, or otherwise unfair, then the chance for renewed insurrection is great. (Ironically, the government's recent inaction has drawn the two sides closer together; they now appear to be working in tandem toward the creation of the Reconciliation Government. This may ultimately augur well for acceptance of the election results.)

Other players do not see the possibility of elections before August. These include the Office of Bougainville Affairs, representatives from foreign and international groups, and the chief election officer in Bougainville, Mathias Pihei. Both Pihei and Assistant Electoral

Commissioner Morea Veri have developed election preparation schedules that suggest a lead period of six to fourteen months to conduct a successful election (see attachment I). This time frame assumes that a new constitution and new electoral boundaries for Bougainville are already in place, neither of which is currently the case. Pihei also has stated that he will not start election preparations without approval from some governmental authority. Such approval had not come by the end of the assessment visit and, in light of the current confusing situation, would not be expected in the very near future.

Many respondents spoke of the likelihood of some interim governmental setup composed of the members of parliament, elected local officials who could be "deemed to have been elected" (these would be members of local Councils of Elders and Councils of Chiefs), and some appointed members. Such a grouping could function as a rump provincial assembly until true direct elections could be held. Others spoke of the possibility of some sort of electoral college of currently elected or appointed people who would choose temporary provincial assembly members.

Another issue in the debate over when elections can be held is disarmament. While the Lincoln Agreement and subsequent treaties called for the disarming of all factions on the island, progress in this arena has been slow. Some respondents believe that it would be dangerous and perhaps disastrous to attempt elections before disarmament is completed.

2. *Command Structure for the Elections*

There is no provision for any entity other than the Electoral Commission to conduct elections such as those proposed in Bougainville. The ultimate electoral authority would be the electoral commissioner. Commissioner Kaiulo has already delegated a member of his staff to work on the elections. Under the commissioner and his staff, the normal chain of command would operate, with the chief electoral officer in Bougainville being the current provincial returning officer. As in other elections, assistant returning officers would report to the returning officer, and presiding officers and pollworkers would report to assistant returning officers.

For the 1997 election, a Planning and Steering Committee was created to help provide policy guidance for the electoral staff. This committee later became more of a monitoring committee -- ensuring that adequate security precautions were being taken. The committee was composed of various government agents, police officers, and representatives of the church, businesses, and the BTG. Such a committee has yet to be formed for the upcoming election because, according to the chief election officer in Bougainville, no budget for it has been authorized, and no one will work without a guarantee of reimbursement for his time and effort.

Findings

There are several problematical aspects to the command structure now in place. Foremost is the fact that, as of this writing, the Electoral Commission has no legal basis for conducting this election, and it is doubtful that the commissioner would go forward with election planning until such a legal basis is established. Second, while the appointment of a coordinator from the

commission office is laudable, it is unclear what role that person will be expected to perform. Third, the current returning officer, while committed to his electoral duties, is a Papua New Guinea government worker (he is currently the Acting Secretary for District Services) and not a direct employee of the Electoral Commission. Rightly or wrongly, some factions may view his service to the national government as a hindrance to his ability to be both fair and forceful in his supervision of the election. Fourth, BIG leaders are wary of Papua New Guinea government oversight of any Bougainville election; they believe that an independent, and preferably international, body should oversee the elections. Direct outside command of the elections may not, however, be acceptable to the Electoral Commission.

Recommendations

(1) The Electoral Commission should either bring Mr. Pihei directly under its authority or hire another individual to serve as returning officer, also under its direct authority.

(2) Logistics support should be provided to the Electoral Commission, preferably by an election administration specialist who could assist in the organization of the Bougainville election. This person would be involved in coordinating the voter enrolment effort (described below), organizing a communications and transportation plan for the election period, monitoring polling place security arrangements, coordinating the activities of any international observers, and other tasks as deemed appropriate.

(3) A Planning and Steering Committee composed of representatives of all Bougainville factions should be organized and funded with all deliberate speed. This committee should be involved in all aspects of election planning and should be in continuous contact with the logistics specialist and the returning officer. Formation of this committee should not be delayed by the current political machinations involved in creating the Reconciliation Government.

3. *Voter Enrolment (Registration)*

Some updating of the Common Roll was completed in Bougainville prior to the 1997 election, but only where security permitted. Since no census was conducted in Bougainville in 1990, and since the rebellion resulted in significant deaths and displacement, it is impossible to determine the accuracy of the Roll as it now exists.

Some updating has been done since the 1997 election, but updating activities have been suspended until authorities provide the funding and approval to continue them. In the meantime, the assistant returning officer from South Bougainville states that he has arranged for people from all factions -- BRA commanders, Resistance leaders, and BTG personnel -- to be involved in the roll updating. His plan calls for the rolls to be taken to village chiefs who will mark out those citizens no longer there and add any newly eligible citizens in the village. His plan does not involve usage of the "Claim for Enrolment" form; in fact, he seemed only vaguely aware of such a form.

Complete and correct registration of eligible voters for the upcoming election is the linchpin for a successful election. Unfortunately, the current status of the Bougainville rolls leaves much to be desired. Based on the figures obtained from the Electoral Commission and the Bougainville returning officer, the estimated eligible population is only 52,000, and yet there are currently over 85,000 voters enrolled. Is the eligible population vastly underestimated or are the rolls crammed with voters who have permanently moved, are no longer alive, or worse yet, never existed? Answering this question may be impossible. But performing only a cursory updating of the rolls would leave much room for complaint.

The consensus of opinion is that the Common Roll should be created from scratch for this election. (The only notable exception to this was voiced by Premier Sinato, who believes only updating is needed.) But starting from scratch will naturally require a longer preparation time. Mr. Pihei believes that, with normal use of personnel, the rolls could be completely redone in six months, but with "a big push" that time frame could be cut to three months.

Given the national outcry over the voter rolls for the 1997 election, the dilapidated state of the Bougainville rolls, and the importance of providing maximum insurance against error and fraud in the proposed election, beginning anew to create a Bougainville roll seems the best path to follow.

Recommendations

- (1) The Electoral Commission should provide adequate staff and financial resources to create a new Bougainville Common Roll.
- (2) Enrolment should require every citizen to complete a claim form.
- (3) Enrolment field staff should be employed. This field staff should include representatives of all political factions in the province. Where possible, the field staff should work as teams.
- (4) The Electoral Commission should develop and implement policies for the enrolment of Bougainville citizens who are currently residing outside the province, particularly those in other parts of Papua New Guinea and in the Solomon Islands. Enrolment efforts should be well publicized in the media.

4. Time Period for Elections

The Organic Law gives flexibility to the Governor General to dictate whether any election will be held on one day or multiple days (up to two weeks). Guiding objectives in determining what is best for Bougainville are (1) ensuring the maximum opportunity for registered voters to vote, (2) ensuring that polling teams and observers are able to get to all polling stations on the appointed day or days of voting, and (3) ensuring that adequate security is available for voters, polling teams, and observers. There are many trade-offs in determining how these objectives can best be met. Viewed from one angle, having only one day of voting lessens the chances of electoral violence that could develop over an extended voting period and of fraud perpetrated by

voters attempting to vote at multiple locations. From another angle, one-day voting provides logistic difficulties for polling teams and security personnel that would probably force election organizers to use fewer polling places. This would in turn make voting less accessible to the populace.

Findings

All parties were asked their views on this issue. Again, there was little consensus. The deputy electoral commissioner feels one day is ideal. The chief government officer in Buka thinks two days is best and that "one week would be a terrible idea." The Assistant Commissioner for Operations thinks one week is ideal because it would allow for reducing the number of polling teams and increasing security. The assistant returning officer for South Bougainville agrees with him, citing road conditions as a primary cause for lengthening the voting period. The electoral commissioner also believes there should be a longer voting period. And finally, BIG Chairman Joseph Kabui believes it should be one to two weeks or "however long it takes" to get the job done. He also believes that every polling place should be open a minimum of two days.

Recommendations

- (1) Establishment of the polling calendar should take into account the need to fully staff each polling place and make provision for election observers. Considering this need, and the opinions expressed by those involved, it would appear that a polling window of from three to seven days would be best.
- (2) Once the polling calendar is established and publicized, every effort should be made by the parties involved to avoid any variance from the schedule.

5. Voter Education

Voter education and public information may be conducted through broadcast and print media and through face-to-face contact. In the current period of peace and reconciliation activity, information is being disseminated by various methods.

Print Media -- Papua New Guinea newspapers are available to some parts of the province, particularly the Buka area, and provide daily, if sometimes conflicting, information on reconciliation and government-building activities. These include *The National*, the *Post-Courier*, and *The Independent*. Three publications are directed solely at Bougainvilleans. The Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) publishes a weekly newsletter in both Pidgin and English called "Nuis Blong Peace" that is distributed throughout the island. PMG members take copies to village meetings and also distribute them at markets (see attachment J). The Office of Bougainville Affairs recently began publishing "Nuis Bilong Sankamap," an English-only newsletter summarizing activities of the office. Distribution size and method is unknown. The BTG publishes "Ville Press," a weekly newspaper distributed through district managers. (As of December, funding problems had caused temporary suspension of this publication.)

Broadcast Media -- Only a small percentage of Bougainvilleans have televisions, and there is only one Papua New Guinea television station -- EM-TV. While it provides national news, most of its programming is Australian. Radio stations seem to come and go on Bougainville. Radio Bougainville is a short-wave station that appears to have the widest audience. The BRA runs "Radio Free Bougainville," but sources say that it is no longer broadcasting. There are two FM stations -- one in Buka and one in Arawa -- and both read the PMG's newsletter over the air. The extent of their listening audience is not known.

Person-to-Person -- The PMG runs regular patrols through most of the villages in Bougainville and conducts informational sessions that often reach as many as 200 people at one time. The BRA also has patrols that go to BRA-controlled villages and apprise the residents of progress in the peace process.

Findings

While there was no real consensus on the need for an organized voter education program, most of the interviewees felt the concept was worthwhile. Non-Bougainvilleans such as the PMG, UN, and Director of the Office of Bougainville Affairs (which is located in Port Moresby) were most vocal in their support for a voter education component before the elections. PMG leaders found the issue paramount and thought there could be a role for PMG members in disseminating voter information, both through village discussions and through their newsletter. The political advisor of the UN Observer Mission felt that voter education was extremely important, and that it should focus on issues rather than on the electoral process. Of chief importance, according to him, is quashing the "many unfounded rumors that float around here endlessly. Some people only get what their chiefs tell them."

Conversely, Bougainville natives were less convinced of the need for voter education. One reason is the pride natives have in the allegedly high literacy rate of Bougainvilleans. (While this was certainly true in pre-crisis days, schools in the province were closed for several years, and one can assume that the literacy rate now is not as high as some think.) Finally, the BTG Premier thought education was needed in BRA-controlled areas, and the BIG Chairman felt it was needed in BTG-controlled areas.

Recommendations

- (1) A voter education specialist should develop and implement an education/information program that could be utilized through all three dissemination mechanisms.
- (2) The Peace Monitoring Group should be requested to provide personnel to be trained in providing person-to-person civic and voter education activities during the election run-up. PMG should also be requested to provide space in its publication for a weekly election-related informational article.

(3) Members of various factions should nominate individuals to serve as civic education trainers and to provide civic education services in areas not easily covered by PMG personnel.

6. *Recruitment/Training of Officials*

For the 1997 elections, Bougainville election officials primarily used school teachers and civil servants as pollworkers. Data from the returning officer's report on that election is conflicting, but it appears that there were either 46 or 84 teams, and the budget called for a total of 258 election officials. Presumably, these officials were trained by the returning officer and his assistants using the Polling Place Management Procedures manual produced by the Electoral Commission's Information and Education Branch.

Findings

When queried about whom he might recruit for the upcoming election, the assistant returning officer who was interviewed gave different options. At one point, he said he would use the same individuals as in 1997; at another point, he said he would try to recruit people from the various factions in the Bougainville crisis. There are advantages to both tactics. Using public servants who are non-partisan provides a much-needed perception of neutrality on the part of election officials. Using representatives from opposing factions ensures that everyone has bought in to the process and makes it more difficult for losers to allege misconduct on the part of officials.

According to sources in Bougainville, many of the election officials from 1997 still have not been paid for their work. Evidently the money allotted by the Electoral Commission to Bougainville for paying officials was insufficient for the number of officials who were hired. Mr. Pihei stated that he paid those who were otherwise unemployed, and is still trying to get an allocation from the Electoral Commission to pay the rest. According to the Electoral Commission, the only ones not paid were those who only worked in the counting centers.

Recommendations

(1) In hiring officials, the Electoral Commission should target a mix of non-partisan public servants and partisan representatives. Where possible, the presiding officer of a polling team should be perceived as non-partisan. If the presiding officer is from a partisan background, then the assistant presiding officer should be from a different faction. For example, a typical polling team of five people may include non-partisan presiding and assistant presiding officers, a poll clerk from the BRA/BIG, a doorkeeper from the Resistance, and an interpreter from the BTG.

(2) Sufficient time should be allotted for extensive pollworker training. It is imperative that there be uniformity of procedures throughout Bougainville, and that these procedures be well known and transparent.

(3) A short-term training coordinator should ensure that uniform techniques and materials are used in the training process. This position may be combined with the voter education position recommended above.

(4) Any pollworkers or counters from the 1997 election that have not been paid should be paid immediately, regardless of who was at fault for hiring them without adequate funding. Non-payment is an invitation to sabotage in the upcoming election as well as a disincentive for quality workers to consent to work again.

7. *Absentee Voting*

There are three types of geographically displaced citizens of Bougainville as a result of the civil war. Internally displaced people -- those who left their villages but remained in Bougainville -- most often went to "care centers" (which could loosely be described as refugee centers) in other parts of the island. At one time, the number in care centers may have exceeded 60,000, but the number has dropped rapidly over the last year. At the time of the assessment visit, the best estimate from sources in Port Moresby was that 14,000 remained in these centers. Sources on Bougainville, however, reported that only one care center - Arawa - remains open. In any event, officials believed that most care centers would be closed and inhabitants returned home by June 1999.

The second type of displaced people is those living in other provinces in Papua New Guinea. While there are purported to be significant numbers in the Port Moresby area, no estimate of this category could be found.

The third type is refugees living outside of Papua New Guinea, mostly in the Solomon Islands. A Repatriation Committee was organized about the time of the Lincoln Agreements. In February 1998 the committee members visited Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands, to assess the situation of these refugees and recommend steps toward repatriation. One committee member estimates that 2,500 Bougainvilleans are now in the Solomons.

For the 1997 elections, the Electoral Commission advertised the availability of absentee, or "postal," voting for all Papua New Guineans, and it appears that the overwhelming majority of those voting absentee were from Bougainville. Some of the absentee ballots were sent directly to Bougainville; others were collected in Port Moresby and forwarded. Unfortunately, accurate counts of these could not be obtained as the records in Bougainville and those in Port Moresby were in conflict. It would appear that the final number of counted absentee ballots was about 650. In any event, it was a relatively small proportion of the displaced population in June 1997.

Findings

There was wide consensus among respondents from all factions that displaced persons should be afforded the opportunity to vote. Even rebel government chief Joseph Kabui agreed, although it can be assumed that most displaced persons living elsewhere in Papua New Guinea are government loyalists and thus not his supporters.

Respondents were also in agreement that the care centers would be largely empty by the time a Bougainville election could be organized and thus should pose no great problem. But if this is

not the case, efforts must be made to ensure that individuals in these centers are enfranchised. A decision must be made as to what district they are eligible to vote for -- that in which the care center is located or that in which they lived before fleeing.

While the Organic Law provides an adequately detailed procedure for postal voting, it is a procedure that appears seldom used. While there may be little need in most parts of the country, the current situation suggests significant need for this voting option in Bougainville.

Recommendations

(1) The Electoral Commission and its agents on Bougainville should develop a comprehensive plan for distributing and processing Bougainville absentee ballots. Such a plan should be widely advertised through Papua New Guinea media and in the Solomon Islands.

(2) The Electoral Commission should consider setting up polling places in Port Moresby and, if agreed to by Solomon Island authorities, in Honiara, to allow in-person absentee voting by displaced citizens. (Such voting in the Solomon Islands may require assistance and supervision by the UN or the PMG.)

8. *International Monitoring*

The desire for an international monitoring team is consistent among all parties. Commissioner Kaiulo believes that "it would be ideal." Provincial Administrative Secretary Francis Kabano feels it is "absolutely critical" and one of the most important issues surrounding the election. UN Political Advisor James Sloan believes there *must* be an international presence. Even BTG Premier Sinato, who generally sees Bougainville election concerns as local issues, believes it would be helpful because it would allay suspicions of BRA supporters that the government will try to rig the election. The question is, who should be involved and what should be the extent of their involvement?

Findings

The number of monitors needed depends on the length of the polling period and desired extent of coverage. While the Commonwealth Observer Group which monitored the 1997 national election collected much information and produced a valuable report, the group consisted of only ten members and eight staff and attempted to cover a country of four million people roughly the size of California. Needless to say, much of their information was anecdotal hearsay.

Maximum coverage would necessitate at least one monitor with every polling team. If the election were held on only one day, and only one monitor worked each polling place, about 150 people would be required. Conversely, an election in phases would only require twenty to thirty monitors. A practical consideration of bringing monitors from outside the country is the need for accommodations. The three main towns in Bougainville -- Buka, Arawa, and Buin -- together have guest accommodations for a maximum of forty-five people. The current PMG contingent of 300 live primarily in tents; some accommodations could possibly be obtained through it. The

length of the mission must also be considered. The PMG's Senior Negotiator believes that the campaign period should also be internationally monitored.

The question of who should organize and lead such a mission was put to many of the interviewees. The following organizations were mentioned:

IFES -- Mr. Kabui expressed particular interest in IFES sponsorship of a monitoring mission as well as overall election supervision.

Commonwealth Observer Group -- Having participated in one election (apparently the first Papua New Guinea election to ever be monitored by an international group) and having observed twenty-two elections since 1989, this group may be the obvious choice.

Peace Monitoring Group -- According to PMG officials, they could not take on this task without a modification of their charter by the four member countries. (However, their Senior Civilian Negotiator felt that it would be natural for them to provide some infrastructure for such a mission.) Both Mr. Kabui and Mr. Dihm, the Director of the Office of Bougainville Affairs, expressed reservations about PMG having such a mission. Some BIG/BRA supporters apparently feel that the PMG is biased in favor of the Papua New Guinea government.

United Nations -- Several respondents expressed hope that the UN could provide such a monitoring mission. Sources at the UN Development Programme in Port Moresby said that use of UN volunteers for such a role has already been discussed. While the UN Observer Mission's Political Advisor did not know what role the UN may be able to play, he enthusiastically endorsed the concept of international observers.

Carter Center -- At the time of the assessment visit, the chief assistant to Mr. Dihm had inquired at the US Embassy about the availability of the Carter Center to conduct an assistance/observation mission.

Recommendations

- (1) An effort to finance and organize a monitoring mission should be considered by the international donor community.
- (2) Assuming the availability of adequate resources, the mission should include sufficient members to provide one for every polling team for the full length of the polling period.

9. Domestic Monitoring

The concept of organizing domestic monitoring teams was also explored. By law, each electoral candidate is permitted one representative/observer in each polling place, so monitoring by the various factions can be expected to occur naturally. This concept involves monitoring by non-partisan groups with strong ties to the citizenry.

Findings

Due to the extent and length of the Bougainville crisis, it may be hard to find sufficient non-aligned NGOs to field such domestic teams. But some potential NGOs exist. AusAID Country Program Director Percy Stanley proved an invaluable source of information on these groups.

The Leitana Women's Agency, located in Buka, receives high praise for its work and for the organizational skills of its director, Helen Hakena. The Peace Foundation Melanesia is located in Arawa but works throughout the province. One of its functions is providing conflict resolution courses. However, it may be viewed by some as being too closely allied with BIG. The Provincial Women's Council is active in all parts of Bougainville. It was said to be extremely influential in the peace process. Its director, Teresa Jaintong, is a powerful figure with close ties to rebel leader Francis Ona. Others mentioned as possible sources for domestic monitors are the Red Cross and the province's numerous health workers.

Recommendation

(1) Development of domestic observers who can be posted to all polling places as teams or individuals in lieu of or addition to international observers should be explored. At the very least, the organizations discussed above should be invited to participate in the Planning and Steering Committee for the elections.

10. Communication

The provincial returning officer's first priority for the upcoming election is possession of sufficient communication equipment to be in contact with his polling teams. Such communication is currently impossible because the war virtually destroyed the Bougainville infrastructure. All telephone land lines were destroyed and sold for scrap. The only communication avenues now existing are a few satellite telephones and some high-frequency radio telephone equipment. If international monitors are to be deployed, then they must have the ability to communicate with a command post.

Findings

A brief conversation was held with a private communication contractor, and a more lengthy session was conducted with the UN Communications Officer in Arawa. While New Zealand's international aid organization is planning to develop some land-based telephone system for the island, it is highly doubtful that it will be operational before the planned election. VHF radio telephones do not appear to be an option since they would require installation of numerous repeaters and it would be exceedingly difficult to obtain, and provide security from sabotage and vandalism to, the property on which these would be built. While satellite telephones are an option and could be rented, each unit would have its own telephone number, thus making quick response to multiple units difficult. The cost of individual calls would also be prohibitive. A high frequency single side band (HF SSB) system seems the most advisable for the situation.

Each polling team would have its own unit which could transmit to a command station. The units are highly portable and can be powered by solar batteries. Training of approximately one-half day would be required for all users. The units cost approximately US\$5,000 apiece. These units can be heard by anyone with similar equipment, so supplementary satellite telephones may be needed for confidential conversations.

Recommendations

(1) Funding should be provided and a communication system should be installed before the next Bougainville election. One option would consist of approximately 50 HF SSB units and three satellite telephone units. The cost for the entire system would appear to be US\$250,000 - \$300,000.

(2) After the election, the communication units should be donated or loaned to aid stations, health clinics, and/or other public services that currently have no communication capabilities.

11. Security

Respondents from all factions and the international community were asked their opinion on the best method of providing security to polling teams and monitors. Several security organizations were discussed. These include the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (the army), the Papua New Guinea Royal Constabulary (the government police), joint police patrols (operated by the BTG and the BRA), and "community police" (village policing units organized by the tribal units).

Findings

On one aspect of this question, there was definite consensus: the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) should not play a role in the election. In fact, the BIG believes a prerequisite for the election is that the PNGDF be completely removed from the island. While most sources consider that unlikely, all felt that their visible presence would be a detriment to free and fair elections.

Beyond this, there was no consensus as to which entity was best suited to provide the necessary security. A few respondents doubted the need for security, believing that citizen desire for peace and a peaceful election would minimize election-related violence. The most fervent opinion on this question was expressed by the PMG senior negotiator. He believes that whatever security force is used, it must be *unarmed*. In his opinion, current efforts to disarm the island would be severely set back by arming election security workers. Interestingly, those queried about this concept tended to agree. It must be noted that the UN political advisor, while endorsing the principle of unarmed security, believed it would be a tough decision to make, especially if international monitors are present. BIG leader Kabui believed that unarmed security could work, but also believed that an international organization should provide the security.

A corollary issue involves pre- and post-election security for both sensitive and non-sensitive election materials. Current storage on the island consists of two small locked sheds outside the

returning officer's office. While more adequate storage -- either shipping containers or permanent storage buildings -- has been recommended, nothing has been done to correct the problem.

Recommendations

(1) The Electoral Commission, the Bougainville electoral officers, and the Planning and Steering Committee should fully explore the different security alternatives and develop a plan acceptable to all factions. Whatever decision is reached should be widely publicized among the Bougainville citizenry.

(2) If the parties above believe that the situation is sufficiently calm that the benefits of unarmed security outweigh the risks, then this alternative should be employed.

(3) The Electoral Commission should immediately provide funding for a more adequate and secure election material storage facility in Bougainville.

12. *Counting and Tabulation*

In 1997 three counting centers were utilized, one for each of the Bougainville electorates. However, they were merely three different sections of the same building, a high school in Buka. Counting commenced on 30 June, which appears to be several days after voting had ended. The counting lasted about thirty-four hours. It is not known what personnel were used to actually conduct the counting, but according to Electoral Commission officials, those individuals have not been paid for their work.

Findings

Election transparency requires that results be tallied under public scrutiny *and* as soon after polls close as is feasible. The Papua New Guinea system fails the latter requirement. While counting at a central location may provide for better supervision of the proceedings, it also creates a risk of ballot box theft and/or tampering while in transit, and it encourages the perception that election officials may be altering the results.

Recommendations

(1) The Electoral Commission should attempt to conduct the count at local or regional centers where ballot boxes can be delivered within hours of the closing of the polls. Transport of ballot boxes should be done only under adequate and accountable security.

(2) The Electoral Commission should immediately make provisions to pay all counting officials from the 1997 national election.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Papua New Guinea Electoral Issues

This report presents twenty-four recommendations of ways to improve and enhance the operation and performance of the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission. The thread running through most of the recommendations for the Electoral Commission is an emphasis on providing greater *control* and *uniformity* in voter registration and election procedures. The Electoral Commission's past flexibility and decentralization of election and registration functions is commendable. However, ongoing internal and external criticisms of certain practices in previous elections, as well as the lack of full-time provincial electoral staff, suggest that greater emphasis needs to be placed on training and supervision of all provincial election workers.

A summary of major recommendations dealing with control and uniformity is presented below:

Control

- The commission should take the necessary steps, organizationally and financially, to bring all provincial returning officers under its direct control.
- The commission should not allow the enrolment of any citizen who does not complete a witnessed claim for enrolment. Such claim forms should be readily available for public inspection.
- All provincial offices should be provided with computers equipped with the necessary software to allow voter enrolment data entry. These computers should be directly linked with the commission to ensure proper supervision of the process.
- The commission should make provisions for direct involvement by its staff or those employed by it to provide direct oversight of pollworker training.
- Variance from polling times and places should only be allowed with prior approval from the commission.
- The commission should recommend to Parliament that voters must be assigned to a unique polling place or area. The law that permits a voter to go to any polling place in the electorate should be repealed.
- The commission may consider asking Parliament to amend the Organic Law by providing explicit directions for the transport and security of ballot boxes, and the disposition and retention of ballots after an election.

Uniformity

- A greater degree of uniformity throughout the whole enrolment process should be mandated and enforced by the commission.
- To the best degree possible, organization of the names on the Common Roll should be standardized. At the very least, each Common Roll should have the names organized uniformly throughout.
- Every effort should be made to ensure uniformity of the training agenda and training methods.
- During the election, all voters should be processed on a first-come first-served basis.
- Action on recommendations concerning assistance from the international donor community is largely dependent on what activities, such as retooling of the Common Roll, have been approved and funded by AusAID. As of this writing, these are not known. Three major recommendations for assistance to the Electoral Commission are presented below:
 - funding for a training expert to draft a comprehensive set of training materials;
 - funding for a training specialist to organize and provide “train the trainer” workshops with the Electoral Commission; and
 - funding for a voter education specialist to assist the Electoral Commission in developing a strategic plan for voter education.

B. Bougainville Election

The recommendations concerning the planned Bougainville election may be grouped into two main focus areas: (1) planning and control, and (2) transparency and inclusiveness. This election will be a pivotal event in the future of Bougainville. While the balloting may only be to elect individuals, the subtext of the election is to decide whether peace continues or armed insurrection begins again, and whether the province remains part of Papua New Guinea or charts its own independent course. For this reason, it is imperative that the election be properly organized, that its planning and conduct include participants from all factions, and that the citizenry be fully aware of all the processes in place.

A summary of recommendations in these two focus areas is provided below:

Planning and Control

- The Electoral Commission should either bring the current returning officer directly under its authority or hire another individual to serve as returning officer, also under its direct authority.

- A Planning and Steering Committee composed of representatives of all Bougainville factions should be organized and funded with all deliberate speed. This committee should be involved in all aspects of election planning.
- The commission should provide adequate staff and financial resources to create a new Bougainville Common Roll.
- Once the polling calendar is established and publicized, every effort should be made by the parties involved to avoid any variance from the schedule.
- Sufficient time should be allotted for extensive pollworker training.
- The commission and its agents on Bougainville should develop a comprehensive plan for the processing of Bougainville absentee ballots.
- The commission should immediately provide funding for a more adequate and secure election material storage facility in Bougainville.
- The commission should attempt to conduct the count at local or regional centers where ballot boxes can be delivered within hours of the closing of the polls. Transport of ballot boxes should be done only under adequate and accountable security.

Transparency and Inclusiveness

- Enrolment should require every citizen to complete a claim form.
- Enrolment field staff should be employed. This field staff should include representatives of all political factions in the province. Where possible, the field staff should work as teams.
- The commission should develop and implement policies for the enrolment of Bougainville citizens who are currently residing outside the province, particularly those in other parts of Papua New Guinea and in the Solomon Islands. Enrolment efforts should be well publicized in the media.
- Members of various factions should nominate individuals to serve as civic education trainers and to provide civic education services in areas not easily covered by PMG personnel.
- In hiring officials, the commission should target a mix of non-partisan public servants and partisan representatives.
- It is imperative that there be uniformity of polling procedures throughout Bougainville, and that these procedures be well known and transparent.

- Development of domestic monitoring teams should be explored for posting to all polling places. NGOs with the potential for serving as monitors should be invited to participate in the Planning and Steering Committee for the elections. If adequate resources are available, fielding international observers should also be considered.
- The commission, the Bougainville electoral officers, and the Planning and Steering Committee should fully explore the different security alternatives and develop a plan acceptable to all factions. Whatever decision is reached should be widely publicized among the Bougainville citizenry.

The international donor community can support the Bougainville election in important ways. Primary recommendations for assistance are given below:

- provide a logistics specialist who could assist with election organization;
- provide a registration advisor to help coordinate the enrolment effort;
- fund a short-term voter education expert to assist with a VE strategy and campaign;
- fund a short-term training coordinator to assist in developing pollworker materials and training programs;
- support financing and organization of a monitoring mission; and
- support the purchase of a communication system.

C. Conclusions

Elections that are both free and fair and *have the perception* of being free and fair are critical to the continuing peace in Bougainville. Currently both sides of the conflict (BIG/BRA and BTG/Resistance) appear eager for a productive reconciliation process and a lasting peace. This eagerness is certainly a ray of hope for Bougainville's future. Unfortunately, it has not been matched by a similar enthusiasm for addressing and agreeing on the many details that must be handled to ensure a free, fair, and transparent election, and one in which all sides will accept the outcome.

Elections are a time that exposes political nerves and heightens sensitivity anywhere, especially in Papua New Guinea, which has a tradition of electoral violence. That makes successful conduct of the election paramount. A flawed election -- even if the flaws were due to honest errors or lack of resources -- would be disastrous to Bougainville. As such, every effort must be made to minimize the ability of any party to "claim foul" and to minimize election-related violence.

International funding -- for communications equipment, monitoring, pollworker training, voter education, and election logistics support -- seems imperative in order to ensure a successful

Bougainville election. According to the UN's political advisor on Bougainville, it is critical to the peace process that the election be conducted correctly. Guaranteeing that will require some outside assistance. U.S. support in this effort would be quite welcome by all parties, since the U.S. is highly regarded and seen to be neutral in the Bougainville situation.

VI. ATTACHMENTS

Attachment A -- List of Meetings Held

Attachment B -- Electoral Commission Organizational Chart

Attachment C -- Synopsis of Media Statements of Commissioner Kaiulo during 1997 Election

Attachment D -- The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on the 1997 Election

Attachment E -- Claim for Enrolment (voter registration) Form

Attachment F -- Sample Page from the Common Roll

Attachment G -- 1997 Election Sample Ballot

Attachment H -- Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security, and Development on Bougainville

Attachment I -- Proposed Timetable for Bougainville Election Preparation

Attachment J -- "Nuis Blong Peace," Newsletter of the Peace Monitoring Group

Attachment K -- List of Materials Collected on Mission

Attachment L -- List of Relevant Documents Reviewed



ATTACHMENT A

List of Meetings Held and Individuals Interviewed

LIST OF MEETINGS HELD AND INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)

Cynthia Burton, 1st Secretary
Robin Scott-Charlton, Counsellor
Fleur Davies, (Title Unknown)
Tony Simonelli - advisor to Bougainville premier
Percy Stanley - Country Program Manager
Alistair Legge - AusAID Consultant
Kerry Heisner - AusAID Consultant

Bougainville Interim Government/Bougainville Revolutionary Army

Joseph Kabui - Vice-President and Chairman
James Tanis - Minister of Internal Affairs
Members of BRA
Members of Peace Foundation Melanesia

Bougainville Transitional Government

Gerard Sinato - Premier
Francis Kabano - Secretary

Electoral Commission Management Team, Staff, and Returning Officers

Reuben Kauilo - Electoral Commissioner
Andrew Trawen - Deputy Electoral Commissioner
Jojo Urbiztondo - Chief of Electronic Data Processing
Moses Warpulu - Director of Political Party Registration
Michael Malabag - Director of Operations
Rex Au - Director of Finance
Cara - Chief Accountant
Bill - Director of Internal Audit
Morea Veri - Director of Projects and Research
Rex Sabin - Assistant Commissioner for Information and Education
Alphonse Yapin - EC Area Manager in Mt. Hagen
Cyril Retau - EC Area Manager in Port Moresby
John Itanu - Assistant Returning Officer - Buin (South Bougainville Electorate)

PNG Office of Bougainville Affairs

William Dihm - Director
Peter Gall - Assistant to Mr. Dihm (?)

Peace Monitoring Group

Major John Eastgate - Buka Commander
James Batley - Senior Negotiator
Paul Koorey - Commander, New Zealand Delegation

United Nations Development Programme

Finn Reske-Nielsen, Deputy Resident Representative
Barry Henson, Field Security Officer
Timothy Sopp - UN Communications Officer

United Nations Observer Mission

James Sloan - Political Advisor

US Embassy

Arma Jean Karaer - US Ambassador
Alan Latimer - Deputy Chief of Mission

Other Individuals

Samuel Kaipu - Deputy Secretary of Justice
Ben Yagi (accompanied S. Kaipu)
Matthias Pihei - Bougainville Returning Officer (Chief Election Official) and Assistant
Secretary for District Affairs
Stuart Priestly - Deputy Secretary of Provincial Affairs




ATTACHMENT B

Electoral Commission Organizational Chart

FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE - ELECTORAL COMMISSION

The Constitution provides for:-

- i) **Electoral Commission**
An independent Electoral Commission (consisting of the Electoral Commissioner) to conduct all elections, in accordance with the Organic Law on National Elections.
- ii) **Electoral Boundaries Commission**
An independent Electoral Boundaries Commission (of which the Electoral Commissioner is Chairman) to make recommendations, in accordance with the Organic Law on National Elections, on the number and boundaries of National Parliament electorates at regular intervals.
- iii) **Registration of Political Parties**
Protection of Electors from outside or hidden influence by providing for:-
 - (a) the registration of political parties;
 - (b) the integrity of political parties; and
 - (c) the integrity of candidates.



NOTE: The Secretary for Personnel Management on the 13th of April, 1994 approved this organisational structure. The Establishment of the Commission as of 13th April, 1994 consisted of 56 positions. In line with NEC Decision No. 125/93 the Secretary for Personnel Management further endorsed on the 7th of July 1994, the following senior management positions to be filled on contract basis:-

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| 1. EL 003 Deputy Electoral Commissioner Grade 17 | 4. EL 015 Assist. Commissioner (Information & Education) Grade 15 | 7. EL 018 Assist. Commissioner (Finance & Administration) Grade 15 |
| 2. EL 008 Director (Registry, Political Parties) Grade 15 | 5. EL 020 Assist. Commissioner (Operations) Grade 15 | |
| 3. EL 010 Assist. Commissioner (Programmes & Research) Grade 15 | 6. EL 032-EL 036 Area Manager (5 positions) Grade 13 | |

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ATTACHMENT C

Synopsis of Media Statements of Commissioner Kaiulo during 1997 Election

ELECTION '97

Synopsis of Media Statements Issued by Reuben T. Kaiulo, Electoral Commissioner Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea

Ed. Note: RK = Reuben Kaiulo, Electoral Commissioner
EC = Electoral Commission
B'ville = Bougainville

1/7 -- RK announces only 83 days left to register. By now, 1.95 million registered out of target of 2.3 million. Enrolment continues to 3/27. Writ of election will be issued that day. Nominations close 4/25; voting runs from 6/14 to 6/28. Preliminary Common Rolls for all 109 electorates now open for public inspection and objection at Provincial Electoral offices.

1/8 -- RK challenges PNGs to vote: "either put up or shut up." He said many of the so-called middle and upper-middleclass PNGs -- particularly the urban elite -- had made a mockery of previous elections by refusing to vote.

1/9 -- 2,000,375 now registered; total enrolment may be more than expected "because registration in two provinces and one electorate (Southern Highlands, B'ville, and Kompian-Ambum of Enga) are still to be completed." Expected to finish enrolment in those areas by end of January. In all other electorates, preliminary common rolls ready for inspection. In 1992, 1.9 million registered and 1.6 million actually voted.

1/10 -- New common rolls will be easier to read than old, which had become thick and bulky. "It was getting difficult for voters and polling officials to check names. This will not be a problem with the new common roll," RK says. RK also expresses concern that many people are traveling to Port Moresby to inspect common roll when they should save their money and see the Returning Officer at the Provincial Electoral Office. "For this year's election, the EC is refusing to accept lists of eligible voters supplied by prospective candidates," RK says, as "a lot of cheating went on in previous election so we have tightened control." Also EC is printing common roll for the first time "to stop enrolment being tampered with and to avoid printing delays."

1/14 -- RK urges voters to go to their EC office and find their voter number and page number on the common roll to make voting quick and smooth. RK releases provincial office phone/fax numbers for voters to arrange inspection of rolls.

1/16 -- RK says EC is tightening control over officials by only hiring public servants "with no known ties to politicians." Most will be teachers and students. Non-public servants were used in 1992, and "a few of them were influenced by candidates and there were problems "verifying the identity of many of them to make payments to the right people."

1/17 -- RK discusses election changes to be introduced to Parliament on 1/21, saying the changes will "minimise the potential for trouble." Nomination period will be cut back from 28 days to 7 days and campaign period will be cut back from three to two months. Illiterate and disabled voters will be allowed to pick their assistants (not just officials). PNGs living or traveling overseas will be allowed to vote for the first time. Counting of votes will start immediately when voting in an electorate finishes. Losers must be within .25 % of winner in order to ask for recount. EC will be allowed to keep all nomination fees of K1000. Local government council election will be allowed to be held at same time as Parliament election or 3 months later.

1/21 -- Five-week series of election official refresher training programs start.

Chronology of election preparations since August 1995 published. Highlights include:

- 1/96: K40,000 infomercial campaign begun on EM-TV.
- 3/96 to 11/96: Nationwide undercover security survey to prepare potential trouble
- 4/96: National Statistical Office agrees with EC that election can be held without a national census.
- 5/96: All 109 Returning Officers are appointed.
- 5/96 to 11/96: Security forces and EC meet to review security in different regions.
- 6/96: NBC begins K60,000 Election '97 education program

1/23 -- RK warns candidates not to cause trouble. "Our police and Defense Force know who is storing weapons, who is smuggling in weapons using helicopters and where the weapons are. Force will be met with force." RK said 1995 experience in Southern Highlands by-election will not be allowed to happen. In that one, criminals working for certain politicians held up election officials at gun-point and stole 22 ballot boxes containing 5000 votes. RK said 1000 Defense Force troops will work with police and jail officers. 500 will be deployed in Highlands.

1/24 -- RK not happy with political parties, saying few have provided information (names/addresses of party execs) that he asked for two years ago. He also does not have records (Certificates of Incorporation of Association) from most parties proving that they are registered. Without certificates, pictures of party leaders will not appear on voting papers.

1/28 -- Morale is getting high among election officials as refresher training programs continue. K400,000 has been set aside for the training programs. RK also announced 25% pay increase for election officials over 1992 rate.

1/30 -- RK announces that so far 10 women have announced intentions to stand for Parliament.

1/31 -- At training session RK warns election officials to "not allow prospective candidates and their supporters to enrol eligible voters then give us the enrolment... We have to be careful that ghost names do not get onto the Common Roll." Enrolment is the job of the election officials.

2/4 -- In a radio talk-back show, RK announces reports that a candidate on the Indonesian border has been trying to get officials to enrol Indonesian border crossers and refugees. Because of past mistakes, this had been allowed in 1992, but will not be now.

2/7 -- PNG founding father Sir Michael Somare cannot be pictured on the voting papers for the candidates he endorses because his the National Alliance, which he leads, is not registered as a political party.

2/11 -- At refresher training for Highlands region, election official spokesman Joe Neng asks for a curfew in the Highlands to help officials do their work, saying "our lives are very important." Meanwhile, RK is meeting with Police Commissioner Bob Nenta and PNG Defense Force Commander Brig-Gen Jerry Singirok to discuss personal security for officials. ==

2/13 -- Police Commissioner Nenta announced he would personally take charge of security in the Highlands. RK holds security briefing with mining and petroleum execs, who advised RK that their companies would help security forces and officials with transport and accommodations. Nenta also says that armed police and soldiers would escort election officials in and out of all voting places and place their homes and families under constant police surveillance. He will also recommend a Highlands curfew to the Prime Minister. It was also announced that "voting in potential trouble spots will be for one or two days only to allow police and security forces to deal with one potential trouble zone at a time."

2/18 -- West New Britain Provincial Administrator Sebulon Kulu takes part in Refresher Training workshop and provides public support for "campaign for voters to elect good leaders to form good government." This campaign is being led by NGOs, particularly the church.

2/20 -- RK expresses second thoughts about using auxiliary and reserve police, saying that they may be too close to many politicians. If used, they would be assigned to areas away from voting places and counting centres. "According to provincial police commanders, many auxiliary policemen were working like the private armies of certain MPS who had bought them high-powered weapons from the Parliamentary slush fund now called the Rural Action Program."

2/21 -- New Guinea Islands election boss Openakali Tiane speaks at week long refresher training course for the islands, saying it is the first time in 20 years that such a training has been organized. It is also announced by Assistant EC for Operations Michael Malabag that Kimbe Defense Force patrol boats will be used to transport election officials and equipment in the region, backing up air and land transport. Malabag said "Bougainville was being treated as a special case and all steps were being taken to allow B'ville refugees to vote in Election '97."

2/25 -- B'ville election boss Mathias Pihei promises that elections will go ahead despite threats from one BRA faction. Other BRA factions support the elections.

2/27 -- First round of refresher training sessions ends. Second round will start next week in Southern region.

2/28 -- RK announces that 20,000 members of the Evangelical Alliance of PNG will work as volunteers to back up election officials. Each volunteer would be asked to sign a contract, proposed by the church group, saying they did not have any ties with political parties or candidates. RK says he "is refusing to use other non-public servants because they had been a problem in previous elections."

3/4 -- RK appeals for cooperation from politicians, candidates and supporters to not "go around saying bad things about Election 97 officials and EC staff unless you can prove your claim in court." He was referring to repeated claims that:

- officials and EC staff are not enrolling eligible voters who support certain candidates;
- officials/staff are deliberately allowing ghost names on the Common Roll so supporters of certain candidates can vote more than once;
- officials/staff must be removed because they are supporting relatives who are candidates.

RK also says that staff are working 64 hours a week to make sure the Common Roll is as accurate as possible. It has been opened for public inspection and objection since September 1996 so mistakes could be corrected by public and EC staff. Staff are working 8 to 7 Monday thru Friday and 8 to 3 on Saturday.

3/6 -- Former Foreign Affairs Secretary Gabriel Dusava calls on RK to set up a procedure whereby prospective candidates would be examined and cleared of mental illness. RK says only the National Courts, and not the EC, have the power to decide if someone is mentally unfit.

3/7 -- RK says time has run out for political groups not legally registered as political parties, and he lists 11 groups not registered in addition to five groups whose registration had been canceled.

3/9 -- RK announces that he will be leaving his post as Electoral Commissioner in six months, although he had been asked by PM Sir Julius Chan to serve another six-year term. He is the only EC to serve under three Prime Ministers: Sir Rabbie Namaliu, Paias Wingti and Sir Julius Chan.

3/11 -- Founding Father Sir Michael Somare is now happy because his political group, the National Alliance, will be registered tomorrow.

3/13 -- RK says "dishonest people are trying all sorts of tricks to enrol and vote illegally in electorates they do not belong to. I am pleased that our Election '97 officials and EC staff are on the alert. We are getting long lists of names for voter enrolment from prospective candidates and their supporters and we are refusing to enrol these people because we are not given their residential addresses."

3/14 -- The nation's leading thinker, John Momis, praises RK and says the US Embassy had told him they were impressed with the high level of Election 97 awareness among the people. Momis had just re-registered the Melanesian Alliance after its registration as legal political party had been canceled.

3/20 -- Operation Rausim Kwik Defense Force troops will not disrupt Election 97 security operations, their Operation Commander Walter Enuma has promised.

3/21 -- The Opposition ways it will help the Government in Parliament on March 25 to pass proposed election changes to speed up declaring results and change the election calendar. Under the proposed changes, enrolment will continue until April 10 and nominations will open April 10

and close April 17.

3/25 -- Election 97 managers from all over the country are meeting from today through Thursday in Port Moresby for a final check on election preparations. They will be doing a final check on the writs, election forms, the Common Roll, voting schedules, and the election budget for each province. They will also be briefed by a National Court judge on rules for petitions on disputed election results. RK says this is the first time rules on disputes had been drawn up. He says the EC spent a lot of money after the 1992 election on lawyer fees and airfares and accommodations for witnesses in the 62 disputes after that election. 61 took two years to decide and one took four.

3/26 -- RK praises military and PM Chan for averting bloodshed over the Sandline affair. "Sir Julius had done this by allowing Parliament to vote on the motion against him before he made the decision to step aside so an independent inquiry could be done." RK also warns candidates and supporters to be careful about what they say and do during campaigning. He lists the following illegal acts:

- influencing voters with force, threats and violence
- influencing voters with bribes of cash, goods, and favors
- stealing and/or destroying ballot boxes and papers
- interfering with or disturbing voting
- campaigning during the voting period
- stopping voters from voting
- cheating and lying to trick voters
- saying untrue things about other candidates (*added in 4/11 press release*)

3/27 -- Parliament passes proposed election changes so writs that are supposed to be issued today will be issued on April 10. RK says voting in Highland provinces and in Lae and Port Moresby will be for one day only. He says he will also be visiting B'ville this week to thank officials for the great job they are doing.

4/3 -- RK makes clear that disgraced leaders dismissed for misconduct in office over the past three years cannot seek election to Parliament this year. He lists who is qualified and unqualified to run for office.

4/8 -- Governor-general Sir Wiwa Korowi takes one hour to sign all 545 writs for the 109 electorates being contested. The writs will be issued at 4 p.m. tomorrow.

4/10 -- RK announces that local council elections will not be held now with Election 97 but would be held sometime between mid-July and October.

4/11 -- RK appeals to candidates and supporters "to protect the country's image. Please don't cause trouble during your campaigning. The Sandline Affair has given the election a whole new dimension and the world is watching us."

4/17 -- On the last day for nominations of candidates, Acting PM Mr. Giheno instructed all nation government departments and provincial administrators to help the EC with transport during the

election. RK also appealed to private vehicle owners to help. Also the Finance Department gave the EC K500,000 to pay for NBC to give live nationwide coverage of the vote-counting. He said their provincial network will be used to relay information from the provincial tally centres to the national tally centre.

4/22 -- RK says he was "sickened to learn that woman candidate had been threatened on the telephone and harassed by six armed youths." He described as "animals" the candidates and supporters responsible for this. He said police and Defense Forces want to know about threats like this and about candidates and supporters who destroy the posters and billboards of rival candidates.

5/1 -- RK says he does not have the power to stop MP's from giving out money from their Parliamentary slush funds during the campaign period, and that this issue should be taken to the National Court. He is on a Highlands tour to check where Defense Forces would be deployed to help police in election security operations. He, Police Commissioner Nenta, and Defense Force Commander Tuat are taking a special look at security preparations for gas, oil, and mining projects to make sure the projects are not disrupted.

5/2 -- RK declares this a sad day in the history of PNG because the illustrious National Party had been unable to re-register in time, even though he had extended the time five days to give various political groups more time to register. The National Party had not applied until March and their registration is still pending with the Registrar of Companies. He can't extend the deadline any longer because voting papers have to be printed. National Party candidates will be shown on the papers as "independents."

5/13 -- RK announces on a radio talk-back show the election time-table for voting in the five Highlands provinces, Lae, and Port Moresby. "One-day voting in these areas will allow Police and Defense Force troops to concentrate their efforts to deal with troublemakers." A caller from Lae says the Government must release money for the Defense Force deployment because people were already being killed in election wars.

5/15 -- RK says there are 703 candidates officially endorsed by political parties as opposed to only 377 in 1992. The People's Action Party has endorsed 105.

5/16 -- A three-member advance team of a Commonwealth Observer Group arrived for meetings with the EC.

5/20 -- Defense Force troops are moving into Western Highlands to help police put down fighting between warring candidate supporters. A clash at a rally left 15 missing, 5 seriously injured and property worth thousands of kina damaged. One candidate has gone into hiding. Also, RK urges voters to put good leadership before tribalism and says the negative side of tribalism is destroying PNG with payback killings and tribal wars.

5/22 -- RK urges workers to make plans to get time off from work and reminds employers that the Organic Law requires them to give workers time off with pay to go vote. Election managers from

across the country are in Port Moresby for a two-day meeting.

5/23 -- Five people have died so far in election-related violence.

5/26 -- The Trade Union Congress has called on the EC to allow for two-day voting in those areas currently planned for only one day. RK says he understands their concern but must stick with his decision since one-day voting "will make it easy for police and the Defense Force to provide maximum security to protect voters and the general public from harm." One-day voting is now planned for Lae, Port Moresby, all Highlands provinces, South B'ville, central B'ville, and three areas of North B'ville. It is also planned for Wewak, Rabaul, Kokopo, and parts of Gazelle because it can be done easily in one day in these places.

5/27 -- RK reminds workers who cannot leave work that they can vote by postal vote. Postal voting will also be used by registered B'ville and Rabaul voters who have left their provinces because of the B'ville crisis and volcanic eruptions.

5/28 -- Newspapers reported that 5 Government Ministers and 8 PM's were among 50 candidates who have armed themselves with high-powered rifles for the election. RK asks Police Commissioner to prosecute the offenders.

5/29 -- Newspapers reported that the returning officers for Chimbu Province have threatened to quit if RK doesn't meet their demands concerning cutbacks in their election budget, allowances, and voting places. Deputy Trawen is investigating the matter. RK also stood up for Highlands election officers who are being accused of foul play.

6/2 -- RK calls on the BRA to release MP John Momis who had been kidnapped at an election rally yesterday.

6/5 -- RK is throwing the book at a candidate in Madang who apparently registered under a false name. Previously, RK had instructed to police to arrest the man for violation of election law (giving false information) but he will now have the man charged under the criminal law for impersonation.

6/10 -- Police Commissioner Nenta has appealed to the EC to release the Defense Force share of election money, but RK urges him to check his facts before making statements to the media. The Defense Secretary backed up RK, saying he has already given the Defense Force its election money.

6/17 -- RK says he is sad because so many voters could not vote, but he is cross because this would not have happened if voters had followed EC advice and checked the Common Roll to make sure their names were on it. Some said their names had been registered in house-to-house calls by election officials; others thought they need not enrol this year because they would still be registered from 1992. However, RK says names of voters from 1992 were not left on the Common Roll because all eligible voters have to enrol or re-enrol for each new election. Among those who were unable to vote were a member of RK's family, the chairman of Shell Pacific, and the editor-in-chief of the *National*.

6/20 -- RK appeals to party-endorsed candidates to not change parties after winning election. He learned over the weekend that some parties were already trying to sign up candidates who had been endorsed by other parties.

6/22 -- RK expresses concern that some candidates are continuing to campaign during the election period. He said offending candidates would lose their election in court if found guilty. Four law companies have been selected to represent the EC in election court cases.

6/24 -- RK says votes in ballot boxes stolen by candidates and their supporters will not be counted and that counting would not be stopped because of the stolen boxes.

6/25 -- RK is giving more time for voting in parts of Morobe Province (due to bad weather) and Western Province (due to transport difficulties). Voting will be extended in these places until July 3 and 4.

6/26 -- Some candidates and a departmental head have asked RK to stop live nationwide coverage of the counting of votes by NBC, claiming that this coverage would influence results where voting was still continuing. RK said he could not interfere with the independence of the Press, including NBC.

7/1 -- RK bid farewell to the Commonwealth Observer Group and promised to act quickly on the Group's recommendations. Since he is planning to leave the EC August 9, he wants the proposed changes enacted now rather than later.

7/? -- Writs for Local-level Government Elections will be issued 1 August. 5,747 wards with 284 local-level governments will be contested. Voting will begin 27 September and end on 10 October.



ATTACHMENT D

The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on the 1997 Election

ADVANCE COPY

The General Election in Papua New Guinea

14-28 June 1997

The Report of the
Commonwealth Observer Group



Commonwealth Secretariat

**The General Election
in
Papua New Guinea**

14-28 June 1997

**The Report of the
Commonwealth Observer Group**

**Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House, Pall Mall
London SW1Y 5HX**

**REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP TO THE
GENERAL ELECTION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA**

14-28 June 1997

CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of Transmittal	v
INTRODUCTION	1
The Observer Group and its Terms of Reference	1
Method of Work	2
1. POLITICAL BACKGROUND	3
Political Developments since Independence	3
Recent Developments	4
Political Parties	5
2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK	9
Basic Structure	9
Provincial Government	10
Electoral Boundaries and Representation	10
The Census	10
The Franchise	11
The Electoral Commission	11
The Electoral Staff and Powers of the Commission	11
Polling Places	12
The Common Roll	12
Nominations	12
Comment	12
3. PREPARATIONS FOR THE ELECTION	13
The Common Roll	13
Candidates and Political Parties	14
Voter Education and Training of Officials	15
Preparation of Ballot Papers	15
Security	15

4. THE CAMPAIGN AND THE NEWS MEDIA	17
The Campaign	17
The News Media	19
5. THE POLL AND COUNT	23
The Poll	23
The Count	28
Comments	29
CONCLUSIONS	31
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	33



**Papua New Guinea General Election 1997
Commonwealth Observer Group**

Tel: Port Moresby 323 5005
Fax: Port Moresby 323 8008

**The Islander Travelodge
P O Box 1981, Soroka
Port Moresby**

30 June 1997

Dear Secretary-General,


We gladly accepted your invitation to participate in the Commonwealth Observer Group for the 1997 General Elections in Papua New Guinea. We wish to thank you for allowing us this opportunity to play a part in the consolidation of democracy in this country.


In spite of the shortcomings to which we have referred in our Report to you, in particular the inadequacies of the Common Roll, overall we believe that the conditions existed for a free expression of will by the electors and that the result of the election will reflect the wishes of the voters.

We wish to record our deep appreciation to the Government of Papua New Guinea, the Electoral Commission, the political parties and above all, the people of Papua New Guinea for their warm welcome and their assistance during the course of our mission. We wish them well.


**Sir Robin Gray
Chairperson**

**His Excellency Chief Emeka Anyaoku
Commonwealth Secretary-General
Marlborough House
London SW1 5HX**



Sir Jim Lester



Ms Joycelyn Lucas



The Hon Ian Macphee AO


Mr Ejaz Naik


Justice Muhammad Habibur Rahman


Mr Maharajakrishna Rasgotra


Hon. Ambassador Paul Rupia MP


Mr Omar Sey


Ms Judy Thompson

INTRODUCTION

In May 1997 the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, received a request from the Acting Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Hon John Giheno MP, to establish a Commonwealth Observer Group to observe his country's fifth General Election. The Election had been called in April and would be held between 14 and 28 June 1997. This was the first time that the Government of Papua New Guinea had invited Commonwealth or other international observers to observe a General Election.

In line with established practice, the Secretary-General sent an Assessment Mission of three Commonwealth Secretariat officials to Papua New Guinea to establish whether the major political parties would welcome Commonwealth observers. The Assessment Mission visited Papua New Guinea between 19 and 23 May 1997 and met representatives of the Electoral Commission, the main political parties and non-governmental organisations. It subsequently reported to the Secretary-General that there was broad support for the presence of Commonwealth Observers.

The Observer Group and its Terms of Reference

This was the twenty-second Commonwealth Observer Group to have been constituted by the Commonwealth Secretary-General since the October 1989 meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. That meeting had agreed that member countries could benefit from the sending of Election Observers as a means of strengthening democratic processes and institutions. This view was reaffirmed by Heads of Government at their meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe, in October 1991, where it was reflected in the historic Harare Commonwealth Declaration, and at subsequent meetings of Heads of Government.

It was against this background that the Secretary-General invited our Group of ten Observers, supported by eight members of staff from the Commonwealth Secretariat, to observe the General Election in Papua New Guinea. The composition of the Group, which was led by Sir Robin Gray, is set out at Annex I. The terms of reference for our Group were incorporated in the Secretary-General's letter inviting each of us to participate in the mission and were as follows:

The Group is established by the Commonwealth Secretary-General at the request of the Government of Papua New Guinea and supported by all the major political parties. It is to observe relevant aspects of the organisation and conduct of the election in accordance with the law of Papua New Guinea. It is to consider the various factors impinging on the credibility of the electoral process as a whole and to determine in its own judgment whether the conditions exist for a free expression of will by the electors and if the result of the election reflects the wishes of the people.

The Group is to act impartially and independently. It has no executive role; its function is not to supervise, but to observe the process as a whole and to form a judgment accordingly. It would be free to propose to the government and other concerned authorities such action on institutional, procedural and other matters as would assist the holding of the election and thereafter, the effective functioning of the elected government.

The Group is to submit its report to the Commonwealth Secretary-General, who will forward it to the Government of Papua New Guinea, to the leadership of political parties taking part in the election and thereafter to all Commonwealth governments.

The Secretary-General's announcement of our mission on 3 June 1997 is at *Annex II*.

Method of Work

We were briefed in Singapore on 5 June 1997 by the Commonwealth Deputy Secretary-General (Political), Mr K Srinivasan. We arrived in Papua New Guinea the following day and held a press conference in the capital, Port Moresby, at which we issued the Arrival Statement attached at *Annex III*.

On 7 June 1997 we began a series of meetings in Port Moresby with the Electoral Commissioner and his colleagues, the police, senior representatives of political parties, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), media organisations, the business community, women's groups and Commonwealth High Commissions. These meetings provided a valuable opportunity to be briefed on the preparations for and background to the General Election. It also enabled us to explain our mandate and the way in which we intended to conduct our observation. Our Schedule of Engagements is at *Annex IV*.

We divided our Group into eight two-person teams. Seven of these were deployed on 10 and 11 June and were based in key provincial capitals - Port Moresby, Lae, Mount Hagen, Goroka, Rabaul, Madang, Wewak - from which it was intended that they should cover their own and neighbouring provinces. The eighth, consisting of the Chairperson and Staff Team Leader, was based in Port Moresby but roved across the country, including to North Solomons Province (which includes the island of Bougainville). Altogether these teams were able to cover 18 of the country's 20 provinces. Details of our deployment are at *Annex V*. Two members of the Group's support staff remained in Port Moresby to support and maintain communication with the teams in the field.

Our teams were briefed on arrival in the provinces by officials of the Electoral Commission and the police. They subsequently met candidates, political parties and others, in an exercise parallel to that conducted earlier in Port Moresby. All teams travelled extensively before and during the election period, and submitted daily reports of their observations to the Observer Group's Chairperson.

In some places the elections were held on one or two days, in others over the whole two-week period. Our teams observed the poll at as many polling stations (known in PNG as polling booths) as possible, witnessing the opening procedures and polling and ending with scrutiny of the counting and tallying process. Altogether, our teams visited 321 polling booths in 66 electorates and observed 17 counts, once more meeting election officials and party representatives, but also speaking to the voters themselves. During our deployment we were assisted by Observation Notes and Check Lists (see examples at *Annexes VI and VII*).

Our Group reassembled in Port Moresby on 26 June 1997 for a debriefing and to finalise our Report. We departed from Port Moresby from 1 July 1997.

CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Papua New Guinea (PNG) was formed by the merger of the Territory of Papua, which had been under Australian rule from 1906, and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, which had been a German colonial territory from 1884 to 1918.

Comprising the eastern section of the island of New Guinea and about 600 smaller islands, including the island of Bougainville, PNG was administered by Australia under a League of Nations mandate granted in 1919 and then under UN trusteeship from 1945. In 1949, Australia brought the two territories under a unified administration. The Territory of Papua New Guinea became internally self-governing in December 1973 and achieved full independence on 16 September 1975, as the Independent State of Papua New Guinea.

Since independence, PNG has expanded the development of its considerable mineral resources. Most of the population, however, continues to be engaged in agriculture - cash crops such as coffee for export and subsistence farming. PNG has close relations with its former colonial power, Australia, but has been attempting to broaden its international contacts particularly in South-East Asia. It is a member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, the South Pacific Forum and the Melanesian Spearhead Group. PNG consists of 19 provinces and a national capital district. The capital is Port Moresby. Traditional forms of social organisation play an important part in PNG society and have significant political as well as cultural and social influence.

Political Developments since Independence

Politics in PNG in the post-independence period has been characterised by coalition governments drawing support from a number of political parties and independent MPs. Political allegiances are largely based on locality and personal ties, rather than ideology. The party system is relatively weak and the system is marked by shifting loyalties and frequent floor crossing by MPs. A significant proportion of elected MPs - and an even larger proportion of candidates - are independents. There have been few women MPs since independence and no women have been elected since 1982.

Prior to the 1997 General Election there had been four elections since independence. An interim coalition government which had been elected in 1972 remained in power until 1977. Elections were held in that year and then in 1982, 1987 and 1992. By 1997 there had been eight governments. No single party had ever governed in its own right and a series of no-confidence motions had resulted in frequent mid-term changes of government.

On independence, Sir Michael Somare, leader of the Pangu Pati formed the first governing coalition with the PPP, and later with the United Party. In 1980, a no-confidence motion moved by Sir Julius Chan, leader of the People's Progress Party (PPP) resulted in Sir Michael Somare losing his premiership. At the 1982 elections, Sir Michael Somare and his Pangu Pati defeated Sir Julius Chan and became Prime Minister again.

In 1985, following the defeat of a challenge against Sir Michael Somare, the deputy leader of the Pangu Pati, Mr Palas Wingti, broke away and subsequently founded a new political party, known as the People's Democratic Movement. In the same year, Mr Wingti assumed office as Prime Minister following a no-confidence motion introduced by Sir Julius Chan. At the 1987 elections, Mr Wingti again became Prime Minister when he successfully formed a multi-party coalition, thereby securing a parliamentary majority of three votes. In early 1988 Sir Michael Somare was replaced as leader of the Pangu Pati by his deputy, Sir Rabbie Namaliu. In the same year Sir Rabbie Namaliu defeated Mr Wingti and formed a new coalition government.

The Constitution was amended in 1991 so that a no-confidence motion in the Prime Minister could no longer be proposed until he or she had completed 18 months in office. An amendment was also incorporated into the Constitution which allowed for the early dissolution of Parliament, rather than a change of government, if a no-confidence motion was won within the last 12 months of a term of Parliament.

Following the 1992 elections, Mr Wingti was elected Prime Minister, defeating Sir Rabbie Namaliu on the strength of the casting vote of the Speaker. In 1993, Mr Wingti called a snap parliamentary ballot on leadership which resulted in his immediate re-election as Prime Minister. Widespread protest at his action and a Supreme Court ruling in 1994 which declared his re-election invalid, led to Mr Wingti's resignation and a new parliamentary leadership vote. Sir Julius Chan of the PPP defeated the Speaker, Mr Bill Skate, leader of the People's National Congress, and formed a governing coalition with the Pangu Pati and the League for National Advancement (LNA).

In 1996, Sir Michael Somare formed a separate alliance - the National Alliance - supported initially by 11 MPs. This led to differences between himself and the Pangu Pati which he had founded in 1975.

Recent Developments

The months immediately prior to the 1997 General Election were dominated by a political crisis occasioned by the decision of the Government to intensify its efforts to secure a military resolution to the attempted secession of the island of Bougainville.

The attempted secession of Bougainville, the main island in the North Solomons Province of PNG, began when landowners there took up arms in 1988, following what they regarded as an unsatisfactory response to their claims for compensation from an Australian company mining copper on the island. The Panguna mine had been in operation since 1964, and in 1988 accounted for around 20 per cent of PNG government revenues and around 44 per cent of PNG's exports.

The secession attempt was led by an organisation styling itself the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the ensuing conflict led eventually to the indefinite closure of the mine and a significant loss of revenue to the PNG Government. The conflict then escalated and it is estimated that thousands of lives have been lost to date. The conflict also damaged the economy, overstretched the security forces and strained relations with neighbouring countries.

In an effort to finally resolve the conflict by military means, a number of attempts at negotiation having failed, the PNG Government decided in January 1997 to hire a UK-based company, Sandline International. The Government stated that Sandline would train members of the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF). Critics claimed that foreign mercenaries would be used in action in Bougainville. The contract, which was reportedly worth US\$35 million led to international and domestic protest. The then Commander of the PNGDF, Brigadier-General Jerry Singirok, came out in opposition to the contract and called for the resignation of the Prime Minister and senior Ministers. Members of the PNGDF and others protested on the streets of Port Moresby and the mercenaries were expelled from the country. In a subsequent parliamentary debate Prime Minister Chan defeated a motion calling for his resignation, which was later amended for him to step aside. Subsequently, Sir Julius Chan decided to stand aside in favour of an Acting Prime Minister, Mr John Giheno, while a Commission of Inquiry investigated the Sandline events. This Commission reported to the Acting Prime Minister during the General Election campaign. The Sandline events further fuelled the national debate about the way in which PNG is governed.

Political Parties

Twenty political parties registered prior to the 1997 General Election:

Christian Country Party	Leader	Avusi Tanao
Christian Democratic Party	Chairman	Dilu D Goma
Hausman Pati	Leader	Waim Tokam
Liberal Party	Leader	Thomas Pupun
Melanesian Alliance Party	Leader	John Momis
Melanesian Labour Party	Leader	Dr Paul Mondia
Milne Bay Party	Leader	Simon Mumurik
Movement for Greater Autonomy	Leader	Steven Pokawin
National Alliance Party	Leader	Sir Michael Somare
National Party	Leader	Philip Kapal
Papua New Guinea First	Leader	John Gundu
Pangu Pati	Leader	Chris Haiveta
People's Action Party	Leader	Ted Diro
People's Democratic Movement	Leader	Paia Wingti
People's National Congress	Leader	Bill Skate
People's Progress Party	Leader	Sir Julius Chan
People's Resources Awareness Party	Leader	Michael Uvilio
People's Solidarity Party	Leader	Kala Swokin
People's Unity Party	Leader	David Unagi
United Party	Leader	Rimbink Pato

At the 1992 General Election the tally of seats gained by party-endorsed candidates was as follows, while 31 seats were gained by independents:

Pangu Pati	22
People's Democratic Movement	15
People's Action Party	13
People's Progress Party	10
Melanesian Alliance	9
League for National Advancement	5
National Party	2
Melanesian United Front	1

None of the 20 political parties is easy to characterise in ideological terms. Five of these parties have participated in coalition governments, but three have emerged as having had particularly important roles in several of the eight coalition governments since independence: the People's Progress Party, Pangu Pati and the People's Democratic Movement. In addition, many also considered that, although only recently formed, the National Alliance (led by former Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare) would also be an important contestant in the 1997 General Election.

People's Progress Party (PPP) - led by Sir Julius Chan, Prime Minister immediately prior to the 1997 General Election. The PPP has participated in six coalition governments and has led two. In the 1997 General Election the party endorsed candidates for 74 of the 109 seats. The PPP has traditionally been perceived as a party which is supportive of business and economic development. During the campaign Sir Julius Chan promised the reintroduction of a land mobilisation or registration programme, to enable landowners to participate fully in the economy by using land as security for bank loans.

Pangu Pati - led by Mr Chris Haiveta, Deputy Prime Minister in the government which left office following the Sandline crisis. The Pangu Pati has led three coalition governments since independence. In the 1997 General Election the party contested 90 of the 109 seats, including 26 of the 29 seats in its traditional regional base of the Momase region.

People's Democratic Movement (PDM) - led by Mr Paias Wingti, a former Prime Minister. The PDM has led three coalition governments since independence. In the 1997 General Election the party supported candidates for 61 seats. The PDM concentrated its campaigning on a policy of 'free education', promising free education from elementary school to Grade 12.

People's Action Party (PAP) - led by Mr Ted Diro, a former Deputy Prime Minister. In the 1997 General Election 105 candidates were aligned with the party or its leader. The party endorsed multiple candidates in its traditional regional base - the Papuan Region. One major PAP theme in the 1997 election campaign was their proposal for the introduction of a federal system of government, with the national government controlling only foreign affairs, defence and finance.

National Alliance (NA) - led by former Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare. The National Alliance endorsed 71 candidates in the 1997 elections. During the campaign the party emphasised the need for good government, opposition to corruption and the strengthening of provincial government.

Melanesian Alliance (MA) - led by Mr John Momis, a former Minister and MP for the North Solomons Province since 1975. The party sponsored 35 candidates in the 1997 General Election and was closely aligned with the National Alliance in the campaign.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee. The names are listed in alphabetical order, and the addresses are listed in the order in which they appear in the list.

2. The second part of the document is a list of the names and addresses of the members of the committee who have been elected to the office of chairman. The names are listed in alphabetical order, and the addresses are listed in the order in which they appear in the list.

CHAPTER 2

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Basic Structure

The Independent State of Papua New Guinea is a unitary state. The Constitution provides for the establishment of a National Capital District which is the seat of government, and authorises the establishment of other Provinces under an Organic Law made by Parliament. Currently the country consists of 20 Provinces. The Head of State, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, is the constitutional monarch, represented by a Governor-General. The Governor-General is a citizen appointed by the Queen on the advice of the National Executive Council, given in accordance with a decision made by simple majority of a secret ballot of Parliament.

The Legislature consists of a single chamber vested with the 'legislative power of the people'. It consists of 89 representatives elected by single-member Open electorates and 20 elected by the single-member Provincial electorates. Representation in the Parliament is on the basis of the first-past-the-post (majoritarian) system.

The Judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the National Courts and the Inferior Courts. The Supreme Court is the court of final appeal. The courts play a significant role in the electoral process, as the final arbiter - as the Court of Disputed Returns - of disputed results. We learned that in 1992, some 61 petitions were filed, of which three were to an extent successful.

The Executive governs as long as it enjoys the support of the majority of Parliament (subject to the modifications, noted below, of the use of the vote of no confidence).

While the Constitution establishes a clear separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government at the centre, it is noted that as a result of the amendments to the Constitution and the new Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Governments, the distinction is not respected in that sphere. The Provincial MP, a legislator in the Parliament, becomes the governor and chief executive of the province. The elected member for each Open electorate is given a significant administrative role in local-level government. For example, he bears the main responsibility for deciding upon and executing important development projects funded by the Electoral Development Fund. We believe that the neutrality and independence of the civil service should be strengthened.

In the universal suffrage elections conducted before independence in 1975, the voting was on the basis of an optional limited transferable vote. The debate over the suitability of the present system in a society so diverse as this has been continuous since then among both academics and active politicians.

We heard considerable support for a return to such a system, based on the premise that it would encourage a more national and issue based form of politics. The combination of a first-past-the-post system and the split voting resulting from multiple candidacy, has in the past enabled one candidate, relying on a solid core of clan voters, to be elected with a simple majority which represented as little as six per cent of the votes cast. It was also argued that this encouraged a multitude of nominations by independents who saw the possibility of victory on a very narrow and sectional platform based on nothing more than family loyalty.

We were also told that the transferable vote, even in an optional and limited form, where the voter would be able to vote for perhaps three candidates in order of preference rather than only one, would be more complicated for many than the relatively simple system now used.

We are of the view that, given the numbers of candidates contesting elections in Papua New Guinea, serious consideration should be given to alternative systems of voting.

Provincial Government

In this context we noted the considerable interest in, and concern with, the issue of Provincial Government and its relationship to the Central Government. This is another aspect of the diverse nature of the country. The impact of this, and the inevitable competition for national resources, on the electoral situation was noticeable in a country which is seeking to find a balance between diversity and unity, central authority and local autonomy. A variety of views was heard by us as to the merits and demerits of various combinations of ideas for the promotion of effective government, stability and democracy in the country. These views ranged from federal solutions, through shades of devolution to local autonomy within a unitary state.

Recent constitutional amendments and the law on provincial and local level governments have resulted in a changed relationship between the centre and the provinces. As already noted, these have produced a situation where the same elected representatives in Parliament have the power to exercise legislative, fiscal and administrative authority in the provinces.

Electoral Boundaries and Representation

The Legislature consists of 89 single-member Open Electorates and 20 Provincial Electorates, including the National Capital District. The Constitution provides that the number of Open and Provincial Electorates and their boundaries shall be determined by Parliament in accordance with recommendations of a Boundaries Commission (chaired by the Electoral Commissioner) to be made at least every ten years. The present Organic Law on National Elections sets a minimum of 81 and a maximum of 91 Open Electorates, while each Province constitutes one electorate. The legal criteria laid down for boundary changes are standard considerations of population density, geography and communications as well as existing electoral and administrative boundaries, and are set out in the electoral law. In fact Parliament has not accepted any of the Commission's recommendations to date and the present electorate boundaries are based on census figures from the 1970s. The fact that the largest electorate has 84,578 registered voters and the smallest only 21,175 provides clear evidence of the distortions this has caused.

The constitutional provision which allows for the nomination of three members of Parliament has never been implemented, though this has been discussed. There was general support for the view that this provision could be usefully employed to nominate women MPs.

The Census

In 1995, the Parliament enacted a law requiring that a census be held prior to each five-yearly election. After advice from the National Statistical Office this was amended so as to exempt the 1997 General Election from this law. The last national census was conducted in 1990. It

is notable that the current estimated population is 4.3 million and the number of voters registered for the 1997 election was 3.41 million, suggesting a distortion in one figure or the other.

It was noted that although the census, which is the responsibility of the National Statistical Office, is an entirely separate activity from voter registration, the statistical base which it provides can considerably facilitate the planning and conduct of voter registration. We would emphasise the importance of holding regular periodic censuses.

The Franchise

Universal, adult, citizen suffrage is granted under the Constitution, the qualifying age being 18 years. The vote is optional, unlike registration which is mandatory.

The Electoral Commission

The Electoral Commission is established under the Constitution (Section 126), which states that it is not subject to the direction or control of any person or authority. The Commission, in terms of the electoral law, consists of the Electoral Commissioner who is a constitutional office-holder. He is appointed by the Head of State on the advice of the Electoral Appointments Commission. A recent amendment has brought the Leader of the Opposition into this process together with the Prime Minister and the Appointments Commission.

The Constitution stipulates that the Organic Law shall provide for the independence of the Commission. It is to be solely responsible for the electoral system, the integrity of the elections and dealing with petitions and appeals to the Courts in electoral matters. Under the Organic Law the prime function of the Commission is to organise and conduct all elections for Parliament and the legislative arms of the local-level government.

The Electoral Staff and Powers of the Commission

The Law imposes an obligation on the government department responsible for personnel matters to make available to the Electoral Commissioner and to Returning Officers, such staff as is necessary for the discharge of their statutory functions. The Observer Group was informed by the Commissioner that the effective power of appointment, discipline and control of Returning Officers and polling staff does not in practice rest solely in his hands. This is a result of the fact that District Officers are *ex officio* Returning Officers, and their appointment, under the new Provincial Government law, involves the sitting MPs. Thus, while the Law (Section 18) gives the Commissioner the authority to revoke any power delegated by him, it does not give him effective power to discipline staff made available to the Commission. It was suggested to us that his choice is reduced to dismissal and the loss of staff who cannot be replaced, or his enforced tolerance of performance which he knows is inadequate.

In our view a truly independent Electoral Commission should have a real choice in the appointment of the staff made available to it and full control over all staff engaged in election work.

Polling Places

The electoral law authorises the Commission to appoint and abolish polling places by notice in the *National Gazette*. No polling place shall be abolished after the issue of the electoral writ and before its return.

The Common Roll

Each electorate must be provided with a copy of its Common Roll. The law requires all persons to register. The Commissioner has the power to direct, by a notice in the *Gazette*, that a new Common Roll must be prepared and that persons not on the new Roll must submit a claim for enrolment. Section 46(4) of the Law makes it clear that any elector enrolled for an address for which he is entitled to be enrolled shall not be required to make a further claim. Section 47 provides that the new Roll shall be sent to Returning Officers who must then make additions or corrections to it in accordance with information received by them. The Law (Section 48 and Part VII) provides that objections can be lodged, in writing, with the Returning Officer to the Roll on the payment of a K4 (four kina) fee. No case was brought to our attention where these provisions or mechanisms had been used. It appeared that they are largely unknown to voters.

Supplementary rolls with the recent additions to the Roll may be printed immediately after the election writ is issued or at other times. Copies of the Roll and supplementary prints are required to be open for inspection during office hours at the office of the Returning Officer or elsewhere, and to be obtainable for a fee from her/his office. Section 51 imposes an obligation on all persons apparently entitled to enrolment and on all occupants of habitations, to give any information required by the Commission or by a Returning Officer in connection with the preparation or revision of the Roll.

The basic qualifications for enrolment are age, citizenship and six month's residence at the place where enrolment is claimed. Provisions include the right of appeal to the District Courts when applicants' claims or objections have been rejected by the Returning Officer (Part IX of the Law).

Nominations

Candidates must be 25 years of age or over and must have been born or resided in the electorate contested for two years continuously or five years at any time. We learned that there is no requirement for the candidate to produce a list of supporters, though we heard no complaints on this point. Candidates can stand in only one electorate. The nomination fee was increased ten-fold in 1991 to K1,000 - a figure which some regard as too small and others feel is too large. For this election it has been made non-refundable. Nominations closed on 17 April 1997.

Comment

The electoral law of Papua New Guinea is fair and comprehensive.

CHAPTER 3

PREPARATIONS FOR THE ELECTIONS

The Common Roll

The registration of qualified voters is acknowledged to be the cornerstone of a credible election. The integrity and adequacy of the electoral roll is fundamental to democracy. Without a credible roll all the further expense, efforts, preparations and activities for the poll and count amount to nothing for unregistered voters. They are effectively disenfranchised. We believe that PNG's Common Roll deserved greater attention, time and resources than seem to have been devoted to it during the past 15 months.

The Electoral Commission's registration programme for the General Election scheduled for 1997 began in May 1996. Its funds for the 1996 part of this programme amounted to some K3 million. The programme included an information and awareness-raising campaign underlining the legal duty to register, and sought to inform and motivate citizens throughout the country. The campaign was mainly conducted through the press and on the radio. There were some problems because several provincial radio stations, which as noted later rely for funding on the provincial authorities, were out of action. However, the National Broadcasting system was available.

In the main urban centres the Commission employed students as well as staff made available by the national and local authorities. In the rural areas Village Recorders and the local District and Provincial officials were used. We were told that the enumerators were instructed to use the 1992 Roll as the basis of their work, make door-to-door visits in whichever area they were operating, and list any other qualified persons whom they found. The lists were to be consolidated and given to the Returning Officer for ultimate transmission to the Commission in Port Moresby. There they would be fed into the computers and new rolls produced.

It was not clear whether in fact rolls produced as a result of this process were always returned to their places of origin for inspection and possible objection well in advance of the immediate pre-polling period.

The Group was informed that in some areas the enumerators were faced with refusal to register and often with threats of violence. We were told that this was because the people were angry at not having received adequate services from the national and local authorities since the previous election. Our own inspection of registration figures on the eve of polling indicated dramatic reductions between the numbers of voters listed in the first enumeration, as compared with those confirmed on the second, checking, survey. It was explained that many who had been registered initially were found later not to have been resident where they claimed to be, to be unknown or not to be qualified on residential grounds.

We were informed that the roll would be set out in alphabetical order according to place of residence - villages in rural areas, lots and streets in the towns.

The Electoral Commission had a difficult task in seeking to achieve efficient and effective registration. The population is unevenly spread, the terrain of the country is difficult and road communications are under-developed. (For example, there is no road from the capital Port

Moresby to any provincial capital.) These practical problems appear to have been exacerbated by financial, management and organisational shortcomings, some of which arose from ineffective delegation and over-centralisation.

We were told that there were also shortcomings in the enumeration process, in particular that there was too little face-to-face contact. There also appear to have been problems in the collection of data and printing. It has been suggested that in future more direct and personal methods of registration should be used and that, despite the expense, each voter should be issued with a Voter ID card bearing her/his photograph. We learned that in 1991 Parliament had legislated for such a system. The Supreme Court declared this to be unconstitutional. Such a system could be beneficial and with adequate advance planning and due regard to the Constitution it could be implemented. A number of Commonwealth countries use such cards, linked with a computerised register, and we understand that this can speed the voting process, provide an additional safeguard against double-voting and other abuses, promote face-to-face registration and create greater confidence in the system.

Candidates and Political Parties

A much-remarked and widely criticised feature of elections in PNG is the very large number of candidates and, within this, the large number of independents. For the 1997 General Election there were over 2,300 candidates in all - the highest total since independence and 40 per cent more than in 1992. Only slightly over 700 were endorsed by political parties. There were an average of 22 candidates per seat and one electorate in the Northern Province would be contested by no less than 61.

There is no requirement for political parties to register with the Electoral Commission. However, in order to contest an election they are required to register as corporations. The Electoral Commission is not involved in and has no control over this process.

We noted the sometimes vigorous debate in PNG concerning the political parties. The Westminster parliamentary system, a form of which is used in PNG, is based on a strong party system. However, as noted earlier, the party system in PNG is relatively weak. Loyalty is essentially to the clan or to the individual rather than to the party. Many MPs, both independents and those notionally linked with a particular political party, are ready to desert to another group. Such shifts in the allegiance of individual MPs result in frequent changes of government and are criticised by many in PNG who see this as a major defect and an obstacle to good government. As indicated earlier, the Constitution has been amended to restrict the use of the vote of confidence mechanism. Although seen elsewhere as a guarantee of accountability, many in PNG do not regard this mechanism in this way. We believe that there are other means of discouraging defections, such as a law requiring that MPs who cross the floor must submit themselves to a by-election.

In an attempt to strengthen the party system a private member's bill was introduced in 1993. It proposed a number of reforms. These included the registration of political parties by the Electoral Commission, public funding, transparency concerning donations and accountability for and limits on election expenses. The breach of election expenditure limits would have been made a ground for disputing the result and severe penalties would have been imposed. The bill did not become law. However, there is still widespread concern in PNG about the numbers of independents and their role in the formation of governments. Proposals of the

sort considered in 1993 are still being widely discussed and we hope that parliament will give them serious consideration in future as a possible means of strengthening the political party system.

Voter Education and Training of Officials

The Electoral Commission began its voter education campaign in February 1996 with a six month campaign on the national television channel, EM-TV. This was intensified in June 1996, supplemented by a church campaign. The Commission also produced a range of posters, booklets and other publicity information. We believe that such voter education (and ongoing civic education) is of the greatest importance and should be enhanced in future.

The Electoral Commission produced a training manual for polling officials explaining the election law and how it should be implemented. It dealt comprehensively with preparations for the elections; procedures for setting up and operating the polling booth; the various stages of the elections; the finalisation and closing of the poll; and procedures for the security of the votes and materials. It was difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the Commission's training and whether it was provided in good time. However, we were able to observe some training sessions at the Electoral Commission headquarters and in the provinces. The techniques varied from somewhat formal lectures with only a small hands-on element to very lively participatory instruction incorporating simulations.

Preparation of Ballot Papers

The ballot papers were printed by three separate private printers in Port Moresby. Because of the large number of candidates the ballot papers were in many cases very large. The paper quality was of good, but not bank-note, standard. The late delivery of and/or the submission of inferior quality photographs by candidates led to problems in the production of some ballot papers. It was proposed that in future it should be insisted that proper photographs should accompany nomination papers.

Security

This matter was taken extremely seriously by both the Electoral Commission and the police. Plans for the deployment of police and soldiers to parts of the country where violence had occurred at election time in the past were drawn up early and well publicised. The actual deployment was also widely advertised and it was made clear that violence would be dealt with firmly.

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1. *Introduction*
 2. *Background*
 3. *Methodology*
 4. *Results*
 5. *Discussion*
 6. *Conclusion*
 7. *References*
 8. *Appendix*
 9. *Index*
 10. *Table of Contents*
 11. *Abstract*
 12. *Summary*
 13. *Key Words*
 14. *Keywords*
 15. *Subject Headings*
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1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

2. Once the problem is identified, the next step is to define the objectives and goals of the project. This helps to clarify what needs to be achieved and provides a clear direction for the team.

3. The third step is to develop a plan or strategy to address the problem. This involves breaking down the problem into smaller, manageable tasks and determining the resources needed to complete them.

4. The fourth step is to implement the plan. This involves putting the strategy into action and monitoring progress regularly to ensure that the project is on track.

5. Finally, the fifth step is to evaluate the results of the project. This involves assessing the outcomes against the objectives and goals to determine the effectiveness of the project and identify areas for improvement.

CHAPTER 4

THE CAMPAIGN AND THE NEWS MEDIA

The Campaign

The 1997 election campaign began officially on 18 April 1997 when nominations closed. Because it was in its final stages by the time our Observer Group arrived in Port Moresby on 6 June, we were unable to see much of the campaign.

We should record at the outset that we were told that candidates were able to campaign freely. This was confirmed by our own observations at the end of the campaign period. The extent and visibility of campaigning reflected the high level of candidate participation. Everywhere we went, we encountered an enthusiastic atmosphere in which it was widely believed that anyone could win.

In general, campaign methods in the 1997 elections in PNG were similar to those used in other Commonwealth countries at election time: vehicles with loudspeakers, bullhorns, billboards, T-shirts and posters (some four-sided and suspended from trees). Indeed, many of our Group remarked that there was seldom a rural or urban dwelling which was not festooned with candidates' posters. Many like-minded candidates in Regional and Open seats also campaigned together, occasionally drawing in national political figures for extra support. Some of the larger and better financed political parties were also able to afford paid advertisements in the press and on the radio. But more customary methods were also used. These included motorcades, feasts and rallies, the latter often resembling colourful 'sing-sings' where supporters would be lavished with food and gifts by candidates as a demonstration of their status as traditional 'big men'.

Although there was no specific Code of Conduct for election campaigning, the Electoral Commission did produce and disseminate a leaflet entitled *Law on Campaign, Bribery, Undue Influence and Illegal Practices*. The information contained in this leaflet, as well as other election news, was also widely publicised through 'advertorial'-type columns and programmes in the national media, financed by the Electoral Commission. Pre-campaign spots warned candidates to stay within the law "or the police and defence force will deal with you." Towards the end of the campaign the threat was disqualification in the Court of Disputed Returns. Despite these efforts, our Group was aware of allegations of campaign abuses including bribery and threats, the calling-in of favours, campaigning past polling day and the nomination of 'friendly candidates' to split the electorate's vote along village and tribal lines. In addition, our Group observed that incumbent ministers continued to make announcements and to take political initiatives, which the media publicised to maximum effect.

Our attention was also drawn to the benefits derived by sitting members during the campaign period from the use of their Electoral Development Funds over the preceding years. As noted earlier, the EDF is used to establish development projects in the MP's electorate. Recently it has been decided that EDF expenditure should be controlled not by the MP alone but by a committee which the MP chairs. Nevertheless, the MP continues to have substantial influence on EDF expenditure - and to claim the benefit during the election campaign period. Critics have objected that since a sitting MP may initiate and promote projects in the run-up to the

General Election and even in the campaign period this contradicts the spirit of the electoral law and gives an unfair advantage to the MP.

Violence

Election campaigns in PNG have in the past been marked by considerable violence in parts of the country. We were told that there had been less violence during the campaign period this time. The imposition of curfews and liquor bans in Port Moresby and other centres, and towards the end of the campaign across the entire country, was cited as one of the reasons for this. Police, who were on alert throughout the campaign, told us that these efforts had made a major impact. Church organisations also assisted by encouraging peaceful polling, as did the Electoral Commission by repeatedly stressing the importance of a calm campaign period through the media. Our Group also detected a determination on the part of many voters to ensure that campaigning was peaceful. Although there were violent incidents which were extensively reported, the overall campaign did not appear to us to have been as violent as had been feared.

Election Issues

From our own observations, it appeared that the former government parties concentrated on their record in office, while the opposition emphasised that the incumbent parties had failed to live up to the expectations of the people. However, campaigning was often localised and focused on individuals and personalities rather than issues. Many candidates had very general platforms, stressing for instance their support for development, better roads and schooling. Party manifestos were not in wide circulation. One party organiser went so far as to tell members of our Group that his party's manifesto was a secret - for fear that other parties would steal its ideas.

Corruption and the need for good governance emerged as the major national issues of the campaign. Several national and many local campaigns denounced successive generations of political leaders for their alleged failure to live up to the required standards and proposed a new style of politics. One senior media representative told us that this issue had "gripped the nation". It was given a powerful boost during our time in PNG by the intensification of a campaign by the NGO Transparency International, which urged political leaders to sign a national integrity pledge. This group urged politicians to condemn vote-buying and to make public disclosures on campaign contributions. Debate about the conduct of PNG's political leaders was also stimulated by media treatment of the recent 'Sandline events', the submission to the Acting Prime Minister of the Commission of Inquiry's report at the end of May and the public campaign on the Sandline issue by Brigadier-General Jerry Singirok, who addressed rallies alongside 'anti-corruption' candidates in many parts of the country.

Church organisations through 'Operation Brukin Skru' (Operation Kneeling) and a 'Pray-Before-You-Vote' campaign encouraged voters to break free of traditional obligations and elect the best candidate for the job - not just the person in their own clan or language group.

The News Media

Print Media

Papua New Guineans are well served by a small but robust and professional news media, both publicly and privately owned. The nature of the country's rugged landscape, however, make newspapers nearly inaccessible to all but urban dwellers. There are two English-language newspapers, privately owned, which publish Monday to Friday and are distributed nationally. These are the *Post-Courier* (33,251 audited circulation), owned by Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, and *The National* (24,000 - according to the publisher's statement). There are also two quality weekly newspapers, *The Independent* (English) and *Wantok* (Tok Pisin), both of which are owned jointly by the Catholic, Lutheran, Anglican and United churches. The weeklies print 10,000 and 11,000 copies respectively.

Of the country's English-language newspapers, the *Post-Courier* has the wider circulation. However, neither it nor its lively rival, *The National*, backed a particular party in the latter part of the campaign. On occasion, both are feisty and willing to question the major pronouncements of the parties. All the newspapers provided healthy criticism of the campaign and called for a new way of conducting government business.

While there were no specific guidelines for election coverage in the press, for the most part the industry did adhere to a basic code of conduct for election advertising. In the English-language papers efforts were made to distinguish editorial matter from paid advertising, and after campaigning officially ended no campaign advertisements were run in any of the papers.

Radio

Radio is by far the most important channel of information in PNG, given the country's difficult terrain and poor road system. The country's publicly owned radio network, the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), is therefore the most important source of election news, providing it in both English and Tok Pisin. Particularly in the months prior to the election campaign, the NBC was an invaluable source of voter education through its twice-weekly election awareness programme.

The NBC has suffered, and continues to suffer, serious funding problems which inhibit its ability to upgrade antiquated equipment and operate as a national and regional broadcaster. It has a national station as well as 19 provincial stations providing coverage in theory to 95 per cent of the country. At the time of our visit, however, some five provincial stations were off the air due to lack of funding and a sixth, in the Eastern Highlands Province, was only able to broadcast on a temporary basis when additional provincial funds were made available at the time of the count. Despite being publicly funded (albeit modestly), the NBC is an independent news-gathering organisation and not a government information bureau.

During the campaign it was alleged in the *Post-Courier* that one provincial station in the Highlands, which broadcast a long-running radio programme hosted by one of the candidates, was closed by the provincial Governor. The allegation exposed an anomaly in the functioning

of provincial NBC stations. Since a restructuring of the provincial government system, day-to-day responsibility for running the provincial radio stations now rests with provincial governors who could, potentially, exercise undue influence over them during election campaigns. Political interference with the media was also suggested when it was reported that several election candidates and a government department head had asked the Electoral Commissioner to halt NBC's live reporting of the count to avoid influencing election results while voting was still continuing.

The lack of funding for the NBC, and the current climate of fiscal self-reliance, mean that NBC must now operate on a commercial basis to complement public resources. It therefore no longer provides free airtime to recognised political parties. The cost of purchasing airtime was felt by many to be prohibitive to all but the wealthiest political parties.

Given the important nature of the NBC in disseminating voter education at election time, as well as its ongoing role in a democracy, we were very concerned with the underfunding of the NBC, and hope that the next government will upgrade radio equipment as a national priority to ensure a properly functioning national radio network.

The other radio broadcaster in the country is PNG FM Pty Ltd which owns two music radio stations, NAU FM in English and Yumi FM in Tok Pisin. Although both are highly popular, only NAU FM, launched in 1994 and the older of the two, has national coverage while Yumi principally reaches the major cities. Unlike in the printed media, there was less careful division between 'editorial' and advertising here. One party, the People's Progress Party, regularly ran a musical campaign jingle on NAU FM which was never identified by the station as a paid political announcement.

Television

Although there is no public television broadcaster in PNG, there is a privately owned television station, EM-TV. Launched in 1987, it is today still received only by a relatively small percentage of homes in the rural areas. It is owned by Australia's Network 9. Once a week it broadcast an Election '97 Update in English, and three times a week in Tok Pisin, spots paid for by the Electoral Commission. This was an important source of information and education for voters, particularly illiterate ones, and complemented the Electoral Commission's twice-weekly columns in the print media and other publicity on the radio.


Like its radio-station counterparts, EM-TV did not provide any free airtime to political parties or candidates; nor did it provide a televised leadership debate. The role of constructive criticism and commentary is less developed here than in the press, despite the weekly commentary provided by its news editor, John Eggins.

* * *

In conclusion, our Group felt that the media on occasion exaggerated the negative aspects of the campaign: this might have been because the counting was slow, which allowed the press more time to concentrate on election troubles. However, our feeling was that the media were generally professional and fair in their reporting of the elections.

Access to the media - whether print, radio or television - was never an issue amongst political parties. Some of them complained that only those with substantial funds could afford paid advertisements, though most accepted the prevailing climate of 'user-pay' with resignation.

Given that the prevailing levels of literacy and the availability of the media limited its reach, overall the Group found that the media played an important role in the 1997 election campaign. The Group noted with satisfaction that the media are free and not subject to political restrictions. We believe that this is an essential element in PNG's democracy.



CHAPTER 5

THE POLL AND COUNT

The Poll

Polling was due to take place over a two-week period, between 14 and 28 June. In some provinces it was scheduled for one day only - for instance, on 16 June in the National Capital District, covering the capital Port Moresby, and on 17 June in the second city, Lae. In the Highlands, accounting for around half the population, voting in the Western Highlands Province was due to take place on 16 June, in Simbu and the Eastern Highlands on 18 June, in the Southern Highlands on 21 June and in Enga Province on 23 June. Elsewhere voting was staggered throughout the election fortnight, with teams of election officials moving from place to place, though at any one polling booth it was planned that voting would take place on one day only.

This arrangement enabled the Electoral Commission to make the best use of its limited resources. To have held the elections on the same day everywhere would have required a vast increase in the number of polling teams and the resources required would have been immense, especially given the difficult terrain of much of the country. In the Highlands one-day voting enabled the security forces to be concentrated for maximum effect.

The Opening of the Poll

Our teams were in place several days ahead of voting, in order to familiarise themselves with the provinces to be covered. On the first day on which voting took place in their province they were ready early to observe the opening procedure at polling booths. However, few of the booths that we visited opened at the scheduled time of 8 a.m. In some places the officials were ready but they only started the process once most of the voters were present. In many others either the officials were late, essential materials failed to arrive on time, necessary items (such as tables and other furniture) had to be found or there was some other reason for a late start. Sometimes voting started very late and in some electorates it could not begin until the day after it was due to take place. On the first day of the polling period delays in the printing of ballot papers led to the postponement of voting in some electorates.

As time went on more problems were reported. In parts of the country the schedule had to be amended and rearranged. However, even where this allowed for additional preparation time, delays still occurred. Helicopters failed to turn up on time to take polling teams to remote areas, supplies of ballot papers were inadequate and polling booths opened late even when they were only a relatively short distance from Electoral Commission offices in provincial capitals.

We noted the deep disappointment of voters in some areas who had turned out in large numbers at the right time and the right place in the justifiable expectation that the polling booths would be there too. It was no surprise that the voters were not always able to remain calm, patient and forbearing.

Voting Arrangements

Everywhere the process was transparent and in most places the procedures were properly implemented. However, there were marked variations in practice in different parts of the country. In some rural areas whole communities gathered and waited, sometimes for very long periods, then came up one by one as the names on the Common Roll were called out. In others electors were able to vote on a 'first-come, first-served' basis, once their names were found and marked off on the Roll. No use appeared to have been made of the voter number system, under which a voter can quote a number allowing ready access to her/his name in the list.

Each elector's little finger was marked with indelible ink, as a safeguard against double-voting. They were each handed two ballot papers - one for the election of the MP to represent the electorate in which the elector was registered (known as the 'Open Electorate') and another for an MP to represent the Province as a whole (known as the 'Provincial Electorate'). It was not obligatory to take two ballot papers or to mark both. The law prohibited the removal of ballot papers from the polling booth. Each ballot paper bore the name and photograph of the candidates and, in the case of party-endorsed candidates, the name of their party and the photograph of their party leader. Independents were identified as such. Specimen ballot papers are at *Annexes IX* and *X*. Not all were printed properly. In at least one case mistakes were made with candidates' photographs.

Usually the procedure began with the marking of the register, the application of indelible ink and the presentation of the ballot papers, though in some places the sequence differed. We were informed of some cases of double-voting.

Arrangements and facilities at the polling booths varied. Many booths were well equipped and properly laid out. Others were less impressive. They were almost always sited out of doors, which meant that the process was commendably transparent - though it posed difficulties when it rained and relocation indoors was impossible, in which case voting sometimes had to be suspended.

The location of the booths was not always as well thought out as it might have been and several of our teams came across instances where there were too many voters per booth - in one case as many as 1,800. In several places additional booths would have helped. The employment of additional staff, relevant to the number of electors, would also have made it unnecessary for councillors and other 'helpers' to participate in the organisation of the polling process, sometimes handling ballot papers. It would also have ensured that all Presiding Officers could oversee the process effectively: at many polling booths we visited in the Highlands, and some elsewhere, the Presiding Officer was directly engaged in the mechanics of the process and to that extent was unable to 'preside' effectively.

Voters generally seemed to be not only serious in their motivation and enthusiastic about the event but also well aware of the procedures. The polling booths were in any case well provided with sample ballot papers and information notices - in pidgin, English and sometimes the local language - and Presiding Officers or local leaders in many places addressed the voters to ensure that they knew the procedures whether or not they had read the posters. However, voters were sometimes at the wrong booth and had to visit several in an effort to find the right one. We were surprised to find that there was a discrepancy

between the legal provision that a voter could cast her/his ballot at any booth in the electorate, and the requirement on the day that this should be done at a specified booth.

We noticed that in some places the rule preventing candidates from displaying their posters very near the polling booth itself was being ignored. However, the scrutineers and the voters rarely objected.

The Common Roll

The one consistent complaint concerned the Common Roll. It was alleged that there was both under-registration in particular areas and overall over-registration. We were told of 'ghost-names', double registration and dramatic increases in the size of the Common Roll in particular electorates. In one electorate the numbers on the roll had increased by over 50 per cent since the 1992 General Election. Voters insisted that they had registered but had been turned away at the polling booths because their names were not on the Roll. The figures alone suggest that in some parts of the country investigation by the Electoral Commission and an examination of registration procedures are both merited.

Our own observations during the polling period revealed an extremely uneven picture. In the same area it was possible to find evidence of effective registration while nearby the opposite was the case. It appeared that this unevenness was due to the quality and ability of those responsible for compiling the roll. In some rural areas the Village Recorders had produced rolls which included all those residents who had voted in 1992 as well as the newly qualified: the same was true in some urban areas. In other areas we came across people who claimed long residence and participation in previous elections but who were not enrolled. Despite election awareness efforts many people in senior positions, some of whom played a role as election officials, were unaware of the need to register for the General Election. Polling officials told us that names which they were sure they had submitted properly had been omitted from the roll. In some of the rolls we saw names were listed more than once - on occasions up to three or four times. Presiding Officers used their discretion in such cases. Some people complained that their names had been so badly misspelled or transcribed as to be virtually unrecognisable.

We discovered that in some cases Presiding Officers who had disallowed a large number of apparently qualified persons from voting (because they were not on the roll) then resorted to the use of the 1992 Roll. This reduced the number of rejections. One result of this was that the time taken to process the voters was extended to ten or 12 minutes per voter, with consequent delays and crowding. This had a knock-on effect into the late afternoon and the subsequent denial of the vote to persons waiting outside the voting enclosure at the close of the polls.

The format and presentation of the roll was not uniform in style or content. Voters were sometimes grouped in alphabetical order in residential zones or villages. In other cases the listing seemed to have no particular order. This was frustrating for the voter, especially in places where 'first-come, first served' was the practice, and the polling officials had to spend a great deal of time trying to find names, searching for them in one block of names after another. The patience of the people in these situations was admirable. In villages the lack of an alphabetical ordering was not such a problem, since voters were called up in order and often appeared to be happy to wait their turn.

The problems caused by the organisation of the roll were compounded by the fact that many people in PNG do not use a uniform family name. In urban areas some people claiming a vote appeared not to be able to recognise the address where they were registered. In such cases they were either denied the vote or directed to another booth. It was not possible to discover whether the problem of identifying voters was due to the fact that they were not qualified, were confused or had been misplaced on the roll.

Voters by Group and the Secrecy of the Ballot

Illiterate voters were allowed to take a helper to the voting compartment to assist them, although in many cases the Presiding Officer, another polling official or even a police officer performed this task - sometimes at the insistence of the scrutineers. Where a helper assisted the voter - for instance in rural areas, where the numbers of illiterate voters was greatest - we noticed that the same person sometimes made repeated visits to the polling booth accompanied by a different voter each time. This gave rise to the suspicion that these helpers could have been working for a particular candidate and that they were ensuring that voters cast their ballot for that candidate. In some places more than one 'helper' attempted to accompany the voter. Voters may be well aware that they are free to choose whoever they wish to accompany and assist them. However, it might help for there to be greater publicity of this fact before and on polling day itself.

The polling officials kept a 'sex tally' so that they would be able to monitor the number of voters by gender and thereby enable the Electoral Commission to know whether women were participating in the process as fully as men. It appeared that they were. Women voters turned out in large numbers and in many cases there were more female than male voters.

We were also told that clan affiliations would influence voting patterns, with every member expected to support a particular candidate. Although it is clear that such influences are stronger in some places than in others, there was often strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that traditional group loyalty is still a powerful factor in elections in PNG.

While in much of the country the ballot was genuinely secret, in parts of the Highlands, for instance, it was not. Voting compartments or screens were not used, so voting was not done in private: the ballot paper was marked at a table within sight of anyone who cared to watch.

In some places it was considered acceptable for minors to vote. While some officials and voters were robust in their opposition to attempted under-age voting, in certain electorates polling officials took the view that this was permissible as long as the scrutineers did not object and the name of the child in question appeared on the Common Roll.

Scrutineers, Polling Officials and Police

Scrutineers, each representing a particular candidate, were present at all the polling booths visited. Their role was to observe the process and to object if procedures were not being followed. In some cases they proved to be knowledgeable and vigilant. In others they would have benefited from more thorough preparation and training. In only a few cases did they express dissatisfaction with the process. In the best cases, and there were many of them, we noted a good relationship between the scrutineers and the polling staff and with one another.

The majority of Presiding Officers and polling staff were efficient and diligent even when they were under great pressure. Many of them were 'old hands' with very effective techniques, especially in the rural areas. Some officials were young, but they learned fast and their inexperience was often balanced by the presence of other experienced officials. In a number of cases the officials showed great courage in resisting pressure to allow a breach of procedure, although unfortunately in some - especially where police were not present - this was not the case. On other occasions, the officials seemed not to be aware that irregularities were taking place. Almost everywhere the voters appeared to trust them. They often showed great ingenuity in making ad hoc arrangements, for instance in the use of local materials to make improvised voting compartments. Except in the Highlands, where many officials did not even wear badges, polling officials were easily identified by their T-shirts (which were marked 'Election Official').

Security at polling booths was provided by one or more, usually unarmed, police officers. Mobile teams of other, armed, officers - in some areas supported by soldiers of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force - were held in reserve to be deployed if required. The police officers we met were invariably helpful to voters and Commonwealth Observers alike. In most cases they clearly enjoyed the confidence of the voters and were effective in ensuring security for both people and process.

However, there were not always sufficient police to ensure one at every polling booth. And even where police were present this was not always enough to prevent sometimes serious election offences. We were informed by the police that at this General Election, as at previous ones, there were instances of ballot boxes being stolen, the abduction of polling teams, the destruction of ballot papers and sometimes serious disorder. Such incidents were well publicised in the national media.

However, where the police were unable to prevent such occurrences robust follow-up action was undertaken. And in areas that were thought likely to be troublesome, large contingents of security force personnel were deployed as a deterrent. Such precautionary deployment - well publicised in advance - helped to ensure greater calm on polling day than might otherwise have been expected. We were deeply impressed by the organisation, discipline, professionalism and competence of the police and their determination to uphold the democratic rights of their fellow citizens. We should also state that the Group was struck by the contrast, almost everywhere, between the image of a violent Papua New Guinea and the reality which we experienced.

The Closure

The closure sometimes came quite early in the day, with officials and scrutineers taking the view that it was unnecessary for the polling booth to remain open when all the voters on their list had cast their ballots. At other places many voters had still to exercise their franchise at 6 p.m. Often this was caused by the late opening, sometimes by the sheer numbers of voters on the list. Often both factors were combined. Always this occasioned frustration, and sometimes worse, especially when those who had yet to vote had seen members of other clans vote while their own had had to wait. Where the numbers of voters still to participate justified it Presiding Officers announced that polling would continue the next day. But in some places Presiding Officers did not allow voters who were in the queue at 6 p.m. to be processed that day or the next, in clear contravention of our understanding of the rules.

We encountered few objections to the way in which the closure procedure was implemented and there was general confidence that the ballot boxes would be well looked after between the end of the poll and the beginning of the count.

The Count

The count was not conducted at the polling booth itself but at specially designated counting centres (usually in the provincial capital, but sometimes in the district headquarters town). It was only allowed to begin once all the ballot boxes in the electorate were gathered in. These were normally stored at police stations prior to the count. Sometimes large crowds gathered outside the police stations, both to witness the return of the boxes and to mount a vigil until the count began. Crowds were also to be seen outside counting centres, although police usually managed to keep them well back when the counting got under way.

The Procedure

The boxes were opened one at a time and the papers sorted first into piles for the 'Open Electorate' and for the 'Provincial Seat', and then by candidate. At all times the candidates' scrutineers were able to observe the process at close quarters, and good order was maintained. The ballot papers were counted and recounted to ensure that there was no possibility of error and the numbers for each candidate were recorded on boards lining the walls of the counting centre.

Periodically sub-totals were calculated and the media informed of the progressive tally, so that they could in turn inform the general public. Apart from enabling the process to be as transparent as possible, given that the public could not be admitted to the counting centre itself, the media's periodic bulletins on the course of the count probably had a positive effect in places where anticipation of the result might have triggered trouble. They enabled the supporters of particular candidates to adjust to the likely outcome over a period, which was probably a preferable alternative to a sudden announcement.

Assessment

All the counts we witnessed were thorough and correct, though the scrupulousness of the procedure, the limitations imposed by the often small size of the counting rooms, frequent suspensions caused by challenges from vigilant scrutineers and the relatively small number of counters employed meant that the process took a very long time. In some places it was further prolonged by extensive breaks to enable the counting teams to rest, whereas employment of additional counting teams could have enabled the process to be continuous and therefore quicker. Some of our Observers were concerned that where the counting was continuous too few shifts of counters were used, so that they became over-tired. Others argued that by proceeding a box at a time the process enabled the candidates' scrutineers to detect 'disloyalty' on the part of certain groups of voters. On the latter point we suggest that the Electoral Commission might consider amending arrangements so that the voting of particular communities cannot be easily identified. This might be done, for instance, by ensuring that the contents of ballot boxes are mixed before counting. We also believe that counting more than one box at a time would speed up the process. In general, however, we were impressed by the count. The counters were efficient and the process well managed.

Results

In each provincial capital a central 'Tally Centre' kept track of the progress at each count. Outside scoreboards were erected to enable the public to see all the results once they had been declared. Declarations were sometimes followed by serious violence as one set of supporters exacted revenge on voters believed to have voted the 'wrong' way. However, the extent of such disturbances appears to have been more limited than had been feared, even in areas with a reputation for uproar.

Comments

The Electoral Commission was confronted by formidable logistical difficulties. We were told that they had received less money than requested and that there had been problems in transmission of the required amounts on time. This caused last-minute problems, for instance in the hiring of helicopters, the payment of allowances to election officials and the purchase of necessary items. However, these factors do not explain all the problems that were encountered during the polling period. We were disappointed at the scale and effect of the shortcomings in planning and organisation and we believe that the Electoral Commission must consider its management of the arrangements in good time for the next General Election. It should also revise the system of registration so that an accurate Common Roll is in place prior to the next General Election, or sooner if possible, and improve arrangements for the secrecy of the ballot, which as we have noted above was not assured in some parts of the country.

The Commission should also have more staff, especially at provincial level where it has to rely too much on the provincial administration rather than its own officers. Inevitably, the organisation of a General Election will require assistance from provincial administration officials. But it is absolutely necessary that the Commission should have more staff. At headquarters there should be additional professional staff, particularly in logistics and information technology. And there should be an office in each province with additional permanent core staff, especially to deal with registration. An increase in funding not only immediately before the election, when transmission must be timely, but over the entire period between elections would, we believe, result in greater efficiency and better organised elections. We believe that the Commission should be funded directly from parliamentary appropriations.

Despite the logistical and organisational difficulties experienced this year, we believe that it should be possible, in time, for PNG to hold countrywide one-day elections and that the Electoral Commission should continue to move in this direction.

Finally, we commend the voters not only for their patience and fortitude but also, and above all, for their enthusiastic engagement in the process and their determination to express their democratic rights.

[illegible][illegible]

1. The above information was obtained from the files of the [redacted] and [redacted] and is being furnished to you for your information. The information is being furnished to you in confidence and is not to be distributed outside of your office.

[illegible][illegible]

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

CONCLUSIONS

In the Introduction to this Report we described the arrangements for our deployment across the country. Seven two-person teams were based in major provincial centres, while our Chairperson roved across the country. During the fortnight that we were in the field we observed all aspects of the electoral process and witnessed polling at 321 polling booths in some 66 electorates in 18 of the 20 provinces. Our sample embraced the coastal provinces, the islands and the highlands, urban and rural areas, peaceful places and those with a reputation for turbulence, the traditional and the modern. We spoke to many people and we visited many places. In short, we achieved as comprehensive a coverage as possible. As a result we believe that our 'core sample' of the election process was a good one.

There will be shortcomings in any election and this was no exception. Some of them were serious, particularly the inadequacies of the Common Roll. But these were not such as to invalidate the outcome. Overall, we believe that the conditions existed for a free expression of will by the electors and that the result of the election will reflect the wishes of the voters. Candidates were able to campaign freely and vigorously. Their words and activities were reported fairly by a professional, responsible and free media. The election laws were fair, the process was transparent, in most places the polling procedures were implemented properly. Polling officials were diligent, the people participated eagerly and the counting process was good. Strenuous - and largely successful - efforts were made to ensure security for both people and process.

The shortcomings to which we have drawn attention can be addressed and improvements made for the future - and we are confident that they will be. With this and the wider interests of democracy in Papua New Guinea in mind, we have three sets of suggestions:

- * **Strengthening the Electoral Commission** - the Commission needs to improve its management and organisation of elections. To be able to do so and to improve its all-round effectiveness, the Electoral Commission in turn needs to be strengthened in two key areas. First, it must have more staff. At headquarters there should be additional professional staff, particularly in logistics and information technology, and there should be an office in each province with more permanent core staff, especially to deal with registration. The Commission must also have full control over all those engaged in election work. Secondly, it must have more money, both at election time (when transmission of funds must be timely) and throughout the period in between elections, in the form of annual grants. These should ideally come directly from parliamentary appropriations.
- * **Improving the electoral process** - in order to ensure that a reliable and accurate Common Roll can be put in place prior to the next General Election, and sooner if possible, a more efficient and effective system of registration should be introduced. With this in mind the Electoral Commission might consider the experience of other Commonwealth countries, both in the use of continuous registration and the use of photo Voter ID cards linked to a computerised registration process. In this context we must also emphasise the importance of holding regular censuses. Other matters might usefully be examined, in particular to ensure the secrecy of the ballot at every polling booth, since we observed that in some parts of the country this was not always assured. We were generally impressed with the counting process, but the Commission

might consider amending arrangements so that the voting of particular communities cannot be easily identified. Enhanced voter and ongoing civic education activities might be considered by the Commission and NGOs.

- * **Strengthening democracy** - we believe that Papua New Guinea should progressively move towards the holding of country wide one-day elections. Consideration might be given to alternative systems of voting, given the number of candidates contesting elections in Papua New Guinea, and to possible means of strengthening PNG's political party system. These might include state funding for the parties, ensuring that an MP who crosses the floor should resign and fight a by-election, increasing the level of the candidate's deposit and requiring additional evidence of support from candidates at the time of nomination. We believe that an apolitical civil service makes an important contribution to democracy in any country: in the interests of democracy Papua New Guinea's civil service should continue to be strengthened. The separation of legislative and executive powers should be maintained and in the provinces the combination of the two in the same person should be reconsidered.

If the shortcomings observed during these elections, and the wider issues we have highlighted concerning the consolidation of Papua New Guinea's democracy, are to be addressed Papua New Guinea may well need help from its friends. We therefore hope that the Commonwealth will be ready to assist if requested.

It has been an enriching experience to have been able to observe these elections. We were impressed by the commitment of the people to democracy and have no doubt that they want a participatory system with complete accountability of MPs to parliament and to the electorate. We wish Papua New Guinea every success in its endeavours both to consolidate its democracy and to develop the talents of its people and the riches of its land for the next century.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We wish to thank the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, for inviting us to participate in this important mission. We are indebted to him for giving us the opportunity to play a small part in the consolidation of Papua New Guinea's vigorous democracy.

The work of our Observer Group benefited from the assistance of many people. We are especially grateful to the Electoral Commissioner, Mr Reuben Kaiulo, and his colleagues at the Electoral Commission Head Office in Port Moresby and the provincial election offices. They went out of their way to assist us in the preparations for our work and, despite the many pressures on them during the election itself, always tried to find time to help. We also greatly appreciated the assistance extended to us by the Commissioner of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, Mr Robert Nenta, his senior officers in the provinces, who were unfailingly helpful and courteous at a time when they were severely stretched, and in particular the officers who escorted us during our deployment. We must also record our thanks to members of the provincial administrations, who provided us with valuable background information and advice.

We received valuable briefings from representatives of the political parties, non-governmental organisations, the media, Commonwealth High Commissioners and a number of individuals. We thank them for guiding us through the complexities of Papua New Guinean politics. Our drivers and the staff of the hotels in which we were accommodated provided us with assistance without which it would have been impossible to undertake this mission.

But most of all, we must thank the people of Papua New Guinea. They received us with great warmth and kindness and we have made many friends. We wish them every success in the development of their democracy for the future.



ATTACHMENT E

Claim for Enrolment (Voter Registration Form)

Organic Law on National Elections

CLAIM FOR ENROLMENT

NOTE: — The instructions on the reverse side should be read before the form is completed. The claimant should make sure that he receives an acknowledgement of this form from the Returning Officer.

To the Returning Officer.

Electorate.

Father's name or Surname:

Other names, given names or

Traditional names:

Place of residence:—

Lot number:

Section number:

Street:

Suburb, Town

or Village:

Census Division:

District:

Province:

Occupation:

Sex:

Postal Address:

1. I am a citizen of Papua New Guinea

2. I have resided in the
Electorate for at least the last six months.

3. I am not under the age of 18 years.

4. I am not under sentence of death or sentence of imprisonment for a period of more than nine months.

5. I have not, in the last three years, been convicted of an offence relating to elections prescribed by an Organic Law or an Act of the Parliament for the purposes of Section 50(1)(b) of the Constitution.

6. I am of full capacity.

7. I am not now enrolled on the Roll for this or any other Electorate.

I hereby claim enrolment as an elector of Papua New Guinea. I declare that all of the statements made in this claim are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Personal signature or mark of claimant:

Date:

NOTE: — The witness should not sign his name until he has read the instructions on the side.

I, the undersigned, am an elector or am qualified to be an elector, and certify that I have seen the above-named claimant sign the above claim, and that I either know the statements made by him to be true or have satisfied myself by asking the claimant, or in some other way, that they are true.

Personal signature or witness:

Date:

Occupation:

Address:

SPACE TO BE FILLED IN BY RETURNING OFFICER

(date)

(initials)

Rec'd

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPLICANT AND WITNESS FOR FILLING IN PARTICULARS ON THIS FORM

The applicant, when filling in his place of residence, must state any house number, lot and section number, name of house, name of street, suburb or town or name of village or settlement, census division, district and province and postal address.

The applicant must mark the squares for paragraphs 1 or 2.

WARNING FOR APPLICANTS

An applicant who knowingly makes a false statement on this form may be imprisoned for up to six months.

Any person who signs the name of another person as applicant may be fined up to K200.00.

WARNING FOR WITNESSES

A witness who knowingly makes a false statement on this form may be imprisoned for up to six months.

A witness who

- (a) signs as witness on this form when it has not been completed and signed by the applicant; or
 - (b) signs this form as witness when he has not seen the applicant sign it; or
 - (c) signs any one else's name or a name not being that of the witness on this form; or
 - (d) signs this form without first being satisfied, by asking the applicant or in some other way, that the statements made by the applicant in this form are true, unless he knows that they are true.
- may be fined up to K200.00.

NOTE: — "Application for Postal Certificate and Postal Ballot Paper" forms and envelopes in which the forms may be sent post free to the Returning Officer may be obtained at any Electoral Office or Post Office.



ATTACHMENT F
Sample Page from the Common Roll

ELECTORAL COMMISSION

1997

GENERAL ELECTION

PRINCIPAL ROLL OF ELECTORS

North Solomon Province

Electorate: Central Bougainville Open

Census Divisions:

Arawa Urban, Ioro-Eivo, Kieta Urban, Koromira-Kongara
Loloho Urban, Nasioi-Pirung, North Nasio, Panguna Urban, Rotokas

Numbers of Electors Enrolled: 28,221

Made up to 10th April, 1997

CENTRAL BOUGAINVILLE OPEN ELECTORATE

INDEX

CENSUS DIV.	VILLAGES/RNVS	PAGES	CENSUS DIV.	VILLAGES/RNVS	PAGES
	PORT MORESBY RESIDENCE	1	IORO-EVO	ATAMO	31
ARAWA URBAN	ARAWA CCENTRE	1	IORO-EVO	ATAMO COMM SCHOOL	32
ARAWA URBAN	ARAWA BCAMP SETTLEMENTS	1	IORO-EVO	BOIRA	32
ARAWA URBAN	ARAWA BEACH SETTLEMENT	4	IORO-EVO	BORUMAI	32
ARAWA URBAN	ARAWA TOWN	5	IORO-EVO	BOVE	33
ARAWA URBAN	BAROKU SETTLEMENT	6	IORO-EVO	BLIANA COMM SCHOOL	34
ARAWA URBAN	CAMP 8	7	IORO-EVO	DAPERI COMM SCHOOL	34
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 10 (ARAWA)	8	IORO-EVO	DARENAIDUPANTA	34
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 11 (ARAWA)	8	IORO-EVO	DARENAUKORU-UKU	34
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 12 (ARAWA)	8	IORO-EVO	DARENAI/POKUNAMERI	35
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 13 (ARAWA)	9	IORO-EVO	DARENAI/SIMPORE	35
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 14 (ARAWA)	9	IORO-EVO	DARU	35
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 15 (ARAWA)	12	IORO-EVO	GUAVA	36
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 16 (ARAWA)	12	IORO-EVO	IARAKO	36
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 17 (ARAWA)	12	IORO-EVO	ITAUPA	36
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 18 (ARAWA)	13	IORO-EVO	JAVA VILLAGE	36
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 19 (ARAWA)	13	IORO-EVO	KANAVITU	36
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 20 (ARAWA)	14	IORO-EVO	KARAKENI	37
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 21 (ARAWA)	14	IORO-EVO	KOIANU COMM SCHOOL	38
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 22 (ARAWA)	15	IORO-EVO	KOKORE VILLAGE	38
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 23 (ARAWA)	16	IORO-EVO	KONKORNE COMM SCHOOL	39
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 24 (ARAWA)	16	IORO-EVO	KOPIKIRI VILLAGE	39
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 27 (ARAWA)	16	IORO-EVO	KORPEI	39
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 3 (ARAWA)	16	IORO-EVO	KOSIA VILAGE	40
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 35 (ARAWA)	16	IORO-EVO	KUNERIA CIS	40
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 36 (ARAWA)	17	IORO-EVO	MABIRI SCHOOL	40
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 37 (ARAWA)	17	IORO-EVO	MAINOKI	41
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 38 (ARAWA)	17	IORO-EVO	MANATAI	41
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 39 (ARAWA)	17	IORO-EVO	MANETAJ COMM SCHOOL	41
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 4 (ARAWA)	18	IORO-EVO	MANETAJ LIMSTONE (BORUMAI)	41
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 40 (ARAWA)	21	IORO-EVO	MANETAJ MISSION STATION	41
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 41 (ARAWA)	21	IORO-EVO	MANOKI	41
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 42 (ARAWA)	21	IORO-EVO	MISSION VILLAGE	42
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 44 (ARAWA)	21	IORO-EVO	MORONI VILLAGE	42
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 5 (ARAWA)	21	IORO-EVO	MOSINAU	42
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 6 (ARAWA)	23	IORO-EVO	NASIWAI	42
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 7 (ARAWA)	23	IORO-EVO	NGVI	43
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 8 (ARAWA)	23	IORO-EVO	ORAMI COMM SCHOOL	43
ARAWA URBAN	SECT 9 (ARAWA)	24	IORO-EVO	ORAMI VILLAGE	44
ARAWA URBAN	TONIVA SETTLEMENT	25	IORO-EVO	PAKIA	44
ARAWA URBAN	TONIVA URBAN	28	IORO-EVO	PANCA	44
ARAWA URBAN	TUBIANA CATHOLIC CHURCH	30	IORO-EVO	PARUPARU COMM SCHOOL	45
ARAWA URBAN	TUBIANA COMM SCHOOL	30	IORO-EVO	PASINAU	45
ARAWA URBAN	TUPUKAS SETTLEMENT	31	IORO-EVO	POARU	45
			IORO-EVO	PURAPI VILLAGE	46

CENSUS DIV.	VILLAGES/RMVS	PAGES	CENSUS DIV.	VILLAGES/RMVS	PAGES
KORO-EVO	SIPATAKO COMM SCHOOL	46	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	NABUA VILLAGE	60
KORO-EVO	SIPURU	46	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	PEIWAHA VILLAGE	60
KORO-EVO	SIREONOJI VILLAGE	47	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	PIKA VILLAGE	60
KORO-EVO	SIROWAJ	47	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	PONTONA	60
KORO-EVO	SUEMA	48	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	ROREINA-NG	61
KORO-EVO	TARARA	49	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	ROREINANG UNITED CHURCH	61
KORO-EVO	URLUTO	49	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	SIOROVI	61
KORO-EVO	VITO	49	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	SIPURU AIDPOST	61
KORO-EVO	VOIRA	50	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	SIPUREI	61
			KOROMIRA-KONGARA	SUPUREI	62
KIETA URBAN	KIETA SETTLEMENT	50	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	TAVATAYA COMM SCHOOL	62
KIETA URBAN	KIETA URBAN	51	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	TAVATAYA VILLAGE	62
KIETA URBAN	KIETA VOCATIONAL CENTRE	52	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	TOIMONABU PLANTATION	62
			KOROMIRA-KONGARA	TOROREI	62
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	ABARU PLANTATION	52	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	TOVING	63
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	AMAPONG	52	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	TSIRAUIMPANA VILLAGE	63
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	BAKAKANI	53	KOROMIRA-KONGARA	WDA VILLAGE	63
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	BANEI VILLAGE	53			
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	BONA VILLAGE	53	LOLOHO URBAN	LOLOHO CAMP 5	63
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	DAATE	53	LOLOHO URBAN	LOLOHO CAMP 6	64
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	DAAVITU	54			
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	DAMUNG	54	NASIOI-PIRUNG	AMON	66
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	DELOJORI COMM SCHOOL	55	NASIOI-PIRUNG	ANKANA	66
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	DONGETA	55	NASIOI-PIRUNG	ARAWA	67
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	DONGETA COMM SCHOOL	55	NASIOI-PIRUNG	AROPA PLANTATION	67
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	DOTA	55	NASIOI-PIRUNG	AROPA SQUATER SETTLEMENT	68
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	DULUNARA COMM SCHOOL	55	NASIOI-PIRUNG	BAIRIMA	68
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	ISINA	55	NASIOI-PIRUNG	BAIRIMA COMM SCHOOL	68
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	IMI PLANTATION	56	NASIOI-PIRUNG	BAKATONG	69
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	KAMAROVE	56	NASIOI-PIRUNG	BAKAWORI VILLAGE	69
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	KAPIKAYE	56	NASIOI-PIRUNG	BOUGAIRVILLE FOREST ENTERPRISE	69
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	KARURU	57	NASIOI-PIRUNG	BOUGAIRVILLE TIMBER SAWMILL	69
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	KARUSIDA COMM SCHOOL	57	NASIOI-PIRUNG	BOUGAIR CAMP AROPA SETTLEMENT	70
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	KEKERE PLANTATION	57	NASIOI-PIRUNG	BUNUMANG	70
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	KEREMONA	57	NASIOI-PIRUNG	DATTA VILLAGE	70
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	KOROMIRA COMM SCHOOL	57	NASIOI-PIRUNG	DAMAOSI	70
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	KUNUDUA	57	NASIOI-PIRUNG	DATURUE VILLAGE	70
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	KURAI	57	NASIOI-PIRUNG	DINGUNA	70
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	KURIVATE	58	NASIOI-PIRUNG	DOKOTORY	71
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	LALLAI	58	NASIOI-PIRUNG	DONSIRO	71
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	LALUAI DWS CAMP	58	NASIOI-PIRUNG	KARAKUNG (BAY)	71
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	LOULU	59	NASIOI-PIRUNG	KARIKIRA VILLAGE	72
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	MANGKATE	59	NASIOI-PIRUNG	KIVIRAI	72
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	MANGONA VILLAGE	59	NASIOI-PIRUNG	KOBUAN	72
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	MARILAU	59	NASIOI-PIRUNG	KOKODEI	72
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	MARURA	60	NASIOI-PIRUNG	KOROKORO AID POST	72
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	MINANI VILLAGE	60	NASIOI-PIRUNG	KUPEI	72
KOROMIRA-KONGARA	MUNIASI	60	NASIOI-PIRUNG	MANAI	73

CENTRAL BOUGAINVILLE OPEN ELECTORATE

WAKUNAI CARE CENTRE

CODE NO	NAME	OCCUPATION	SEX
42	RAPHAEL RAPHAELMO	SP	M
43	MACULATE MACULATE	HO	F
44	PAUL PAUL	SP	M
45	CHRISTINE VASHANI	HO	F
46	AUGUST ERIC	SP	M
47	MARYJANE ERIC	HO	F
48	KEVIN TALNA	SP	M
49	MARGARETH TALNA	HO	F
50	HUBERT TALNA	SP	M
51	PATROIA LOO	HO	F
52	TIMOTHY AVRI	SP	M
53	KEASI AVRI	HO	F
54	SARLAS AVRI	SP	M
55	AROS PETERAN	SP	M
56	LARI PETERAN	HO	F
57	SHOCH AVRI	SP	M
58	RENE SHOCH	HO	F
59	RICHARD SHOCH	SP	M
60	THOMAS BRO	SP	M
61	JEAN SEVIA	HO	F
62	SAM MEKE	SP	M
63	JULIAN MEKE	HO	F
64	WILLIAM RALOM	SP	M
65	CHRISTINE RALOM	HO	F
66	PAULINE RALOM	HO	F
67	REGINA UAYEOM	HO	F
68	GABRIEL TAKAVE	SP	M
69	MARIA TAKAVE	HO	F
70	JASON PEACOS	SP	M
71	JENNIFER JASON	HO	F
72	TONY PONOTO	SP	M
73	SERAH PONOTO	HO	F
74	MICHAEL VAYAI	SP	M
75	SALOME VAYAI	HO	F
76	GERE BENNY	SP	M
77	CECILIA GERE	HO	F
78	ANDREW GERE	SP	M
79	ROSE ANDREW	HO	F
80	DOMING SIASO	SP	M
81	HELEN SIASO	HO	F
82	IONY BUSU	SP	M
83	REGINA BUSU	HO	F
84	SAMON ORSITA	SP	M
85	ELIZABETH ORSITA	HO	F
86	WILLIAM SAMERO	SP	M
87	PAULA SAMERO	HO	F
88	RAPHAEL GARETO	SP	M
89	BARBARA RILANCO	HO	F

Male = 52 Female = 37 Total = 89

WAKUNAI GOVT STATION

CODE NO	NAME	OCCUPATION	SEX
1	KAPUP SEMH	LBR	M
2	KERY YAMA	LBR	M
3	KERY PEPA	LBR	M
4	JOON SOEL	LBR	M
5	KINA TOEA	LBR	M
6	KOL MASIP	LBR	M
7	KOLOM MAOMBE	LBR	M
8	KUNE AMI	LBR	M
9	KUMUP EAL	LBR	M
10	KURA	LBR	M
11	LARI	LBR	M

WAKUNAI GOVT STATION

CODE NO	NAME	OCCUPATION	SEX
12	LUCY POPO	HO	F
13	MAGAP MINES	LBR	M
14	MARGARET PAURA	NURSE	F
15	MATHEW TADE	TOUR	M
16	MATHEW	LBR	M
17	MURUPA	LBR	M
18	MOROS	LBR	M
19	MOSES	LBR	M
20	NOLAI PENTEOL	LBR	M
21	PALPE YAMBU	LBR	M
22	PAUL	LBR	M
23	PAUL LEAMAN	LBR	M
24	PAUL MAROUS	LBR	M
25	PAUL BAMA	LBR	M
26	PETER AMI	LBR	M
27	PETER KONA	LBR	M
28	PETER LEAMAN	LBR	M
29	PEPA	LBR	M
30	PETER PAHE	MASTRT	M
31	PETER PA	LBR	M
32	PETER PAO	LBR	M
33	PETER SOEP	LBR	M
34	PIUP OMOWA	LBR	M
35	POMDEPE TOMBOL	LBR	M
36	POPO MALOWA	LBR	M
37	PUNDA TUNOU	LBR	M
38	SAMON TA	DRVR	M
39	SONG PHAN	DRVR	M
40	THERESA NAFU	NURSE	F
41	TIMOTHY 1	LBR	M
42	TIMOTHY 2	LBR	M
43	APAKAS OKEP	CP	M
44	GAP PIP	CP	M
45	HALOPA BOTU	CP	M
46	HANDON KAN	CP	M
47	HANOK BOTU	CP	M
48	HENER	CP	M
49	KEP SLUBU	CP	M
50	KERRY YAP	LBR	M
51	KORAI MONTE	CP	M
52	KONAU PUNA	CP	M
53	KONONNA	CP	M
54	MACULATE KENO	HO	F
55	MURUPA PEAP	CP	M
56	JACK PAKSO	CP	M
57	JACK SAM	CP	M
58	JAMES KOREA	CP	M
59	ALPHONSE WASE	LBR	M
60	ANTON KAM	LBR	M
61	AUGUST MANE	LBR	M
62	BALL KAMA	LBR	M
63	BONEN LAMARI	HO	F
64	DAVID RAMURKEA	LBR	M
65	ELISA TADE	TOUR	M
66	HELEN GOLU	TOUR	M
67	HOMBE KAKI	LBR	M
68	INCINE CANGES	SP	M
69	JACK TOM	LBR	M
70	JACOB WARAKEA	LBR	M
71	JAMES REPRE	LBR	M
72	JOE VARRREA	LBR	M
73	JOHN BUKA	LBR	M
74	JOHNSON JERCAE	LBR	M
75	JOSEPH SERIA	SP	M

WAKUNAI GOVT STATION

CODE NO	NAME	OCCUPATION	SEX
76	MARK KODI	LBR	M
77	MEP KEL	LBR	M
78	MICHAEL KOSSAN	LBR	M
79	PETER WALD	LBR	M
80	PETER WALUS	DRVR	M
81	PIP GAR	LBR	M
82	RENA LATU	TYPT	M
83	RICHARD HAMEL	SP	M
84	RYTA KEBBA	HO	F
85	ROBIN KADI	LBR	M
86	ROSE PARI	HO	F
87	SAM LATU	CPTR	M
88	SUSANA MAMBOLA	HO	F
89	TOM KEBBA	OFF	M
90	TOM MORL	LBR	M
91	VINCENT MURARO	GM	M
92	WILLIAM KILAU	LBR	M
93	JAMES KUNDU	DP	M
94	JAMES NAPOS	APD	M
95	JAMES TLEM	CP	M
96	JAMES WAH	DP	M
97	JAMES YAP	DP	M
98	JOHN AMI	CP	M
99	JOHN HOMBE	DP	M
100	JOHN HOOK	CP	M
101	JOHN KENO	CLK	M
102	JOHN PILSO	CLK	M
103	JOHN WAPON	CP	M
104	KOM MONTE	CP	M
105	KANE MINES	LBR	M
106	JACOB REREVATE	PISERV	M
107	BESS REREVATE	OFFICER	F
108	JOEL TOM NASAM	OFFICER	M
109	VIREN NASAM	HO	F
110	SYLVESTER SEMOSO	CLERK	M
111	JUDY SEMOSO	HO	F
112	OLENTON SEMOSO	SP	M
113	JOHN TORIKIPA	OFFICER	M
114	WANA TORIKIPA	HO	F
115	HACIA TORIKIPA	SP	M
116	GRACE AKOTAI	HO	F
117	JACOB ESIETE	LABOUR	M
118	JOYCE ESIETE	HO	F
119	BALL KAKI	LABOUR	M
120	TIMOTHY TACHYR	OFFICER	M
121	BARNABAS KUNOTS	OFFICER	M
122	YERIN KUNOTS	HO	F
123	THERESA KAMAI	TOUR	F
124	SAMON KAMAI	SP	M
125	ELIZABETH KAMAI	HO	F
126	GEORGE GIDUN	TOUR	M
127	POSELYN GIDUN	TOUR	F
128	MEISY SEBASHAN	TOUR	F
129	PETER SEBASHAN	SP	M
130	THERESA SERIA	TOUR	F

WAKUNAI HEALTH CENTRE

CODE NO	NAME	OCCUPATION	SEX
1	ALEXS KOMU	LBR	M
2	AVENOU BURE	NURSE	F
3	BETTY RANBY	SR	F
4	CECILA ABRI	NURSE	F

WAKUNAI HEALTH CENTRE

CODE NO	NAME	OCCUPATION	SEX
5	DANIEL ARAI	WRA	M
6	ENDOR PURASH	APD	M
7	FANNYAN GABATO	HO	F
8	FRANCIS TOMMY	INSPECT	M
9	GETRUIE TORI	HO	F
10	GORDON BURE	SP	M
11	ISRAEL KOREA	APD	M
12	LINA AREAI	HO	F
13	LUKE SATORRI	APD	M
14	MIRIAM KIRON	NURSE	F
15	NIN SAKONO	NURSE	F
16	PAUL HABRUS	CPTR	M
17	PAUL VULIA	SP	M
18	TALPI THPLU	LBR	M
19	TIMOTHY KAREPA	LBR	M
20	TIMOS MOAU	HO	F
21	WILLIAM JASANS	SP	M
22	ALEXS KOMU	LBR	M
23	AVENOU BURE	NURSE	F
24	BETTY RANBY	SR	F
25	CECILA ABRI	NURSE	F
26	ENDOR PURASH	APD	M
27	FANNYAN GABATO	HO	F
28	FRANCIS TOMMY	INSPECT	M
29	GETRUIE TORI	HO	F
30	GORDON BURE	SP	M
31	ISRAEL KOREA	APD	M
32	LINA AREAI	HO	F
33	LUKE SATORRI	APD	M
34	MIRIAM KIRON	NURSE	F
35	JOE POCKEY	OFFICER	M
36	JOANTA POCKEY	HO	F
37	NATHAN BRIC	OFFICER	M
38	THERESA BRO	NURSE	F
39	ESTHER MOSE	SISTER	F
40	VASH LINA	SISTER	F
41	JERRY KAMAI	SP	M
42	LAWRENCE KEVING	APD	M
43	JOSEPHINE KEVING	HO	F
44	REBECCA SAMP	NURSE	F
45	JACOB SAMP	PASTOR	M
46	WILLIAM KUNA	SP	M
47	JOHN MAURON	SP	M
48	ALICE SPAN	NURSE	F
49	CHRISTINE MON	SISTER	F
50	WESLEY RINM	DRIVER	M
51	ROSE WESLEY	HO	F
52	STEWART SALES	PLUMBER	M
53	CATHY MOTERA	NURSE	F
54	CHRISTOPHER ATAGOLA	SP	M
55	YFRONICA KONNOU	NURSE	F
56	SELM LOPANANO	HO	F
57	MARY LOPANANO	HO	F
58	JOSEPH KONNOU	SP	M
59	PETER LOPANANO	SP	M
60	RIVEN HOARA	LBR	M
61	ANNETTE HOARA	HO	F
62	JOE GRN	LBR	M
63	JOHNY GRN	LBR	M
64	TASA KORA	HO	F
65	MARGRETH SAMPRE	LBR	M
66	PETER LAUBADI	APD	M
67	DELMAY LAUBADI	HO	F
68	DASY LAUBADI	?	F

ATTACHMENT G

1997 Election Sample Ballot

SOHE OPEN ELECTORATE

5th NATIONAL ELECTION 1997

HOW TO VOTE:

1 MARK YOUR VOTE ON THIS BALLOT - PAPER BY PLACING AN X IN THE BLANK ☐ SQUARE NEXT TO THE NAME OF THE CANDIDATE FOR WHOM YOU WISH TO VOTE.

2 DO NOT PUT MORE THAN ONE X ON THIS PAPER

3 DO NOT PUT ANY OTHER MARK ON THIS PAPER

 1 <input type="checkbox"/> PROF JOHN WAIKO	 2 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> MATHEW PURARI	 3 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> ALEX ERORO DIASAI	 4 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> MCNEIL PUERA
 5 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> ABRAHAM SORARI	 6 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> RAYMOND ASIRI	 7 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> ALEXANDER ANDARIS	 8 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> CLAUDE SINGAR
 9 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> GING T. DAWIDI	 10 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> CHRIS WAIM KAROGOL	 11 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> ALIET OKIE HOLLAND KITOFU	 12 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> GREGORY BUIBUI
 13 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> DANIEL MEIKOPA SERERE	 14 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> RODNEY WAKEL	 15 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> DAVID JOSEPH KEVILA	 16 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> WENCESLAS AIMBARI
 17 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> NATHANIEL VICTOR	 18 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> JOHN DOUGLAS KIVO	 19 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> JOHN WYCLIFFE JIREGARI	 20 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> DONALD JOE EGIMBARI
 21 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> GIBLING OROVO	 22 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> JOSEPH ORIDE KERIAPA	 23 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> LABAN HAURO	 24 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> PETER ATU ORESI
 25 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> STANTON HAIVA	 26 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> REGINALD HOMBA	 27 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> RONALD KIBINI	 28 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> DENNIS EMBO HOE
 29 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> JOEL SIEMBO	 30 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> MACLAREN JUDE HIARI	 31 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/> KINGSTON EVARI	

043201

043201

BALLOT PAPER

CENTRAL PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE

5th NATIONAL ELECTION 1997

HOW TO VOTE:

1

MARK YOUR VOTE ON THIS BALLOT PAPER BY PLACING AN **X** IN THE BLANK ☐ SQUARE NEXT TO THE NAME OF THE CANDIDATE FOR WHOM YOU WISH TO VOTE

2

DO NOT PUT MORE THAN ONE **X** ON THIS PAPER

3

DO NOT PUT ANY OTHER MARK ON THIS PAPER

 1 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/>	 2 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/>	 3 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/>	 4 NATIONAL ALLIANCE <input type="checkbox"/>
 5 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/>	 6 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/>	 7 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/>	 8 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/>
 9 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/>	 10 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/>	 11 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/>	 12 PEOPLE'S NATIONAL CONGRESS <input type="checkbox"/>
 13 INDEPENDENT <input type="checkbox"/>	 14 PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY <input type="checkbox"/>		

PRINTED BY MOORE

JUNE 1997/131,000

Popua New Guinea
BALLOT PAPER
NORTHERN PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE
5th NATIONAL ELECTION 1997

**HOW TO
VOTE:**

1






























































MARK YOUR VOTE ON THIS BALLOT - PAPER
BY PLACING AN **X** IN THE BLANK
SQUARE NEXT TO THE NAME OF THE
CANDIDATE FOR WHOM YOU WISH TO VOTE.

2

DO NOT PUT
MORE THAN
ONE **X** ON
THIS PAPER

3

DO NOT PUT
ANY OTHER
MARK ON
THIS PAPER

 CLEMENT KERAMU 1 INDEPENDENT	 ARTHUR JAVODIMA 2 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	 PAPAU MARK ANTHONY 3 INDEPENDENT	 BENSON ARIEMBO 4 INDEPENDENT	 LINDSAY GOSODE 5 INDEPENDENT	 CLODWBERT TELANE 6 INDEPENDENT	 JOHN AREKAI 7 INDEPENDENT	 KIPLING SANATA 8 INDEPENDENT
 DAISY DIKORO 9 INDEPENDENT	 ALLAN SARUWA 10 INDEPENDENT	 MENDODEBA KIPLING NAONI 11 INDEPENDENT	 AKOKA DOI 12 PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY	 JACKSON GOSODE 13 INDEPENDENT	 SAKIMO DUIGU 14 INDEPENDENT	 DAVID CLARK FURIFURI 15 INDEPENDENT	 NANCY JIREGARI 16 INDEPENDENT
 ERIC IEWAGO 17 UNITED PARTY	 HENRY WARIWANGI 18 INDEPENDENT	 WILSON WASE MOROVE 19 INDEPENDENT	 MISAEI IWAIE PAINE 20 INDEPENDENT	 CHARLES K. JASARI 21 INDEPENDENT	 DAVID HUNIMA 22 INDEPENDENT	 ARNOLD KOKO 23 INDEPENDENT	 JOE SIL GALA 24 INDEPENDENT
 DICKSON AIKE MAJONI 25 INDEPENDENT	 WILLIAM (BILL) SAMBOBA 26 INDEPENDENT	 DUNCANIA JAWA 27 INDEPENDENT	 EASIPETE EIDEHIPA 28 INDEPENDENT	 CHAMPION SORARI 29 INDEPENDENT	 ADELBERT GANGAI 30 INDEPENDENT	 JAMES BENSON HONDARI 31 INDEPENDENT	 WESLEY JOROTO ARUGA 32 INDEPENDENT
 REX EMBANE 33 PEOPLES PROGRESS PARTY	 LEONARD KAJARI 34 INDEPENDENT	 GIDEON PINOKA 35 INDEPENDENT	 DENNY AKESA 36 INDEPENDENT	 LADRI KULI 37 INDEPENDENT	 JERRY KANSAN 38 INDEPENDENT	 WILLINGTON JOJOGA 39 INDEPENDENT	 RICHARD EURURA GABURA 40 INDEPENDENT
 WESLEY EDEHIPA JANOPA 41 INDEPENDENT	 ALBERT FARAPO 42 INDEPENDENT	 BENSON TOROI 43 INDEPENDENT	 ANDREW KAIAT 44 INDEPENDENT	 CECILIA IARI 45 INDEPENDENT	 SYLVANES SIEMO 46 PANGU PARTY	 BENSON GARUI 47 INDEPENDENT	 CECIL WALLACE KIBIKI 48 INDEPENDENT
 JUDITH KUSCHEL PENUNUA 49 INDEPENDENT	 MOSE MAIDE 50 INDEPENDENT	 DOUGLAS GARAWA 51 INDEPENDENT	 SAMSON ANDOGA 52 INDEPENDENT	 FR. EDISON KOPADA 53 INDEPENDENT	 CECILY AJIMBANI 54 INDEPENDENT	 STEVEN ISAAC OGAJI TAGA 55 INDEPENDENT	 DOUGLAS PETER ANAYABERI 56 INDEPENDENT
 JOHN HENRY PIA 57 INDEPENDENT	 BENJAMIN IJUMI 58 INDEPENDENT	 TARUA TUTA 59 INDEPENDENT	 SAMUEL PAUL KIENZLE 60 INDEPENDENT	 JOHN DUCAS 61 INDEPENDENT			

PRINTED BY MOORE

JUNE, 1997/73

ATTACHMENT H

Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security, and Development on Bougainville

LINCOLN AGREEMENT ON PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT ON BOUGAINVILLE

The Government of Papua New Guinea, the Bougainville Transitional Government, Bougainville Resistance Force, the Bougainville Interim Government; the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and Bougainville Leaders (the "Parties"), having met in Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, from 19 - 23 January 1998.

- Praying for the Almighty's forgiveness, guidance and blessing for their common endeavours;
- Emphasising their firm commitment to peace by building on the achievements in the *Burnham Declaration*, *Burnham Truce* and the *Cairns Commitment*;
- Acknowledging the suffering, pain and loss on all sides of the conflict that they have agreed to end forever;
- Committing themselves to peace, reconciliation and working together for the common good;
- Engaged in a process of consultation and cooperation, initiated by Bougainvillean leaders, which they will continue;

Hereby agree:

1. PEACEFUL MEANS

The parties will co-operate to achieve and maintain peace by peaceful means. They also pledge to renounce the use of armed forces and violence, and agree to resolve any differences, by consultation, both now and in the future. They confirm also their respect for human rights and the rule of law.

2. EXTENSION OF THE TRUCE

The parties agree to extend the period of the Truce currently in force to the 30th of April 1998 to allow for consultation as regards the establishment of the ceasefire.

3. CEASEFIRE

- 3.1 A permanent and irrevocable ceasefire will take effect in Bougainville at 2400 hours on 30 April 1998.

- 3.2 The parties will co-operate to reduce fear in Bougainville and take urgent steps to cooperate in promoting public awareness of, and respect for, the ceasefire.
- 3.3 immediately the ceasefire takes effect, the parties will refrain from use of arms, ammunition, explosives and other instruments of death, injury or destruction in Bougainville
- 3.4 The parties will not manufacture, trade or distribute weapons and ammunitions.
- 3.5 The parties will co-operate in accordance with law in reporting and preventing the use, manufacture, importations, sale, trade, exchange of weapons and ammunitions.
- 3.6 The parties will cooperate with the successor to the TMG in recording, locating and arranging disposal of all arms, ammunitions, explosives and other instruments of death, injury and destruction, including parts and ingredients of all the parties in Bougainville.

4. WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENCE FORCE FROM BOUGAINVILLE

The parties agree to a phased withdrawal of the PNG Defence Force from Bougainville subject to restoration of civil authority.

5. PEACE MONITORING GROUP

- 5.1 The Papua New Guinea National Government undertakes to conclude the arrangements required for deployment of the successor to the neutral regional Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) by no later than 30 April 1998.
- 5.2 The Papua New Guinea National Government will seek the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council for these arrangements, including the appointment of a Special observing mission to monitor these arrangements.

6. MANDATE OF THE PEACE KEEPING FORCE

The Mandate of the Successor to the TMG will be to:

- 6.1 monitor and report on the compliance of the parties to all aspects of the ceasefire;
- 6.2 promote and instil confidence in the peace process through its presence, good offices and interaction with people in Bougainville;

- 6.3 provide people in Bougainville with information about the ceasefire and other aspect of the peace process;
- 6.4 provide such assistance in restoration and development consistent with this Agreement as the parties may agree and available resources allows.
- 6.5 assist with the development and training and institution of a Bougainvillean constabulary.
- 6.6 and such other matters as may be agreed to by the parties which will assist with the democratic resolution of the situation.

7. **TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN PEACETIME POLICING**

The parties will co-operate in:

- (a) re-establishing the Village Court System in Bougainville; and
- (b) restoration of civilian peacetime policing, including arrangements that will facilitate the recruitment, training and deployment of Bougainvillean police.

8. **RECONCILIATION**

- 8.1 The parties will co-operate in promoting reconciliation between Bougainvilleans and with other individuals, groups and organisations in Papua New Guinea.
- 8.2 The parties agree to free and democratic elections on Bougainville to elect a Bougainville Reconciliation Government before the end of 1998.

9. **REMOVAL OF BOUNTIES AND FREE MOVEMENT**

9.1 The Papua New Guinea National Government:

- (a) has confirmed the removal of bounties and:
- (b) will facilitate the free and unhindered movement of Bougainvilleans into, within and out of Papua New Guinea in accordance with law:

10. **AMNESTY AND PARDON**

The Papua New Guinea National Government will:-

- (a) grant amnesty to persons involved in crisis-related activities on all sides;

- (b) following receipts of advice from the Advisory Committee on the Power of Mercy, recommend pardons for persons convicted of crisis-related offences.

11. RESTORATION AND DEVELOPMENT

- 11.1 The parties will co-operate in restoration and development in Bougainville in both the public and private sectors, with particular emphasis on rural areas.
- 11.2 The Papua New Guinea National Government will seek appropriate forms of assistance from intentional organisations, foreign governments and organisations for restoration and development in Bougainville.
- 11.3 Assistance for restoration and development in Bougainville will, to the maximum practical extent, be sought and administered so as to promote Bougainvillean participation.
- 11.4 The Papua New Guinea National Government will prepare an Indicative Program in consultation with the parties to help secure funding and other resources to assist in restoration and development in Bougainville.
- 11.5 The parties agree to co-operate in restoring normalcy, including the return of Bougainvilleans in care centres to their villages and resuming development in Bougainville by acting without delay to:
 - (a) facilitate communications and access to villages on Bougainville
 - (b) provide essential services, such as health and education.

12. CONSULTATION AND LIAISON

The parties agree to promote consultation, co-operation and liaison at the political level among Bougainvilleans and with the Papua New Guinea National Government.

13. POLITICAL ISSUE

- 13.1 The parties agree to meet again in Bougainville to address the political issue before the end of June 1998.
- 13.2 Officials will meet as required to prepare for such meetings..

14. PUBLIC AWARENESS

The parties will co-operate in promoting public awareness of , and respect for, this Agreement.

15. ANNEXES TO THIS AGREEMENT AND SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS

Detailed arrangements for implementation and development of this Agreement may, by agreement, be embodied in Annexes or subsidiary arrangements to this Agreement.


16. ONGOING CO-OPERATION


In signing this Agreement the parties whose signatures appear below commit themselves to working together for peace, justice, security and development in Bougainville by:


- (a) co-operating with each other; and
- (b) promoting a bipartisan approach in the National Parliament and in the community as a whole.


Done at Lincoln, Christchurch, New Zealand this 23rd day of January, 1998.


SIGNED:



.....
Sir John Kaputin, KBE, CMG, GC (Togo), MP
Chief Negotiator
PNG Government



.....
Hon. Sam Akoitai MP
Minister for Bougainville Affairs
PNG Government



.....
Hon. Gerard Sinato
Premier
Bougainville Transitional Government



.....
Mr Joseph Kabui
Vice President
Bougainville Interim
Government


.....
General Sam Kauona
Commander BRA



.....
Hon. John Momis, MP
Member for Bougainville Regional
PNG Government


.....
Hon. Michael Laimo, MP
Member for South Bougainville
PNG Government


.....
Hon. Michael Ogio, MP
Member for North Bougainville
PNG Government


.....
Hilary Masiria
Resistance Commander

WITNESSED BY:


.....
HON. BARTHOLOMEW ULUFA'ALU, MP
PRIME MINISTER
SOLOMON ISLANDS

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ATTACHMENT I

Proposed Timetable for Bougainville Election Preparation

BOUGAINVILLE GOVERNMENT ELECTION PROGRAMME

DATE

ACTIVITY

1998

May 1998	-	Prepare budget submission for Bougainville Government elections
10 th - 22 nd June 1998	-	Patrol and Polling equipment preparation for each polling team
22 nd June 1998	-	Compile polling schedule
6 th July 1998	-	Polling schedule Gazetted
13 th July 1998	-	Final List of polling officials selected
27 th July 1998	-	Complete training of polling officials
10 th August 1998	-	Common Roll updating starts
6 th November 1998	-	Common Roll 2 nd . Recheck completes

1999

10 th Feb 1999	-	Common Roll finalised
10 th March 1999	-	Issue of Writ
7 th April 1999	-	Nomination opens
5 th May 1999	-	Ballot Papers Printing
9 th June 1999	-	Polling Commences
30 th June 1999	-	Return of Writ

- A total of approx. 14 months duration

This is assuming the following is in place:-

1. The Constitution for Bougainville is agreed of and formally approved.
2. The Provincial Boundaries Electorates are finalized and formally approved
3. That the census updating is completed
4. That funding required is available
5. That experience personal is available
6. That security situation is conducive - disarmament?

Assuming that the time frame for the above requirement is not in place as yet.

- | | |
|--|----------------|
| 7. The Constitution for Bougainville is agreed to and formally approved. | - 6 months |
| 8. The Provincial Boundaries Electorates are finalized and formally approved | - 3 months |
| 9. That the census updating is completed | - 6 months |
| 10. That funding required is available | - N/A |
| 11. That experience personal is available | - N/A |
| 12. That security situation is conducive - disarmament? | -Unpredictable |

- A further 15 months will be required on top of the planned 14 months, to get the relevant constitutions, etc in place.

A period of 29 months is required to have a democratically elected Government of Bougainville.

The target should be to have a democratically elected government for Bougainville by the 30th of June 2000.



ATTACHMENT J

“Nuis Blong Peace,” Newsletter of the Peace Monitoring Group



OBA SECTORAL GROUP MEETINGS

The second Office of Bougainville Affairs Sectoral Group Meetings were conducted this week in Arawa. The meetings opened on the 27 October and were well attended by delegates from various aid donors and agencies, the BTG, the BIG, the BRA and from provincial and national government agencies. These meetings aimed to provide a forum for discussion about several key areas including health, education, women's issues, agriculture, infrastructure, and law and order.

Discussions held at the Health Sector Meeting on the 28 October revealed that representatives of the various parties and factions would like to see a greater emphasis on the provision of basic health facilities such as Aid Posts, rather than through large centralised facilities such as regional hospitals.

Reports from the Agriculture and Private Sector Issues Meeting indicated that the donor programs are currently focussing on cocoa and copra rehabilitation and, in spite of limitations of current transport and infrastructure capacities, there has been a resurgence in cash crop exports in several areas.

The Women's Sector Meeting included vigorous discussion from all concerned factions. Speakers at this session included Theresa Jiantong (Bougainville Provincial Council of Women),

Sister Lorraine (President of the Inter Church Group) and Josephine Sirivi (President of the Bougainvillean Women for Peace and Freedom). The main theme to emerge was the lack of coordination among aid donor groups and the need for a more effective and efficient distribution of aid.

On Thursday, 29 October, the Education, Infrastructure, and Law and Order Sector meetings were held. Key issues relating to Education focused upon the need to promote school reconstruction projects, distance education, curriculum development and teacher training, whilst the infrastructure meeting revealed that donors are keen to provide assistance with projects in key areas such as roads, telecommunications and wharves. However, it was highlighted that issues relating to local training and sub-contracting need to be resolved before large infrastructure projects can be implemented effectively.

The Law and Order meeting saw donor groups indicate their willingness to support projects such as police training, and village based conflict resolution training.

The Sectoral Meetings concluded on Friday, 30 October with entertainment from the PokPok Island Cultural Group and closing speeches from the representatives of all of the local factions.

Sawmill Presented to North Nasoi Community

At a brief ceremony in Arawa on Friday 23 October, Mr Michael Tane, representing the Minister for Bougainville Affairs, and Mr Mark Ramsden of the New Zealand Office for Development Assistance (NZODA), presented a Lucas sawmill to Mr Chris Uma of the Kerei Community.

The NZODA and the Minister for Bougainville Affairs, Mr Sam Akoitai, jointly funded the K30,000 sawmill. The sawmill is currently operating in Arawa but will be relocated shortly to the Kerei Community, where the local youths will undergo training in



the operation of the sawmill under the direction of the North Nasoi Council of Elders who will be responsible for the coordination of the project. Both Mr Uma and Mr Tane are hopeful that the sawmill will allow the people of Kieta District to undertake their own community reconstruction projects including the building of classrooms and health facilities, as well as houses and furniture construction.

Any organisations from around the Central District that would like to have timber cut for construction projects should contact Chris Uma through the North Nasoi Council of Elders (NNCOE).

Michael Tane (far left) from Bougainville Affairs and Mark Ramsden of the NZODA (far right) present the Lucas Sawmill to Chris Uma (centre) of the North Nasoi Community.

NEWS IN BRIEF

- Bougainville Affairs Minister Sam Akoitai has asked the Government for K100 million in the 1999 budget to fund restoration, reconstruction and rehabilitation programs in Bougainville next year.
- Port Moresby police have re-opened the sedition case against PNGDF commander, Brigadier General Jerry Singirok. Brigadier General Singirok has strenuously denied these charges.
- A man who appealed against a 10 year sentence for rape was instead given a 15 year sentence by the Supreme Court in Wewak last week.
- New Zealand scientists believe that land subsidence was a major factor in causing the tsunami that swept the Aitape coast and killed more than 2000 people.
- Two prison escapees are recovering in the Mendi Provincial Hospital after they were wounded by warders while attempting to escape from the Bui Yebi jail outside Mendi in Southern Highlands Province.
- The Government has injected K50 million into Air Niugini, to help keep the troubled airline afloat.

PEACE MESSAGE SPREADS TO DISTANT SHORES

South of Arawa, about a one hour drive along a rough bush track, at a village called Rumba, members of the Peace Monitoring Group have been spreading the peace message.

Rumba is home to a picturesque school, located several hundred metres from the main village area and perched neatly on top of a hill. On Monday, members of MT Arawa and staff from the PMG Headquarters visited Rumba school to see first hand how peace is creating better opportunities for the youth of Bougainville. Headmistress Claire Marko said the ten-year struggle significantly impacted on the education standards of Bougainville's young people. With the twelve-month cease-fire, however, many students are returning to school. So great is their commitment that some students as old as 18 are returning to complete their primary school education.

One member of the visiting PMG group, Major Mark Walker, has initiated a unique pilot exchange project at Rumba aimed at informing an Australian school in Perth, Western Australia about peace on Bougainville and giving the students a glimpse of Australian life.

"It's the young people in the future that are going to make this island what it is. Just have a look at this school: it was constructed during the crisis and the people here are very serious about the value of their school to the community."

In the weeks to come, the Rumba students will be completing their projects which describe their daily lives in Rumba, and exchanging them with the students from the Perth school. There is little doubt that these projects will reveal a vastly different way of life between the two groups of children, but one thing is certain. Be it in a small village school in Rumba, Bougainville, or a busy city school in Perth, Western Australia, both groups of children look forward to a future that promises peace and opportunity for all.



Lieutenant Angela Gehrke and Major Mark Walker get involved in fun and games at Rumba school.


PADRE'S CORNER WITH CHAPLAIN K. BANI; PMG

Greetings to everyone in the name of Jesus. Soon, myself Chaplain K. Bani, and Chaplain Michael Taylor will leave Bougainville Island to go back to our homes in Vanuatu and Australia.

The two of us are very pleased to thank all of the Christian people for the good way in which you have worked together for God. We pray that God will be with your spirit and God's peace will be in our homes and in our thoughts.

There have been many good signs that peace will come to Bougainville, but we have got many more things to achieve yet before the year has ended, and we must forgive the bad ways of the years that have passed (Col 3:8, 13-17).

We encourage all people in Bougainville to keep their strong faith in God, so that we may all find peace with Him (Phil 4:7). All good people of Bougainville, we must rebuild this island so that Bougainville will be a place of Christ once again. Thankyou to all people of Bougainville, and may peace be with each one of you.



PEIT VILLAGERS STAND AGAINST HOMEBRU



Members of Beikut Village at their homebru information stall.

Villagers from the Peit district village of Beikut took a stand against homebru recently when they set up an information stall in Buka on market day. The villagers, led by COE member Henry Karolo and assisted by Buka Police Sergeant John Pinio distributed posters, displayed confiscated stills and spoke with market goers about how they have made Beikut a 'spak free zone'. The highlight was a singsing which demonstrated the before and after effects of homebru on the village.

The Peit district had previously been a homebru trouble spot, and attracted frequent police attention, but following presentations and a workshop sponsored by Monitoring Team Buka, the villagers have stamped out homebru production in favour of more worthwhile activities.

The village now boasts an active youth group, a village court, and a much happier and healthier population. A number of self-help projects are underway, and each day has seen improvements in the village and more produce going to the markets. Their efforts have not gone unnoticed by the Police and Provincial Police Commissioner Joel Kean now uses the district as a positive example of what people power can achieve in his weekly brief at the Buka Peace Monitoring Committee meetings.

The villagers hope that by spreading their example to others they can help reduce the negative effects of homebru on village life, and say that they, more than anyone, are in a position to tell. Team Buka has developed a model workshop as a result of the Peit success and will be starting a similar program in the Haku district following an invitation by the COE. The workshop encourages villagers to plan their own future through reconciliation, a positive mental attitude, and a return to customs and traditions.



Olgeta del i toktok: 0500 - 0730
1700 - 2200
Nius Blong Peace: Fraide 1910 -
1940

RADIO BOUGAINVILLE

FM 101 MHz
SW 3.325 KHZ


UNITY FM



Station we i givim toksave blong peace.
TANIM I KAM NAKEL LONG 6PM - 10.30PM
OLGETA MANDE, TRINDE NA FRAIDE LONG KISIM
TOKSAVE NA HARIM SAMPALA MUSIC

The voice of Peace & Unity


89.5 UNITY FM



TINPUTZ DISTRICT COMMUNITY SCHOOL

High in the mountains in Tinputz District, a large two-storey building is being constructed. This is the new Wasinobus Community School. When a PMG group from the Wakunai Monitoring Team recently visited Wasinobus, the community showed off the new building and told its story with pride.

The existing school has become too small for its seventy students. Some students walk from nearby Topis and Mutahi and spend up to three hours each day walking to and from school. The new school building will have four classrooms, an office and a storeroom.



This new school is a community self-help project. The people of Wasinobus themselves decided that a new school was urgently needed, and it is the community that is now providing the money and labour needed to complete it. Wasinobus men have worked cutting the timber, carrying timber and other material up the steep mountain tracks, and constructing the new building with very few tools. Many of these men are ex-combatants and have received valuable training through their voluntary work on the school. Together with donations from the entire community, the Wasinobus women have worked hard growing and selling choko at the Tinputz and Buka markets to finance the school.

The efforts of the community have been supplemented by assistance from AusAID, who provided roofing iron and nails. The Tinputz Council of Elders will also assist the school by providing fuel.



Soccer Draw SUNDAY 8TH NOVEMBER 1998 (Games start at 11.30 am)

FINALS

A GRADE

J. Souths Vs Rangers

MATCH OFFICIALS

P. Onabui,
J. Koredong,
M. Torokel,
S. Dutarel

B GRADE

2 Poraka Vs Wantoks

MATCH OFFICIALS

A. Barkson,
E. Momis, C.
Duala,
D. Manoni

NOTE:

1. all games on ground one
2. each half 45 minutes
3. half time is 5 minutes

The school will open in December this year. Given the success of this community project, the people of Wasinobus are already making plans to build another school building for students in grades 7 and 8, and to build dormitories and facilities for boarding students.

Produced by
Military Information Support Team





OBA SECTORAL GRUP MITING

Namba tu Ofis blong Bogenvil Affairs Sectoral Grup mitings oli bin holim long dispela wik insait long Arawa. Miting hia i bin opim long 27 blong mun Oktoba we plenti delegate i bung bilong olkain aid donors na agencies; na BTG, BIG, BRA, na tu ol manmeri i makim provincial na national gavamen agencies. Ol miting hia i aim long bungim plenti manmeri long toktok long ol bigpela eria olsem health, education, women's issues, agriculture, infrastructure na loa na oda.

Toktok oli holim blong Health Sectoral Miting long 28 Oktoba i tokaut, plenti representatives i kam long plenti pati i bin tok, oli laik lukim bigpela hap blong wok health mas kamap long ol Aid Posts na Health Centres na no ken holim wok bilong hausik insait long ol bigpela hausik tasol (regional hospitals).

Ripot i kam long Agriculture na Private Sector Issues Miting i tokaut donor programs long dispela taim i lukluk long kakao na kopra rehabilitation. Taim yumi i daun yet long ol wei bilong transpot moa yet long rot sistim yumi gat pinis sampela eria blong provins ol ino nap long salim moa yet cash crop bilong ol.

Women's Sector Miting i bin toktok stret i kam long ol women representatives. Ol spika i bin givim toktok long dispela taim emi Theresa Jiantong (Bougainville Provincial Council of

Women), Sister Lorraine (President blong Inter Church Grup) na Josephine Sirivi (President blong Bougainvillean Women for Peace na Freedom). Bigpela tok insait long miting bilong ol meri, em ol wei ol aid donor i wok long mekim wok bilong ol i no gut tumas. Oli mas painim gupela na stretpela wei long sikelim ol halivim i go long man o grup i laikim.

Miting i bin toktok tu long rol bilong ol women insait long political process. Long Fronde 29 Oktoba, Education, Infrastructure na Loa na Oda Sector Miting oli bin kamap. Bigpela ol toktok long Education i kliarim ol nids i stap long promotim skul reconstruction projects, distance education, curriculum development, na tisa trening taim infrastructure miting i tokaut olsem ol donor i hamamas long givim halivim wantaim projects long ki eria olsem ol rot, telecommunications na ol wharves. Moa yet oli bin tokaut klia olsem olgeta wok blong local trening na sub contracting nid mas kamap bipo long ol bigpela infrastructure projects i ken kamap. Loa na oda miting lukluk ol donor group i soim laik blong ol long sapotim ol kain project olsem polis trening na viles based conflict resolution trening.

Dispela Sectoral mitings i pinis long Fraide 30 Oktoba wantaim entertainment i kam long PokPok Ailan Kultural Grup na ol klosim speeches i kam long manmeri i makim lokal grup.

Sawmill Presentim i go long North Nasoi Kommunititi

Long liklik seremoni long Arawa long Fraide 23 Oktoba, Mr Michael Tane makim Ministry bilong Bogenvil Affairs na Mr Mark Ramsden bilong New Zealand Office blong Development Assistance (NZODA) i bin presentim Lucas sawmill i go long han blong Mr Chris Uma, memba bilong Kerei Kommunititi.

Dispela K30,000 sawmill i bin kam long NZODA na Minister for Bougainville Affairs, Mr Sam Akoitai. Dispela Lucas sawmill i wok na istap yet long Arawa, tasol behain taim liklik bai go long nuipela ples bilong en insait long Kerei



Kommunititi, we ol lokal yangpela manmeri bai kisim skul long how long operatim dispela sawmill, na North Nasoi Council of Elders (NNCOE) bai coordinate dispela project. Mr Uma na Mr Tane i ting dispela sawmill hia bai larim pipol blong Kieta Distrik long karim aut kommunititi construction wok olsem ol klasrum health fasiliti na ol narapela haus, furniture olsem tebol na chair.

Sapos sampela ol organisations husat i stap long Central Distrik, oli laik kisim katim ol pleng, yu mas tokim Chris Uma blong NNCOE.

Michael Tane (lephan) blong Bogenvil Affairs na Mark Ramsden blong NZODA (raithan) oli presentim Lucas Sawmill long Chris Uma (namei) blong North Nasoi Community.

LIKLIK RIPOOT BLONG NUIS

- Bogenvil Affairs Minister Sam Akoitai i askim Gavamen long K100 milion insait long 1999 moni yia long fundim restoration, reconstruction, na rehabilitation programs insait long Bogenvil long yia i kam.
- Port Moresby police i opim bek kot long harim bek ol sas bilong PNGDF Commander, Brigadier General Singirok. Brigadier General Singirok emi tok nogat strong long ol dispela sas.
- Wanpela man husat i mekim apil long tenpela yia kalabus bilong em blong reip, kot i surikim kalabus yia gen i go inap long 15 yia olgeta insait long Suprem Kot long Wewak las wik.
- New Zealand Scientists i bilip olsem bruk daun blong graun ananit long solwara i kamapim dispela bigpela si bruk oli kolim tsunami i bin bagarapim nambis bilong Aitape na kilim dai 2000 manmeri.
- Tupela kalabus man husat i bin traim long ranawe long Bui Yebi Kalabus ausait long Mendi Southern Hailans, i bin kisim bagarap taim ol wardens i sut long ol na nau oli wok long kamap orait bek insait long Mendi Provincial hausik.
- Gavamen i putim K50 milion i go long Air Niugini long emi ken wok gen long flai.

NUIS BLONG PEACE I GOL LONGWE ARASAIT

Saut bilong Arawa wan auz drive samting behainim ol rot nogut tru insait long bus long wanpela ples oli save kolim Rumba ol memba bilong Peace Monitoring Group i bin skulim ol manmeri long nius blong peace. Rumba emi home bilong naispela skul i stap sampela hundret mita long wei long bigpela ples na oli bildim gut tru antap long wanpela mantan. Long Mande, memba bilong Arawa MT na ol staf bilong PMG Headquarters i visitim Rumba skul long hukim pastaim sapos peace i wok long kamapim sampela gutpela taim long ol yangpela bilong Bougainville. Headmistress Claire Marko i bin tok, istap tenpela yia insait long taim nogut i bringim traipela bagarap long standard bilong education blong ol yangpela bilong Bogenvil. Wantaim halivim blong 12 month ceasefire hia plenti sumatin i wok long kam bek long skul. Laik blong ol long i stap bek long skul i bigpela olsem maski oli bigpela manmeri olsem 18 yia oli wok long kam bek na painim rum long pinisim primary education bilong ol.

Wanpela memba bilong visitim PMG grup, Major Mark Walker i bin kamapim wanpela kam pasin emi laik mekim wantaim ol Rumba skul sumatin emi kolim en exchange project. Em bai tok tok wantaim wanpela skul long Perth, Western Australia na ol sumatin blong Rumba i ken rait i go long sumatin blong dispela skul long Perth na stori long ol long wok bilong peace process long hia na laip bilong ol insait long skul na oli ken save long wanem samting i wok long kamap long Bougainville. Long wankam pasin ol sumatin blong dispela skul long Perth i ken rait i kam na stori long wanem samting i stap insait long skul bilong ol o long kanti blong ol. Long dispela wei tupela skul hia i ken save gut long wanpela narapela na tu long laip stail long ples bilong ol.

Olgeta manki hia i bilong behain taim, taim oli kamap bigpela ol bai mekim dispela ailan i kamap gutpela ples tru. Yumi ken hukuk klostu moa insait long dispela skul blong ol, oli bin wokim dispela insait long crisis na olgeta i serius tru long gat dispela insait long komuniti blong ol.

Bihain long sampela wiki kam Rumba sumatin bai pinisim nambawan project blong ol, dispela project emi stori bilong laip blong ol long Rumba, na taim oli pinis bai oli salim i go daun long Perth school. Ino giaman, dispela tupela project bai kamapim samting i naraka in olgeta namel long laip blong tupela grup hia, tasol wanpela samting emi tru tumas i stap. Maski yu stap long wanpela viles skul olsem Rumba, Bogenvil or maski yu blong wanpela bisi siti skul olsem Perth, Western Australia tupela grup wantaim i hukuk i go moa yet long taim i kam we bai i gat peace na gutpela taim blong olgeta man.



Lieutenant Angela Gehrke na Major Mark Walker pilai games wantaim sumatin blong Rumba school.


PADRE'S CORNER

WANTAIM CHAPLAIN K. BANI; PMG

Greetings long yupela everi wan long nem bilong bikpela Jisas. I no long taim nating, mitupela Chaplin K. Bani na Chaplin M. Taylor i lusim ailan Bogenvil na go bek long ples, Vanuatu na Australia.

Mitupela i amamas na tok tenkyu long yupela olgeta Kristen man na meri, long gutpela pasin bilong bungwantaim gutpela wok bilong Papa God. Mitupela i prea yet na Papa God i stap wantaim yupela long Spirit bilong en. Peace bilong Papa God imas kamap long ples na insait long tingting bilong yumi. I gat planti gutpela sain pinis, na peace i kamap long ples. Yumi gat moa samting yet bilong mekim long yia i kam bihain. Tasol yumi mas pogivim yumi kain pasin nogut bilong yia i go pinis (Col 2:8, 13-17).

Mitupelai encouregem yupela ol pipol bilong Bogenvil strongim bilip bilong yumi long Papa God, long wanem, peace i kam long Papa God (Phil 4:7). Ol gutpela pipol bilong Bogenvil, rebildem Bogenvil, i kam Bogenvil bilong Krai tasol! Peace i stap wantaim yupela. Tenkyu tru!



PIPOL BLONG PIET VILES EMI SANAP I GO LONG HOMBRU



Membas blong Beikut Village i stap long homebru information stall.

Ol pipol blong viles blong Beikut, blong Peit Distrik, oli sanap i go long hombru long taim oli putapim wangepa information stall long Buka long maket long dei i go pinis. Manmeri blong viles, oli bin lidim long COE memba, Henry Karolo, husat emi kisim halivim long Polis Sergeant bilong Buka.

Taim i go pinis, Peit distrik emi bin gat problem blong hombru na ol polis i kamap plenti taim long lukautim dispela problem. Tasol, behain taim ol presentations na ol wokshop i bin presentim long MT Buka, na production blong hombru i bin stapim.

Olsem, viles emi nau gat bigpela grup blong ol yangpela manmeri, wangepa kot blong viles, na olgeta pipol oli no gat sik na oli kamap hamamas tru. Plenti ol project blong helivim ol yet, oli bin kamap na wanwan dei na viles i go mobeta na moa produce i bin salim long ol maket.

Polis na Provincial Polis Commissioner, nem bilong em Joel Kean, emi nau yusim dispela distrik olsem gutpela example long ol pipol husat i bin achievim pipol husat i kamap strong i go long problem bilong hombru. Olgeta pipol blong viles oli hopim olsem long dispela example bai i halivim stopim dispela problem blong hombru long ol viles, na oli tokim olsem long oli ken save dispela problem.

Buka Monitoring Tim emi mekim wangepa model wokshop olsem wokshop i bin yusim long Peit Distrik na ol bai stopim dispela program insait distrik blong Haku bihainim wangepa invitation long COE. Dispela wokshop bai tokim ol pipol blong ol viles long mekim plen long taim behain blong ol, long reconciliation na gutpela tingting, na kam bek long pasin long ol pipol.



Olgeta dei i toktok: 0500 - 0730
1700 - 2200
Nius Blong Peace: Fraide 1910 -
1940

RADIO BOUGAINVILLE


FM 101 MHz
SW 3.325 KHZ



Station we i givim toksave blong peace.
TAIM I KAM NAMEL LONG 6PM - 10.30PM
OLGETA MANDE, TRINDE NA FRAIDE LONG KISIM
TOKSAVE NA HARIM SAMPELA MUSIC

The voice of Peace & Unity

89.5 UNITY FM



TINPUTZ DISTRIK KOMMUNITTI SKUL


Antap long maunten blong Tinputz Distrik kommuniti blong dispela eria i bildim bigpela tu stori klasrum. Dispela emi Wasinobus Kommuniti Skul. Taim PMG bilong Wakunai Monitoring Team ino long taim tumas mekim wanpela lukluk raun blong ol long Wasinobus eria, kommuniti i bin hamamas na kusai long soim Monitoring Team dispela tripela niupela klasrum ol yet i bin bildim.

Olpela skul blong bipo ino bin nap long holim 70 sumatin. Sampela long ol sumatin hia i save wokabaut inap 3 haua olgeta lusim Topis na Nutahi i go i kam olgeta de. Dispela niupela skul bildin bai gat long en foa klas rums, wanpela rum ofis na stoarum.

Dispela niupela skul emi selfhelp project. Pipol blong Wasinobus yet tokaut wanpela niupela skul mas kamap taim oli lukim i gat bigpela nid long en. Wasinobus Kommuniti yet i wok long putim moni long en na tu ol yet i leba long wokim inap long oli pinisim olgeta wok long en.

Olgeta man blong Wasinobus i wok hat long katim tinba na narapela material na karim ol i go antap long ol tripela stip maunten rot na ol wok long bildim skul want ol liklik tol bilong kamda oli gat long en. Plenti long ol dispela i wok long givim taim long wok insait long niupela skul i bin holim masket long pait olsem insait long crisis, nau oli wok long kisim gutpela skul long kamap bung long wok olsem wanpela kommuniti na lus tingting long birua pasin. Long inapim tru donasin blong kommuniti i go long skul olgeta meri bilong Wasinobus wok strong tru long kamapim ol samting blong salim long Tinputz na Buka – maket long kamapim moni long helpim niupela skul hia.

Bigpela hat wok blong Wasinobus Kommuniti ol i wok long mekim insait long niupela skul blong oli kisim liklik halivim i kam long AusAID husat i givim ol sampela roofing iron na nails. Tinputz COE bai givim halivim tu i go long skul wantaim long fuel. Ol bai openim dispela niupela skul insait long mun December long dispela yia tasol.



SOCCER DRAW

SUNDAY 8TH NOVEMBER 1998 (Games start at 11.30 am)

FINALS

A GRADE

1 Souths Vs Rangers

MATCH OFFICIALS

P. Onabui,
J. Koredong,
M. Torokel,
S. Dutarei

B GRADE

2 Poraka Vs Wantoks

MATCH OFFICIALS

A. Barkson,
E. Momis, C.
Duaku,
D. Manoni

NOTE:

1. all games on ground one
2. each half 45 minutes
3. half time is 5 minutes

Lukim olsem Wasinobus Kommuniti i wokim pinis bigpela hap long dispela Kommuniti project ol mekim wok redi long arapela project em long bildim narapela skul bildin bilong ol sumatin blong grades 7 na 8 na long bildim haus bilong slip blong ol sumatin long slip insait long skul.

Produced by
Military Information





ATTACHMENT K

List of Materials Collected on Mission

List of Materials Collected on Mission

Forms and Exhibits from Electoral Commission

1996 Common Roll Updating Form for a village in Central Province
1996 Common Roll Update Summary Sheet and copies of completed Claim for Enrolment forms
Claim For Enrolment form
Examples of pages from the Common Roll (Central Bougainville Open Electorate)
1997 Ballot - Central Provincial Electorate
1997 Sample Ballot - Sohe Open Electorate
1997 Ballot - Northern Provincial Electorate
Blank Sex Tally Sheet
1997 Tally Sheets from Counting Centres

Other Items from Electoral Commission

Electoral Commission organizational chart with names
Common Roll Update flowcharts
Planning Timetable for Bougainville Elections
Elections Operations Div. Field Office Directory
Electoral Commission 1999 Budget
1997 Parliament and Local-level Elections Timetables under various options

Press Related Publications from Electoral Commission

1997 Election-related media statements by Reuben Kaiulo
1997 Print ad showing voter turnout and election timetable
Pamphlets on various topics including guidelines for campaign contributions, review of preliminary roll, candidate bio sheets/pictures, etc.

Manuals and Handbooks

"Vote for the Future" - voter education pamphlet by Yauka Liria
Old training materials used by election officers, including copy of old Organic Law on National Elections
1997 Returning Officers Manual - prepared by Morea Veri
1997 "Polling Place Management Procedures" - election officials manual
"Handbook on Election Offenses for Use by Electoral Official Only"
"Candidates Handbook to the 1997 General Elections"

Constitutions and Laws

Annotated Constitution of Papua New Guinea
Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections - 1997
BTG's Organic Law on Provincial Government (without amendments)
Constitution of North Solomons

Reports and Communications

Report on the 1997 National Election by the Electoral Commissioner (my annotations)
"1997 General Election Report" (listing of votes cast for each of 2372 candidates)
Recommendations by Constitutional Review Commission for an Organic Law on Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates
Report on Advance Visit to Solomon Islands by Provincial Repatriation Committee (concerning repatriation of Bougainville refugees)
Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on the 1997 Election
1997 National Election - Bougainville Report (by Mathias Pihei)

Reports and Communications from International Community

John Norris (USAID), "The Land of the Unexpected," trip report and recommendations for Bougainville aid projects
Tony Simonelli (AusAID) proposal to Australian High Commission concerning election officer training project
Letters from Kofi Annan, et. al. concerning UN Observer Mission
UNDP Mission Paper and recommendations for aid
"Australia's AID to Bougainville" (author unknown)
Position paper on establishment of Bougainville Reconciliation Government by US Ambassador Karaer (with timetable)
Bougainville Restoration Program update, Aug 1998, AusAID
Red Cross/Crescent Papua New Guinea Emergency Appeal Plan of Action and Programme Description, Feb 1998 - May 1999
"Summary of Donor and NGO Activities, Sept. 1998" - Peace Monitoring Group

Bougainville Peace Documents

Lincoln Agreement (Jan. 23, 1998)
Buin Declaration (Aug. 22, 1998)
Collection of Key Agreements and Statements and organization of Truce Monitoring Group
(All documents prior to Lincoln Agreement; includes BTG membership amendments)

Other Publications directed to Bougainville citizens

"Nius Blong Peace" - newsletter produced by Peace Monitoring Group (Pidgin and English)
"Nius Bilong Sankamap" - newsletter of Office of Bougainville Affairs (English only)




ATTACHMENT L

List of Relevant Documents Reviewed

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- The Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea
- Organic Law on Provincial Government (the law for the Bougainville Transitional Government which expired on December 31, 1998)
- Organic Law on National Elections (expired on December 31, 1998)
- Organic Law on Provincial and Local-level Government
- Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections
- Papua New Guinea History (source unknown)
- The General Election in Papua New Guinea -- The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group
- Record of weekly election-related media statements issued by Reuben T. Kaiulo, MBE, Electoral Commissioner
- Report to the Sixth Parliament on the 1997 National Election, by the Electoral Commissioner, Reuben T. Kaiulo
- *Vote for the Future*, Yauka Aluambo Liria (voting guide for youth)
- Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville, and Annex 1
- Election '97 Report (Bougainville Province)
- Constitution of North Solomons Province
- Electoral Commission 1999 budget



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