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
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**International Foundation for Election Systems**

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## **The 1999 Election to the Russian State Duma**

### **Findings and Recommendations**

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## Introduction

The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) applauds the efforts of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (CEC), the Subject Election Commissions and other sub-level election commissions in conducting the 1999 Duma elections in a manner in which the will of the voters was confirmed. In general, IFES concludes that, with some exceptions, on Election Day the election process worked. On the whole, the State Duma election was not compromised and the electorate declared its choices in a democratic manner. However, significant issues remain to be addressed with regard to the pre-election campaign period and the administration of elections on election day. These findings discuss these issues in depth and provide specific recommendations in an effort to promote freer and fairer elections in the Russian Federation.

Considerable improvements in the Russian electoral system were evidenced in the Duma elections. The legal framework to carry out elections was significantly improved in comparison with the 1995 electoral process. For example, the new laws: (a) define deadlines for specific actions to be undertaken, such as registration of candidates and submittal of financial disclosure documentation; (b) strengthen the ballot access regime by requiring financial disclosure and disclosure of the existence of any criminal history; (c) strengthen the role of the Central Election Commission and clarify the hierarchy of the election commissions and their relationship with federal bodies; (d) provide for free air time for public service announcements to election commissions; and (e) generally increase transparency in the election process, especially by requiring that election commissions' work be conducted under public scrutiny. Evidence of greater transparency was witnessed on election day and included the posting of large protocols at the polling stations and the greater use of election observers by political parties, blocs and independent candidates. In addition, the development of new non-governmental organizations whose mission is to promote improvements in the electoral process and human rights is certainly a step in the right direction.

Due to the change in the Presidential election calendar, this report on the Russian State Duma elections will be abbreviated, highlighting the chief findings identified during IFES' assessment of the Duma election process. While the section on Election Day Concerns concentrates on weaknesses and violations of electoral norms, IFES contends that, on the whole, these were minor infractions and conduct with significant fraudulent intent was not observed. IFES' assessment of the entire election process for the State Duma elections, however, indicates that important improvements should be made in the administration of elections in the pre-election day campaign period, the period in which the most egregious abuses of electoral procedures took place. IFES's pre-election campaign and election day and findings are contained herein.

Through this brief report of findings, IFES proposes to the CEC, for its consideration, areas in need of improvement so as to ensure freer and fairer democratic elections in Russia. The IFES Pre-Election Technical Assessment (PETA), Analysis of the Presidential Election Law and The Role of the Media During Elections take a more detailed look at some of these issues and fully describe the Constitutional and legislative basis for the conduct of elections in Russia. IFES' report on the upcoming Presidential election will explore these issues in

much further detail and provide recommendations for improvement (as did the PETA). These findings are aimed at providing information to the CEC and other election-related organizations in an effort to assess and make necessary improvements to voting procedures and election administration in Russia in the context of the recently held State Duma elections (19 December 1999).

## **Section I: Pre-Election Campaign Concerns**

Although the Duma elections were widely viewed, with some qualification, as free and fair, the pre-election campaign period was fraught with excessive abuses and illustrated a need for major improvement in the conduct of elections throughout Russia. The most apparent improprieties were as follows:

- arbitrary application of election laws – especially concerning the registration/exclusion of candidates;
- bias and manipulation within the mass media being used to influence the decisions made by voters;
- inappropriate economic and political pressure being used by forces within the state infrastructure (especially regional authorities) to attempt to produce desired voting results;
- lack of clarity with regard to financial disclosure requirements and reporting, and the capricious use of sanctions for discrepancies in disclosure documentation.

### **I. Nomination and Registration of Candidates**

Candidates for the Duma had to agree to be nominated by Associations, groups of voters, or they could nominate themselves. Most of those elected to the Duma had been placed on Electoral Association (political party or bloc) lists for the proportional vote nationally, or had been nominated by an association for the single-mandate districts.<sup>1</sup> However, 106 or 24% of 450 Duma deputies elected on December 19 were independently nominated or self-nominated.

Candidates seeking election to the Duma in the December 19, 1999 election had to follow a rather detailed process outlined in the Basic Guarantees and the Duma Election Laws, including a complex set of personal and campaign financial disclosure elements. Most of these requirements did not exist in previous Duma elections. Candidates also had to use the previous method of collecting a minimum number of valid signatures of voters to qualify or they could use the new method of making a financial deposit to secure a position on the ballot. Once submitted, the nomination documents had to be reviewed by an election

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<sup>1</sup> An Electoral Association is a political party, political organization or movement that is formed under the law and registered with the Ministry of Justice at least one year prior to the election. Such associations may also voluntarily join forces with one or more political associations to form electoral blocs to field candidates for the Duma. Such blocs are treated as associations.

commission prior to a candidate becoming officially registered and thus placed on the election ballot.

## **1. Candidate Registration and Arbitrary Decisions**

While candidates were nominated to be placed on the ballot, only until the election commission accepted such nomination was the candidate considered to be officially registered and thus an official candidate for the Duma. Under the law, the Central Election Commission and District Election Commissions were charged with the responsibility of reviewing and verifying signatures and qualifications, financial deposits, and, perhaps most challenging, the financial holdings of the candidates.

The registration process was extremely problematic in the pre-election phase of this Duma election. Some candidates complained that, for political reasons, their registration for the ballot was denied, delayed, or scrutinized more closely. While most of the publicity regarding rejections centered on the Central Election Commission, particularly the controversy surrounding the problems with the registration of Vladimir Zhirinosky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia bloc, there appeared to be many controversial rejections made of candidates at the district election commission level. According to CEC Chairman Alexander Veshniakov, "lots of the district election commissions' decisions about the refusal in registration were not convincing or even arguable." Serious allegations of pressure by the regional administration on district election commissions to deny registrations were also made.

Examples of alleged administrative pressure upon regional electoral commissions and courts to harass or hinder opposition candidates were recorded throughout Russia, and specific instances of such incidents were recorded in Omsk, Kursk, Sakhalin, Primorskii Krai, and in the Republics of Kalmykia, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan. In Bashkortostan, the current Duma Deputy Aleksandr Arinin was denied registration by the local electoral commission and local courts even after the CEC had overruled the decision of the local electoral commission. In Primorskii Krai, Viktor Cherepkov, former Mayor of Vladivostok and one of the chief opponents of Governor Evgenii Nazdratenko, was deregistered in both mayoral and single-mandate contests for minor and disputable financial reporting irregularities. In Omsk, a candidate had been denied registration repeatedly even though he had made successful appeals to the CEC.

In addition to election commissions, it was also alleged that the courts were used in a manner to harass associations and candidates. Many such court challenges focused on minute details in nomination documents and stipulations in the law.

The complexity of the law and the difficulty verifying information provided by candidates placed a difficult burden on the Central and District Election Commissions during the registration process. It is clear that changes should be made to improve the process for future Duma elections so that candidate documents could be verified in a more fair and timely manner and that arbitrary decisions of election commissions could be discouraged.

**For Consideration**

A thorough review should be made of all the candidates who were nominated for the Duma election whose registration was rejected by election commissions. All complaints made by candidates should be carefully scrutinized as well as any court action or decisions of higher level commissions regarding appeals of registration rejections. It should be determined if a pattern existed whereby certain political parties or movements had an unusual number of rejections, the rejections resulted in only one or two primary parties or movements left on the ballot, or if certain election commissions rejected an unusually high number of candidates.

After such analysis, it should be determined whether the following actions need to be taken:

- Changing the disclosure requirements in the law to lessen nomination/registration requirements or to provide more clarity for candidates and election commissions.
- Requiring the Central Election Commission to provide more specific rules and procedures regarding the eligibility for registration of candidates.
- Providing additional training of election commissions regarding the determination of eligibility for registration of candidates.
- Accelerating the appeal process for candidates whose registration has been rejected.
- Implementing sanctions against election commissions that unduly deny a candidate's registration or that ignore court and CEC decisions or act on them in an untimely manner.

**II. Mass Media Coverage**

The Duma Election Law attempts, in a fairly thorough way, to regulate the activities of the media and ensure that the media behave in a responsible way. However, in relation to the media, there are areas of the law that lack clarity and could be detrimental to the electoral process. Although regulation of the media is necessary to prevent severe abuses and fraud, it should not be used as a straightjacket to restrict the traditional role of the media in democratic elections.

In so far as the law provides equal conditions on free and paid political advertising for all candidates and parties to express their views in the media and to attract voters to its side, the law can be said to be effectively fulfilling its function in promoting fair play. The problem lies in the fact that the law does not make the distinction between two very important but totally different activities - political advertising and coverage of events.



Political advertising should be distinguished from media coverage (i.e. news reports, information and analysis), which is the job of the media. Under Russia's current electoral law, however, the role of the media is not clear and political advertising is not distinguished from political coverage. Although there is nothing in the law that disqualifies journalists from reporting in the customary manner, the CEC's provisions and clarifications have indicated that journalists cannot participate in electoral agitation; that is, they cannot "encourage or aim to encourage voters to participate in the election and to vote for or against" registered candidates or parties.

Restricting media coverage of elections by including media coverage under the rubric of prohibited activities under the terminology of electoral agitation is problematic when considering the role of the media. If a journalist cannot say anything "for" or "against" a candidate or party this negates his professional duty to act as the "watchdog" of public interest. The traditional role of journalism during elections in established democracies is to provide accurate information and to ask probing questions of candidates or representatives of parties in order to reveal any hypocrisy or deception on their part (which they can get away with in political advertising) and to study the background of candidates and parties so that can give a proper assessment and overview of their policies and statements, good or bad. Thus, if the advertising agent works in the interests of the candidate, the journalist works in the interest of the voter. A voter cannot be expected to be an "expert" and must therefore rely on others, whose job it is, to get accurate information

Neither the Law on the Election of Deputies to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, nor its implementation by the Central Electoral Commission was able to prevent the media from conducting an extensive propaganda battle on behalf of certain candidates and a profound campaign to besmirch the name of other candidates.

As we saw in the parliamentary campaign, the well intentioned attempt by the Central Electoral Commission to restrict the media from participating in agitation so as, presumably, to prevent the illegitimate practice of purveying propaganda (supporting specific candidates/parties or actively attempting to weaken candidates/parties), did not have the desired effect.

Of course, the CEC's intention to prevent, as far as possible, a biased and partisan media from manipulating the elections is understandable. In the past two years of information wars, cynical "kompromat" and other forms of negative journalism provided ample evidence of the abuses of journalistic practices in the Russian federation. Unfortunately, this state of affairs has come about because of a lack of regulation in the sphere of concentration of media ownership, the influence of media moguls, pressure from state and regional administrations and the recent financial difficulties of many media outlets that make them susceptible to influence in order to survive.

However, as we have seen during the Duma elections, attempting to curb the media in such an all-encompassing way is counterproductive. It is also untenable because it goes against the fundamental right of free speech and free media in a democracy. It was precisely disagreement with the CEC's interpretation of agitation that made the Ministry of the Press, Teleradio Broadcasting and Mass Communications refuse to implement the

CEC's request to issue a warning to ORT for its programming (e.g. The Sergei Dorenko Show, which had a clear political intent to destroy the name of the leadership of Fatherland-All Russia); a principled stance, whatever the politics behind it. When the Ministry did finally issue a warning, late in the campaign on 14 December, it was addressed to both ORT and TV Center (which, supported the Fatherland-All Russia political association and was critical of the President and "Unity"), although TV Center can hardly be accused of having offended in its coverage to the same degree as ORT. RTR (which carried out a campaign similar to ORTs as it is a state controlled entity), also a prime culprit for abusing its journalistic license, got away without any warnings.

Despite the harsh potential of the law and the CEC's clarifications, which could have been restrictive, in practice the CEC did not unduly interfere with the media. The problem, rather, was that those decisions that were taken were random and arbitrary. It appears that CEC's aim was more in the realm of scare tactics, which, unfortunately, did not scare the worst offenders. Nevertheless, imperfect laws remain dangerous if democratic rights can be manipulated at will. Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision of November 19, 1999, in the case against the journalist Alexander Minkin, strengthens the CEC's hand by reinforcing the position that journalists cannot take part in agitation. The problems of the Duma campaign are therefore carried over to the presidential campaign. The CEC, however, is obliged only to implement the law; it is up to the lawmakers in the Duma to amend those laws if it has concern for democratic institutions.<sup>2</sup>

#### **For consideration**

That a journalist should provide information and analysis is hardly contestable in a democratic society. The only proviso is that the information is accurate and the analysis sound. The fact that there are unscrupulous journalists and that information can be manipulated (i.e. concealed advertising) does not take away from the value of journalism as such.

- In this case the Central Electoral Commission should give those journalists, who retain a sense of pride in their independence and impartiality, the chance to do their jobs properly without the threat of sanctions. The Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes of the Presidential Administration made the same point in their statement of 7 December 1999 arguing that elements of agitation in media coverage should not be used as grounds for banning journalist participation in the electoral campaign.

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<sup>2</sup> The investigative journalist Aleksandr Minkin took the CEC to court over its Clarification to the Law on the Election of Deputies to the State Duma prohibiting participants other than registered candidates and parties from taking part in pre-electoral agitation in the media. The Supreme Court rejected Minkin's complaint on 19 November. Although formally the CEC had won its case, it was generally felt that Minkin had not prepared his case competently enough. Some residual doubt therefore remains in the legal argument, in particular as the Supreme Court refused to hear the case under a revisory procedure that would have involved the whole collegium.

- The CEC would do well, and relieve itself of a headache at the same time, if it made a serious appeal to the media community to regulate their own activities. After all, many of the cases of improper journalistic practice are matters of ethics and conduct. In Russia there are a number of well-formulated and principled journalistic codes, drafted and approved by journalists themselves. The Union of Journalists has its own code of ethics, as well as a Grand Jury, which was the only self-regulatory journalistic body that issued a public reprimand during the parliamentary campaign. The Charter of Television and Radio Broadcasters was signed by most of the top stations last year but, unfortunately, its signatories did not once invoke it during the parliamentary campaign despite massive violations of taste and decency. There is also the Russian National Association of Telebroadcasters' Memorandum on elections, NTV's Instructions for its journalists and an Advertising Code. If the task of bringing together disparate journalists and their vested interests appears overwhelmingly difficult today, there is still no better time to start than during a crisis of confidence. Journalistic professionalism and independence is, after all, a common interest. In other countries journalists tend to abide by their codes precisely because they don't want to be regulated by any outside force, which may not understand the finer points of their profession and may represent opposing interests.
- If the CEC challenged the media to abide by their own rules, it would be doing the media a service. The media really has only two options: self-destruction, if the excesses of the parliamentary campaign are repeated, or self-regulation.

### **III. Inappropriate Political and Economic Pressure Used by State (and Regional) Infrastructure**

The Duma Election Law is explicit in prohibiting the use of official influence on the outcome of the elections – Article 1 states that “No one shall exert any influence on a citizen of the Russian Federation in order to compel him/her to participate or not to participate in the election in a free expression of a citizen's will.” The Law also includes several provisions that forbid the use of state power or the use of position to influence voting.

Throughout the period of the pre-election campaign for seats in the State Duma, undue influence by federal and regional political authorities - and by other institutions, such as state ministries, powerful enterprises and military leaders - was a pervasive problem. Influence on the campaign process most often included pressure on local and regional election commissions, courts, political party structures, and mass media, with the aim of restricting the effectiveness of political opponents or influencing public opinion (examples of these efforts are covered above under the topic of Registration of Candidates and the Use of Mass Media – other areas in which political influence is used to effect the election process).

Russian and Western media have reported numerous instances of official influence on regional campaigns. A few examples include:

- In Bashkortostan, President and OVR member Murtaza Rakhimov banned a November broadcast of Sergei Dorenko's ORT program, which was harshly critical of Yuri Luzhkov and other OVR leaders. In December, local police received orders to confiscate campaign literature from candidates not supported by the republic's authorities, and various materials from the KPRF and the local Rus political association were seized. Republican authorities claimed that the seizures were in conjunction with the "Whirlwind" anti-terrorist operation in effect since the August-September bombings in Moscow and Dagestan, but they were an obvious attempt to mute opposition voices.
- Not all lower level election commissions acted in an independent and transparent manner during the election process. While hard evidence of administrative pressure is not proven, the fact that the SECs of Moscow City and Moscow Oblast, Bashkotarstan, and Krasnodar had the most complaints with regards to registration of candidates (40 in total) is indicative of the selective nature in the way the SECs accomplished their work. More than half of these complaints were overturned by the CEC.
- The SEC of Kalmykia sought to overturn the will of the people by disqualifying an elected State Duma Deputy for District 14. Ms. Burataeva, a well-known TV anchorwoman was elected, even beating Yuri Luzhkov's wife, who was running in the same district. Ms. Burataeva is also an opponent of Kirsan Ilumginov, President of Kalmykia. The decision of the SEC rested mainly on technicalities – such as her presentation of the documents required for her to assume office one day later than the deadline. Her appeal of the SEC decision to the CEC was ruled positively on February 4, and she is now a State Duma deputy.

Many of the infractions of electoral law from the part of administrative and executive authorities stem from a combination of lack of legal clarity and proper financial independence from local regimes. This is not an unusual situation, and methods to combat corruption and local influences can be addressed through the use of mass media, investigative authority, and consistent decisions in such cases. For more details on corrupting influences in the electoral process, refer to *Corruption in Politics* by Professor Michael Pinto-Dushinsky, which was published by IFES/Russia in 1999.

In addition, the abuse of power to influence Russian elections occurs due to the enormous state infrastructure that was left in the wake of the collapse of the Communist system, the existence of an underdeveloped mass media that is not prepared to play its traditional role as the 4<sup>th</sup> Estate, the lack of private watchdog organizations, and the peculiarities of regional political situations.

<b>For consideration</b>
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Public awareness of the influence on the part of government authorities contributes to the cynicism of the entire electoral process. On Election Day, the

conduct of the elections could be a model of the democratic process, but public confidence in the election results is lessened due to it being common knowledge that the authorities have manipulated the process during the pre-election period to ensure certain outcomes.

After a review and analysis of election-related activities on the part of local, regional and federal authorities, it should be determined whether the following actions need to be taken:

- Providing sufficient oversight of governmental entities, possibly including the establishment of a CEC department specifically to deal with federal and regional electoral law enforcement, in coordination with sub-level commissions.
- Increasing the mass media's capacity to assess and report government accountability. Russian mass media outlets need better training in investigative journalism and its role in government accountability. Moreover, laws or regulations seeking to improve media independence may need to be instituted.
- Promoting private, non-profit watchdog organizations to be independent forces for civic advocacy and government oversight.

#### **IV. Lack of Clarity with Regard to Campaign Finance and Disclosure**

Regulation and disclosure of campaign finance activity of candidates and electoral associations is far more clearly developed than ever before in the 1999 Duma Election Law and in new regulations adopted by the Central Election Commission in preparation for the State Duma election. In principle, Russian elections are conducted under a relatively sophisticated campaign finance regulatory and disclosure regime.

As practiced in the 1999 Duma elections, however, the political finance system was not widely respected and failed to facilitate monitoring of campaign funds by political participants, civil society or the public. As with many aspects of the election law and regulations, these provisions' function was widely viewed as purely for legal enforcement against violations. IFES acknowledges that the election commissions were extremely overextended and short of resources and that the time frame for proper review was short. Thus, as cited in an earlier section of this report, enforcement by election commissions was spotty, and oftentimes arbitrary, unfair and biased, resulting in some candidates' and parties' registrations either denied or subsequently cancelled in a seemingly capricious or politically motivated manner.

These first reports tended to set a tone lacking respect for or confidence in financial disclosure as a monitoring mechanism, particularly since it was obvious that many candidates had hidden assets and income from election reporting (necessitated, presumably, by their other reports to taxing authorities).

The obvious inaccuracy on the required pre-election reports of electoral associations and candidates combined with a general lack of appreciation within Russian society, especially

journalists, for the idea of campaign finance disclosure as a separate value in elections resulted in the issue of campaign finance playing an insignificant role in the elections (apart from the enforcement cases already mentioned).

### **For consideration**

The primary reasons for campaign finance disclosure are to provide as much information as possible to the voters about the candidates they will be considering as they cast their ballots and to ensure that all candidates are following the rules equally. Thus, it is vitally important that the information be complete and disclosed to the public for easy access as soon as possible.

After reviewing and comparing the reasons for the disqualification of candidates by the CEC and the DEC's, a determination should be made to implement one or more of the following actions:

- Disclosing candidate information submitted on nomination papers, including financial disclosures, within 48 hours after registration has been confirmed.
- Changing the penalties for non-disclosure or false disclosure of personal and/or campaign finances from only disqualification of candidacy ("life or death") to a range of penalties from modest monetary fines for minor breaches to heavier fines for more serious infractions to disqualification for major violations.
- Providing financial disclosure information to the general public in a user-friendly format, through which automated searches could be conducted, at a minimum, by name, donor, candidate, region and electoral association.
- Significantly raising the ceiling for campaign finance expenditures as it is currently so low (candidates could not spend more than \$65,000 and political association or blocs could not spend more than \$1,700,000 for their party lists) that it acts as an encouragement for political associations and candidates to pursue other and technically illegal means of financing their campaigns.

For more details on IFES' recommendations on Campaign Finance issues, see the IFES Compilation of Campaign Finance Materials and Recommendations (1999), which details concerns, issues, and options for lawmakers.

## **Section II: Election Day Concerns**

On Election Day, IFES assessed election procedures in eight locations within Russia: Moscow City and Oblast, Tver, Tatarstan, Omsk, Kaliningrad, Yekaterinburg, and

Volgograd. While IFES overall perception of election officials and the election process was positive (especially the professionalism of election officials, the sense of pride they exhibited in their efforts and the importance they placed on carrying out their functions in a proper and fair manner), IFES assessment teams reported irregularities ranging from removal of ballots from polling sites by voters to family voting to discrepancies in the vote count in several locations.

This section concentrates on weaknesses and violations of electoral norms. However, IFES contends that, on the whole, these were minor infractions and conduct with significant fraudulent intent was not observed. Given the vast numbers of people involved in the conduct of elections, innocent mistakes will be made during the course of an election. For election commissioners at all levels, the importance is to minimize the mistakes and ensure that they are not of a magnitude that would call for invalidation of results. Possible areas in which those with less than noble intentions can exploit weaknesses in the election process that can impact election results need to be reviewed, and, if necessary, tightened to preclude these possibilities.

One overarching concern that IFES noted throughout its election assessment effort was the lack of standardization in the administration of elections throughout the country and an uncertainty on the part of election administrators as to proper procedures and conduct. IFES' findings with regard to Election Day irregularities follow below.

## **V. The Ballot**

The CEC is responsible for the accountability and protection of ballots for the Duma election. Most ballots for both single-mandate districts and for proportional party lists are printed at the SEC level. After ballots have been printed and handed over to the TECs, all rejected and surplus ballots are destroyed. A record is drawn up by the printing house and signed by all election commission members present to certify that all surplus ballots have been destroyed. A ballot transfer document is drawn up between the SEC and the TEC in the presence of the DEC indicating the number of ballots to be transferred and the time of transfer. Ballots are transferred to the PEC no later than four days prior to the election. For a ballot to be certified, two members of the PEC are required to sign all ballots and place the election commission's seal in the upper right of the ballot.

At 100% of the polling station IFES visited before and on Election Day, our representatives observed, and election commissioners confirmed, that all ballots were pre-stamped with the precinct seal and signed by two PEC members (this is a legal practice). As cited in IFES' Pre-Election Technical Assessment Report for the 1999 Duma election, this practice is troublesome, because the ballots, once signed and stamped, are valid. While, in most instances, the signed and stamped ballots were locked safely until election day, IFES representatives noted that on election day ballots were easily accessible at many polling stations during voting and even during the vote count. These are valid ballots, and with accessibility, unscrupulous persons could take enough ballots, mark them, and put them in the ballot box and impact the results of the election for that polling station. If the same

tactics are used in enough polling stations, the results could sway local, district and even federal elections.

IFES did note that efforts were made to improve the quality of the ballots by allowing each Subject to print it in various forms, either with or without color, or with or without microprinting. This is an improvement in itself that follows previous IFES recommendations. The copying of ballots, as it occurred in the Karacheavo-Cherkassia Republic, for example, is made much more difficult simply by adding color to the ballot.

Another issue worth noting is the sizing of and spacing on the ballot that is issued. Had the Supreme Court decided to allow for both LDPR and the Zhirinovsky Bloc to be on the ballot on election day, one can only begin to imagine the legal issues and the administrative nightmare of having to add a party on the proportional ballot when there was no space on the ballot for such an addition. In cases of uncertainty, printing the ballot with additional space when it's obvious some candidacies are pending resolution, may be worth the expense.

#### **For consideration**

The integrity of the ballot is sacrosanct. Every effort must be made to ensure that only official valid ballots are used in the election. Moreover, only ballots cast by eligible voters should be counted. After a review of current practices, a determination might be made regarding the following strategies:

- The paper used in ballot printing allows for fraudulent duplication due to the absence of any specifications in the law concerning paper quality. Article 71 of the Duma Elections Law expressly states that ballots cannot be numbered and that the printing should be in black and white. These specifications limit what can be done to prevent duplication of ballot papers. The use of watermark paper would reduce the risk of fraud but watermarked paper is rather expensive. What could be used instead is micro printing. Realizing that ballots are printed throughout the Russian Federation, the CEC could encourage all SECs to use micro printing where it is available. This would not cover the entire Russian Federation but could be used in all the large population centers accounting for a high percentage of voters. In addition, while uniformity of the ballot is important, the non-availability of micro printing in one area of the country would most likely not be noticed by voters on election day. Micro prints are generally not visible to the untrained eye.
- Special packaging of ballots or binding with rubber glue would also provide officials with better control. Special packaging in groups of 100 or 500 ballots would provide a more accurate and easier count when verifying the number of ballots during transfers. Also, on polling day the members of the PEC would have a better control on the number of uncertified ballots.



- A transfer record for each point of ballot transfer from the printing organization to the TEC down to the PEC should show two signatures of the persons receiving the ballots, an exact count and verification of the number of ballots received and the time the transfer took place. The law does not mention that signatures should be put on the transfer record. However, the CEC requires that all transfer records be signed by three persons. Appropriate security personnel should be involved during all phases of ballot transport and storage.
- Modify the practice of PEC members stamping the PEC seal and signing all the ballots prior to Election Day. Instead, stamp the PEC seal and have only one PEC member signature on each ballot prior to Election Day. Only when a ballot is to be issued to an eligible voter should a PEC member add the second required signature, making the ballot valid.
- If significant doubt exists regarding the number of candidates to be listed on the ballot due to the intricacies of the registration process (e.g. when cases are pending in the Supreme Court), the CEC may have to establish a ballot which allows for a candidate to be added to the ballot at the last minute. The preferred method for this is to have a stamp or a sticker that can be added, although such solutions are only favored in extreme cases. For example, in the South African Presidential elections of April 1994, M'Buthlezi was reinstated as a candidate only three weeks before the election. His followers did not cause additional civil disturbances, as they were satisfied with the addition of the candidate with a sticker at the bottom of the ballot. In this case, the Independent Election Commission had printed a longer ballot with extra space in response to the situation.

## VI. The Voter List

The provision in current election laws allowing voters to be added to the voter list prior to and on Election Day is very helpful toward the enfranchisement of all eligible voters. However, in IFES' assessment of election commissions in six regions, we noted the difficulty of producing accurate voter lists at the polling stations due to the increased mobility of Russians. In addition, the commissioners working with the voter lists that have been compiled by local authorities are changing, and the new commissioners may not be properly trained to do a thorough and accurate job.

Most voters presented their passport for voting, but IFES observed a variety of other documents presented to precinct election commissioners, who appeared at times to make arbitrary decisions regarding the eligibility of these people to vote. In numerous polling stations the voter list had been detached into separate sheets. At one polling station, one page of the voter list was given to a voter, who then took it and left for 10-15 minutes before returning to the polling station. The person was then allowed to vote. There were several cases in which the IFES teams were not allowed to look at the voter list. More often, however, IFES' teams were allowed to look at the voter list, but it was sometimes difficult to understand the meaning of notations used from polling station to polling station.

**For consideration**

The purpose of the voter list is to ensure that eligible voters are the only ones who vote in an election. A determination of any shortcomings in the preparation and use of the voter list might be made, and the following actions contemplated:

- Create a national computerized voter registry to update the voter list at each polling station and ensure that a voter is not on more than one voter list.
- Revise the procedures for compiling the voter list to take into account the fact more and more Russians are moving and moving more often.
- Improve the training for election commissioners so that they will be more effective in confirming the information on the voter list, which has been compiled by local authorities.
- Increase the ease in which voters who have moved can be added to the appropriate voter list and deleted from other voter lists.

**VII. Conduct at the Polls**

In general, the conduct of the polls was adequate. One outstanding feature that Western democracies could emulate is the pride election commissioners have in being chosen for their roles. They are formally dressed, and they have made real efforts to make their polling stations attractive and pleasant for voters. At one polling station, the PEC handed out books to all first-time, 18-year-old voters. This was an excellent gesture to welcome and congratulate new voters, and to provide a positive experience for first-time voters. In addition, the PECs obviously tried very hard to conduct the election at their polling station in accordance with the laws, directives, manuals and instructions that they received. Voters, too, took voting as a serious responsibility.

**1. Local Authorities in the Election Process**

Local authorities were pleasant when things were going as expected, but became intimidating when the unexpected occurred. At two polling stations IFES representatives entered, the PEC members became nervous as they reviewed the international observer identification cards. They made a point of introducing the local authorities who were present, and responding to questions within their hearing range. At these same polling stations, the local authorities tried very hard to learn the day's itineraries for IFES representatives,<sup>3</sup> and failing to gain this information, had the police follow them after they left their respective polling stations.

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<sup>3</sup> IFES representatives did not have set itineraries. Geographical regions were selected, and then, for the entire day, polling stations were chosen randomly within and near the selected regions.

At one Territorial Election Commission the local authorities were obviously in control. In fact, one of them proudly announced that he had personally trained all the PEC members in the territory, and therefore knew that all the procedures would be followed properly. The TEC Chairman consulted with this person regularly during two separate periods when IFES representatives were in attendance.

### **For Consideration**

Interference on the part of governmental authorities, political parties or other entities must be prohibited in democratic elections. Voters observing the control and intimidation of the election commissioners by the local authorities may conclude that the election is not being conducted in a free and fair manner. Therefore, the role of government authorities in elections may need to be further clarified.

- A review of the election laws and training election commissioners on the appropriate roles of local authorities may be needed.
- In some situations, election commissioners may need additional assistance, in which case it might be logical to recruit from the government authorities. However, any such assistance should be clearly delineated with the election commissioners in charge, and government representatives subservient to the election commissioners.
- The role of government representatives in the election process needs to be made clear to all voters and the public, so there can be no misunderstandings. Otherwise, the public may deem the election commissioners mere puppets of the authorities and the election a fraud.

## **2. Observers and Transparency in the Election Process**

In almost all polling stations where IFES representatives were present, there were political association and candidate observers. The majority of these local observers were sitting in a row of chairs where, as much as possible, they did not obstruct election activities. At some polling stations, the observers were situated so they could see almost everything, but at others, they could see only a portion. On the whole, observers appeared passive, reading a book, napping, taking a cigarette break, and sitting without being alert. When asked why they were not more alert, they explained that they thought the elections were being conducted properly. They did not appear diligent in their assignments, so their ability to detect voter fraud is questionable.

At times, especially after the polls were closed, PEC chairpersons, in addition to consulting with other PEC members or more often not consulting with them at all, would confer with observers on particular procedures or whether a particular ballot should be valid or invalid.

### **For Consideration**

People must have confidence that elections are conducted freely and fairly, or they will not have faith in the process. The secrecy of the ballot is sacrosanct, and sufficient security measures need to be in place to prevent election fraud. Within that context, the election process needs to be as transparent as possible. Toward that end, the following steps might be implemented:

- Create a voter education program to inform voters and the general public about all aspects of the election. Invite them to observe each step.
- In the training program for election commissioners, include a section on common methods of voter fraud and how to prevent and detect them.
- Revise the training program for election commissioners so they are more cognizant of the “dos” and “don’ts” of observers (e.g. they should not consult with observers about questionable ballots.)
- Encourage candidates and political parties to better train their observers to be more alert and effective.

### **3. Conflicts between Federal and Local Election Laws**

Election Commissioners from SEC’s to PEC’s complained about the difficulty they had when federal and local election laws were in conflict. One Subject Election Commission Chairman stated that they had to decide which law applied on a case by case basis. At the PEC level, the commissioners generally chose to follow local laws. For example, when IFES representatives asked to accompany the mobile ballot box at a couple of polling stations, the teams were told they could not, because according to the local election laws, permission from the TEC had to be obtained at least the day before the election. At one polling station, IFES representatives were told they could not stay after the polls were closed, because, according to local election laws, they did not register in advance.

In a few cases, after consulting with the laws, election manuals, and other available documents, rather than clarifying the situation, the election commissioners became more confused. This was especially true in trying to determine how to complete the protocols. In the end, the one law or directive that was the most understandable and/or easiest to implement was usually the one chosen.

#### **For Consideration**

Essential to the proper conduct of elections are laws that do not conflict and are written clearly, so there can be no misinterpretation leading to their misapplication. Manuals and training curricula must be based on these laws, being careful not to go beyond the laws. To clarify current confusion, the following steps may be helpful:

- Modify training of election commissioners to make it clear that where there are conflicts, federal laws and directives take precedence over local laws and directives.

- Improve written instructions, election manuals and other documents to make them easier for election commissioners to understand. For example, this could be made by having a separate booklet for election day activities and for vote count and transmittal, with each training manual containing: an index, graphics, flow charts of decisions, a "Basic Q & A" section, simple and direct language, phone numbers and guidance as to where to get help, a "What if" case study of real examples (e.g., what if the person has no ID and wants to vote), as well as a feedback form to be completed by the user and compiled after the election process for future improvements.

#### **4. Polling Station Size and Voting Booths**

In every region IFES assessed, there were polling stations that were too small to accommodate the voters in that precinct. Voters were very patient, waiting as long as two hours in and around the polling station, to sign in and get their ballots. Having received their ballots, however, voters were sometimes no longer willing to wait to vote. Oftentimes, there were insufficient voting booths even in large polling stations. These conditions fostered more than one person in a voting booth as well as many voters using tables, ledges, and anything else they could to mark their ballots. Insufficient voting booths also encouraged the return of family and group voting, and consultations with relatives, friends, party representatives and/or others prior to voters marking their ballots. In fact, voting in the open and in groups, in many places appeared to be the norm.

<b>For consideration</b>
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The combination of crowded conditions and voters voting openly rather than in the secrecy of voting booths provide opportunities for unfair influence on voters, negative experiences for voters, a callous view of elections, and, even worse, public lack of confidence in the results of the election. An analysis may be needed to determine means to improve these conditions, such as:

- Finding larger spaces for polling stations.
- Re-drawing the precinct lines to increase the number of precincts, and thus increasing the number of polling stations.
- Encouraging people to vote during non peak times, so there will be fewer people in the morning when the polling stations are the most crowded.
- Increasing the number of voting booths, perhaps using smaller, lighter booths that are less expensive, take up less room, and are easier to assemble and disassemble.

#### **5. Voting Outside Assigned Polling Stations**

##### **a) Mobile Ballot Box Voting**

This particular aspect of the voting process was fraught with election violations, although it is not clear that these violations resulted in fraud. Certainly, the opportunity for fraud exists using this voting mechanism. In some cases, observers were not allowed to accompany the mobile ballot boxes. In others, political party observers were asked to take the place of one of the two PEC members required to accompany the mobile ballot boxes to voters. In almost every situation where IFES representatives accompanied mobile ballot boxes, there was no privacy for the voters when they voted. Granted, in many instances, the voters were elderly and could not read too well, and thus relied on the assistance of others to read and mark the ballots. The worst cases were those in which the voter, with the assistance of relatives, voted in front of everyone present – PEC members, local observers, and international observers.

Of major concern were the relatively high number of requests for mobile voting in some polling stations - as much as 11% of the number of voters on the voter list. In close elections, this percentage could tip the vote decisively in one direction.

For example, at one polling station with 1,410 voters, there were already 94 requests for mobile voting, and another 60 requests were anticipated based on the experience of previous elections. The probability that mobile ballot boxes could be brought to all 154 voters before 8 p.m. is almost impossible. Between transportation, reviewing documents, completing forms, and marking ballots, it would take 30 to 40 hours for these 154 voters vote. With only two or three mobile ballot boxes and starting out after the long lines of voters had diminished, the PEC members could not get to every dwelling in time. Thus, if the records show that all of these ballots were cast, at least some of them would have had to be fraudulent.

At one polling station with four mobile ballot boxes (note: the federal law only allows a polling station to have three ballot boxes), during one round of mobile voting, two of the mobile ballot boxes were accompanied by one PEC member and one observer. The PEC Chairman decided on this course, because the remaining PEC members were needed to assist with the large numbers of voters at the polling station. The alternatives would have been to either to not go to all the voters who requested mobile voting or to risk chaos at the polling station.

#### **For consideration**

Mobile ballot box voting, carried over from Soviet days, certainly contributes to high voter participation. The effort to include homebound voters in elections is highly commendable. As currently practiced however, there is too much opportunity for voter fraud. After a review the procedures for mobile ballot box voting, needed changes may be identified, such as:

- One possible change might be to have additional PEC members, whose only responsibility would be overseeing the mobile ballot box voting.
- Another suggestion is that mobile voting conditions be more limited to ensure that only those needing the service receive it and limit the numbers of votes cast this way.

### **b) Absentee Voting Certificates**

PEC members appeared to be confused about their duties when presented with absentee voting certificates. Other than the inordinate amount of time it took, two of our IFES representatives who are Russian nationals had no difficulty getting their absentee voting certificates. Each of them went to a different polling station in the same Subject. Each of them was given a federal ballot and a single-mandate district ballot when they should have only received the federal ballot. Each of them challenged the ballots they received. One specifically stated that at his home polling station, he was informed that he would receive only the federal ballot. The other voter insisted that the election commissioner check with higher authorities. In both cases, the commissioners were definite that two ballots should be issued to voters with absentee voting certificates. Only ballots for lower election contests were not to be issued to them. In addition, the manner in which unused absentee voting certificates were handled was inconsistent. Some election commissioners ignored them, others counted them, yet others counted them and then invalidated them.

<b>For Consideration</b>
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The inclusion of voters who are away from their precincts contributes toward the enfranchisement of all voters. Proper management of this process is essential as the opportunity for fraud is high. In deliberating the need for any changes, the following list might be referred to:

- Improve the instruction manuals and training programs so that election commissioners can more easily follow the laws for the issuance of the absentee voting certificates and the issuance of ballots to voters who present such certificates.
- Improve the instruction manuals and training programs for the accountability of the absentee voting certificates from the point where the commissions receive them through to their disposition at the end of Election Day.

### **c) Voting Beyond the Borders of the Russian Federation**

IFES had representatives assess the election process for the Duma elections in 12 countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Yemen, Armenia, Georgia, and the United States). In the United States, six polling stations were assessed: Washington, D.C., Chicago, Houston, San Francisco, Cleveland, and New York.

Overall, the elections outside the Russian Federation were conducted fairly well. Generally, one or more embassy or consulate official constituted the PEC along with Russian nationals living in the cities where the polling stations were located. There were a few places where the polling stations were too small, but none were chaotic or in disarray as was the case in some polling stations within the country. PEC members used their ingenuity in their attempts to provide every opportunity to voters. A restaurant was used as a polling station. Another polling station was at a hotel. Many PECs provided information about the election,

including the date, time, and place for voting to newspapers read by many Russians. However, better efforts could have been made to inform Russian voters (it was noted, for example, that no sustained effort was made to inform Russians that were studying abroad of their voting rights) that were not in Russia on the day of the elections with regard to their voting rights and the procedures required to facilitate their vote. In all cases, people who presented valid passports were allowed to vote. Absentee voting certificates were not required. In one country, mobile ballot box voting was conducted in a city miles away.

There were minor differences in the interpretation of election laws, since they had to rely on their readings of the election laws, directive, manuals and other documents from the CEC.

The voters who were disenfranchised were those who were not within commuting distance of a polling station.

#### **For Consideration**

This is another laudable attempt to include all eligible voters in the election process. The number of Russians traveling abroad will probably increase, and thus procedures to allow them to vote may need to be amended. For example:

- Provide better information to Russian voters who are abroad on the day of an election.

#### **6. Campaign Materials in Vicinity of Polling Stations**

At several polling stations, campaign materials were seen near or even in the polling stations (this practice was pervasive in areas where local authorities were supporting a specific party list). In one polling station, a seemingly innocuous calendar with a large "19" was hanging at the entrance. A closer examination revealed that, in fact, it was a campaign poster made to look like a calendar. The calendar/poster was for the political association that was #19 on the ballot. Such displays so near or in polling stations could have undue influence on how voters vote, as they are the last things voters see before getting their ballots.

#### **For consideration**

For the same reason that campaigning the last 24 hours before election day is banned, campaign posters and other materials near and/or in polling stations may unfairly influence voters. Some thought might be given to making the ban more comprehensive. In that deliberation, the following might be included:

- Within 24 hours of Election Day, remove all campaign materials within 100 meters of each polling station. The PECs could perform this task, or under its supervision, the appropriate government department could be given this assignment.



- Another option is to inform the campaigns where the polling stations are located and require the campaigns to remove their own materials no later than 24 hours before Election Day.

## **7. Ballot Count and Transmittal of Results**

Ballot counting becomes more and more complicated as the number of elections on a given Election Day increase. IFES representatives were at one polling station with five elections to count. Between the vote count and the completion of the protocols, precinct election commissioners did not leave until 6:30 a.m. It would have been considerably later if the ballots had been re-counted to verify the first vote counts of each election. In polling stations having seven elections to count, the commissioners did not complete their work until even later.

At all polling stations where IFES was present at the poll closing, except for the PEC Chairman and Secretary, PEC members were involved with sorting the ballots. One or two PEC members counted the ballots, and one PEC member recorded the results. Each ballot was not shown to those present, nor was the vote cast announced to all observers as proscribed in the Law. Following these provisions would have likely doubled the amount of time needed to count the ballots. In most cases, observers were allowed to get close enough to the ballots so they could see for themselves how the ballots were marked and which stacks the ballots were being placed. IFES representatives at one polling station noted that in stacking the voted ballots for the party list for the State Duma election, there was not much difference between the two highest stacks. Yet, the election commissioners counting the ballots reported that there was a large difference between the top vote getter and the one coming in second. No one questioned this apparent discrepancy.

In general, questionable ballots were set aside. IFES representatives did not observe any PEC voting as a group on the validity of these ballots. Instead, the PEC chairman, oftentimes consulting with observers and/or local authorities, would arbitrarily determine the validity of each questionable ballot. In comparing notes, IFES representatives present at polling stations found that the decisions made appeared to be arbitrary.

Further complicating this entire process is the completion of the protocols. The protocols are difficult to fill out. There is also the additional stress caused by the need to have the numbers "match," or the entire protocol is rejected by the "SAS Vybory" computer vote counting system. PEC members, especially the chairmen and secretaries, made valiant attempts to complete the protocols properly, but they were tired from a long, stressful day and, in the end, some corners might have been cut to make sure that the numbers matched.

### **For Consideration**

Experience, worldwide, has shown that counting ballots by hand is inaccurate. Mistakes will be further compounded by the fatigue factor, a natural result of a long day trying to properly conduct an election. Asking 9 to 12 exhausted election commissioners to, in a timely manner, accurately count over 1,000 ballots at the end of a long day is asking a lot. Compound this difficulty with multiple

elections necessitating a concomitant increase in the number of ballots, as was the case in many jurisdictions during the Duma elections, and the task becomes near impossible.

Accounting for all ballots issued is another key element in a democratic election. The completion of the protocols by the PECs is the means to accomplish this important task. As with ballot counting, protocols are filled in at the end of a very long day by the most fatigued PEC members, the Chairperson and Secretary. The protocols serve not only as the means to account for all ballots issued, but also the means to report the official vote count. PEC protocols are brought to their respective TECs, and the numbers are entered into the computer system. At the TEC level, the ballots are accounted for and vote counts transmitted using the "SAS Vybory" computer vote count system.

A review of these essential elements of the election process, that is the reconciliation of the ballots and the vote count and their transmittal, would likely result in the identification of areas that need change or improvement. These could include the following factors:

- Computerize of the vote count system. In the alternative, increase the number of people counting the ballots.
- Separate the reporting documents for ballot reconciliation and vote count. One set of protocols should exist for the accounting of ballots and one set for the overall vote count. Note: if the vote count system is computerized, then the PECs would have no vote count protocols to complete.
- For election night reporting, simplify the protocols for ballot accounting. Perhaps, the protocols should be done in a two-step process. The first step would be to report the number of valid ballots counted for each choice in each election. These numbers could be transmitted to the TEC immediately, where they would be entered into the "SAS Vybory" computer vote count system. The "SAS Vybory" system would need to be modified to accommodate this simplified two-step reporting process. The second step would be the complete reconciliation of the ballots issued to the PEC.
- Improve the training for ballot counting and reconciliation of ballots issued.
- Improve the instruction manuals and include clear step-by-step illustrations for ballot counting and ballot reconciliation.

### **VIII. Lack of Standardization**

From the registration of candidates to the transmittal of election results, IFES noted the lack of standardization of election procedures on the part of election commissioners. This was confirmed in interviews with more than 100 individuals and organizations that IFES

conducted in the eight regions in which IFES carried out assessments. Earlier in this report, we cite the seemingly arbitrary manner in which candidates were disqualified, citizens without passports were determined to be eligible or ineligible to vote, and ballots with uncertain markings were deemed to be valid or invalid. The varying practices that were encountered certainly indicate a lack of standard training of election officials at their respective levels. As previously noted: election officials used different notations on the voter list to indicate voter status; some polling stations were well organized and orderly, while others appeared chaotic with election officials and voters not knowing what to do; many PEC officials did not know what to do when a voter wanted a second ballot because the voter's first ballot was damaged; and, the manner in which mobile ballot box voting was conducted differed from polling station to polling station.

Lack of standardization was due, in part, to the following:

- Differences between local and federal election laws. Most of the time, election commissioners at the SEC and lower levels chose to follow the local election laws. For example, some IFES representatives were informed by PEC chairmen that they could not accompany the mobile ballot box because they had not received prior permission as required by local election laws directly in contrast to federal election laws.
- Difficulty understanding the laws and election manual when trying to make a decision in unusual situations. This was especially true when election commissioners were trying to complete the protocols. All the laws, manuals and other materials are only provided in the Russian language. For election commissioners whose first language is not Russian, the problem is compounded, even though the commissioners tried very hard to interpret them.

#### **For Consideration**

In order to ensure a more effective and standardized administration of elections in Russia, the following suggestions should be considered:

- The election manual published by the CEC and provided to all election commissions needs to be revised to make it easier for election commissioners to find the section they need. Perhaps, for the more difficult activities, large sheets with detailed instructions and graphic representations should be produced and distributed.
- The election manual should be revised to make it easier for election commissioners to understand what they are supposed to do in different Election Day situations. Perhaps clearer writing and step-by-step illustrations would help.

### **Section III: Summary and Recommendations**

As stated previously, the State Duma elections were generally conducted in a positive manner. This is due in large part to the professionalism that the CEC members and their staffs have developed in the six years since democratic elections were instituted in Russia. This professionalism is beginning to manifest itself at the lower election commissions, which is an indication of the success the CEC is having in carrying out its oversight function of sub-level commissions.

However, there remains a need for significant improvements in the elections process in Russia. For example, the "life or death" approach to penalties is still the main sanction mechanism used by election authorities and the courts. IFES has long argued that campaigning which represents a violation of election norms should result either in a warning, penalization or the cancellation (for major violations) of the registration of the candidate or party list. The only form of penalization for violations should not be complete exclusion as currently is the case. Another example of a significant improvement in elections processes that IFES has recommended is changing the legal necessity for having a minimum level of participation of voters for elections to be valid. There should be no legal minimum participation of voters for elections to be valid if they are held in a free and fair manner – it is the citizens' right to vote or not to vote.

The purpose of this report is to provide the CEC with information that IFES believes will assist the Commission in making further improvements in the election process. Thus, the outstanding effort and solid performance of the election administration infrastructure in Russia are only briefly noted herein, while the areas identified as possibly needing improvement are highlighted.

These findings have noted the solid progress the Central Election Commission has made in improving the conduct of elections in the Russian Federation. Indeed, legislative changes and a conscientious effort by the CEC to meet international standards have resulted in fewer problems than existed in past elections. In addition, this progress has instilled greater confidence by voters and the international community in the electoral process of the Russian Federation. However, this report does note many important areas where shortcomings exist and where significant improvements could be made to continue the progress that has been accomplished in recent years. Below is a summary table of IFES' recommendations.

### **Pre-election Activities**

Many pre-election activities conducted in the Russian Federation were fraught with excessive abuse and illustrated a need for major improvement in the conduct of elections throughout Russia.
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<h3><b>Nomination and Registration of Candidates</b></h3>
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A thorough review should be made of all the candidates who were nominated for the Duma election and those whose registration was rejected by election commissions. All complaints made by candidates should be carefully scrutinized as well as any court action or decisions of higher level commissions regarding appeals of registration rejections. It should be determined if a pattern existed whereby certain political parties or movements had an unusual number of rejections, the rejections resulted in only one or two primary parties or movements left on the ballot, or if certain election commissions rejected an unusually high number of candidates.

After such analysis, it should be determined whether the following actions need to be taken:

<b>Recommendations</b>	
<i>Changing the disclosure requirements in the law to lessen nomination/registration requirements or to provide more clarity for candidates and election commissions.</i>	1
<i>Requiring the Central Election Commission to provide more specific rules and procedures regarding the eligibility for registration of candidates.</i>	2
<i>Providing additional training of election commissions regarding the determination of eligibility for registration of candidates.</i>	3
<i>Accelerating the appeal process for candidates whose registration has been rejected.</i>	4
<i>Providing for sanctions against election commissions who unduly deny a candidate's registration.</i>	5
<i>Providing for sanctions against election commissions who ignore court and CEC decisions or act on them in an untimely manner.</i>	6

### **Mass Media Coverage**

That a journalist should provide information and analysis is hardly contestable in a democratic society. The only proviso is that the information is accurate and the analysis sound. The fact that there are unscrupulous journalists and that information can be manipulated (i.e. concealed advertising) does not take away from the value of journalism as such.

<b>Findings</b>	<b>Potential Problems</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	
Manipulation and bias of the mass media. Apparent abuse of journalist practices.	Public is not given fair, equal and accurate information needed to make informed judgment on whom to support in election.	<i>While journalists should be allowed to continue to do their job without fear of retribution or sanctions, the CEC should make a serious appeal to the mass media community to regulate their own activities. They should promote a code of ethics for all journalists.</i>	7
		<i>Together with non-governmental organizations, the CEC could hold seminars for the media to promote fairness in the coverage of the election campaign.</i>	8

### **Inappropriate Political and Economic Pressure by State and Regional Infrastructure**

<p>Public awareness of the influence on the part of government authorities contributes to the cynicism of the entire electoral process. On Election Day, the conduct of the elections could be a model of the democratic process, but public confidence in the election results may be zero, knowing how authorities have manipulated the process during the pre-election period to guarantee certain outcomes.</p> <p>After a review and analysis of election-related activities on the part of local, regional and federal authorities, it should be determined whether the following actions need to be taken:</p>	
Recommendations	
<i>Providing sufficient oversight of governmental entities, possibly including the establishment of a CEC department specifically to deal with federal and regional electoral law enforcement, in coordination with sub-level commissions.</i>	9
<i>Clarifying the course of appeal for electoral violations between the commissions and the courts, and perhaps ensconce them within the relevant laws.</i>	10
<i>Increasing the mass media's capacity to assess and report government accountability.</i>	11
<i>Russian mass media outlets need better training in investigative journalism and its role in government accountability. Moreover, laws or regulations seeking to improve media independence may need to be instituted.</i>	12
<i>Promoting private, non-profit, non-governmental watchdog organizations to be independent forces for civic advocacy and government oversight. Laws governing non-profit status (including tax laws) might need to be set in place.</i>	13

Lack of Clarity with Regard to Campaign Finance and Disclosure		
<p>The primary reasons for campaign finance disclosure are to provide as much information as possible to the voters about the candidates they will be considering as they cast their ballots and to ensure that all candidates are following the rules equally. Thus, it is vitally important that the information be complete and disclosed to the public for easy access as soon as possible.</p> <p>After reviewing and comparing the reasons for the disqualification of candidates by the CEC and the DEC's, a determination could be made to implement one or more of the following actions:</p>		
Findings	Recommendations	
Information on candidates was disclosed inconsistently or too late to adequately inform the voters.	<i>Disclosing candidate information submitted on nomination papers, including financial disclosures, within 48 hours after registration has been confirmed.</i>	14
Public was confused by the information which was disclosed.	<i>Providing financial disclosure information to the general public in a user-friendly format, through which automated searches could be conducted, at a minimum, by name, donor, candidate, region and electoral association.</i>	15

Candidates and associations/blocs appeared to skirt the law in the amount of funds raised and spent.	<i>Significantly raising the ceiling for campaign finance expenditures as it is currently so low (candidates could not spend more than \$65,000 and political association or bloc could not spend more than \$1,700,000 for their party lists) that it acts as an encouragement for political associations and candidates to pursue other and technically illegal means of financing their campaign on the rails.</i>	16
Arbitrary methods of disqualification resulted in a disparity within the Federation of who and who was not denied placement on the ballot.	<i>Changing the penalties for non-disclosure of personal and/or campaign finances from only disqualification of candidacy to a range from modest monetary fines for minor breaches to heavier fines for more serious infractions to disqualification for only major violations.</i>	17

## Election Day

The integrity of the ballot is sacrosanct. Every effort must be made to ensure that only official valid ballots are used in the election; that they are counted fairly and accurately; and that there is adequate transparency. A determination might be made regarding the following strategies.

The Ballot			
The integrity of the ballot is sacrosanct. Every effort must be made to ensure that only official valid ballots are used in the election. Moreover, only ballots cast by eligible voters should be counted. After a review of current practices, a determination might be made regarding the following strategies:			
Findings	Potential problems	Recommendations	
Ballot paper used did not have any special markings or watermarks.	Ballots could be produced and used fraudulently.	<i>Use special paper and printing for the ballots, so that it would be impossible for fraudulent ballots to be printed and used in elections. As an alternative, the CEC could encourage the SEC to use micro-printing, where it is available. Micro-prints are generally not visible to the untrained eye.</i>	18
Unused ballot papers not kept in any kind of numbered batch. No record kept of number of ballot papers issued to each election commission.	Opens up the opportunity for misuse and misappropriation of ballot papers.	<i>Batch and number the ballots, and keep records of the distribution of the ballots to each commission. Special packaging with rubber glue would also provide officials with better control. Packaging in groups of 100 or 500 ballots would provide a more accurate and easier count during transfers.</i>	19
Counting and stamping of bulletins before election day does not appear to be controlled.	The existence of pre-stamped and signed bulletins leaves valid ballots available for those with fraudulent intentions.	<i>Final check of bulletins before balloting, placing of voter lists and ballots in safe should be seen by observers to insure integrity of process. Modify the practice of PEC members stamping the PEC seal and signing all the ballots prior to election day. Stamp the seal and one signature before election day; add the final signature when ballot issued.</i>	20
Not all packages with ballots were sealed	Opportunities for fraud and manipulation of	<i>All packages with ballots and documents should be sealed before delivery to TEC. A transfer</i>	21

and recorded before and after delivery.	ballots.	<i>record for each point of ballot transfer from the printing organization to the TEC down to the PEC should show two signatures of the persons receiving the ballots, an exact count and verification of the number of ballots received and the time the transfer took place.</i>	
Confusion over candidates being added to ballot at last minute.	Not enough space on ballot to add name of candidate ordered on ballot at last minute.	<i>If significant doubt exists regarding the number of candidates to be listed on the ballot due to the intricacies of the registration process (e.g., when cases are pending in the supreme court), the CEC may have to establish a ballot which allows for a candidate to be added to the ballot at the last minute. The preferred method for this is to have a stamp or a sticker that can be added, although such solutions are only favored in extreme cases. In the South African Presidential elections of April 1994, M'Buthelezi was reinstated as a candidate only three weeks before the election. His followers did not cause additional civil disturbances, as they were satisfied with the addition of the candidate at the bottom of the ballot, with a sticker. In this case, the Independent Election Commission had printed a longer ballot with extra space in response to the situation.</i>	22

The Voter List			
The purpose of the voter list is to ensure that eligible voters are the only ones who vote in an election. A determination of any shortcomings in the preparation and use of the voter list might be made, and the following actions contemplated:			
Findings	Potential Problems	Recommendations	
Voter lists are developed inconsistently and not coordinated between the 89 subjects of the federation.	Due to the increased mobility of voters throughout the Federation, citizens can be placed on voter lists several times in different areas and subjects.	<i>Create a national computerized voter registry to update the voter list at each polling station and ensure that a voter is not on more than one voter list. Revise the procedures for compiling the voter list to take into account the fact that more and more Russians are moving and moving more often.</i>	23



Dead voters and voters who have long moved away are still on voter rolls in some PECs.	Allows greater opportunities for fraud.	<i>Improve the training for election commissioners so that they will be more effective in compiling the voter list. Increase the manner in which voters who have moved can more easily be added to the appropriate voter list and deleted from other voter lists.</i>	24
In some polling stations, the list of voters is not bound together.	Manipulation of voter lists.	<i>List of voters should be joined together; books should be numbered.</i>	25

<b>Conduct at the Polls</b>	
<b>Local Authorities in the Election Process</b>	
Interference on the part of governmental authorities, political parties or other entities must be prohibited in democratic elections. Voters observing the control and intimidation of the election commissioners by the local authorities may conclude that the election is not being conducted in a free and fair manner. Therefore, the role of government authorities in elections may need to be further clarified.	
<b>Recommendations</b>	
<i>A review of the election laws and the training of election commissioners on the appropriate role of local authorities may be needed.</i>	26
<i>In some situations, election commissioners may need additional assistance, in which case it might be logical to recruit from the government authorities. However, any such assistance should be clearly delineated with the election commissioners in charge, and government representatives subservient to the election commissioners.</i>	27
<i>The role of government representatives in the election process needs to be made clear to all voters and the public, so there can be no misunderstandings. Otherwise, the public may deem the election commissioners mere puppets of the authorities and the election a fraud.</i>	28

<b>Conduct at the Polls</b>	
<b>Observers and Transparency in the Election Process</b>	
People must have confidence that elections are conducted freely and fairly, or they will not have faith in the process. The secrecy of the ballot is sacrosanct, and sufficient security measures need to be in place to prevent election fraud. Within that context, the election process needs to be as transparent as possible. Toward that end, the following steps might be implemented:	
<b>Recommendations</b>	
<i>Create a voter education program to inform voters and the general public about all aspects of the election. Invite them to observe each step.</i>	29
<i>Encourage candidates and political parties to better train their observers to be more alert and effective.</i>	30

<b>Conduct at the Polls</b>
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<b>Conflicts between Federal and Local Election Laws</b>		
Essential to the proper conduct of elections are laws that do not conflict and are written clearly, so there can be no misinterpretation leading to their misapplication. Manuals and training curricula must be based on these laws, being careful not to go beyond the laws. To clarify current confusion, the following steps may be helpful:		
<b>Findings</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	
Election Commissioners from SEC's to PEC's complained about the difficulty they had when federal and local election laws were in conflict. One Subject Election Chairman stated that they had to decide which law applied on a case by case basis. At the PEC level, the commissioners generally chose to follow local laws.	<i>Modify training of election commissioners to make it clear that where there are conflicts, federal laws and directives take precedence over local federal laws and directives.</i>	31
	<i>Improve written instructions, election manuals and other documents to make them easier for election commissioners to understand. For example, this could be made by having a separate booklet for election day activities and vote count &amp; transmittal, including in each training manual: an index, graphics, flow charts of decisions, a rapid "Basic Q &amp; A" section, simple and direct language, phone numbers and guidance as to where to get help, a "What if" case study of real examples (i.e. what if the person has no ID and wants to vote), as well as a feedback form to be completed by the user and compiled after the election process for future improvements.</i>	32

<b>Conduct at the Polls</b>		
<b>Polling Station Size and Voting Booths</b>		
The combination of crowded conditions and voters voting openly rather than in the secrecy of voting booths provide opportunities for unfair influence on voters, negative experiences for voters, a callous view of elections, and, even worse, public lack of confidence in the results of the election. An analysis may be needed to determine means to improve these conditions, which would include the following:		
<b>Findings</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	
In every region IFES assessed, there were polling stations that were too small to	<i>Finding larger spaces for polling stations.</i>	33

<p>accommodate the voters in that precinct. Voters were very patient, waiting as long as two hours in and around the polling station, to sign in and get their ballots. Having received their ballots, however, voters were no longer willing to wait to vote. Oftentimes, there were insufficient voting booths even in large polling stations. These conditions fostered more than one person in a voting booth as well as many voters using tables, ledges, and anything else they could to mark their ballots. Insufficient voting booths also encouraged the return of family and group voting, and consultations with relatives, friends, party representatives and/or others prior to voters marking their ballots.</p>	<p><i>Re-drawing the precinct lines to increase the number of precincts, and thus increasing the number of polling stations.</i></p>	34
	<p><i>Increasing the number of voting booths, when necessary, using inexpensive smaller and lighter booths. The Central Election Commission or the law should establish a formula for polling stations regarding how many booths should be available. If there is just one ballot to be marked, then there should be one booth for each 300 people on the voting rolls at the polling station. With a 70% turnout, a polling station with 1000 voters would have 700 voters casting ballots or about one person per minute. Assuming it took a voter about one to three minutes to mark one ballot, three booths should be adequate. It is recommended that the formula below be used when deciding how many booths should be at a polling station</i></p>	35
<p><b>Formula for determining the number of voting booths needed at Polling Stations</b></p>		
<b># of ballots to be voted</b>	<b># of booths per # of voters</b>	<b># of booths for 1000 voters</b>
1	1 @ 300 voters	3
2	1 @ 275 voters	3-4
3	1 @ 250 voters	4
4	1 @ 200 voters	5

<b>Conduct at the Polls</b>			
<b>Mobile, Absentee Certificate, and Beyond the Border Voting</b>			
<b>Findings</b>	<b>Potential Problems</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	
In our assessment, Mobile Voting was fraught with election violations. In some cases, observers were not allowed to accompany the mobile	Opens up the opportunity for voter fraud and manipulation. When there is only one commission left to conduct voting, it	<i>Allow for a minimum of 4 PEC commissioners so that there is at least two left at a polling station when mobile voting takes place, or have additional PEC members, whose only responsibility would be overseeing the mobile ballot box.</i>	36

accompany the mobile ballot boxes. In others, political party observers were asked to take the place of one of the two PEC members required to accompany the mobile boxes to voters.	conduct voting, it allows great potential for fraud.	<i>Place more limitations on mobile voting to ensure that only those needing the service receive it.</i>	37
		<i>Allow immediate family member to take ballot to immobilized voter and return ballot in sealed envelope after it has been voted.</i>	38
PEC members appeared to be confused about their duties when presented with absentee voting certificates. The manner in which unused absentee voting certificates were handled was inconsistent. Some election commissioners ignored them, others counted them, yet others counted then invalidated them.	The inclusion of voters who are away from their precincts contributes toward the enfranchisement of all voters. Proper management of this process is essential as the opportunity for fraud is high.	<i>Improve the instruction manuals and training programs so that election commissioners can more easily follow the laws for the issuance of the absentee voting certificates and the issuance of ballots to voters who present such certificates.</i>	39
		<i>Improve the instruction manuals and training programs for the accountability of the absentee voting certificates from the point where the commissions receive them through to their disposition at the end of Election Day.</i>	40
While voting abroad at embassies and consulates was laudable, there were still a significant number of Russian citizens who were disenfranchised due to the distance to the voting locations.	Disenfranchisement of voters.	<i>Encourage overseas embassies and consulates to conduct greater public information campaigns to inform Russian citizens of their opportunity to vote overseas at designated sites. This can be accomplished through the mass media and by direct mail.</i>	41

<b>Conduct at the Polls</b>			
<b>Campaign Materials in Vicinity of Polling Stations</b>			
<b>Findings</b>	<b>Potential Problems</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	
At several polling stations, campaign materials were seen near or even in the polling stations (this practice was pervasive	Such displays so near or in polling stations could have undue influence on how voters vote, as they are the last things voters see before getting their ballots.	<i>Within 24 hours of Election Day, remove all campaign materials within 100 meters of each polling station. The PECs could perform this task, or under its supervision, the appropriate government department could be given this assignment.</i>	42

in areas where local authorities were supporting a specific party list.		Another option is to inform the campaigns where the polling stations are located and require the campaigns to remove their own materials no later than 24 hours before Election Day.	43
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Conduct at the Polls			
Counting Process and Transmittal of Results (Protocols)			
Findings	Potential Problems	Recommendations	
The counting process varied greatly in the polling stations assessed. There did not appear to be consistency in the method of counting and the reconciliation of ballot papers.	Mistakes that would lead to an inaccurate vote count. Delay in counting.	<i>Improve the instruction manuals and include clear step-by-step illustrations for ballot counting and ballot reconciliation.</i>	44
		<i>Improve the training for ballot counting and reconciliation of ballots issued.</i>	45
		<i>Separate the reporting documents for ballot reconciliation and vote count. One set of protocols should exist for the accounting of ballots and one set for the overall vote count</i>	46
		<i>For election night reporting, simplify the protocols for ballot accounting. Perhaps, the protocols should be done in a two-step process. The first step would be to report the number of valid ballots counted for each choice in each election. These numbers could be transmitted to the TEC immediately, where they would be entered into the "SAS Vybory" computer vote count system. The "SAS Vybory" system would need to be modified to accommodate this simplified two-step reporting process. The second step would be the complete reconciliation of the ballots issued to the PEC.</i>	47
PEC members fatigued when counting ballots allowing for greater mistakes and repeat of counting process.	Inaccurate count.	<i>Determine whether additional PEC members could be added just to assist in the count (they could also assist in the delivery of mobile boxes in the afternoon)</i>	48
Ballots for one party or one candidate check and counted by one person.	Deliberate wrong checking or counting of votes.	<i>The validation and counting of ballot stacks should be done two times by two different commissioners</i>	49
Decisions about whether ballots are valid or not were made by commission chairman after	Partisan decisions.	<i>Decisions on questionable ballots should be made in accordance with law by all voting members of the commission.</i>	50

consultation with observers.			
Not all PECs had large protocols available.	Observers have no opportunity to observe process step by step.	<i>All PECs should have large protocols posted and used.</i>	51
Final protocol is reported by phone to territorial election commission.	Procedure could be used by territorial election commission to advise PEC how to change results.	<i>Results of counting should only be responsibility of PEC. In case of differences (protocol not balancing), territorial commission should be obliged to report differences in a separate line.</i>	52
Some PECs issued two sets of protocols-official 3 copies of protocols with signatures and stamps.	This gives TEC opportunity to change and replace protocols.	<i>Signing and stamping protocols in advance should be prohibited.</i>	53
Final PEC, TEC, DEC, SEC results could be presented to observer by request (A 85.1 of Duma Law). Law does not indicate whether results should be given free of charge.	Many commissions set their own price for copies of protocols.	<i>Law should state that all certified observers are to be given copies of results free of charge.</i>	54
Election Commissions conduct no audit of election results.	Opens opportunity for fraud.	<i>There should be audit of results or selective recounting of ballots in the presence of observers.</i>	55

### Lack of Standardization and Need for Training

If there was one finding that was consistent in these findings, it is that there needs to be improvements in training procedures and training materials so that election commissioners, governmental bodies who provide assistance in the election, political party observers, and others can have a greater understanding of the law, procedures and their role in the process. Lack of such training led to great inconsistency in the applicability of many aspects of the election code and rules and confusion.

Findings	Potential Problems	Recommendations
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Inconsistency in training of election officials. Subject Election Commissions appear to use widely-different methods to conduct training procedures. Some election commissions, particularly district election commissions, had major problems with the registration of candidates.	Arbitrary and incomplete application of election laws and procedures.	<i>Develop procedure for consistent training of election officials, at all levels. Such a program could include improved training manuals complete with diagrams and graphic illustrations of various aspects of election procedures. A training video which is watched by all those who serve as election commissioners at all levels--including the 93,000 + polling stations --- would go a long way to improve the training process throughout the Russian Federation.</i>	56
		<i>Creation of a training department within the Central Election Commission should be considered to provide consistent training to election commissions at lower levels; monitor the results of their training so they can modify their training efforts effectively and on a timely basis.</i>	57
In some polling stations, PEC members had difficulty in understanding the laws and election manuals when trying to make a decision in unusual situations. They had trouble finding the section they needed. Some PEC members whose first language is not Russian had problems understanding manual and instructions.	Confusion, delays and inconsistent interpretations of proper procedures.	<i>The election manual should be revised to make it easier for election commissioners to find the section they need. Diagrams, step-by-step instructions, a table of contents, and an index would be very helpful. Manuals should be printed in a local language, if necessary.</i>	58
Some election officials appeared to have little knowledge of what constitutes voter fraud.	Opens opportunity for fraud.	<i>In training manuals, include section on common methods of voter fraud and how to prevent and detect them.</i>	59

Other Technical Considerations			
Findings	Potential Problems	Recommendations	
Unless voter is registered as living somewhere ("propiska"), citizen cannot vote.	Russian citizens not desiring to register with local authorities is denied ability to vote	<i>Development of a national computerized voter registry.</i>	63
There appeared to be no deadline for decisions regarding the registration of candidates.	Candidates attempting to register until last day.	<i>Law fixing deadline for DEC to register candidate or deny registration.</i>	60
No information in media about number of registered voters, as required by law.	Manipulation of voter lists, creation of lists with phantom voters.	<i>CEC and PEC should publish number of voters, as law requires.</i>	61
No information in media about number of ballots and absentee certificates issued and distributed, as required by law.	Manipulation of absentee certificates and ballots.	<i>PEC should publish number of ballots printed and absentee certificates, as law requires.</i>	62



## Appendix I: Polling Station Assessments:

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### Volgograd

#### 1. Polling station A (poll opening). 7:15 a.m. -11:15 a.m.

- 12 PEC commissioners present
- in every day life commissioners are workers and teachers
- **Domestic observers present:** LDPR (1); CPRF (2); Unity (2); 2 representatives from candidate Ischenko; 1 representative from cand. Savenko
- Police present
- 3 voters in line at 8:00. First voter served at 8:00.
- 4 privacy booths
- All ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped. Ballots kept in a safe.
- 2180 voter on the original voter list
- Additions were made (absentee certificates taken; change of address, etc.)
- 2095 voters on the revised list.
- In an event of an absentee certificates being issued the following notes were added to the voter list ("special marks" column): 1)Signature of the Commissioner who issued the absentee certificates; 2) Signature of the voter; 3)Number of the absentee certificate; 4) Date
- Voters not on the voter list but able to prove their right to vote there were allowed to cast their vote
- For voters not on the list a passport with the local authorities ("ЖЭК") stamp was required before the PEC would add them to the voter list and issue a ballot

#### 2. Polling station B (TEC). 11:30 a.m. -12:25 p.m.

- All ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped
- Attempts at family voting
- Some voters placing someone else's ballots into the ballot box
- In case of a voter spoiling the ballot, the PEC filled out on appropriate protocol with 2 signatures and a stamp; cut left bottom corner of the spoiled ballot. Second ballot was issued to the voter.
- Some people tried to obtain ballots for other voters; not successful.
- On the average, 20 min. needed for a single voter to cast a ballot
- 22 requests for portable ballot box
- Most voters live in the area surrounding the polling site and always vote here
- Some complained how long it takes to cast a ballot

#### 3. Polling station C. 12:40 p.m.-1:05 p.m.

- All ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped
- Passport required to be shown in order to get a ballot
- Some people tried to obtain ballots for other voters; not successful
- On the average, 20 min. needed for a single voter to cast a ballot
- 23 requests for mobile ballot boxes
- Exit polling showed that all voters generally think that everything is fine and have no complaints or suggestions
- Premises for voting are too small; hundreds of voters struggling to read and fill out their ballots
- Military voters very orderly, instructed by their superiors
- Problem with military ID's having no appr. seal

**4. Polling station D. 1:15 p.m. -1:30 p.m.**

- Ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped
- Some people tried to obtain ballots for other voters; not successful
- On the average, 3 min. needed for a single voter to cast a ballot
- 16 requests for portable ballot box
- No spoiled ballots
- Orderly military detachments

**5. Polling station E. 1:35 p.m.**

- Ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped
- Voters conferring with each other prior to marking their ballot
- Attempts at family voting
- 3 voters have not been allowed to vote (wrong election precinct)
- 10 min. needed for each voter to cast a ballot
- 25 requests for portable ballot box (+500 to military hospital)
- Mobile boxes not properly fixed (due to the large number of ballots in the hospital it was impossible to seal the box tightly and a large opening was left on top, making it easy to add or to remove a ballot)

**6. Polling station F. 2:40 p.m. -3:15 p.m.**

- Ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped
- Voters conferring with each other prior to marking their ballot
- In case of a voter spoiling the ballot, the PEC filled out on appropriate protocol with 2 signatures and a stamp; cut left bottom corner of the spoiled ballot. Second ballot was issued to the voter.
- 5-7 min. needed for a single voter to cast his/her ballot
- 20 requests for mobile ballot box
- Polling site rating (1 to 10): 2

**7. Polling station G. 3:30 p.m. ~ 3:45 p.m.**

- Ballots signed and stamped a day before the election
- Attempts at family voting
- No spoiled ballots
- Voters received an advance notice on where and when to vote
- Polling site rating (1 to 10): 3

**8. Polling station H. 3:45 p.m. – 4:00 p.m.**

- Ballots signed and stamped a day before the election
- Voters conferring with each other prior to marking their ballot
- Attempts at family voting
- Some people tried to obtain ballots for other voters; not successful
- 31 requests for mobile ballot box
- 900 ballots in all
- Polling site rating (1 to 10): 3

**9. Polling station I. 4:30 p.m.-4:50 p.m.**

- Ballots signed and stamped a day before the election
- Voters conferring with each other prior to marking their ballot
- Attempts at family voting
- 5 min. needed per voter to cast a ballot
- 30 requests for mobile boxes (+ 4 for hospitals)
- Voters received an advance notice
- Polling site rating: 4

**10. Polling station J. 5 p.m.-5:15 p.m.**

- Ballots signed and stamped a day before the election
- Voters conferring with each other prior to marking their ballot
- Attempts at family voting
- 2 persons was not allowed to vote (wrong credentials; wrong election precinct)
- Attempts to obtain ballots for other voters (not successful)
- 5 min. needed for single voter to cast a ballot
- 35 requests for mobile box
- No opportunity to cover all applications for mobile box
- Chairperson not adequately familiar with procedures

#### **11. Polling station #K (poll closing and vote count). 7:00 p.m. – 6:55 a.m.**

- 1 voter in line at 8:00 p.m.
- 1647 voters on the voter list
- 62 voters on the supplementary list
- Voting ended at 8:02 p.m.
- PEC voided the unused ballots by cutting the right bottom corners
- Unused ballots were stored outside the polling area in a safe
- **# of unused ballots according to PEC count:** 637 (S-M)+630 (FE) = 1267+ 2 (FE, spoiled)
- Ballot boxes unsealed in the presence of all commissioners and observers
- PEC members appeared to know the procedures
- The polling place appeared orderly
- Apparently, the PEC members knew how to count votes and complete the protocols
- Observers were able to stand close enough to see
- The PEC used stacking while counting the ballots
- 1669 (FE)=1676(S-M) ballots were cast
- Ballots had PEC seal and 2 signatures on them
- 28(FE)+17(S-M) invalid ballots
- Ballots containing no marks, more than one mark were declared invalid
- The protocols were completed by the PEC secretary (by pen)
- Everyone present was given a chance to record results from the protocol
- Chairperson, Deputy-Chair and secretary delivered the protocols to the TEC (6:55 a.m.)
- The commissioners appeared to know the procedures but they didn't pay any attention to the clauses they considered insignificant

### **Kazan**

#### **1. Polling station A (poll opening), 7:35 a.m.-8:30 a.m.**

**Precinct commission background:** electrician, librarian, and receptionist. Chair – a man. Commissioners – young women.

**Observers:** representing candidate from local administration (Communist); independent candidate (perhaps OVR)

**Polling site:** two very small rooms divided by voting booths. Police present.

**First voter served:** 8:05. **Voters in line at 8:00:** 12.

Ballots stored in safe boxes. **# of ballots:** 14142 (RF) 1432(TR). **Voters on original voter list:** 1414  
Voters were added to the list on the basis of *propiska* stamp, going door to door to verify list. For voters who had requested absentee certificates a note saying "absentee certificate issued" was added to the voter list.

#### **2. Polling station B. 12:00 p.m.-12:30 p.m.**

Passports required to be shown in order to vote.

Several observers representing CPRF, candidates from local administration and Tatarstan- New Century Movement (supporting OVR) were present. All ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped before Election Day.

Police present. Persons without *propiska* wouldn't be allowed to vote (never actually happened). Family voting was evident. Commissioners checked the ballots before they went into the box (in case of voting outside the polling station using the mobile ballot box). About 20 min. needed per one voter to vote. Voters were informed on when and where to vote by activists going from door to door. In the past the polling station used to be in a different, less convenient place, so voters think all is well now and have no complaints.

### **3. Polling station C. 2:00 p.m.-2:40 p.m.**

Voters on voter list: 248. Requests for mobile boxes: 17

Campaign materials (posters, leaflets) for OVR and local administration displayed at the entrance to a grocery store next door to the polling station.

All ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped. Some voters tried to confer with each other prior to marking their ballot but the chairman interfered. There were no spoiled ballots. During voting outside the polling station two commissioners and two observers (Communist + local administration) were present; commissioners told the voter to mark her ballot in another room; family assisted. The polling site was always located in the same place so the voters had no trouble finding out where to vote, but invitations were delivered nevertheless.

### **4. Polling station D. 3:10 p.m.-3:20 p.m.**

No early voting. No observers present. One request for absentee certificate (vote went to Kazan to have surgery). All ballots pre-stamped and pre-signed. No spoiled ballots. 3 voters out of 153 total have applied to vote outside the polling station. By 15:00 all voters have already cast ballots; voting was over. In every day life the commissioners work on a local collective farm.

### **5. Polling station E. 3:40 p.m. -4:30 p.m.**

All ballots pre-stamped. No spoiled ballots. Some voters managed to obtain ballots for other voters. PEC Chairman failed to give any explanation. # of requests for mobile boxes: 138 according to chair; 160 according to observer from CPRF. "Activists" delivered invitations to all voters. The administration also appointed an "activist" to "help voters". She picked up ballots (without showing any ID) from a commissioner & gave them to another young woman (who apparently did not sign the ballots); the young woman went into a voting booth. The first woman explained that she gave ballots to her daughter and both she and the chairwoman said that it was irregular but excusable.

### **6. Polling station F. 5:05 p.m. -5:40 p.m.**

- All ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped since Dec.16.
- No spoiled ballots. 66 requests for portable ballot box.
- 5-10 min. needed per one voter to vote.
- "Activists" delivered invitations to all voters.

### **7. Polling station G (poll closing and vote count). 7:20 p.m. -6:40 a.m.**

- No voters in line at 20:00.
- Initially there were 1167 voters on the voter list; after corrections - 1156.
- 49 voters on the supplementary list.
- Voting ended at 19:45.
- PEC voided the unused ballots by cutting the left bottom corner.
- Unused ballots were wrapped up and tied; no seal or signatures; later taken to TEC
- Number of unused ballots according to PEC count: #1-150; #2-144 (blue); #3-150; #4-150; #5-150 (+2 spoiled; counted twice)
- Ballot boxes unsealed in the presence of all commissioners and observers
- PEC commissioners didn't appear to know the procedures all that well
- Ballots containing two or more marks; or no marks at all were invalidated
- After the counting, the ballots were not placed into sealed containers but were tied (not sealed)
- Protocols were completed by the chairman, the secretary and one commissioner
- There was no vote on invalidation procedure
- No vote on protocols

- Large protocols posted on the wall were only partially filled
  - Ballots weren't sealed after the counting
  - Local administration head was present
  - Counting and reconciling voter lists lasted for 2 hours
  - No sample ballots were posted
  - 4 mobile boxes for 104 requests
- 

## **Yekaterinburg**

### **1. Polling station A. (local jail; opening). 8:30a.m. - 9:15 a.m.**

- Election posters (information) of candidate for district & federal list
- Personal record # was required
- Ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped
- The subject whether any voters weren't been allowed to vote was not defined. Voting was held by absentee certificates or personal applications. It was the voter's personal choice whether to vote or not.
- 2 min. needed for each voter to cast a ballot
- The polling site itself was mobile.
- Polling site rating: 2 (considering jail conditions)

### **2. Polling station B (local jail). 9:15 a.m.-9:30 a.m.**

- Information on the candidates posted
- Personal record # was required
- Ballots were pre-signed and pre-stamped
- 2 min. needed for each voter to cast a ballot
- Observers were not permitted to talk to prisoners hence no exit polling
- Polling site rating: 2

### **3. Polling station C. 11:00 a.m.-11:30 a.m.**

- Information posters inside the polling site
- Passports required
- Ballots signed and stamped a day before the election
- Some voters conferring with each other prior to marking their ballots
- Attempts at family voting
- No spoiled ballots at the time when observers were present
- 15 min. needed for a single person to cast a ballot
- 15-20 requests for mobile ballot box
- Polling site rating: 6 (too crowded, messy)
- Exit polling showed that voters believed the election process at this site to be generally OK but time consuming (too many people; need to stand in line, etc.) Putting more voting booths would be very helpful.

### **4. Polling station D. (Nizhny Tagil). 1:30 p.m-2: 20 p.m.**

- Information about the candidates posted inside
  - Ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped
  - Some voters conferring with each other prior to marking their ballots
  - Attempts at family voting
  - No spoiled ballots
  - Observer failed to learn whether any voters have not been allowed to vote
  - It's possible that some voters have not been allowed to vote because they didn't have their passports
  - 10 min. needed for each voter to cast a ballot
  - 10 requests for mobile ballot box
  - Polling site rating: 3
  - Exit polling showed that voters thought the lack of music made the polling site feel "like a cemetery".
-

**5. Polling station E (N.Tagil). 2:50p.m. -3:20 p.m.**

- Passport was required. In one case an international passport was shown.
- Ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped
- Some voters conferring with each other prior to marking their ballots
- Attempts at family voting
- No spoiled ballots
- 4 min. needed for 1 voter to cast a ballot
- 13 applications to vote outside the polling station
- Exit polling showed that voters found the music being too loud

**6. Polling station F. 5:30 p.m. – 6:05 p.m.**

- Ballots were pre-signed and pre-stamped
- Passport was required
- Voters conferring with each other prior to marking their ballots
- Attempts at family voting
- No spoiled ballots
- 3 min. needed for one voter to cast a ballot
- 11 requests for mobile ballot box
- Polling site rating: 5

**7. Polling station H&I. 6:10 p.m.-6:35 p.m.**

- Information about candidates posted
- Passport required
- All ballots pre-signed and pre-stamped
- People entering booths in pairs
- Voters conferring with each other
- Family voting
- No spoiled ballots
- Some people tried to obtain ballots for other voters (not successful)
- 5 min. needed for 1 voter to cast a ballot
- 15-17 applications to vote outside the polling station
- Exit polling suggestions: voter list should be prepared more carefully

**8. Polling station J (poll closing and vote count). 7:30p.m.-3:30 a.m.**

- No voters in line at 8:00 p.m.
- 1804 voters on the voter list
- 31 voters on the supplementary list
- Voting ended at 7:58 p.m.
- The PEC voided the unused ballots by cutting the left bottom corners
- Unused ballots were kept in a locked safe
- 2293 unused ballots in all
- Ballot boxes unsealed in presence of all the commissioners and observers
- PEC members appeared to know the procedures
- Polling site appeared orderly
- While counting , the PEC used tally for district ballots and stacking for the federal
- 1628 valid ballots were cast at this polling station (all signed and stamped by the commissioners)
- 1 invalid ballot was cast
- After the counting the ballots were wrapped into paper
- The protocols were completed by PEC Secretary (in pencil)
- Protocols were temporarily brought to the TEC before being completed by pen at the polling site
- The Secretary of the PEC delivered the protocols to the TEC (at 1:30 a.m.)
- Poll closing rating : 2+

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## Kaliningrad

### 1. Polling Station A, Leningrad District (poll opening). 7:35 a.m.-8:48 a.m.

- 10 Precinct Commissioner present (8 of which are teachers at the school)
- 5 Domestic Observers present (1 OVR, 1 KPRF, 1 Unity and 2 independent candidates)
- 1 policeman is present
- 2354 voter on the original voter list as of 8:00 a.m.
- First voter served promptly at 8:00 a.m.
- 4 voter were added to list and four were removed (these all were clearly marked)
- Seven absentee ballots were issued. Persons were crossed out of Voting List and this was signed by Chairman of PEC
- Unused ballots all had stamp and two signatures from PEC members (each member signed in different color)
- Voter not on the list, but able to prove their right to vote (absentee ballot or propiska), are allowed to vote with appropriate document (passport, military ID)

### 2. Polling Station B, Girevni District. 9:07 a.m. - 9:35 a.m.

- 1013 voters on Voters List. They expected about 60% to vote
- Very slow when we arrived
- 5 members of PEC (all teachers at the school)
- All ballots signed and sealed the day prior to voting and kept in safe overnight
- Two observers (1 OVR and 1 Unity)
- Average vote cast in a matter of minutes
- Two people applied for the mobile voting unit
- Polling site rating: 8

#### Unusual Procedures

- family voting
- if ballot is spoiled, no second ballot is issued

### 3. Polling Station C. 10:00 a.m. – 10:25 a.m.

- 1966 voter on Voter List. Five added so far in the day based on documentation shown.
- 12 members of PEC. A few did not seem to know anything about elections.
- All ballots signed and sealed the day prior to voting and kept in safe overnight.
- 2 observers (1 Unity and 1 independent candidate)
- No absentee ballots issues. Received 20 absentee ballots and voided all 20
- Average vote cast in a matter of minutes.
- No one has applied for the mobile voting unit
- Polling site rating: 2

#### Unusual Procedures

- family voting
- voting outside of booth
- 5-10 people in extended public voting booths

### 4. Polling Station D. 10:25 a.m. – 10:45 a.m.

- 2256 voters on Voter List
- 8 members of PEC
- All ballots signed and sealed two days prior to voting and kept in safe.
- 2 observers (1 Unity and 1 independent candidate)
- 9 absentee ballots issues. Received 20 absentee ballots. 6 voided and 5 provided to another PEC through an Act
- At 10:00 a.m., 83 voters had cast ballots

- Average vote cast in a matter of minutes
- One voter turned away as came from work without proper documentation
- 8 people applied for the mobile voting unit
- Polling site rating: 7

Unusual Procedures (positive)

- although in the same building as Polling Station 453, this was much better organized and had far fewer instances of "voting discussions"

**5. Polling Station E, Svetogorsk Region. 12:00 p.m. – 12:35 p.m.**

- 2300 voters on Voter List
- 11 members of PEC
- Very crowded and chaotic
- All ballots signed and sealed a day prior to voting and kept in safe
- 5 observers (2 Unity, 2 KPRF and 1 OVR)
- 3 absentee ballots issues
- Average vote cast in 10 minutes
- 15 people applied for the mobile voting unit
- One voter wanted to vote for daughter and was not allowed
- A couple of voters not on voters list, but resident in the regions and legitimate voters, were upset to be put on additional voters list as if this were a stigma (or a possible means of "big brother" like control)
- Polling site rating: 5

Unusual Procedures

- Did not seem to be reporting on a timely basis to the TEC – had no idea as to number of votes cast
- Chairman seemed uncomfortable when discussing absentee ballots
- Very poorly organized voting flow, with voting on tables outside the booth

**6. Polling Station F, Svetogorsk Region (military sanatorium). 12:45 p.m. – 1:30 p.m.**

- 1160 voters on Voter List
- Many voters, but well organized flow
- All ballots signed and sealed a day prior to voting and kept in safe
- 7 observers (2 Unity, 3 KPRF and 2 OVR)
- At 10:00 a.m., 60 voters had cast ballots
- Because this is a sanatorium (for rest), an unusual number of absentee voters, with ballots, cast votes (40). Absentee voters all asked to present proper documentation
- Average vote cast in a matter of minutes
- 11 people applied for the mobile voting unit
- Polling site rating: 9

Unusual Procedures (positive and negative)

- attempted to make sure only 1 voter at a time went into voting booth, but were not always successful.
- commissioners were quite knowledgeable and explained voting procedures to each voter (in an efficient manner) – no ballots were spoiled and they were proud of this.

**7. Polling Station G, Primorskii region. 3:20 p.m. – 4:00 p.m.**

- 1850 Voters on the Voters List ("give or take a few" according to Precinct Chairman).
- 11 members of PEC
- 1092 voters by 4:00 p.m.
- All ballots signed and sealed a day prior to voting and kept in safe
- 4 observers (1 Unity, 1 Yabloko and 2 independent candidates)
- 16 people applied for the mobile box
- Followed mobile box to TB sanatorium for young men in the military. All had their passports. Did not vote in separate room as planned because light bad in room. Voted out in open. Mobile box also



followed for one house visit, where voter was assisted to the point of commission member filling in her choice on the ballot (due to her infirmity)

- Average vote cast in a matter of minutes
- Polling site rating: 7

#### Unusual Procedures

- Unity poster in close proximity to polling station. Looks like feeble attempt made to remove it.

### **8. Polling Station H, Leningradskii Region (Student Housing unit): 7:00 p.m. – 7:25 p.m.**

- 1392 Voters on the Voters List
- 10 members of PEC
- At 6:00 p.m., approximately 650 people had voted.; about 52% of voters expected
- All ballots signed (separate color for each of the signers) and sealed a day prior to voting and kept in safe
- 7 observers (1 Unity, 2 OVR and 1 independent candidate – 3 had left)
- 9 people applied for the mobile box
- They provided 16 absentee ballots of 24 issued. Remaining 8 absentee ballots destroyed
- They had seven voters with absentee ballots
- Because this is student housing, not all who come to vote are registered (“propiska”). They are not allowed to vote unless they received temporary registration. As discussed below, Russian passport is not enough
- Average vote cast in a matter of minutes
- Polling site rating: 8

### **9. Polling Station I, Moscovskii Region (poll closing). 7:30 p.m. – 2:00 a.m.**

- 2704 Voters on the Voters List
- 13 members of the PEC 910 of the 13 members are from the factory where PEC is located)
- 6 observers (1 KPRF, 1 Unity and 4 independent candidates)
- At 6:00 p.m., 1485 people had voted
- 4 people with absentee ballots voted here
- Voting ended at 8:00 p.m. promptly
- 1595 total votes cast (21 Voters on supplemental list)
- Unused ballots stored on the commission table. They are counted separately and not destroyed for a long while
- Invalid ballots were decided upon unilaterally by the individual looking at the vote and distributing it to be piled
- Reasons for invalid ballots: multiple votes, no votes or crossed out one, several or all.
- The Secretary of the PEC filled out the protocols
- The protocols were filled out by pen. They took a significant amount of time to complete.
- the PEC was very inexperienced in filling out protocols and did not know how to do it. They needed to refer to CEC book many times
- Polling site rating: 8

#### Unusual Practices

- 10 of 13 of PEC members were from factory of polling station – head of factory is a SMD candidate. Head of factory came in second at this polling station 9better than he did in Kaliningrad)
- During vote count, 4 members of PEC called out for whom the vote was cast and handed out the ballots.
- Unused ballots were not destroyed until well after the vote count started.

## **Appendix II: Official Protocols**

Sverdlovsk Oblast

Omsk Oblast

Kaliningrad Oblast

Tatarstan Autonomous Republic

Beyond the Border Protocols – Moldova, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan

**Sverdlovsk**

# ВЫБОРЫ ДЕПУТАТОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ТРЕТЬЕГО СОЗЫВА

19 декабря 1999 года

## ПРОТОКОЛ № 1

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования  
по Нижнетагильскому одномандатному избирательному округу № 164

### ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 616

Свердловская обл., г. Верх-Исетский, пл. Революции д. 1  
(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии - наименование субъекта Российской Федерации, район, город, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования и обладающих активным избирательным правом в одномандатном избирательном округе	1804	Одна тысяча восемьсот четыре
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	1000	Две тысячи
3	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных досрочно проголосовавшим избирателям	0000	
4	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	1147	Одна тысяча сто сорок семь
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	0818	Восемьсот восемнадцать
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0035	Тридцать пять
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0035	Тридцать пять
8	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	0818	Восемьсот восемнадцать
9	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	0815	Восемьсот пятнадцать
10	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней	0038	Тридцать восемь
11	Число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными на основании пункта 14 статьи 77 Федерального закона «О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации»	0000	
12	Число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из позиций	0023	Двадцать три

12a	Число признанных недействительными избирательных бюллетеней, в которых голоса избирателей поданы в ходе досрочного голосования за выбывшего впоследствии зарегистрированного кандидата	0000	
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0020	Двадцать
14	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0004	Четыре
14a	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных избирателям в территориальной избирательной комиссии	0000	
15	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0003	Три
16	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0016	Шестнадцать
17	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 6 статьи 73 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0000	
Фамилии, имена, отчества зарегистрированных кандидатов, внесенных в избирательный бюллетень		Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждого зарегистрированного кандидата	
18	Белоусов Сергей Орестович	0065	Шестидесять пять
19	Веер Артур Павлович	0077	Семьдесят семь
20	Казаков Геннадий Семенович	0019	Деветнадцать
21	Котков Анатолий Степанович	0056	Пятьдесят шесть
22	Потапов Сергей Алексеевич	0110	Сто десять
23	Титова Нина Александровна	0052	Пятьдесят два
24	Язев Валерий Афонасьевич	0298	Двасти девяносто восемь
25	Число голосов избирателей, поданных против всех кандидатов	0138	Сто тридцать восемь

Председатель участковой  
избирательной комиссии

Долгих О. А.

(фамилия, инициалы)

(подпись, отметка об особом мнении либо  
причина отсутствия члена комиссии)

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

Макарова Т. Б.

Секретарь комиссии

Горошина И. С.

Члены комиссии :

Бибиков А. А.

Кузюникова Н. Б.

Жуикова М. В.

Ганова В. Л.

Гаронова Л. Л.

Щекалева О. С.

М.П.

Протокол подписан « 20 » декабря 1999 года в 1 часов 10 минут


Копия верна.

Председатель комиссии О. А. Долгих

Секретарь комиссии И. С. Горошина

время: 2 ч. 10 мин.

дата: 20 декабря 1999



Экземпляр № \_\_\_\_\_

ВЫБОРЫ ДЕПУТАТОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ  
ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ТРЕТЬЕГО СОЗЫВА

19 декабря 1999 года

ПРОТОКОЛ № 2

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования  
по федеральному избирательному округу

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 616

Свердловская обл., г. Верх-Ильменский, пл. Революции, 1  
(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии - наименование субъекта Российской Федерации, район, город, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования и обладающих активным избирательным правом в федеральном избирательном округе	1804	Одна тысяча восемьсот четыре
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	2000	Две тысячи
3	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных досрочно проголосовавшим избирателям	0000	
4	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	1146	Одна тысяча сто сорок шесть
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	0819	Восемьсот девятнадцать
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0035	Тридцать пять
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0035	Тридцать пять
8	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	0818	Восемьсот восемнадцать
9	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	0810	Восемьсот десять
10	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней	0043	Сорок три
11	Число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными на основании пункта 14 статьи 77 Федерального закона «О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации»	0000	
12	Число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из позиций	0019	Десять девять

12a	Число признанных недействительными избирательных бюллетеней, в которых голоса избирателей поданы в ходе досрочного голосования за федеральный список кандидатов выбывшего впоследствии избирательного объединения, избирательного блока	0000	
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0020	Двадцать
14	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0004	Четыре
14a	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных избирателям в территориальной избирательной комиссии	0000	
15	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0003	Три
16	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0016	Шестнадцать
17	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 6 статьи 73 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0000	
Наименования избирательных объединений, избирательных блоков, выдвинувших федеральные списки кандидатов		Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждый федеральный список кандидатов	
18	1. КОНСЕРВАТИВНОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ РОССИИ	0002	Два
19	2. РОССИЙСКИЙ ОБЩЕНАРОДНЫЙ СОЮЗ	0001	Один
20	3. ЖЕНЩИНЫ РОССИИ	0026	Двадцать шесть
21	5. СТАЛИНСКИЙ БЛОК - ЗА СССР	0007	Семь
22	6. ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЕ «ЯБЛОКО»	0046	Сорок шесть
23	7. КОММУНИСТЫ, ТРУДЯЩИЕСЯ РОССИИ - ЗА СОВЕТСКИЙ СОЮЗ	0011	Одиннадцать
24	8. МИР. ТРУД. МАЙ	0075	Семьдесят пять
25	9. БЛОК ГЕНЕРАЛА АНДРЕЯ НИКОЛАЕВА, АКАДЕМИКА СВЯТОСЛАВА ФЕДОРОВА	0002	Два
26	10. ВСЕРОССИЙСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВЕННО- ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ «ДУХОВНОЕ НАСЛЕДИЕ»	0001	Один
27	11. КОНГРЕСС РУССКИХ ОБЩИН И ДВИЖЕНИЕ ЮРИЯ БОЛДЫРЕВА	0001	Один



28	12. ПАРТИЯ МИРА И ЕДИНСТВА	0000	Два
29	13. РОССИЙСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ ЗАЩИТЫ ЖЕНЩИН	0004	Четыре
30	14. МЕЖРЕГИОНАЛЬНОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ «ЕДИНСТВО» («МЕДВЕДЬ»)	0276	Относительно шесть
31	15. СОЦИАЛ-ДЕМОКРАТЫ	0000	
32	16. ОБЩЕРОССИЙСКОЕ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ «В ПОДДЕРЖКУ АРМИИ»	0002	Два
33	17. БЛОК ЖИРИНОВСКОГО	0085	Восемьдесят пять
34	18. ЗА ГРАЖДАНСКОЕ ДОСТОИНСТВО	0008	Восемь
35	19. ОТЕЧЕСТВО – ВСЯ РОССИЯ	0019	Десять девять
36	20. КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ	0100	Сто
37	21. РУССКОЕ ДЕЛО	0000	
38	22. ВСЕРОССИЙСКАЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ НАРОДА	0001	Один
39	23. СОЮЗ ПРАВЫХ СИЛ	0063	Шестидесять три
40	24. ЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ «КЕДР» (ЗЕЛЕННЫЕ)	0000	
41	25. ВОПД «НАШ ДОМ – РОССИЯ»	0023	Двадцать три
42	26. СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ	0000	
43	27. ПАРТИЯ ПЕНСИОНЕРОВ	0025	Двадцать пять
44	28. РУССКАЯ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ	0001	Один
45	Число голосов избирателей, поданных против всех федеральных списков кандидатов	0029	Двадцать девять

Перечень жалоб (заявлений), актов и иных документов, прилагаемых к протоколу :

Председатель участковой  
избирательной комиссии

Долгих О. А.

(фамилия, инициалы)

(подпись, отметка об особом мнении либо  
причина отсутствия члена комиссии)

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

Макарова Т. Б.

Секретарь комиссии

Порошина И. С.

Члены комиссии:

Бибиков А. А.

Кузовникова Н. Б.

Микитина Н. В.

Ланова В. Л.

Тарфенова Л. Л.

Цыганова О. С.

МП

Протокол подписан « 20 » декабря 1999 года в 1 часов 10 минут

Копия верна

Председатель комиссии (О. А. Долгих)

Секретарь комиссии (И. С. Порошина)

Время : 22.10.1999

Дата : 20 декабря 1999г



812.999. Березовская тип. Зак. 4326. Тир. 15000.

**OMSK**

**ВЫБОРЫ ДЕПУТАТОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ  
ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ТРЕТЬЕГО СОЗЫВА**

19 декабря 1999 года

**ПРОТОКОЛ № 1**

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования  
по Вискуну одномандатному избирательному округу № 129  
**ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 1198**

(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии - наименование субъекта Российской Федерации, район, города, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования и обладающих активным избирательным правом в одномандатном избирательном округе	1876
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	1800
3	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных досрочно проголосовавшим избирателям	0000
4	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	0904
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	0883
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0013
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0013
8	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	0883
9	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	0865
10	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней	0037
11	Число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными на основании пункта 14 статьи 77 Федерального закона «О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации»	0000
12	Число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из позиций	0013

12a	Число признанных недействительными избирательных бюллетеней, в которых голоса избирателей поданы в ходе досрочного голосования за выбывшего впоследствии зарегистрированного кандидата	0000	
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0030	
14	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0007	
14a	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных избирателям в территориальной избирательной комиссии	0000	
15	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0006	
16	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0023	
17	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 6 статьи 73 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0000	
Фамилии, имена, отчества зарегистрированных кандидатов, внесенных в избирательный бюллетень		Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждого зарегистрированного кандидата	
18	Авдейчиков	0016	
19	Добровольский	0084	
20	Корюковский	0008	
21	Ларин	0123	
22	Максакова	0008	
23	Мица	0018	
24	Неклярова	0042	
25	Росинский	0021	

26	Седельников	0045
27	Смолкин	0390
28	Смоленин	0007
29		
30		
31		
32		
33		
34		
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36		
37		
38		
39		
40		
41		
42	Число голосов избирателей, поданных против всех кандидатов	0103

Перечень жалоб (заявлений), актов и иных документов, прилагаемых к протоколу :

Председатель участковой  
избирательной комиссии

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

Секретарь комиссии

Члены комиссии :

*Масаров В*  
(фамилия, инициалы)

*Касенов Н.А.*  
(подпись, инициалы)

*Исмаилов А.*  
(подпись, инициалы)

*Жарасбеков С.Н.*  
(подпись, инициалы)

*Самсонов О.В.*  
(подпись, инициалы)

*Масар*  
(подпись, инициалы)

(подпись, инициалы)

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
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(подпись, инициалы)



Протокол подписан « \_\_\_\_\_ » \_\_\_\_\_ года в \_\_\_\_\_ часов \_\_\_\_\_ минут

Экземпляр № \_\_\_\_\_

**ВЫБОРЫ ДЕПУТАТОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ  
ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ТРЕТЬЕГО СОЗЫВА**

19 декабря 1999 года

**ПРОТОКОЛ № 2**

**участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования  
по федеральному избирательному округу**

**ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 1198**

(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии - наименование субъекта Российской Федерации, район, города, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

**Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :**

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования и обладающих активным избирательным правом в федеральном избирательном округе	1876	
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	1800	
3	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных досрочно проголосовавшим избирателям	0000	
4	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	0900	
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	0887	
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0013	
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0013	
8	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	0887	
9	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	0867	
10	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней	0033	
11	Число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными на основании пункта 14 статьи 77 Федерального закона «О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации»	0000	
12	Число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из позиций	0013	



12а	Число признанных недействительными избирательных бюллетеней, в которых голоса избирателей поданы в ходе досрочного голосования за федеральный список кандидатов выбывшего впоследствии избирательного объединения, избирательного блока	0000	
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0030	
14	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0007	
14а	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных избирателям в территориальной избирательной комиссии	0000	
15	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0006	
16	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0023	
17	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 6 статьи 73 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0000	
Наименования избирательных объединений, избирательных блоков, выдвинувших федеральные списки кандидатов		Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждый федеральный список кандидатов	
18	1. КОНСЕРВАТИВНОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ РОССИИ	0000	
19	2. РОССИЙСКИЙ ОБЩЕНАРОДНЫЙ СОЮЗ	0011	
20	3. ЖЕНЩИНЫ РОССИИ	0015	
21	5. СТАЛИНСКИЙ БЛОК - ЗА СССР	0014	
22	6. ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЕ «ЯБЛОКО»	0090	
23	7. КОММУНИСТЫ, ТРУДЯЩИЕСЯ РОССИИ - ЗА СОВЕТСКИЙ СОЮЗ	0023	
24	8. МИР. ТРУД. МАЙ	0001	
25	9. БЛОК ГЕНЕРАЛА АНДРЕЯ НИКОЛАЕВА, АКАДЕМИКА СВЯТОСЛАВА ФЕДОРОВА	0007	
26	10. ВСЕРОССИЙСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ «ДУХОВНОЕ НАСЛЕДИЕ»	0001	
27	11. КОНГРЕСС РУССКИХ ОБЩИН И ДВИЖЕНИЕ ЮРИЯ БОЛДЫРЕВА	0004	

28	12. ПАРТИЯ МИРА И ЕДИНСТВА	0004	
29	13. РОССИЙСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ ЗАЩИТЫ ЖЕНЩИН	0007	
30	14. МЕЖРЕГИОНАЛЬНОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ «ЕДИНСТВО» («МЕДВЕДЬ»)	0111	
31	15. СОЦИАЛ-ДЕМОКРАТЫ	0000	
32	16. ОБЩЕРОССИЙСКОЕ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ «В ПОДДЕРЖКУ АРМИИ»	0024	
33	17. БЛОК ЖИРИНОВСКОГО	0054	
34	18. ЗА ГРАЖДАНСКОЕ ДОСТОИНСТВО	0007	
35	19. ОТЕЧЕСТВО – ВСЯ РОССИЯ	0068	
36	20. КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ	0261	
37	21. РУССКОЕ ДЕЛО	0000	
38	22. ВСЕРОССИЙСКАЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ НАРОДА	0000	
39	23. СОЮЗ ПРАВЫХ СИЛ	0114	
40	<del>24. ЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ «КЕДР» (ЗЕЛЕННЫЕ)</del>		
41	25. ВОПД «НАШ ДОМ – РОССИЯ»	0003	
42	26. СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ	0000	
43	27. ПАРТИЯ ПЕНСИОНЕРОВ	0076	
44	28. РУССКАЯ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ	0007	
45	<del>29. РОССИЙСКАЯ КОНСЕРВАТИВНАЯ ПАРТИЯ ПРЕДПРИНИМАТЕЛЕЙ (РКПН)</del>		
46	<del>30. ЛИБЕРАЛЬНО-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ (ЛДПР)</del>		
47	Число голосов избирателей, поданных против всех федеральных списков кандидатов	0031	

Перечень жалоб (заявлений), актов и иных документов, прилагаемых к протоколу :

Председатель участковой  
избирательной комиссии

*Масаров А.В.*  
(фамилия, инициалы)

*Масар*  
(подпись, печать об особом значении либо  
о полном отсутствии членства в комиссии)

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

*Набоков Н.А.*

*Масар*

Секретарь комиссии

*Масаров А.В.*

Члены комиссии:

*Дерягина С.Н.*  
*Серебряков О.К.*

*Дерягина*  
*С*



Протокол подписан « \_\_\_\_\_ » 1999 года в \_\_\_\_\_ часов \_\_\_\_\_ минут

**KALININGRAD**

ВЫБОРЫ ДЕПУТАТОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ  
ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ТРЕТЬЕГО СОЗЫВА

19 декабря 1999 года

ПРОТОКОЛ № 1

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования  
по Камышинскому одномандатному избирательному округу № 84

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 164

Камышинский ул. г. Камышин, Московский район ул. Октябрьский 76  
(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии — наименование субъекта Российской Федерации, район, город, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования и обладающих активным избирательным правом в одномандатном избирательном округе	2 7 2 0	Две тысячи семьсот двадцать
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	2 5 0 0	Две тысячи пятьсот
3	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных досрочно проголосовавшим избирателям	0 0 0 0	Ноль
4	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	0 8 8 0	Восемьсот восемьдесят
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	1 5 9 9	Одна тысяча пятьсот девяносто девять
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0 0 2 1	Двадцать один
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0 0 2 1	Двадцать один
8	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	1 5 9 9	Одна тысяча пятьсот девяносто девять
9	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	1 6 0 1	Одна тысяча шестьсот один
10	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 0 1 9	Деятнадцать
11	Число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными на основании пункта 14 статьи 77 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0 0 0 0	Ноль
12	Число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из позиций	0 0 0 7	Семь

12a	Число признанных недействительными избирательных бюллетеней, в которых голоса избирателей поданы в ходе досрочного голосования за выбывшего впоследствии зарегистрированного кандидата	0000	Ноль
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0010	Десять
14	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0010	Десять
14a	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных избирателям в территориальной избирательной комиссии	0001	Один
15	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0004	Четыре
16	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0000	Ноль
17	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 6 статьи 73 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0000	Ноль
	Фамилии, имена, отчества зарегистрированных кандидатов, внесенных в избирательный бюллетень	Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждого зарегистрированного кандидата	
18	Трогданов Велеслав Михайлович	0005	Пять
19	Рыбников Владимир Александрович	0007	Семь
20	Воевода Юрий Евгеньевич	0008	Восемь
21	Дороницы Павел Васильевич	0006	Шесть
22	Казанков Игорь Викторович	0008	Восемь
23	Козлов Сергей Дмитриевич	0092	Девяносто два
24	Крайний Андрей Анатольевич	0255	Двести пятьдесят пять
25	Кубанов Андрей Викторович	0006	Шесть

26	Редник Виталий Владимирович	0 0 5 6	Пятьдесят шесть
27	Медведев Сергей Константинович	0 2 2 8	Двести двадцать восемь
28	Никитин Владимир Петрович	0 5 3 7	Пятьсот тридцать семь
29	Тонов Владимир Монисович	0 0 1 7	Семьдесят
30	Семезнев Валерий Владимирович	0 0 4 1	Сорок один
31	Степкоуров Дмитрий Викторович	0 0 2 6	Двадцать шесть
32	Сычев Валерий Васильевич	0 0 0 3	Три
33	Тулмаев Николай Петрович	0 0 7 9	Семьдесят девять
34	Ромченко Тамара Ивановна	0 0 2 7	Двадцать семь
35	Трунцетко Владимир Филиппович	0 0 6 5	Шестьдесят пять
36			
37			
38			
39			
40			
41			
42	Число голосов избирателей, поданных против всех кандидатов	0 1 3 5	Одно тридцать пять

перечень жалоб (заявлений), актов и иных документов, прилагаемых к протоколу:

Председатель участковой  
избирательной комиссии

Минилов В.А.  
(фамилия, инициалы)

Виссариофф

(подпись, отметка об особом мнении либо  
причина отсутствия члена комиссии)

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

Смирнов В.И.

СВУ

Секретарь комиссии

Кравченко Г.И.

Г

Члены комиссии:

Антронова Л.Е.

Антронова

Зуря И.А.

Зуря

Кашкина Л.И.

Кашкина

Малков Ю.В.

Малков

Минаев В.П.

Минаев

Михайлова С.И.

Михайлова

Образцова Н.И.

Образцова

Пилимова А.Е.

Пилимова

Пилимова Т.Н.

Пилимова

Чистяков И.А.

Чистяков



М. П.

Протокол подписан «20 декабря 1999 года в 00 часов 40 минут



ВЫБОРЫ ДЕПУТАТОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ  
ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ТРЕТЬЕГО СОЗЫВА

19 декабря 1999 года

## ПРОТОКОЛ № 2

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования  
по федеральному избирательному округуИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 164Калининградская обл. Калининград Московский район ул. Октябрьская 76  
(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии — наименование субъекта Российской Федерации, район, город, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования и обладающих активным избирательным правом в федеральном избирательном округе	2 7 2 0	Две тысячи семьсот двадцать
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	2 5 0 0	Две тысячи пятьсот
3	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных досрочно проголосовавшим избирателям	0 0 0 0	Ноль
4	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	0 8 7 9	Восемьсот семьдесят девять
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	1 6 0 0	Одна тысяча шестьсот
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0 0 2 1	Двадцать один
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0 0 2 1	Двадцать один
8	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	1 6 0 0	Одна тысяча шестьсот
9	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	1 5 9 2	Одна тысяча пятьсот девяносто два
10	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 0 2 9	Двадцать девять
11	Число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными на основании пункта 14 статьи 77 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0 0 6 0	Ноль
2	Число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из позиций	0 0 1 6	Шестнадцать

	открепительными избирательными бюллетеней, в которых голоса избирателей поданы в ходе досрочного голосования за федеральный список кандидатов выбывшего впоследствии избирательного объединения, избирательного блока	0 0 0 0	Ноль
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0 0 1 0	Десять
14	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0 0 1 0	Десять
14а	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных избирателям в территориальной избирательной комиссии	0 0 0 1	Один
15	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0 0 0 4	Четыре
16	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0 0 0 0	Ноль
17	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 6 статьи 73 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0 0 0 0	Ноль
	Наименование избирательных объединений, избирательных блоков, выдвинувших федеральные списки кандидатов	Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждый федеральный список кандидатов	
18	Консервативное движение России	0 0 0 0	Ноль
19	Российский общенародный союз	0 0 0 5	Пять
20	Мемориал - России	0 0 3 3	Тридцать три
21	Евразийский блок - За СССР	0 0 0 9	Десять
22	Объединение "Выборы"	0 1 0 0	Есть
23	Коммунисты, трудящиеся России - За Советский Союз	0 0 2 5	Двадцать пять
24	Мир. Труд. Май	0 0 0 0	Ноль
25	Блок Генерала Андрей Николаевича, Академика Светослава Федорова	0 0 0 6	Шесть
26	Всероссийский общественно-политическое движение "Духовное наследие"	0 0 0 2	Два
27	Конгресс русских общин и родственники Бориса Богатырева	0 0 1 9	Девятнадцать

	Партии мира и Единства	0004	Четыре
29	Российская Партия Защиты Мемички	0013	Тринадцать
30	Интеррегиональное Движе- ние "Единство" ("Медведь")	0452	Четыреста пятьдесят два
31	Социал - Демократ	0001	Один
32	Общероссийское политическое Движение в Поддержку Армии	0004	Четыре
33	Глек пириновская	0092	Девяносто два
34	За Трагеданское Достояние	0016	Шестнадцать
35	Вместе со - Все России	0168	Сто шестьдесят восемь
36	Коммунистическая Партия Российской Федерации	0360	Триста шестьдесят
37	Русское Демо	0002	Два
38	Всероссийская политическая Партия	0000	Ноль
39	Связь Правых Сил	0152	Сто пятьдесят два
40	ВотВД "Наши Дети - Россия"	0009	Девять
41	Социалистическая Партия России	0000	Ноль
42	Партия Темеискиров	0045	Сорок пять
43	Русская Социалистическая Партия	0002	Два
44			
45			
46	Число голосов избирателей, поданных против всех федеральных списков кандидатов	73	семьдесят три

Председатель участковой  
избирательной комиссии

Шаронов В. А.  
(фамилия, инициалы)

Мещеряков  
(подпись, отметка об особом мнении либо  
причина отсутствия члена комиссии)

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

Смирнов В. И.

В. И.

Секретарь комиссии

Кравченко Т. И.

Т. И.

Члены комиссии:

Андреева Л. Е.

Андреева

Зыкова И. А.

Зыкова

Калинина Л. М.

Калинина

Мамин Н. В.

Мамин

Минаев В. Т.

Минаев

Мокрецова С. С.

Мокрецова

Образцова Н. И.

Образцова

Тимонова А. Е.

Тимонова

Тимофеева Т. И.

Тимофеева

Четкин И. А.

Четкин




Протокол подписан «20» декабря 1999 года в 0 часов 20 минут

# TATARSTAN

PROTOCOLS		Protocol #1			Protocol #2				Prot.#3		Prot.#4		Prot.#5	
		FEDERAL SINGLE-MANDATE (Nizhnekamsky single-mandate constituency #25)	Sums		FEDERAL LIST (Nizhnekamsky single-mandate constituency #25)	Sums			Arsk Administrative Territorial Okrug #29	Sums	Arsk electoral district #2	Sums	Safinskyi Territorial District #115	Sums
1	The number of voters that are on the voter list as of the end of voting and have the right to vote in the federal election district/ single-mandate election district/ ... election district	1191			1194				1191		1191		1191	
2	The number of ballots received by the PEC	1155			1155			2	The number of ballots received by the PEC	1156	1156		1156	
3	The number of ballots issued to voters for early voting	0			0									
4	The number of cancelled / spoiled ballots	150	1005		146 [Note: 144 cancelled + 2 spoiled. IR]	1009		3	The number of cancelled / spoiled ballots	151 [Note: there were 150 unused ballots at the first count in all three local elections; in one of those there	1005	151	1005	1005
5	The number of ballots issued to voters at the precinct on election day	944			948			4	The number of ballots issued to voters at the precinct on election day	944		944		944
6	The number of ballots issued to voters for voting outside the voting premises	61	1005		61	1009		5	The number of ballots issued to voters for voting outside the voting premises	61	1005	61	1005	1005
7	The number of ballots found in the mobile ballot boxes	61			61			6	The number of ballots found in the mobile ballot boxes	61		61		61
8	The number of ballots found in the stationary ballot boxes	944	1005		913	974		7	The number of ballots found in the stationary ballot boxes	1005	1066	1005	1066	1005 1066
9	The number of valid ballots	948			957			8	The number of valid ballots	983		984		966
10	The total number of invalid ballots	32			17			9	The total number of invalid ballots; among them, see below	17		11		16
11	The number of ballots declared invalid based on Clause 14, Article 77 of the Federal Law "On the Election of Deputies of the State Duma..."	0			0			10	the number of ballots declared invalid because the total number of ballots found in mobile boxes exceeds the number of voters' applications with the note about issuing of ballots	0		0		0
12	The number of invalid ballots showing no marks in any boxes	25			13			11	the number of invalid ballots showing no marks in any boxes or marked in more than one box	6	1005	10	1005	23 1005
12a	The number of invalid ballots cast in the course of early voting for the federal list of candidates of an electoral association, electoral bloc / a registered candidate which / who has subsequently withdrawn	0	1005		0	987								
13	The number of absentee voting certificates received by the PEC	30			30			12	The number of absentee voting certificates received by the PEC	24		24		24

14	The number of absentee voting certificates issued by the PEC to voters at the precinct prior to election day	2			2		13	The number of absentee voting certificates issued by the PEC to voters at the precinct prior to election day	0		0		0	
14a	The number of absentee voting certificates issued to voters by the TEC	0			0									
15	The number of voters that voted at the precinct using absentee voting certificates	3			3		14	The number of voters that voted at the precinct using absentee voting certificates	0		0		0	
16	The number of cancelled unused absentee voting certificates	28			28		15	The number of cancelled unused absentee voting certificates	24		24		24	
17	The number of absentee voting certificates cancelled based on Paragraph 6, Article 73 of the Federal Law "On the Election of Deputies..."	0			0		16	The number of absentee voting certificates cancelled based on Paragraph 7, Article 30(1) of the Tatarstan Republic Law "On the Election of People's Deputies of Tatarstan Republic"	0		0		0	
18	Gilmutdinov	37		18.1.	1		18	Sabirov (incumbent)	732	Valiyev	618	Gainutdinov	212	
19	Ziyatdinova (Shaimiev's government)	401		19.2.RNU	6		19	Khalilov (CPRT)	217	Garayev	207	Minnutlin (incumbent)	344	
20	Karimova	87		20.3.WoR	16	...34	Against all	34	Khusainov	76	Fazylazianov (CPRT)	339		
21	Maximov	174		21.5.Stalin	13			983	Against all	83	Against all	71		
22	Makhmutov	7		22.6.Yabl	12					984		966		
23	Mukhamadiev	71		23.7.Com	25									
24	Petrov	80		24.8.PLm	1									
...42	Against all	91		25.9.Fedor	10									
			948	26.10.Spiri	1									
				27.11.Bold	0									
				28.12.PP&	2									
				29.13.Dof	11									
				30.14.UNI	202									
				31.15.S-D	1									
				32.16.Arm	1									
				33.17.ZhIr	32									
				34.18.CitD	4									
				35.19.OV	268									
				36.20.CP	279									
				37.21.Pca	2									
				38.22.PPo	0									
				39.23.SPS	35									
				40.24.KED										
				41.25.ND	6									
				42.26.SPR	1									
				43.27.Pen	7									
				44.28.RPS	1									
				45.29.RKP										
				46.	20									
						957								

Экземпляр № \_\_\_\_\_



Приложение I  
к постановлению Центральной избирательной  
комиссии Российской Федерации  
от 10 ноября 1999 года № 41/525-3

# ВЫБОРЫ ДЕПУТАТОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ТРЕТЬЕГО СОЗЫВА

19 декабря 1999 года

## ПРОТОКОЛ № 1

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования  
по Читинской области одномандатному избирательному округу № 25

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 913

Республика Бурятия, Итатский р-н, р.п. Архан, Сов. площадь 14  
(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии - наименование субъекта Российской Федерации, район, город, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования и обладающих активным избирательным правом в одномандатном избирательном округе	1 1 9 1	тысяча сто девяносто один
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	1 1 5 5	тысяча сто пятьдесят пять
3	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных досрочно проголосовавшим избирателям	0 0 0 0	ноль
4	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	0 1 5 0	сто пятьдесят
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	0 9 4 4	девятьсот сорок четыре
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0 0 6 1	шестьдесят один
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0 0 6 1	шестьдесят один
8	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	0 9 4 4	девятьсот сорок четыре
9	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 9 4 8	девятьсот сорок восемь
10	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 0 3 2	тридцать два
11	Число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными на основании пункта 14 статьи 77 Федерального закона «О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации»	0 0 0 0	ноль
12	Число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из	0 0 9 5	девятьдесят пять



12а	Число признанных недействительными избирательных бюллетеней, в которых голоса избирателей поданы в ходе досрочного голосования за выбывшего впоследствии зарегистрированного кандидата	0 0 0 0	ноль
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0 0 3 0	тридцать
14	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0 0 0 2	два
14а	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных избирателям в территориальной избирательной комиссии	0 0 0 0	ноль
15	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0 0 0 3	три
16	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0 0 2 8	двадцать восемь
17	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 6 статьи 73 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0 0 0 0	ноль
Фамилии, имена, отчества зарегистрированных кандидатов, внесенных в избирательный бюллетень		Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждого зарегистрированного кандидата	
18	Гильмуллин Георгий Закиевич	0 0 3 7	тридцать семь
19	Зиятдинов Флора Рахизовна	0 4 0 1	четыре с половиной
20	Каримова Дания Исмаиловна	0 0 8 7	восемь с половиной
21	Максимов Николай Николаевич	0 1 7 4	одиннадцать с половиной
22	Махмутов Валерий Геннадиевич	0 0 0 7	семь
23	Мухаммадиев Рикат Сагдиевич	0 0 7 1	семь с половиной
24	Петров Юрий Николаевич	0 0 8 0	восемь
25			

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41						
42	Число голосов избирателей, поданных против всех кандидатов	0	0	9	1	девяносто один

Председатель участковой  
избирательной комиссии

Габдельмин Р.М.  
(фамилия, инициалы)

(подпись, отметка об особом мнении либо  
причина отсутствия члена комиссии)

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

Давлетмин М.Х.

Секретарь комиссии

Галиева С.Х.

Члены комиссии :

Валиева Л.А.

Галигузина Р.Х.

Каширов А.Д.

Артенов А.Ф.

Ахметжанов Р.Ф.

Сагдиева Л.М.

Сагдиева Ч.Р.

Рауизова З.Б.



Протокол подписан « 20 » декабрь 1999 года в 2 часов 40 минут

Экземпляр № \_\_\_\_\_

# ВЫБОРЫ ДЕПУТАТОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ТРЕТЬЕГО СОЗЫВА

19 декабря 1999 года

## ПРОТОКОЛ № 2

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования  
по федеральному избирательному округу

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 913

Городской избирательный округ № 913, г. Сев. Лужский, д. 14  
(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии - наименование субъекта Российской Федерации, район, город, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования и обладающих активным избирательным правом в федеральном избирательном округе	1 1 9 4	Одна тысяча сто девятнадцать
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	1 1 5 5	Одна тысяча сто пятьдесят пять
3	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных досрочно проголосовавшим избирателям	0 0 0 0	Ноль
4	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	0 1 4 6	Сто сорок шесть
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	0 9 4 8	Девятьсот сорок восемь
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0 0 6 1	Шестьдесят один
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0 0 6 1	Шестьдесят один
8	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	0 9 1 3	Девяносто тринадцать
9	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 9 5 7	Девяносто семь
10	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 0 1 7	Семнадцать
11	Число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными на основании пункта 14 статьи 77 Федерального закона «О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации»	0 0 0 0	Ноль
12	Число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из	0 0 1 3	Тринадцать

	тельных бюллетеней, в которых голоса избирателей поданы в ходе досрочного голосования за федеральный список кандидатов вышедшего впоследствии избирательного объединения, избирательного блока	0000	Ноль
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0030	Три сорок
14	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0002	Две
14а	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных избирателям в территориальной избирательной комиссии	0000	Ноль
15	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0003	Три
16	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0028	Двадцать восемь
17	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 6 статьи 73 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0000	Ноль
Наименования избирательных объединений, избирательных блоков, выдвинувших федеральные списки кандидатов		Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждый федеральный список кандидатов	
18	1. КОНСЕРВАТИВНОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ РОССИИ	0001	Один
19	2. РОССИЙСКИЙ ОБЩЕНАРОДНЫЙ СОЮЗ	0006	Шесть
20	3. ЖЕНЩИНЫ РОССИИ	0016	Шестнадцать
21	5. СТАЛИНСКИЙ БЛОК - ЗА СССР	0013	Тринадцать
22	6. ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЕ «ЯБЛОКО»	0012	Двенадцать
23	7. КОММУНИСТЫ, ТРУДЯЩИЕСЯ РОССИИ - ЗА СОВЕТСКИЙ СОЮЗ	0025	Двадцать пять
24	8. МИР. ТРУД. МАЙ	0001	Один
25	9. БЛОК ГЕНЕРАЛА АНДРЕЯ НИКОЛАЕВА, АКАДЕМИКА СВЯТОСЛАВА ФЕДОРОВА	0010	Десять
26	10. ВСЕРОССИЙСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ «ДУХОВНОЕ НАСЛЕДИЕ»	0001	Один

	ДВИЖЕНИЕ ЮРИЯ БОЛДЫРЕВА	0 0 0 0	Ноль
28	12. ПАРТИЯ МИРА И ЕДИНСТВА	0 0 0 2	Два
29	13. РОССИЙСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ ЗАЩИТЫ ЖЕНЩИН	0 0 1 1	Одиннадцать
30	14. МЕЖРЕГИОНАЛЬНОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ «ЕДИНСТВО» («МЕДВЕДЬ»)	0 2 0 2	Две и два
31	15. СОЦИАЛ-ДЕМОКРАТЫ	0 0 0 1	Один
32	16. ОБЩЕРОССИЙСКОЕ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ «В ПОДДЕРЖКУ АРМИИ»	0 0 0 1	Один
33	17. БЛОК ЖИРИНОВСКОГО	0 0 3 2	Тридцать два
34	18. ЗА ГРАЖДАНСКОЕ ДОСТОИНСТВО	0 0 0 4	Четыре
35	19. ОТЕЧЕСТВО – ВСЯ РОССИЯ	0 2 6 8	Две и шестьдесят восемь
36	20. КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ	0 2 7 9	Две и семьдесят девять
37	21. РУССКОЕ ДЕЛО	0 0 0 2	Два
38	22. ВСЕРОССИЙСКАЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ НАРОДА	0 0 0 0	Ноль
39	23. СОЮЗ ПРАВЫХ СИЛ	0 0 3 5	Тридцать пять
40	24. ЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ «КЕДР» (ЗЕЛЕННЫЕ)		
41	25. ВОПД «НАШ ДОМ – РОССИЯ»	0 0 0 6	Шесть
42	26. СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ РОССИИ	0 0 0 1	Один
43	27. ПАРТИЯ ПЕНСИОНЕРОВ	0 0 0 4	Четыре
44	28. РУССКАЯ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ	0 0 0 1	Один
45	29. РОССИЙСКАЯ КОНСЕРВАТИВНАЯ ПАРТИЯ ПРЕДПРИНИМАТЕЛЕЙ (РКП)		
46	30. ЛИБЕРАЛЬНО-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ		

Перечень жалоб (заявлений), актов и иных документов, прилагаемых к протоколу :

Председатель участковой  
избирательной комиссии

Тареловский Г.И.  
(фамилия, инициалы)

[Подпись]  
(подпись, отметка об особом мнении либо  
причина отсутствия члена комиссии)

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

Давлетшиев М.Р.

Секретарь комиссии

Тамбиев С.К.

Члены комиссии:

Балева Л.А.

Тайбуллина Р.К.

Жакимов Н.Д.

Артемьев Н.Ф.

Ахметханов Т.Ф.

Самиева Л.М.

Самиев Н.Д.

Тажиева З.Б.



Протокол подписан « 20 » января 1999 года в 4 часов 50 минут

"19" декабря 1999 года

# ПРОТОКОЛ

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования

по Муромскому районному административно-территориальному - избирательному округу № 29  
(наименование округа) (административно-территориальному, территориальному)

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 913

Республика Татарстан, Муром. ул. Сов. Татарстан, 17  
(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии - район; город, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования	1 1 9 1	Одна тысяча сорок один
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	1 1 5 6	Одна тысяча сорок шесть
3	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	0 1 5 1	Сто пятьдесят один
4	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	0 9 4 4	Девятьсот сорок четыре
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0 0 6 1	Шестьдесят один
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0 0 6 1	Шестьдесят один
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	1 0 0 5	Одна тысяча пять
8	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 9 8 3	Девятьсот восемьдесят три
9	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, в том числе отдельными строками	0 0 1 7	Семнадцать
10	число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными, если число избирательных бюллетеней по соответствующему избирательному округу, обнаруженных в переносных ящиках для голосования, превышает число заявленных избирателей, содержащих отметку о получении избирательных бюллетеней	0 0 0 0	Ноль
11	число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметки ни по одной из	0 0 0 5	Пять



12	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0 0 2 4	Двадцать четыре
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0 0 0 0	Ноль
14	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0 0 0 0	Ноль
15	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0 0 2 4	Двадцать четыре
16	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 7 статьи 30 <sup>1</sup> Закона РТ "О выборах народных депутатов Республики Татарстан"	0 0 0 0	Ноль
17	Фамилии, имена, отчества зарегистрированных кандидатов, внесенных в избирательный бюллетень	Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждого зарегистрированного кандидата	
18	Сабиров Ильхам Наилевич	0 7 3 2	Семьсот тридцать два
19	Хамматов Мурсель Мингалиевич	0 2 1 7	Две тысячи семьсот сорок семь
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32					
33					
34	Число голосов избирателей, поданных против всех кандидатов	0	0	3	4

Перечень жалоб (заявлений), актов, особых мнений членов комиссии (если они имеются) и иных документов, прилагаемых к протоколу:

исполнительной комиссии

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

Секретарь комиссии

Члены комиссии :

Харламов И. И.  
(фамилия, инициалы)

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

(подпись, отметка об особом мнении либо  
причине отсутствия члена комиссии)

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

Харламов И. И.

М.П.

Протокол подписан "20" декабря 1999 года

в 5 часов 20 минут

"19" декабря года

## ПРОТОКОЛ

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования

избирательному округу № 2

Аркамыш  
(наименование округа)избирательному  
(административно-территориальному, территориальному)

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 913

Республика Татарстан, Арск, ул. Сов. молодежи, 17.  
(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии - район, город, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования	1 1 9 1	одна тысяча девять сто один.
Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	1 1 5 6	тысяча сто пятьдесят шесть
Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	0 1 5 1	сто пятьдесят один.
Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	0 9 4 4	девятьсот сорок четыре.
Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0 0 6 1	шестьдесят один.
Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0 0 6 1	шестьдесят один.
Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	1 0 0 5	тысяча ноль
Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 9 8 4	девятьсот восемьдесят четыре
Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, в том числе отдельными строками	0 0 1 1	одна тысяча
число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными, если число избирательных бюллетеней по соответствующему избирательному округу, обнаруженных в переносных ящиках для голосования, превышает число заявленных избирателей, содержащих отметку о получении избирательных бюллетеней	0 0 0 0	ноль
число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из	0 0 1 0	один

	ных участковой избирательной комиссией	0 0 2 4	двадцать четыре
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0 0 0 0	ноль
14	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0 0 0 0	ноль
15	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0 0 2 4	двадцать четыре
16	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 7 статьи 30 <sup>1</sup> Закона РТ "О выборах народных депутатов Республики Татарстан"	0 0 0 0	ноль
17	Фамилии, имена, отчества зарегистрированных кандидатов, внесенных в избирательный бюллетень	Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждого зарегистрированного кандидата	
18	Валиев Искан Исраимеевич	0 6 1 8	шестьсот восемнадцать
19	Гареев Марат Гайнуллеевич	0 2 0 7	двасти семь
20	Хасанов Тушар Тусманович	0 0 7 6	семьдесят шесть
21			
22			
23			
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26			
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28			



избирательной комиссии

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

Секретарь комиссии

Члены комиссии :

Чадревский Р.И.  
(фамилия, инициалы)

(подпись, отметка об особом мнении либо  
причина отсутствия члена комиссии)

Давлетов М.К.

Ганиев С.К.

Валиев Н.А.

Гайдуков Р.Х.

Хакимов А.Д.

Артемьев А.Ф.

Ахметханов Р.Ф.

Сагдиев Л.М.

Самиев Н.Р.

Тамбиев З.Б.

С.В.С.

Тайф

Тайф

Артёмов

Ахметов

Самиев

Самиев

Тамбиев

М.П.

Протокол подписан "20" сентября 1999 года

в 5 часов 00 минут

# ВЫБОРЫ НАРОДНЫХ ДЕПУТАТОВ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ТАТАРСТАН

18 декабря 1999 года  
РЕСПУБЛИКА ТАТАРСТАН

## ПРОТОКОЛ

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования

по Сагринскому территориальному избирательному округу № 115  
(наименование округа) (административно-территориальному, территориальному)

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 913

Республика Татарстан, г. Казань, Сов. Т. Пискарь, 14  
(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии - район, город, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования	1 1 9 1	Одна тысяча сто девяносто один
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	1 1 5 6	Одна тысяча сто пятьдесят шесть
3	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	0 1 5 1	Сто пятьдесят один
4	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	0 9 4 4	Девятьсот сорок четыре
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0 0 6 1	Шестьдесят один
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0 0 6 1	Шестьдесят один
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	1 0 0 5	Одна тысяча пять
8	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 9 6 6	Девятьсот шестьдесят шесть
9	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, в том числе отдельными строками	0 0 1 6	Шестьнадцать
10	число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными, если число избирательных бюллетеней по соответствующему избирательному округу, обнаруженных в переносных ящиках для голосования, превышает число заявленных избирателей, содержащих отметку о получении избирательных бюллетеней	0 0 0 0	Ноль
11	число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из	0 0 2 3	Двадцать три



	ных участковой избирательной комиссией	0	0	2	4	Двадцать четыре
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0	0	0	0	Ноль
14	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0	0	0	0	Ноль
15	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0	0	2	4	Двадцать четыре
16	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 7 статьи 30 <sup>1</sup> Закона РТ "О выборах народных депутатов Республики Татарстан"	0	0	0	0	Ноль
17	Фамилии, имена, отчества зарегистрированных кандидатов, внесенных в избирательный бюллетень	Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждого зарегистрированного кандидата				
18	Табиткумов Камиль Шакир улы	0	2	1	2	Двести двенадцать
19	Миннуллин Туган Абдулов	0	3	4	4	Триста сорок четыре
20	Саязиев Роберт Каримов	0	3	3	9	Триста тридцать девять
21						
22						
23						
24						
25						
26						
27						
28						

29					
30					
31					
32					
33					
34	Число голосов избирателей, поданных против всех кандидатов	0	0	7	1

Перечень жалоб (заявлений), актов, особых мнений членов комиссии (если они имеются) и иных документов, прилагаемых к протоколу:

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.

избирательной комиссии

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

Секретарь комиссии

Члены комиссии :

Тареевский Г. И.  
(фамилия, инициалы)

Давыдовский М. К.

Тамбова С. К.

Валеев А. А.

Тайфуллин Р. К.

Халимов А. Д.

Артисов А. Ф.

Ахметханов Т. Ф.

Сагдиев А. М.

Самоев Н. Д.

Тареев З. Б.

(подпись, отметка об особом мнении либо  
причина отсутствия члена комиссии)

(подпись, отметка об особом мнении либо  
причина отсутствия члена комиссии)

Самоев

Тайфуллин

Халимов

Артисов

Ахметханов

Сагдиев

Самоев

Тареев



Протокол подписан "20" декабря 1999 года

в 5 часов 20 минут

# **BEYOND THE BORDERS**

**MOLDOVA  
AZERBAIJAN  
UZBEKISTAN  
TAJIKISTAN**

Ваки (1)

мск. 21 1999 05:44PM P9

экземпляр № 1

Копия

Приложение 2

к постановлению Центральной избирательной  
комиссии Российской Федерации  
от 10 ноября 1999 года № 41/525-3ВЫБОРЫ ДЕПУТАТОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ  
ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ТРЕТЬЕГО СОЗЫВА

19 декабря 1999 года

## ПРОТОКОЛ № 2

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования  
по федеральному избирательному округуИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 350  
Посольство Российской Федерации в Азербайджанской Республике  
г. Баку, ул. Бакиханова, д. 17

(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии - административная субъекта Российской Федерации, район, город, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)

Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования и обладающих правом участия в федеральном избирательном округе	1 6 6 2	Одна тысяча шестьсот шестьдесят два
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	1 5 6 0	Одна тысяча пятьсот шестьдесят
3	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных досрочно проголосовавшим избирателям	0 0 0 0	Ноль
4	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	1 2 5 5	Одна тысяча двести пятьдесят пять
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	0 3 0 4	Триста четыре
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0 0 0 1	Один
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0 0 0 1	Один
8	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	0 3 0 4	Триста четыре
9	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 3 0 2	Триста два
10	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 0 0 3	Три
11	Число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными на основании пункта 14 статьи 77 Федерального закона «О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации»	0 0 0 0	Ноль
12	Число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из	0 0 0 0	Ноль



Ваки (2)

	теlemых бюллетеней, в которых голоса избирателей поданы в ходе досрочного голосования за федеральный список кандидатов вышедшего впоследствии избирательного объединения, избирательного блока	0 0 0 0	Ноль
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0 0 6 0	Шестьдесят
14	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0 0 0 0	Ноль
14a	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных избирателям в территориальной избирательной комиссии	0 0 0 0	Ноль
15	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0 0 0 2	Два
16	Число погашенных использованных открепительных удостоверений	0 0 6 0	Шестьдесят
17	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 6 статьи 73 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0 0 0 0	Ноль
	Наименования избирательных объединений, избирательных блоков, выданных федеральные списки кандидатов	Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждый федеральный список кандидатов	
18	"Консервативное движение России"	0 0 0 0	Ноль
19	"Российский общенародный союз"	0 0 0 0	Ноль
20	Движение "Дети России"	0 0 0 5	Пять
21	"Сталинский блок: Трудовая Россия, офицеры - за СССР"	0 0 0 6	Шесть
22	Объединение "ЯБЛОКО"	0 0 2 7	Двадцать семь
23	Блок "Коммунисты, трудящиеся России - за Советский Союз"	0 0 0 5	Пять
24	Блок "Мир. Труд. Май."	0 0 0 0	Ноль
25	"Блок генерала Андрея Николаева, академика Святослана Федорова"	0 0 0 3	Три
26	Движение "Духовное наследие"	0 0 0 1	Один
27	Блок "Конгресс Русских Общин и Движение Дрия Бондырева"	0 0 0 1	Один

28	"Партия Мира и Единства"	0	0	0	2	Два
29	"Российская партия защиты женщин"	0	0	0	0	Ноль
30	Блок "МЕЛВЕЛЬ"	0	0	6	2	Шестьдесят два
31	Движение "Социал-демократы"	0	0	0	0	Ноль
32	"Движение в поддержку армии"	0	0	0	4	Четыре
33	"Блок Ельцинского"	0	0	0	9	Девять
34	Движение "За гражданское достоинство"	0	0	0	0	Ноль
35	Блок "Отечество - Вся Россия"	0	0	6	0	Шестьдесят
36	"Коммунистическая партия Российской Федерации"	0	0	8	9	Восемьдесят девять
37	Блок "Движение патриотических сил - Русское Дело"	0	0	0	1	Один
38	"Всероссийская политическая партия народа"	0	0	0	0	Ноль
39	Блок "Соез Правых Сил"	0	0	1	4	Четырнадцать
40	Движение "Наш дом - Россия"	0	0	0	3	Три
41	"Социалистическая партия Россия"	0	0	0	0	Ноль
42	"Партия пенсионеров"	0	0	0	4	Четыре
43	"Русская социалистическая партия"	0	0	0	2	Два
44						
45						
46	Число голосов избирателей, возмужавших против всех федеральных списков кандидатов	0	0	0	4	Четыре

Ваки ③



FROM : IFE

: 925208

Dec. 21 1999 05:46PM P12

Перечень жалоб (заявлений), актов и иных документов, прилагаемых к протоколу:

НЕТ

Председатель участковой  
избирательной комиссииЗаместитель председателя  
комиссии

Секретарь комиссии

Члены комиссии:

Копия везена

Секретарь участковой  
избирательной комиссии

Басхеев И.Н.

20 декабря 1999 года  
01 час 10 минут

Прищипов А.Л.

(фамилия, имя, отчество)

Перегудов С.В.

Басхеев И.Н.

Губышева И.Б.

Захарченко М.В.

Кяку Д.В.

Раонаев С.А.

Требухин В.В.

Трифимов А.М.

Камалев А.Л.

Кузнецов В.И.



МП.

Протокол подписан « 14 » 1999 года в 1 часов 55 минут

АП

Протокол подписан « 17 » 1999 года в 21 час 55 минут

Васи (4)

21/12 '99 18:32

TX/RX NO. 484.7

P12



**P02**

Tashkent ②

12	Число признанных недействительными избирательных бюллетеней, в которых голоса избирателей падали в ходе досрочного голосования за вышедшего впоследствии зарегистрированного кандидата	0 0 0 0
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0 0 5 0
14	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке по дня голосования	0 0 0 2
14a	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных избирателям в территориальной избирательной комиссии	0 0 2 0
15	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0 0 2 0
16	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0 0 4 8
17	Число открепительных удостоверений, поставленных в соответствии с пунктом 6 статьи 73 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0 0 0 0
Фамилия, имя, отчество зарегистрированных кандидатов, внесенных в избирательный бюллетень		Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждого зарегистрированного кандидата
18	АВЕРИН Виктор Сергеевич	0 0 1 0
19	АЛКОНИС Виктор Уманович	0 0 3 9
20	АНДРЕЕВА Татьяна Алексеевна	0 0 3 7
21	БРЕШНЕВ Андрей Юрьевич	0 0 4 3
22	БУРЛАЦКИЙ Федор Михайлович	0 0 9 2
23	ГАДКИН Александр Александрович	0 0 1 4
24	ГОРЮНОВ Александр Александрович	0 0 4 4
25	ЛЫСОВ Виталий Парфенович	0 1 6 1

Секретариат  
Генерального секретаря  
Центра  
19/12/99

20/12 '99 15:58

TX/RX NO. 48:18

P03

Tashkent 3

26	МАЛОВ Александр Сергеевич	0	0	0	4
27	МИЛАШЕНКО Евгений Георгиевич	0	0	1	9
28	МИЛОСЕРДОВ Владимир Иванович	0	0	1	3
29	МИТТЕЛ Евгений Геннадьевич	0	0	1	4
30	ОБУХОВ Игорь Андреевич	0	0	0	2
31	ПОПОВ Василий Григорьевич	0	2	7	9
32	ПРОНИН Виктор Алексеевич	0	0	4	8
33	САВИН Олег Иванович	0	0	1	6
34	СОБАКИН Евгений Юрьевич	0	0	0	5
35	ШАПОВАЛОВ Александр Александрович	0	0	0	4
36	ШЕКОЧИХИН Виктор Владимирович	0	0	4	4
37					
38					
39					
40					
41					
42	Число голосов избирателей, позвонивших против всех кандидатов	0	0	8	2




Tashkent (4)

+371 1526838

Dec. 20 1999 05:11PM P05

Перечень жалоб (заявлений), актов и иных документов, прилагаемых к протоколу

*[Large handwritten 'X' mark across the list area]*

Председатель участковой  
избирательной комиссии

СУРИКОВ Е.М.

(фамилия, имя, отчество)

Заместитель председателя  
комиссии

САВИН А.А.

Секретарь комиссии

ИВАНОВА М.Г.

Члены комиссии:

ИВАНОВ А.М.

ТЕТЕРДКОВ М.А.

ТРОФИМОВ Д.А.

ГЛУХОВ П.В.

ПУКИН В.А.

НОЧВАЯ Г.С.

БЕЛИКОВ К.П.

ИЕРУСАЛМЦЕВА С.И.

ЧИЖОВА Г.Г.

СЕМЕНОВ А.А.

РОМАНОВА Т.Б.



Протокол подписан « 20 » декабря 1999 года в 11 часов 00 мин



1999 1012

B 6 3 42008 00

16:50

FROM NCS INTERNATIONAL E1842 124738

20/12 '99 15:56

TX/RX NO. 4658

P05





# ВЫБОРЫ ДЕПУТАТОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ТРЕТЬЕГО СОЗЫВА

19 декабря 1999 года

## ПРОТОКОЛ № 2

участковой избирательной комиссии об итогах голосования  
по федеральному избирательному округу

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ УЧАСТОК № 300

при Посольстве Российской Федерации в Республике Таджикистан

(адрес участковой избирательной комиссии - наименование субъекта Российской Федерации, район, город, район в городе, поселок, село, улица, дом)


Участковая избирательная комиссия у с т а н о в и л а :

1	Число избирателей, включенных в список избирателей на момент окончания голосования и обладающих активным избирательным правом в федеральном избирательном округе	1 3 9 7	ОДНА ТЫСЯЧА ТРИСТА ДЕВЯНОСТО СЕМЬ
2	Число избирательных бюллетеней, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	7 1 7 4	СЕМЬ ТЫСЯЧ СТО СЕМЬДЕСЯТ ЧЕТЫРЕ
3	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных досрочно проголосовавшим избирателям	0 0 0 0	НОЛЬ
4	Число погашенных избирательных бюллетеней	5 9 4 5	ПЯТЬ ТЫСЯЧ ДЕВЯТЬСОТ Сорок ПЯТЬ
5	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям на избирательном участке в день голосования	1 2 2 9	ОДНА ТЫСЯЧА ДВЕСТИ ДВАДЦАТЬ ДЕВЯТЬ
6	Число избирательных бюллетеней, выданных избирателям, проголосовавшим вне помещения для голосования	0 0 0 0	НОЛЬ
7	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в переносных ящиках для голосования	0 0 0 0	НОЛЬ
8	Число избирательных бюллетеней, содержащихся в стационарных ящиках для голосования	1 2 2 9	ОДНА ТЫСЯЧА ДВЕСТИ ДВАДЦАТЬ ДЕВЯТЬ
9	Число действительных избирательных бюллетеней	1 2 1 2	ОДНА ТЫСЯЧА ДВЕСТИ ДВЕНАДЦАТЬ
10	Общее число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней	0 0 1 7	СЕМНАДЦАТЬ
11	Число избирательных бюллетеней, признанных недействительными на основании пункта 14 статьи 77 Федерального закона «О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации»	0 0 0 0	НОЛЬ
12	Число недействительных избирательных бюллетеней, не содержащих отметок ни по одной из позиций	0 0 1 1	ОДИННАДЦАТЬ

		0	0	0	0	НОЛЬ
13	Число открепительных удостоверений, полученных участковой избирательной комиссией	0	0	0	5	ПЯТЬ
14	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных участковой избирательной комиссией избирателям на избирательном участке до дня голосования	0	0	0	1	ОДИН
14а	Число открепительных удостоверений, выданных избирателям в территориальной избирательной комиссии	0	0	0	0	НОЛЬ
15	Число избирателей, проголосовавших по открепительным удостоверениям на избирательном участке	0	0	0	2	ДВА
16	Число погашенных неиспользованных открепительных удостоверений	0	0	0	4	ЧЕТЫРЕ
17	Число открепительных удостоверений, погашенных в соответствии с пунктом 6 статьи 33 Федерального закона "О выборах депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"	0	0	0	0	НОЛЬ
Наименования избирательных объединений, избирательных блоков, выдвинувших федеральные списки кандидатов		Число голосов избирателей, поданных за каждый федеральный список кандидатов				
18	"Консервативное движение России"	0	0	0	1	ОДИН
19	"Российский общенародный союз"	0	1	6	5	СТО ШЕСТЬДЕСЯТ ПЯТЬ
20	"Женщины России"	0	0	1	1	ОДИНАДЦАТЬ
21	"Сталинский блок - за СССР"	0	0	2	1	ДВАДЦАТЬ ОДИН
22	"Объединение "Яблоко"	0	0	1	9	ДЕВЯТНАДЦАТЬ
23	"Коммунисты, трудящиеся России - за Советский Союз"	0	0	4	2	СОРОК ДВА
24	"Мир, труд, май"	0	0	0	0	НОЛЬ
25	"Блок генерала Андрея Николаева, академика Свет.Федорова"	0	0	0	5	ПЯТЬ
26	"Всероссийское общественно-политическое движение "Духовное наследие"	0	0	0	1	ОДИН
27	"Конгресс русских общин и движение Юрия Болдырева"	0	0	2	1	ДВАДЦАТЬ ОДИН

	ЕДИНСТВО	0	0	0	1	ОДИН
	Российская партия защиты женщин	0	0	0	8	ВОСЕМЬ
30	"Межрегиональное движение "Единство" ("Медведь")"	0	2	3	1	ДВЕСТИ ТРИДЦАТЬ ОДИН
31	"Социал-демократы"	0	0	0	1	ОДИН
32	"Общероссийское политическое движение "В поддержку армии"	0	0	0	9	ДЕВЯТЬ
33	"Блок Жириновского"	0	0	3	4	ТРИДЦАТЬ ЧЕТЫРЕ
34	"За гражданское достоинство"	0	0	0	4	ЧЕТЫРЕ
35	"Отчество - вся Россия"	0	0	9	2	ДЕВЯНОСТО ДВА
36	"Коммунистическая партия Российской Федерации"	0	4	7	1	ЧЕТЫРЕСТА СЕМЬДЕСЯТ ОДИН
37	"Русское дело"	0	0	0	6	ШЕСТЬ
38	"Всероссийская политическая партия народа"	0	0	0	0	НОЛЬ
39	"Союз правых сил"	0	0	1	8	ВОСЕМНАДЦАТЬ
40	"Вопд "наш дом - Россия"	0	0	0	1	ОДИН
41	"Социалистическая партия России"	0	0	0	2	ДВА
42	"Партия пенсионеров"	0	0	3	9	ТРИДЦАТЬ ДЕВЯТЬ
43	"Русская социалистическая партия"	0	0	0	2	ДВА
44						
45						
46	Число голосов избирателей, поданных против всех федеральных списков кандидатов	0	0	0	7	СЕМЬ





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