




PUBLIC OPINION
IN TAJIKISTAN
1996

STEVEN WAGNER



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INTRODUCTION

This first IFES-sponsored survey in Tajikistan analyzes the opinion environment in the country – the views of the public on political and economic developments, independence, government, civil society and organizations, and information sources. Findings are based on the IFES nationwide opinion survey fielded in Tajikistan from November to December 1996. The *Executive Summary* consists of major findings providing an overview of the survey data. The *Appendix* includes the full question text and the marginal results in tabular form.

The IFES-sponsored survey was fielded in Tajikistan between November 25 and December 13, 1996. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with a sample of 1,500 adults (18 years and older); the sample was of a stratified random probability design (the margin of error is $\pm 2.5\%$ for this kind of sample). Fieldwork and data processing were conducted by the Sharq Sociological Center of Dushanbe. QEV Analytics, a Washington-based research firm, developed the weights and conducted the tabulations. The design of the sample and the weighting ensured that respondents represent the adult national population of Tajikistan and, therefore, the findings accurately reflect the opinions and attitudes of the public in Tajikistan.

The analysis was written by Steven Wagner; the formatted report and tables were prepared by Rakesh Sharma. Editorial assistance was provided by Christopher S. Siddall and Monica Neal. Elehie Natalie Skoczylas reviewed the project at several stages for methodological soundness.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: A PROFILE OF THE TAJIKISTANI POPULATION

The November-December 1996 IFES survey of public opinion in Tajikistan investigated attitudes, perceptions, knowledge, values, and behavior on a wide array of topics concerning the life of the people. This analysis begins with a description of the five distinct constituencies which emerge from the data:

Pro-Government Democrats (20% of the adult population)

These people are exclusively pro-democracy and pro-government. They consider Tajikistan to be a democracy (rather than a country in the process of becoming one). This is one of two constituencies that believes changes are occurring in Tajikistan. Many desire a greater degree of societal change than is currently occurring, but a majority perceives at least some change to be occurring. It is therefore no mere coincidence that this is the only constituency supportive of the government. This is a constituency with considerable enthusiasm for the Tajikistani nation-building project, but is about evenly divided on economic liberalism. Because this group favors both democracy and the government, it gives a strong endorsement of voting in principle, but notwithstanding other democratic sympathies (appropriateness of dissent, for example), it has the highest preference for a system of one-party rule (doubtless also a function of satisfaction with the current government).

Liberal Dissidents (16% of the adult population)

This constituency is the most liberal both economically and politically. These people are impatient with the pace of economic reform, and they are the next-to-least satisfied with the performance of the government. They are also of the opinion that Tajikistan is not a democracy. This constituency is the most likely to say it is appropriate for politicians to criticize the government openly and its members have the lowest preference for a system of one-party rule. They endorse voting as a way for individuals to influence the state.

Anti-Democrats (14% of the population)

This group is the least sympathetic toward democracy in principle, and it is illiberal on economic reforms (these terms are defined in following sections). These individuals have a very high degree of dissatisfaction with the government and are the most adamant that Tajikistan is not a democracy. They resoundingly reject the efficacy of voting.

Hopeful Pragmatists (17% of the adult population)


These individuals are non-ideological, neither liberal nor illiberal on the political or economic dimensions. They are dissatisfied with the government, but not extremely so. They regard Tajikistan as a democracy and are the second most optimistic group – after the pro-government democrats – about Tajikistan’s economic future. They have a high degree of enthusiasm for the Tajikistani nation-building project and are very impatient to get on with the economic reform process.

The Bewildered (33% of the adult population)

In many countries undergoing a substantial degree of systemic change, some portion of the population does not participate much in the process and feels the pains of dislocation. In Tajikistan, this segment of the population is a plurality.

This is both the largest and the most poorly informed (or least opinionated) of the constituencies. The members of this group deny that change is occurring in society. They “don’t know” what the democratic status of Tajikistan is today and are the least likely to perceive the practical benefits of democracy – even though they seem to endorse democracy in principle. They are substantially illiberal on economic matters, doubtless the result of frustrations with Tajikistan’s economic performance. This constituency is more female than male.

Figure A. Summary Orientation of Tajikistani Population



The identification of five constituencies is somewhat arbitrary. One could define as many as 1500 constituencies – one for each respondent – by allowing for more shades of gray. But five is the minimum number of groups which, in the opinion of the analyst, retains the most important patterns of responses found in the data.

The summary profile of the Tajikistani population was derived from the following nine measures, each of which is discussed in turn in following pages:

- “ Perceptions of the democratic status of Tajikistan;
- “ The composite measure of political liberalism, meaning support for democracy in principle (“composite” means that the measure derives from several variables);
- “ Perceptions of the benefits of democracy;
- “ The composite measure of satisfaction with government performance;
- “ The composite scale of economic liberalism;
- “ The score of intellectual engagement;
- “ Attitudes toward societal change;
- “ Attitudes toward economic change;
- “ The national identification score.

Note that the summary profile was not composed of demographic characteristics. For the issues with which this survey was most concerned, the demographic characteristics of the respondent – sex, age, ethnicity, education, income, family structure, and so forth – were shown to be rather poor “explainers” or predictors of responses. This generalization includes a tragic feature of life in Tajikistan, exposure to civil war.

This survey was conducted during a period of relative quiescence, in the closing months of 1996. Our questions concerning civil strife focused on whether respondents had been personally touched by the violence of the early 1990s. The survey found 54 percent of respondents had not been

affected by the war (see Table 79 in the Appendix). Nine percent (9%) saw a relative killed or wounded, 18 percent moved or fled to avoid the fighting; the balance were affected economically or suffered a less serious incident. But to have been the victim of these events does not seem to have a significant impact on the respondent's disposition toward economic or political reforms. The aforementioned description of the Tajikistani population holds several important implications for the country's future. First, currently just one constituency has a pro-government disposition, but this constituency is distinctly pro-democratic. So the base of support for the government is found to be politically and economically liberal. This means that the government is well-advised to be identified with a reform program so as to maintain its base of support.

Second, there are constituencies attitudinally opposed to the government pulling in opposite directions. Any society will have some degree of polarization over the direction and extent of development or evolution in the country. But generally a government is able to enlist the support of most of either half of the political spectrum. In Tajikistan, the government faces both liberal critics who would move the country more aggressively toward democracy and a market economy, and "reversionists" who oppose these reforms. The liberal critics outnumber the anti-democrats by a small margin – 16 percent to 14 percent.

Third, support for the government is strongly related to the perception of societal change. Tajikistanis want change, yet 63 percent perceive none. The only expressions of satisfaction with the government come from those who perceive change to be occurring. Authorities need not worry about offending a constituency of Tajikistanis who want to keep things as they are – there are virtually none.

Fourth, a strikingly broad pro-democracy consensus exists in Tajikistan. Seventy-nine percent (79%) are pro-democratic in principle, and 72 percent believe democracy is beneficial in a practical sense. Fully 45 percent are "hard-core" democrats on both of these dimensions of democratic sentiment. What is most interesting about this observation is that pro-democratic sentiments exist without a high degree of satisfaction with the government. Unlike other Central Asian countries in which IFES has conducted surveys, support for democracy in Tajikistan exists independently of support for the government.

Fifth, a plurality of the adult population (33% – the *Bewildered*s) does not know what to make of Tajikistan's situation and lacks a clear orientation on matters of future development. This group represents a significant "wild card" in Tajikistani politics. Whereas such a constituency is identifiable in any country, it is rarely so numerically dominant. The members of this constituency,


under the right circumstances, could potentially swell the ranks of either pro-democrats or anti-democrats.

The most controversial conclusion of this analysis (based on an initial presentation of findings by the analyst in Tajikistan) is that regionalism is less significant than supposed. Many blame the violence of the 1990s on the strength of regional affiliation, which is considered to be an impediment to national unity and reconciliation. But this survey failed to find evidence that regional, cultural, or religious differences are related to attitudinal differences in the specific areas measured by this survey, even though several questions presented opportunities for the expression of such regional distinctions. Likewise, the data suggest that Islamic fundamentalism is an insignificant aspect in Tajikistani public opinion; at least our respondents did not avail themselves of the opportunity to reveal any significant depth of religious commitment, although questions on the subject of fundamentalism did attempt to measure the phenomenon indirectly (see section on *Regionalism*, p. 29).

DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM

A narrow plurality of 37 percent is of the opinion that Tajikistan is a democracy (Tables 44 and 45 in the Appendix). This perception is strongly related to satisfaction with the government: Those who are satisfied with government performance (a modest 22%) are much more likely to say Tajikistan is a democracy than are those who are dissatisfied. Nearly as many (27%) give the polar opposite response that Tajikistan is not a democracy *and* is not becoming one.

Figure B. Orientation of Tajikistani Population: Tajikistani Democracy




In analyzing the numerous survey questions dealing with attitudes toward or perceptions of democracy, it becomes clear that there are two distinct dimensions of opinion: one, the extent of support for democracy in principle; two, the perception of democracy as beneficial.

To be sure, the preference for democracy in principle was not exhaustively probed, as substantial portions of the public in most countries do not handle abstract questions well. The proposition that by standing for election public officials will be more responsive to the desires of the people was affirmed by 72 percent and opposed by 20 percent (only 7% gave no opinion, Table 55 in the

Appendix). Similarly, 72 percent agreed that, by having to be elected, public officials will have more respect for the rights of the people (Table 56 in the Appendix). Finally, 64 percent agreed that voting gives the individual the opportunity to influence decisions made by the state (Table 55 in the Appendix).


Combining responses to these three questions (using the statistical technique of factor analysis), 40 percent emerge as strong democrats, 39 percent as tepid democrats, and 21 percent as anti-democrats.

Figure C. Orientation of Tajikistani Population: Support for Democracy



In terms of the practical impact of democracy, 57 percent believe democracy will promote solutions to Tajikistan's economic problems, rather than create obstacles which was the response of 8 percent (Figure D next page; Table 47 in the Appendix). The benefits of democracy are perceived to extend "to most people" rather than to "just a few at the top" by a margin of 60 percent to 26 percent (Figure D below; Table 48 in the Appendix).

Figure D. Ideas about Democracy in Tajikistan




But a plurality of 47 percent says the ideal number of political parties is one. Twenty-eight percent (28%) prefer a multi-party system (2 or more parties), 11 percent want a system with no parties (Table 64 in the Appendix).

Interviewees were asked about the appropriateness of political figures openly criticizing the government, a question that can arguably be part of either dimension of democratic sentiment (although factor analysis indicates it belongs here). Just half (53%) consider such behavior appropriate, 38 percent consider it inappropriate (Table 70 in the Appendix).

Finally, on a question regarding the necessity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or "groups to solve problems in the community without government involvement," half (49%) say such activities are not necessary while 35 percent say NGOs are necessary (Table 82 in the Appendix).


Taken together, these questions reveal that 39 percent have a very positive conception of democracy's benefits, 33 percent are more tepid, and 28 percent are generally negative on this topic (Figure E below).

Figure E. Benefits of Democracy



Overall, the extent of pro-democratic sentiment in Tajikistan is quite impressive. When both dimensions of democratic opinion are taken together, 58 percent emerge as pro-democratic on both, 21 percent are pro-democratic in principle but negative on its impact. Twenty-one percent (21%) are opposed to democracy in principle. This finding is unique in IFES' survey research experience in Central Asia: Support for democracy is usually so extensive, as it is in Tajikistan, only where highly popular governments are identified with the promotion of democracy. Yet in Tajikistan, popular support for democracy appears to be more spontaneous, certainly not welling from satisfaction with the government (Figure F next page).

Figure F. Orientation of Tajikistani Population: Democratic Profile of Tajikistan




When asked in an open-ended format what it means to live in a democracy, 80 percent were able to give a substantive response. Virtually all responses were positive, save the 4 percent who said it means nothing and 2 percent who said democracy is not needed. The most common responses were that democracy implies guarantees of human rights (26%); freedom of choice, thought, or action (12%); or security or legal defenses (12%; Table 46 in the Appendix).

IFES introduced its socio-political barometer, a set of questions concerning satisfaction with various aspects of government and social performance, in previous Central Asian surveys. In Tajikistan, the results are lopsidedly negative, but this is not without precedent. Of the 12 questions in this battery, none topped 43 percent satisfaction, and that involved the quality of water provided by authorities (Table 30 in the Appendix). Receiving the lowest scores were “the quality of education” (with which 13% were satisfied) and “the social welfare protections of the people” (16% satisfied).


Satisfaction with the situation in Tajikistan is strongly related and proportional to satisfaction with the government’s performance, which is a common relationship.

Figure G. Socio-Political Barometer



Many Tajikistanis are conscious of the increased opportunities open to citizens as the result of independence. In the opinion of 60 percent, opportunities to participate in religious activities are judged to have increased since independence. Fifty-eight percent (58%) perceive greater possibilities for economic activity. Yet, the extent of respect for individual rights is perceived to have increased by a very modest 16 percent (Tables 12, 13, 14 in the Appendix). In fact, a substantial majority of 59 percent sees less respect for individual rights in Tajikistan today than before independence.

Figure H. Freedoms since Independence



In addition to the socio-political barometer questions, which measure the government's delivery of services, two additional questions in this survey tapped opinions of the government. One question concerns the efficacy of the national government (Table 21 in the Appendix), to which half (48%) responded "it is possible for the national government in Dushanbe to improve significantly the lives of the citizens of Tajikistan." Thirty-eight percent (38%) say it is not possible.


The other question concerns the extent to which "government authorities respect the rights of individuals in Tajikistan" (Table 23 in the Appendix). Only 20 percent responded "a great deal," or "a fair amount," while 47 percent said "a little" and 27 percent said "not at all."

Examining the pattern of responses to the "barometer" and these two additional questions on

government can yield a composite measure of professed attitudes toward the government. Statistical procedures such as factor analysis are available to indicate the extent to which these various questions belong together – that is, the extent to which these seem to measure a common, underlying sentiment. The data analysis revealed a substantial degree of homogeneity of responses.

Only 8 percent expressed consistent and frequently intense satisfaction with the performance of the government in Dushanbe. Another 14 percent expressed consistent but more tepid satisfaction – in other words, one in five (22%) expressed more satisfaction with the government than dissatisfaction, while 78 percent expressed more dissatisfaction than satisfaction. Nearly half (46%) score as highly dissatisfied.

Figure I. Satisfaction with Government



P LUMBING THE DEPTH OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISM


Just as this survey sought to assess the extent of political liberalism, it separately measured several dimensions of economic liberalism. Notwithstanding the very high degree of political liberalism found in Tajikistan, a solid majority prefer a kind of economic reversion, with a remarkably high number (59%) saying, “when thinking about our economic future, we (should) return to an economy basically controlled by the state” (Table 32 in the Appendix). Only one in four (26%) prefers an economy with limited state control.

The preference for an economy generally managed by the state is consistent with the fact that 65 percent of respondents either work for a state enterprise (a farm or industry) or are married to someone who does (Table 102 in the Appendix). At the same time, however, support for a state-controlled economy is equally prevalent among those who do and do not hold this type of state employment, indicating there is more to this response than perceptions of self-interest on one’s own job.

When asked in an open-ended format what it means to live in a “free or market economy,” 67 percent were able to give a substantive response (Table 35 in the Appendix). Just 28 percent of these responses were negative, principally that it means “high and unstable prices” (7%) or “speculation” (6%). Fifty-five percent (55%) overall gave positive or neutral responses, principally that a free market economy implies entrepreneurial freedom (the response of 14%).

Whereas democracy is seen to be broadly beneficial (by 60%, Table 48 in the Appendix), the free-market economic system is not: 28 percent regard the free market economy to benefit “most people,” but 62 percent report it benefits just a select few “at the top” (Figure J next page; Table 36 in the Appendix).

Figure J. Beneficiaries of Market Economy



Taken together, these three questions constitute the basis for assessing the extent of popular economic liberalism. Factor analysis confirms that these three variables can legitimately be combined into a single composite measure of economic liberalism, and it provides a case-by-case liberalism score.


In summary, 12 percent of Tajikistanis are scored as highly liberal, 29 percent are moderately liberal, 44 percent are moderately illiberal, 16 percent are highly illiberal (Figure K next page). The endpoints are more easily described than the middle categories. None of the highly liberal want a state-controlled economy; 79 percent have positive things to say about a free-market economy (none have negative things to say); virtually all (99%) say a market economy benefits everyone. The highly illiberal are the exact mirror image, exclusively preferring a state-controlled economy, criticizing the market economy in the open-ended question, and saying it benefits a select few.

The two moderate categories consist of people who gave less consistent responses. A plurality of 48 percent of moderate liberals say a market economy benefits everyone; 57 percent said positive things about the market economy (37% percent gave no opinion); but 40 percent wanted state control of the economy, versus 38 percent who wanted little or no state involvement in the economy – a virtual dead heat.

The moderately illiberal prefer state control by 75 percent versus 9 percent for limited or no state

involvement in the economy. One-third of the moderately illiberal gave negative descriptions of a free-market system but a plurality said they “didn’t know.” And most (84%) say the market economy will benefit just a select few.

Figure K. Orientation of Tajikistani Population: Scale of Economic Liberalism




D DEALING WITH SOCIETAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

One thing most Tajikistanis (85%) agree upon is that life has gotten worse since independence (Table 9 in the Appendix). But curiously, a plurality (48%) is of the opinion that “significant changes are not occurring in Tajikistan today” (Table 17 in the Appendix).

Of the 37 percent who believe changes are occurring, most say that these changes are not occurring fast enough (Table 18 in the Appendix). So taken together, 22 percent say changes are occurring, but not fast enough; 9 percent say changes are occurring and at the correct pace; and a mere 6 percent say the changes which are occurring are too fast. Given the extent of dissatisfaction in Tajikistan today, it is consistent that so few should feel overwhelmed by the pace of change. Finally, 61 percent say change is not occurring (2% have no opinion).


Figure L. Perceptions about Societal Change



Questions concerning perceptions of economic reform in Tajikistan (as opposed to generic change in society) yield similar results, in that there is very little apprehension expressed about an excessive rate of change. A majority (55%) prefers an incremental approach to economic reform (small but steady reforms) to a more abrupt “get to a free market as quickly as possible” approach (22%) (Table 33 in the Appendix). But again, a solid majority (61%) regards the current pace of economic reform as being too slow (Table 34 in the Appendix).

Combining these responses, a plurality of 36 percent of Tajikistani adults are impatient incrementalists, wanting steady reforms but also wanting to get on with them. Another 16 percent are impatient and prefer a more abrupt approach to reform. These constituencies outweigh the 16 percent who think too much reform is occurring or don't want reforms in the first place.

Figure M. Perceptions about Economic Change




SCORING INTELLECTUAL ENGAGEMENT

This report has discussed elsewhere the insufficiency of using demographic characteristics of the respondent to explain positions on key issues of reform, the direction of society, and political and economic liberalism (see above). But one very significant characteristic of the respondent can be linked back to a demographic: The extent of awareness of the processes going on around them is significantly related to respondents' education levels.

The extent of information and awareness is a significant factor in how a respondent perceives the condition and dynamics of Tajikistani society today. As discussed above, the "Bewildered" constituency – partially defined by its "no opinion" response on key questions – is numerically important and a principal source of apprehension regarding the liberalization, both economic and political, of Tajikistan. The conversion of some portion of this constituency into reform enthusiasts could be achieved by making information more accessible. But many of the least intellectually engaged must certainly assume that status by choice.

Figure N. Scale of Intellectual Engagement



The information score, shown here, was calculated simply by counting the instances of "don't know" responses (or expressions of disinterest where available) in the following Tables: 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 52, 64, 74. These questions are the most substantive – or perhaps the most abstract – concerning the state. On these 22 questions, 9 percent responded "don't know" to none or just one of the questions. Thirty-eight percent (38%) responded "don't know" on 2 or 3 questions, 37

Although the information score is related to education level and somewhat to SES (socio-economic status) and gender, it is not a function of settlement size: The rural population is as opinionated about events in Tajikistan as are residents of Dushanbe, the capital.

NATIONAL AND ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

While all of the nations of Central Asia are regarded as ethnically diverse, Tajikistan is the second most homogeneous of the four where IFES has conducted national public opinion surveys. The other three are Kazakhstan (42% Kazak), Kyrgyzstan (54% Kyrgyz), and Uzbekistan (75% Uzbek). A solid majority (64%) self-identify as ethnic Tajiks; 22 percent are Uzbek; and 5 percent are Russian (Table 89 in Appendix). Only Uzbekistan has a higher proportion of the population reporting to be of the dominant ethnic group.

As in other countries of the region, ethnicity has a clear bearing on national pride and support for the nation-building exercise in which Tajikistan is engaged. Consider, for example, the question of whether the independence of Tajikistan is a good thing or a bad thing. Overall, 48 percent are of the opinion it is a good thing, whereas 37 percent say it is a bad thing. And responses to this question between the various ethnic groups in Tajikistan reveal some striking differences.

Fifty-two percent (52%) of ethnic Tajiks think of independence as a good thing; 50 percent of ethnic Uzbeks agree; and just 30 percent of “other” ethnicities – a category which includes Russians, Tatars, Kazaks, Kyrgyz, and others – regard independence as a good thing. By contrast, only 32 percent of ethnic Tajiks say independence is a bad thing, compared to 37 percent of ethnic Uzbeks and 53 percent of other ethnic groups.

The finding that Tajikistan’s “second” ethnicity, the Uzbeks, is nearly as favorable toward independence as the dominant ethnicity is striking; this prevails in none of the other nations of the region. In general, however, the overall extent of enthusiasm for independence is quite low in Tajikistan, owing to the broad perception that the quality of life has gotten worse since independence.

A similar pattern of responses by ethnicity is evident in the question of whether Tajikistan is truly independent. Tajiks are mixed (46% to 42%), but a majority of ethnic Uzbeks (55%) say Tajikistan is truly independent, whereas a majority of Russians and others (59%) say it is not.

Pride in citizenship also tracks with ethnicity. Overall, half (54%) profess to be proud of their citizenship, 23 percent are “content,” 9 percent are indifferent, and 12 percent are malcontented or ashamed (Table 92 in Appendix). Ethnic Tajiks have the highest level of professed pride in being a citizen of Tajikistan (61% say they are proud), followed by ethnic Uzbeks (47%), and others (37%).

These questions have a consistent pattern of responses, with ethnic Tajiks evidencing the greatest degree of national identification, meaning an embrace of an independent Tajikistan, but followed closely by the Uzbeks of Tajikistan. Yet when asked which is of greater importance – regional, ethnic, or national identity – the picture becomes murky. Forty-two percent (42%), cite their ethnicity, 27 percent their national citizenship, and 10 percent their regional origin, whereas 12 percent say these allegiances are equally important (Table 91 in Appendix).

Yet ethnic Tajiks value their ethnicity more than their national citizenship by 52 percent to 24 percent. Ethnic Russians have the opposite priority, 15 percent to 46 percent. Ethnic Uzbeks value region as much as citizenship.

Figure O. Affiliation by Ethnicity

PRIORITY	TAJIK	UZBEK	RUSSIAN
Region	5%	26%	1%
Ethnicity	52%	20%	15%
Citizenship	24%	27%	46%
Equal/DK	19%	27%	38%

So whereas ethnic Tajiks are doubtless the greatest enthusiasts for the Tajikistani state overall, their citizenship is relatively a lower priority to them than is their ethnicity. Conversely, although ethnic Russians are the ethnic group most likely to hold their citizenship high, they clearly are not the most enthusiastic supporters of an independent Tajikistan.

On related issues:

- “ Seventy-eight percent (78%) are of the opinion that citizens of Tajikistan should be encouraged to speak the Tajik language; 20 percent disagree (Table 97 in Appendix). Naturally, this sentiment is more prevalent among ethnic Tajiks (84% support the proposal) than ethnic Russians (41% favor) and ethnic Uzbeks (71% favor).
- “ Nine percent (9%) of Tajikistanis report they are planning to emigrate, but half of the ethnic Russians gave this response (Table 103 in Appendix). Most of those planning to leave are headed for Russia or Uzbekistan (Table 104 in Appendix).

- “ Overall, 22 percent report they have been the victim of discrimination because of their ethnicity (Table 95 in Appendix). All of the major ethnic groups report the same rate of discrimination.

Two of the previously anticipated impediments to the building of a broad popular Tajikistani national identity were regionalism and Islamic fundamentalism. The most controversial findings of the IFES survey, therefore, based on preliminary discussions of the results in Tajikistan, were that both phenomena are less prevalent than supposed.

The survey questionnaire was designed with regionalism in mind, asking several questions that offered respondents the opportunity to express a regional orientation superior to any national identity. Rather few availed themselves of these opportunities.

One of these (Table 77 in the Appendix) asked from which region a president ought to come. Over half (59%) volunteered that "it does not matter." A substantial minority (31%) preferred a president from Leninabad *oblast* (coincidentally, almost exactly the percentage of respondents from Leninabad). But this preference has less to do with regional chauvinism than it does with support for political opposition parties and leaders based in Leninabad: This is demonstrated by the fact that only 50 percent of those favoring a president from Leninabad are themselves from Leninabad, whereas 11 percent are from Dushanbe, 22 percent from Kurgan-tyube, and 15 percent from the Regions of Republican Subordination (the national government jurisdiction around Dushanbe). This indicates that the desire for a president from Leninabad goes beyond that region.

Just as significant, very few said a president ought to come from Khatlon *oblast* (1%), even though this region is thought to have a strong separatist sentiment. The current president, Imomali Rokhmanov, comes from Khatlon *oblast*.

Another question designed to elicit regional identity asked respondents which was more important to them, region of origin, ethnicity, or national citizenship (Table 91 in the Appendix). Region was selected by 10 percent. These respondents were disproportionately ethnic Uzbeks: Whereas 5 percent of ethnic Tajiks place region above ethnicity and citizenship, 26 percent of ethnic Uzbeks gave this response. Forty-two percent (42%) of ethnic Uzbeks live in the northern Leninabad *oblast*.

Finally, respondents were asked to identify their ethnicity, and interviewers were instructed to accept and record any responses of regional affiliation, such as "Kulyabi" – not strictly an ethnicity, but certainly indicative of a regional orientation. Seven percent (7%) gave such responses, mostly

in Pamiri and Khojandi at 3 percent each. Very few people chose to identify themselves more closely with a regional affiliation than an ethnic one.

Our analysis of the regional responses to these three questions finds no consistent pattern that would allow IFES to identify a strongly regional-oriented constituency. This is due partly to the rarity of these expressions, and partly to the fact that these questions are not exhaustive measures of regional identity. Nevertheless, the inescapable conclusion is that Tajikistani society is not dominated by anti-national, regional affiliations that might impede the building of a Tajikistani state.

The results are similar in IFES' search for indications of Islamic fundamentalism. The survey did not seek to measure this directly. Fully probing the question of the presence of Islamic fundamentalism in Tajikistan would have required more questions than IFES was able to devote to this issue. But to the extent that some of this survey data might have detected fundamentalism, the strength of the signal is very weak.

Overwhelmingly, Tajikistanis report they believe in God (97%; Table 98 in the Appendix) and are of the Islamic faith (90%; Table 99 in the Appendix). But a minority (34%) performs daily prayers (at least once a day), and far fewer attend Mosque once a week (Tables 100, 101 in the Appendix). Taken together, 12 percent do both, and if religious activism is a necessary condition for "fundamentalism," this establishes the upper limit.

Another question presented respondents with the opportunity to express a different aspect of fundamentalism. When asked which leader is most trusted to act in the interests of the people – respondents were given several options – only 1 percent selected the *Imami Mosquit*, their local religious leader (Table 94 in the Appendix).


These data can hardly be said to provide a conclusive measure of Islamic fundamentalism, but it appears that the phenomenon is not widespread. Also, fieldwork (data collection) occurred after the Taliban capture of Kabul, an event that was reported to have caused some anxiety in Tajikistan. Finally, few respondents named Islamic states (states whose policies and governance are managed by a theocratic elite) as models for either political or economic development. The only Islamic state mentioned was Iran, which found favor with 4 percent and 5 percent as a model for economic and political development, respectively.

ADDITIONAL MATTERS OF POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

A majority (56%) of those surveyed in Tajikistan describe their quality of life as “bad” as against 40 percent who say their quality of life is good (Table 6 in the Appendix). Not surprisingly, a direct correlation exists between socio-economic status (SES) and how respondents describe their quality of life. For example, 87 percent of those with a high SES say their quality of life is good, versus 56 percent of those with a moderate SES and 17 percent of those with a low SES.

Although 40 percent describe their quality of life as good, only one in five is satisfied with the current situation in Tajikistan. Understandably, 51 percent of those with a high SES are satisfied versus 11 percent with a low SES (Tables 7, 109 in the Appendix); overall, a huge number (77%) are dissatisfied (Table 7 in the Appendix). The main reasons for dissatisfaction are economic difficulties (28%), insufficient or irregular payment of salary or pension (23%), political instability (15%), and the struggle for survival (12%) (Table 8 in the Appendix). The level of dissatisfaction is understandable considering 86 percent of Tajikistanis say it is difficult to buy enough food each month (Table 38 in the Appendix). Nonetheless, three-fourths (76%) of those surveyed reported that they did not receive a local government subsidy (Table 39 in the Appendix).


Figure P. Satisfaction with Situation and Difficulty in Buying Food



Although Tajikistanis are evenly split over whether Tajikistan is actually independent (44% say it is, 44% say it is not), most Tajikistanis are sure that things have gotten worse since independence was declared (Tables 10, 9 in the Appendix). Eighty-five percent (85%) say that things are worse. Forty-eight percent (48%) of those surveyed say that the declaration of independence was a good thing but 37 percent say it was a bad thing (Table 11 in the Appendix).

There is great dissatisfaction with the economic situation. Only 14 percent describe the economy as “good,” versus 84 percent who describe it as bad (Table 15 in the Appendix). As for the future, one-third (35%) of the Tajikistani population believes that things will be worse in a year. Half (50%) say that things will either be the same or better in 12 months (Table 16 in the Appendix). An alarmingly high 61 percent say that, further down the road, their children will have a worse life than their parents (Table 19 in the Appendix). Thirty-three percent (33%) believe their children’s lives will be the same or better.


Figure Q. Current and Future Economic Situation



Uzbekistan tops the list of countries that Tajikistanis say could be a model of economic development, with 17 percent naming that country. Russia and the United States tied for second place with 13 percent each (Table 49 in the Appendix). The substantial number of Tajikistanis citing Uzbekistan as a model for Tajikistan’s political and economic development (16% and 17% respectively) does not derive solely from the substantial minority of Uzbeks living in Tajikistan

(22%). Ethnic Tajiks comprise 48 percent of the respondents citing Uzbekistan as a model for both economic and political development, outnumbering ethnic Uzbeks who comprise 45% (political development) and 44% (economic development) of the respondents citing Uzbekistan.

Figure R. Models for Development



When it comes to the amount of information Tajikistanis have about economic developments and political reforms, it is clear that they have very little. A full 79 percent say they have little or no information about the economic developments underway in Tajikistan (Table 26 in the Appendix). Only 15 percent say they have a "great deal" or "fair amount" of information. When it comes to information about political reform, the situation is the same (81% to 13%) (Table 27 in the Appendix). Respondents with a higher level of education do have relatively more information. Whereas 8 percent of those with a primary-level education say they have a "great deal" or "fair amount" of information, 26 percent of those with some university or higher education report having adequate information.

There is also a large amount of dissatisfaction with the social situation. For example, only 16 percent say they are satisfied with social welfare protections in Tajikistan, 18 percent with the quality of health care, and 13 percent with the quality of education (Table 30 in the Appendix). Again, there is a socio-economic proportionality – the higher the SES, the more satisfaction (50% satisfaction for people with high SES; 20% for moderate SES; 9% for low SES). A somewhat higher percentage – 30 percent – is satisfied with the fight against crime (Table 30 in the Appendix).

Fifty-four percent (54%) are dissatisfied with the quality of water (Table 30 in the Appendix). Yet most Tajikistanis seem to believe that there is a fairly good balance of taxes and services, because 57 percent say the government should maintain the current level of taxes and services whereas only 20 percent that say taxes and services should both be cut (Table 78 in the Appendix). Interestingly, 81 percent say that they would be willing to pay more in taxes for more reliable water, electricity, and gas services (Table 31 in the Appendix).

A plurality (42%) of those surveyed are “completely dissatisfied” with the moral quality of Tajikistan’s leaders and another third (33%) are “fairly dissatisfied” (Table 30 in the Appendix). When asked whom they trust the most, 28 percent of the respondents said the President of the Republic (Table 94 in the Appendix). Twenty-five percent (25%) say they trust their clan leader and 27 percent say they trust no one. A plurality (36%) are also completely dissatisfied with Tajikistan’s progress toward national reconciliation (Table 30 in the Appendix). Yet, one-fourth (27%) are satisfied with the progress being made.

A majority (59%) of those surveyed believe that women are equal to men – a view that is more prevalent in the rural areas than in the cities (58% to 36%) (Table 72 in the Appendix). Thirty-six percent (36%) say that women are subordinate to men. However, only 21 percent say that women should be subordinate to men (Table 73 in the Appendix).

▪ **The Government in Dushanbe and the Electoral Process**

A majority (55%) say they have little interest in matters of politics (Table 20 in the Appendix). Perhaps that is because only 16 percent of Tajikistanis believe that the national administration has the greatest influence on their quality of life (Table 22 in the Appendix). Eighteen percent (18%) think that their city or *rayon* administration has the most influence on their quality of life (4% cited the military and 3% cited the *oblast* administration). Importantly, 50 percent say that none of these have much influence at all.

Concerning the power of local officials, 52 percent of those surveyed say that local officials have less power than before independence (Table 40 in the Appendix). A plurality (40%) says that those local officials are not the same people as before independence (Table 41 in the Appendix). Twenty-two percent (22%) think they are the same people as before.

With regard to the *Majlisi Oli* (parliament), 53 percent of the respondents know the name of the Deputy that represents their area (Table 51 in the Appendix). About the same percentage, 51 percent, say their Deputy represents their views poorly while one in five (23%) say he or she

represents their views well (Table 52 in the Appendix). Two-thirds (68%) of Tajikistanis say that being a Deputy should be a part-time job and that the Deputies should live in their districts (Table 53 in the Appendix). Tajikistanis are evenly split, however, over whether the Deputies should have other government responsibilities (46%) or work full-time as a Deputy (42%) (Table 54 in the Appendix).

* Electoral System


Although most Tajikistanis (70%) say voting is the most important right (85% of the respondents reported voting in the 1994 presidential election), they express a great deal of dissatisfaction with the present electoral system. Three-fourths (76%) of Tajikistanis say they are dissatisfied and only one in five (20%) claims to be satisfied (Table 30 in the Appendix). Most Tajikistanis do not have much information about the Central Election Commission (77% say that they have not much information or none at all) (Table 58 in the Appendix). As expected, the amount of information about the CEC is a function of education (6% of those with some secondary education have “a great deal” of information about the CEC whereas 38 percent of the most educated say they do. Of those who have at least some information, 44 percent say that the CEC favors particular groups whereas 34 percent believe the CEC is completely neutral.

The plurality of those surveyed (48%) do not know if the election laws are in need of reform (Table 60 in the Appendix). Thirty-six percent (36%) say the laws are in need of reform. Even with this concern about the election laws, 93 percent say they will vote in the 1999 elections and 54 percent expect those elections to be honest (Tables 62, 63 in the Appendix).

* Important Qualities for President

When it comes to what four qualities Tajikistanis believe are the most important in a future president, 91 percent prefer a candidate who is honest and trustworthy (Figure S next page). Sixty-five percent (65%) believe that they need a “strong leader who can get things done.” Sixty-three percent (63%) want a president who cares about the needs of the people. Forty-six percent (46%) want someone who has close ties to Russia, 18 percent want a president with close ties to the West, and only 14 percent want one with close ties to the Islamic world (arguably another indication that Islamic fundamentalism is not a dominant force in Tajikistan; Table 76 in the Appendix). Fifty-nine percent (59%) do not care what region the new president comes from, while 31 percent prefer someone from the Leninabad *oblast* (Table 77 in the Appendix).

Figure S. Important Qualities for President




▪ **Political Parties**

Forty-seven percent (47%) of Tajikistanis say that having one political party is the ideal (Table 64 in the Appendix). Twenty-eight percent (28%) suggest that a system with several political parties is more appropriate, whereas 11 percent say having no political parties is best. Fifty-one percent (51%) believe there are clear differences between the parties whereas one in five (19%) say there are no clear differences (Table 67 in the Appendix). Although a majority (55%) of Tajikistanis say that it makes no difference in their vote if a candidate is a member of a particular political party, one-third (33%) say it makes their support more likely (Table 69 in the Appendix). Only 7 percent say that candidates affiliated with a political party are less likely to receive their vote.

▪ **Media**

The main sources of information about events in Tajikistan include Russian Federation television programs (86%); friends, family, and neighbors (83%); and Tajikistani television programs (77%). The sources of information that are used the least include posters (5%), international newspapers/magazines (5%), and leaflets (3%). Other international television and radio programs are also not used very often, at 22 percent and 14 percent respectively (Table 28 in the Appendix).

Figure T. Sources of Information



▪ **Civil Rights**

There seems to be a sense that authorities have little respect for the rights of individuals. Three-fourths (74%) of those surveyed say that this is true (Table 23 in the Appendix). There is a significant division on this issue, however, related to SES. For instance, 43 percent of those with a high SES say that authorities respect individual rights either a "great deal" and "a fair amount," versus 13 percent of those with a low SES. Furthermore, 52 percent of the respondents are not satisfied (30% are satisfied) with the level of political freedom that exists in Tajikistan (Table 30 in the Appendix). This dissatisfaction may stem from the fact that 57 percent of Tajikistanis report having very little information about their civil rights versus 37 percent who report having either "a great deal" or "fair amount" of information (Table 37 in the Appendix). One in five Tajikistanis (22%) has experienced discrimination since independence due to ethnic or regional identity (Table 95 in the Appendix).

- **Law, Order, and the Justice System**

By a 15-point margin (53% to 38%), more Tajikistanis say it is necessary to limit the political and civil rights of the people to establish order and discipline (Table 25 in the Appendix). One-third (33%) believe that the condition of law and order will worsen over the next 12 months, whereas 52 percent say it will stay the same or improve (Table 24 in the Appendix).

Fifty-six percent (56%) of Tajikistanis agree that there are groups in Tajikistan causing problems (Table 74 in the Appendix). When asked what kinds of groups are causing the problems, 13 percent named religious groups and another 13 percent identified regional groups (Table 75 in the Appendix).

Concerning official corruption, two-thirds (66%) of Tajikistanis say that it is common (Table 42 in the Appendix). Likewise, 66% also believe that official corruption is a serious problem (Table 43 in the Appendix).

Fifty-three percent (53%) of Tajikistanis have little or no confidence in the courts (38% are confident) (Table 71 in the Appendix). Fifty-five percent (55%) have very little confidence in the public prosecutor (versus 36% who have either a "fair amount" or "great deal" of confidence) (Table 71 in the Appendix). The militia fares even worse; 64 percent say they have little confidence in this law-enforcement institution (Table 71 in the Appendix).


- **The Civil War**

Fifty-four percent (54%) of Tajikistanis say they were not affected by the war. Thirty-nine (39%) percent of those affected by the war report that they suffered economically. One-third (33%) of those who were affected were forced to move or became refugees (68% of those that became refugees say that they now live in the same place that they lived before the war. Seventeen percent (17%) of those affected lost a family member or had a family member wounded. Concerning the fighting in the eastern part of the country, at the time the survey was conducted 48% believed that the fighting would spread (Table 81 in the Appendix). The unrest in the country did, in fact, increase after the time that the IFES survey was conducted.

- **Non-Governmental Organizations**

One-third (35%) of Tajikistanis express their belief that it is necessary for citizens to form groups that are free from government control, although only 23 percent know of such groups in their communities (Tables 82, 84 in the Appendix). On the other hand, 49 percent say that it is not necessary to form these groups.

Figure U. Necessity of Civil Society Organizations



As is the case in most of the surveys recently completed by IFES in Central Asia, a plurality of the respondents (23%) would be most likely to join a charitable organization over other types of NGOs. Other groups Tajikistanis would likely join are educational organizations (13%), women's organizations (12%), and youth organizations (11%) (Table 83 in the Appendix).

▪ **Emigration**

Only 9 percent of those surveyed say that they are planning to leave Tajikistan (Table 103 in the Appendix), with 53 percent of those intending to move to Russia. The second most popular destination (24%) is Uzbekistan. Religion plays an important part in what country one moves to. The most active Muslims plan on moving to Uzbekistan, but those who are less active or of another faith are more likely to move to Russia (Tables 105, 100 in the Appendix). The most-cited reasons for leaving among those who said they are planning to move are economic and political instability (2%), difficult life (1%), and economic hardship (2%) (Table 105 in the Appendix).

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF TAJIKISTAN

▪ **LANGUAGE OF INTERVIEW**

Most (68%) of the interviews were conducted in Tajik. Two-hundred-forty-six interviews, or 16 percent, were conducted in Uzbek. Russian was used in 15 percent of the interviews (Table 3 in the Appendix).

▪ **Gender**

The sample was 52 percent male and 48 percent female (Table 4 in the Appendix).

▪ **Employment Situation**

Fifty-eight percent (58%) of those surveyed were employed (Table 85A in the Appendix). Non-industrial specialists (16%) and collective farmers (11%) are the two largest employment groups. Sixteen percent (16%) of the respondents work in either industrial enterprises, the service industry, or as unskilled laborers (Table 85B in the Appendix). Two-thirds (65%) work at factories or farms that are state owned or have a spouse who does (Table 102 in the Appendix). There is a direct relationship between level of education and working in a state-owned factory or farm. Whereas only 30 percent of those with the least education work in state-owned enterprises, 75 percent of the most educated do so.

▪ **Family**

Seventy-seven percent (77%) of those interviewed are married with children (5% married without children) (Tables 86, 87 in the Appendix). Twelve percent (11%) are single without children and 4 percent are single with children. One in five do not have children living with them (Table 88 in the Appendix).

▪ **Ethnicity**

Sixty-four percent (64%) of the sample is of Tajik ethnicity. Twenty-two percent (22%) are of Uzbek origin and 16 percent are from other ethnic backgrounds (Table 89 in the Appendix).

Regionally, the Leninabad *oblast* produced the largest number of respondents, 30 percent of the sample were born in this *oblast*. Twenty-two percent (22%) come from the Regions of Republican Subordination. The other significant regions represented are the Kurgan-Tyube region (18%) and the Kulyab region (13%) (Table 90 in the Appendix).

Two-thirds (67%) of the people live in rural settlements while 11 percent live in Dushanbe (Table 2 in the Appendix). Seven percent (7%) come from cities of 50,000 to 199,999. Cities smaller than 50,000 also account for 7 percent of the population and working settlements account for another 7 percent.

- **Religion**

The vast majority (90%) of the respondents are of the Islamic faith. Thirteen percent (13%) report being active, 19 percent claim to be fairly active, and 59 percent are inactive. Of those of the Islamic faith, 13 percent attend mosque on Friday and 59 percent don't pray at all during the day. Twenty-seven percent (27%) pray five times a day. Ninety-seven (97%) percent believe in God (Table 99 in the Appendix). As one would expect, the older the person, the more likely it is that they pray multiple times a day. Whereas 78 percent of those age 18-24 do not pray at all during the day, only one-third (32%) of those aged 55-64 do not pray. Sixty-seven percent (67%) of those aged 65-74 pray five times a day.

- **Age**

Eighteen percent (18%) of the sample are between the ages of 18 and 24. Twenty-seven percent (27%) are between the ages of 25 and 34. Twenty-six percent (26%) are 35 to 44. Fourteen percent (14%) are 45 to 54. Fifteen percent (15%) are over the age of 54 (Table 106 in the Appendix). Thirty-seven percent (37%) are males under the age of 45; 15 percent are males over the age of 45; 35 percent of females are under 45. Fourteen percent (14%) of females are over 45.

- **Education**

One in ten (9%) of the respondents has a primary education or less. Seven percent have some secondary education and 34 percent completed secondary school. One-fourth (23%) have a technical education and another fourth (24%) have some university education or more (Table 107 in the Appendix).

▪ **SES [SELF-IDENTIFIED]**

When asked to identify their socio-economic status, 6 percent said "high," 49 percent said moderate, and 45 percent said "low" (Table 108 in the Appendix). One in four (26%) report having a telephone in their home (Table 109 in the Appendix). People with certain occupations are more likely than others to have phones in their homes. For instance, 69 percent of heads of enterprises have a phone versus 13 percent of tenant farmers.

MMETHODOLOGY

This report is based on public opinion data obtained in a nationwide personal-interview survey with a sample that is nationally representative of the adult population in Tajikistan. Fifteen hundred interviews were conducted between November 25 and December 13, 1996; the margin of sampling error associated with a survey sample of this size is $\pm 2.5\%$.

This project began with an in-country assessment of the capabilities of potential contractors to conduct the interviews. The Sharq Sociological Center of Dushanbe was selected in a competitive bid process. The questionnaire was designed by Steven Wagner, President of QEV Analytics, and IFES regional staff, drawing heavily on questions used in previous IFES surveys in Central Asia. The questionnaire was translated by the contractor into Tajik, Uzbek, and Russian. These translations were reviewed for accuracy and fidelity to the original questionnaire intent by IFES staff and consultants in Washington. In the end, 68 percent of surveys were administered in Tajik, 16 percent in Uzbek, and 15 percent in Russian.

The sample design was of a stratified probability type. Tajikistan consists of six regions: the Dushanbe metropolitan area, the "Regions of Republican Subordination" (subject to the national government), Leninabad *oblast* (the largest region by population), the Kulyab portion of the Khatlon *oblast*, the Kurgan-Tyube portion of Khatlon, and Gorno-Badakhshan (which is largely inaccessible due to geography and activity by opposition forces). IFES' objective was to conduct interviews in every region, and in the end, the survey excluded less than 10 percent of the national population, mostly along the Surkhob river valley (in and around the cities of Dzhirgatal, Todzikobod, Tavit Dara, Komsomolobod, and Garm), an area inaccessible due to the activities of anti-government rebels. Consequently, IFES did not believe that the safety of the interviewers could be guaranteed in these closed areas. Otherwise, this survey was nationally representative and conforms to the highest methodological standards.

For each of these six regions, a quota for the number of interviews proportional to their share of the national population was established. Districts within regions were selected randomly, yielding 30 primary sampling units (places of interview).

Settlements were selected randomly within districts, with a quota dictating the number of rural and urban interview sites; overall, 67 percent of interviews were conducted in rural settlements. Households were selected at random within settlements from the village council household register. In all cases, the individual interviewee within a household was selected by reference to

the Kish grid, a device for randomly selecting the interviewee from among the residents of a household.

Supervisors were responsible for confirming the performance of the interviewers by re-interviewing 10 percent of households. Data entry was accomplished by the contractor; all data analysis was performed in Washington by QEV Analytics.

Figure V. Interviews By Region

Dushanbe City	11%
Gorno-Badakhshan	3%
Khatlon: Kulyab	12%
Khatlon: Kurgan-Tyube	21%
Leninabad Oblast	31%
Regions of Republican Subordination	22%
TOTAL	100%

APPENDIX

OBSERVATION VARIABLES**T**ABLE 1. SITE OF INTERVIEW

Q-1. Wiloyat	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Dushanbe City	11%
2. Gorno-Badakhshan	3%
3. Khatlon: Kulyab	12%
4. Khatlon: Kurgan-Tyube	21%
5. Leninabad Oblast	31%
6. Regions of Republican Subordination	22%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 2. SIZE OF CITY

Q-4. Kind of settlement	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Dushanbe	11%
2. Cities of 50,000 - 199,999	7%
3. Cities of 20,000 - 49,999	7%
4. Other cities of less than 20,000	1%
5. Working settlements	7%
6. Rural settlements	67%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 3. LANGUAGE

Q-5. Language of Interview	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Tajik	68%
2. Uzbek	16%
3. Russian	15%
<i>Total</i>	99% T

TABLE 4. GENDER

Q-6. Gender of Respondent	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Male	52%
2. Female	48%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 5. SES BY OBSERVATION

Q-7. SES by observation	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Very high	j
2. High	7%
3. Intermediate	60%
4. Low	27%
5. Very low	5%
6. Difficult to answer/DK	j
<i>Total</i>	99% U

NON-OBSERVATION VARIABLES**T**ABLE 6. OVERALL QUALITY OF LIFE

Q-8. How would you describe the overall quality of your life today -- it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Very good	1%
2. Fairly good	39%
3. Fairly bad	27%
4. Very bad	29%
5. Neither (Volunteered)	3%
6. Don't know/No response	j
<i>Total</i>	99%U

TABLE 7. SATISFACTION WITH SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN

Q-9. And what about the situation of Tajikistan generally: are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the situation in Tajikistan today?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Very satisfied	2%
2. Somewhat satisfied	19%
3. Somewhat dissatisfied	38%
4. Very dissatisfied	39%
5. Don't know/No Response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 8. REASONS FOR SATISFACTION/DISSATISFACTION

Q-10. Please tell me the main reason you said you are [satisfied/dissatisfied] with the situation in Tajikistan today? (OPEN-END RESPONSE)			
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)		11-24/12-14 (1500)	
<u>REASONS SATISFIED</u>		<u>REASONS DISSATISFIED</u>	
1. Well-being in life	5%	1. Political instability	15%
2. Freedom of activity	5%	2. Insufficient/Irregular Salary/Pension	23%
3. Basic conditions	4%	3. Economic difficulties	28%
4. Non-interference in my life	3%	4. Difficult survival	12%
5. Free trade	1%	5. Continuation of military affairs	11%
6. Others	2%	6. Unemployment	11%
7. Don't know/No response	2%	7. Absence of civil rights, order, Security	8%
		8. Absence of order and discipline	7%
		9. Incompetence of powers	5%
		10. Poor social services	3%
		11. Powers don't control situation	3%
		12. Change for the worse	3%
		13. Decline of education	3%
		14. Anxiety for children's future	2%
		15. Anarchy	2%
		16. Communal land not distributed	1%
		17. Regional conflicts	1%
		18. Inequity of wealth distribution	1%
		19. Don't know/No response	7%

TABLE 9. CHANGES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Q-11. Thinking back, how has life in Tajikistan changed since independence -- has life in Tajikistan improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse since achieving independence?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Improved	7%
2. Stayed the same	6%
3. Gotten worse	85%
4. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 10. INDEPENDENCE OF TAJIKISTAN

Q-12. Do you consider Tajikistan to be a truly independent country today, or is it not truly independent?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Is independent	44%
2. Is not independent	44%
3. Don't know/No response	12%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 11. VIEWS ON DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Q-13. In your opinion, was the declaration of independence of Tajikistan a very good thing, a fairly good thing, a fairly bad thing, or a very bad thing for the people of Tajikistan?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. A very good thing	18%
2. A fairly good thing	30%
3. A fairly bad thing	19%
4. A very bad thing	18%
5. Neither (Volunteered)	7%
6. Don't know/No response	8%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 12. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Q-14. With the achievement of independence, is there now greater freedom to participate in religious activities, or the same extent of freedom, or is there less freedom to participate in religious activities?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Greater	60%
2. Same	28%
3. Less	7%
4. Don't know/No response	5%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 13. RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS

Q-15. With the achievement of independence, is there now greater respect for the rights of individuals by government authorities, or the same level of respect, or less respect for the rights of individuals?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Greater	16%
2. Same	18%
3. Less	59%
4. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	99% U

TABLE 14. POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC INITIATIVES

Q-16. With the achievement of independence, are there now greater possibilities for individuals to undertake new economic activities, or the same possibilities, or are there fewer possibilities?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Greater	58%
2. Same	11%
3. Less	25%
4. Don't know/No response	7%
<i>Total</i>	101% T

TABLE 15. CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION

Q-17. How would you describe the current economic situation in our country -- is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Very good	1%
2. Somewhat good	13%
3. Somewhat bad	48%
4. Very bad	36%
5. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 16. FUTURE ECONOMIC SITUATION

Q-18. In the next twelve months, in your opinion, will the economic situation of Tajikistan be better than it is now, will be the same as it is now, or will be worse than now?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Better than it is now	25%
2. Remain the same	25%
3. Get worse	35%
4. Don't know/No response	16%
<i>Total</i>	101% T

TABLE 17. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN TAJIKISTAN

Q-19(A). Do you feel that significant changes are occurring in Tajikistan today -- whether good or bad -- or do you not feel this way?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Significant changes are occurring	37%
2. There are not significant changes occurring	48%
3. Don't know/No response	14%
<i>Total</i>	99% U

TABLE 18. PACE OF CHANGES

Q-19(B). [IF THINGS CHANGING] Do you feel that the changes in Tajikistan are too rapid, or too slow, or at the correct pace?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Too rapid	6%
2. Too slow	22%
3. Correct pace	9%
4. Don't know/No response	j
NOT ASKED	63%
<i>Total</i>	101% T

TABLE 19. QUALITY OF LIFE OF YOUNG PEOPLE

Q-20. How will the lives of people who are young today compare with the quality of lives their parents had: will their lives be better than their parents, the same as their parents, or worse than their parents?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Better	23%
2. Same	10%
3. Worse	61%
4. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 20. INTEREST IN POLITICS

Q-21. How interested are you in matters of politics and governing the country: are you very interested, fairly interested, not too interested, or not interested at all?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Very interested	14%
2. Fairly interested	28%
3. Not too interested	33%
4. Not interested at all	22%
5. Don't know/No response	4%
<i>Total</i>	101% T

TABLE 21. EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT ON CITIZENS

Q-22. In your opinion, is it possible or not possible for the national government in Dushanbe to improve significantly the lives of citizens of Tajikistan through its policies and actions?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Is possible	48%
2. Is not possible	38%
3. Don't know/No response	14%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 22. INFLUENCE OF STATE STRUCTURES

Q-23. Which of these structures of the State has the greatest influence on the way you live your life:	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. The National Administration	16%
2. The Oblast Administration	3%
3. The <i>Rayon</i> or City Administration	18%
4. The Militia or the Military	4%
5. None of these have any influence on my life	50%
6. Don't know/No response	9%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 23. RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Q-24. How much do the government authorities respect the rights of individuals in Tajikistan: a great deal, a fair amount, a little, or none at all?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. A great deal	6%
2. A fair amount	14%
3. A little	47%
4. None at all	27%
5. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 24. CONDITION OF LAW AND ORDER

Q-25. Will the condition of law and order in the Republic improve, get worse, or stay the same over the next year?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Improve	25%
2. Stay the same	27%
3. Get worse	33%
4. Don't know/No response	14%
<i>Total</i>	99% U

TABLE 25. LIMITING RIGHTS TO SECURE ORDER

Q-26. Do you agree or disagree with this statement: “In order to establish order and discipline in society, it is necessary to limit the political and civic rights of the people?” Do you:	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Completely agree	27%
2. Somewhat agree	26%
3. Somewhat disagree	17%
4. Completely disagree	21%
5. Don't know/No response	9%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 26. INFORMATION ABOUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Q-27. How much information do you feel you have about the economic developments underway in Tajikistan?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. A great deal	2%
2. A fair amount	13%
3. Not very much	43%
4. Nothing at all	36%
5. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 27. INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICAL REFORMS

Q-28. How much information do you feel you have about the political reforms underway in Tajikistan?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. A great deal	1%
2. A fair amount	12%
3. Not very much	47%
4. Nothing at all	34%
5. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 28. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Q-29. Next I am going to read to you sources of information you might use to get information about events in Tajikistan. As I read each one, please tell me if you use it often, use it sometimes, or use it never:				
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)			Total
	<i>Often</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Never</i>	
1. Tajikistani TV programs	36%	41%	23%	100%
2. Russian Federation TV programs	49%	37%	14%	100%
3. Other International TV programs	10%	12%	77%	99%
4. Tajikistani radio programs	26%	30%	44%	100%
5. Russian Federation radio programs	12%	25%	63%	100%
6. Other International radio programs	4%	10%	85%	99%
7. Tajikistani newspaper and magazine articles	7%	26%	67%	100%
8. Russian Federation newspaper and magazine articles	4%	14%	82%	100%
9. Other International newspaper and magazine articles	1%	4%	96%	101% U
10. Leaflets	j	3%	96%	99%
11. Posters	1%	4%	95%	100%
12. Speeches or other public meetings, materials	2%	17%	81%	100%
13. Friends, family, or neighbors	39%	44%	17%	100%

TABLE 29. INDEPENDENCE OF SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Q-30. What sources of information which are available to you -- TV, radio, newspapers, magazines -- do you consider to be free of government control? (If there are any in your opinion). Name them.	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Tajikistani TV station	5%
2. International TV station	10%
3. Tajikistani radio	2%
4. International radio	6%
5. Tajikistani newspaper	1%
6. International newspaper	4%
7. Tajikistani magazine	1%
8. International magazine	4%
9. Don't know	39%
10. Others	1%
11. No such source	40%

TABLE 30. SOCIO-POLITICAL BAROMETER

Q-31 thru Q-42. Please tell me whether you are completely satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or completely dissatisfied with each of the following:

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)					Total
	<i>Cmpltly Satisfie d</i>	<i>Smwht Satisfied</i>	<i>Smwht Dissatisfie d</i>	<i>Cmpltly Dissatisfie d</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	
31. Economic reforms	6%	12%	28%	40%	14%	100%
32. Social welfare protections of the people	2%	14%	29%	49%	6%	100%
33. Level of political freedom	8%	22%	25%	27%	17%	99% U
34. Fight against crime	8%	22%	25%	35%	10%	100%
35. Quality of health care	4%	14%	20%	58%	4%	100%
36. Quality of education	3%	10%	22%	62%	3%	100%
37. The electoral system	3%	17%	23%	53%	4%	100%
38. Opportunity of citizens to influence the State	10%	24%	23%	29%	14%	100%
39. Moral character of the people	4%	16%	25%	32%	22%	99% U
40. Moral character of our leaders	3%	18%	33%	42%	5%	101% U
41. Progress towards National Reconciliation	5%	22%	28%	36%	9%	100%
42. Quality of water provided by authorities	19%	24%	17%	37%	3%	100%

TABLE 31. PAYMENT FOR BETTER SERVICES?

Q-43. Would you be willing or not willing to pay additional money to the authorities in order to receive better quality water and more reliable electricity and gas service?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Willing to pay more	81%
2. Not willing to pay more	15%
3. Don't know/No response	4%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 32. TYPE OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Q-44. When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop an economy with limited state control, or should we return to an economy basically controlled by the state?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Economy with limited state control	26%
2. State control of economy	59%
3. Neither (Volunteered)	4%
4. Other responses	1%
5. Don't know/No response	10%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 33. PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS

Q-45. When it comes to our economic development, should we work toward a market economy with steady but small reforms, should we get to a market economy as quickly as possible, or should we not pursue a free economy at all?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Small but steady reforms	55%
2. Get to free economy as quickly as possible	22%
3. Not pursue free economy	13%
4. Don't know/No response	9%
<i>Total</i>	99% T

TABLE 34. ECONOMIC REFORMS

Q-46. In your opinion, are the economic reforms in Tajikistan being made too rapidly, with appropriate speed, or too slowly?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Too rapidly	4%
2. With appropriate speed	15%
3. Too slowly	61%
4. There should be no reforms	9%
5. Don't know/No response	11%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 35. MEANING OF MARKET ECONOMY

Q-47. What does it mean to you to have a market economy -- I mean, how will things be different than they have been in the past? [OPEN END]	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
<u>Positive Responses</u>	
Freedom of entrepreneurship	14%
Economic Cooperation	9%
Many goods in market	8%
Market determines development	7%
Market works for people's benefit	6%
Limited gov't. control of economy	5%
Reasonable Prices for goods	4%
Demand defines supply	2%
<u>Negative Responses</u>	
High and unstable prices	7%
Speculative economy	6%
Market isn't needed	5%
Government control of economy	4%
Does not protect vulnerable classes	4%
Economy based on trickery	2%
Others	10%
Don't know/No response	23%
<i>Total</i>	116%*

*Multiple responses allowed

TABLE 36. WHOM WILL MARKET ECONOMY BENEFIT?

Q-48. In your opinion, will a market economy in Tajikistan benefit most of the people, or would this benefit just a few people at the top?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Benefit most of the people	28%
2. Benefit just a few people at the top	62%
3. There will be no benefit (Volunteered)	4%
4. Don't know/No response	7%
<i>Total</i>	101% T

TABLE 37. INFORMATION ABOUT RIGHTS AS A CITIZEN

Q-49. How much information do you feel you have about your rights as a citizen with regard to the authorities: [READ OPTIONS]	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Great deal	8%
2. Fair amount	29%
3. Not very much	40%
4. Nothing at all	17%
5. Don't know/No response	5%
<i>Total</i>	99% U

TABLE 38. ABILITY TO BUY FOOD

Q-50. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or strongly disagree with the following statement: "It is very difficult for my family to buy enough food each month."	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Strongly agree	62%
2. Agree somewhat	24%
3. Disagree somewhat	9%
4. Strongly disagree	4%
5. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 39. SUBSIDIZATION BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Q-51. During the past year, did you or anyone in your immediate family receive any kind of subsidy through the local authorities which is necessary to support your standard of living?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	23%
2. No	76%
3. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 40. POWER OF LOCAL OFFICIALS

Q-52. Do local organs of power (officials) have more power or less power now compared with before independence?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. More power	32%
2. Less power	52%
3. Don't know/No response	16%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 41. COMPOSITION OF LOCAL POWER

Q-53. Does it seem to you that the people who run things in your community (the local organs of power) today are pretty much the same people as before independence, or are they not the same people?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Local officials are same people	22%
2. Not same people	40%
3. Some new, some old (Volunteered)	32%
4. Don't know/No response	5%
<i>Total</i>	99% U

TABLE 42. FREQUENCY OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

Q-54. How common is the problem of official corruption -- is it very common, fairly common, fairly rare (uncommon), or very rare (uncommon)?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Very common	44%
2. Fairly common	22%
3. Fairly rare	7%
4. Very rare	4%
5. Intimidated to answer (Volunteered)	3%
6. Don't know/No response	19%
<i>Total</i>	99%U

TABLE 43. SEVERITY OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

Q-55. And how serious is the problem of official corruption, meaning how much does it matter -- is it very serious, fairly serious, not too serious, or not serious at all?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Very serious	44%
2. Fairly serious	22%
3. Not too serious	9%
4. Not serious at all	3%
5. Don't know/No response	22%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 44. IS TAJIKISTAN A DEMOCRACY?

Q-56. Would you say that Tajikistan is primarily a democracy, or is it primarily not a democracy?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Is a democracy	37%
2. Is not a democracy	44%
3. Don't know/No response	19%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 45. MOVEMENT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

Q-57. [IF PRIMARILY NOT A DEMOCRACY] Is Tajikistan moving towards becoming a democracy, or not?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Is becoming a democracy	10%
2. Is not becoming a democracy	30%
3. Don't know/No response	4%
NOT ASKED	56%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 46. MEANING OF DEMOCRACY

Q-58. What does it mean to you to live in a democracy? [OPEN-END]	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
Guaranties of human rights	26%
Freedom of choice, thought, action	12%
Security and legal defense	12%
Freedom of speech	9%
Live in free and prosperous society	7%
Priority of law	7%
Free labor	7%
Financial prosperity	7%
Equality of citizens	5%
Means nothing	4%
Democracy	3%
Independence	2%
Democracy is not needed	2%
Free elections	1%
Concurrence of opinions of people and State	1%
Others	6%
Don't know/No response	20%
<i>Total</i>	131%*

*Multiple Responses Allowed

TABLE 47. DEMOCRACY AS SOLUTION TO ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Q-59. Would being a democracy promote the solution of our economic problems, or create obstacles to the solution of our economic problems, or does it not make a difference?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Promote solutions	57%
2. Create Obstacles	8%
3. It does not makes a difference	17%
4. Don't know/No response	18%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 48. BENEFITS OF DEMOCRACY

Q-60. In your opinion, will Tajikistan being a democratic society benefit most of the people, or would this benefit just a few people at the top?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Benefit most of the people	60%
2. Benefit just a few people at the top	26%
3. There will be no benefit (Volunteered)	4%
4. Don't know/No response	10%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 49. MODEL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Q-61. Which foreign country -- if any -- do you think could be a model for Tajikistan's economic development? [OPEN-END]	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
Uzbekistan	17%
USA	13%
Russia	13%
Germany	9%
China	7%
Other West European countries	6%
Turkey	5%
Iran	5%
Japan	5%
Switzerland	3%
England	2%
Former USSR	1%
Former Tajik SSR	j
Others	13%
Should be its own way	2%
Don't know/No response	13%

TABLE 50. MODEL FOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Q-62. Which foreign country -- if any -- do you think could be a model for Tajikistan's political development? [OPEN-END]	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
Uzbekistan	16%
Russia	14%
USA	12%
Germany	8%
China	6%
Turkey	5%
Iran	4%
Switzerland	3%
England	2%
Other West European countries	4%
Saudi Arabia	1%
Former USSR	1%
Former Tajik SSR	j
Others	11%
Should be its own way	2%
Don't know/No response	18%

TABLE 51. KNOWLEDGE OF REPRESENTATIVE

Q-63. Do you happen to know the name of Deputy of the <i>Majlisi Oli</i> who represents this area?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	53%
2. No	44%
3. Don't know/No response	3%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 52. PERFORMANCE OF REPRESENTATIVE

Q-64. How well does the Deputy of the <i>Majlisi Oli</i> from this area represent your views and interests before the government in Dushanbe: very well, fairly well, fairly poorly, or very poorly?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Very well	6%
2. Fairly well	17%
3. Fairly poorly	23%
4. Very poorly	28%
5. Don't know/No response	26%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 53. DOMICILE OF REPRESENTATIVE

Q-65. Should the job of Deputy of the <i>Majlisi Oli</i> be a full-time job with the members living in Dushanbe, or should it be a part-time job with members living part of the year in their districts?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Full-time job/Living in Dushanbe	20%
2. Part-time job/Live in districts part of the year	68%
3. Don't know/No response	12%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 54. RESPONSIBILITIES OF REPRESENTATIVE

Q-66. Should Deputies of the <i>Majlisi Oli</i> have other responsibilities in government, or should they work only as Deputies?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Have other responsibilities	46%
2. Work full-time as deputy	42%
3. Don't know/No response	11%
<i>Total</i>	99%U

TABLE 55. ATTITUDES TOWARDS VOTING

Q-67 thru Q-69. Let me now ask you a few questions about voting in general. Please tell me whether you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely with these statements:	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
67. "Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decisions made in our country."	
Agree completely	32%
Agree somewhat	32%
Disagree somewhat	16%
Disagree completely	10%
Don't know	10%
68. "When government authorities must be elected by the people in order to keep their power (position in government), they will be more concerned with people's needs."	
Agree completely	37%
Agree somewhat	35%
Disagree somewhat	13%
Disagree completely	7%
Don't know	7%

TABLE 56. VOTING AND RIGHTS

Q-69. Please tell me whether you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely with these statements:	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
"When government authorities must be elected by the people in order to keep their position in government, they will have more respect for the rights of the people."	
Agree completely	37%
Agree somewhat	35%
Disagree somewhat	13%
Disagree completely	7%
Don't know	7%

TABLE 57. IMPORTANCE OF RIGHT TO VOTE

Q-70. On the subject of voting, some people say the right to vote is the most important right of the people. But others say that different rights are most important. Which of these views is closer to your own?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Voting is most important right	70%
2. Voting is not most important right	22%
3. Don't know/No response	8%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 58. INFORMATION ON CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Q-71. How much have you heard or read about the Central Election Commission of Tajikistan -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. A great deal	4%
2. A fair amount	12%
3. Not very much	31%
4. Nothing at all	46%
5. Don't know/No Response	7%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 59. IMPARTIALITY OF CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Q-72. [IF AWARE] With which of the following statements do you agree more:	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. The Central Election Commission of Tajikistan is a completely neutral body, guided in its work only by the law	16%
2. The Central Election Commission of Tajikistan makes decisions which favor particular candidates or which the government wants	21%
3. Don't know/No response	10%
NOT ASKED	52%
<i>Total</i>	99% U

TABLE 60. OPINION OF ELECTION LAWS

Q-74. What is your overall opinion of the election laws of Tajikistan -- does it seem to you that they are in need of reform or not in need of reform?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. In need of reform	36%
2. Not in need of reform	15%
3. Don't know/No response	48%
<i>Total</i>	99% T

TABLE 61. VOTE IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS?

Q-75. In November 1994, the election for President took place. Did you happen to vote in this election?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	85%
2. No	14%
3. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 62. LIKELIHOOD OF VOTING IN 1999 ELECTIONS

Q-76. In 1999, there will occur elections for both the President and the members of Parliament. How likely is it that you will vote in these elections: is it definite, very likely, possibly, or fairly unlikely you will vote -- or will you definitely not vote?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Definitely will vote	54%
2. Very likely will vote	20%
3. Possibly will vote	19%
4. Rather unlikely will vote	3%
5. Definitely will not vote	2%
6. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 63. HONESTY OF ELECTIONS

Q-77. Do you expect that these elections in 1999 will be honest, and that those persons declared to have won will have actually received the greatest number of votes, or do you not expect this?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Expect honest elections	54%
2. Do not expect honest elections	32%
3. Don't know/No response	14%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 64. IDEAL NUMBER OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Q-78. What do you think would be the ideal number of political parties to have in Tajikistan -- none, one two, several, or many?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. None	11%
2. One	47%
3. Two	10%
4. Several	12%
5. Many	6%
6. Don't know/No response	15%
<i>Total</i>	101% ^T

TABLE 65. AWARENESS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Q-79. Which political parties are you aware of? [OPEN-END; LIST ALL RESPONSES]	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Communist Party	81%
2. Democracy Party A (Shodmon Yusouf)	31%
3. Islamic Revival Party	30%
4. Rastokhez (National Movement)	25%
5. The Popular Party of Tajikistan	14%
6. Pamiri Cultural and Social Organization	10%
7. Democracy Party (Almaty Platform)	9%
8. Party of Popular Unity of Tajikistan	7%
9. Party of Political and Economic Renovation of Tajikistan	2%
10. Party of Union (ITTIHOD)	2%
11. The Party of Justice of Tajikistan	2%
12. Ehyai Milli	1%
13. The Congress of Popular Unity of Tajikistan	1%
14. Other Party	j
15. Don't know/No response	14%

TABLE 66. IDENTIFICATION WITH POLITICAL PARTY

Q-80. Which of the political parties listed below best represents the views and interests of people like you?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Communist Party	60%
2. The Popular Party of Tajikistan	7%
3. Party of Popular Unity of Tajikistan	5%
4. Party of Political and Economic Renovation of Tajikistan	2%
5. Islamic Revival Party	2%
6. Democracy Party A (Shodmon Yusouf)	2%
7. Democracy Party (Almaty Platform)	1%
8. The Party of Justice of Tajikistan	1%
9. Rastokhez (National Movement)	j
10. Party of Union (ITTIHOD)	j
11. The Congress of Popular Unity of Tajikistan	j
12. Pamiri Cultural and Social Organization	j
13. Ehyai Milli	j
14. Other party	2%
15. None	22%

TABLE 67. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PARTIES?

Q-81. In general, do you find that there are clear differences between the various political parties in how they would propose to solve the important problems facing Tajikistan, or are there not clear differences between the parties?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. There are clear differences	51%
2. There are no clear differences	19%
3. Don't know/No response	30%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 68. GOALS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Q-82. Some people say the political parties are only interested in obtaining political power. Others say the political parties really want to help improve the situation in Tajikistan. Which of these views is closest to your own?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Parties only interested in obtaining power	42%
2. Parties want to improve the situation in Tajikistan	28%
3. Neither [Volunteered]	6%
4. Both [Volunteered]	11%
5. Don't know/No response	14%
<i>Total</i>	101% T

TABLE 69. ATTRACTIVENESS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Q-83. If a candidate for public office were a member of a political party, would that fact make you more likely or less likely to vote for that candidate, or would it not make a difference to you?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. More likely	33%
2. Less likely	7%
3. No difference	55%
4. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	101% T

TABLE 70. OPEN CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT

Q-84. In your opinion, is it appropriate or not appropriate for politicians who disagree with the government to openly criticize the President and the Government?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Is appropriate	53%
2. Is not appropriate	38%
3. Don't know/No response	10%
<i>Total</i>	101% T

TABLE 71. CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Q-85 thru Q-87. I would like to ask you about several organs of the justice system. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them in the matter of fairness and justice: a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all.						
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)					
	<i>Great Deal</i>	<i>Fair Amount</i>	<i>Not Very Much</i>	<i>None At All</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>Total</i>
85. The Courts	10%	28%	27%	26%	8%	99% ^U
86. The Public Prosecutor's Office	10%	26%	26%	29%	9%	100%
87. The Militia	9%	21%	22%	42%	6%	100%

TABLE 72. SOCIAL POSITION OF WOMEN

Q-88. Generally, are women in Tajikistan today subordinate to men, or are women have equal rights to men -- or do they have the superior position to men?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Women subordinate to men	36%
2. Women equal to men	59%
3. Women have superior position to men	3%
4. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	99% ^U

TABLE 73. IDEAL SOCIAL CONDITION OF WOMEN

Q-89. Which situation, in your opinion, ought to prevail: should women in Tajikistan today be subordinate to men, or should women be equal to men -- or should they be superior to men?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Women should be subordinate to men	21%
2. Women should be equal to men	76%
3. Women should be superior to men	2%
4. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 74. CAUSE OF PROBLEMS IN SOCIETY

Q-90. Please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following statement: "There are particular ethnic, religious, regional, or political groups which are causing problems in our society today."	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Agree strongly	30%
2. Agree somewhat	26%
3. Disagree somewhat	5%
4. Disagree strongly	9%
5. Don't know/No response	30%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 75. GROUPS CAUSING PROBLEMS

Q-91. [IF AGREE] What groups do you have in mind? [OPEN-END]	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
Regional	13%
Religious	13%
Political	7%
Opposition groups	5%
Islamic Renaissance Party	5%
Military groups	4%
National groups	5%
Rastokhez	2%
Democratic Party	1%
Mafia	2%
National Front	1%
Others	4%
All groups	2%
Don't know/No response	12%
Not asked	41%
<i>Total</i>	117%*

*Multiple Responses allowed

TABLE 76. IMPORTANT QUALITIES FOR PRESIDENT

Q-92. On this card [SHOW CARD] is a list of qualities which a President of the nation might or might not have. Please indicate the four qualities which you consider to be the most important:

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Honest and trustworthy	91%
2. Cares about the needs of people like you	63%
3. Has new ideas for reforming the country	38%
4. A family man with traditional values	22%
5. A strong leader who can get things done	65%
6. Has close ties to Russia	46%
7. Has close ties to the West	18%
8. Has close ties to the Muslim world	14%
9. Promotes tolerance between all people of Tajikistan	29%
10. Preserves the old system	9%
11. Protects his own interests and those of his family	4%

TABLE 77. IDEAL REGION FOR PRESIDENT

Q-93. In an ideal situation, from which region of the country should a future President come?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Dushanbe City	4%
2. Gorno-Badakhshan	j
3. Khatlon {In general}	j
4. Kulyab region of Khatlon	1%
5. Kurgan-Tyube region of Khatlon	1%
6. Leninabad Oblast	31%
7. Region of Republican Subordination	2%
8. Does not matter [Volunteered]	59%
9. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 78. TAX RATES

Q-94. Some people say they prefer to pay less in taxes to the state, even if this means the government will have to cut back on services it provides to citizens. Others say they prefer to keep the current level of taxes in order to preserve the current level of services. Which view is closer to your own?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Cut taxes/Cut back services	20%
2. Maintain taxes & services	57%
3. I get no services [Volunteered]	13%
4. Don't know/No response	10%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 79. EFFECT OF CIVIL WAR

Q-95. My next question concerns the civil war in Tajikistan. Were you and your family directly affected by the civil war in some way, or were you not directly affected? [IF AFFECTED] How was it that you were affected by the civil war?

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Not affected	54%
2. Lost a family member in the war, or family member was wounded	9%
3. Became refugees/moved because of the war	18%
4. Lost property due to the war	9%
5. Suffered economically because of the war	21%
6. Was threatened, had a scary incident in the war	5%
7. Suffered a different "Rights" violation	6%
8. Other responses	4%
9. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	128%*

*Multiple Responses Allowed

TABLE 80. DISLOCATED AFTER THE WAR?

Q-96. [IF BECAME REFUGEES] Are you now living in the same place as where you lived before the war?

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	16%
2. No	6%
3. Don't know/No response	1%
NOT ASKED	76%
<i>Total</i>	99% T

TABLE 81. LIKELIHOOD OF RESUMED FIGHTING

Q-97. As you know, although most of the fighting has come to an end, some serious fighting continues in the east. Do you think this fighting will spread, or will it not?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Fighting will spread	48%
2. Fighting is over	26%
3. Don't know/No response	26%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 82. NECESSITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Q-99. Is it necessary for citizens to form organizations (groups) to solve problems in their communities (Makhalas, Kishlak, Rayon, City) without government involvement, or not?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Necessary	35%
2. Not necessary	49%
3. Don't know/No response	16%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 83. GROUPS LIKELY TO JOIN

Q-100. Which of the following groups listed on this card [HAND CARD] -- if any -- would you most likely join:	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. An educational organization	13%
2. A religious organization	2%
3. An organization which helps people in need	23%
4. A women's organization	12%
5. A youth organization	11%
6. An environmental protection organization	6%
7. Organizations which defend interests of an ethnic group	2%
8. A political party	3%
9. Other	5%
10. None	24%
11. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	112%*

*Multiple Responses Allowed

TABLE 84. GROUPS IN COMMUNITY

Q-101. Do you know of any such organizations (groups) which exist in your community?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Know of such organizations	23%
2. Do not know of such organizations	56%
3. Don't know/No response	21%
<i>Total</i>	100%

Demographics**T**ABLE 85 (A) . EMPLOYMENT

Q-102. What is your current employment situation? Are you:	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Self-employed	9%
2. Employed full-time at one job	41%
3. Employed part-time at one job	5%
4. Employed at more than one job (part-time)	2%
5. A homemaker	15%
6. Student	3%
7. Pensioner/Invalid	12%
8. Not employed	14%
9. No response	j
<i>Total</i>	99% T

TABLE 85 (B). OCCUPATION

Q-103. Employment position/Occupation	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Collective Farmer	11%
2. Farmer, tenant	1%
3. Worker: Industry	9%
4. Worker: Trade, Services	4%
5. Unskilled laborer	3%
6. Office workers	2%
7. Engineers, industrialists	5%
8. Non-industrial specialist	16%
9. Businessmen	3%
10. Head of enterprise	2%
11. Military, law-enforcement	1%
Not working	42%
<i>Total</i>	98% T

TABLE 86. MARITAL STATUS

Q-104. What is your marital status? Are you:	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Now married	77%
2. Single and never married	11%
3. Divorced	4%
4. Widowed	8%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 87. CHILDREN

Q-105. Do you have any children? How many?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. None	18%
2. One	10%
3. Two	18%
4. Three	16%
5. Four	14%
6. Five	12%
7. More than five	13%
8. Don't know	1%
<i>Total</i>	102% T

TABLE 88. CHILDREN LIVING AT HOME

Q-106. [IF HAVE CHILDREN] How many of your children live with you?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. None	20%
2. One	16%
3. Two	17%
4. Three	16%
5. Four	14%
6. Five	10%
7. More than five	7%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 89. ETHNIC HERITAGE

Q-107. What is your main ethnic heritage?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Tajik	64%
2. Uzbek	22%
3. Russian	5%
4. Kulyabi	1%
5. Kurgan-Teppagi	1%
6. Khojandi	3%
7. Pamiri	3%
8. Gharmi	j
9. Kazak	j
10. Kyrgyz	j
11. Other	3%
12. No response	j
<i>Total</i>	102% T

TABLE 90. BIRTHPLACE

Q-108. In which region of the country were you born?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Dushanbe City	6%
2. Gorno-Badakhshan/Pamira	4%
3. Khatlon (In General)	1%
4. Kulyab Region of Khatlon	13%
5. Kurgan-Tyube Region of Khatlon	18%
6. Leninabad <i>Oblast</i>	30%
7. Regions of Republican Subordination	22%
8. Not born in Tajikistan	7%
9. Don't know/No response	j
<i>Total</i>	101% ^T

TABLE 91. PRIMARY AFFILIATIONS

Q-109. Which is of more importance to you: your regional origin, your ethnicity or your national citizenship?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Regional origin	10%
2. Ethnicity	42%
3. National citizenship	27%
4. Equally important [Volunteered]	12%
5. I don't care about any [Volunteered]	9%
6. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	101% ^T

TABLE 92. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING A TAJIKISTANI

Q-110. What are your feelings about saying you are a citizen of Tajikistan: proud, content, indifferent, not content, ashamed?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Proud	54%
2. Content	23%
3. Indifferent	9%
4. Not content	5%
5. Ashamed	7%
6. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	99%U

TABLE 93. CLAN MEMBERSHIP

Q-111. Are you a member of a clan?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	68%
2. No	25%
3. Don't know/No response	7%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 94. TRUST IN LEADERSHIP

Q-112. Which of these leaders do you trust the most to do what is right for the people? If you don't trust any, please tell me so. [Read the options]	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Leader of Clan	25%
2. Leader of <i>Makhala</i>	3%
3. Chairman of <i>Jamoat</i>	5%
4. <i>Imami Mosquit</i>	1%
5. Deputy of <i>Majlisi Oli</i>	1%
6. Deputy of District or <i>Rayon Majlisi</i>	1%
7. Chairman (<i>Hakim</i>) of <i>Wiloyat</i>	2%
8. President of Republic	28%
9. Do not trust any [Volunteered]	27%
10. Don't know/No response	7%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 95. DISCRIMINATION

Q-113. Have you ever experienced instances of discrimination because of your regional origin or ethnicity since the day of independence?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	22%
2. No	70%
3. Don't know/No response	8%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 96. LANGUAGE

Q-114. What language do you speak in your home?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Tajik	65%
2. Uzbek	18%
3. Russian	8%
4. Tajik and Russian	2%
5. Uzbek and Russian	1%
6. Tajik and Uzbek	3%
6. Other combinations of languages	1%
7. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 97. TAJIK AS NATIONAL LANGUAGE

Q-115. Should all citizens be encouraged to speak Tajik in our country?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	78%
2. No	20%
3. Don't know/No response	3%
<i>Total</i>	101% T

TABLE 98. BELIEF IN GOD

Q-116. Do you believe in God?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	97%
2. No	3%
3. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	101% ^T

TABLE 99. RELIGION

Q-117. Are you the member of a religion? Which one:	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Islam/Muslim	90%
2. Orthodox	4%
3. Other Christian	1%
4. Judaism	j
5. Buddhist	j
6. Other	1%
7. Do not belong to any church	2%
8. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 100. WEEKLY RELIGIOUS PRACTICES

Q-118. [IF ISLAM] In a typical week, will you go to the mosque on Friday?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	13%
2. No	78%
3. Don't know/No response	1%
NOT ASKED	9%
<i>Total</i>	101% U

TABLE 101. DAILY RELIGIOUS PRACTICES

Q-119. {IF ISLAM} In a typical day, how often will you pray?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1 time	2%
2 times	2%
3 times	2%
4 times	27%
5 times	1%
Don't pray	59%
Don't know	1%
NOT ASKED	7%
<i>To tal</i>	101% U

TABLE 102. EMPLOYER

Q-120. Do you or your spouse work for a factory or farm owned by the state?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	65%
2. No	35%
3. Don't know/No response	j
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 103. EMIGRATION PLANS

Q-121. Are you planning to leave Tajikistan to live in another country?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	9%
2. No	89%
3. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 104. COUNTRIES LIKELY TO MOVE TO

Q-122. {IF PLAN TO MOVE} To what country are you planning to move? (OPEN ENDED)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
Russia	5%
Uzbekistan	2%
USA	1%
Others	1%
Don't know/No response	j
NOT ASKED	91%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 105. REASONS FOR LEAVING

Q-123. {IF PLAN TO MOVE] What is the main reason you are planning to leave Tajikistan? (OPEN ENDED)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Economic/political instability	2%
2. Very difficult to live	1%
3. Economic difficulties	2%
4. Search for a better life	1%
5. Departure of relatives	1%
6. To realize own opportunities	1%
7. Lack of confidence in future	1%
8. Departure of Russian population	j
9. To work	j
10. Don't know/No response	j
11. Not asked	91%
<i>Total</i>	101% U

TABLE 106. AGE

Q-124. What is your age please?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. 18-24	18%
2. 25-34	27%
3. 35-44	26%
4. 45-54	14%
5. 55-64	8%
6. 65-74	5%
7. 75+	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 107. EDUCATION

Q-125. What is the highest level of education you received?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Less than 4 years at school	4%
2. Completed primary, less than 7 years	5%
3. Some secondary, less than 10 years	7%
4. Completed secondary technical school 7-8 years	3%
5. Completed high school 10-11 years	34%
6. Professional technical school 10-11 years	6%
7. Specialized technical education	17%
8. Some university	4%
9. Completed university	19%
10. Post-graduate education	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 108. FINANCIAL POSITION (SELF IDENTIFICATION)

Q-126. Please evaluate for me the financial position of your family:	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. High	1%
2. Higher than moderate	5%
3. Moderate	49%
4. Lower than moderate	21%
5. Lowest	24%
5. Don't know/No response	j
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 109. TELEPHONE

Q-127. Do you have a telephone in your home?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	11-24/12-14 (1500)
1. Yes	26%
2. No	74%
3. Don't know/No response	j
<i>Total</i>	100%