Public Opinion In Ukraine 1999

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Gary A. Ferguson October 1999

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Introduction	1
Background and Overview	2
Political Environment	
Interest in Politics and Government	3
Dissatisfaction with Conditions Remains Ubiquitous	4
Reasons for Dissatisfaction and Steps needed to Improve Situation	5
Generations Divided over Market Economy	6
Pace of the Transition to a Market Economy	7
Further Measure of Desired Extent of Market Reform	8
The Meaning of a Market Economy	8
Economic Reforms Occurring Too Slowly	9
Economic Outlook Remains Pessimistic	
Executive Branch Most Likely to Resolve Economic Problems	
A Plurality Says the President is most Responsible for Impeding Economic Refo	
Corruption and Flawed Legislation Seen As Reform Impediments	
Black Market Activities	
Black Market Goods	
Black Market Services	
Ukrainians Divided on the Importance of Foreign Investments	
Political Reforms Occurring Too Slowly	
Citizens Say Ukraine is Not a Democracy	
Meaning of Democracy	
Perception of Vote Efficacy Improving	
Other Measures of Efficacy	
1998 Voting	
No Party Best Represents Ukrainians' Views and Interests	
High Voter Turnout Expected in 1999	21
1999 Presidential Election	
Kuchma's Bid for Reelection	
The Presidential Election Environment	
Party Affiliation	
Distinctions between Candidates	
Confidence in Presidential Candidates	
Candidate Support Profiles	
Run-off Scenarios	
Voting Issues	
Perceptions about the Election Process	31

Contents

Views on Political	Parties	36
	Political Parties	
The Importance	ce of Having at Least Two Parties Competing in an Election	37
	etween Parties	
	sts Not Represented by Parties	
	Composition of the Supreme Rada	
	arty Seen As Most Effective in Rada	
Plurality Says	Military Personnel Compelled to Vote	43
Eanstein Madala (a.		
	r Ukraine's Development	
	n as the Best Economic Model	
United States	Seen as the Best Political Model	44
		45
	rd Land Ownership by Ukrainians and Foreigners	
	ng Treating of Land as Private Property	
Ownership ver	rsus Leasing	45
Nongovernmental	Organizations	48
	om Government Participation are Possible	
	en as Necessary	
	en as necessary	43
Importance of Cert	ain Rights	50
Confidence in Insti	itutions and Individuals	E 4
	itutions and Individuals	
	itutions and Individuals nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court	
Few Understar	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court	52
Few Understan	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court	52
Few Understan Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion Widespread and Serious	52 53 54
Few Understan Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion Nidespread and Serious zens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life	52 53 54 54
Few Understan Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion Widespread and Serious	52 53 54 54
Few Understan Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion <i>W</i> idespread and Serious zens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life Believed to be Common in Ukrainian Institutions	52 53 54 54 55
Few Understan Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz Corruption is E Public Information	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion Nidespread and Serious zens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life Believed to be Common in Ukrainian Institutions	52 53 54 54 55 56
Few Understan Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz Corruption is E Public Information Information ab	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion	52 53 54 54 55 56
Few Understan Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz Corruption is E Public Information Information ab Information ab	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion Nidespread and Serious zens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life Believed to be Common in Ukrainian Institutions	52 53 54 55 55 56 56
Few Understan Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz Corruption is E Public Information Information ab Information ab	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion Widespread and Serious zens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life Believed to be Common in Ukrainian Institutions bout Rights under the Constitution bout Political and Economic Developments	52 53 54 55 55 56 56
Few Understan Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz Corruption is E Public Information Information ab Information ab Main Sources Assessment of the	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion Widespread and Serious zens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life Believed to be Common in Ukrainian Institutions bout Rights under the Constitution bout Political and Economic Developments of Information	52 53 54 55 56 56 56 57 59
Few Understant Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz Corruption is E Public Information Information ab Information ab Main Sources Assessment of the Objectivity	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion	52 53 54 55 56 56 56 57 59
Few Understant Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz Corruption is E Public Information Information ab Information ab Main Sources Assessment of the Objectivity	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion Widespread and Serious zens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life Believed to be Common in Ukrainian Institutions bout Rights under the Constitution bout Political and Economic Developments of Information	52 53 54 55 56 56 56 57 59
Few Understant Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz Corruption is E Public Information Information ab Main Sources Assessment of the Objectivity Role of Media	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion Widespread and Serious zens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life Believed to be Common in Ukrainian Institutions bout Rights under the Constitution bout Political and Economic Developments of Information	52 53 54 55 56 56 56 57 59 59 59
Few Understant Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz Corruption is E Public Information Information ab Main Sources Assessment of the Objectivity Role of Media	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion	52 53 54 55 56 56 56 57 59 59 59
Few Understant Ethics and Corrupt Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz Corruption is E Public Information Information ab Main Sources Assessment of the Objectivity Role of Media	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion Widespread and Serious zens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life Believed to be Common in Ukrainian Institutions bout Rights under the Constitution bout Political and Economic Developments of Information	52 53 54 55 56 56 56 57 59 59 59
Few Understant Ethics and Corruption Corruption is V Ukrainian Citiz Corruption is E Public Information Information ab Main Sources Assessment of the Objectivity Role of Media	nd the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court tion Widespread and Serious zens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life Believed to be Common in Ukrainian Institutions bout Rights under the Constitution bout Political and Economic Developments of Information	

Introduction

As part of its ongoing program in Ukraine, the International Foundation for Election Systems commissioned Gary A. Ferguson and SOCIS-Gallup, Kyiv, to conduct a national survey of the Ukrainian electorate. In all, 1,484 interviews with adults age 18 and older were conducted between June 16 and 23, 1999.

The total sample includes a national representative sample of 1,200 interviews and proportional oversamples of 40 interviews in Kyiv (for a total of n=100) and 244 interviews in Crimea (for a total of n=300). The sample was weighted by sex and region and is representative of the population by age, sex, ethnicity, and region.

All surveys are subject to errors caused by interviewing a sample of persons rather than the entire population. The margin of error for a sample of 1,200 persons is 2.9 percentage points at 95 percent confidence. For most questions and in annotated tables, the equation "n=x" signifies the number of respondents per question.

The principal analyst for this survey was Gary A. Ferguson, Senior Vice President of American Viewpoint, Inc. Interviewing was conducted by SOCIS-Gallup, Kyiv, under the direction of Anastasia Tankovska. The questionnaire was a joint effort of the principal analyst and IFES staff, including the project director Michael Conway, IFES Senior Program Officer for Europe and NIS, David Earl, IFES Project Director in Ukraine, and Rakesh Sharma, Applied Research Officer.

This is the fifth in a series of national surveys of the Ukrainian electorate. The first was fielded in December 1994, the second in May 1996, the third in July 1997, and the fourth in June 1998.

This survey report:

- " provides a description of the political environment in Ukraine;
- " examines views toward economic and political reform;
- " views the public perspective on the upcoming presidential election;
- " examines voting patterns;
- " assesses the outlook for political participation;
- " gauges the viability of political parties and NGOs;
- " examines ethics and corruption issues, and
- " profiles the level of public information and provides an assessment of the mass media.

Background and Overview

On the eve of the 1999 presidential election, this survey finds that Ukrainians remain overwhelmingly dissatisfied with conditions in the country. More than half (59 percent) are owed back wages or pension payments (42 percent for three months or more), and they see corruption as an enormous problem. They are pessimistic about future economic conditions and lack confidence in the ability of their leaders to solve the nation's problems.

Although the nation believes that economic and political reforms are occurring too slowly or not at all, there is less support for a market economy than in the past and a plurality says that a market economy should be approached with steady but small steps.

The president is the official seen as most likely to solve the nation's economic problems and, at the same time, the one most responsible for impeding economic reform. At the time this survey was conducted, far too early to serve as a predictor of election results, President Kuchma remained vulnerable in his reelection bid—with just 26 percent saying he deserves reelection. Nevertheless, he held a slim lead over other contenders because of the multi-candidate field and fragmented electorate. Natalia Vitrenko had gained momentum as of June and presented the most formidable challenge in terms of a two-way runoff.

Ukraine is not perceived to be a democracy by a growing majority, and the perception of vote efficacy remains low. Nevertheless, there has been an increase in the number who say that voting gives them a chance to influence decision-making, and projected turnout for the October election is high. Still, interest in politics and government is at its lowest point since IFES began surveying the electorate in 1994.

It appears that young people remain less likely to vote than older people. Our survey indicates that turnout among those under 45 years of age was 13 percent lower than among those age 45 and older.

Ukrainians say that the media have the responsibility to provide in-depth analysis of candidates and parties in order to aid voters' decision-making. However, the media are said to have shown partisan support for candidates or parties in their coverage of the presidential election thus far.

Although there has been an improvement in information levels regarding political and economic affairs, a majority still does not have a good understanding of the presidential election process. As a result, IFES is heavily involved in public education efforts to improve voters' understanding of the process.

Political Environment

Interest in Politics and Government

On the eve of the presidential election, interest in politics and government is at its lowest level (43 percent) since IFES began its surveys of the Ukrainian electorate in 1994. Only 13 percent are very interested while 21 percent are not at all interested. This represents a 7 percent decline since the immediate post-election period in 1998 and a rather steep drop since 1997.




Figure 1. Interest in Politics and Government¹

Only Kyiv and the North show a majority interested. Men (53 percent) remain far more interested than women (35 percent). Men 45 and older (57 percent) are the most interested, but men age 18-44 (49 percent) are much more interested than either younger (32 percent) or older women (37 percent).

Interest increases with education (from 37 percent of those with less than a secondary education to 58 percent of those with university degrees), but there is little difference between ethnic Ukrainians (43 percent) and ethnic Russians (40 percent) or urban (43 percent) versus rural (42 percent) residents.

Interest rises with assessment of vote efficacy, belief in the necessity of political parties and the importance of party competition in elections. Economic optimists are far more interested (64 percent) than those who say the economy will remain the same (41 percent) or worsen (42 percent).

Naturally, 1998 voters (47 percent) are more interested than non-voters (30 percent) as are those who plan to vote in 1999 (51 percent versus 20 percent of those who are not likely). So too are those who understand the election process (55 percent versus 34 percent of those

¹ "How interested are you in matters of politics and government - are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?" (n=1200)

who do not). Those who have some confidence in the ability of the presidential candidates to solve the nation's problems are more interested (53 percent) than those who have little or no interest (41 percent). Supporters of Marchuk (58 percent), Moroz (57 percent) and Symonenko (51 percent) are more interested than Kuchma (45 percent) or Vitrenko (45 percent) supporters. Other IFES research (see Russia 1995) indicates that interest in politics is strongly correlated with voter turnout.


The following table profiles interest by region, age, and sex.

	Very/Somewhat Interested	Not Too/Not At All Interested		Very/Somewhat Interested	Not Too/Not At All Interested
Kyiv	60%	40%	Male	53%	46%
Northern	51%	47%	Female	35%	63%
Central	42%	55%			
Northeast	37%	62%			
Northwest	40%	59%	18-24	38%	61%
Southeast	47%	51%	25-34	41%	57%
West	36%	62%	35-44	43%	56%
Southwest	45%	55%	45-54	46%	54%
South	39%	60%	55-64	44%	54%
Crimea	43%	56%	65+	44%	54%
East	40%	58%			

Figure 2. Interest in Politics (by region, sex, and age)

Dissatisfaction with Conditions Remains Ubiquitous





Once again, nearly all Ukrainians (94 percent) are dissatisfied with conditions in the country. Only 2 percent are satisfied while a majority in all regions except the Southwest (47 percent) are very dissatisfied.

² "Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today?" (n=1200)

Reasons for Dissatisfaction and Steps Needed to Improve Situation

Poor living conditions (35 percent), unemployment (29 percent), and payment arrears (27 percent) are the most commonly cited reasons for citizens' dissatisfaction.

Living conditions are mentioned more often by those age 45 and older (38 percent of men versus 40 percent of women), ethnic Russians (44 percent versus 32 percent of Ukrainians), and urban residents (40 percent versus 27 percent of those in rural areas). Also, Symonenko supporters (42 percent), advocates of central planning (40 percent), and those who are not owed back payments (42 percent) frequently cite living conditions as the source of their dissatisfaction.

Unemployment is more of a concern to those under age 45 (34 percent among men and 39 percent among women), among Vitrenko supporters (34 percent), and those who would like to pursue a market economy as quickly as possible (36 percent).

The problem of payment arrears is more important to women 45 and older (39 percent), proponents of central planning (31 percent), Vitrenko supporters (31 percent), Symonenko supporters (32 percent), Moroz supporters (32 percent), and those who report being owed back payments for three months or longer (45 percent).

Reasons for Dissatisfaction		Steps Needed to Improve Situation		
Poor living conditions	35%	Stabilization of production	25%	
Unemployment	29%	Rotation of leading personnel	23%	
Payment arrears	27%	Acceleration of market reforms	13%	
Unstable economy	15%	Job creation activities	11%	
Power utilities	8%	Increase level of payments	9%	
Lack of social guarantees	5%	Social reform	6%	
Flawed legislation	4%	Tax reform	5%	
State corruption	4%	Return to old system	3%	
Unstable political situation	4%	Reduction in prices	2%	
Other	12%	Other	3%	

Figure 4. Dissatisfaction - Reasons and Remedies³

Ukrainians list "stabilization of production" (25 percent), "rotation of leading personnel" (23 percent), "legislative reform" (14 percent), "acceleration of market reforms" (13 percent), and "job creation activities" (11 percent) as the main steps needed to improve conditions in Ukraine.

Subgroup analysis indicates only minor variations from the mean scores.

³ "[IF DISSATISFIED] Please tell me some of the reasons why you said you are dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today?" (n=1200, Multiple responses allowed)

[&]quot;In your opinion, what needs to be done to improve the situation in Ukraine?" (n=1200, Multiple responses allowed)

Generations Divided Over Market Economy

Support for a market economy remains well below 1996-1997 levels as just 27 percent say that Ukraine should develop a market economy. This corresponds with the 25 percent support measured in 1998. Another 30 percent say Ukraine should have a centrally-planned economy, and 25 percent call for both in conjunction (trend data for this question is presented in question 5 in the Appendix).

Regionally, market economy scores are highest in Kyiv (48 percent), the Northeast (37 percent), and the West (34 percent). Residents of the Central and Southeastern regions (36 percent) are most likely to favor a centrally-planned economy while those in the East are most likely to favor both in conjunction (34 percent).

Men (34 percent) are more likely than women (22 percent) to support a market-based system, but women are no more likely to support central planning than men (31 percent versus 29 percent). They are, however, more likely to say they don't know which path of economic development is preferable (21 percent versus 11 percent).

The defining characteristic on this issue is age. Support for a market economy declines steadily with increasing age (from 43 percent among those age 18-24 to just 9 percent among those age 65 and older) and support for central planning increases with age. Men under 45 (44 percent) are more likely to support a market system than women under 45 (34 percent), men 45 and older (21 percent), or women 45 and older (12 percent).




Figure 5. Support for Market Economy, Overall and by Age⁴

Market support also increases with education (from 12 percent of those with less than a secondary education to 50 percent of those with university degrees). Urban residents (32 percent) are far more likely than rural residents (20 percent) to back a market approach.

⁴ "When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop a market economy or a centrally-planned economy?" (n=1200)

There are sharp differences between those who say that economic reform is occurring too slowly (40 percent favor a market economy, while 22 percent favor a centrally planned economy) and those who say reforms are not occurring at all (17 percent favor a market economy, while 39 percent favor a centrally planned economy). There are also differences between those who are owed back wages (23 percent favor a market economy, while 32 percent favor a planned economy) and those who are not (33 percent versus 27 percent). This is especially pronounced among those whose arrears are longer in duration (20 percent versus 36 percent).

Those who did not vote in 1998 are more supportive of a market economy (31 percent versus 26 percent) than those who voted (26 percent versus 32 percent). Supporters of Kuchma's reelection are more market-oriented (39 percent versus 21 percent) than those who say they would back someone else (24 percent versus 34 percent). Among presidential support bases, Marchuk's supporters are the most market-oriented (45 percent) followed by Kuchma's (38 percent) and Vitrenko's (24 percent). A majority of Symonenko supporters (58 percent) favor central planning as do a plurality of Moroz supporters (46 percent).

Pace of the Transition to a Market Economy

As noted since 1997, a plurality (33 percent) says Ukraine should work toward a market economy with steady but small reforms, while roughly equal numbers say "as quickly as possible" (23 percent) or "not at all" (19 percent).




Figure 6. Pace of Market Reforms⁵

Residents of the Northwest and the Southeast are the most likely to say a market economy should not be pursued (27 percent and 26 percent, respectively) while Kyiv and the Southwest are the regions where residents are most likely to want to move as quickly as possible (35 percent and 38 percent, respectively). Support for a rapid transition increases with education

⁵ "When it comes to our economic development, should we work toward a market economy as quickly as possible, with steady small reforms, or should we not pursue a market economy?" (n=1200)

but declines with age, and men under 45 are the most likely to want to move quickly toward a market economy (36 percent).

	As Soon as Possible	Steady Small Reforms	Should Not Pursue		As Soon as Possible	Steady Small Reforms	Should Not Pursue
Kyiv	35%	40%	19%	Males 18-44	36%	39%	11%
Northern	27%	35%	21%	Males 45+	23%	27%	29%
Central	21%	32%	17%	Females 18-44	25%	41%	14%
Northeast	21%	39%	19%	Females 45+	12%	26%	24%
Northwest	21%	25%	27%				
Southeast	14%	42%	26%				
West	24%	31%	12%				
Southwest	38%	26%	10%				
South	22%	37%	18%				
Crimea	24%	30%	20%				
East	24%	30%	20%				

Figure 7. Pace of Market Reforms, by region and age/sex

Once again, those who say that economic reforms are occurring too slowly appear to be market-oriented (35 percent say reforms should occur as quickly as possible, while 13 percent say they should not occur at all) while those who say reforms are not occurring at all are more inclined toward central planning (16 percent versus 26 percent). Patterns regarding presidential hopefuls' support bases are similar to those outlined in the previous question with Marchuk supporters (35 percent say reforms should occur as quickly as possible), Kuchma supporters (28 percent) and Vitrenko supporters (25 percent) more market-oriented than Moroz's (16 percent) or Symonenko's (8 percent).

Further Measure of Desired Extent of Market Reform

As in past surveys, Ukrainians cluster near the middle when asked, "On a scale of one to five where one means a pure market economy and five means completely centrally planned by the state, where on that scale should Ukraine be located in the future?" The mean score is 3.36, slightly tilted toward central planning. A plurality (26 percent) gives a score of three. Scores increase with age and decline with higher education. Urban residents are slightly more market oriented (3.25) than rural residents (3.54).

The Meaning of a Market Economy

It is telling that when asked the open-ended question, "In your opinion, what does a market economy mean?" a plurality (39 percent) cannot give an answer. This reflects a lack of broad understanding of the theoretical concept and helps explain the low levels of support for a market economy seen in recent surveys.


With the exception of residents of Kyiv (17 percent), a high percentage of all major subgroups answer "don't know." Such an answer is particularly high among women 45 and older (56 percent), those age 55-64 (48 percent) and 65 and older (62 percent), rural residents (49 percent), and undecided presidential voters (49 percent).

The second most common response is "freedom of enterprise" (21 percent).

Economic Reforms Occurring Too Slowly

Eight out of ten Ukrainians say that economic reforms are occurring too slowly (47 percent) or not at all (33 percent). The latter is a volunteered response. Only 3 percent say that reforms are happening too quickly.





Majorities in five regions (Kyiv–61 percent; North–57 percent; Central–50 percent; Southwest–62 percent; and South–55 percent) say that reforms are occurring too slowly while pluralities in the Northeast (44 percent) and East (46 percent) volunteer that reforms are not occurring. Men (55 percent) are more likely than women (42 percent) to say that reforms are occurring too slowly. A majority in all age and sex groups, except women 45 and older (34 percent say reforms are occurring too slowly, 35 percent say they are not

occurring, and 23 percent don't know), say that reforms are moving too slowly.

Ethnic Ukrainians are more likely to say that reforms are occurring too slowly (51 percent say they are occurring too slowly versus 30 percent who say they are not occurring at all) while ethnic Russians are evenly divided between those who say reforms are occurring too slowly (40 percent) and those who say not at all (39 percent).

Market proponents (69 percent) tend to think that reforms are occurring too slowly while those who favor central planning are most likely (42 percent) to say that reforms are not occurring. Kuchma supporters (50 percent), Vitrenko supporters (51 percent) and Marchuk supporters (65 percent) say that reforms are occurring too slowly while pluralities of those who support Symonenko (41 percent) and Moroz (43 percent) say reforms are not occurring.

"Don't know" responses generally rise with age (to 26 percent of those age 65 and older).

⁶ "In general, would you say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring too quickly, too slowly, or at about the right pace?" (n=1200)

Economic Outlook Remains Pessimistic

For the fourth consecutive year, a plurality of the respondents says they expect the economic situation will worsen. Only 7 percent think the economy will improve while 44 percent say it will worsen.





Figure 9. Future Economic Outlook⁷

No major subgroup is significantly more optimistic than the others. Several, however, are more pessimistic. These include: residents of the Northwest (54 percent say the economy will worsen), residents of the South (53 percent), residents of Crimea (52 percent), residents of East (52 percent), those age 45-54 (54 percent), and ethnic Russians (52 percent). Also included are those who say political (56 percent) and economic (54 percent) reforms are not occurring, those who say that Ukraine is not a democracy (55

percent), proponents of central planning (53 percent), those who are not likely to vote in 1999 (52 percent), and supporters of a new president (50 percent)--in particular, Symonenko supporters (50 percent) and Moroz supporters (59 percent).

⁷ "In your opinion will the economic situation in Ukraine in a year be better than it is now, remain the same, σ get worse?" (n=1200)

Executive Branch Most Likely to Resolve Economic Problems






As the presidential election approaches, this survey finds an increase in the number of Ukrainians who say the executive branch is most likely to resolve the economic problems facing the nation. In all, 26 percent name the executive (up 9 percent from 1998), 19 percent name the Supreme Rada (-2 percent), 3 percent name the judiciary (-2 percent), and 11 percent name local government (-5 percent after a 14 percent increase in 1998). Another 18 percent say "none" (-5 percent), and 22 percent don't know (+5 percent).

Residents of Kyiv (37 percent) and the Northwest (35 percent) are more likely than those of other regions to look to the president to resolve Ukraine's economic problems, while those who live in the Southeast and Southwest are more likely to look to the Supreme Rada (29 percent and 30 percent, respectively). Local government ratings are fairly evenly distributed while residents of the North and East are most likely to say that no division of the government will resolve the nation's problems (22 percent and 23 percent, respectively). A plurality of those who are interested in politics name the executive (30 percent) while a plurality of those who are not interested do not know who is most likely to resolve the nation's problems (27 percent).

⁸ "Thinking only of the Executive Branch, the Supreme Rada, the judiciary, and your local government, which of these four, in your opinion, is most likely to resolve the economic problems facing Ukraine in the next year?" (n=1200)

A Plurality Says the President Is Most Responsible for Impeding Economic Reform



Although a plurality believes the executive branch is most likely to resolve the economic problems, a plurality (32 percent) says that the president is the official most responsible for impeding the pace of economic reform. Figure 11 details the responses.

Only three regions, Kyiv (37 percent), the West (37 percent), and the Southwest (25 percent) show a plurality stating that the Rada is most responsible for impeding economic

reform. The likelihood of naming the Rada increases with education while the tendency to name the president decreases. There are no significant differences according to ethnicity or urban/rural status.

Those who say Ukraine is, or is becoming, a democracy are more likely to cite the Rada as most responsible (28 percent) while those who say Ukraine is not a democracy are more likely to name the president (38 percent). Market economy proponents are more likely to name the Rada (33 percent versus 28 who name the president) while those who prefer central planning are more likely to blame the president (37 percent versus 20 percent who blame the Rada).

Naturally, those who support Kuchma's reelection are more likely to blame the Rada (32 percent) than the president (20 percent) while Kuchma opponents are more likely to name the president (38 percent) than the Rada (19 percent). Supporters of presidential hopefuls other than Marchuk and Kuchma are more likely to name the president than the Rada.

Figure 11. Institutions Impeding Economic Reform⁹

⁹ "Between the various government bodies, which one of the following is most responsible for impeding the pace of economic reform?" (n=1200)

Corruption and Flawed Legislation Seen As Reform Impediments

When asked if economic reform is being impeded mainly by corruption, flawed legislation or over-regulation, 47 percent mention corruption, 31 percent mention flawed legislation, 5 percent mention over-regulation, and 15 percent don't know.




Figure 12. Impediments to Reform¹⁰

Respondents who say corruption impedes reform are more likely to be residents of Kyiv (64 percent) or the Central region (53 percent). In addition, men 45 and older (54 percent), those with university degrees (51 percent), those who say political reforms are not occurring (53 percent), Symonenko voters (51 percent), and Moroz voters (53 percent) are more likely than the average to name corruption.

Respondents who say flawed legislation is responsible are more likely to be residents

of the Southeast (41 percent), women age 18-44 (36 percent), unemployed (37 percent), market economy proponents (38 percent), and Marchuk supporters (37 percent).

¹⁰ "Do you think that economic reform is being impeded mainly by:..." (n=1200)

Black Market Activities

Respondents report that the black market is widely used to obtain both goods and services in Ukraine. As the following chart indicates, a majority say that at least a fair amount of both goods (71 percent) and services (62 percent) are provided to their community in this way.




Figure 12. Reliance on Black Market¹¹

Black Market Goods

Residents of Kyiv (62 percent) and the Southeast (51 percent) are most likely to say that a great deal of goods are obtained from the black market in their respective areas. Young people are more likely than their elders to say that a great deal of black market goods are being purchased (ranging from 50 percent of 18-24 year olds to 24 percent of those age 65 and older). The sale of black market goods appears to be more of an urban phenomenon than a rural one (47 percent say a great deal of black market goods are purchased versus 29 percent). Non-voters (in 1998) are more likely than voters to say a great deal of black market goods are purchased (50 percent versus 37 percent).


Black Market Services


Once again, residents of Kyiv (46 percent) and the Southeast (41 percent) are the most likely to report a great deal of activity, and older people are less likely to than younger people. Here too, urban residents are more likely (37 percent) than rural residents (19 percent) to say that a great deal of services are obtained in this way, and non-voters (36 percent) are more likely than voters (28 percent) to say so.

¹¹ "From what you have seen or heard, how many (goods/services) are provided in your community by organizations or private persons which break the law to a certain extent (do not pay tariffs or taxes, do not register an enterprise, etc.)?" (n=1200)

Ukrainians Divided on the Importance of Foreign Investments

As in 1997, the public is divided on how important foreign investments are to the economic recovery of Ukraine. In all, 43 percent say they are important (18 percent say they are very important) and 40 percent say they are not important (23 percent say they are not at all important).





Younger Ukrainians are more likely than older Ukrainians to note the importance of foreign investments. A majority of both men age 18-44 (52 percent) and women age 18-44 (54 percent) say foreign investments are important as compared with just 37 percent and 29 percent of their counterparts age 45 and older.

Kyiv (74 percent) and the North (53 percent) are the only regions where a majority of people holds this view. The perceived importance of foreign investment increases with education (from 24 percent among those with less than a secondary education to

64 percent of those with university degrees). Urban residents (48 percent) are more likely than rural residents (33 percent) to say foreign investments are important.

Market proponents (62 percent) are more inclined than either central planning advocates (27 percent) or those who favor combined approaches (47 percent) to say that foreign investments are important. Those who say Kuchma deserves reelection place a higher importance on such investments (50 percent) than those who call for a new president (40 percent). Among the various presidential support bases, Marchuk supporters (62 percent) and Kuchma supporters (48 percent) place greater importance on foreign investments than Vitrenko (40 percent), Symonenko (24 percent), or Moroz (44 percent) supporters.

¹² "In your opinion, how important are foreign investments to the economic recovery of our country?" (n=1200)

Political Reforms Occurring Too Slowly

As with economic reforms, the vast majority says that political reforms are occurring too slowly (43 percent) or volunteer that they are not occurring at all (26 percent).

	1997 (n=1200)	1998 (n=1200)	1999 (n=1200)
Too quickly	7%	13%	5%
Too slowly	56%	45%	43%
As they should	9%	8%	6%
Reforms not occurring	-	-	26%
Don't know	27%	31%	19%
Refused/NA	1%	4%	2%
	100%	101%	101%

Figure 14. Pace of Political Reforms¹³

~

However, only in Kyiv does a majority of respondents (53 percent) say reforms are occurring too slowly. A plurality of respondents in other regions says the same. Residents of the Central region (36 percent), the Northeast (32 percent), the East (36 percent) and Crimea (32 percent) are particularly likely to say that reforms are not occurring.

Those with less than a secondary education (36 percent of the sample) account for more than half (54 percent) of those who say that reforms are not occurring.

Advocates of a market economy and advocates of a planned economy also differ with respect to political reforms, but to a lesser degree. That is, market advocates tend to say reforms are occurring too slowly (57 percent) while a 35 percent plurality of central planning proponents say reforms are not occurring.

Again, Symonenko supporters (35 percent) and Moroz supporters (33 percent) are more likely to say that reforms are not occurring.

Citizens Say Ukraine is Not a Democracy

For the fourth consecutive year, a majority of Ukrainians says the country is not a democracy. In fact, this view is held by a larger majority (58 percent) than in years past.

Only 17 percent say the country is a democracy. This sentiment is more prevalent in Kyiv (27 percent), the Northwest (26 percent), the West (26 percent), and the Southwest (33 percent). A majority in most regions, however, says the nation is not a democracy. In fact, a majority of most major subgroups— including likely voters— believes the nation is not a democracy.

¹³ "In general, would you say that political reforms in Ukraine are occurring too quickly, too slowly, or at about the right pace?"

Among the supporters of particular presidential candidates, only Kuchma's are more likely to say that Ukraine is a democracy (26 percent versus 47 percent).

	Ukraine is a Democracy	Ukraine is not a	Both		Ukraine is a Democracy	Ukraine is not a	Both
		Democracy				Democracy	
Kyiv	27%	62%	6%	1996	20%	55%	NA
Northern	11%	59%	11%	1997	20%	52%	8%
Central	12%	57%	9%	1998	19%	55%	9%
Northeast	16%	65%	7%	1999	17%	58%	10%
Northwest	26%	46%	11%				
Southeast	23%	58%	6%				
West	26%	48%	12%				
Southwest	33%	37%	11%				
South	13%	60%	7%				
Crimea	13%	61%	6%				
East	9%	66%	14%				

In a follow-up question asked of those who said that Ukraine is not a democracy or who don't know, only 24 percent say that Ukraine is moving toward becoming a democracy, while 46 percent say it is not.

Meaning of Democracy

When asked, "What does it mean to you to live in a democracy?" respondents gave the following responses:

Democratic freedoms	28%
Observance of the Constitution	17%
Possibility to work and earn	12%
Confidence in the future	12%
Protection of human rights	11%
Social Security	9%
Other	7%

It is significant that one respondent in four cannot express an opinion about the meaning of democracy. Respondents in this group tend to be older women (42 percent of all "don't know" responses) with lower education levels (49 percent have less than a secondary education). Rural residents account for 51 percent of all "don't know" responses, but just 39 percent of the total sample.

¹⁴ "Would you say that Ukraine is a democracy, or is it not a democracy?" (n=1200)

Residents of Kyiv (47 percent), the West (42 percent) and the Southwest (40 percent) are most likely to mention democratic freedoms such as freedom of speech or freedom of the press. So too are younger respondents and those with higher levels of education.

It is interesting to note that responses from urban and rural residents are similar, with only two exceptions. The first is the high rate of "don't know" responses among rural residents mentioned earlier. The second is that urban residents are far more likely to mention "observance of the Constitution" (21 percent) as a component of democracy than rural residents (9 percent).

Perception of Vote Efficacy Improving

After three straight years of decline, and despite a drop-off in interest in politics and government, there is an increase in the number of Ukrainians who agree that "voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country." This variable is important for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is its relationship to voter turnout.

Some regions' residents are quite optimistic on the question of vote efficacy while others remain decidedly pessimistic. Near-majorities in both Kyiv (46 percent versus 43 percent) and the Southwest (44 percent to 41 percent) agree that voters can influence decision-making in Ukraine, and over 40 percent of respondents in several other regions agree.

	Agree	Disagree	Neither		Agree	Disagree	Neither
Kyiv	46%	43%	3%	1996	30%	60%	NA
Northern	43%	49%	1%	1997	28%	67%	2%
Central	31%	60%	1%	1998	25%	59%	9%
Northeast	44%	50%	3%	1999	35%	58%	2%
Northwest	33%	65%	1%				
Southeast	45%	51%	1%				
West	32%	53%	5%				
Southwest	44%	41%	-				
South	24%	71%	1%				
Crimea	23%	68%	1%				
East	30%	64%	4%				

Figure 16. "Voting gives people a chance to influence decision-making?" trend and by region¹⁵

Men 45 and older are more likely to agree with the statement (40 percent) than younger respondents or female respondents, but the total percentage of those who agree with the statement is higher than last year's mean of 26 percent. As one would expect, those interested

¹⁵ "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country? (Agree Completely, Agree Somewhat, Disagree Somewhat, Disagree Completely)" (n=1200)

in politics are more likely to agree (42 percent) than those who are not interested (31 percent).

In addition, market proponents are more likely to have a higher perception of vote efficacy (41 percent) than those who prefer central planning (33 percent). Of course, voters (39 percent) are more likely to have a higher perception of vote efficacy than non-voters (26 percent).

Kuchma supporters are most likely to believe voters have an impact on the political process in Ukraine (42 percent), followed by Moroz (41 percent) and Symonenko supporters (40 percent). Vitrenko supporters are less likely to believe in vote efficacy (29 percent) than the supporters of other candidates.

Other Measures of Efficacy

A majority (63 percent) agree that "sometimes politics is so complicated that people like me can't understand what's really happening." Voters in all regions except Kyiv (33 percent) agree with this statement. Otherwise, majorities in all major subgroups agree.

	How much do you agree or disagree wi	th the following statements:
	"Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like you can't understand what's really happening." (n=1200)	"People like you have little or no influence on the way things are run in Ukraine." (n=1200)
Agree Completely	34%	44%
Agree Somewhat	29%	27%
Disagree Somewhat	19%	14%
Disagree Completely	11%	9%
Neither Agree or Disagree	1%	1%
Don't know	4%	4%
Refused/NA	1%	1%
	99%	100%

Figure 17. Political Efficacy

✓ Rounding error

An even larger majority (71 percent) agree that "people like me have little or no influence on the way things are run in Ukraine." Again, majorities in all major subgroups agree.

1998 Voting

Most respondents (76 percent) report having voted in 1998. This is slightly higher than actual turnout.

Voters age 18-34 are much less likely to have voted (65 percent) than those age 35 and older (81 percent). Although the turnout among youth is high, older voters still determine the outcome of elections.




Figure 18. Voting in 1998, by Presidential Choice¹⁶

Market advocates (73 percent) voted in fewer numbers than advocates of central planning (80 percent). A higher percentage of Symonenko supporters (91 percent) voted in 1998 than supporters of any other presidential hopeful. Still, all presidential candidates' bases of support, except Moroz supporters (66 percent) and undecided voters (74 percent), are above the mean.

No Party Best Represents Ukrainians' Views and Interests

Political parties still face many challenges, not the least of which is the fact that many Ukrainians feel that their interests are not represented by political parties. When asked, "Which party best represents your own views and interests?" 42 percent answer "none," and 21 percent say they don't know. Only the Communist Party received a rating higher than 10 percent (16 percent), and 52 percent of that party's supporters are age 55 or older. Among those who mention a party, 83 percent say they voted for that party in 1998. The numbers are listed below (based on n=1200):

Communist Party of Ukraine People's Rukh Croop Party	16% 6% 3%
Green Party Socialist Party of Ukraine	3% 2%
All-Ukraine Association Hromada	1%
Democratic Party of Ukraine	1%
People's Democratic Party	1%
Party of Reforms and Order	1%
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	1%
Rural Party of Ukraine	1%
Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine	1%
Social-Democratic Party (United)	1%
Other	1%
None	42%
Don't know	21%

¹⁶ "Did you vote in the March 1998 election for Supreme Rada or not?"

High Voter Turnout Expected in 1999

Over half of those questioned (53 percent) report they are "certain to vote" in October's presidential election. Sixteen percent say they are "very likely," and another 10 percent are "somewhat likely" to vote. We should expect, then, that turnout will be above 70 percent. As can be expected, the certainty of voting has increased since a year ago (Figure 55 from 1998).

Regionally, residents of Kyiv (59 percent), the Northeast (58 percent), the Northwest (59 percent), and the Southwest (64 percent) are more likely to say that they are "certain to vote."

	Certain to Vote	Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Not Very Likely	Not At All Likely	Definitely Not
Kyiv	59%	19%	9%	7%	2%	3%
Northern	55%	12%	19%	6%	2%	3%
Central	50%	22%	11%	7%	1%	5%
Northeast	58%	4%	6%	11%	1%	8%
Northwest	59%	16%	11%	5%	2%	5%
Southeast	55%	9%	7%	12%	4%	8%
West	49%	20%	12%	9%	2%	2%
Southwest	64%	12%	6%	4%	2%	9%
South	46%	12%	13%	14%	1%	10%
Crimea	42%	19%	8%	13%	4%	11%
East	54%	17%	10%	10%	1%	7%

Figure 19. Likelihood of Voting in October 1999, by region¹⁷

Men 45 and older (61 percent certain) are more likely than other age or sex groups to vote. Projected turnout increases with education, and certainty is higher among ethnic Ukrainians (54 percent) than ethnic Russians (49 percent).

Those who are interested in politics (68 percent) are far more certain to vote than those who are not interested (43 percent). Similarly, those with a high perception of vote efficacy are more likely to vote (62 percent are certain they will) than those with a low perception of vote efficacy (50 percent).

Those who voted in 1998 are more likely to vote this year (62 percent certain) than non-voters (26 percent). Among the supporters for the major presidential hopefuls, Symonenko supporters (69 percent) are the most certain they will vote, followed by Kuchma supporters (60 percent), Vitrenko supporters (59 percent), and Moroz supporters (59 percent).

¹⁷ "How likely are you to vote in the 1999 election for President? " (n=1200)

1999 Presidential Election

Kuchma's Bid for Reelection

Although a larger percentage of voters than in 1998 support him, President Kuchma remains vulnerable in his reelection bid. Just 26 percent say he has done his job well enough to deserve reelection (up from 13 percent in 1998) while 55 percent say they would support someone else for president. Only 6 percent strongly feel that he deserves reelection, while 33 percent strongly feel that they would support someone else.

	Reelect Strongly/ Not Strongly	New President Stongly/Not Strongly	Depends		Reelect Strongly /Not Strongly	New President Stongly/Not Strongly	Depends
Kyiv	36%	52%	9%	1997	43%	37%	8%
Northern	29%	52%	8%	1998	13%	66%	10%
Central	19%	64%	6%	1999	26%	55%	8%
Northeast	23%	51%	11%				
Northwest	22%	59%	7%				
Southeast	20%	63%	8%				
West	48%	37%	6%				
Southwest	40%	39%	2%				
South	23%	56%	7%				
Crimea	20%	51%	10%				
East	20%	61%	9%				

Figure 20. Attitudes toward President Kuchma, trend and by region¹⁸

The percentage of respondents who support Kuchma's bid for reelection is highest in Kyiv (36 percent), the West (48 percent), and the Southwest (40 percent). Support for a new president is highest in the Central (64 percent), Southeast (63 percent) and East (61 percent) regions.

Majorities in all sex, age, education, ethnic, and geographic groups say they would vote for someone other than President Kuchma. The percentage of respondents who say they will vote for Kuchma is higher among those who say that Ukraine is a democracy (38 percent), market proponents (37 percent), and those with a higher level of confidence in presidential candidates. Undecided voters offer little encouragement to the president (13 percent want to reelect Kuchma, and 55 percent want a new president).

¹⁸ "In general, would you say that Leonid Kuchma has done his job as President well enough to deserve re-election, or would you support else for President? " (n=1200)

The Presidential Election Environment

In examining the political environment surrounding the presidential election, we find that the party affiliation of the candidate is not important to voters, that fewer than four in 10 can discern clear differences between the various candidates in how they plan to solve the nation's problems, and that a 65 percent majority lacks confidence in the ability of any of the candidates to solve the problems facing Ukraine. These factors make it difficult for any candidate to break out of the pack and may serve to aid the president's campaign because of the opportunities afforded by the power of incumbency.

Party Affiliation




Figure 21. Would you vote for Party-Affiliated Candidate?¹⁹

Only 20 percent would be more likely to support a candidate affiliated with a political party, while 18 percent would be more likely to back a candidate who is not affiliated. Forty-three percent say it doesn't matter. Demographically, residents of the Southeast (27 percent) and men 45 and older (27 percent) are the most inclined to vote for a party-affiliated candidate.

Symonenko supporters (50 percent), Moroz supporters (45 percent), and those who support other candidates (i.e.

Kostenko, Udovenko, and Tkachenko– 32 percent) are more likely to back a party-affiliated candidate. Vitrenko supporters (24 percent), Marchuk supporters (20 percent), Kuchma supporters (13 percent) and respondents who do not yet know who they will support (6 percent) are less party-oriented.

¹⁹ "If the presidential election were held tomorrow, would you be more likely to support a candidate for the presidency who was affiliated with a political party or who was not affiliated with a party?" (n=1200)

Distinctions Between Candidates

Only 38 percent find that there are clear differences between the various presidential candidates in how they plan to solve the problems facing Ukraine, while 41 percent say there are no clear differences and 20 percent don't know. Essentially, 61 percent do not see any clear differences between the candidates. This poses a major problem for candidates in their efforts to attract new supporters.

Clear differences	38%
Not clear differences	41%
Don't know	20%
Refused/NA	1%
	100%

Figure 22. Distinctions between Candidates²⁰

Majorities in three regions (Kyiv– 57 percent, the Northwest– 53 percent, and the West– 54 percent) are able to discern clear differences between the presidential candidates. Men (43 percent) are more likely than women (34 percent) to note differences, as are those with university degrees (46 percent). Rural respondents (42 percent) are more likely to note differences than urban respondents (36 percent).

As one would expect, those interested in politics (43 percent) are more discerning than those who are not (35 percent). The same is true for those with a high perception of vote efficacy (44 percent), as compared with those with a low perception of efficacy (35 percent). Those who discern clear differences between the parties are more likely to see differences between the candidates than those who see no clear differences in parties (68 percent versus 16 percent).

Proponents of a market economy are more likely to note differences than are proponents of a planned economy (48 percent versus 36 percent). Those who understand the presidential election process (45 percent) are more likely to discern differences between the presidential candidates than those who do not (34 percent). Undecided voters are far less likely to discern such differences (27 percent).

²⁰ "Do you find that there are clear differences between the various presidential candidates in how they plan to solve problems facing Ukraine or not?" (n=1200)

Confidence in Presidential Candidates

Again, only 19 percent have a great deal or fair amount of confidence that any of the candidates for president will be able to solve the nation's problems.

Figure 23. Confidence in Candidates²¹

Great deal/Fair amount	19%
Not very much/Not at all	65%
Depends	9%
Don't know	8%
Refused/NA	1%
	102‰

Rounding error

Confidence in presidential candidates is low across all major demographic groups. Even voters who back a particular candidate lack confidence in any candidate's ability to solve the problems facing Ukraine. Symonenko supporters have the highest confidence (26 percent), followed by Moroz supporters (25 percent), Vitrenko supporters (22 percent), and Kuchma supporters (20 percent).

²¹ "How much confidence do you have that any of the candidates for President of Ukraine will be able to solve the problems facing Ukraine?" (n=1200)

Candidate Support Profiles

At the time this survey was conducted, President Kuchma led the field in the presidential race with 24 percent of the vote. Natalia Vitrenko ran second (14 percent), followed by Petro Symonenko with 12 percent. In all, eight candidates' names were presented to respondents. Six others entered the race after this survey was conducted.



	1
Kuchma	24%
Vitrenko	14%
Symonenko	12%
Moroz	6%
Marchuk	4%
Udovenko	3%
Tkachenko	2%
Kostenko	D 1%
Will not vote	5%
None of above	9%
	-

The largest presidential support bases are profiled below.

Kuchma Supporters (24 percent)

Kuchma performs best in Kyiv (40 percent), in the West (47 percent), and in the Southwest (37 percent). These regions comprise 34 percent of his total support. The West comprises the largest segment of his support (20 percent). His support is slightly higher in urban areas (55 percent versus 45 percent in rural areas) and is fairly evenly distributed by region, sex and age.

His ratings are higher among those who are interested in politics (26 percent), those who say that Ukraine is becoming a democracy (35 percent), those who have a higher perception of vote efficacy (29 percent), and those who prefer a market economy (33 percent). His score rises to 28 percent among those who are very likely to vote (80 percent of his supporters fall into this category). Kuchma's base of support is a bit soft as just 48 of his supporters will definitely vote for him.

²² "If the 1999 election for President were being held today, for whom would you vote?" (n=1200, rotate)

Vitrenko Supporters (14 percent)

Regionally, Vitrenko's highest ratings are in the North (19 percent), Central (20 percent), Southeast (19 percent) and East (19 percent). These regions comprise 69 percent of her base of support (with 21 percent from the East alone). Her supporters are predominantly female (64 percent), and 37 percent are women age 45 and older. The urban/rural distribution (63 percent–37 percent) is close to that of the total sample.

Vitrenko's support base is more likely to say that Ukraine is not, and is not becoming, a democracy (58 percent versus 46 percent in the total sample), and their perception of vote efficacy is rather low (29 percent). They are somewhat less likely to prefer a market economy (24 percent) or central planning (29 percent), and are slightly more likely to prefer both in conjunction (32 percent). A majority of her supporters says that both economic and political reforms are occurring too slowly. A larger percentage of her supporters than average is owed wage arrears (64 percent), and they are likely to be owed arrears for longer periods than average (48 percent are owed arrears for three months or longer). Her supporters voted in 1998 (81 percent) and are likely to do so in 1999 (74 percent very likely). However, they have a below-average understanding of the election process (34 percent). Her level of support rises to 15 percent among likely voters. A majority of her supporters (56 percent) will definitely vote for her.

Symonenko Supporters (12 percent)

Symonenko's most supportive regions are the East (20 percent), Central (15 percent), Northeast (14 percent), Crimea (14 percent), and the South (13 percent). These regions comprise 72 percent of his total support. His supporters tend to be older (57 percent are age 55 and older), and 73 percent of his base of support is 45 and older. Women 45 and older comprise 41 percent of his support base but give him just 16 percent of their vote. A majority (54 percent) are pensioners. His supporters are not particularly well educated; 47 percent have less than secondary schooling.

Ethnic Russians comprise a greater portion of his base of support (27 percent) than of others'. Symonenko's supporters are highly interested in politics (51 percent) and have a high perception of vote efficacy (40 percent). They are more likely to say that Ukraine is not a democracy (62 percent) and, of course, to advocate a centrally-planned economy (58 percent). They tend to say that economic reforms are not occurring (41 percent) and that the economy will worsen in the future (50 percent). Nearly seven in 10 (68 percent) are owed back payments–50 percent for three months or more.

Symonenko's support base voted in 1998 in greater numbers than any other presidential support base (91 percent), and is more likely to turn out in 1999 (88 percent very likely). His level of support is 15 percent among likely voters—tied with Vitrenko. Most of his supporters (64 percent) will definitely vote for Symonenko.

Moroz Supporters (6 percent)

Moroz' support reaches double digits only in the Southwest (13 percent). Otherwise, his scores are evenly distributed by region and age. Forty-seven percent are men, and 53 percent are women. Women 45 and older comprise the largest segment of his support (36 percent), but he receives just 7 percent of that group's vote.

A plurality of his supporters (42 percent) has less than a secondary education, and 51 percent are rural residents. They are highly interested in politics (57 percent) and have a high perception of vote efficacy (41 percent). They prefer a centrally planned economy (46 percent) and are more likely to say that economic reforms are not occurring (43 percent). They are very pessimistic about the future economy (59 percent say it will worsen) and are close to the average in terms of wage arrears.

They are less likely to have voted in 1998 (66 percent) and have a below-average understanding of the election process (35 percent). Nonetheless, 73 percent say they are very likely to vote in October. Support for Moroz is 6 percent, and only 42 percent of his supporters will definitely support him.

Marchuk Supporters (4 percent)

Marchuk's highest levels of support are in Kyiv (10 percent) and the West (9 percent). The West accounts for 27 percent of his total support. A majority of his supporters are men (56 percent), and men age 18-44 make up 40 percent of his support base. Most of his supporters (63 percent) have a secondary education, 48 percent are employed full-time, 88 percent are ethnic Ukrainians and 70 percent are urban.

Marchuk supporters are interested in politics (58 percent), but have a lower perception of vote efficacy (34 percent) than supporters of other presidential candidates. They prefer a market economy (45 percent) and are more likely to say that a market-oriented approach should be pursued as quickly as possible (35 percent). Their wage arrears are less than average.

Marchuk's voters are likely to participate in the electoral process: 84 percent voted in 1998, 53 percent understand the electoral process, and 74 percent are very likely to vote. His level of support, however, does not improve among likely voters (4 percent), and only 39 percent of his supporters are definitely voting for him.

Undecided Voters

Undecided voters are concentrated in the Northeast (27 percent), Northwest (29 percent), Southeast (22 percent), Southwest (22 percent), South (20 percent), Crimea (22 percent) and the East (21 percent). Twenty-two percent of all women are undecided as compared with 16 percent of men. Women comprise 64 percent of the undecided vote. Among women age 18-44, 26 percent are undecided. Thirty-three percent are ethnic Russians, and 83 percent reside in urban areas. Three out of four (74 percent) say they voted in 1998, but just 58 percent are very likely to vote in 1999.

Run-off Scenarios

In head-to-head run-off match-ups, Kuchma defeats Moroz, Marchuk, Vitrenko, Symonenko, and Tkachenko, receiving approximately one-third of the vote in each case. As the following chart indicates, his toughest contests are against Vitrenko (30 percent–26 percent) and Symonenko (33 percent–21 percent).

Kuchma versus Vitrenko

Against Vitrenko, Kuchma leads in Kyiv, the Northeast, the West, Southwest, and Crimea but trails in the North, Central, Northwest, Southeast, and East regions. The candidates are virtually tied in the South. The President's lead is dependent on turnout among those age 18-44 as the candidates are tied among those age 45 and older.

The President leads slightly among ethnic Ukrainians, but the candidates are tied among ethnic Russians. The candidates receive equal percentages of support in urban areas, while Kuchma has a slight lead in rural areas. Among likely voters, Kuchma leads by 34 percent to 28 percent. Vitrenko attracts more voters from other candidates' bases of support than Kuchma. She receives 32 percent of Symonenko and Moroz voters' support, 23 percent of Marchuk voters' support, and 13 percent support from other presidential support bases. Just 6 percent of Symonenko's vote goes to Kuchma along with 16 percent of Moroz's, 25 percent of Marchuk's, and 27 percent of the "other" vote. Kuchma receives 11 percent of the undecided vote, 20 percent goes to Vitrenko, and 47 percent remain undecided.

Kuchma versus Symonenko

Against Symonenko, Kuchma leads in all regions except Central (20 percent-22 percent), the East (25 percent-34 percent) and Crimea (23 percent-23 percent). He leads in all age groups except those age 55 and older. Again, Kuchma must rely on the youth vote while Symonenko can rely on solid turnout among older voters.

Among ethnic Ukrainians, Kuchma leads 36 percent to 20 percent. Among ethnic Russians, however, the ballot is virtually tied (27 percent-25 percent). Kuchma leads in both urban and

rural areas. Among very likely voters, Kuchma leads 38 percent to 24 percent. Like Vitrenko, Symonenko pulls slightly more votes than Kuchma from other presidential support bases. Namely, 25 percent of Vitrenko supporters and 30 percent of Moroz supporters would support Symonenko as compared with 12 percent and 13 percent, respectively, for Kuchma. Marchuk supporters would move support to Kuchma by a 31 percent to 3 percent margin and other voters give Kuchma a 28 percent to 17 percent margin. Undecided voters favor Kuchma (18 percent versus 11 percent who support Symonenko).

Voting Issues

When asked which issues will be most important in the presidential election, many voters list personal characteristics of the candidates before issues per se. Most important to voters is someone who will render assistance to the people (25 percent). Interestingly, 21 percent don't know what their most important issue is. It should be noted that "professional politician" is likely meant in a positive sense and not as a euphemism encountered in the U.S. Responses are fairly evenly distributed. Since the differences in approach by the candidates to the issues are not discernable to a majority of respondents, basing support on personal characteristics may be the only logical choice for these voters. In a country where the population is accustomed to empty slogans and unfulfilled promises, what a candidate professes deserves less consideration than what sort of person he or she is as can be determined from background and anecdotal information. Although most responses differ, it is useful to compare these with those issues named nearly a year earlier (1998).

1998 (n=1200)		1999 (n=1200	
Honesty, decency	15%	Render assistance to people	25%
Care of people	10%	Honesty and respectability	16%
Pre-election platform	9%	Platform	11%
Ability to get out of crisis	8%	Professional politician	10%
Business qualities	7%	Stabilization of economics	10%
Competence	7%	Determination of action	5%
Real leadership	5%	Political convictions	4%
Party membership	45	Man of principle	4%
Past Activity	3%	Foreign policy	2%
Reform oriented	2%	Other personal characteristics	8%
Other	13%	Other	3%

Figure 25. Issues of Importance in 1998 and 1999²³

1999: "Which issue will be the most important to you when you vote for a candidate for President of Ukraine in 1999?" (n=1200)

 $^{^{23}}$ 1998: "Which issue will be of importance to you when you vote for a candidate for the President of Ukraine in 1999?" (n=1200)

Perceptions about the Election Process




Figure 26. Honesty of Elections²⁴

Despite generally positive perceptions about the way the 1998 elections were conducted, a majority of respondents doubt the fairness and honesty of the upcoming presidential election. As the following chart indicates, a majority lacks confidence in the honesty of the elections in general, the campaign leading up to the election, the preparation and administration of the election, and the counting and reporting of votes. Clearly, the Central Election Commission faces a major challenge in terms of public confidence, in addition to the work it must complete in order to conduct the election.

Elections in General

Only 4 percent say the elections will be completely fair and honest, 20 percent say they will be mostly honest, 40 percent say they will be not very honest, and 18 percent say they will be not at all fair and honest. Scores are evenly distributed for the most part. However, residents of Kyiv (52 percent) and the Southwest (35 percent) have higher levels of confidence. Surprisingly, those who are interested in politics and government are no more confident than those who are not. Those who have a higher perception of vote efficacy, however, are more confident (38 percent) than those with a lower perception (17 percent). Those with university degrees have the highest overall confidence (35 percent) in the electoral process. Kuchma supporters (40 percent) and Moroz supporters (32 percent) have higher levels of confidence than supporters of other candidates. Symonenko supporters are the least confident (16 percent).

Pre-Election Campaigning

Slightly fewer (21 percent) than those who say elections will be fair and honest say the same of the campaign. In total, 4 percent say it will be completely fair; 17 percent mostly; 43 percent not very; and 19 percent not at all fair and honest. Kyiv is the only region whose residents are more likely to say the campaign will be fair (46 percent). Only Kuchma supporters are significantly more likely to say the campaign will be fair (34 percent).

²⁴ "When talking about the October 1999 elections, how fair and honest, in your opinion, will be: (elections in general, campaigning leading up to the elections, preparation for and administration of the elections in October, counting of votes and reporting of the election results)? (n=1200)

Preparation and Administration


Only 27 percent of respondents believe the preparation and administration of elections will be fair and honest (5 percent say it will be completely honest, and 22 percent say it will be mostly honest) while 55 percent say it will not be (39 percent say it will not be very honest, and 16 percent say it will not be honest at all). Again, residents of Kyiv lead the way in terms of confidence (53 percent), followed by those who live in the North (39 percent). Kuchma supporters have the highest level of confidence (43 percent).

Counting of Votes and Reporting of Results

Only 23 percent of respondents are confident in the fairness of the vote tabulation and reporting process (5 percent are completely confident, and 18 percent are mostly confident) while 57 percent have doubts (37 percent are not very confident, and 20 percent are not at all confident). Residents of Kyiv (55 percent) and the North (32 percent) express higher confidence in the vote counting and reporting. Once again, Kuchma supporters are less skeptical (38 percent fair) than supporters of other candidates.

Responsibility for the Elections Being Fair and Honest

The CEC is given the most credit by those who say the elections will be fair and honest (25 percent), followed by observers (12 percent), political parties (8 percent), polling station officials (7 percent), and constituency election officials (5 percent). The chart on the next page details the responses.





²⁵ "You said that, on the whole, you thought the October 1999 elections will be [response in Q31]. Who will be (most responsible/most to blame) for the elections being [response in Q31]?"

Blame for the Elections Being Unfair and Dishonest

The mafia/organized crime receives the most blame (18 percent) for elections not being fair and honest. The CEC is next at 13 percent, followed by the President (8 percent), business interests (7 percent), and polling station officials (7 percent). Interestingly, organized crime was considered as a positive force in assuring the fairness and honesty of parliamentary elections in 1998.




Figure 28. Blame for Dishonesty of Elections (n=692)

Majority Does Not Understand the Election Process

A majority (53 percent) does not understand the electoral process for the presidential elections. In total, 6 percent understand it very well; 34 percent, somewhat well; 42 percent, not very well; and 11 percent, not at all well.

Overall, men claim a better understanding than women, and women 45 and older (27 percent) are the least likely to understand the electoral process. An understanding of the electoral process increases with respondents' level of education. Urban residents (43 percent) have a somewhat better grasp of the electoral process than rural residents (35 percent).

Proponents of a market economy have a higher level of understanding (59 percent) than those who prefer central planning (36 percent).

	Very/ Somewhat Well	Not Very/Not At All Well		Very/ Somewhat Well	Not Very/Not At All Well
Kyiv	60%	38%	TOTAL	40%	53%
Northern	55%	38%			
Central	31%	58%	Kuchma	43%	49%
Northeast	52%	42%	Vitrenko	34%	61%
Northwest	27%	66%	Symonenko	44%	49%
Southeast	48%	54%	Marchuk	52%	46%
West	30%	64%	Moroz	34%	55%
Southwest	36%	60%			
South	40%	56%			
Crimea	43%	51%			
East	33%	56%			

Figure 29. Understanding of Election Process, total and by region and presidential choice²⁶

²⁶ "How well do you understand the electoral process for the presidential election?" (n=1200)

Views on Political Parties

Necessity of Political Parties

A majority (56 percent) says that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy. This is an improvement over 1998 (46 percent) and similar to the overall score for 1997 (58 percent). However, as the following chart demonstrates, the intensity of opinion is far lower than in 1997.

Majorities in all regions except the North (47 percent), Central (48 percent) and Northwest (44 percent) say that parties are necessary. This sentiment is particularly strong in Kyiv (81 percent), the Northeast (63 percent) and the East (64 percent).

	Tr	end Da	ata					Reg	gional I	Data				
	1997	1998	1999	Kyiv	Northern	Central	Northeast	Northwest	Southeast	West	Southwest	South	Crimea	East
Necessary	58%	46%	56%	81%	47%	48%	63%	44%	59%	55%	51%	54%	52%	64%
Not Necessary	28%	40%	29%	15%	34%	39%	21%	44%	29%	29%	26%	26%	30%	18%

Figure 30. Necessity of Political Parties²⁷

Those age 65 and older are the only age group in which less than a majority (43 percent) says parties are necessary. Men age 18-44 are more likely to say that parties are necessary (67 percent), while women 45 and older (45 percent) are less likely to. Perceived necessity increases with level of education.

Urban residents (62 percent) are more likely to perceive a need for parties than rural residents (47 percent). Those who are interested in politics (64 percent), who say that Ukraine is a democracy (67 percent), who have a higher perception of vote efficacy (65 percent), and who discern differences among parties (70 percent) are all highly likely to say that parties are necessary. So, too, are those who back a market economy (71 percent) or a combined economic approach (65 percent versus 47 percent among those who want central planning).

Majorities of every presidential hopeful's supporters say that parties are necessary.

²⁷ "Do you believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy or not?" (n=1200 for 1997, 1998, and 1999)

Importance of Having at Least Two Parties Competing in an Election

The total saying that multiparty elections are important has also increased (to 61 percent from 58 percent in 1997 and 1998). Once again, however, the level of intense support has declined for two consecutive years.




Figure 31. Multiparty Elections²⁸

Support for competition among parties is widespread. A majority in all regions except the Central (47 percent) says multiparty that elections are important. A majority of both men (68 percent) and women (56 percent) holds this view, as do majorities in all age groups except those 65 and older (47 percent). Women 45 and older are the only age/sex group to fall below majority support (49 percent).

Support increases with education and is higher in urban (65 percent) than in rural areas (56 percent). As with the importance of parties in general, those who are interested in politics (70 percent), those who say Ukraine is a democracy (73 percent), those with a high perception of vote efficacy (70 percent), and those who can discern party differences (75 percent) are all more likely to say that multiparty elections are important.

A majority of the support bases for the presidential hopefuls, 1998 voters, and likely 1999 voters say that party competition is important.

²⁸ "How important do you think it is for Ukraine to have at least two political parties competing in an election?" (n=1200)

Differences Between Parties




Figure 32. Differences between Parties²⁹

A plurality (40 percent) finds that there are clear differences between the various political parties and blocs in how they plan to solve problems facing Ukraine, 37 percent do not see differences, and 21 percent don't know. This is consistent with the 1998 findings and demonstrates an enduring improvement over 1997.

A majority in three regions (Kyiv–58 percent, Northwest–52 percent, and West–60 percent) note clear differences while a majority in the South (52 percent)

says there are not clear differences. Men (48 percent) are more likely to discern these differences than women (34 percent). Those age 18-34 are the most likely to see differences between political parties (46 percent).

The ability to discern differences increases with education, interest in politics, perception of vote efficacy, support for a market economy, and likelihood of voting.

²⁹ "Do you find that there are clear differences between the various political parties and blocs in how they plan to solve problems facing Ukraine?" (n=1200)

Voters' Interests Not Represented by Parties

One of the many challenges faced by political parties is the perception that parties do not advance the interests of the voters. Only 12 percent of the respondents say voters' interests are represented by parties, while 24 percent say only those of the party leader's are, 13 percent say those of the government are, 10 percent say those of the financial structures are, and 8 percent say the interests of the criminal structures are served. Another 20 percent can't say whose interests are advanced by political parties.

	1997 (n=1200)	1999 (n=1200)
Interests of the leader of the political party	26%	24%
Interests of the intelligentsia	2%	1%
Interests of the citizens of Ukraine	7%	12%
Interests of the government apparatus	10%	13%
Interests of financial structures	13%	10%
Interests of criminal structures	4%	8%
Interests of voters in my region	4%	1%
Interests of specific individual specific groups	4%	4%
Other	2%	5%
Don't know	25%	20%
Refused/NA	2%	2%
	99%√	100%

Figure 33.	"Whose interests are	advanced by	Ukrainian	political	parties?"

✓ Rounding error

Accordingly, only 1 percent of respondents are members of a political party, and just 9 percent would consider joining a party at this time. It is worth noting that historically party membership implies a more serious commitment than in Western countries. Therefore, parties may not be as eager to bestow membership status on a large portion of their supporters, as supporters are unlikely to seek the responsibility traditionally associated with membership. (Only about 2 percent of the population was ever admitted to the Communist Party in Soviet times.) While the data is important to monitor, it must be kept in mind that neither parties nor the population may be attempting to dramatically alter these statistics.

Only 22 percent think that parties will play a stronger role in the next Rada election, 10 percent a weaker role, and 40 percent say parties' role will be about the same.

The Political Composition of the Supreme Rada

The low perception of representation of the interests of voters by parties also applies to the political composition of the Supreme Rada. Only 19 percent say its political composition reflects the population's political preferences overall while 63 percent say it does not. This represents a 7 percent decline since 1998.

Majorities in all regions except the Northeast (45 percent) say the Rada does not reflect voters' political preferences. Majorities of all sex and age groups hold this view as do voters, non-voters, and supporters of all presidential hopefuls.

In the immediate post-election period in 1998, 21 percent thought the newly-elected Rada would be more effective than the last. A year later, only 10 percent say that it has been more effective while 18 percent say it has been less effective, and 57 percent say its effectiveness is about the same as that of the last Rada. Scores are consistent across the demographic subgroups.


"In your opinion, does the political composition of Supreme Rada reflect the population's political preferences overall?			"Do you think that the Supreme Rada elected in March 1998 has been more effective than the last Rada in addressing the problems facing Ukraine, less effective, or about the same as the last Rada?"		
	1998 (n=1200)	1999 (n=1200)		1999 (n=1200)	
Yes, strongly	3%	2%	More effective	10%	
Yes, somewhat	23%	17%	Less effective	18%	
No, somewhat	31%	37%	Same	57%	
No, strongly	16%	26%	Don't know	15%	
Don't know	25%	17%		100%	
Refused/NA	1%	1%			
	99%√	100%			

Figure 34. Attitudes toward Supreme Rada

✓ Rounding error

Communist Party Seen As Most Effective in Rada

When asked to place the Rada's parties on a nine point scale to rate their effectiveness, the Communist Party of Ukraine receives the highest effectiveness score (the only one that receives a rating above four, which is still below the midpoint), followed by the Socialist Party and the Progressive Socialists. Only two parties, the People's Rukh and the SDPU, received better marks in 1999 than in 1998. All other parties declined at least somewhat, with Hromada suffering a severe decline. (NOTE: The Peasant Party was added to the ratings in 1999.)





- **" The Communist Party** receives the highest ratings in Crimea and the East, and from older voters—particularly older women—and the less well-educated. Central planning proponents and Symonenko supporters also give high marks to the CP.
- **" The Socialist Party** does better in the South, East, and Crimea. Older voters, those with less education, supporters of central planning, and three of the presidential voting blocs– Vitrenko's, Symonenko's, and Moroz's–all give higher scores.
- **" The People's Democratic Party** is perceived to be more effective by residents of the West and Crimea, by those age 18-24 and women 18-44, by those who say Ukraine is or is becoming a democracy, those who want a combined economic approach, by economic optimists, and by Kuchma supporters, Marchuk supporters, and undecided voters.
- " **Hromada** does best in the South. Residents of all other regions give scores below 3.0.
- " The Progressive Socialist Party does relatively well in the North, Central,

³⁰ "On a scale of one to nine where "1" is the least effective and "9" is the most effective, where on that scale would you place each of the following parties and blocs in how effective they are in addressing the problems facing Ukraine?" (n=1200)

Northeast, Northwest, and Southeast. High ratings also come from women 45 and older, the less well-educated, central planners, Vitrenko supporters, Moroz supporters, and undecided voters.

- **" The Green Party** receives higher ratings in Kyiv, the Northwest, South, and Crimea. Those age 18-24 and undecided voters also give higher marks to the Green Party.
- " The People's Rukh does well in Kyiv, the West, and Southwest. In addition, those who say Ukraine is a democracy, who discern differences in the parties, who are market proponents, Kuchma supporters, Marchuk supporters, and other voters give Rukh higher ratings.
- **" The Social Democratic Party** of Ukraine does best in the Northeast, Southeast, and South. Scores are also higher among voters age 18-34, those who say Ukraine is a democracy, advocates of a combined economy, Kuchma supporters, Marchuk supporters, and supporters of other presidential candidates.
- **" The Peasant Party** receives higher scores in the Southwest, North, and South, as well as from women age 45 and older. It also does well with rural voters, advocates of a combined economy, Vitrenko supporters, Moroz supporters, and those who remain undecided.
- " **Independent Deputies** receive higher scores in the Southwest and Kyiv.

Plurality Says Military Personnel Compelled to Vote

Forty two percent think that military personnel are compelled by their superiors to vote for certain candidates or parties, while just 16 percent believe military personnel exercise free choice. This is a marked change from 1998 when only 26 percent thought military personnel were compelled to vote.

Young men (47 percent) are more likely than those in other sex or age groups to hold this view. Residents of several regions, including Kyiv (50 percent), the Northeast (55 percent), the Southeast (49 percent), and Crimea (57 percent) are more likely to say military personnel are compelled to vote. Urban residents (47 percent) are more likely than rural citizens (33 percent) to hold this view. Those who are interested in politics (47 percent) also have a higher tendency to hold this view than those who are not interested (38 percent).

Those who believe military personnel are compelled to vote also believe this has a strong impact on the outcome of elections (88 percent).

"In your opinion, are mil	itary personn	al compelled	[If Compelled] "In your opinion, how much of an		
"In your opinion, are military personnel compelled by their superiors to vote for certain candidates or			impact does this have on the outcome of		
parties or do they exerci			elections?"		
	1998	1999		1998	1999
	<u>(n=1200)</u>	<u>(n=1200)</u>		<u>(n=307)</u>	<u>(n=499)</u>
Compelled to vote	26%	42%	Great impact	36%	47%
Free choice	16%	16%	Substantial impact	47%	41%
Depends [Volunteered]	11%	12%	Not much impact	12%	10%
Don't know	45%	29%	No impact	1%	1%
Refused/NA	2%	2%	Don't know	3%	2%
	100%	101%√		99%√	101‰

Figure 36. Military Personnel and Voting

✓ Rounding error

Foreign Models for Ukraine's Development

Germany Seen as the Best Economic Model

As we found in 1997, Germany (18 percent) is perceived as the best economic model for Ukraine, followed by the United States at 11 percent. Fifteen percent say that no country can serve as an economic model, and 20 percent don't know.

United States Seen as the Best Political Model

As in past surveys, the United States (14 percent) is viewed as the best foreign model for Ukraine's political development. However, more respondents (16 percent) say that no country can serve as a model, and 33 percent don't know.

Economic Models		Political Models		
Germany	18%	USA	14%	
USA	11%	Germany	9%	
Poland	6%	Switzerland	5%	
Sweden	5%	Sweden	4%	
Switzerland	4%	England	3%	
Canada	3%	France	3%	
Russia	2%	Canada	2%	
Other former Soviet states	4%	Poland	2%	
Other W. European countries	6%	Russia	1%	
Other	5%	Other former Soviet states	3%	
No country is a model [Volunteered]	15%	Other W. European countries	2%	
Don't know	20%	Other	2%	
	99%√	No country is a model [Volunteered]	16%	
		Don't know	33%	
			99%√	

Figure 37. Economic and Political Models³¹

✓ Rounding error

³¹ "Which foreign country, in your opinion, could be a model for our country's economic development?" (n=1200) "And which foreign country, in you opinion, could be a model for our country's political development?" (n=1200)

Land Issues

Attitudes toward Land Ownership by Ukrainians and Foreigners

Forty-four percent say Ukrainians should be able to own a limited amount of land, 29 percent think the amount of land should be unlimited, and 19 percent say land ownership should not be allowed.

Support for limited land ownership is highest in Kyiv (54 percent), the Southeast (59 percent), and the South (53 percent). Higher levels of support are also noted among those with university degrees (53 percent) and those who say Ukraine is a democracy (50 percent).

Support for unlimited land ownership is higher in Kyiv (40 percent), the North (47 percent), Central (36 percent), Northwest (37 percent), and Southwest (37 percent). In addition, support is higher among those age 18-24 (42 percent), market economy proponents (37 percent), and Marchuk supporters (39 percent).

Older Ukrainians (29 percent), those in the Northeast (29 percent), and Symonenko supporters (31 percent) are more likely to say that land ownership should not be allowed.

"Should the amount of land that CITIZENS OF UKRAINE may own be limited, unlimited, or should			"Should the amount of land that NON-CITIZENS may own be limited, unlimited, or should private				
	wnership not be all		land ownership not be allowed?"				
	1997	1999		1997	1999		
	<u>(n=1200)</u>	<u>(n=1200)</u>		<u>(n=1200)</u>	<u>(n=1200)</u>		
Limited	49%	44%	Limited	38%	27%		
Unlimited	34%	29%	Unlimited	11%	4%		
Not allowed	11%	19%	Not allowed	43%	58%		
Don't know	6%	8%	Don't know	8%	10%		
	100%	100%	Refused/NA	-	1%		
				100%	100%		

Figure 38. Land Ownership

Non-citizens face an entirely different hurdle. A 58 percent majority says non-citizens should not be allowed to own land, while 27 percent say they should be able to own a limited amount, and 4 percent say they should be able to own an unlimited amount of land. Majorities of most major subgroups oppose foreign land ownership.

Laws Regarding Treating of Land as Private Property

Less than half (43 percent) of all Ukrainians say that the laws of Ukraine should allow citizens to buy and sell land as private property without unreasonable difficulty. Even more Ukrainians (45 percent) disagree with this approach.

Only residents of Kyiv (54 percent) and the North (51 percent) are more likely to say that citizens should be able to buy and sell land as private property. Agreement declines with age and increases with education. Supporters of a market economy (59 percent) are more likely to agree as are Marchuk supporters and other voters (50 percent).

Disagreement with the idea of land being bought and sold as private property is higher in the Southeast (55 percent), the West (57 percent), among those age 55-64 (55 percent), among those age 65 and older (51 percent), those with less than a secondary education (50 percent), pensioners (54 percent), those who say that parties are not necessary (53 percent), and those who say that party competition is not important (52 percent). Naturally, advocates of central planning (56 percent) and Symonenko supporters (67 percent) are more likely to hold this view.

Agree or Disagree: "The laws of Ukraine should allow CITIZENS OF UKRAINE to buy and sell land as private property without unreasonable difficulty?"			Agree or Disagree: "The laws of Ukraine should allow NON-CITIZENS to buy and sell land as private property without unreasonable difficulty?"				
	1997	1999		1997	1999		
	<u>(n=1200)</u>	<u>(n=1200)</u>		<u>(n=1200)</u>	<u>(n=1200)</u>		
Agree Completely/Somewhat	59%	43%	Agree Completely/Somewhat	19%	9%		
Disagree Completely/Somewhat	34%	45%	Disagree Completely/Somewhat	72%	79%		
Neither Agree/Disagree	1%	4%	Neither Agree/Disagree	1%	6%		
Don't know	6%	7%	Don't know	7%	7%		
	100%	99%√	Refused/NA	-	1%		
				99%√	102%√		

Figure 39. Land Ownership

✓ Rounding error

As with land ownership itself, a majority (79 percent) disagrees that laws should allow noncitizens to buy and sell land without unreasonable difficulty. Disagreement is consistently high across the demographic subgroups.

Ownership versus Leasing

The public is divided over the issue of citizens' land ownership versus leasing from the government. A plurality says that land should be leased (44 percent), while 19 percent call for outright ownership, and 24 percent say either or both. Only 5 percent say that neither should be allowed.

Support for land ownership declines with age just as support for leasing increases. Supporters of a market economy are far more likely to support ownership (31 percent) while proponents of central planning prefer leasing (52 percent).

Only 3 percent say that non-citizens should be able to own land outright, 48 percent prefer leasing, and 34 percent say that neither option should be allowed.

"In general, would you prefer th OF UKRAINE be allowed to pu outright, or just be able to lease government for long periods	rchase land land from the	"In general, would you prefer that NON-CITIZENS be allowed to purchase land outright, or just be able to lease land from the government for long periods of time?"		
	1999 <u>(n=1200)</u>		1999 <u>(n=1200)</u>	
Own outright	19%	Own outright	3%	
Lease from government	44%	Lease from government	48%	
Either/Both [Volunteered]	24%	Either/Both [Volunteered]	6%	
Neither [Volunteered]	5%	Neither [Volunteered]	34%	
Don't know	8%	Don't know	8%	
	100%	Refused/NA	1%	
			100%	

Figure 40. Land Ownership

Nongovernmental Organizations

NGOs Free from Government Participation are Possible

A majority (55 percent) says that it is possible to form groups or associations without the participation of government while 10 percent say it is not possible.




Figure 41. Can Citizens Form NGOs?³²

Less than a majority of respondents in the South (48 percent) and East (45 percent) say it is possible to independently form associations, as more people in these regions do not know. Women age 45 and older (45 percent) are somewhat less likely to say that it is possible to form NGOs– again because a larger percentage of respondents do not know.

There are few groups that are more likely to say that it is not possible to form NGOs. These include residents of the

Northwest (31 percent), those age 45-54 (18 percent), and Moroz supporters (17 percent).

³² "In your opinion, do citizens of Ukraine have the possibility to unite into groups or form associations without the participation of government or not?" (n=1200)

NGOs Not Seen As Necessary

Only one in five (23 percent) say that NGOs are essential or very necessary, perhaps reflecting a lack of understanding about the purpose and function of such organizations or the lack of a volunteer culture in Ukrainian society.




Figure 42. Necessity of NGOs³³

Young people are more likely than older people to acknowledge a need for NGOs. The college-educated (42 percent) and urban residents (29 percent) are also more likely to, as are market proponents (32 percent) and non-voters (27 percent).

Those who say NGOs are necessary (n=275) give the reasons stipulated in Figure 43.

Figure 43. Reasons why NGOs are Necessary ³⁴	4
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Protection of interests	26%
Possibility of self-expression	23%
Component of democracy	15%
Close people	8%
Increase economic development	4%
Improving social and cultural level	2%
Other	3%
Don't know	19%
	100%

Ukrainians would be most likely to join consumer advocate (14 percent) or education (11 percent) organizations, but 23 percent state flatly that they would not join such an organization. People who would not join an NGO are evenly distributed across the population.

Only 5 percent are currently volunteering their time at an NGO. Most (63 percent) are women, and 45 percent are women 18-44. More (25 percent) say they would give their time, but only 5 percent say they definitely would volunteer. Again, a majority (55 percent) are women, and a plurality (32 percent) are young women.

³³ "How necessary are such organizations-essential, very necessary, not very necessary, or not at all necessary?" (n=1200)

³⁴ [Ask if 'Essential' or 'Very Necessary'] "Why do you feel that way?" (n=275)

Importance of Certain Rights

We asked the public to rate how important it is for certain rights to be respected in their country. Across all demographic subgroups, a majority said these rights are important. However, some people clearly view these rights as a low priority. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the lower scores are because the rights in question are less important to respondents or perceived as less threatened.

At the top of the list of rights is "private property protected by law," followed closely by "freedom of religion," and that "honest elections are held regularly." At the bottom or the list are the rights to form political parties or NGOs.

	Very/Somewhat Important	Not Very/Not At All Important
Private property of individuals is protected by law	87%	7%
Honest elections are held regularly	84%	8%
All can freely practice the religion on one's choice	84%	11%
One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting	77%	16%
Rights of minority ethnic groups are protected	75%	15%
Right to publicly criticize the government is protected	67%	24%
All can form associations or union without any government involvement	51%	37%
Citizens have the right to form political parties	50%	41%

Figure 44. Importance of Rights and Freedoms³⁵

³⁵ "How important is it to you that the following rights be respected in the country where you live?" (n=1200)

Confidence in Institutions and Individuals

One of the most troubling aspects of Ukrainian life is the utter lack of confidence citizens have in their institutions and officials. There is no doubt that citizens of other nations doubt the credibility and motivations of their leaders at times, but the economic crisis and perception of corruption seem to be driving a more profound disillusionment in Ukraine.

As the following charts indicate, a majority lacks confidence in every branch of government except the state security service, the Constitutional Court, the public prosecutors, the courts, and the military forces. Political parties and political leaders are treated with similar disdain. Of the many politicians tested, only Natalia Vitrenko (36 percent confident versus 45 percent not confident), Yuri Kostenko (10 percent versus 43 percent), and Viktor Yuschenko (23 percent versus 41 percent) receive some noteworthy level of public confidence.

	Great Deal/Fair Amount	Not Very Much/None At All
Ukraine's Military Forces	59%	27%
State Security Service	44%	34%
Public Prosecutors	37%	47%
Natalia Vitrenko	36%	45%
Constitutional Court	35%	36%
Courts	35%	49%
Leonid Kuchma	32%	60%
Central Bank	28%	50%
Petro Symonenko	28%	51%
Local Government	25%	67%
Viktor Yuschenko	23%	41%
Militia	22%	67%
Supreme Rada	21%	71%
Presidential Administration	21%	66%
Oleksandr Moroz	21%	59%
Cabinet of Ministers	20%	69%
Hennady Udovenko	18%	50%
Yevhen Marchuk	15%	52%
Oleksandr Tkachenko	15%	56%
Political Parties	15%	64%
Yuri Kostenko	10%	43%
Pavlo Lazarenko	2%	87%

Figure 45. Confidence in Institutions and Individuals³⁶

³⁶ I am now going to ask you about several government bodies and individuals. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them. (n=1200)

Few Understand the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court

Only 23 percent say they have some understanding of the purpose and function of the Constitutional Court. The majority (69 percent) has little or no understanding of what the Court accomplishes.




Figure 46. Understanding of Constitutional Court³⁷

Men (34 percent) and younger voters have a better understanding of the Constitutional Court, while only 10 percent of women 45 and older understand the purpose and function of the Constitutional Court. Respondents' level of understanding increases with education (46 percent of college-educated respondents say they understand).

Those who are interested in politics (32 percent) have a better understanding than those who are not (18 percent). In addition, market proponents (35 percent) have a better understanding than those who favor a centrally planned economy (19 percent).

³⁷ "How well do you understand the purpose and function of the Constitutional Court?" (n=1200)

Ethics and Corruption

As we saw in the discussion of confidence in institutions and officials, the public is skeptical about government officials. This section shows that a majority questions the ethics of both local and national officials. In addition, they doubt the ethical behavior of their fellow citizens; a majority disagrees that local officials, national officials, and fellow citizens can be relied upon to act ethically in accordance with the best general public interest.

Agree Disagree "How much do you agree or disagree with the following Completely/ Completely/ statements:" (n=1200) Somewhat Somewhat "Officials elected to local government can be relied upon 23% 64% to act ethically in the best interest of Ukraine" "Officials elected to national government can be relied 20% 67% upon to act ethically in the best interest of Ukraine" "Fellow citizens generally act ethically in accordance 29% 51% with the best general public interest"

Figure 47. Ethics of Government and Citizens

Local Government

A majority in all major subgroups doubt the ethics of local officials, and 28 percent disagree completely with the statement that local elected officials can be relied upon to act ethically in the best interest of Ukraine.

National Government

The same is true for the national government officials, with the exception of the Southeast (41 percent agree-49 percent disagree). Nearly one in three (30 percent) doubts the national government's ethics completely.

Fellow Citizens

Although a majority says that citizens cannot be relied upon, the percentage is smaller than the percentage of those who doubt the ethics of the elected national government officials. Nearly one-third (29 percent) say their fellow citizens can be trusted. Still, majorities in all age and sex groups, except women 45 and older (46 percent), doubt the ethics of other citizens. Political optimists (i.e. those who say Ukraine is a democracy and those who have a higher perception of vote efficacy) are more likely to agree that citizens can be relied on to act ethically. This can be considered as the perceived dissolution of a formally recognized social contract, if it can be assumed one in fact was recognized under Communism.

Corruption is Widespread and Serious

As we have seen since 1994, the vast majority of respondents say that official corruption is very common. No doubt, this current undercuts confidence in institutions and officials and drives skepticism in general. This perception cuts across all demographic groups.

In terms of the severity of the problem, most Ukrainians say that official corruption is very serious. Again, all demographic subgroups acknowledge the serious nature of the problem.

	Very/Fairly Common	Very/Fairly Rare	Very/Fairly Serious	Not Too/Not At All Serious
1996	84%	3%	88%	1%
1997	89%	2%	90%	2%
1999	88%	2%	89%	2%

Figure 48. Frequency and Seriousness of Corruption³⁸

Ukrainian Citizens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life

A 62 percent majority believes Ukrainians accept official corruption as a fact of life. Only 13 percent say they do not, and 22 percent don't know.

This perception is consistent across various segments of the population. Few groups are more likely to say that the public does not accept corruption as a fact of life, such as residents of the Northwest and South (26 percent and 21 percent, respectively).

Among those who say that Ukrainians accept corruption as a fact of life, a majority (60 percent) says that this contributes to the problem of official corruption to great extent. Only 11 percent say it contributes little to the problem.

"Do you think the citizens of Ukraine accept official corruption as a fact of life?" (n=1200)			
Yes	62%	A great deal	60%
No	13%	Somewhat	21%
Don't know	22%	Not very much	6%
Refused/NA	2%	Not at all	5%
	99%√	Don't know	8%
			101%

Figure 49. Corruption as a Fact of Life

✓ Rounding error

³⁸ "In your opinion, how common is the problem of official corruption?" (n=1200)

[&]quot;And how serious is the problem of official corruption, meaning how much does it matter?" (n=1200)

Corruption is Believed to be Common in Ukrainian Institutions

The public says that corruption is at least fairly common in major national and local institutions. Only foreign business seems to have escaped a negative rating by a majority of respondents.


The list below ranks institutions by the percentage of respondents saying that corruption is very common therein:

Customs Agents	47%
Tax Officials	45%
Police Officers	43%
Government Officials	42%
Judges	35%
Elected Local Officials	35%
Cabinet of Ministers	33%
Supreme Rada	32%
Presidential Administration	31%
Ukrainian Banks	29%
Private Entrepreneurs	29%
Foreign Businesses	17%

Public Information

Information About Rights Under the Constitution

As we have seen in the past, few are well informed about their rights under the new Constitution of Ukraine. Only 3 percent have a great deal of information, 18 percent have some information, 47 percent do not have very much, and 29 percent have none at all.





Levels of information are higher in Kyiv (39 percent), and among those age 18-24 (31 percent), the college-educated (40 percent), market proponents (31 percent), those who understand the voting process (34 percent), and undecided presidential voters (37 percent).

Only 28 percent say that information about their rights is readily available while 42 percent say it is not and 18 percent don't know.

Those in the West (39 percent) and the South (35 percent) are more likely to say that information is available, as are men age 18-44 (36 percent) and women age 18-44 (33 percent). College-educated Ukrainians are also more likely to say that information is available (46 percent). So, too, are those interested in politics (35 percent), market proponents (41 percent), Kuchma supporters (35 percent), and undecided voters (39 percent).

Information About Political and Economic Developments

This survey demonstrates the first noticeable improvement in the amount of information citizens have about political developments in Ukraine. In all, 41 percent have at least a fair

³⁹ "Thinking now about the Ukrainian Constitution...How much information do you have about your rights under the new Constitution of Ukraine?" (n=1200)

amount of information—an 11 percent gain over last year. Few (5 percent) have a great deal of information, however.

The least well informed regions are the Central (28 percent), Northwest (27 percent), and Crimea (28 percent). Men (47 percent) are better informed than women (36 percent). Older women are less well informed (32 percent) than younger women (41 percent).

Naturally, information levels improve with education, interest in politics, and perception of vote efficacy.

	Political Developments	Economic Developments
Great deal	5%	5%
Fair amount	36%	32%
Not very much	47%	51%
None at all	7%	8%
Don't know	4%	5%
	99%√	100%

Figure 51. Information about Political and Economic Developments⁴⁰

Rounding error

This survey also shows an improvement in the public's level of information on economic developments. In total, 37 percent are fairly well informed (up 13 percent since last year), while a majority remain poorly informed (59 percent have little or no information).

Again, residents of the Central region (25 percent) and Crimea (24 percent) regions are the least well informed. Men (41 percent) are better informed than women (32 percent). Women 45 and older are the least well-informed (30 percent). A respondent's level of information decreases with age and increases with education.

As before, those who are interested in politics and those who support a free market are better informed.

Main Sources of Information

Television is the main source of information in Ukraine. In general, 58 percent of respondents watch television news daily, and 42 percent listen to radio news on a daily basis, but only 19 percent read the newspaper every day. City and Oblast papers are the most widely read (46 percent), and 19 percent read *Facty Ta Kommentari* most often.

⁴⁰ "How much information do you feel you have about political (economic) developments in Ukraine?" (n=1200)

In terms of information about politics and government, UT-3/Inter is the most popular choice (36 percent), followed by UT-2/1+1 (24 percent) and UT-1 (12 percent). Less than 10 percent of the respondents mention any other stations.

There are a few regional differences regarding sources of information. Residents of the Northwest are more reliant on UT-1 (25 percent); residents of the Southeast (46 percent); residents of Crimea (57 percent); and residents of the East (54 percent) are more reliant on UT-3; and residents of the West are more reliant on UT-2 (46 percent).




Figure 52. Main Sources of Information⁴¹

⁴¹ "What is your main source of information about government and politics?" (n=1200)

Assessment of the Media

Objectivity

As the following charts demonstrate, major media sources are perceived to be more objective than other sources. However, a substantial number of respondents says the major television stations are both objective and not objective. As use of these sources decreases, "don't know" responses increase.

	Objective	Not Objective	Both
UT-1	34%	14%	33%
UT-2	42%	9%	33%
UT-3	44%	9%	32%
STB (Vikna)	11%	6%	17%
ICTV (Visti)	9%	6%	17%
Local TV stations	18%	13%	30%
State radio	24%	12%	30%
Non-state radio	11%	8%	23%

Figure 53. Objectivity of Various Media Sources⁴²

Role of the Media

A 71 percent majority says that it is at least somewhat important for the media to analyze the differences between candidates and parties on various issues in order to help the public understand these differences. One-third of the respondents says this type of analysis is very important. Overall, scores are consistent across demographic subgroups. The failure to perceive clear differences between the candidates' approaches to solving Ukraine's problems may indicate that the public is not receiving this type of analysis from the media.

However, a 64 percent majority says that the news media have shown partisan support for different candidates and parties in their coverage of the 1999 presidential election so far. A majority in all major demographic subgroups holds this view.

⁴² "Now I'm going to ask about your views on the way our mass media report the news about events and developments in our country. For each of the following media, please tell me whether you would describe its domestic news coverage as objective or not objective." (n=1200)

Conclusion

By Michael Conway

Public Opinion in Ukraine – 1999 does provide some positive news regarding public perception over that measured in past years. The most interesting development seems to be the increase in the perception of vote efficacy. At least for these elections, Ukrainians are more likely to feel that their vote can actually influence the way their state is governed, hopefully for the better. Consequently, a high turnout is expected. The public also claims to be more informed about economic and political issues. However, this may be a momentary increase linked to the turmoil, which surfaced since the last survey was conducted in June of 1998, in both areas (in particular coverage of and concern surrounding the Russian economic crisis and the conflict in Kosovo). It also appears that political parties have in some way managed to maintain their individuality in the public's eye following the 1998 elections, even though the public holds the opinion that this parliament, although formed more along party lines, is no more effective than the parliament formed through the 1994 electoral process.

All other indicators point to a lack of progress if not an actual deterioration in positive perception since the last survey. Particularly disturbing for advocates of land reform is the decrease in public support for the privatization of land or its lease since 1997. Apparently, the public is unaware of any overall economic benefit linked to the creation of a property market, sees criminal or foreign interests as the immediate benefactors, and understands that the average citizen is currently unable to take advantage of any sell-off. An improvement in economic conditions could change this for the better, however, it is also apparent that respondents do not expect improvements in these conditions in the near future. Indeed, the response to the number of goods and services acquired outside the bounds of the formal economy make this almost certain.

There is a continued lack of trust and confidence in most public officials and institutions. Although "honesty and decency" has lost its top ranking to "ability to take care of the people" as the number one issue in the selection of a presidential candidate, it is still very important in the decision-making process. However, the lack of trust and confidence seems even to sully the choice of a presidential candidate. Faith in the ethical conduct of fellow citizens is also low, although recent research⁴³ indicates that this is a problem currently shared by developed democracies as well. Corruption remains a major problem, and the public is aware that their own tacit acceptance of corruption serves only to exacerbate the problem. It is equally clear that citizens do not see any possibility of affecting this situation since there is little chance of influencing the way the country is governed beyond participation in elections. Even this is dubious as a majority of citizens are particularly concerned about the free and fair nature of the upcoming presidential elections. Concern over the participation of military service members in elections can be seen as an indication that addressing this concern is not an issue for election officials alone.

The mass media is the first institution to take sides in the eyes of the public. As can be seen in the IFES report *Ukrainian Political Issues and Media Focus Groups: A Summary of Findings*⁴⁴ most

⁴³ Francis Fukuyama, *The Great Disruption*

⁴⁴ Gary Ferguson, July 1999

Ukrainians believe that the media is dominated by foreign and domestic political agendas and personalities. The public sees the problem as not just a lack of quality reporting, but an attempt to influence public opinion through the presentation of factual information taken out of context or unsubstantiated claims. Despite this negative perception, Ukrainians continue to insist that the media should provide unbiased critical analysis of political and social developments to assist citizens in making important choices, particularly at the time of elections. Understandably, the expectation is for the media to attempt to inform rather than influence the public.

Perhaps the use of the mass media is not the only way to address the critical lack of information on politics, laws and institutions in Ukraine. Provision of information regarding institutions performing critical functions within a democracy, such as the Constitutional Court, may be considered as the task of the institutions themselves in an established democracy. Conceding the budgetary limitations of most institutions, domestic and international NGOs should be relied upon to provide assistance. After all, democracy is only possible through its institutionalization; institutions only serve the public when properly used, and people can only make use of processes and institutions whose functions they understand. Therefore, when Ukrainian citizens admit that politics is too complicated for them to understand, it should not be taken as a statement of a lack of capability, but as a notification that so far no one has seen fit to properly explain the functions of Ukrainians' representative government.

This, of course, leaves us with the conclusions presented year after year: nothing will truly change for the better in Ukraine until its citizens are adequately equipped with the knowledge necessary to make democracy and a market economy work for them. All the problems measured in this survey can be attributed to the population's disengagement from a system that will provide for their needs only in accordance with their level of participation. In other words, the citizens of Ukraine themselves need to make their democracy work. Nonetheless, it is up to the government and the architects of a civil society to ensure that the opportunity to assume responsibility is provided in a sustained effort through instruction and the dissemination of useful information. This effort should be presented as a clear curriculum for educating the general public through:

- Informational television and radio programming;
- NGO-government partnerships that attempt to educate the public on all matters of understanding and involvement of citizens; and
- Civic education programs in schools focusing on critical thinking and participatory activities in combination with traditional resources and instruction.

Although programs should seek to inform all citizens, Ukrainian youth require special attention since results show that they are the most likely to hold opinions in support of continued reform, but least likely to get involved in social or political solutions. Programs that attempt to involve youth in community efforts would be especially useful since involvement in immediate, incremental, positive changes close to home may embolden young adults to expand their involvement to regional and national affairs.

Certainly greater involvement at the community level by all Ukrainian citizens may be the key to eventually solving the more complex issues facing the nation. Certainly people cannot be expected to act in an information vacuum, nor can citizens be expected to assume greater civic responsibilities without assurance of an outcome beneficial to themselves and their loved ones.

APPENDIX I: TOPLINE DATA

1. How interested are you in matters of politics and government -- are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?

	5/96	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)
Very Interested	15%	16%	14%	13%
Somewhat Interested	34%	39%	36%	30%
Not Too Interested	23%	23%	23%	35%
Not At All Interested	26%	20%	25%	21%
Don't Know	3%	1%	2%	1%
Refused/NA	-	-	አ	公
Total	101‰	99%√	100%	1 00%

2. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today?

	5/96	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)
Very Satisfied	1%	\$	0%	\$
Fairly Satisfied	3%	2%	3%	2%
Somewhat Dissatisfied	32%	21%	28%	29%
Very Dissatisfied	59%	75%	68%	65%
Don't Know	6%	2%	1%	2%
Refused/NA	-	1 2	\$	1 7
Total	101%	100%	100%	98%√

3. **[Ask if 'Dissatisfied' in Q2]** Please tell me some of the reasons why you said you are dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today? **[Multiple Responses Allowed]**

	6/99 (1200)
Poor living conditions	35%
Unemployment	29%
Payment arrears	27%
Unstable economy	15%
Power utilities	8%
Lack of social guarantees	5%
Flawed legislation	4%
State corruption	4%
Unstable political situation	4%
High crime	2%
Imperfect system of taxation	2%
Other	8%

4. In your opinion, what needs to be done to improve the situation in Ukraine? [Multiple responses allowed]

6/99
<u>(1200)</u>
25%
23%
13%
11%
9%
6%
5%
5%
3%
2%
2%
1%
16%

5. When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop...? [ROTATE]

	5/96	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)	<u>(1200)</u>
Market Economy	35%	39%	25%	27%
Centrally Planned Economy	47%	31%	33%	30%
Both in conjunction [Volunteered]	-	14%	20%	25%
Other [1996 Only]	2%	-	-	-
Don't Know	16%	14%	20%	17%
Refused/NA	-	1%	2%	1%
Total	100%	99%√	100%	1 00 %

6. When it comes to our economic development, should we work toward a market economy...?

	5/96	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)
As quickly as possible	43%	25%	22%	23%
Steady small reforms	13%	41%	29%	33%
Should not pursue	18%	17%	24%	19%
Other [Volunteered]	2%	1%	3%	1%
Don't Know	24%	16%	21%	22%
Refused/NA	-	1%	1%	1%
Total	1 00%	101%	100%	99%√

7. On a scale of one to five where one means a pure market economy and five means an economy that is completely centrally planned by the state, where on that scale should Ukraine be located in the future?

	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
One/Pure Market Economy	11%	9%	9%
Two	14%	10%	11%
Three	24%	23%	26%
Four	12%	12%	15%
Five/State Control	22%	26%	22%
Don't Know	14%	18%	16%
Refused/NA	2%	2%	1%
Total	99%√	100%	100%

7a. In your opinion, what does a market economy mean? [Multiple responses allowed]

Freedom of enterprise activity Development of domestic production Negative phenomenon	6/99 (1200) 21% 6% 6% 6%
Economic progress Free competition Freedom of pricing policy Supply-demand relationship Wide variety of goods Absence of state control	5% 5% 4% 4% 3%
Get a profit Proper taxation Other Don't know	2% 2% 6% 39%

8. From what you have seen or heard, how many goods are provided in your community by organizations or private persons which break the law to a certain extent (do not pay tariffs or taxes, do not register an enterprise, etc.)?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
A Great Deal	40%
A Fair Amount	31%
Not Very Much	8%
Not At All	2%
Don't Know	17%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	99%√

8b. From what you have seen or heard, how many services are provided in your community by organizations or private persons which break the law to a certain extent (do not pay tariffs or taxes, do not register an enterprise, etc.)?

A Great Deal	6/99 <u>(1200)</u> 30%
A Fair Amount	32%
Not Very Much	11%
Not At All	5%
Don't Know	21%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

9. In general, would you say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring...? [ROTATE]

	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)
Too Quickly	5%	6%	3%
Too Slowly	70%	61%	47%
As They Should	4%	6%	3%
Reforms Not Occurring/Have			
Come to a Standstill [Volunteered]	-	-	33%
Don't Know	19%	25%	13%
Refused/NA	2%	3%	1%
Total	100%	101‰	100%

10. In your opinion will the economic situation in Ukraine in a year...?

	5/96	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)
Be better than it is now	9%	12%	10%	7%
Remain the same	32%	34%	38%	35%
Get worse	47%	45%	40%	44%
Don't Know	12%	8%	11%	14%
Refused/NA	-	\$	\$	公
Total	100%	99‰√	99%	100%

11. Thinking only of the Executive Branch, the Supreme Rada, the judiciary, and your local government, which of these four, in your opinion, is most likely to resolve the economic problems facing Ukraine in the next year?

	5/96	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)	<u>(1200)</u>
Executive Branch	21%	19%	17%	26%
Supreme Rada	8%	18%	21%	19%
Judiciary	8%	13%	5%	3%
Local Government	NA	2%	16%	11%
None [Volunteered]	33%	24%	23%	18%
Don't Know	29%	22%	17%	22%
Refused/NA	-	2%	\$	公
Total	99%√	100%	99‰√	99%√

12. Between the various government bodies, which one of the following is most responsible for impeding the pace of economic reform?

	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)
The President	16%	32%
The Cabinet of Ministers	14%	15%
Judicial	1%	1%
Supreme Rada	24%	22%
Local Government	14%	10%
Other	7%	4%
None/Reforms Not Being Impeded [Volunteered]	2%	1%
Don't Know	20%	14%
Refused/NA	2%	1%
Total	100%	100%

12A. Do you think that economic reform is being impeded MAINLY by...? [ROTATE] ALLOW ONE RESPONSE ONLY

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Flawed Legislation	31%
Over-Regulation	5%
Corruption	47%
Other	1%
Economic reform not impeded (Not Read)	公
Don't Know	15%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

13. In your opinion, how important are foreign investments to the economic recovery of our country?

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Important	19%	26%	18%
Somewhat Important	31%	29%	25%
Not Very Important	14%	12%	17%
Not At All Important	18%	18%	23%
Don't Know	18%	15%	16%
Refused/NA	-	1%	1%
Total	100%	101‰	1 00 %

14. In general, would you say that political reforms in Ukraine are occurring...? [ROTATE]

	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Too Quickly	7%	13%	5%
Too Slowly	56%	45%	43%
As They Should	9%	8%	6%
Reforms Not Occurring/Have Come to a Standstill	-	-	26%
Don't Know	27%	31%	19%
Refused/NA	1%	4%	2%
Total	100%	101‰	101%√

15. Is Ukraine a democracy, or not?

	5/96	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)
Yes	20%	20%	19%	17%
No	55%	52%	55%	58%
Both [Volunteered]	NA	8%	9%	10%
Don't Know	25%	20%	15%	14%
Refused/NA	-	1%	1%	1%
Total	100%	101%	99%√	100%

16. [Ask if Not 'Yes' in Q15] Is Ukraine moving toward becoming a democracy or not?

	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Yes	24%	22%	20%
No	37%	36%	38%
Don't Know	19%	22%	25%
Refused/NA	1%	1%	1%
NOT ASKED	20%	19%	17%
Total	101‰√	1 00 %	101%√

17. What does it mean to you to live in a democracy? [Multiple Responses Allowed]

	7/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Democratic freedoms	28%
Observance of the Constitution	17%
Possibility to work and earn	12%
Confidence in the future	12%
Protection of human rights	11%
Social security	9%
Contribute people's share to main	
state solution	4%
Other	3%
Don't know	25%

Q18 - Q20. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

18. Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country.

	5/96	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)
Agree Completely	11%	7%	5%	11%
Agree Somewhat	19%	21%	20%	24%
Disagree Somewhat	25%	17%	26%	29%
Disagree Completely	35%	50%	33%	29%
Neither Agree/Disagree [Vol.]	NA	2%	9%	2%
Don't Know	10%	4%	6%	5%
Refused/NA	-	\$	1%	公
Total	100%	101‰	100%	100%

19. Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like you can't understand what's really happening.

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Agree Completely	34%
Agree Somewhat	29%
Disagree Somewhat	19%
Disagree Completely	11%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree [Volunteered]	1%
Don't Know	4%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	99%√

20. People like you have little or no influence on the way things are run in Ukraine.

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Agree Completely	44%
Agree Somewhat	27%
Disagree Somewhat	14%
Disagree Completely	9%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree [Volunteered]	1%
Don't Know	4%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

21. Did you vote in the March 1998 election for Supreme Rada or not?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Yes, Voted	76%
No, Did Not Vote	20%
Don't Recall	3%
Refused/NA	\$
Total	99%√

	6 /99
Communist Party of Ukraine	<u>(1200)</u> 16%
People's Rukh	6%
Green Party	3%
Socialist Party of Ukraine	2%
All-Ukraine Association Hromada	1%
Democratic Party of Ukraine	1%
People's Democratic Party	1%
Party of Reforms and Order	1%
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	1%
Rural Party of Ukraine	1%
Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine	1%
Social-Democratic Party (United)	1%
Other	1%
None	42%
Hard to Answer	21%
Total	1 00%

22b. *[If Voted in Q21 and named a party in Q22a]* Did you vote for this party in the 1998 parliamentary elections?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Yes	28%
No	4%
Don't Know	2%
Didn't Vote/No Party	66%
Refused/NA	\$
Total	100%

23. How likely are you to vote in the 1999 election for President? [Show Card]

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Certain to vote	53%
Very Likely	16%
Somewhat Likely	10%
Not Very Likely	9%
Not At All Likely	2%
Definitely will not vote	6%
Don't Know	3%
Refused/NA	\$
Total	99%√

24. In general, would you say that Leonid Kuchma has done his job as President well enough to deserve re-election, or would you support someone else for President?

	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Re-elect, Strongly	21%	5%	6%
Re-elect, Not Strongly	22%	8%	20%
New Person, Not Strongly	13%	7%	22%
New Person, Strongly	24%	59%	33%
Depends (Volunteered)	8%	10%	8%
Don't Know	10%	8%	10%
Refused/NA	1%	1%	2%
Total	101%	98%√	101%

25. If the presidential election were held tomorrow, would you be more likely to support a candidate for the presidency who was affiliated with a political party or who was not affiliated with a party?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Affiliated	20%
Not Affiliated	18%
Doesn't Matter [Volunteered]	43%
Depends [Volunteered]	8%
Definitely Will Not Vote [Volunteered]	3%
Don't Know	7%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

26. Do you find that there are clear differences between the various presidential candidates in how they plan to solve problems facing Ukraine or not?

	6/99 (1200)
Yes, Clear Differences	38%
No, Not Clear Differences	41%
Don't Know	20%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

27. How much confidence do you have that any of the candidates for President of Ukraine will be able to solve the problems facing Ukraine?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
A Great Deal	4%
A Fair Amount	15%
Not Very Much	35%
None At All	30%
Depends	9%
Don't Know	8%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	102%

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Kuchma	24%
Moroz	6%
Marchuk	4%
Udovenko	3%
Vitrenko	14%
Symonenko	12%
Kostenko	1%
Tkachenko	2%
Other	\$
Will Not Vote [Volunteer]	5%
For None of the Above [Volunteer]	9%
Don't Know/Undecided [Volunteer]	19%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

28A.	[Ask if name given in Q28] As regard Kuchma (n=290)	s (NAME), would you…
	Definitely be Voting for Him/Her	48%
	Probably be Voting for Him/Her	28%
	Just Leaning toward Him/Her	21%
	Moroz (n=71)	
	Definitely be Voting for Him/Her	42%
	Probably be Voting for Him/Her	41%
	Just Leaning toward Him/Her	16%
	<u>Marchuk (n=46)</u>	
	Definitely be Voting for Him/Her	39%
	Probably be Voting for Him/Her	41%
	Just Leaning toward Him/Her	12%
	<u>Udovenko (n=37)</u>	
	Definitely be Voting for Him/Her	38%
	Probably be Voting for Him/Her	33%
	Just Leaning toward Him/Her	23%
	bust Leaning toward minime	2070
	<u>Vitrenko (n=168)</u>	
	Definitely be Voting for Him/Her	56%
	Probably be Voting for Him/Her	28%
	Just Leaning toward Him/Her	14%
	<u>Symonenko (n=141)</u>	
	Definitely be Voting for Him/Her	64%
	Probably be Voting for Him/Her	23%
	Just Leaning toward Him/Her	12%
	Kostenko (n=11)	
	Definitely be Voting for Him/Her	75%
	Probably be Voting for Him/Her	14%
	Just Leaning toward Him/Her	10%
	Sust Learning toward Finn/Fiel	1070
	<u>Tkachenko (n=21)</u>	
	Definitely be Voting for Him/Her	33%
	Probably be Voting for Him/Her	37%
	Just Leaning toward Him/Her	24%

As you may know, if no presidential candidate secures a majority of ballots cast in the first round of elections, a run-off election is held between the two candidates who received the most votes. If run-off elections were held tomorrow between the following candidates, who would you vote for? **[Rotate]**

29.1 Kuchma v. Moroz

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Kuchma	33%
Moroz	17%
Neither [Volunteered]	33%
Don't Know	14%
Refused/NA	3%
Total	100%

29.2 Kuchma v. Marchuk

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Kuchma	31%
Marchuk	11%
Neither [Volunteered]	38%
Don't Know	16%
Refused/NA	3%
Total	99%√

29.3 Kuchma v. Vitrenko

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Kuchma	30%
Vitrenko	26%
Neither [Volunteered]	28%
Don't Know	13%
Refused/NA	3%
Total	100%

29.4 Kuchma v. Symonenko

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Kuchma	33%
Symonenko	21%
Neither [Volunteered]	29%
Don't Know	14%
Refused/NA	3%
Total	100%

29.5 Kuchma v. Tkachenko

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Kuchma	34%
Tkachenko	11%
Neither [Volunteered]	39%
Don't Know	14%
Refused/NA	3%
Total	101%√

29.6 Moroz v. Marchuk

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Moroz	19%
Marchuk	12%
Neither [Volunteered]	47%
Don't Know	19%
Refused/NA	3%
Total	100%

29.7 Symonenko v. Udovendo

	6/99 (1200)
Symonenko	23%
Udovenko	11%
Neither [Volunteered]	43%
Don't Know	20%
Refused/NA	3%
Total	100%

29.8 Udovenko v. Moroz

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Udovenko	11%
Moroz	20%
Neither [Volunteered]	45%
Don't Know	20%
Refused/NA	3%
Total	99%√

29.9 Vitrenko v. Symonenko

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Vitrenko	25%
Symonenko	18%
Neither [Volunteered]	36%
Don't Know	18%
Refused/NA	3%
Total	100%

30. Which issue will be the most important to you when you vote for a candidate for President of Ukraine in 1999? [Multiple Responses Allowed]

Render assistance to the people	25%
Honesty and respectability	16%
Platform	11%
Professional politician	10%
Stabilization of economics	10%
Determination of action	5%
Political convictions	4%
Man of principle	4%
Foreign policy	2%
Thrift	1%
Other personal characteristics	7%
Other	3%
Do not vote	4%
Don't Know	21%

Q31-Q34. When talking about the October 1999 elections, how fair and honest, in your opinion, will be...?

31. Elections in general

	6/99 <u>(1200)</u>
Completely fair and honest	4%
Mostly fair and honest	20%
Not very fair and honest	40%
Not at all fair and honest	18%
Don't Know	16%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	99%√

32. Campaigning leading up to the elections

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Completely fair and honest	4%
Mostly fair and honest	17%
Not very fair and honest	43%
Not at all fair and honest	19%
Don't Know	16%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

33. Preparation for and administration of the elections be in October

	6/99 (1200)
Completely fair and honest	5%
Mostly fair and honest	22%
Not very fair and honest	39%
Not at all fair and honest	16%
Don't Know	17%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

34. Counting of votes and reporting of the election results

	6/99 (1200)
Completely fair and honest	5%
Mostly fair and honest	18%
Not very fair and honest	37%
Not at all fair and honest	20%
Don't Know	18%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	99%√

35. You said that on the whole, you thought the October 1999 elections will be [RESPONSE GIVEN IN Q31]. [Who will be most responsible/most to blame] for the elections being [RESPONSE GIVEN IN 31]? [Show Card, Allow Only One Response]

	Fair and Honest (n=276)	Not Fair and Honest (n=692)
Central Election Commission	25%	13%
Observers	12%	2%
Political parties	8%	6%
Polling station officials	7%	7%
Constituency election officials	5%	6%
Citizens	5%	1%
Mafia/Ogranized crime	5%	18%
Business interests	3%	7%
International organizations	2%	1%
President	2%	8%
Supreme Rada	2%	1%
Press/Mass media	2%	\$
Security forces	1%	-
Individual candidates	1%	2%
Cabinet of Ministers	\$	1%
NGOs	\$	1%
Military	-	-
Other officials	2%	4%
Don't know	11%	17%

36. How well do you understand the electoral process for the presidential election?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very Well	6%
Somewhat Well	34%
Not very well	42%
Not at all	11%
Don't know	6%
Refused/NA	公
Total	99%√

37. Do you believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy or not?

	7/97	5/98	6/99
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)
Necessary, Strongly	37%	9%	14%
Necessary, Not Strongly	21%	37%	42%
Not Necessary, Not Strongly	12%	22%	18%
Not Necessary, Strongly	16%	18%	11%
Don't Know	14%	13%	15%
Refused/NA	\$	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	101%

	5/96	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)
Very Important	23%	26%	23%	21%
Somewhat Important	23%	31%	35%	40%
Not Very Important	14%	15%	16%	16%
Not At All Important	20%	13%	14%	9%
Don't Know	20%	14%	11%	12%
Refused/NA	-	1%	\$	2%
Total	100%	100%	99%	100%

39. Do you find that there are clear differences between the various political parties and blocs in how they plan to solve problems facing Ukraine?

	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)	<u>(1200)</u>
Yes, Clear Differences	31%	41%	40%
No, Not Clear Differences	49%	39%	37%
Don't Know	19%	19%	21%
Refused/NA	ঠ	1%	1%
Total	99%	100%	99%√

40. Whose interests are advanced by Ukrainian political parties (one answer only)?[Show Card]

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)
The interests of the leader of the political party	26%	24%
The interests of the intelligentsia	2%	1%
The interests of the citizens of Ukraine	7%	12%
The interests of the government apparatus	10%	13%
The interests of financial structures	13%	10%
The interests of criminal structures	4%	8%
The interests of voters in my region	4%	1%
The interests of individual specific groups, such		
as the military industrial complex or labor unions	4%	4%
Other	2%	5%
Don't Know	25%	20%
Refused/NA	2%	2%
Total	99‰√	1 00%

41. Are you a member of a political party?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Yes	1%
No	98%
Don't Know	1%
Refused/NA	\$
Total	100%

42. [If 'Yes' to Q41] Which one? [Open ended]

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Communist Party of Ukraine	1%
People's Rukh	ঠ
Rural Party of Ukraine	\$
All-Ukrainian Association Hromada	ঠ
Not a Member of a Party	98%
Total	99%√

43. [If 'No' to Q41] Would you consider joining a political party?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Yes	9%
No	83%
Don't Know	8%
Refused/NA	\$
Total	100%

44. In your opinion, does the political composition of Supreme Rada reflect the population's political preferences overall?

	7/98	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)
Yes, Strongly	3%	2%
Yes, Somewhat	23%	17%
No, Somewhat	31%	37%
No, Strongly	16%	26%
Don't Know	25%	17%
Refused/NA	1%	1%
Total	99%	100%

45. Do you think that the Supreme Rada elected in March 1998 has been [ROTATE] more effective than the last Rada in addressing the problems facing Ukraine, less effective, or about the same as the last Rada?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
More Effective	10%
Less Effective	18%
Same	57%
Don't Know	15%
Refused/NA	አ
Total	100%

46a-i. On a scale of one to nine where "1" is the least effective and "9" is the most effective, where on that scale would you place each of the following parties and blocs in how effective they are in addressing the problems facing Ukraine? **SHOW CARD RECORD** Communist Party of Ukraine; Socialist Party of Ukraine; NDPU; Hromada; Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine; Green Party; People's Rukh; Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU); Independent Deputies.

	a. Communist Party	b. Socialist Party	c. People's Democratic Party
1 - Least Productive	16%	12%	10%
2	7%	9%	6%
3	10%	9%	12%
4	7%	11%	12%
5	8%	9%	10%
6	4%	5%	4%
7	6%	5%	4%
8	4%	3%	1%
9 - Most Productive	10%	2%	1%
Don't Know	23%	31%	34%
Refused	4%	4%	5%
Total	99%	100%	99%√

	<u>d. Hromada</u>	e. Progressive Socialist Party	f. Green Party	g. People's Rukh
1 - Least Productive	32%	13%	16%	17%
2	7%	6%	10%	8%
3	9%	10%	9%	9%
4	7%	10%	11%	9%
5	4%	8%	8%	8%
6	2%	5%	4%	5%
7	1%	4%	2%	4%
8	1%	2%	1%	2%
9 - Most Productive	1%	3%	2%	3%
Don't Know	33%	34%	34%	30%
Refused	5%	5%	5%	5%
Total	102% √	100%	102‰	100%

	h. Social Democratic Party	i. Peasant Party	j. Independent Deputies
1 - Least Productive	12%	12%	16%
2	6%	9%	7%
3	10%	8%	7%
4	11%	9%	7%
5	9%	9%	8%
6	5%	4%	3%
7	4%	3%	2%
8	2%	3%	1%
9 - Most Productive	1%	2%	1%
Don't Know	35%	36%	42%
Refused	5%	5%	5%
Total	100%	100%	99%~

47. Overall, will political parties play a stronger or weaker role in the next Supreme Rada election than they did in the 1998 elections?

	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)
Stronger	39%	22%
Weaker	17%	10%
Same [Volunteered]	-	40%
Don't Know	43%	28%
Refused/NA	1%	1%
Total	100%	101%

48. In your opinion, are military personnel compelled by their superiors to vote for certain candidates or parties or do they exercise free choice in voting?

	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)
Compelled to vote	26%	42%
Free Choice	16%	16%
Depends [Volunteered]	11%	12%
Don't Know	45%	29%
Refused/NA	2%	2%
Total	100%	101%

49. *[If 'Compelled' in Q48]* In your opinion, how much of an impact does this have on the outcome of elections?

	5/98	6/99
	<u>(307)</u>	(499)
Great Impact	36%	47%
Substantial Impact	47%	41%
Not much impact	12%	10%
No Impact	1%	1
Don't Know	3%	2%
Refused/NA	\$	-
Total	99%√	101%

50. Thinking now about the Ukrainian Constitution...How much information do you have about your rights under the new Constitution of Ukraine?

	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
A great deal	4%	2%	3%
Some	21%	13%	18%
Not very much	35%	45%	47%
None at all	38%	36%	28%
Don't Know	3%	2%	4%
Refused/NA	\$	\$	公
Total	101‰	98%	100%

51. In your opinion, is information about the new Constitution readily available to most people or not?

	7/97	5/98	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Yes, Information is readily available	26%	24%	28%
No, Information is not readily available	23%	46%	42%
Depends [Volunteered]	5%	15%	12%
Don't Know	5%	14%	18%
Refused/NA	40%	1%	1%
Total	99%	100%	1 0 1% √

On a different topic...

52. Which foreign country, in your opinion, could be a model for our country's economic development?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Germany	18%
USA	11%
Poland	6%
Sweden	5%
Switzerland	4%
Canada	3%
Russia	2%
Other Former Soviet Union	4%
Other Western European	6%
Other	5%
No country is a model [Volunteered]	15%
Don't know	20%
Total	99%√

53. And which foreign country, in your opinion, could be a model for our country's political development?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
USA	14%
Germany	9%
Switzerland	5%
Sweden	4%
England	3%
France	3%
Canada	2%
Poland	2%
Russia	1%
Other Former Soviet Union	3%
Other Western European	2%
Other	2%
No country is a model [Volunteered]	16%
Don't Know	33%
Total	99%√

Thinking about land ownership in Ukraine...

54. Should the amount of land that CITIZENS OF UKRAINE may own be limited, unlimited, or should private land ownership not be allowed?

	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)
Limited	49%	44%
Unlimited	34%	29%
Not Allowed	11%	19%
Don't Know	6%	8%
Refused/NA	-	ঠ
Total	100%	100%

55. Should the amount of land that NON-CITIZENS may own be limited, unlimited, or should private land ownership by non-citizens not be allowed?

	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)
Limited	38%	27%
Unlimited	11%	4%
Not Allowed	43%	58%
Don't Know	8%	10%
Refused/NA	-	1%
Total	100%	100%

How much do you agree with each of the following statements: do you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree completely?

56.1 The laws of Ukraine should allow CITIZENS OF UKRAINE to buy and sell land as private property without unreasonable difficulty.

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Agree Completely	42%	37%	20%
Agree Somewhat	20%	22%	23%
Disagree Somewhat	12%	10%	19%
Disagree Completely	17%	24%	26%
Neither Agree/Disagree [Volunteered]	NA	1%	4%
Don't Know	7%	6%	7%
Refused/NA	-	ঠ	ঠ
Total	100%	100%	99%√

56.2 The laws of Ukraine should allow NON-CITIZENS to buy and sell land as private property without unreasonable difficulty.

	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)
Agree Completely	7%	4%
Agree Somewhat	12%	5%
Disagree Somewhat	14%	19%
Disagree Completely	58%	60%
Neither Agree/Disagree [Volunteered]	1%	6%
Don't Know	7%	7%
Refused/NA	\$	1%
Total	99‰	1 02%√

56.3 In general, would you prefer that CITIZENS OFUKRAINE be allowed to purchase land outright, or just able to lease land from the government for long periods of time?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Own outright	19%
Lease from government	44%
Either/Both [Volunteered]	24%
Neither [Volunteered]	5%
Don't Know	8%
Refused/NA	☆
Total	1 00%

56.4 And would you prefer that NON-CITIZENS be allowed to purchase land outright, or just able to lease land from the government for long periods of time?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Own outright	3%
Lease from government	48%
Either/Both [Not Read]	6%
Neither [Volunteered]	34%
Don't Know	8%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

57. In your opinion, do citizens of Ukraine have the possibility to unite into groups or form associations without the participation of government or not?

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
NGOs possible	54%	60%	55%
Associations Not Possible	22%	17%	10%
Depends [Volunteered]	NA	6%	16%
Don't Know	24%	16%	17%
Refused/NA	-	ঠ	2%
Total	100%	99‰√	100%

58. How necessary are such organizations -- essential, very necessary, not very necessary, or not at all necessary?

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Essential	18%	9%	12%
Very Necessary	33%	23%	11%
Not Very Necessary	15%	33%	39%
Not At All Necessary	10%	12%	11%
Depends [Volunteered]	NA	8%	3%
Don't Know	24%	14%	21%
Refused/NA	-	1%	2%
Total	100%	100%	99%√

58A. [Ask if 'Essential' or 'Very Necessary' in Q58] Why do you feel that way?

	6/99 (275)
Protection of interests	26%
Possibility of self-expression	23%
Component of democracy	15%
Close people	8%
Increase economic development	4%
Improving social and cultural level	2%
Other	3%
Don't know	19%
Total	1 00 %

59. Please look at this CARD and tell me which of the types of non-governmental organizations listed would you most likely join? [Allow two responses]

	6/99 (1200)
First Mention	<u></u>
Educational	6%
Religious	5%
Ethnic	\$
Assistance to the poor	4%
Women	7%
Youth	4%
Sport	5%
Environmental	4%
Political	3%
Consumer advocate	9%
Other	1%
None	45%
Don't know	6%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%
Second Mention	
Educational	2%
Religious	2%
Ethnic	270 St
Assistance to the poor	4%
Women	4%
Youth	3%
Sport	3%
Environmental	7%
Political	2%
Consumer advocate	9%
Other	\$2
None/No Second Mention	56%
Don't Know	7%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

60a. Are you currently giving your time to work for a non-governmental organization without being paid?

	6/99
	(1200)
Yes	5%
No	91%
Depends [Volunteered]	2%
Don't Know/Not Sure	1%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

60b. Would you give your time to work for a non-governmental organization without being paid – definitely yes, probably yes, probably no, or definitely no?

	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)
Definitely Yes	15%	5%
Probably Yes	26%	20%
Probably No	10%	14%
Definitely No	9%	41%
Depends [Volunteered]	4%	14%
Don't Know	4%	5%
Refused/NA	32%	1%
Total	100%	1 00 %

How important is it to you that the following rights be respected in the country where you live? **[ROTATE 61.1-61.8]**

61.1 One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting

	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)
Vendensertent	<u> </u>		· · · · · ·
Very Important	32%	38%	39%
Somewhat Important	28%	28%	38%
Not Very Important	16%	17%	12%
Not At All Important	13%	10%	4%
Don't Know	11%	6%	5%
Refused/NA	-	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	99%√

61.2 Honest elections are held regularly

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Important	65%	65%	50%
Somewhat Important	22%	22%	34%
Not Very Important	6%	7%	6%
Not At All Important	2%	3%	2%
Don't Know	4%	3%	6%
Refused/NA	-	1%	1%
Total	99%	101%	99%√

61.3 The rights of minority ethnic groups are protected

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Important	47%	39%	36%
Somewhat Important	35%	29%	39%
Not Very Important	7%	16%	11%
Not At All Important	3%	8%	4%
Don't Know	8%	7%	9%
Refused/NA	-	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%

61.4 The private property of individuals is protected by law

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Important	72%	77%	55%
Somewhat Important	19%	16%	32%
Not Very Important	2%	2%	5%
Not At All Important	2%	2%	2%
Don't Know	5%	3%	6%
Refused/NA	-	1%	1%
Total	100%	101%√	101%

61.5 Citizens have the right to form political parties

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Important	28%	22%	22%
Somewhat Important	29%	24%	28%
Not Very Important	19%	29%	30%
Not At All Important	13%	16%	11%
Don't Know	12%	8%	7%
Refused/NA	-	1%	1%
Total	101%	1 00%	1 00 %

61.6 The right to publicly criticize the government is protected

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Important	53%	58%	35%
Somewhat Important	28%	26%	32%
Not Very Important	8%	9%	18%
Not At All Important	4%	3%	6%
Don't Know	7%	4%	8%
Refused/NA	-	1%	1%
Total	100%	101‰	100%

61.7 All can freely practice the religion of one's choice

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	(1660)	(1200)	(1200)
Very Important	57%	60%	46%
Somewhat Important	28%	26%	38%
Not Very Important	7%	9%	9%
Not At All Important	3%	3%	2%
Don't Know	4%	2%	3%
Refused/NA	-	ঠ	1%
Total	99%√	100%	1 00%

61.8 All can form associations or unions without any government involvement.

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Important	29%	23%	23%
Somewhat Important	29%	27%	28%
Not Very Important	16%	26%	26%
Not At All Important	9%	14%	11%
Don't Know	17%	10%	11%
Refused/NA	-	1%	1%
Total	100%	101‰	100%

Q62.1-Q62.19. I am now going to ask you about several government bodies and individuals. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them. [ROTATE 62.1-62.19]

62.1 The Supreme Rada

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	(1660)	(1200)	(1200)
A great deal	6%	2%	3%
A fair amount	19%	14%	18%
Not very much	36%	36%	39%
None at all	32%	43%	32%
Don't Know	7%	5%	7%
Refused/NA	-	ঠ	1%
Total	100%	100%	1 00 %

62.2 The Cabinet of Ministers

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
A great deal	6%	2%	2%
A fair amount	19%	14%	18%
Not very much	36%	36%	38%
None at all	32%	43%	31%
Don't Know	7%	5%	10%
Refused/NA	-	\$	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%

62.3 The Presidential Administration

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	6%	2%	2%
A fair amount	22%	19%	19%
Not very much	38%	31%	34%
None at all	28%	37%	32%
Don't Know	6%	10%	11%
Refused/NA	-	አ	2%
Total	100%	99‰√	100%

62.4 Local government

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
A great deal	4%	3%	3%
A fair amount	18%	14%	22%
Not very much	36%	31%	34%
None at all	37%	48%	33%
Don't Know	5%	4%	7%
Refused/NA	-	公	2%
Total	100%	100%	101%

62.5 Central Bank

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
A great deal	4%	5%	4%
A fair amount	11%	19%	24%
Not very much	25%	24%	24%
None at all	38%	33%	26%
Don't Know	22%	18%	20%
Refused/NA	-	1%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%

62.6 Ukraine's military forces

	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)
A great deal	8%	21%	17%
A fair amount	16%	35%	42%
Not very much	32%	22%	15%
None at all	35%	14%	12%
Don't Know	10%	8%	12%
Refused/NA	-	公	1%
Total	101‰	100%	99%√

62.7 The Constitutional Court

	6/99 (1200)
A great deal	8%
A fair amount	27%
Not very much	20%
None at all	16%
Don't Know	26%
Refused/NA	2%
Total	99%√

62.8 State Security Service

A great deal	7/97 (1200) 11%	6/99 (1200) 12%
A fair amount Not very much	25% 24%	32% 17%
None at all	22%	17%
Don't Know Refused/NA	18% 1%	21% 2%
Total	101%	101%√

62.9 Leonid Kuchma

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)
A great deal	8%	6%
A fair amount	23%	26%
Not very much	27%	26%
None at all	37%	34%
Don't Know	5%	7%
Refused/NA	\$	2%
Total	100%	101%√

62.10 Oleksandr Moroz

	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)
A great deal	5%	4%
A fair amount	14%	17%
Not very much	25%	31%
None at all	39%	28%
Don't Know	15%	17%
Refused/NA	1%	2%
Total	99%	99%√

62.11 Pavlo Lazarenko

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)
A great deal	2%	1%
A fair amount	10%	1%
Not very much	18%	13%
None at all	45%	74%
Don't Know	25%	10%
Refused/NA	1%	1%
Total	101‰	1 00%

62.12 Hennady Udovenko

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)
A great deal	3%	3%
A fair amount	11%	15%
Not very much	18%	22%
None at all	25%	28%
Don't Know	43%	31%
Refused/NA	1%	2%
Total	101%	1 0 1%√

62.13 Yevhen Marchuk

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)
A great deal	2%	2%
A fair amount	7%	13%
Not very much	19%	24%
None at all	27%	28%
Don't Know	44%	31%
Refused/NA	1%	2%
Total	100%	100%

62.14 Natalia Vitrenko

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	8%
A fair amount	28%
Not very much	23%
None at all	22%
Don't Know	18%
Refused/NA	2%
Total	101%√

62.15 Petro Symonenko

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	9%
A fair amount	19%
Not very much	22%
None at all	29%
Don't Know	19%
Refused/NA	2%
Total	100%

62.16 Oleksandr Tkachenko

	6/99 (1200)
A great deal	3%
A fair amount	12%
Not very much	24%
None at all	32%
Don't Know	27%
Refused/NA	2%
Total	100%

62.17 Yuri Kostenko

	6/99 (1200)
A great deal	1%
A fair amount	9%
Not very much	20%
None at all	23%
Don't Know	46%
Refused/NA	2%
Total	101%

62.18 Viktor Yuschenko

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	4%
A fair amount	19%
Not very much	18%
None at all	23%
Don't Know	34%
Refused/NA	2%
Total	100%

62.19 Political Parties

A great deal	6/99 <u>(1200)</u> 2%
	=/0
A fair amount	13%
Not very much	32%
None at all	32%
Don't Know	20%
Refused/NA	2%
Total	101%

Q63.1-Q63.3. And how much confidence do you have in each of the following branches of the legal system to treat people with fairness and justice when making their decisions? **ROTATE 63.1-63.3**]

63.1 The courts

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
A great deal	6%	4%	7%
A fair amount	27%	24%	28%
Not very much	32%	37%	27%
None at all	25%	28%	22%
Don't Know	10%	7%	14%
Refused/NA	-	ঠ	1%
Total	100%	100%	99%√

63.2 The public prosecutors

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
A great deal	5%	5%	6%
A fair amount	26%	24%	31%
Not very much	31%	34%	25%
None at all	25%	28%	22%
Don't Know	11%	8%	15%
Refused/NA	-	\$	1%
Total	98%√	99%√	100%

63.3 The militia

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
A great deal	4%	4%	4%
A fair amount	16%	17%	18%
Not very much	33%	32%	31%
None at all	38%	42%	36%
Don't Know	9%	5%	10%
Refused/NA	-	\$	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%

64. How well do you understand the purpose and function of the Constitutional Court?

	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)
Very Well	4%	3%
Somewhat	20%	21%
Not very Well	34%	40%
Don't Understand at All [Vol.]	36%	29%
Don't Know	5%	6%
Refused/NA	\$	1%
Total	99‰√	100%

Q65-Q66. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Q65. Officials elected to local government can be relied upon to act ethically in the best interest of Ukraine.

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Agree Completely	5%
Agree Somewhat	18%
Disagree Somewhat	36%
Disagree Completely	28%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree [Vol.]	3%
Don't Know	9%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

65A. Officials elected to national government can be relied upon to act ethically in the best interest of Ukraine.

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Agree Completely	4%
Agree Somewhat	16%
Disagree Somewhat	37%
Disagree Completely	30%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree [Vol.]	2%
Don't Know	10%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

66. Fellow citizens generally act ethically in accordance with the best general public interest.

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Agree Completely	7%
Agree Somewhat	22%
Disagree Somewhat	32%
Disagree Completely	19%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree [Vol.]	4%
Don't Know	16%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	101% √

67. In your opinion, how common is the problem of official corruption -- is it:

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Common	59%	67%	62%
Fairly Common	25%	22%	26%
Fairly Rare	2%	2%	2%
Very Rare	1%	\$	\$
Don't Know	13%	8%	8%
Refused/No Answer	-	\$	1%
Total	100%	99%√	99%√

	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)
Very Serious	<u>(1000)</u> 69%	72%	69%
Fairly Serious	19%	18%	21%
Not Too Serious	1%	1%	2%
Not Serious at all	-	1%	\$
Don't Know	11%	8%	7%
Refused/NA	-	ঠ	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%

69. Do you think the citizens of Ukraine accept official corruption as a fact of life?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Yes	62%
No	13%
Don't Know	22%
Refused/NA	2%
Total	99%√

69A. [Ask if 'Yes' in Q69] And to what extent does this contribute to the problem of state (official) corruption?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	37%
Somewhat	13%
Not very much	4%
Not at all	3%
Don't Know	5%
Not Asked	38%
Total	100%

Q70.1-Q70.12. For each body or group I mention, please tell me whether, in your opinion, corruption is very common, fairly common, fairly rare, or very rare? [ROTATE 70.1-70.12]

70.1 Cabinet of Ministers

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Common	31%	39%	33%
Fairly Common	32%	31%	39%
Fairly Rare	6%	4%	6%
Very Rare	1%	1%	1%
Don't Know	30%	24%	18%
Refused/No Answer	-	1%	2%
Total	100%	100%	99%√

70.2 Government officials

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Common	36%	52%	42%
Fairly Common	36%	29%	39%
Fairly Rare	7%	3%	2%
Very Rare	1%	1%	1%
Don't Know	20%	15%	14%
Refused/No Answer	-	1%	2%
Total	100%	101‰	100%

70.3 Ukrainian Banks

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Common	32%	33%	29%
Fairly Common	27%	26%	32%
Fairly Rare	8%	9%	11%
Very Rare	1%	2%	2%
Don't Know	31%	28%	24%
Refused/No Answer	-	1%	2%
Total	100%	99%√	100%

70.4 Private entrepreneurs

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Common	35%	35%	29%
Fairly Common	30%	29%	35%
Fairly Rare	7%	10%	11%
Very Rare	3%	5%	4%
Don't Know	25%	20%	20%
Refused/No Answer	-	1%	2%
Total	100%	100%	101%√

70.5 Foreign businesses

	5/96	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1660)</u>	(1200)	(1200)
Very Common	21%	21%	18%
Fairly Common	21%	21%	24%
Fairly Rare	8%	12%	15%
Very Rare	5%	7%	7%
Don't Know	44%	39%	33%
Refused/No Answer	-	1%	3%
Total	99%√	100%	100%

70.6 Supreme Rada

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)
Very Common	39%	32%
Fairly Common	30%	41%
Fairly Rare	4%	6%
Very Rare	2%	2%
Don't Know	23%	17%
Refused/No Answer	1%	2%
Total	99%	100%

70.7 President Kuchma's administration

	7/97	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>	(1200)
Very Common	36%	31%
Fairly Common	25%	34%
Fairly Rare	8%	9%
Very Rare	3%	2%
Don't Know	27%	22%
Refused/No Answer	1%	2%
Total	100%	100%

70.8 Police officers

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very Common	43%
Fairly Common	38%
Fairly Rare	4%
Very Rare	1%
Don't Know	12%
Refused/No Answer	2%
Total	100%

70.9 Judges

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very Common	35%
Fairly Common	38%
Fairly Rare	7%
Very Rare	2%
Don't Know	16%
Refused/No Answer	2%
Total	100%

70.10 Tax officials

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very Common	45%
Fairly Common	34%
Fairly Rare	4%
Very Rare	1%
Don't Know	14%
Refused/No Answer	2%
Total	100%

70.11 Customs agents

	6/99 (1200)
Very Common	47%
Fairly Common	33%
Fairly Rare	3%
Very Rare	1%
Don't Know	14%
Refused/No Answer	2%
Total	100%

70.12 Elected Local Officials

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very Common	35%
Fairly Common	38%
Fairly Rare	9%
Very Rare	1%
Don't Know	15%
Refused/No Answer	2%
Total	100%

71. How much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine -- a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	6/99 (1200)
Great Deal	2%	3%	5%	5%
Fair Amount	15%	21%	25%	36%
Not Very Much	57%	56%	52%	47%
None At All	19%	15%	12%	7%
Don't Know	7%	5%	6%	4%
Refused/NA	-	\$	\$	公
Total	100%	100%	100%	99%√

72. How much information do you feel you have about economic developments in Ukraine -- a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

	5/96	7/97	5/98	6/99
	(1660)	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)
Great Deal	10%	2%	2%	5%
Fair Amount	24%	15%	22%	32%
Not Very Much	43%	55%	55%	51%
None At All	17%	22%	15%	8%
Don't Know	6%	7%	5%	5%
Refused/NA	-	-	\$	公
Total	100%	101‰	99‰√	100%

73. What is your main source of information about government and politics?

	6/00
	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
UT-1	12%
UT- 2/1+1	24%
UT-3/Inter	36%
ICTV(Visti)	\$
STB (Vikna)	1%
Local television stations	2%
Other Channels of Russian Television	2%
UR-1	5%
UR-2	\$
UR-3	\$2
Local radio stations	1%
Central (national) newspapers	3%
Local newspapers	4%
Articles in journals	\$
Speeches and other presentations public meetings	\$
Discussions with colleagues, friends, and family	4%
Other	1%
Don't know	3%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	99%√

developments in our country. For each of the following media, please tell me whether you would describe its domestic news coverage as objective or not objective. [ROTATE 74A-H] Α. UT-1 6/99 <u>(1200)</u> Objective 34% Not Objective 14% Objective as Well as Not Objective [Vol.] 33% Don't Know 17% Refused/NA 1% 99%√ Total Β. UT-2/1+1 6/99 (1200) Objective 42% Not Objective 9% Objective as Well as Not Objective [Vol.] 33% Don't Know 15% Refused/NA 1% Total 100% C. UT-3/ INTER 6/99 (1200)Objective 44%

I'm going to ask about your views on the way our mass media report the news about events and

Objective	44 /0
Not Objective	9%
Objective as Well as Not Objective [Vol.]	32%
Don't Know	14%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

D. STB (Vikna)

74.

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Objective	11%
Not Objective	6%
Objective as Well as Not Objective [Vol.]	17%
Don't Know	55%
Refused/NA	10%
Total	99%√

Ε.

F.

G.

Η.

Don't Know

Refused/NA Total 6/99

52% 6% **100%**

=rounding error

Objective Not Objective Objective as Well as Not Objective [Vol.] Don't Know Refused/NA Total	6/99 (1200) 9% 6% 17% 58% 10% 100%
Local Television Stations	6/99
Objective Not Objective Objective as Well as Not Objective [Vol.] Don't Know Refused/NA Total	(<u>1200</u>) 18% 13% 30% 36% 5% 102%
State Radio	6/99
Objective Not Objective Objective as Well as Not Objective [Vol.] Don't Know Refused/NA Total	(<u>1200)</u> 24% 12% 30% 31% 4% 101%√
Independent Radio	6/00
Objective Not Objective Objective as Well as Not Objective [Vol.]	6/99 (1200) 11% 8% 23%

106

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very Important	33%
Somewhat Important	38%
Not Very Important	9%
Not At All Important	3%
Don't Know	17%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	101‰

76. In your opinion, have the news media shown partisan support for different candidates or parties in their coverage of the 1999 presidential elections so far?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Yes	64%
No	10%
Don't Know	25%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	100%

77. How often do you read the newspaper?

Daily Several times a week Once a week Several times a month Once a month or less	6/99 (1200) 19% 34% 25% 7% 5%
Don't Read Newspapers [Volunteered]	11%
Don't Know	公
Refused/NA	公
Total	101%

78. [Ask if 1-5 in Q77] Which newspaper do you read most often?

	6/99 <u>(1200)</u>
City/Oblast newspaper	46%
Rayon newspaper	10%
Facty Ta Kommentari	19%
Argumenty I Facty	5%
Komsomolskaya Pravda	3%
Silski Visti	2%
Sehodnya	2%
Kievskie Vodomosti	1%
Uryadovyi Kurier	1%
Holos Ukrainy	1%
Den	1%
Other national newspaper	6%
Don't Know	2%
Refused/NA	\$
Not Asked	12%

79. How often do you watch news programs on television?

	6/99
	<u>(1200)</u>
Daily	58%
Several times a week	30%
Once a week	5%
Several times a month	2%
Once a month or less	1%
Don't Watch TV/News Programs [Vol.]	5%
Don't Know	\$
Refused/NA	\$
Total	102%

80. How often do you listen to news programs on the radio?

Daily	6/99 <u>(1200)</u> 42%
Several times a week	20%
Once a week	3%
Several times a month	4%
Once a month or less	3%
Don't Listen to Radio/News Programs [Vol.]	27%
Don't Know	1%
Refused/NA	\$
Total	100%

Demographics

Just a few more questions for statistical purposes.

81. Sex of Respondent

Male	45%
Female	55%
Total	100%

82. Age -- What is your age please?

18-24	12%
25-29	11%
30-34	11%
35-39	9%
40-44	8%
45-49	9%
50-54	9%
55-59	8%
60-64	8%
65-69	5%
70-74	7%
75+	4%
Total	101%√

83. What is the highest level of education you received?

Primary	7%
Secondary Incomplete	30%
Secondary Complete	50%
Less then three years of University	2%
More than three years of University	10%
Advanced Degree	1%
Total	100%

84. What is your employment situation?

Employed full-time at one job	37%
Employed part-time at one job	7%
Employed at more than one part-time job	1%
Student	3%
Pensioner	31%
Not Employed	14%
I do housework and take care of children	5%
Other	\$
Refused/No Answer	1%
Total	99%√

85. *[If Employed]* What is your field of employment at your main work place?

"Intellectual" worker teacher, journalist, writer	4%
Executive and professional and senior level (government or private)	3%
Executive or professional at mid-level (government or private)	7%
Skilled laborer	18%
Unskilled laborer	8%
Soldier, in military service	1%
Farmer	2%
Student	\$
Other	2%
Refused/NA	1%
Not Asked	55%
Total	101%

86. [If Employed] Occupation (Field of Employment) at your main work place?

	State	Private
Industrial productions	10%	2%
Construction	2%	1%
Transportation, communications	4%	1%
Culture and "nauka"	6%	\$
Trade and services	3%	4%
Agriculture	4%	1%
Security, defense	1%	\$
Other	5%	公
Refused/NA	1%	

87. Are you currently owed any back wages or pension payments from your employer or the government?

Yes	59%
No	36%
Don't Know	3%
Refused/NA	2%
Total	100%

88. [Ask If 'Yes' in Q87] For how long a period are you owed back payments"

8%
8%
9%
6%
5%
6%
16%
2%
\$
40%
100%

89.	What is your marital status?	
	Married Single/Never Married Divorced/Separated Widowed Refused/NA Total	66% 14% 7% 12% 1% 100%
90.	Do you have any children? [IF YES] Do	o they live with you?
	Yes, live with respondent Yes, do not live with respondent No Refused/NA Total	56% 26% 18% ☆ 100%
91.	What is your nationality?	
	Ukrainian Russian Ukrainian and Russian Crimean Tatar Other Refused/NA Total	74% 21% 1% ☆ 4% ☆ 100%
92A.	Have you ever been discriminated agair	st because of your national affiliation?
	Yes	4% 46%

Total	100%
Refused/NA	49%
Don't Know	1%
No	46%
165	4 70

92B. Since Independence, do you feel your rights have been restricted because of your nationality?

Yes No	2% 46%
Don't Know	-
Refused/NA	52%
Total	100%

93. What is the main language you speak in your home? [Two Answers Acceptable]

Ukrainian	52%
Russian	53%
Other	2%
Refused/NA	1%

94. Are you [or your husband/wife] a member of any of the following organizations? (Accept Multiple Responses)

Educational/Scientific/Scholarly organization	1%
Religious	2%
Ethnic rights	-
Charitable group	\$
Women's group	\$
Youth group	\$
Sports Organizations	1%
Environmental	\$
Political parties	1%
Consumer rights	-
Independent trade union	2%
Veterans Group	1%
Labor collective	5%
Creative union	2%
NONE	84%
Don't Know	2%
Refused	1%

95. With which church or religious group do you identify yourself?

Ukrainian Orthodox	35%
Other Ukrainian Orthodox (Autocephalna)	2%
Russian Orthodox	4%
Orthodox Christianity	24%
Roman Catholic	\$
Greek Catholic	3%
Protestant	ঠ
Muslim	公
Jewish	-
Other	2%
None	27%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	98%√

96. How often do you attend religious services?

Daily	公
Multiple times weekly	1%
Weekly	4%
A few times a month	7%
A few times each year	32%
Once a year or less	18%
Depends [Volunteered]	35%
Don't Attend [Volunteered]	2%
Don't Know	1%
Refused/NA	1%
Total	101‰

97. How would you describe the income level of your household -- high, moderate, lower than moderate, low?

High	\$
Moderate	15%
Lower than moderate	23%
Low	62%
Refused/NA	於
Total	100%

98 In your opinion, how much do most people in Ukraine rely on the shadow economy for their livelihood?

A great deal	26%
A fair amount	37%
Not very much	10%
Not at all	4%
Don't Know	21%
Refused/NA	2%
Total	100%

99. Place of residence

City of 500,000+	23%
City 200,000-499,999	18%
City 50,000-199,999	9%
City 20,000-49,999	11%
Towns of less than 20,000	7%
Rural residents	32%
Total	100%

100. Observed SES

High	1%
Moderate	19%
Lower than moderate	29%
Low	48%
Indeterminate	3%
Total	100%