

**PUBLIC OPINION IN
UZBEKISTAN 1996**

STEVEN WAGNER



International
Foundation
for Election
Systems

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UZBEKISTAN 1996**

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**A PUBLICATION IN THE
*VOICES OF THE ELECTORATE SERIES***

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INTRODUCTION

This first IFES-sponsored survey in Uzbekistan analyzes the opinion environment in the country – the views of the public on political and economic developments, independence, government, civil society and organizations, and information sources. Findings are based on the IFES nationwide opinion survey fielded in Uzbekistan from December 1996 to February 1997. The *Executive Summary* consists of major findings providing an overview of the survey data. The *Appendix* includes the full question text and the marginal results in tabular form.

The IFES-sponsored survey was fielded in Uzbekistan between December 3, 1996, and January 16, 1997; some reinterviews were conducted between January 22 and February 5 in and around Farghona due to suspicions of interviewer error. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with a sample of 1,830 adults (18 years and older); the sample was of a stratified random probability design (the margin of error is $\pm 2\%$ for this kind of sample). Fieldwork and data processing were conducted by a group of local Uzbekistani researchers; QEV Analytics, a Washington-based research firm, developed the weights and conducted the tabulations. The design of the sample and the weighting ensured that respondents represent the adult national population of Uzbekistan and, therefore, the findings accurately reflect the opinions and attitudes of the public in Uzbekistan.

The analysis was written by Steven Wagner; the formatted report and tables were prepared by Rakesh Sharma; and editorial assistance was provided by Elsie Natalie Skoczytas, Christopher S. Siddall, Juliana Geran Pilon, and Monica Neal.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A PROFILE OF THE UZBEKISTANI POPULATION

The 1996 IFES survey of public opinion in Uzbekistan investigated attitudes, perceptions, knowledge, values, and behavior on a wide array of topics concerning the life of the state. This analysis begins where it will end, with a summary picture of the disposition of the Uzbekistani people with regard to what their country is today and where it is going. Five distinct constituencies emerge from the data:

Contented Democrats (25% of the adult population)

These people are exclusively pro-democracy and pro-government. They are the most content with the pace of economic reform and with societal change in general. They are also the most economically liberal constituency, and are especially prevalent in the eastern Farghona Valley portion of the country.

Pro-Reform Dissidents (19% of the adult population)

This constituency is the most impatient with the pace of economic reform and is the least satisfied with the performance of the government. These individuals are also less certain than other groups that Uzbekistan is already a democracy. This constituency is the most likely to say it is appropriate for politicians to criticize the government openly and they have the lowest preference for one-party rule, but they are fairly evenly mixed on the measure of economic liberalism.

The Bewildered (19% of the adult population)

This is the most poorly informed, most disengaged of the constituencies. They consider the paces of change and of economic reform to be too great. Slightly more economically illiberal than liberal, they "don't know" what the democratic status of Uzbekistan is today and are the least likely to perceive the benefits of democracy. Besides the *Dissidents*, this is the only other group with a significant degree of unfavorable opinion of government performance. This group is more than 3-to-1 female.

Frustrated Intellegentsia (19% of the adult population)


This constituency is the best informed (or at least the most opinionated) and overwhelmingly of the view that too much change is occurring in Uzbekistani society. The members of this group are the best educated with the highest socio-economic status (SES), although the five groupings are not well defined by their demographic

characteristics. This group also has the highest representation of ethnic Uzbeks. They believe the declaration of independence of Uzbekistan was a very good thing and say Uzbekistan is today a democracy. They profess satisfaction with the government and are mixed on the scale of economic liberalism, tilting slightly toward liberal, but many in this group want to put the brakes on economic change. It may be they are expressing concern for threatened values, it may be this young professional constituency is expressing concern for the loss of privilege and the clearly established avenues for material achievement.

Old Guards (18% of the population)

This group is exclusively illiberal in economic matters. Interestingly, these individuals want a greater degree of societal change than is occurring in Uzbekistan today (perhaps they want change so as to get back to the way things were). Yet, they have a very high degree of satisfaction with the government. Many of the one-party "anti-democrats" (described later in this report) are found in this group, but they are a minority and therefore do not adequately characterize this constituency. Old Guards are most common in the far western *oblasts* and the Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic.

Figure A. Summary Orientation of Uzbekistani Population



The identification of five constituencies is somewhat arbitrary. One could define as many as 1830 constituencies – one per respondent – by allowing more shades of gray. But five is the

minimum number of groups that, in the opinion of the analyst, retains the most important patterns of responses found in the data.

The summary profile of the Uzbekistani population was derived from six measures, each of which is discussed in turn in following pages:

- The composite measure of satisfaction with government performance (“composite” means the measure derives from several variables);
- The composite measure of political liberalism;
- The composite scale of economic liberalism;
- The score of intellectual engagement;
- Attitudes toward societal change; and
- Attitudes toward economic change.

Note that the summary profile did not comprise demographic characteristics. For the issues with which this survey was most concerned, the demographic characteristics of the respondent – sex, age, ethnicity, education, income, family structure, and so forth – were shown to be rather poor “explainers” or predictors of responses. This is why demographic characteristics were not used in defining the five constituencies.

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y

KEY FINDINGS

The “center of political gravity” in Uzbekistan is found among those who are satisfied with the changes underway in their country and satisfied with the government. But most of those dissatisfied with the manner in which the country is changing are also satisfied with the government. While there is a significant liberal opposition that wants greater reforms, there is virtually no reactionary or reversionist opposition. A substantial number of Uzbekistanis are opposed to political and economic liberalization (14% opposed to the former and 44% to the latter), but these non-liberals are not generally opposed to the government. This finding means that a) the government has successfully kept one powerful source of opposition inside its tent, and b) all external pressure is in one direction – for reform.

The government has defined democracy for Uzbekistan; the extraordinary degree to which Uzbekistanis say their country is already a democracy attests to this: Only among the modestly-sized *Pro-Reform Dissidents* does a vision exist of a more thoroughly democratic Uzbekistan. And while there exists a stunning consensus in favor of democracy across the country, genuine political liberalism can come into conflict with loyalty to a government with which most Uzbekistanis are satisfied, namely over the issues of dissent and respect for individual rights.

The pursuit of economic liberalism is inherently more divisive for Uzbekistan than is political liberalism. For while the government can assert that Uzbekistan is a democracy and enlist the support of pro-democracy and pro-government sympathizers, it cannot assert that the country has a free-market economy and at the same time retain controls over economic activity. Most Uzbekistanis, however much they want economic modernity and prosperity, do not want an economy with limited government involvement (a condition desired by just 26%). The desire to retain a strong government hand in guiding the economy remains widespread.

Finally, a fairly high degree of attention to these affairs of state exists in Uzbekistan. It is sometimes assumed that vast portions of Central Asian publics are excluded from the debates concerning their countries’ future due to their own disinterest or lack of access to information. In Uzbekistan, roughly one in five is substantially disengaged from current events, leaving 79 percent who are fairly attentive to current events. Especially impressive is that 71% have a notion of what democracy means, and 72% of what defines a market economy. But there is ample opportunity to improve the availability of information: Only 39% say they have a “great deal” or “fair amount” of information about political developments; 42% about economic developments; and 32% about their rights *vis-à-vis* government authorities.

SETTING


This survey is not the first national poll to be conducted in Uzbekistan, but it may be the most rigorously representative. The sample design and data collection protocol insured, insofar as it was practical, that every Uzbekistani adult, 18 years of age or older, in every part of the country, had an equal probability of participating in the survey. The conduct of interviews in three languages furthered this goal. The IFES track record of administering similar questionnaires in Central Asia, and the pretesting of the questionnaire with Uzbekistanis, contributed to IFES' confidence that the questions themselves were intelligible to respondents. The analytic strategy employed here minimized the reliance on any one question so as to avoid measurement sources of error. IFES took every precaution to ensure that the contractor and its interviewers conformed to the highest methodological standards. All interviews were conducted in person by Uzbekistani citizens trained by the IFES contractor.

GETTING OUR ARMS AROUND UZBEKISTAN PUBLIC OPINION


The first imperative for an analyst of public opinion is to not impose his or her beliefs about the world upon the people being studied. There are no contradictory responses in public opinion research; there is only the data. Contradictions may be simply due to the analyst's failure to understand fully what the respondents are trying to say.

Uzbekistan really puts one to the test in this regard: The responses in this survey of public opinion in Uzbekistan, the first to be conducted there by IFES, are almost mystifying. For instance, two-thirds of the public agrees with the proposition that their family "doesn't have enough money to buy basic foods each month" (Table 41 in the Appendix), and yet an equal proportion describe the current economic situation as "very" or "somewhat good" – indeed, 53 percent of those having the most difficulty affording enough food say the economy is good (Table 13 in the Appendix). It must be stressed, however, that the fieldwork for the survey was conducted in the winter and the timing might have led to somewhat negative responses on the question related to food.


Figure B. Current Economic Situation and Difficulty in Buying Food



Similarly, three of four Uzbekistanis (77%) rate the "the overall quality of (their) life today" as "very good" or "fairly good" (Table 5 in the Appendix), including 62 percent of those who strongly agree sufficient food is hard to come by. Sixty-five percent pronounced themselves satisfied with "the situation in Uzbekistan today" (Table 6 in the Appendix), including half of those most economically at risk. These levels of professed satisfaction are extraordinarily high.

Figure C. Satisfaction with Situation in Uzbekistan


Virtually no Uzbekistanis are looking backward: Fully 86 percent consider independence to have been a good thing (Table 9 in the Appendix). Yet just over half say "life in Uzbekistan" has improved since independence. No matter: Even 63 percent of those who report life has gotten worse consider independence to have been a good thing.

Figure D. Views on Declaration of Independence

Perhaps it is their degree of optimism that leads Uzbekistanis to overlook their current circumstances in rendering these judgments about their quality of life. Two-thirds (68%) say


the economic situation in 12 months will be better than today (Table 14 in the Appendix), including 59 percent of the most economically at-risk. As a further sign of optimism toward the future, 70 percent believe the quality of life that will be experienced by current young people will be better than their own (Table 17 in the Appendix).

Figure E. Expected Economic Situation in Short and Long Term





These are counterintuitive results: Normally economic hardship, gauged in this case by the reported difficulty in purchasing enough food, depresses judgments of economic performance and satisfaction with current conditions. Perhaps there is sufficient visible evidence of reform, of positive change, that the citizens of Uzbekistan are willing to be patient with current hardships. But if these hardships are as severe as the respondents say they are, how then to explain the extraordinarily high degree of professed satisfaction with the performance of the government in every dimension of public service?

IFES introduced its socio-political barometer, a set of questions concerning satisfaction with various aspects of government and social performance, in earlier Central Asian surveys. Never before have the results been so lopsidedly positive as in Uzbekistan. Of 12 questions in the set, 9 registered better than 60 percent satisfaction. Only "the opportunity of citizens to affect the state" dipped below 50 percent (Figure F next page; Table 31 in the Appendix). Normally, satisfaction with the way things are is inversely proportional to support for reform, since change threatens the positive *status quo* while reform may be sought by those dissatisfied with the present situation. Not so in Uzbekistan, where majorities are simultaneously content with the forward pace of change and satisfied with the way things are.

Figure E. Socio-Political Barometer

Many Uzbekistanis are conscious of the increased opportunities available to citizens as a result of independence. Opportunities to participate in religious activities are judged to have increased since independence, in the opinion of 94 percent. Greater possibilities for economic activity are perceived by 88 percent. Yet, the extent of respect for individual rights is perceived to have increased by a comparatively modest 48 percent (Figure G next page; Tables 10, 11, 12 in the Appendix).


Figure G. Greater Freedoms in Uzbekistan



LOOKING FOR POLITICAL LIBERALISM

Another way that the Uzbekistani public differs dramatically from publics in other former Soviet Republics surveyed by IFES is in the degree to which they perceive their country to have "arrived" democratically. Fully two-thirds of Uzbekistani adults (71%) believe their country is a democracy (Table 47 in the Appendix). An additional 12 percent believe that although Uzbekistan is not yet a democracy, it is becoming one (Table 48 in the Appendix). Very few (5%) say it is not a democracy; 12 percent give no response.


**Figure H. Orientation of Uzbekistani Population:
Uzbekistani Democracy**



So what does democracy mean to them? In an open-ended question, 71 percent were able to render an opinion, and just 4 percent of responses make reference to economic prosperity (Table 49 in the Appendix). The most common responses were that democracy means living in freedom (30% gave this response) or having particular liberties (20%).


Democracy as a system of government is broadly considered by Uzbekistanis to be beneficial to society. Large majorities regard democracy to benefit most persons rather than a select few by a margin of 73 percent to 13 percent (Figure I next page; Table 51 in the Appendix). A similar majority, by a margin of 72 to 2 percent, says democracy promotes economic solutions rather than impedes solutions (Figure I next page; Table 50 in the Appendix).

Figure I. Ideas about Democracy in Uzbekistan



Other survey questions assessed public recognition of the relationship between democratic practice and government responsiveness. The proposition that "voting gives people like me a chance to influence decisions made in our country" is affirmed by 73 percent – strongly affirmed by 29 percent (Table 59 in the Appendix). Enthusiasm for voting is strongly related to support for the government: Pro-democrats dissatisfied with the performance of government account for most of those who disagree that voting empowers. One reason may be that dissatisfaction with government performance coincides with suspicion that the government would not allow free and fair elections. As a practical matter, this is important: Promoting election participation among those who are already pro-democratic, but likely to hold the view the government cannot lose an election (see the description of the "Non-voting Democrats," below), is likely to be more successful than promoting voter participation among the totally disinterested.

The fact that government officials are required to stand for election is perceived by a large majority (78%) to make those officials more responsive to the public's goals (the text of question 74 is, "When government authorities must be elected by the people in order to keep their position in government, they will be more concerned with doing what the people want.") Almost the same percentage (79%) report that "when government authorities must be elected by the people in order to keep their position in government, they will have more respect for the rights of people" (Table 59 in the Appendix).

Figure J. Democracy and Respect for Rights

Another important dimension of political liberalism was tapped with a question on the appropriateness of politicians openly criticizing the government (Table 76 in the Appendix). This question sharply divided Uzbekistanis, with 43 percent responding that open criticism is appropriate, and 49 percent responding it is not appropriate (the actual question text was, "In your opinion, is it appropriate for politicians who disagree with the government to openly criticize the President and the Government, or are these activities not appropriate").

The development of a civil society – in particular, the emergence of active non-governmental organizations – is potentially impeded by the common perception that it is not necessary for citizens to engage in social activism outside government. In fact, a substantial minority of Uzbekistanis (31%) do consider NGOs "not necessary," although a majority (56%) say that NGOs are necessary (Table 83 in the Appendix).

The final question measuring political liberalism concerns the ideal number of political parties. A plurality of 33 percent prefer a one-party system; the sum of responses indicating a preference for a system with more than one party equals 36 percent (Table 71 in the Appendix). A modest 5 percent prefer a system with no party, and one-quarter (26%) expresses no preference.

The public's disposition on the question concerning democracy is multidimensional rather than linear; an Uzbekistani is not simply either pro- or anti-democratic, in part because attitudes toward the government intervene. The following is a political typology of Uzbekistani adults, derived solely from the question concerning democracy in theory and in practice, discussed

above. The typology is different from the summary profile presented previously, in that the summary profile took into account attitudes on numerous dimensions, of which democracy was but one.

These are our political opinion clusters:

Voting Democrats (51% of the population)

These people consider Uzbekistan to be a democracy, regard democracy as beneficial, and have the highest rate of satisfaction with the government. They also have the highest percentage of agreement with the proposition that voting represents individual empowerment.

Non-voting Democrats (19% of the population)

While this constituency thinks democracy is beneficial, its members do not think Uzbekistan is a democracy, and they are the most dissatisfied with the government's performance. They also have the highest rate of asserting the need for NGOs and for expressing the appropriateness of overt criticism of the government.


Skeptics of Democracy (16% of the population)

These adults express no opinion on many of the indicators of political liberalism, but they are generally suspicious of NGOs and consider criticism of the government to be inappropriate.

Anti-Democrats (14% of the population)

This constituency is most distinctive because it considers democracy to benefit only a select few. It also has the highest preference for one-party rule. Not that these people are well off: 55 percent of this anti-reform constituency strongly agrees it is difficult to get enough money to buy basic foods to eat in a typical month. Yet as a group they say they are more satisfied with the current government than not (Figure K next page).

**Figure K. Orientation of Uzbekistani Population:
Democracy in Theory & Practice**



Certain *wiloyats* (administrative districts) have a noticeably higher extent of “Non-voting Democrats”: in Bukhoro they account for 37 percent; in Samarkand, 33 percent; and in Surkhondaryo, 30 percent. All of these *wiloyats* are in the south-central region of the country.

Political liberalism, a concern about the rights of individuals, is most likely to be superseded by concerns about ethnic relations than by concerns about law and order. Virtually all Uzbekistanis (96%) report the current relations between ethnic groups are good (Table 22 in the Appendix). But the maintenance of good ethnic relations is said by 76 percent to require “strong presidential power” (Table 23 in the Appendix). A majority (64%) expects the condition of law and order will improve over the next year, but a distinct minority of 37 percent agrees that “order and discipline in society” require limits on the political and civil rights of the people (Tables 25, 26 in the Appendix). Government authorities are perceived by 59 percent to have a “great deal” or a “fair amount” of respect for the rights of individuals in Uzbekistan (Table 24 in the Appendix).




P PLUMBING THE DEPTH OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISM

Just as this survey sought to assess the extent of political liberalism, it separately measured several dimensions of economic liberalism. Although Uzbekistanis are not looking backward in the sense that the vast majority consider independence to have been a good thing, a majority does prefer a kind of economic reversion, with half (50%) saying, "When thinking about our economic future, we (should) return to an economy basically controlled by the state" (Table 33 in the Appendix). One-quarter (26%) prefer an economy with limited state control. True, 58 percent either work for a state-owned factory or farm themselves or their spouse does (Table 104 in the Appendix), but this fact does not explain the preference for a "state-controlled economy": those not dependent on a state job are no more likely to want a free economy than those who are.

When asked in an open-ended format what it means to live in a "free or market economy," 72 percent were able to give a substantive response (Table 36 in the Appendix). Of these responses, forty-three percent (43%) of these responses were negative, principally that it means unemployment (19%) or low income and poor standard of living (12%). Roughly half (55%) gave positive or neutral responses, principally that a free market economy implies economic freedom and property rights (the response of 26%).

Although democracy is seen to be broadly beneficial (by 72%, Table 51 in the Appendix), the free market economic system is not: even though 47 percent regard the free market economy to benefit "most people," 46 percent report it benefits just a select few (Figure L next page; Table 37 in the Appendix).

Figure 1. Whom Will A Market Economy Benefit?


Taken together, these three questions constitute a basis for assessing the extent of popular support for economic liberalism. The statistical technique of factor analysis confirms that these three variables can legitimately be combined into a single composite measure of economic liberalism, and provides a case-by-case liberalism score. This means that we can rank-order each respondent by his or her degree of expressed liberalism.

In summary, 18 percent are scored as highly liberal, 36 percent are moderately liberal, 32 percent are moderately illiberal, 12 percent are highly illiberal. The end points are more easily described than the middle categories. None of the highly liberal want a state-controlled economy; 78 percent of the highly liberal have positive things to say about a free market economy (none have negative things to say); virtually all (97%) say a market economy benefits everyone. The highly illiberal are the exact mirror image, preferring an exclusively state-controlled economy, criticizing a market economy in the open-ended question, and saying it benefits a select few.

The two moderate categories consist of people who gave less consistent responses. Of the moderate liberals, 62 percent said a market economy benefits everyone; 53 percent said positive things about the market economy, while 37 percent gave no opinion; but 45 percent wanted state control of the economy, versus 24 percent for limited or no state involvement in the economy.

The moderately illiberal prefer state control by 67 percent versus 10 percent for little or no state involvement in the economy. One-third of the moderately illiberal gave negative descriptions of a free-market system, and most (80%) said it will benefit just a select few.

**Figure M. Orientation of Uzbekistani Population:
Economic Liberalism**



Economic liberalism is little related to whether a respondent resides in an urban or rural community, but is related to region. Solid majorities in the eastern Farghona Valley region and in the central-southern *Wiloyats* score as economically liberal. Majorities in and around Tashkent and in the western region are illiberals.


THE GOVERNMENT'S REPORT CARD

In addition to the socio-political barometer questions that measure the government's delivery of services, two additional questions in this survey tapped opinions about the government, and both yielded similar, highly positive results.

One question concerns the efficacy of the national government (Table 19 in the Appendix), to which 80 percent responded that it is possible for the national government in Tashkent to improve significantly the lives of the citizens of Uzbekistan. This result is an affirmation of government as a vehicle for societal advancement. Another question concerns the extent to which "government authorities respect the rights of individuals in Uzbekistan" (Table 24 in the Appendix). Fifty-nine percent (59%) responded "a great deal," or "a fair amount."

Examining the pattern of responses to the "barometer" and these two additional questions on government yields a composite measure of professed attitudes toward the government. Statistical procedures (such as factor analysis) are available to indicate the extent to which these various questions belong together or the extent to which these seem to measure a common, underlying sentiment. There was an extremely high degree of homogeneity of responses, suggesting either that many respondents gave a consistently "safe" response of "fairly satisfied" to each of these questions, or that a high degree of government paternalism is accepted.

Nonetheless, 43 percent expressed consistent and frequently intense satisfaction with the performance of the government. Another third (33%) expressed consistent but more tepid satisfaction. Only 24 percent expressed more dissatisfaction than satisfaction (Figure M on next page).

Figure N. Satisfaction with Government Performance

Summary attitudes toward the government are highly significant when compared to other attitudes about which the survey is concerned. In fact, satisfaction with the government is arguably the most important composite variable that explains fundamental dispositions of the people on economic and political development. It is also arguably the most important factor in the real-world political dynamics of Uzbekistan.

There is very little anti-government sentiment that is also anti-democratic in Uzbekistan today. Allowing for "grade inflation" in assessments of government performance (possibly resulting from an unwillingness to criticize the government), roughly 10 percent of the population is less than very satisfied with the government and also not pro-democratic. By comparison, roughly a third are less than very satisfied with the government and pro-democratic.


Similarly, there is a small (10%) anti-government, anti-economic reform constituency. Most of the dissent in Uzbekistan is therefore liberal and can be counted on to encourage further political and economic change. Yet confidence in the government appears to constrain regressive agitation – the illiberal anti-reformers are mostly inside the government's tent. These political factors create a dynamic tending to push reform in one direction.

The government clearly benefits from the high degree of support for the nation-building project in Uzbekistan today. This survey cannot claim to have exhaustively assessed

nationalism, but available data suggest that those with the greater degree of interest in nation-building show less dissatisfaction with the government. This too is a significant political finding, as dissent propelled by nationalist sentiment can have a distinctively unpleasant character and intensity.

In another area related to the performance of the government, 26 percent of the respondents rely on some form of local government subsidy to sustain their quality of life (Table 42 in the Appendix), although only 28 percent of pensioners consider themselves dependent in this way on the government.

Figure O. Local Subsidies



Finally, in Karakalpakstan, 42 percent are dissatisfied with the government, with the highest rate of dissent found among the *wiloyats*. In Tashkent proper, 36 percent are dissatisfied; around Tashkent (Tashkent *Shahri*) 33 percent are dissatisfied.




DEALING WITH SOCIETAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

The high level of professed satisfaction with the situation in Uzbekistan today would indicate either that the economic and political transformation underway in the country is moving in a positive direction or that the situation is satisfactory even though nothing much is changing. It seems that the former perception is most prevalent.

An astounding 82 percent report that “many things are changing in Uzbekistan today” (Table 15 in the Appendix). And only a minority hold the view that these changes are excessive (Table 16 in the Appendix). Combining the responses to these two questions reveals that a plurality of 35 percent holds the view that change is significant yet occurring at the appropriate pace; 27 percent think change is significant and too rapid; 17 percent think change is significant yet insufficient. Thirteen percent (13%) assert change is not occurring, and 8 percent express no opinion.


**Figure P. Orientation of Uzbekistani Population:
Societal Change**



Questions concerning perceptions of economic reform in Uzbekistan (as opposed to generic change in society) yield similar results, revealing a general “contented incrementalism.” More

than half of Uzbekistanis prefer incremental (step-by-step) economic reform (55%) rather than rapid reform (36%; Table 34 in the Appendix). Similarly, more than half (54%) report the current pace of economic reform in Uzbekistan is proceeding with appropriate speed (Table 35 in the Appendix). Combining these responses, a plurality of one-third (36%) are contented incrementalists, and an additional 17 percent are content with the pace but prefer quick reform. Nineteen percent (19%) are impatient for a greater degree of economic reform, while 17 percent report reforms are proceeding too quickly.


**Figure Q. Orientation of Uzbekistani Population:
Economic Change**



SCORING INTELLECTUAL ENGAGEMENT

We have discussed elsewhere the drawbacks of using exclusively, or even principally, demographic characteristics of the respondent to explain positions on key issues of reform, opinions about the direction of society, as well as degrees of political and economic liberalism (see above). But there is one significant dimension of public opinion that can be linked to a demographic indicator: The respondent's level of education has a pronounced bearing on the extent to which the respondent is aware of and has formed opinions about the processes of social, political, and economic evolution in the country. Uzbekistan, like the other countries in Central Asia, has a well-educated population, which is undoubtedly why all but 21 percent evidence some degree of intellectual engagement in the issues addressed by this survey.

**Figure R. Orientation of Uzbekistani Population:
Intellectual Engagement**



The intellectual engagement score was calculated simply by counting the instances of "don't know" responses or expressions of disinterest on the following Tables: 19, 24, 26, 27, 28, 31, 33, 36, 45 - 51, 56, 71, 78. These Tables are the most substantive – or perhaps the most abstract – concerning the state. Of these 25 Tables, 9 percent had a zero score, meaning they responded "don't know" to none of the questions. Thirty-six percent (36%) responded "don't know" on 1 - 3 questions, 34 percent on 4 - 8 questions, 21 percent on 9 or more questions.

The extent of information available to the respondent seems to be a very significant factor in how he or she perceives the change occurring in Uzbekistan. As discussed above, the "Bewildered" constituency – partially defined by its "no opinion" response on key questions – is numerically important and a principal source of apprehension regarding such change. The conversion of this constituency into a constituency that supports reform may well be achieved as a result of better or more accessible education.

Disengagement is especially pronounced in and around the Farghona Valley; half in Andijon, 40 percent in Farghona, and 30 percent in Namangan rate as "highly disengaged." This may be in part a function of geography and the difficulty in receiving electronic sources of information.

NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION

Uzbekistan, like the other countries of Central Asia, is usually considered to be a multi-ethnic nation, but in fact, the principal ethnicity (Uzbek) overwhelmingly predominates. This survey found 75 percent of respondents to be ethnic Uzbeks, whereas Russians, the second most prominent ethnic group, numbered just 9 percent. Kazaks numbered 6 percent, while Tajiks, Tatars, and Karakalpakis – found in the Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic near the Aral Sea – each recorded 2 percent. One percent of the survey respondents were Kyrgyz, and 3 percent reported other ethnicities (Table 91 in Appendix).

Ethnicity has a clear bearing on national pride and support for the nation-building exercise in Uzbekistan. Consider, as an example, the question of whether the independence of Uzbekistan is a good thing or a bad thing (Table 9 in Appendix). Overall, 50 percent responded that the declaration of Uzbekistani independence was a “very good thing,” while 36 percent said it was a “fairly good thing.” A modest 9 percent said it was either a “fairly bad” or “very bad” thing.

Among ethnic Uzbeks, 91 percent said they considered independence to be a good thing, while only 59 percent of ethnic Russians agreed. A sizable minority of 30 percent of Russians, on the other hand, said independence was a bad thing, and those Russians who said independence was a good thing were much less enthusiastic than ethnic Uzbeks, overwhelmingly rating it was a “fairly good thing” (rather than a “very good thing”).

The only other ethnic group with a sufficient number of respondents to make a meaningful statement about attitudes on independence was the Kazaks. They fell between the Uzbeks and Russians in their degree of favorable sentiment toward independence, overwhelmingly saying it was a good thing (81%), evenly dividing between a “very good thing” and a “fairly good thing.”

The same patterns are evident in a question concerning the extent of national pride (Table 98 in Appendix). Fifty-five percent (55%) of Uzbekistanis are proud of their national citizenship, which varies from 63 percent among ethnic Uzbeks, to 38 percent among ethnic Kazaks, to 15 percent among ethnic Russians. Most Russians (56%) are “content” but not proud to be citizens of Uzbekistan.

Another political variable which strongly correlates with ethnicity is the composite measure of satisfaction with the government. Eighty-one percent (81%) of ethnic Uzbeks profess overall satisfaction with the government, versus 51 percent of ethnic Russians.

The pattern of these responses is clear: Enthusiasm for the creation of the Uzbekistani state, support for the government, and pride in citizenship are all more prevalent among Uzbeks than non-Uzbeks. Were the word not so corrupted by the Soviet legacy, one might say that Uzbeks are more “nationalist” than the other ethnicities of Uzbekistan.

This statement may seem self-evident; yet ironically, when asked which is of greater importance, “your ethnic identity or your citizenship,” ethnic Russians are the more likely to respond “citizenship.” Overall, 44 percent cite their ethnicity as most important, and 28 percent their citizenship, while 24 percent say these allegiances are equally important (Table 92 in the Appendix). Ethnic Uzbeks value their ethnicity more than their national citizenship by 51 percent to 22 percent. Ethnic Russians have the opposite priority, 17 percent to 50 percent.

So for ethnic Uzbeks, ethnicity (and all of the cultural legacy which goes with ethnic identity) is more important than national identity, yet ethnic Uzbeks are practically more “nationalist,” meaning more enthusiastic about the state-building exercise underway in Uzbekistan. It appears that ethnic Uzbeks consider the creation of an independent Uzbekistan to be a natural extension of their ethnic pride.

On a related question, two-thirds (66%) are of the opinion that the citizens of Uzbekistan should be encouraged to speak the Uzbek language; 28 percent disagree (Table 101 in the Appendix). Naturally, this sentiment is more prevalent among ethnic Uzbeks (75% support the proposal) than ethnic Russians (35% favor). Only 2 percent of Uzbekistanis report they are planning to emigrate (Table 105 in the Appendix); almost all intend to stay in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Overall, just 6 percent report they have been the victim of discrimination because of their ethnicity (Table 99 in the Appendix). Four percent of ethnic Uzbeks report discrimination, versus 17 percent of ethnic Russians. Ethnic Tartars claim higher levels of discrimination (1 in 5) but have too few respondents to be considered statistically significant.

Because of regional variations in ethnicity, there are also dramatic differences in national sentiment – defined as support for Uzbekistani nationhood – among various regions. Overall, the highest levels of national sentiment were found in the eastern Farghona Valley and the south-central regions, twice as great as in the capital and western regions.

ADITIONAL MATTERS OF POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Eighty-one percent (81%) of survey respondents say they voted in the December 1995 elections. People with children were more likely to vote than those without children (Table 54 in the Appendix). Fifty-five percent (55%) of Uzbekistanis say they are interested in politics and government affairs and 80 percent think it is possible for the government to improve people's lives (Tables 18 & 19 in the Appendix). Yet, 34 percent report that they have only a fair amount of information about political developments and 46 percent say they don't have much information (Table 28 in the Appendix).

Not surprisingly, a respondent's educational level is directly related to the quality of information about politics. Whereas 24 percent of those with less than a high-school education say they have either a "great deal" or "fair amount" of information about political developments in Uzbekistan, 56 percent of those with some university education or more say the same thing. One in five of those on the lowest end of the educational scale knows "nothing at all" about political developments versus one in twenty of those with the most education.

Two-thirds (66%) of the Uzbekistani people are satisfied with the current level of political freedom whereas only one in five (20%) say they are dissatisfied (Table 31 in the Appendix). Three-fourths (75%) of those interviewed say they are satisfied with the electoral system and only 14 percent claim to be dissatisfied (Table 31 in the Appendix).

Sixty percent (60%) of Uzbekistanis believe government officials have gained more power since independence and 39 percent say those officials are not the same people as before independence (Tables 43 & 44 in the Appendix). Even though the officials are different, 45 percent say that official corruption is "very" or "fairly" common. Even more (50%) consider the extent of corruption to be serious (Tables 45, 46 in the Appendix).

▶ *The Oliy Majlis and the Electoral Process*

A general lack of basic political information is revealed by the fact that only 39 percent of those asked knew their Deputy to the *Oliy Majlis* (Parliament) (Table 55 in the Appendix). The vast majority (93%) have not received any information from their Deputy about activities in Tashkent (Table 57 in the Appendix). Seventy-three percent (73%) of those who say they have received information, however, say they are satisfied with the amount they have received. This lack of information results in the fact that 42 percent do not know if their Deputy represents their views well and 24 percent say they are poorly represented (Table 56 in the Appendix).

A plurality (44%) of the Uzbekistani public knows nothing about the Central Election Commission (only 15% know a fair amount or a great deal; Table 60 in the Appendix). Thirty-four percent (34%) say that the Central Election Commission is completely neutral (Table 61 in the Appendix). Information is also lacking concerning the election laws – a plurality (37%) say they don't know anything about them or if they are in need of reform (Table 62 & 63 in the Appendix). Seventy-eight percent (78%) of the respondents had not heard of the Law on the Guaranties of the Election Rights of Citizens (Table 64 in the Appendix). Yet, 58 percent of those who have heard of the law say it has increased the influence of the citizens on the government's decision-making process (Table 65 in the Appendix). A full 82 percent expect honest elections in the year 2000 (Table 68 in the Appendix). Fifty-two percent (52%) are definitely going to vote in those elections, and another 22 percent are very likely to do so, suggesting a probable electorate of 75 percent for the 2000 elections (Table 67 in the Appendix).

◆ The Justice System

The majority of the Uzbekistani public has confidence in the main components of the justice system. More than two-thirds have either a "great deal" or "fair amount" of confidence in the courts and the Office of the Public Prosecutor (73% and 71% respectively) (Table 77 in the Appendix). Sixty-five percent (65%) say they have confidence in the national militia (Table 77 in the Appendix).

◆ Political Parties

Of the political parties of Uzbekistan, only one party has a broad-based following – the People's Democratic Party, which is the former Communist Party (36% identify with the party; Table 73 in the Appendix). The other parties appear to have very few followers – 1 or 2 percent identify with any one party. This low appeal of political parties reflects the lack of information about parties – about half of the people (45%) are not aware of any political party (Table 72 in the Appendix). Only the former Communist Party is known to the public – 51 percent are aware of the People's Democratic Party. Other parties are known to not more than one in ten. The two leading opposition parties – the Birlik Movement and the Erk Party – are known to roughly one in ten.


◆ Qualities of Leadership

A solid majority of Uzbekistanis (80%) believe the national government in Tashkent has the capability to improve the lives of the people significantly (Table 19 in the Appendix). A

majority say the President of the Republic has the greatest influence on their lives (the choice of 53 percent, versus 19 percent who selected their *Makhala*; *Makhalas* are the neighborhood associations – to use an American equivalent – with a very long history (recent legal changes have sought to incorporate *Makhalas* more into the political structure). A majority (69%) considers the President to have the greatest ability to solve the problems of society (Tables 20, 21 in the Appendix).

When asked to name the most desired qualities in a President of the Republic, 92 percent select honesty, 70 percent select efficacy (“a strong leader who can get things done”), and 66 percent select concern (“cares about the needs of people like you”). Relatively few people have as a priority a president with close ties to any particular part of the world or sphere of influence. Low on the list are “has close ties to the Muslim world” (22%), “has close ties to Russia” (19%), and “has close ties to the West” (15%). Even fewer wanted a president who “protects his own interests and those of his family” (6%), and “preserves the old system” (2%); Table 80 in the Appendix).

Figure 8. Important Qualities for President



◆ Ethnic Relations


Currently, ethnic relations in Uzbekistan seem to be fairly good. Only 15 percent of Uzbekistanis say that there are groups in Uzbekistan, either political, ethnic, or religious, that

are causing problems in the society. Sixty percent (60%) of those surveyed say that there are no groups causing problems, while one in four (24%) simply don't know (Table 78 in the Appendix). Of those who responded that there were groups causing problems, 28 percent said such groups were religious in nature (Table 79 in the Appendix).

Foreign Investment

Uzbekistanis seem to be favorable to investment by foreign companies, with 56 percent saying it should be welcomed and only 12 percent favoring the prohibition of foreign corporate investment altogether (Table 39 in the Appendix). Openness to foreign investment, however, does not necessarily imply enthusiasm about strong involvement of multinational corporations in the economy. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of those surveyed say that foreign companies should not be allowed to purchase or own land in Uzbekistan (Table 38 in the Appendix).

Figure T. Attitudes toward Foreign Investment




Models for Development

Overall, the public is outward looking, seeing Western countries as models for the political and economic development of Uzbekistan. Only a few believe the country should follow its own path of development (3% on economic and 4% on political development). Western countries are cited by 40 percent of respondents as a political model for Uzbekistan and by

40 percent as an economic model; the most frequently named Western countries are the United States (19% mention it as an economic and 23% as a political model) and Germany (14%, 10%). A fifth of the people look toward the East for economic models (14% mention Japan, 8% South Korea, 2% other countries in the East), but only one in ten looks eastward for political models (4% mention Japan, 3% South Korea; Table 52 and 53 in the Appendix). An insignificant percentage cites Russia as a model.

Figure U. Models for Political and Economic Development



▶ Taxes for Services?

Forty-one percent (41%) say they would rather maintain the current tax rates and level of services than cut taxes and services (the latter being the position of 37%; Table 81 in the Appendix). When it comes to improving utilities, a slim majority is willing to pay more taxes for better services (55% willing, 43% not willing) (Table 32 in the Appendix). Not surprisingly, this willingness is directly proportional to the self-identified socio-economic status (SES) of the respondent. Whereas 76 percent of those with a high SES would be willing to pay more, only 36 percent of those with a low SES would be willing to do so. Paying more taxes for better services also seems to be a function of ethnicity. Fifty-eight percent (58%) of Uzbeks are willing to pay more whereas only one-third (35%) of Russians support this idea.

◆ Civil rights

According to the survey, most Uzbekistanis seem to believe that the authorities generally respect their rights. Forty-eight percent (48%) of the respondents say that since independence authorities have greater respect for individual rights (only 16% say they have less respect) (Table 11 in the Appendix). Fifty-nine percent (59%) say the authorities respect their rights either "a fair amount" or a "great deal" (Table 24 in the Appendix). One-third (32%), however, says their rights are respected "very little" or "not at all."


There also seems to be general optimism that the condition of law and order will improve in the next 12 months (64% say it will improve and only 5% say it will worsen) (Table 25 in the Appendix). That optimism is somewhat affected by the ethnicity of the respondent: Whereas 64 percent of ethnic Uzbeks expect things to improve over the next 12 months, this is true for only 38 percent of ethnic Russians. Forty-eight percent (48%) say that it is not necessary to limit the political and civil rights of the people to establish social order and discipline (Table 26 in the Appendix). Thirty-seven percent (37%) say that such restrictions are necessary.

In keeping with what we have seen regarding lack of information that Uzbekistanis have about certain other topics included in the survey, only 32 percent say they have either a "fair amount" or a "great deal" of information concerning their rights (59% say they have very little or none at all) (Table 40 in the Appendix). This lack of information seems to have an ethnic component as well. Thirty-four percent (34%) of Uzbeks but only 13 percent of Russians say they have information about their rights. There is a gap of 23 percentage points between Russians who say they have no information at all about their rights and Uzbeks who hold the same opinion (35% to 12%).

◆ Non-Governmental Organizations

The people of Uzbekistan seem to be evenly divided over the role of NGOs in their communities. Overall, Uzbekistanis are slightly more inclined to say it is not possible (44%) as say it is possible (40%) to form groups in society (Figure V next page; Table 82 in the Appendix). Family structure seems to play an important role in whether someone thinks it is possible to form NGOs. Fifty-one percent (51%) of those who are single without children believe that it is possible to form such organizations as opposed to only 39 percent of people who are married with children. Fifty-six percent (56%) of the respondents thought it was necessary to form such organizations (NGOs), even though 61 percent did not know of any such organizations in their community (Figure V next page; Tables 83, 85 in the Appendix). Overall, Uzbekistanis are more willing to join a charitable organization than any other type, with 46 percent saying they would be willing to do so. Only 3 percent say they would join a political party (Table 84 in the Appendix). Uzbekistanis are willing to join other groups as

well, such as women's groups (27%), environmental organizations (16%), and youth groups (14%).



▶ *Makhalas*

A majority (59%) of Uzbekistanis say that their *Makhala* is active (32% say it is not active; Table 97 in the Appendix). Sixty-six percent (66%) say that they participate in the activities of their *Makhala* (Table 94 in the Appendix). There is a strong connection between ethnicity and participation. Whereas 75 percent of ethnic Uzbeks participate, only 7 percent of ethnic Russians do so. Similarly, 39 percent of ethnic Uzbeks never go to their *Makhala* for help versus 67 percent of Russians. Of those who had gone to their *Makhala* seeking help, only 5 percent said the *Makhalas* usually did not help (Table 95 in the Appendix). As for recent legal reforms affecting *Makhalas*, 64 percent of Uzbekistanis say that their local *Makhala* has not been reorganized (Table 96 in the Appendix).


▶ Media

By far the most important sources of information for Uzbekistanis are Uzbekistani television programs. Ninety-one percent (91%) of those surveyed say they watch such programs either "often" or "some" (Table 29 in the Appendix). Sixty-seven percent (67%) say that they also watch Russian Federation television programs. Radio is somewhat less popular, with 55 percent listening to Uzbekistani radio programs and 25 percent listening to Russian Federation

radio programs. A majority of Uzbekistanis (52%) also get information from Uzbekistani newspapers and magazines. Other significant forms of communication include speeches and public meetings (29%). But the most important source, interestingly enough, is actually "friends and family" (90%).

Very few people in Uzbekistan get information from other international sources. Fourteen percent (14%) watch international television, 5 percent listen to international radio, and 3 percent read international newspapers or magazines. The mass media generally are not seen as independent sources of news. A clear majority (60%) believes that none of the media – television, radio, newspapers, or magazines – are free of government control (a third give no opinion; Table 30 in the Appendix).

Figure W. Sources of Information Used "Often"



DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF UZBEKISTAN

♦ Gender

Forty-six percent (46%) of the respondents were male and 54 percent female (Table 3 in the Appendix). From a demographic standpoint, there are few differences of opinion between the sexes on most questions, except for a greater propensity for women to express no opinion on questions regarding the evolution of Uzbekistan. Consequently, the summary group of *Bewildered* is more than 3-to-1 female.

♦ Age

The survey yielded a young sample with 64 percent of the population below the age of 45 (Table 108 in the Appendix).

♦ Ethnicity

Seventy-five percent (75%) of the sample are ethnic Uzbeks; 9 percent are ethnic Russians. Other ethnic groups included were Kazak (6%), Tartar and Karakalpak (2%), and Tajik (2%) (Table 91 in the Appendix).

♦ Religion

A vast majority of Uzbekistanis believe in God (94%; Table 102 in the Appendix). The overwhelming majority (88%) belong to the Islamic faith, and only 7 percent are Orthodox (Table 103 in the Appendix). Whereas 98 percent of ethnic Uzbeks are Islamic, 72 percent of ethnic Russians are Orthodox. Other ethnicities are exclusively Islamic.

♦ Education

The plurality of those interviewed finished high-school (42%). Twenty-two percent (22%) have less than a complete high-school education and 22 percent had technical training. Fourteen percent (14%) had some college education or a college degree (Table 109 in the Appendix).

▶ Family

The overwhelming majority of the respondents were married with children (74%). One in ten was single with at least one child and 11 percent were single without children. Only 4 percent reported being married without children.

▶ Employment Status

Only 9 percent of those surveyed were unemployed. Seventeen percent (17%) were pensioners or invalids and 1 percent were students (Tables 86, 87 in the Appendix). Seventeen percent (17%) were homemakers and the rest were employed full-time. Fully 58 percent report they work for state-owned enterprise or farm (Table 104 in the Appendix), indicating how far the economy has to go to achieve a genuine free market (Table 86 in the Appendix).

Seventeen percent (17%) of the respondents were collective farmers, the largest occupational group. Nine percent (9%) were industrial or construction workers and another 8 percent were specialists in areas like engineering and manufacturing. Four percent (4%) of those interviewed were educators.

▶ Socio-Economic Status (self-identified)

Most (69%) of the respondents described their economic position as "moderate." Twenty-four percent (24%) described their economic status as "low" and 7 percent said it is "high." (Table 110 in the Appendix). By comparison, the interviewers themselves judged 14 percent as "high SES," 46 percent as moderate, 38 percent as low SES.

▶ Differences among Demographic Groups

When one examines the demographic breakdown of the survey responses, several differences among certain groups become clear. Of all the demographic variables in the survey, ethnicity seems to be one of the most important factors in the way that Uzbekistanis look at the changes taking place in Uzbekistan. For example, 65 percent of ethnic Uzbeks say that life since independence is better whereas only 21 percent of ethnic Russians believe this is true. Other ethnic groups seem to fall in the middle of these two extremes. Along these same lines, 67 percent of Uzbeks are satisfied with the situation in Uzbekistan versus 51 percent of those of Russian background.

There is more of a disparity when it comes to ranking one's quality of life. Eighty-two percent (82%) of ethnic Uzbeks say they have a good quality of life versus only 42 percent of ethnic Russians.

In economic matters concerning the changes taking place in Uzbekistan an "ethnic divergence" also becomes apparent. For instance, whereas 71 percent of ethnic Uzbeks rate the current economic situation as good only 41 percent of Russians say this is so – the lowest percentage of all ethnic categories. Not surprisingly, Russians are also less optimistic about the economic situation in Uzbekistan 12 months down the road. A majority of Russians (59%) say it will be the same or worse while 77 percent of Uzbeks say that it will be better.

Socio-economic status also plays an important role in how people feel about life in Uzbekistan. For example, 79 percent of those with a high SES believe that life in Uzbekistan has improved since independence (Table 8 in the Appendix). Conversely, 59 percent of those with low SES say that conditions have worsened. Those with a lower SES are much more likely to rate their quality of life as bad than are those with a moderate to high SES. Yet, the vast majority of respondents in all three categories of SES say that Uzbekistan's declaration of independence was a good thing, with 85 percent of the total population saying so (Table 9 in the Appendix).

Where the future is concerned, there is a direct relationship between SES and economic outlook. Fifty-four percent (54%) of those with a low SES believe the economy will be better in 12 months and the percentages increase steadily as SES rises (Table 14 in the Appendix).

METHODOLOGY

This report is based on public opinion data obtained in a nationwide personal interview survey with a sample representative of the adult population in Uzbekistan. All told, 1830 interviews were conducted between December 3, 1996, and January 16, 1997; some re-interviews were conducted between January 22 and February 5 in and around Farghona due to suspicions of interviewer error; the margin of sampling error associated with a survey sample of this size is $\pm 2\%$.

This project began with an in-country assessment of potential contractors' capabilities to conduct the interviews. The successful contractor was selected in a competitive bid process. The questionnaire was designed by Steven Wagner, president of QEV Analytics, and IFES regional staff, drawing heavily on questions used in previous IFES surveys in Central Asia. The questionnaire was translated by the contractor into Uzbek, Russian, and Karakalpakki (a regional language found in the far West of the country, near the Aral Sea). These translations were reviewed for accuracy and fidelity to our intent by IFES staff and consultants in Washington. The questionnaire was pretested (50 "pilot" interviews were conducted) in each interview language to assure intelligibility. In the end, 77 percent of surveys were administered in Uzbeki, 17 percent in Russian, and 6 percent in Karakalpakki.

The sample design was of a stratified probability type. Uzbekistan comprises 12 provinces, the autonomous Karakalpakstan region, and the Tashkent metropolitan area. The objective was to conduct interviews in every province, and in the end, the survey excluded just 4 percent of the population (those who resided in areas inaccessible due to geography or martial law).

For each of these 14 regions, a quota was established for the number of interviews proportional to their share of the national population. Districts within provinces were selected randomly, except for 5 metropolitan areas which were imposed (not selected randomly), having been deemed to be necessary to the sample, yielding 35 primary sampling units (places of interview).

Within metropolitan areas, households were selected randomly from the roles of electricity subscription, which is very nearly universal. Those persons not residing at a fixed address were therefore excluded from the survey, as they would have been in any in-home, personal interview survey.

Outside of the metropolitan areas, settlements were selected randomly within districts, with a quota dictating the number of rural and urban interview sites; overall, 62 percent of interviews were conducted in rural settlements. Households were selected at random within settlements from the village council household register. In all cases, the individual interviewee

within a household was selected by reference to the Kish grid, a device for randomly selecting the interviewee from among the residents of a household.

Supervisors were responsible for confirming the performance of the interviewers by reinterviewing 10 percent of households. It was this process that brought to light inconsistencies in Farghona, which provoked the re-interviewing.

Data entry was accomplished by the contractor; all data analysis was performed in Washington by QEV Analytics. The resulting data were adjusted by weighting to conform with the following distribution by *wiloyat* (see Figure X).

Figure X

INTERVIEWS BY REGION	
Andijon	9%
Bukhoro	6%
Farghona	11%
Jizzakh	4%
Karakalpakstan Republic	6%
Kashkadaryo	8%
Khorazm	5%
Namangan	8%
Nawoiy	3%
Samarkand	11%
Sirdaryo	3%
Surkhondaryo	7%
Tashkent Shahri	9%
Tashkent	10%

APPENDIX

OBSERVATION VARIABLES**T**ABLE 1. SITE OF INTERVIEW

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Karakalpakstan Rep.	6%
2. Andijon	9%
3. Bukhoro	6%
4. Jizzakh	4%
5. Qashqadaryo	8%
6. Nawoiy	3%
7. Namangan	8%
8. Samarqand	11%
9. Surkhondaryo	7%
10. Sirdaryo	3%
11. Tashkent Shahri	9%
12. Farghona	11%
13. Khorazm	5%
14. Tashkent	10%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 2. LANGUAGE

Q.5. LANGUAGE OF INTERVIEW	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Uzbek	77%
2. Russian	17%
3. Karakalpak	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 3. GENDER

Q.6. GENDER OF RESPONDENT	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Male	46%
2. Female	54%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 4. SES BY OBSERVATION

Q.7. SES BY OBSERVATION	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Very high	1%
2. Moderate/High	13%
3. Moderate	46%
4. Moderate/Low	29%
5. Low	9%
6. Not discernible	1%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓

NON-OBSERVATION VARIABLES**T**ABLE 5. OVERALL QUALITY OF LIFE

Q-8. How would you describe the overall quality of your life—ranging from very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Very good	7%
2. Fairly good	70%
3. Fairly bad	16%
4. Very bad	3%
6. Don't know/No response	5%
<i>Total</i>	101% [✓]

TABLE 6. SATISFACTION WITH SITUATION IN UZBEKISTAN

Q-9. And to what extent are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the current situation in Uzbekistan—are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with it?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Very satisfied	8%
2. Fairly satisfied	57%
3. Fairly dissatisfied	24%
4. Very dissatisfied	6%
5. Don't know/No Response	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 7. REASONS FOR SATISFACTION/DISSATISFACTION

10. Please tell me the reasons you are satisfied/dissatisfied with the situation in Uzbekistan today. (OPEN END RESPONSE)			
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)		
<u>REASONS SATISFIED</u>	<u>REASONS DISSATISFIED</u>		
1. Stability, peace, security	19%	1. High prices	12%
2. Good income and standard of life	15%	2. Delayed payment of wages	9%
3. Pride for Republic	10%	3. Fall of living standards	8%
4. Don't know/No response	9%	4. Low wage, pension	5%
5. Prospect of growth for Republic	8%	5. Inflation	4%
6. Wide range of goods and services	7%	6. Unemployment	3%
7. Approval of reforms	5%	7. Dissatisfaction with public services	2%
8. Increase of freedoms	4%	8. Absence of social services, security	2%
9. Good authorities and President	3%	9. Corruption of authorities	2%
10. Provision of social services	3%	10. Bad economic climate	2%
11. Revival of national culture	2%	11. Other	2%
12. Hopes for better future	2%	12. Don't know/No response	1%
13. Other	2%	13. Falling morals and culture	1%
<i>Total</i>	90%*	<i>Total</i>	53%*

*Multiple responses allowed

TABLE 8. CHANGES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Q-11. Looking back how has life in Uzbekistan changed since independence? Has life improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse since independence?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Improved	56%
2. Stayed the same	10%
3. Gotten worse	32%
4. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 9. VIEWS ON DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Q-12. In your opinion, was the declaration of independence of 91 a really very good thing, a fairly good thing, a fairly bad thing, or a very bad thing for the people?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. A very good thing	50%
2. A fairly good thing	36%
3. A fairly bad thing	8%
4. A very bad thing	1%
5. Neither (Volunteered)	2%
6. Don't know/No response	3%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 10. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Q.13. Since the independence of Uzbekistan, is there now greater freedom to participate in religious activities or the same extent of freedom, or less freedom to participate in religious activities?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Greater	94%
2. Same	4%
3. Less	1%
4. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 11. RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS

Q.14. Since the independence of Uzbekistan, is there now greater respect for human rights by government authorities, or the same level of respect, or less respect for the rights of individuals?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Greater	48%
2. Same	27%
3. Less	16%
4. Don't know/No response	9%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 12. POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC INITIATIVES

Q-15. Since the independence of Uzbekistan, are there new opportunities for individuals to undertake new economic activities or the same opportunities are there fewer possibilities?

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Greater	89%
2. Same	4%
3. Less	2%
4. Don't know/No response	5%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 13. CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION

Q-16. How would you describe the current economic situation in our country? (1=Very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad)

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Very good	11%
2. Somewhat good	54%
3. Somewhat bad	28%
4. Very bad	3%
5. Don't know/No response	4%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 14. FUTURE ECONOMIC SITUATION

Q-17. In 12 months from now, do you expect the economic situation of Uzbekistan will be better than it is now, will be worse than it is now, or will be the same as it is now?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Better than it is now	68%
2. Get worse	10%
3. Remain the same	15%
4. Don't know/No response	7%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 15. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN UZBEKISTAN

Q-18. Do you feel that many things are changing in Uzbekistan today as in the 1990s?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Many changes are occurring	82%
2. There are not many changes occurring	13%
3. Don't know/No response	5%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 16. PACE OF CHANGES

Q-19. In your opinion, are these changes too rapid, too slow, or at the necessary pace?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Too rapid	27%
2. Too slow	17%
3. Necessary pace	35%
4. Don't know/No response	3%
NOT ASKED	18%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 17. QUALITY OF LIFE OF YOUNG PEOPLE

Q-20. Let's try to compare the quality of life of young people today with the quality of life of the older generation in their youth. Will they be better than their parents, the same as their parents, or worse than their parents?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Better	70%
2. Same	10%
3. Worse	16%
4. Don't know/No response	5%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 18. INTEREST IN POLITICS

Q-21. How interested are you in matters of politics and government? Are you very interested, fairly interested, not too interested, or not interested at all?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Very interested	14%
2. Fairly interested	41%
3. Not too interested	27%
4. Not interested at all	16%
5. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	99% [✓]

TABLE 19. EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT ON CITIZENS

Q-22. In your opinion, over the coming period and beyond, will the actions of the national government, significant improvement of lives of the citizens of Uzbekistan be possible or not possible?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Is possible	80%
2. Is not possible	7%
3. Don't know/No response	13%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 20. INFLUENCE OF STATE STRUCTURES

Q-23. Which structures of the State listed on this card (SHOW CARD) has the greatest influence on you? (N=)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. The President of the Republic	53%
2. The <i>Oliy Majlis</i>	3%
3. The <i>Wiloyat Hokimiat</i>	2%
4. The Rayon or City <i>Hokimiat</i>	8%
5. Your <i>Makhala</i>	19%
6. None of these	8%
7. Don't know/No response	7%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 21. TRUST IN STATE STRUCTURES

Q-24. And which structure of the State can do the most to solve the problem our society faces today? (SHOW CARD)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. The President of the Republic	69%
2. The <i>Oliy Majlis</i>	7%
3. The <i>Wiloyat Hokimiat</i>	2%
4. The Rayon or City <i>Hokimiat</i>	5%
5. Your <i>Makhala</i>	10%
6. None of these	2%
7. Don't know/No response	5%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 22. RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS

Q-25. How would you describe the current relations between the various ethnic groups in Uzbekistan are they very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Very good	61%
2. Somewhat good	35%
3. Somewhat bad	3%
4. Very bad	☆
5. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 23. MAINTENANCE OF INTER-ETHNIC STABILITY

Q-26. Is strong Presidential power necessary for the maintenance of inter-ethnic stability of Uzbekistan?

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Strong Presidential power is necessary	76%
2. Strong Presidential power is not necessary	18%
4. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 24. RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Q-24 How much do government authorities respect human rights in Uzbekistan? (1= A great deal, 2= A fair amount, 3= A little, 4= None at all)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. A great deal	14%
2. A fair amount	45%
3. A little	29%
4. None at all	3%
5. Don't know/No response	10%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 25. CONDITION OF LAW AND ORDER

Q-25 Will the condition of law and order in the Republic improve, get worse, or stay the same in the next twelve months?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Improve	64%
2. Get worse	5%
3. Stay the same	23%
4. Don't know/No response	9%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 26. ORDER VS. POLITICAL RIGHTS

Q-29. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "In order to establish a free and democratic society, it is necessary to limit the political and civil rights of some citizens." (Q-29)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Completely agree	15%
2. Somewhat agree	22%
3. Somewhat disagree	26%
4. Completely disagree	22%
5. Don't know/No response	15%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 27. INFORMATION ABOUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Q-30. How much information do you feel you are getting about the economic developments underway in Uzbekistan? (Q-30) (REAR REGION)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Great deal	5%
2. Fair amount	37%
3. Not very much	44%
4. Nothing at all	8%
5. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 28. INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Q-31. How much information do you feel you are getting about the political developments underway in Uzbekistan? (READ OPTIONS)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Great deal	5%
2. Fair amount	34%
3. Not very much	46%
4. Nothing at all	10%
5. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	101% [✓]

TABLE 29. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Q-12. Which are going to receive your sources of information primarily use to get information about events in Uzbekistan. How often do you use them? You use them often, use them sometimes, or use them never.

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)			
	Often	Sometimes	Never	Total
1. Uzbekistani TV programs	63%	28%	9%	100%
2. Russian Federation TV programs	29%	38%	32%	99%✓
3. Other International TV programs	2%	12%	86%	100%
4. Uzbekistani radio programs	28%	27%	44%	99%✓
5. Russian Federation radio programs	7%	18%	75%	100%
6. Other International radio programs	1%	4%	95%	100%
7. Uzbekistani newspaper and magazine	19%	33%	48%	100%
8. Russian Federation newspaper and magazine	5%	13%	83%	101%✓
9. Other International newspaper and magazine	☆	3%	97%	100%
10. Leaflets	☆	1%	99%	100%
11. Posters	1%	5%	94%	100%
12. Speeches or other public meetings	5%	24%	70%	99%✓
13. Friends, family, or neighbors	54%	36%	10%	100%

TABLE 30. INDEPENDENCE OF MEDIA FROM STATE

Q-23. Thinking about the sources of news which are generally available - TV, radio, newspapers, magazines - are there any of these sources of information available to you which you consider to be free of government control? If YES, which are these? (CHECK ONE OR MORE ANSWERS)

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. There are no such sources	60%
2. Uzbekistani TV	4%
3. International TV program identified	3%
4. Uzbekistani radio	1%
5. International radio program identified	3%
6. Uzbekistani newspapers	1%
7. International newspapers identified	3%
8. Uzbekistani magazines	☆
9. International magazines identified	2%
10. Don't know/No response	30%

TABLE 31. SOCIO-ECONOMIC BAROMETER

Q 34 thru Q 45. Please tell me whether you are completely satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied, or completely dissatisfied with each of the following.						
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)					
	Complty Satsfd	Fairly Satsfd	Fairly Disstsfd	Complty Disstsfd	Don't Know	Total
34. Economic reforms	17%	52%	20%	6%	6%	101%✓
35. Social welfare protections of the people	16%	46%	26%	9%	3%	100%
36. Level of political freedoms	18%	48%	16%	4%	15%	101%✓
37. Respect of rights of citizens by authorities	12%	44%	26%	7%	12%	101%✓
38. Fight against crime	26%	44%	17%	7%	6%	100%
39. Quality of health care	10%	41%	29%	19%	1%	100%
40. Quality of education	15%	52%	22%	7%	4%	100%
41. The electoral system	21%	54%	10%	4%	12%	101%✓
42. Opportunity of citizens to influence the State power	7%	35%	24%	10%	23%	99%✓
43. Moral character of the people	16%	52%	16%	5%	12%	101%✓
44. Moral character of leaders of the country	18%	48%	12%	4%	18%	100%
45. Quality of water provided by authorities	29%	33%	15%	20%	4%	101%✓

TABLE 32. PAYMENT FOR BETTER SERVICES?

Q-46. Would you be willing or unwilling to pay additional money to the supplier for better quality water and reliable electricity and gas service?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Willing to pay more	55%
2. Not willing to pay more	43%
3. Don't know/No response	3%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 33. TYPE OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Q-47. When thinking about the economic system, what should our country have: an economy with limited state control or an economy with state control by the state?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Economy with limited state control	26%
2. State control of economy	50%
3. Neither (Volunteered)	7%
4. Other responses	18%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 34. PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS

Q-48. Speaking about economic reforms, do you follow in your opinion that they be conducted gradually or as quickly as possible?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Gradually	55%
2. As quickly as possible	36%
3. Reforms are not needed at all	1%
4. Don't know/No response	7%
<i>Total</i>	99% [✓]

TABLE 35. ECONOMIC REFORMS

Q-49. In your opinion, are the economic reforms in Uzbekistan being made too rapidly, with appropriate speed, or too slowly?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Too rapidly	17%
2. With appropriate speed	54%
3. Too slowly	20%
4. There should be no reforms	1%
5. Don't know/No response	8%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 36. MEANING OF MARKET ECONOMY

Q-50. What does it mean to you to have a market economy? List all answers that apply to different things they have seen in the past 12 months.	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
Positive Responses	
1. Economic freedom, property rights	27%
2. Wide variety of goods	5%
3. Other positive	7%
Negative Responses	
1. Unemployment	19%
2. Low living standards, low income	12%
3. Dishonest people	6%
4. Instability, lack of certainty about future	2%
5. Other negative	4%
Neutral Responses	
1. Free prices, no state control	7%
2. Competition, entrepreneurship	3%
3. Other neutral	6%
9. Don't know/No response	28%
<i>Total</i>	126%*

*Multiple responses allowed

TABLE 37. WHO WILL MARKET ECONOMY BENEFIT?

Q-51: In your opinion, will the free market economy in Uzbekistan benefit most of the people, or would the benefit just go to a few people at the top?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Benefit most of the people	47%
2. Benefit just a few people at the top	46%
3. There will be no benefit (Volunteered)	1%
4. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 38. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF LAND

Q-52: Should foreign companies be allowed to purchase and own land in Uzbekistan, or not?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Should be allowed	15%
2. Should not be allowed	77%
4. Don't know/No response	8%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 39. FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

Q.53. Consider the foreign investments in Uzbekistan. How do you feel about them? Do you welcome them, or do you have reservations or prohibitions?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Welcome investments to any extent	15%
2. Welcome with some limitations	41%
3. Allow, but don't encourage	16%
4. Prohibit investments	12%
5. Don't know/No response	17%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 40. INFORMATION ABOUT RIGHTS

Q.54. How much information do you feel you have about your rights with regard to the authorities you have a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Great deal	2%
2. Fair amount	30%
3. Not very much	43%
4. Nothing at all	16%
5. Don't know/No response	9%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 41. DIFFICULTY IN BUYING FOOD

Q-57. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, somewhat disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: My family consistently does not have enough money to buy basic foods.

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Strongly agree	38%
2. Agree somewhat	33%
3. Disagree somewhat	23%
4. Strongly disagree	6%
5. Don't know/No response	☆
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 42. LOCAL SUBSIDIES

Q-58. Do you or anyone in your household family receive any kind of subsidy through the local authorities which is necessary to support your standard of living during the last year?

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes	26%
2. No	73%
3. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 43. POWER OF LOCAL OFFICIALS

Q-57. In your opinion, do local organs of power have more real power or less real power now compared with before independence?

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. More power	60%
2. Less power	20%
3. Don't know/No response	19%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓

Table 44. COMPOSITION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Q-58. Does it seem to you that the people who are running things in your community are the same and local organs of power today are really much the same people who were running things before independence or are you local officials merely not the same people?

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Local officials are same people	27%
2. Not same people	39%
3. Some new, some old (Volunteered)	27%
4. Don't know/No response	8%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 45. FREQUENCY OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

Q-59. How common is the problem of official corruption in Uzbekistan? (1 = very common, 2 = common, 3 = fairly rare, 4 = rare, 5 = very rare, 6 = uncommon)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Very common	15%
2. Fairly common	30%
3. Fairly rare	15%
4. Very rare	5%
5. Intimidated to answer (Volunteered)	4%
6. Don't know/No response	32%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 46. SERIOUSNESS OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

Q-60. And how serious is the general public problem of official corruption in Uzbekistan? (1 = very serious, 2 = serious, 3 = not too serious, 4 = not serious at all, 5 = don't know/no response)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Very serious	21%
2. Fairly serious	29%
3. Not too serious	13%
4. Not serious at all	3%
5. Don't know/No response	34%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 47. IS UZBEKISTAN A DEMOCRACY?

Q-61. Would you say that Uzbekistan is primarily a democracy or is it primarily not a democracy?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Is a democracy	71%
2. Is not a democracy	14%
3. Don't know/No response	16%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 48. MOVEMENT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

Q-62. IF UZBEKISTAN IS NOT A DEMOCRACY, IS UZBEKISTAN MOVING TOWARDS BECOMING A DEMOCRACY OR NOT?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Is moving	12%
2. Is not moving	5%
3. Don't know/No response	12%
4. Not asked	71%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 49. MEANING OF DEMOCRACY

Q. 63. What does it mean for you to live in a democracy? (OPEN END)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Living in freedom	30%
2. Freedom of speech, press, etc.	20%
3. Observance of laws, order	11%
4. Observance of human rights	6%
5. Have various freedoms and rights	5%
6. Equality of rights	9%
7. Peace, stability, welfare	4%
8. Ample income, good quality of life	4%
9. Political freedom	3%
10. High social security and services	2%
11. Other	12%
14. Don't know/No response	29%
<i>Total</i>	135%*

*Multiple responses allowed

TABLE 50. DEMOCRACY AS SOLUTION TO ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Q-54. In your view, what influence will being a democracy have on the solution of our economic problems? Would being a democracy promote the solution of our economic problems, create obstacles to the solution of our economic problems, or does it not make a difference?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Promote solutions	72%
2. Create Obstacles	2%
3. It does not makes a difference	5%
4. Don't know/No response	22%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 51. BENEFITS OF DEMOCRACY

Q-55. In your opinion, will Uzbekistan being a democracy benefit most of the people or would this benefit just a few people at the top?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Benefit most of the people	73%
2. Benefit just a few people at the top	13%
3. There will be no benefit (Volunteered)	1%
4. Don't know/No response	12%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓

TABLE 52. MODEL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Q-66. Which foreign country - if any - do you think could be most helpful for Uzbekistan's economic development? (OPEN END)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. United States	19%
2. Germany	14%
3. Turkey	13%
4. Japan	14%
5. South Korea	8%
6. Other Western countries	7%
7. Muslim countries	4%
8. China, Southeast Asia, Pacific	3%
9. Uzbekistan should follow its own way	3%
10. Other	4%
11. Don't know/No response	29%
<i>Total</i>	118%*

*Multiple responses allowed

TABLE 53. MODEL FOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Q 57. Which foreign country — if any — do you think would be a model for Uzbekistan's political development? (OPEN END)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. United States	23%
2. Germany	10%
3. Turkey	5%
4. Japan	4%
5. South Korea	3%
6. Other Western countries	7%
7. Muslim countries	2%
8. Uzbekistan should follow its own way	4%
9. Other	5%
10. Don't know/No response	43%
<i>Total</i>	107%*

*Multiple responses allowed

TABLE 54. VOTE IN 1994 ELECTIONS?

Q-58. In December, 1994, the election for the Deputies of the national <i>Quru'larga</i> took place. Did you happen to vote in these elections?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes	81%
2. No	16%
3. Don't know/No response	3%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓

TABLE 55. KNOWLEDGE OF REPRESENTATIVE

Q-59. Do you happen to know the Deputy of the <i>Quru'larga</i> who represents your area?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes	39%
2. No	57%
3. Don't know/No response	4%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 56. PERFORMANCE OF REPRESENTATIVE

Q-70: How well does the Deputy of the <i>Qizil Markaz</i> from this area represent you (very well, fairly well, fairly poorly, or very poorly)?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Very well	6%
2. Fairly well	28%
3. Fairly poorly	13%
4. Very poorly	11%
5. Don't know/No response	42%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 57. INFORMATION FROM DEPUTY

Q-71: Have you received any information from your Deputy of the <i>Qizil Markaz</i> about what is going on in Tashkent? (If YES) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the quantity of information you have received from your Deputy?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
<u>RECEIVED INFORMATION</u>	
1. Yes	7%
2. No	93%
<u>SATISFIED WITH INFORMATION</u>	
1. Satisfied	1%
2. Not satisfied	5%
3. Don't know	1%
4. Not asked	93%

TABLE 58. DOMICILE OF REPRESENTATIVE

Q-22. Should the job of Deputy of the Qo' Galla in Tashkent be a full-time job with the Deputy living in Tashkent, or should it be a part-time job with members working and living part of the year in their districts?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Full-time job/Living in Tashkent	16%
2. Part-time job/Live in districts	67%
3. Don't know/No response	16%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓

TABLE 59. ATTITUDES TOWARDS VOTING

Q-73 thru Q-75. In the past year, you have been asked questions about voting in general. Please indicate whether you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, disagree completely, or don't know.	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
73. "Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decisions made in our country."	
Agree completely	29%
Agree somewhat	44%
Disagree somewhat	13%
Disagree completely	5%
Don't know	9%
<i>Total</i>	100%
74. "When government authorities must be elected by the people in order to keep their position in government, they will be more concerned with doing what the people want."	
Agree completely	37%
Agree somewhat	41%
Disagree somewhat	10%
Disagree completely	3%
Don't know	9%
<i>Total</i>	100%
75. "When government authorities must be elected by the people in order to keep their position in government, they will have more respect for the rights of people."	
Agree completely	38%
Agree somewhat	41%
Disagree somewhat	9%
Disagree completely	3%
Don't know	9%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 60. INFORMATION ON CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Q-76. How much have you heard or read about the Central Election Commission of Uzbekistan? (A great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. A great deal	2%
2. A fair amount	13%
3. Not very much	37%
4. Nothing at all	44%
5. Don't know/No Response	4%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 61. IMPARTIALITY OF CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Q-77. (IF AWARE) With which of the following assessments of the impartiality of the CEC do you agree more?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. The Central Election Commission of Uzbekistan is a completely impartial body, guided in its work only by the law	34%
2. The Central Election Commission of Uzbekistan makes decisions which favor particular candidates or which the government wants	13%
3. Don't know/No response	5%
4. Not Asked	48%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 62. KNOWLEDGE OF ELECTION LAWS

Q 78. How much do you know about the Election Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Don't know anything about it	37%
2. Have heard something about it	34%
3. Have general impression of its basic points	20%
4. Know it fairly well	4%
5. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 63. OPINION OF ELECTION LAWS

Q 79. What is your overall opinion of the election laws of Uzbekistan - does it seem to you that they are in need of reform or not in need of reform?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. In need of reform	31%
2. Not in need of reform	20%
3. Don't know/No response	48%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓

TABLE 64. LAW ON GUARANTEES OF ELECTION RIGHTS

Q-89a. A new law on the Guarantees of the Election Rights of Citizens has been enacted. Have you heard about this law?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes, I have heard of this law	18%
2. Never heard of this law	78%
3. Don't know/No response	5%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 65. EFFECT OF LAW ON GUARANTEES OF ELECTION RIGHTS

Q-89b. IF YES to 89a, in your opinion, has this law increased, decreased or no had effect on the influence of citizens on the government's decision making process?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Increased citizen influence on government	10%
2. Decreased citizen influence on government	2%
3. No Effect	4%
4. Don't know/No response	6%
NOT ASKED	78%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 66A. KNOWLEDGE OF REFERENDUM

Q-81a. Are you aware of the results of the last year's referendum on extending the Presidential power until the year 2000?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes	93%
2. No	6%
3. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 66B. PARTICIPATION IN REFERENDUM

Q-81b. Had you participated or did you not participate in these elections on extending Presidential power until the year 2000?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes	78%
2. No	13%
3. Don't know/No response	2%
NOT ASKED	8%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 67. LIKELIHOOD OF VOTING IN 2000 ELECTIONS

Q-52. In 2000, elections for both the President and the Deputies to the Oliy Majlis are scheduled. How likely is it that you will vote in these elections. Is it definite, very likely, fairly likely, or fairly unlikely you will vote or will you definitely not vote?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Definite	52%
2. Very likely	22%
3. Fairly likely	22%
4. Rather unlikely you will vote	2%
5. Definitely will not vote	1%
6. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 68. HONESTY OF ELECTIONS

Q 88. In order for any elections to be honest, the correct vote counting is necessary. Do you expect these elections in 2000 to be honest or do you not expect this?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Expect honest elections	82%
2. Do not expect honest elections	6%
3. Don't know/No response	13%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 69. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND OLIY MAJLIS

Q 89. What should be the relationship between the President and the Oliy Majlis?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. President should be subordinate to the Oliy Majlis	27%
2. President should have greater power than the Oliy Majlis	46%
3. Oliy Majlis and the President should be independent of each other	15%
4. Other (Volunteered)	1%
5. Don't know/No response	11%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 70. ACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND OLIY MAJLIS

Q-35 What are the actual relations between the President and the Oliy Majlis?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. President is accountable to the Oliy Majlis	25%
2. Oliy Majlis is accountable to the President	44%
3. Each is independent of each other	9%
5. Don't know/No response	22%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 71. IDEAL NUMBER OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Q-36 What do you think would be the ideal number of political parties to have in Uzbekistan - none, one, two, several, or many?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. None	5%
2. One	33%
3. Two	6%
4. Several	21%
5. Many	9%
6. Don't know/No response	26%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 72. AWARENESS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Q-87. Which political parties are you aware of? (OPEN-ENDED, MULTIPLE RESPONSES)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. People's Democratic Party	51%
2. Vatan Tarakkiyeti	10%
3. Adolat	4%
4. Milliyi Tiklanish	2%
5. Birlik	13%
6. Erk	10%
7. Other parties	1%
8. Don't know/No answer	45%
<i>Total</i>	136%*

*Multiple responses allowed

TABLE 73. IDENTIFICATION WITH POLITICAL PARTY

Q-88. Which of the political parties listed below best represents the views and interests of people like you?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. People's Democratic Party	36%
2. Vatan Tarakkiyeti	2%
3. Adolat	1%
4. Milliyi Tiklanish	☆
5. Birlik	1%
6. Erk	1%
7. Other parties	1%
9. Don't know/No response	15%
10. Not asked	46%
<i>Total</i>	103%✓

TABLE 74. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PARTIES?

Q-99. Speaking about parties existing in Uzbekistan, do you find there are clear differences between the various political parties in how they would propose to solve the major problems facing Uzbekistan, or are there not clear differences between the parties?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. There are clear differences	29%
2. There are not clear differences	11%
3. Don't know/No response	15%
4. Not asked	46%
<i>Total</i>	101% [✓]

TABLE 75. GOALS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Q-90. Some people think the political parties are only interested in obtaining political power. Others think the political parties really want to improve the situation in Uzbekistan. Which of these two views is closest to your own?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Parties only interested in power	18%
2. Parties want to improve Uzbekistan	59%
3. Neither [Volunteered]	8%
5. Don't know/No response	16%
<i>Total</i>	101% [✓]

TABLE 76. OPEN CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT

Q-97. In your opinion, is it appropriate for politicians who disagree with the government's policies to openly criticize the President and the Government, or are these activities not appropriate?

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Is appropriate	43%
2. Is not appropriate	49%
3. Don't know/No response	9%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 77. CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Q-92 thru Q-94. I am now going to ask you about several branches of the justice system. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to create and enforce laws that are a great deal better than the amount of law they make or none at all.

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)					Total
	<i>Great Deal</i>	<i>Fair Amount</i>	<i>Not Very Much</i>	<i>None At All</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	
92. The Courts	30%	43%	15%	8%	4%	100%✓
93. The Public Prosecutor's Office	27%	44%	16%	7%	5%	99%✓
94. The Militia	25%	40%	19%	12%	4%	100%

TABLE 78. CAUSE OF PROBLEMS IN SOCIETY

Q-95. Please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following statement: "There are particular ethnic, religious, regional, or political groups which are causing problems in our society today."

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Agree strongly	4%
2. Agree somewhat	11%
3. Disagree somewhat	28%
4. Disagree strongly	32%
5. Don't know/No response	24%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓

TABLE 79. GROUPS CAUSING PROBLEMS

Q-96. (IF AGREE) What groups do you have in mind?
(OPEN-ENDED)

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Religious groups	4%
2. Nationalistic groups	2%
3. Political groups	2%
4. Other	1%
5. Don't know	3%
6. No response	6%
NOT ASKED	81%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓

TABLE 80. IMPORTANT QUALITIES FOR PRESIDENT

Q-37. Qualities you (SIROV QAYDI) as a list of qualities which a President of the nation might or might not have. Please indicate the four qualities which you consider to be the most important for the President to have.

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Honest and trustworthy	92%
2. Cares about the needs of people like you	66%
3. Has new ideas for reforming the country	50%
4. A family man with traditional values	25%
5. A strong leader who can get things done	70%
6. Has close ties to Russia	19%
7. Has close ties to the West	15%
8. Has close ties to the Muslim world	22%
9. Promotes tolerance between all citizens of Uzbekistan	24%
10. Preserves the old system	2%
11. Protects his own interests and those of his family	6%
12. Don't know/No response	1%

TABLE 81. TAX RATES

Q 96. Some people think that it is necessary to cut taxes even if this means the government will have to cut back on services (social welfare and communal) it provides to citizens. Others say they prefer to keep the current level of taxes in order to preserve the current level of services. Which view is closer to yours?

Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Cut taxes/Cut back services	37%
2. Maintain taxes & services	41%
3. I get no assistance and no services from government [Volunteered]	5%
4. Don't know/No response	17%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 82. POSSIBILITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Q-99. IS IT POSSIBLE FOR CITIZENS TO FORM GROUPS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS IN THEIR COMMUNITIES WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Possible	40%
2. Not possible	44%
3. Don't know/No response	17%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 83. NECESSITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Q-100. IS IT NECESSARY FOR CITIZENS TO FORM GROUPS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS IN THEIR COMMUNITIES WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Necessary	56%
2. Not necessary	31%
3. Don't know/No response	14%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 84. GROUPS LIKELY TO JOIN

Q-101. Which of the following groups listed on this card (HAVE CARD) would you most likely join?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. An education organization	13%
2. A religious organization	12%
3. An organization which helps people in need	46%
4. A women's organization	27%
5. A youth organization	14%
6. An environmental protection organization	16%
7. An ethnic organization	4%
8. A political party	3%
11. Organization not named	1%
12. None of these	13%
13. Don't know/No response	10%

TABLE 85. GROUPS IN COMMUNITY

Q-102. Do you know of any such groups listed on Card 12 which exist in your community?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Know of such organizations	28%
2. Do not know of such organizations	61%
3. Don't know/No response	11%
<i>Total</i>	100%

Demographics**TABLE 86. EMPLOYMENT**

Q 183. What is your current employment situation? Are you:	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Self-employed	5%
2. Employed full-time at one job	46%
3. Employed part-time at one job	4%
4. Employed part-time at more than one job	1%
5. A housekeeper	17%
6. Student	1%
7. Non-working Pensioner/Invalid	17%
8. Not employed	9%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 87. OCCUPATION

Q-194. Employment position/Occupation	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Collective Farmer	17%
2. Private Farmer	1%
3. Worker: Industry, construction, transportation, communications	9%
4. Engineer or specialist in manufacturing	3%
5. Specialist in other areas	5%
6. Service worker	3%
7. Worker: medicine, education, science, culture	6%
8. Independent businessman	2%
9. Manager	1%
10. Clerk	1%
11. Military, worker in justice system organs	1%
12. Other government official	1%
13. Teacher	4%
Missing	44%
<i>Total</i>	98%✓

TABLE 88. MARITAL STATUS

Q-195. What is your marital status? (If you are...)	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Now married	80%
2. Single and never married	8%
3. Divorced	4%
4. Widowed	8%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 89. CHILDREN

Q-386. Do you have any children? How many?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. None	14%
2. One	13%
3. Two	19%
4. Three	17%
5. Four	14%
6. Five	10%
7. More than five	14%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 90. CHILDREN LIVING AT HOME

Q-387. IF YOU HAVE CHILDREN, How many of your children live with you?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. None	20%
2. One	19%
3. Two	19%
4. Three	17%
5. Four	14%
6. Five	8%
7. More than five	5%
<i>Total</i>	102%✓

TABLE 91. ETHNIC HERITAGE

Q. 102. What is your main ethnic heritage?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Uzbek	75%
2. Russian	9%
3. Tajik	2%
4. Karakalpaki	2%
5. Kazak	6%
6. Tatar	2%
7. Kyrgyz	1%
8. Other	3%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 92. PRIMARY AFFILIATIONS

Q-169 Which is of more importance to you: your ethnicity or your citizenship?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
2. Ethnicity	44%
3. Citizenship	28%
4. Equally important [Volunteered]	24%
5. I don't care about any [Volunteered]	2%
6. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 93. PARTICIPATION IN MAKHALA ACTIVITIES

Q-170 Do you participate in the activities of your Makhala?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes	64%
2. No	35%
3. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 94. APPEALS TO *MAKHALA*

Q-111: How often do you apply to your <i>Makhala</i> center (to solve a problem, get information, etc.)?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Often	13%
2. Rarely	43%
3. Never	43%
4. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 95. HELPFULNESS OF *MAKHALA*

Q-112 (OPTIONAL) Did the <i>Makhala</i> help in such cases? Did it usually help, sometimes help, sometimes not help, or usually not help?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Usually helped	25%
2. Sometimes helped, sometimes didn't	26%
3. More often didn't help	5%
4. Don't know/No response	☆
NOT ASKED	44%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 96. REORGANIZATION OF MAKHALA

Q-113. In your locality, has a reorganization of the Makhalas taken place, which divides Makhalas into larger Makhalas committees or into self-governing bodies?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Has taken place	16%
2. Has not taken place	64%
3. Don't know/No response	20%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 97. IS MAKHALA ACTIVE?

Q-114. How active is your Makhalah: very active, fairly active, not active, or is there no activity at all?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Very active	13%
2. Fairly active	46%
3. Not very active	24%
4. No activity at all	8%
5. Don't know/No response	10%
<i>Total</i>	101% [†]

TABLE 98. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING A UZBEKISTANI

Q-116. What are your feelings about being a citizen of Uzbekistan: proud, content, indifferent, not content, ashamed?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Proud	55%
2. Content	37%
3. Indifferent	5%
4. Not content	1%
5. Ashamed	☆
6. Not a citizen (Volunteered)	☆
7. Don't know/No response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 99. DISCRIMINATION

Q-117. Have you ever experienced instances of discrimination because of your ethnic background or independence of Uzbekistan?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes	6%
2. No	94%
3. Don't know/No response	☆
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 100. LANGUAGE

Q-117. What language do you speak in your home?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Uzbek	72%
2. Russian	13%
3. Tajik	3%
4. Karakalpak	4%
5. Uzbek and Russian	1%
6. Tajik and Russian	☆
7. Other combinations of languages	4%
8. No response	4%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 101. UZBEK AS NATIONAL LANGUAGE

Q-118. Should all citizens be encouraged to speak Uzbek in our country?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes	66%
2. No	28%
3. Don't know/No response	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 102. BELIEF IN GOD

Q-119: Do you believe in God?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes	94%
2. No	5%
3. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 103. RELIGION

Q-120: Are you the member of a religion? Which one?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Islam/Muslim	88%
2. Orthodox	7%
3. Other Christian	1%
4. Judaism	☆%
5. Buddhist	1%
6. Other religion	☆
7. Do not belong to any church	☆
8. Don't know/No response	3%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 104. EMPLOYER

Q-121. Do you or your business work for a factory or farm owned by the state?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes	58%
2. No	41%
3. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 105. EMIGRATION PLANS

Q-122. Are you planning to leave Uzbekistan to live in another country?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Yes	2%
2. No	96%
3. Don't know/No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓

TABLE 106. COUNTRIES LIKELY TO MOVE TO

Q-123. IF PLAN TO MOVE, To what country are you planning to move?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Russia	1%
2. Kazakstan	1%
3. A former Soviet republic (not Russia or Kazakstan)	1%
4. Western country	☆
5. Other	☆
6. Don't know/No response	☆
NOT ASKED	97%
Total	100%

TABLE 107. REASONS FOR LEAVING

Q-124. IF PLAN TO MOVE, What is the main reason you are planning to leave Uzbekistan?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Uniting with relatives	1%
2. Attractive living and working conditions	1%
3. Ecological reasons	☆
4. Dissatisfaction with life in Uzbekistan	☆
5. Family circumstances	☆
6. Don't know the language	☆
7. Other	1%
NOT ASKED	97%
Total	100%

TABLE 108. AGE

Q.125. What is your age, please?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. 18-24	4%
2. 25-34	27%
3. 35-44	33%
4. 45-54	16%
5. 55-64	9%
6. 65-74	8%
7. 75+	4%
8. No response	1%
<i>Total</i>	102%✓

TABLE 109. EDUCATION

Q.126. What is the highest level of education you received?	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Less than 4 years at school	5%
2. Completed primary, less than 7 years	5%
3. Some secondary, less than 10 years	8%
4. Incomplete secondary 7-9 years and professional technical school 7-8 years	4%
5. Completed high school 10-11 years	42%
6. Professional technical school with completed high school 10-11 years	8%
7. Specialized technical education	14%
8. Some university	1%
9. Completed university	13%
10. Post-graduate education	☆
<i>Total</i>	101%✓

TABLE 110. FINANCIAL POSITION

Q-127. Please evaluate for me the financial position of your family.	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. High	1%
2. Higher than moderate	6%
3. Moderate	69%
4. Lower than moderate	17%
5. Lowest	7%
5. Don't know/No response	☆
<i>Total</i>	100%

Table 111. Size of Settlement

Q-3. Size of Settlement	
Dates of Fieldwork (Sample Size)	12-3/1-16, 97 (1830)
1. Cities of 500,000+	10%
2. Cities of 200,000 - 499,999	5%
3. Cities of 50,000 - 199,999	12%
4. Cities of 20,000 - 49,999	6%
5. Cities of less than 20,000	3%
6. Working settlements	2%
7. Rural settlements	62%
<i>Total</i>	100%

