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Presidential and Legislative Elections
September 29-30, 1992

INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

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ANGOLA

PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

SEPTEMBER 29-30, 1992

REPORT OF THE IFES OBSERVATION MISSION

Prepared by Tom Bayer

IFES Program Officer for Africa

The IFES Angola Election Observation Mission has been made possible through funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development. Any person or organization is welcome to quote information from this report if it is attributed to IFES.
This Report has been prepared by Tom Bayer, IFES Program Officer for Africa. The Report represents the views and opinions of IFES, and reflects the observations and recommendations of the members of the IFES Angola observer delegation.

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) is a private, nonprofit foundation established in September 1987 with a mandate to analyze, support, and strengthen the mechanics of the election process in emerging democracies and to undertake appropriate education activities which contribute toward free and fair elections.

The Foundation fulfills its objectives through programs in technical election assessment; on-site technical assistance; poll worker training; citizen education in democracy; and election day activities. IFES also serves as a clearinghouse for election-related information and experts.

IFES' program activities have expanded dramatically since the worldwide shift toward democratic pluralism and the ever-increasing demand for technical support services in the area of election administration. In the past five years, IFES has sent over 30 pre-election survey teams to five continents and provided on-site technical assistance to the election councils of Albania, Angola, Bulgaria, Comoros, Congo, Haiti, Guinea, Guyana, Mali, Mongolia, Romania, Venezuela, and many other countries. Election related material and equipment have been shipped to countries in Africa, East-Central Europe, and Latin America.

Among IFES' significant contributions have been the undertaking of training for voter registration workers, poll workers, and other election officials in Bulgaria, Haiti, Mali, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, and the former Soviet Union. IFES has also used its resources to link election administrators on a regional basis through conferences and symposia on selected topics in election administration in Latin America and East-Central Europe.

IFES election observers have produced comprehensive reports on 15 elections on five continents, and post-election analysis reports have been completed for eleven countries in Latin America, Asia, Central Europe, and North Africa.

IFES is a vital resource center for any nation seeking expert assistance in developing a sound election process, an essential step in establishing and maintaining a democratic form of government. IFES also serves as a clearinghouse for sharing information about any technical aspect of electoral systems, including names of those expert in these systems and the materials essential to administering democratic elections.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORICAL OVERVIEW</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAMEWORK OF THE ELECTIONS</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTION ASSISTANCE</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Coordination</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFES' Election Assistance Project</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTION PREPARATIONS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Lists</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE IFES OBSERVATION MISSION</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role and Objectives of IFES Observers</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Deployment Briefings</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment and Regional Briefings</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts from Regional Team Reports</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTION DAY OBSERVATIONS</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Observation Plan for Election Days</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts from Regional Team Reports</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Conditions on Election Days</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts from Regional Team Reports</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Station Kit Delivery and Set-Up</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts from Regional Team Reports</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling Station Staff, Party Agents and Electoral Police</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts from Regional Team Reports</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Processing</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts from Regional Team Reports</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Awareness and Civic Education</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts from Regional Team Reports</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot Design</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot Security</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts from Regional Team Reports</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Armed and Unarmed Police, Military, and Civilians</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts from Regional Team Reports</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Counting</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts from Regional Team Reports</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabulating and Reporting of Results</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpts from Regional Team Reports</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARATION AND RELEASE OF STATEMENT</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST-ELECTION EVENTS</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for the Angolan National Electoral Council
Assessment and Programming of Assistance Effort
Civic Education and Voters Information
Election Preparation
Election Materials
Election Procedures
Recommendations for the United Nations and International Observers
Political Parties

POLITICAL AND MILITARY TIMELINE

APPENDICES

A. List of Observers
B. Law for International Observers
C. Observer Terms of Reference
D. Observers' Checklist
E. Sample Observers Schedule
F. Preliminary Statement of October 3, 1992
G. Summary Acta
H. Ballot mock-up used in training of pollworkers
I. Official Invitation Letter from Government
J. Source Material
K. News Articles on IFES International Observer Delegation

TABLES

1. Final Presidential Election Results--October 14, 1992
2. Final Legislative Election Results--October 14, 1992
3. Null and Blank Votes (Presidential Election), as Reported on October 6 and October 14, 1992
4. Null and Blank Votes (Legislative Election), as Reported on October 6 and October 14, 1992
5. Party Representation in National Assembly
6. Angolan Voter Registration on August 10, 1992
INTRODUCTION

This report is based on the observation reports filed by provincial observation teams and on the final mission statement issued in Luanda by the IFES team. Additional data was collected during the various briefing and debriefing sessions conducted with the observers over the duration of their time in Angola. Background information was gathered by the IFES project manager during his six-months in Angola leading up to the elections. Additional information sources are listed in Appendix J.

The announcement of the final election results on October 17, 1992 did not mark the beginning of a period of peaceful transition in Angola. Much has transpired since the IFES observers departed Luanda in the second week of October. In the interest of keeping this document timely, while remaining in the domain of the observation mission, technical recommendations are offered as well as a discussion of conditions necessary for a second round of elections, or a new series of elections. To help bring the reader up-to-date as to what the situation is in Angola today, a timeline indicating some of the major events occurring since September 29-30 is included.

The delegation was financed with funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development. The observation team did not serve as an official U.S. Government mission. The selection of team members, the organization of field deployments in Angola, and the statement and report issued by the delegation were solely the responsibility of IFES.

IFES would like to offer a special thanks to members of the observation team who invested time and effort in assisting with the compilation of this report: Gerald Bender, Anthony Carroll, Jim Dunlap, Robert Henderson, John Marcum, Shawn McCormick, Guus Meijer, William Minter, Tony Pereira, Job Runhaar, C.S. Whitaker, and Anthony Zenos. Their knowledge of Angola's rich history and their editorial savvy were greatly appreciated. Acknowledgement is also due Leticia Martinez for her precise organization and management of the mission logistics and to Tony Zenos for managing a constantly evolving project during his six months in Angola. Finally, a thank-you goes to the tireless individuals responsible for Angola and Southern Africa at U.S.AID/Washington and the Department of State, as well as the staff of the United States Liaison Office in Luanda, who were supportive of IFES throughout the observation mission and the entire technical assistance project.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was invited by Angola's National Electoral Council to organize an international delegation of election observers for Angola's September 29-30, 1992 legislative and presidential elections. The 39 members of the mission were selected to represent a cross-section of international Angola-watchers and elections specialists. The observation mission was under the leadership of Professor C.S. Whitaker, Director of the Center for Multiethnic and Transnational Studies at the University of Southern California.

The delegation assembled in Luanda, Angola over September 23-24 for three days of national and provincial briefings, deploying into the provinces on September 27. The terms of reference of the delegation were focused on the events immediately before, during, and immediately following the two days of elections. Its objective was to monitor the degree to which activities taking place during this period corresponded with the Angolan electoral code. Delegation members departed Luanda between October 3rd and 8th. IFES staff maintained a presence in Luanda through the official announcement of the election results on the morning of October 17. The IFES office in Luanda remained open, under the direction of the project manager, through the fourth week of October.

The mission was organized by IFES staff in Washington and Luanda. The IFES project manager responsible for the implementation of IFES' technical assistance effort in Angola was joined by two consultants, one responsible for finalizing civic education activities initiated by the project manager and the second responsible for the on-the-ground organization and overall coordination of the observation mission. IFES/Washington Africa program staff were on hand in Luanda before, during, and after the observation activities. For the duration of the mission, IFES permanent and temporary staff in Washington provided logistical and technical back-up.

The observers visited over 400 of Angola's 5,579 polling stations. These polling places were located in the eight most populous and accessible of Angola's eighteen provinces: Bengo, Benguela, Bié, Kuanza Norte, Kuanza Sul, Huambo, Huila, and Luanda. These eight provinces are home to 69% of Angola's registered voters and 67% of Angola's estimated population of 8,989,800.

Polls where potentially serious irregularities were noted received follow-up visits. The IFES teams' observations repeatedly called attention to the open cooperation between the representatives of the various political party poll watchers assigned to the polls as well as between the poll workers, to implement on-site improvisations and overcome operational problems.

The elections were conducted in a peaceful and orderly fashion. Bearing in mind the limits of their terms of reference, and also the limited duration of the observation mission, the consensus of the IFES
international delegation of election observers was that the Angolan elections of September 29-30, 1992 constituted a successful and effective application of the mechanism of elective choice of political representatives.

Six months after the elections, each passing day without a negotiated cease-fire diminishes the probability of a second round of elections. The recommendations put forth by the IFES delegation for Angola’s future elections are applicable only when conditions are fulfilled that do not exist in Angola at present, including:

1) That a solution has been found for the Angolan conflict, resulting in the establishment of a cease-fire;
2) That the cease-fire is holding;
3) That the infrastructure for the demobilization of the armed forces has been established and the demobilization is underway;
4) That there is agreement between political parties on an administrative body responsible for organizing and facilitating the elections;

The IFES group was one of several international delegations, totalling approximately 800 individuals, present in Angola for the elections. The United Nations was responsible for the deployment of 400 of these observers and for the conduct of a parallel vote tabulation. Additional delegations included those of Portugal, Belgium, France, Germany, Programme Angola-Canada, and the European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa (AWEPA). Angola’s predominant political parties, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, sponsored groups of international observers.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Angolans went to the polls to elect a president and a national legislature on September 29 and 30, 1992. Entering the polling stations, voters were presented with two ballot papers. The legislative ballot listed the eighteen political parties that had nominated lists of candidates vying for proportional representation in the 223-seat legislature.¹ The presidential ballot featured names and photographs of the twelve candidates: eleven male and one female. The final results of the elections were officially announced on October 16, 1992. José Eduardo dos Santos, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) leader and presidential candidate, received 49.56% of the vote to 40.07% accumulated by Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). In the legislative election, the gap between first and second place was broader with the MPLA obtaining 53.74% of the votes to UNITA’s 34.09%. Under Angolan electoral law, the inability of either of the top two finishers in the presidential contest to receive over 50% of the votes cast required that the presidential election should be decided by a run-off election to take place within thirty days of the official publication of the results of the September 29 and 30 elections. In fact, a run-off election has yet to occur.

The results of the presidential election were not definitive, and the electoral exercise was marred by controversy in the days following the voting. However, the election days themselves passed in nearly perfect peace. The historic nature of this exercise in electoral choice assumes a greater and more important dimension taking into account Angola’s recent history.

Armed conflict first broke out in Angola in 1961, when small communities in the northeastern portion of the country rebelled against the Portuguese colonial administration. By 1974, when the governing dictatorship of Portugal itself was overthrown by a leftist military coup, the Angolan liberation movement was divided into three distinct groups: the MPLA, composed mostly of Mbundo people, urban blacks, intellectuals, and mestizos; the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), led by Holden Roberto, a Kongo people’s movement operating in northern Angola; and UNITA, an Ovimbundo movement operating in southern Angola.

In a hurried effort to extract itself from the conflict, the Portuguese administration pushed through a power-sharing agreement known as the Alvor Accord in January 1975. Soon after, however, fighting among the three groups broke out in the capital city, Luanda. Traditionally strongest in this urban environment, the MPLA succeeded in driving both UNITA and the FNLA out of the city and when

¹The 223 seats composing the legislature are divided between 130 deputies to be chosen based on national lists; 90 deputies--five representing each of Angola’s eighteen provinces; and three deputies representing expatriate Angolans (2 seats for Angolans elsewhere in Africa, and one seat representing Angolans residing off of the African continent).
the remaining Portuguese units in Angola withdrew from Luanda in November, the MPLA proclaimed itself the one legitimate government of the People's Republic of Angola. This status was soon recognized by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations; the MPLA government of Angola quickly moved to establish diplomatic relations with other nations around the globe. The United States refused to recognize the MPLA government, citing the failure of the Alvor Accord and the increasing role of Cuba and the Soviet Union in the region.

Meanwhile, the independence struggle against the Portuguese had been transformed into a full-scale civil war, with fighting closing in on the capital from both northern and southern fronts. International recognition was (and is) the key to survival for liberation movements throughout Africa as exemplified by the Angolan civil war. On the northern front, FNLA fighters were backed by 1500 Zairian regular troops, covert funds from the U.S., and weapons and instructors from China. On the southern front, UNITA troops backed up a full-scale armored invasion by South African Defense Forces. In turn, the MPLA invited in a full contingent of Cuban combat troops to protect the capital and to try to win back lost territory. Eventually, support for the FNLA in northern Angola eroded and they were eliminated as players in the conflict. In the south, however, fighting between the Cuban and Soviet-backed MPLA and the South African and U.S.-backed UNITA forces continued through 1988.

In December 1988, the U.S. brokered a tripartite accord between Angola, South Africa, and Cuba. This accord called for a phased withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola between April 1989 and July 1991. In exchange, South Africa agreed to terminate support for UNITA, pull all South African troops out of Namibia, and to promote full Namibian independence by the end of 1990. The Cuban troop withdrawal was monitored by the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I), and primary support of UNITA fell to the U.S.

With this major step accomplished, Portugal, the U.S., and the USSR initiated a final series of talks between the MPLA and UNITA in an effort to end Angola's internal civil war. Face-to-face negotiations between the two sides began in Portugal in April 1990 and carried on through six rounds until a final agreement, known as the Bicesse Accord, was signed on May 31, 1991. This accord committed the two warring sides to: 1) a cease-fire, 2) demobilization of their separate armed forces and the creation of a new national army to be drawn evenly from both sides; 3) free, open, and internationally monitored elections for the Presidency of the Republic and for seats in the National Assembly prior to November 30, 1992; and 4) the extension of central administration to all areas of the country. Compliance with the cease-fire and military demobilization was to be overseen by a Joint Political-Military Commission (JPMC) and a Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (JVMC).^3

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^3 The JPMC is frequently referred to employing its Portuguese acronym, CCPM--Comissão Conjunta Polftico-Militar. The Portuguese acronym for JVMC is CMVF--Comissão Mista de Verificação.
In addition, the United Nations created UNAVEM II, an effort staffed by 350 military and 126 civilian police observers to monitor the cease-fire and demobilization.

UNAVEM II operated with a limited mandate:

1.) ...the monitoring and verification of the steps taken by the PRA and UNITA to ensure the cease-fire: termination of hostile actions and propaganda between all parties; confinement of all troops to assembly areas; demobilization and demilitarization of the armies followed by the creation of the new Angolan Armed Forces; and the collection and disposal of weapons.

2.) ...the monitoring and the verification of the neutrality of the Angolan police forces, responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the country. Police actions were not to infringe on the political rights of Angolan citizens.

The methods and approaches to verification were unclear, as was the action plan to be followed in the event that the UN did identify procedural flaws in the peace process.

As the peace process progressed, the two sides agreed to election dates of September 29 and 30, 1992. These dates were the result of a lengthy debate during the Bicesse meetings. Initially, the MPLA declared that 36 months would be needed to prepare the devastated country for elections. UNITA insisted that the elections be held within 12 months. In a further round of discussions, the two sides narrowed their differences substantially, with UNITA willing to accept elections within 15 months while the MPLA declared that the country could be ready within 24 months. A final compromise was hammered out, establishing an electoral deadline of 18 months. When the September election dates were finally announced there remained only 16 months for preparations. In this time period, transportation and communications systems destroyed during thirty years of warfare had to be rebuilt, new legislation had to be promulgated, and an entire electoral process put in place. More importantly, two large-scale military forces (totalling over 160,000 soldiers) had to be disarmed and demobilized. Simultaneously, a new, unified and neutral military force was to be created and a retrained and neutral civilian police force was to be in place.

On the last two days of September 1992, over 91% of registered voters turned out to cast their ballots in the Angolan elections. To the Angolan people, the elections provided the first opportunity for them to express their political will freely, peacefully, and in secrecy. For the former Soviet Union and Cuba, the Angolan elections provided a face-saving exit from a conflict that had bogged down their economies for years without producing any discernible benefits. For the United States, a swift close to the Angolan conflict represented a bold victory for American-led diplomacy in the region, and bolstered the administration's vision of the New World Order. For the United Nations, still savoring the success of the Namibian campaign, the Angolan elections represented the difficult challenge of meeting high expectations with substantially reduced resources. For the Angolan combatants, UNITA and the MPLA,
elections were a quick, non-violent means to settle an old score once and for all. With so many
divergent aspirations, however, the electoral process of 1992 lost sight of one thing: the meaningful
implantation of a representative multiparty system in Angola.
The Bicesse Accords stipulated that the government of the People's Republic of Angola was to remain in power through the transition period, until elections were held between September and November 1992. The government had the responsibility to solicit suggested changes to the Angolan constitution from the political parties and to draft a new constitution and electoral law.

Through a multi-party conference attended by the government and the thirty-odd new political parties in January 1992, and discussions between the government and UNITA in February, a new electoral law was written. UNITA was not in attendance at the conference. The electoral law established the Conselho Nacional Eleitoral (CNE) to be responsible for the organization and the facilitation of all aspects of the electoral process. The CNE consisted of government representatives, judges, five citizen "specialists," and representatives from each political party or coalition of parties and each candidate for the presidency.

The CNE was divided into three groups: the General Directorate of Elections, the executive body of the CNE; the Provincial Electoral Councils (PEC) modeled on the national council and supported by a Provincial Directorate of Elections; and the Municipal Electoral Offices, structured like the national and provisional councils. The leadership of the CNE was required to meet with the approval of all of Angola's political parties. On May 9, 1992, a Supreme Tribunal judge, António Pinto Caetano de Sousa was appointed CNE President. The CNE members elected an Angolan businessman and FNLA member residing in Portugal, Dr. Onofre dos Santos, to become the CNE's Director General.

The terms of the Bicesse Agreement assigned the JPMC the responsibility to "Guarantee the conditions of peace for the holding of free, fair, multi-party, and internationally verifiable elections." In early 1992, the government committed itself to holding elections at the end of September 1992, before the beginning of the rainy season.

In March 24 1992, the UN Security Council expanded UNAVEM II's mandate to include the impending electoral process, assigning UNAVEM II the task of observing and verifying the electoral process, from the registration of voters, through the political campaign, to the elections.

The UN Secretary General created the post of UN Special Representative to assume the leadership of UNAVEM II, and assigned Miss Margaret Anstee to that position. At the same time, a special Electoral

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3 Protocol of Estoril, Chapter II, Section 3.1.
Division was set up within UNAVEM and staffed with approximately 100 individuals under a Chief Electoral Officer. The Electoral Division staffed offices in the eighteen provincial capitals.
ELECTION ASSISTANCE

United Nations Coordination

With the expansion of the United Nations' role in ceasefire monitoring and verification through UNAVEM II, the UN assumed the role as the coordinator of external election assistance. Horacio Boneo of the UN's Department of Technical Cooperation for Development (later named as the Director of the Electoral Assistance Unit) spearheaded this coordination effort. He organized a meeting held in Luanda in February 1992 at which many bilateral donors pledged a level of assistance to the election process. Mr. Boneo was instrumental in developing a comprehensive electoral budget and in matching bilateral donations with line items in that budget. He also designed the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-funded project that established an election assistance coordinating secretariat in Luanda and created a mechanism whereby most bilateral assistance could be channeled through the UNDP in a cost-sharing arrangement.

It was through this mechanism that a team of election advisors, funded by a variety of bilateral donors, was assembled in Angola under the overall umbrella of the UNDP election-assistance project. In addition to providing advisors, more than a dozen donor countries also assisted with the material needs of the election process through financial or in-kind contributions. The advisory team was assembled in Luanda during the months of April and May 1992. This election assistance advisory team worked directly with the CNE and the Ministry of Territorial Administration, under the supervision of Senior Coordinator, José Julio dos Reis and the UNDP/Luanda staff.

The UNDP expressed a preference that all international technical and financial assistance to the Angolan election preparations be channeled through the UNDP program. The United States contribution for technical assistance was facilitated by the United States Agency for International Development (AID) and was implemented by IFES. The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute received financing from AID in order to develop and facilitate programs in political party training and civic education.

IFES' Election Assistance Project

IFES established its elections assistance project in Angola in late May 1992, under the in-country direction of Project Manager Tony Zenos. This project was designed to aid the UNDP Technical Assistance Team and the CNE in preparing for the elections through the design and procurement of ballot papers and other elections commodities, corresponding with the division of roles and responsibilities agreed upon by all of the donor organizations during their February meeting. The project budget provided funds for four international elections consultants with expertise in areas to be
identified based on the technical assistance needs as expressed by the CNE and the UNDP.

Through the months of June and July of 1992 there was confusion regarding the CNE's official assignment to the donors of the responsibility for the provision of ballots, polling station kits, and training for polling center administrators. These tasks were originally assigned to IFES through the donor coordination and negotiation efforts of Mr. Boneo. Throughout the development of the IFES proposal during the first four months of 1992, it was assumed by the Department of State, U.S. AID, and the United Nations that the provision of these commodities and services remained IFES' responsibility. Following the establishment of the IFES project office in Luanda, however, CNE members were not forthcoming with ballot designs and suggestions when requested to do so by IFES. They did show great interest in the samples of ballots that IFES had collected from and/or procured for elections around the world. When pressed to make decisions regarding the Angolan ballots, Dr. Dos Santos asked for additional time to consult with the technical advisors, his fellow commissioners, and the political parties.

In mid-July, the Angolan government publicized their decision to contract a private firm, Thomas De La Rue and Co. Ltd., to produce and deliver ballots and polling station kits, and to provide poll worker training. This same firm had been contracted to provide registration materials and facilitate the voter registration. Mr. Zenos and the staff at IFES/Washington were obliged to reevaluate and chart a new direction for the IFES/Angola project. The project budget was amended to reflect these changes, dividing the funds originally earmarked for procurement between the development and production of voters' information literature; the financing of the training and travel of six teams of Angolan voters' awareness trainers; and the support of international elections observers.

The revised IFES project focused on the area of voter education. A "How to Vote" guide was published by IFES in cooperation with the National Electoral Council, with over 350,000 copies distributed throughout Angola. IFES also facilitated the production of 30,000 copies of a voter education poster to be distributed to each polling station by the provincial electoral commissions. Mr. Zenos was assisted in the later stages of the civic education program by Mariela López, a consultant specializing in graphic arts and civic education initiatives in young democracies.

Through discussions with civic organizations and church groups, IFES employed a group of enthusiastic young Angolans interested in becoming involved in the electoral process and working for peace in Angola. These individuals were trained as voters' information disseminators to be sent into each of Angola's provinces. In the provinces, team members met with local leaders of opinion and the Angolan population at large. IFES, the CNE, UNDP, and UNAVEM II personnel participated in the training of the teams, developing with them a format for a civic information program designed to discuss the topics most relevant to the first-time Angolan voter.
The teams were able to travel in all eighteen provinces, meeting with a total of approximately 30,000 Angolans. Members of the teams returned to Luanda to report on their inspiring, interesting, and occasionally life-threatening experiences to the IFES staff and later to the international observation delegation as part of the delegation's in-country briefings.
ELECTION PREPARATIONS

Although the UN advisory team was mostly in place by the beginning of May, the members of the CNE were not named and sworn in until May 9, 1992. President Dos Santos explained the long wait for a functioning election commission by pointing out that his first candidate for Director General of the CNE, Ambassador Luis de Almeida, had not received UNITA's approval and had been withdrawn. His second candidate, Onofre Dos Santos, at the time of his nomination a member of the FNLA, was greeted with acceptance by all parties. The delay in the establishment of the CNE was also related to delays in the process of political party registration, carried out by the People's Supreme Tribunal. The CNE membership included a representative of all registered political parties, as well as a number of individuals appointed by the government.

Prior to the CNE's appointment, the government entered into the contract with De La Rue to provide registration equipment and supplies. The political parties, through their representatives on the CNE, were not consulted in the selection of the registration format. This was perceived as a lack of openness on the government's part, fueling the parties' claims that the government controlled too many aspects of the elections.

Registration began on May 20. The process of registration included the issuing of a plastic laminated photo ID card to all eligible voters. Work commenced slowly, as the registration brigades were still being trained and transportation was limited. Initially, the registration brigades relied upon the support extended them by the population and by Angolan civic organizations. Eventually, following calls from the CNE and the UN, various donor countries contributed airplanes, helicopters, and vehicles to help transport the brigades and their equipment around the country. More than four million voters were registered by the end of the registration period, July 31. Even though this number exceeded most expectations, the CNE responded to pressure exerted by the United Nations and the international community, extending the period for another ten days, until August 10. The total number of registered voters was approximately 4.8 million, out of an estimated total eligible voter population of 5.3 million.5

In July 1992, the dates for presidential and legislative elections were officially established by government decree. Nomination of candidates followed the close of the voter registration period in mid-August. Thirteen presidential candidates were registered with the CNE, and eighteen of approximately thirty groupings met the criteria for registration as official political parties and submitted a slate of legislative candidates.

5The CNE estimated 5.3 million while the UN used an estimate of 5.8 million potential voters.
Candidate Lists

A candidate’s or a party’s position on the ballots was determined by lot. The two lists below are arranged according to official ballot position.

The Presidential Candidates

Luís Dos Passos
Holden Roberto
Anaília Victória Pereira
Mfulupinga N’Landu Victor
Andre Milton Kilandamoko
Daniel Júlio Chipenda
Rui Vitória Periera
José Simão Cacete
António Alberto Neto
José Eduardo Dos Santos
Honorato Lando
Bengui Pedro Joao
Jonas Malheiro Savimbi

PRD
FNLA
PLD
PDP-ANA
PSDA
PND
PRA
AD
PDA
MPLA
PDLA
PSD
UNITA

* Withdrew before election.

The Parliamentary Lists

Partido Renovador Democrático
Partido da Aliança Juventude Operária e Camponesa de Angola
Partido Angolano Independente
Partido Democrático Liberal de Angola
Partido Social Democrático Angolano
Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
Partido Democrático para o Progresso de Aliança Nacional Angolana
Partido Reformador Angolano
Convenção Nacional Democrática de Angola
Partido Nacional Democrático de Angola
Partido Democrático Angolano
Forum Democrático Angolano
Angola Democrática

PRD
PAJOCA
PAI
PDLA
PSDA
FNL
PDP-ANA
PRA
CNDA
PND
PDA
FDA
AD-Coligação
The mandated demobilization and disarmament of FALA and FAPLA soldiers who were congregated in encampment areas around Angola was practically nonexistent. Also months behind schedule was the creation of a new 50,000 member unified army. With retraining provided by the Portuguese, this new army, the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA), was to enlist FALA and FAPLA soldiers in equal numbers. By mid-September, only a few hundred officers had been trained and commissioned in the FAA. Tens of thousands of FAPLA and FALA soldiers remained in their respective camps or simply drifted away. The official "abolition" of FAPLA and FALA was signed by President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi on September 26, three days before the elections.

Logistical preparations for the elections proceeded relatively smoothly through September, with few complaints from UNITA or the other political parties. Demobilization continued to provoke heated controversy. The MPLA accused UNITA of dragging its feet in sending its demobilized soldiers away from the encampment areas, and of preserving a large number of soldiers and arms outside of the UNAVEM monitoring process. UNITA accused the government of Angola of transferring thousands of FAPLA soldiers into the police force, with many of those going into a newly created branch of riot police (the ninjas), trained by Spain. In August and September, there were clashes involving riot police and both FALA and FAPLA troops resulting in a number of casualties in Bie and Huambo provinces and elsewhere. These incidences remained isolated and differences were resolved on a regional or a local basis.

The U.S. contributed to a last-minute effort by several donor countries to accelerate the demobilization process in the final weeks before the election. Three C-130 transport planes, with 75 Air Force personnel, were loaned to UNAVEM II for six weeks, beginning in mid-August. These and other aircraft were used to carry soldiers and their families from the encampment areas to their homes. The availability of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft proved to be critical in the last-minute transport of election materials, election personnel, and observers. A series of accidents in Uige province on the three weekends preceding the elections diminished the role of helicopters in air-borne logistics. Suspicions as to the cause of the accidents, each involving Russian-crewed helicopter, were varied.

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4 In the period leading up to the elections, President dos Santos announced that Angola's official designation would be simply the Republic of Angola, as opposed to the People's Republic of Angola.
On the eve of the elections, the mood in Angola was cautiously optimistic. The 16-month ceasefire had generally been respected since the signing of the Bicesse Accords. In spite of the lack of accurate census data and the difficulties in accessing Angola’s more remote zones, the voter registration exercise had been successful. The major presidential candidates had traveled throughout the country and had spoken to large crowds with few serious incidents. Election officials and workers had been trained for their election day duties, and balloting materials had arrived in Luanda in sealed, pre-packaged kits, ready for distribution to provincial capitals and on to the polling places.

Regardless of these feelings of optimism, there were areas of concern:

1) Tensions were high in several cities and provinces (Bié, Huambo, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, and Malanje) where armed clashes between MPLA supporters and UNITA supporters had occurred in the final weeks of the campaign.

2) The government claimed that UNITA was reluctant to permit the government’s extensions of central administration to areas under UNITA control in southeastern Angola. As a consequence, many voters in that area were not able to register, and parties other than UNITA were not able to freely campaign in the southeast.

3) UNITA registered frequent complaints with the government about the high visibility and potential intimidation effect of the blue-uniformed riot police, or ninjas.

4) UNITA alleged that its supporters had been harassed and intimidated in many provinces and its campaign headquarters attacked in MPLA stronghold areas, including Malange.

5) UNITA complained that registration of voters was halted before as many as one million eligible voters were able to register, particularly in its areas of support. UNITA differed with the CNE’s estimate of 5.3 million eligible voters, favoring instead a total of 6.16 million eligible voters.

6) The third parties attracted limited attention. Reasons for third-party failure were multiple, including personal ambitions, regional loyalties and parochialisms, and a lack of time to organize. Third-parties also lacked the resources with which to mount an effective campaign. Some were almost completely dependent on their legally mandated 20 minutes of radio time and 10 minutes of television time per day during the campaign period for getting their message to the people. A few parties were unable to organize regularly to fill their allotted media time.

7) Many Angolans and observers felt that the government’s voter information campaign had not adequately reached rural and illiterate voters. The campaign depended heavily on the use of the radio and television, which was more readily available to the urban electorate. There was a concern among the international consultants and observers that illiterate voters would not be able to understand the complicated paper ballots.

8) In the period immediately leading up to the vote, there was a broad-based, if partisan, series of mass-media voter’s information campaigns. State radio and television time were equally rationed among all of the parties. The two primary parties benefited from the biases of their respective electronic and print media. UNITA’s principal print voice was the weekly, Terra Angolana.

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Reduced access to civic education and voters’ information programs in rural areas could be a significant causal factor contributing to the areas recording over 10% spoiled ballots (null and blank) for either the presidential or the legislative race. Provinces falling into this category were: Bengo, Bié, Cunene, Huila, Kwanza Sul, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Melange, Namibe, Uíge, and Zaire.
published and printed in Portugal and flown into Luanda for distribution. Angola's daily paper, the *Jornal de Angola*, was more supportive of the government. Experienced Angola-watchers on the IFES team noted that the paper was less partisan than in the recent past. Most observers agreed that the government's control of the Luanda-based major media of mass communication (state radio, television, and the *Jornal de Angola*) resulted in news coverage that favored the MPLA.

9) UNITA and the MPLA continued to broadcast political propaganda throughout the pre-and post-election periods. UNITA's broadcasts were carried over the Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel (VORGAN), their private radio station. The VORGAN broadcasts presented inaccurate and misleading information—and the language used in the programming was often inflammatory. Response to the VORGAN broadcasts came during an emission by the MPLA on the state-controlled radio: the daily two-hour program, *Angola Combatente*. The impact of these programs was discussed at regular intervals during meetings of the JPMC. Both sides agreed that the programs could only have a negative impact on the population's comprehension of the peace process and the preparations for the elections. Both sides promised to stop—but neither did.

10) With the official creation of the FAA on September 26, it became apparent that the goals of total demobilization and disarmament would not be accomplished before the elections. The United Nations reported that, "...by 7 October, 1992, a total of 96,620 Government troops had been demobilized, representing 80 per cent of the projected figure. However, a much lower proportion of ex-FALA troops were demobilized and even then they did not leave their assembly areas."
THE IFES OBSERVATION MISSION

Role and Objectives of IFES Observers

The fielding of the independent observation mission was the second major phase of IFES' role in the Angolan elections. IFES' Angola staff made an effective shift from civic education and technical elections assistance to international elections observation organization and support during the month of September. This transition was directed by Leticia Martinez, a consultant specializing in the organization of international observation missions who arrived in Luanda on August 29.

Immediately preceding the delegation's arrival, Ms. Martinez and the rest of the in-country staff (Project Manager Tony Zenos and civic education specialist Mariela Lopez) were joined by IFES\Washington Program Officers for Africa, Laurie Cooper and Thomas Bayer. The staff-support was called into Angola to assist with the final mission preparations and the endless administrative tasks that are a component of large-scale election observation.

The IFES international observer delegation was composed of 39 members, citizens of Brazil, Costa Rica, The Netherlands, Nigeria, United Kingdom, Suriname, and the United States (Appendix A). Most members of the delegation arrived in Luanda between September 23 and 25 and remained in Angola until October 5. Among the mission participants were respected Angola-watchers with extensive Angola field experience. They assisted the delegation by providing timely background on elections preparation and the peace process.

IFES assembled the delegation to bolster the international community’s objective assessment of Angola’s electoral processes. The task of observing the elections represented the culmination of the commitment that the UN and other international groups had made to supporting Angola’s democratic forces through security advisors, logistical support, and technical assistance. This international presence throughout the elections process was designed to encourage greater confidence on the part of Angolan citizens that they would be able to vote freely and secretly, that their votes were accurately tabulated and reported, and that the results were respected by all--both inside and outside of Angola. Delegation members were held accountable to all laws of the Angolan government regarding the behavior and conduct of international elections observers (Appendix B).

The observers' mission was to focus on the administration of elections in their respective deployment zones on September 29-30, and on the days immediately preceding and following those dates. Specifically, the observers concentrated on five topics:
1) Polling site preparation and set-up.
2) Voting day process.
3) Ballot security before Day 1, between Days 1 and 2, after Day 2.
4) Ballot Counting.
5) Reporting of the elections results.

It was made clear to the members of the IFES observer delegation and to the mission funders that the delegation would concentrate on events directly witnessed during the time that the observers were in Luanda and deployed in the field. The IFES delegation was not in a position to directly observe the entire elections process, which had begun months before.

Pre-Deployment Briefings

Most of the IFES observers arrived in Luanda over the 23rd and the 24th of September. Briefings for the entire team were scheduled for September 24 through 26 in the conference facility of a local engineering firm.

Before their departure from their homes-of-record, the observers received a briefing book prepared by the IFES staff. The book included the observers' terms of reference, a list of the mission participants, recent Angola news from a wide variety of journals, newspapers, and magazines; economic and social data; historical background; Angola's electoral law; and documents discussing the roles and activities for international observers. Upon arrival, observers received a welcome kit containing additional country-specific data, political party backgrounds, a detailed mission agenda, deployment information, and a translation of the Angolan Law for International Observers.

In order to retain their objectivity, individuals on the IFES observer delegation were discouraged from forming relationships with political parties or interest groups while in Angola. Delegation members were also asked to avoid on-the-record discussions of their observations with members of the domestic and international press until the release of the post-election statement. After its release, individual members were free to report on their experience and their assessment as they saw fit, both in Luanda and after their return home.

Delegation briefings included a review of the campaign process in Angola and an overview of the electoral law. The observers were briefed by the leadership of the CNE, Dr. Onofre dos Santos and Dr. Caetano de Sousa; members of the UNDP team: Julio dos Reis, Senior Coordinator, and Maria Julia Ornelas, Angolan legal specialist; and the Director of the United States Liaison Office, Jeffrey
Millington. The team also received a security briefing and a lecture on personal health maintenance in Angola.

Throughout the sessions, IFES staff familiarized the participants with the administrative side of the mission covering topics ranging from lodging specifics to per-diem information. In-depth discussions focused on the relationship of observers with the media and IFES' interest in preserving the balance and the neutrality of the mission in the eyes of the Angolans and of the international community.

Individual delegates presented first-hand information on Angola's political landscape and how the political parties were preparing for the elections. Others offered discussion on recent Angolan history and its implications on the electoral process. The nuts and bolts of international observation and the role of the international observer in the elections process were also covered.

IFES delegation team members were provided with an observation checklist on which to record their observations at each of the polling sites visited (Appendix C). Observers were encouraged to be attentive for signs of fraud or manipulation of the process to the benefit of one party or another. They were to note administrative inefficiencies that, even if not fraudulent in character, might disenfranchise legitimate voters.

In addition to the checklist, the delegates were provided with a list of "benchmark" questions designed to standardize the information-gathering of each team.

1) Did the local elections officials conduct the elections in a politically neutral manner? Were poll officials independent of political direction? Did they act, and were they perceived to act, in a non-partisan manner?

2) Were some voters disenfranchised because of the inability to acquire a voter’s registration card?

3) Were voters identified in accordance with the procedures established by the Electoral Law?

4) Were some voters prevented from voting because of errors with their registration credentials?

5) Were there adequate safeguards to prevent widespread fraud in the balloting process?

6) Were the voters able to cast a secret ballot?

7) Were the measures to prevent multiple voting effective?

8) Were people registered who were not eligible to vote, such as under-age Angolans and foreigners?

9) Were poll watchers designated by the political parties permitted access to polling sites and counting centers?

10) Were there any challenges to the balloting or counting process?

11) Were ballots counted in the manner established by the electoral law? Were there suspicious
delays in the preparation or release of elections returns?

In the time frame of the mission, the distinction between events directly observed and those which were only heard about was important. The emphasis for the mission participants was on the former. The Angolan specialists in the group were encouraged to gather information on important aspects of the electoral process that were not possible to observe between September 24 and October 3, particularly the political campaign and the role of the media. To gain a more complete picture of the elections process, observers were encouraged to explore the following issues at the regional and local levels:

1) Were there any restrictions, de facto or de jure, that prevented the political parties from conducting their respective campaigns?
2) Were there arrests, detention or killings of party leaders or other individuals during the campaign that appear politically motivated?
3) Were citizens free to organize and become politically involved, whatever their political views?
4) Were voters intimidated into voting for (or not voting for) a particular party or candidate by the armed forces, political parties or government officials?
5) Did the candidates feel free to advocate any position?
6) Were government resources used to give an advantage to any party or candidate? What effect did this have on the campaign?
7) Did the government-controlled media provide adequate and balanced coverage of the political campaign?
8) Did journalists feel free to cover controversial topics? Were certain subjects considered taboo?
9) Did citizens view the elections as a useful mechanism to express their political views?
10) Did citizens appear informed regarding the choices being presented in these elections? Did the civic education programs provide adequate information regarding the mechanics of voting?

On September 26, the delegation divided into small groups and circulated around Luanda, meeting with as many political party representatives as possible. The individual groups shared their findings with the rest of the team in an evening session. The afternoon activities also afforded to several groups the opportunity to observe major rallies staged in Luanda by UNITA and the MPLA in the final forty-eight hours of the official political campaign period.
Deployment and Regional Briefings

Members of the observer delegation were divided into eight provincial teams. The provincial teams were subdivided into eighteen deployment teams. IFES-sponsored observation teams visited polling stations in nine provinces: Bengo, Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Luanda, and Namibe. At least one member of each deployment team was an accomplished Portuguese speaker. The provincial teams departed for their respective provinces in the early morning of September 27. Teams travelling outside of Luanda reached the provinces by land transport or via a United States Air Force C-130 made available to IFES for the transport of international observers.

IFES consultants and project staff had visited the provinces in advance of the delegation’s arrival in Luanda in order to pre-arrange housing, transport, and drivers for each of the teams. This advance preparation allowed the observation teams to maximize their time, commencing local-level briefings immediately upon arrival in the provincial capitals. Teams met with provincial electoral council officials, religious leaders, UNAVEM II Regional Commanders and Regional Election Coordinators, political party representatives, and educators over the remainder of September 27 and through the day on the 28th.

Excerpts from Regional Team Reports

Kwanza Sul

Upon arrival at the provincial capital of Sumbe, our joint team met with the director of the Provincial Electoral Council. In a comprehensive description of pre-electoral organization, he cited several logistical challenges including lack of transport, communications difficulties, lack of food for workers at assembly points and problems with fuel for helicopters. Despite these difficulties he felt that preparations for elections were proceeding apace.

We met with the Catholic Bishop of Kwanza Sul, who expressed some concern about rural voters understanding the electoral process. We also held a meeting with provincial government authorities who expressed satisfaction with security and preparations for elections. Later that day we met with the full electoral council and representatives of political parties. Some of the council representatives expressed concern that we were not covering all sections of the province.

Kwanza Norte

During the two days prior to the election, the four-member Kwanza Norte team canvassed an array of local officials and opinion leaders and international experts in order to obtain a deeper understanding of the particular dynamics of the Province and the environs of its capital city Ndalatando.

The team’s first visit was to the UNAVEM Provisional headquarters where we were briefed by Leila Chaloub, the UNAVEM coordinator, and members of her senior staff. The briefing contained useful information on the registration and ongoing citizen education process as well as the Province’s experience in the troop deployment process.

* The term polling station (Assembleia de Voto) and the term polling place (Mesa da Assembleia de Voto) are frequently interchanged. Throughout this report, polling station can refer to an official area in which is located more than one polling place. In Angola, some Assembleias were comprised of more than one Mesa.
The team's second briefing was with Joao Pinto Maria Lazary, the Provincial Director for the National Election Commission, and members of his senior staff. Mr. Lazary supplemented the information received from UNAVEM concerning the registration process and the logistical arrangements made for the election. After the briefing with Mr. Lazary the team was able to visit the final briefing exercise for municipal election officials in Ndalatando before their deployment to individual polling stations. This meeting allowed team members to be identified as members of the international observer team thereby facilitating the team's access during the actual election.

At Mr. Lazary's suggestion we were able to meet with several leaders of many of the smaller political parties in an informal briefing session. Our efforts to contact the provincial headquarters of other political parties were not successful.

Our last briefing was with two Catholic missionaries with extensive experience in the Province who shared their perceptions of local attitudes. Apart from these individual discussion the pre-election period provided the team with an opportunity to evaluate the mood and procedural preparations along with compliance with the pre-election campaign ban.
ELECTION DAY OBSERVATIONS

General Observation Plan for Election Days

During the two days of voting, September 29 and 30, the eighteen teams of the IFES observer delegation visited more than 400 polling stations in nine provinces.

Observation teams were in position to observe the initial set-up and the opening of polling stations at 7:00 AM on the 29th of September. Within the provincial teams, one deployment team spent the day visiting polls in the urban area and its outskirts. The remaining team(s) set out to cover stations further from the large cities, in rural Angola. Stations were visited throughout the day, until the closing of the stations at the end of the first day’s voting. In most cases, teams returned to the provincial capital for the evening to compare observation notes and discuss the next day’s plan.

The same program was followed on the second day of voting. The rural and urban teams switched routes and visited a new series of polling stations. Stations noted as experiencing difficulties on the first day of polling received a follow-up visit on the second day. The second day was longer than the first as the teams remained in the field observing the closing of the polls and the commencement of, and in several cases, the entire vote count. An example of a typical observation schedule is found in Appendix E.

Excerpts from Regional Team Reports

Kwanza Sul

Group Two visited assemblies from Porto Amboim south to Quicombo and north to Gabela and Quilenda. This sector is comprised of a provincial capital, several towns, fishing villages and hillside farming communities. We visited an estimated 20 sites, some with multiple tables, throughout the two-day process and kept in touch with municipal and provincial Electoral Commission authorities throughout the process.

We visited three voting sites in the town of Cela. We attempted to visit voting stations in rural areas further south, but extremely poor road conditions prevented us from visiting all but one. Returning to Central Waku Kungo we visited a few more voting sites where there was very little activity.

Past Quibala, we stopped in Catofe at a FAPLA (government forces) assembly area, where there were about thirty FAPLA soldiers in uniform. There was a polling station with two lines, one for soldiers and the other for civilians. MPLA and UNITA representatives were present. No one reported any problems.

Group One started in Porto Amboin, traveled east through Gabela to Quibala and south to Waku Kungo. Of the 30 voting sites visited, we encountered few problems or irregularities.
Kwanza Norte

Although Kwanza Norte is one of Angola’s smaller Provinces, its mountainous terrain and our vehicular limitations restricted the team to only three of Kwanza Norte’s ten municipalities. Despite this limitation, the team surveyed 24 polling stations on each day of the election. These stations represented approximately 24,000 voters, 17% of the voters registered in the province.

The team was divided into two groups with one team surveying rural areas on day one and the second team surveying urban areas on that day. On the second day, the itineraries were reversed. Due to logistical limitations, polling station openings were surveyed in Ndalatando only. In order to maintain contact with the centralized counting process and due to the difficult night-driving conditions, the counting process surveys were conducted in Ndalatando exclusively.

The team made 49 visits to polling stations during the two days of elections, and observed 25 stations during the counting phase. The team also observed the beginning of compilation of electoral results at the provincial electoral headquarters.

The stations visited were those in geographically accessible areas, namely the municipality of Cazengo (containing the provincial capital Ndalatando) and the neighboring municipality of Lucala, as well as one polling station in the municipality of Samba Caju. The coverage thus does not reflect the more remote areas of the province.

Benguela

The Benguela team travelled over 1200 km. and observed 88 polling stations in seven of Benguela’s nine municipalities. The majority of these sites had not received visits from other observation teams prior to the arrival of the IFES team.

Huila

The team selected four Assemblies for observation of opening, closing, and counting procedures. Each morning and night the observers noted the operations of these stations at length. During the day, the teams circulated around the province. Areas visited included: Lubango and vicinity, Chiba, Kilometer 16, Quilma, and the Port of Namibe (Namibe Province).

Bengo

The team broke into three groups based on their regional briefings on September 27 and 28. The teams visited three clusters of polling stations: in Ambriz municipality in the north; in Caxito and Dembos municipalities in the center-north, and in Ikolo e Bengo municipality in the center-south. The municipality of Muxima (Kissama) in the south was ruled out due to low population density, and the municipalities of Nambuangongo, Bula, Atumba, and Pango Aluquem in the north and east were ruled out—they were inaccessible by road.

In total, the Bengo team observed 27 of 84 polling stations, or 32 percent of all of the polling sites in the province. There were 100 different polling places at these sites. These sites were planned for use by 27,000 voters in the province, or 29 percent of the province’s registered voters.

Due to the proximity of some of the polling stations visited to Luanda, members of the team were able to continue tracking the tabulation of elections results. Team members observed the delivery to, and verification of ballot boxes and electoral results by the PEC.

Bié

On September 29, the team visited 10 sites in Cuito. We then drove to Kwanza and worked our way back through Camacupa, visiting 8 sites in Kwanza, 3 in Camacupa, 3 in Catabola, and 7 in Chipeta. In the afternoon, 5 sites were visited in Cuito town and 6 in outlying bairros.
On September 30, in addition to visiting 11 town and barrio sites in Cuito, the team drove to Andulo, visiting 7 sites there, 4 in Chicumbe, one at "Kilometer 30", and 7 in Cuninga.

Huambo

The two Huambo observer teams visited a total of 84 polling stations over the two days in Huambo City, Caala, Maungunja, Kalenga, Kokengo, Cuima, Ekunha, Canhala, Londuimbali, Wama and several other villages.

Luanda

Three teams from the IFES delegation observed elections in Luanda province on September 29 and 30. They concentrated on the "suburban" municipios where population density is high, such as Cacuacu, Kazenga, Sambizanga and Viana. Approximately 35 polling stations were visited, many of which consisted of multiple mesas.

General Conditions on Election Days

The two days of voting were among Angola's most peaceful days since 1961. Virtually no incidences of violence were reported. In some areas, voters began to congregate at the polling stations on the evening of the 28th. Early in the morning of September 29, long lines had formed at polling stations in every province where IFES observers were deployed. In a limited number of cases, these lines of voters became unruly and electoral police temporarily lost control of the crowds. Generally, Angolan voters were willing to wait peacefully, if not patiently, for hours for their opportunity to vote.

Polling stations opened on time, at 7:00 a.m., more often than not. In isolated cases, stations opened late because of the late delivery of polling materials. In such instances, the late start could usually be attributed to the administrative inefficiency of individual station staffs. The processing of voters was often painfully slow in the morning of the first day. Initially, many international observers and Angolans were doubtful that the more populated localities would be able to process their registered voters in the allotted two days. In urban areas, polling station locations did not always reflect voter distribution. Crowd pressures at some polling stations were reduced through the organization of the busing of voters to less congested polling stations by the local electoral councils. To the observer, there was a commitment on the part of the election administration to insure that all Angolans qualified to vote could vote. Speed and efficiency increased as the day progressed, and nowhere was it reported that voters were prevented from voting by the end of the second day. The large majority of voters cast their ballots on the first day of voting, and some polling stations closed down early on September 30 when it became apparent that no more voters were coming.

Electors registered complaints with nearly all IFES observers. These complaints were primarily procedural and were not of such nature as to call into question the essential fairness of the vote. Voters complained of the long lines and the long wait, particularly on September 29. Polling station staff and party agents complained of the lack of sleep, of the lack of food, blankets, and water (particularly on
September 30), and sometimes, of the lack of police protection and adequate lighting during the night of September 29. All observers noted a large number of voters who were completely confused by the paper ballots and by the voting procedures in general.

Excerpts from Regional Team Reports

*Kwanza Sul*

The director of the Provincial Electoral Council cited several logistical challenges including lack of transport, communications difficulties, lack of food for workers at assembly points, and problems accessing fuel for helicopters.

*Kwanza Norte*

The average number of voters waiting when we visited the polling stations was 245 on the first day and 25 on the second day. First day total number of processed voters, based on data collected for 16 stations, averaged 625 voters each.

There was a discernable learning curve to the voting procedures, as evidenced by the dwindling crowds beginning in the afternoon of the first day. Few if any voters were denied the opportunity to exercise their voting rights due to processing delays. Rural areas continued to have some processing delays due to the need to bus voters en masse to the polls and to the generally lower literacy level among the rural population.

Despite procedural uncertainty and teeming crowds, all polling places opened within 15 minutes of the scheduled opening. Polling station officials had prepared the site well and unpacked all voting materials. Procedures were strictly complied with by officials to ensure, in both real and symbolic terms, the integrity of the system.

*Benguela*

In general, the polls opened on time. The team noted several cases where rural voters were transported into urban areas to vote due to large crowds at some rural polling stations. All complaints registered with the electoral officials and the observers were related to the lack of food, poor sleeping conditions, and the lack of sufficient lighting.

*Bengo*

Most of the complaints registered by the voters concerned the amount of time spent in line, the lack of food and water, and the fact that the voters had left children at home or had not worked in order to vote. Some voters complained of preferential treatment afforded to some voters who were allowed to circumvent the line.

In Ikolo e Bengo a medical technician was present at every polling station. Technicians were seen at only one site in Dande and Dembos.

*Huila*

The general attitude of the voters was one of impatience standing in long lines that began to shorten by 15:00 on the 29th. Twenty percent of the voters observed were visibly nervous through the voting process; especially elderly and women with young children. There was a notable number of disabled voters.

The opening of the polls on the 30th featured lines averaging 20-30 voters versus the 150-200 voters present at the opening of the polls on the 29th. By the late afternoon of the 30th, voting activity was
practically zero.

Ten percent of the voters observed had considerable difficulty with the voting process. Voters were seen standing motionless in front of the voting booth, not knowing what they were supposed to do.

_Blé_

Town sites all opened approximately on time; one rural site delayed until 8:00 for organizational reasons. In all cases, the full complement of staff and party delegates was present. There were several cases of shortfall in the number of electoral police.

_Huambo_

The team notes a tremendous job being done by all concerned, working in what was a logistical nightmare. The polling place officials were true heroes, especially the presidents who, with two exceptions, were in complete control. The elections took place in an incredibly calm atmosphere. It would have been impossible to guess that the country was emerging from a civil war. Despite minor procedural irregularities at few polling places visited, the vast majority exhibited strict adherence to the electoral laws.

**Voting Station Kit Delivery and Set-Up**

IFES observers generally found the polling station staff present and ready to open at 7:00 a.m. on September 29. In most polling places, the kits containing ballots, ballot boxes, and all necessary supplies and material (shipped in packing crates from the U.K. by the De La Rue Company), were also in place before 7:00. Most polling stations were thus able to open on time. The delivery of all the required materials in a single packing crate greatly facilitated the normally complex logistics of delivering the proper quantity of forms, pens, pencils, pads, lamps, ballot boxes, voting screens, etc., reliably to each voting location.

In Luanda, where the Provisional Electoral Council officials had postponed the delivery of kits to stations in the city until the morning of the 29th, a number of stations opened an hour or more late when the kits did not arrive on time. In a few other areas of the country, observers either witnessed, or heard reports, of late openings where distribution logistics had broken down and materials arrived after 07:00. Late openings did not result in individual voters losing the ability to vote due to the time lost in waiting for the station to become operational. Major delays were compensated with extended voting hours, or in isolated cases, voting days. The station presidents and staffs generally seemed to be well-trained in set-up procedures.

In most polling stations, the polling places were efficiently arranged to allow for a flow of voters. Sometimes this arrangement was arrived at only through trial and error as the day wore on and the pollworkers became accustomed to their respective roles. The most inconsistent element in the station set-up was the placement of the voting booths (also referred to as voting screens). In a large number of cases, the screen were positioned such that the secrecy of the vote was not well protected.
Excerpts from Regional Team Reports

Huila

Visiting the Provincial Electoral Council on September 28, the team counted 147 kits on hand. The province received 681 kits for a total of 529 authorized tables, plus an additional 52 reserve kits. Of the 147 kits on hand, 95 remained to be delivered to nearby polling stations. The PEC possessed signed receipts for the kits already distributed. United Nations helicopters were flying the kits to the remote areas. Members of the PEC were helpful and informative.

Benguela

In each of the polling stations, the kits were complete. The polling places were properly set up except for a limited number of cases where the polling booths were not positioned to afford maximum secrecy to the voter.

Bengo

Years of war and lack of maintenance have rendered many parts of Bengo Province inaccessible by road. The PEC attempted to distribute the majority of the polling station kits to the municipalities via UN helicopters. In the Caxito area, all of the polling stations seemed to receive their kits on time. Deliveries to the difficult-to-reach municipality of Nambuangongo were hampered by lack of fuel for the helicopter. Delivery of the kits for that municipality were scheduled to be handled via overland transport, a trip of 8 to 10 hours. This was not arranged until 17:00 on September 28th, creating the possibility that they would not arrive on time.

The helicopter pilot complained that sometimes he did not know where to drop the kits off. He had a 1:1,000,000 scale map, but the Angolans could not locate villages on it.

Luanda

Several polling stations visited by the Luanda teams opened one to three hours late on September 29, because of a lack of materials. This seems to have been caused by the fact that the Luanda Provincial Electoral Council did not begin distribution of kits to many polling stations in the city of Luanda until early in the morning on September 29, resulting in late delivery in a number of cases.
Polling Station Staff, Party Agents and Electoral Police

The electoral law stipulates that each mesa within a polling place is composed of a president (presidente da mesa), a secretary (secretário), and three clerks (escrutinadores). Each presidential candidate and each party presenting a slate of candidates for the legislature had the right to have one delegate (delegado) in the polling stations where they were on the ballot. The polling station president has at his or her disposal electoral police (policia eleitoral) to aid in the maintenance of calm and order during the election. The IFES delegation was in agreement that the commitment of these individuals to the election process was the primary ingredient in the success of the voting operation.

IFES observers found the polling station presidents, secretaries, and clerks to be generally competent, well-trained and dedicated to the task of fulfilling their important and difficult role in the electoral process. While there were many cases where the electoral law was not followed to the letter, this did not seem to be caused by an ignorance of the law or an intent to subvert the process. Rather, it was most often a matter of adjusting to local conditions and demands, most importantly the need to process many voters as quickly and efficiently as possible. The weakest portion of the poll worker training seemed to be that concerning the procedures for counting the ballots and for reporting the tallies to provincial centers.

If there was one key to the credibility of the voting process on September 29 and 30, and the counting process on October 1, from the perspective of the IFES observers, it was the political party delegates. There were MPLA and UNITA agents at very nearly 100% of the polling stations visited by the IFES observers, and often other parties were represented as well. Often working without food, water and sleep, they maintained a visible presence through the crucial three days when the electoral process took place in over 5579 locations across the country. In monitoring the behavior of the election officials and of each other, they provided the most important check to abuse at the local level.

In many cases, party agents took on a role in the polling station that surpassed that of a passive monitor, participating actively in assisting illiterate and confused voters. At times, they assisted the electoral police in controlling crowds. They played an active role in the ballot counting process. This expansion of their role would be troublesome were it not for the fact that it usually was done with the explicit or implicit agreement of polling officials and of agents of opposing parties.

Electoral police were also key players during these crucial three days. In most cases observed by the IFES delegation, they were effective in their role of controlling the crowds seeking access to the voting station. In the polarized environment of Angola, it was appropriate to have these tasks carried out by civilians and not uniformed members of the police or armed forces. Their presence allowed the station president and his or her staff to focus on the voting procedures without the distraction of controlling the
flow of voters. IFES observers found that four electoral police per polling place were often necessary, and two were insufficient. Many observers commented on the electoral police's occasional lack of civility—young men and women harshly shouting at confused and often elderly voters to hurry them through the voting process.

Excerpts from Regional Team Reports

*Kwanza Norte*

All five electoral personnel were present in 44 of the 49 stations visited. In the remaining five stations one scrutineer was absent in each location.

In general, the staff members were very dedicated to their work. In the rare number of cases where we were informed of or witnessed any problems, the attitude was one of consensus. Even the party agents (*delegados*) were called upon to give their opinion. Staff members carried out their respective tasks concerning the administrative part of the voter processing (opening and closing procedures, calling and registration of names, numbers, handing over of ballot papers, etc.) in a responsible way. Every aspect of the voting process in the stations was very transparent. All actors had access to all relevant activities. The general level of knowledge of the procedures was good.

The role of the *delegados* was not always restricted to that of observer. On their own initiative, or on request of staff members, they were sometimes also involved in giving explanations to the voters. We have to stress, however, that we never observed any attempts to influence or intimidate the voter.

Data on party poll watchers was collected on 47 visits. The average number of parties represented was 4.3. In many cases one party was represented by both the delegate and an alternate. MPLA was represented in all 47 polling station visits, UNITA in 46, FNLA in 21, PNDA in 19, FDA in 11, PAJOCA in 9, PSD in 9, PDPA in 4, PLDA in 2, AD in 1, and PRD in 1.

The role of the electoral police remained consistent throughout the polling stations visited in the two days of balloting. Generally, they appeared to be assigned to maintaining order within the polling station by ensuring that voters entered the polling station according to a sequence of pre-issued numbers, that voters within the booths retained their privacy and that the party agents maintained honesty. In some cases, such as in the *mesas* of Bairro Azul or Tira Aos Pratos, the electoral police took a more active role to the extent of physically searching every voter or observer that entered the mesa.

The authority of the electoral police appeared to be directly proportional to the seriousness of the situation. Maintaining crowd control was manageable as long as the crowd was small and the degree of disorder relatively low. At Assembleia Popular Bairro Azul on the first day of balloting when the crowd rushed both doors of the assembleia, however, the National Police had to be called in to restore order within the first two hours of operation. In another instance at Bairro Azul when two armed UNITA personnel entered one mesa, it was not until the UNITA party representative stepped in that the two men were expelled from the polling station.

We were informed that in at least two instances electoral police may have been coercing voters into selecting a certain party or candidate. We did not find, however, any evidence of this in our observations of the stations.

*Bengo*

The character of the polling station president was a key factor in the operation of the polling station.

At the Popular Assembly polling station in Caxito, four women were observed together at a table folding their ballots before depositing them in the ballot boxes. The pollworkers did not discourage them from doing this. At the Kinzala polling station in Dembos municipality, party representatives were
placing voters' ballots in the ballot boxes for them. Although this prevented the deposit of the wrong color ballot in the wrong box, the action was in violation of the electoral code.

Voting on the second day was much smoother, not only due to the reduced number of voters, but also to the increased efficiency with which the pollworkers performed their tasks.

In Ikolo e Bengo, there were only party agents from UNITA and the MPLA, while in Dande municipality most polls also included representatives from the FNLA and the PRD.

At some polling sites, electoral police treated voters with patience and courtesy. At others, they harassed voters for even minor delays, shouting at them to leave the voting booth, ordering them not to converse, and physically moving them to different places in line. This behavior exacerbated the confusion of the voters with the process. Where there were more than two electoral policemen, crowds were better controlled.

Benguela

Poll workers on the whole were well trained to perform their tasks. However, there was a notable lack of female poll workers and party delegates.

In all cases, both UNITA and the MPLA were represented by not one but two delegates in each site. The working environment was positive. None of the party representatives filed oral or written complaints about the voting process, including the security of the ballots on the nights of the 29th and the 30th. In situations where the ballot boxes were transported to central locations on either night, the party delegates always accompanied the boxes.

Kwanza Sui

The act of casting the ballots in the ballot boxes was always guided by a polling station staff member, party agent, or even one of the electoral police. The purpose was obviously to prevent that the presidential ballots were cast in the pink (legislative elections) box and vice versa.

Bié

The polling station staffs carried out their tasks in reasonably standard fashion. Occasionally, staffs acted to prod voters and speed up the process. Party agents acted appropriately.

Luanda

We were impressed by the commitment of pollworkers to proper functioning of the polling places, and their apparent scrupulousness.

The electoral police in some of the polling stations experiencing heavier turnout were controlling crowd flow and presenting voters’ information to the waiting electors. Some electoral police would position themselves between the lines of waiting voters near the entrance to the polling station and repeatedly fold a piece of paper of similar dimensions to the ballots explaining the need for the voters to fold their individual ballots lengthwise and then in half before exiting the voting booth.

The folding of the ballot proved to be a time-consuming step of the voting procedure. Starting by folding the ballot lengthwise prevented the "ink blot effect" with an elector’s still wet ink mark being duplicated next to another candidate on the ballot when the ballot was folded in half. Ballots with marks for two different candidates would be considered as spoiled and would not be counted. Therefore, the information being transmitted by the electoral police was important and especially pertinent for illiterate voters who marked their ballots with a fingerprint rather than an "X" next to their choice. Electoral police were also observed standing near the entry to the polling stations and explaining the voting process to the waiting voters, employing the IFES-produced "How to Vote" poster as a visual aid.
Voter Processing

The primary activity under observation on September 29 and 30 was the processing of voters at polling stations. While by no means perfect, this component of the electoral process proceeded peacefully and relatively smoothly and efficiently in the locations that IFES observers visited.

Each table (mesa) in a polling station had a staff of a president, secretary and three clerks. There were party agents and electoral police assigned to each table. Materials and supplies for each table were delivered in a single packing crate, or "kit". Included were three ballot boxes--the largest for the presidential ballots (pink), the mid-sized for the legislative ballots (blue), and the smaller third box or ballots cast by voters who had lost their ID card or for whom there was some other irregularity (white). Each table received 1200 presidential ballots and the same number of legislative ballots. The expectation was that each table would process no more than 1000 voters (the 200 extra ballots were to be employed in case of voter's error or in the event that a polling place experienced +100% participation).

Following the procedure employed during the registration exercise, the CNE recommended that polling station staffs distribute numbered tickets (included in the kits) to voters as they arrived at their respective polling stations on the morning of September 29. Voters would then be called into the voting station by number, and would not be required to stand in line to ensure that they be processed in the order that they arrived. IFES observers witnessed many variations on this procedure. In some cases where tickets were used, they did indeed contribute, as intended, to an orderly crowd of waiting voters. In other places, where the tickets were not used, or even at times where they were used, lines of voters featured much shoving and tension. In a few instances, impatient voters stormed the polling station, and order was only restored with the assistance of regular police.

At many polling stations, pregnant and elderly women and mothers with infants, as well as the sick and handicapped, were given priority in line. Usually this was accomplished without rancor, but at times this granting of preference contributed to the impatience and unruliness of the rest of the crowd.

In the polling place layout, the most problematic components were the voting booths. Each table was given a booth with two adjacent compartments. The closeness of the compartments made the maintenance of privacy while voting difficult. In addition, the screens were often placed in the station in a way that was not conducive to being able to keep one's vote secret from polling station staff and agents. In most cases, this lack of privacy seemed of minor concern to the voters. The two voting screens were also the most common bottleneck in the processing of voters. Observers witnessed some station presidents improvising additional voting booths so as to speed up the flow of voters.
Observers took special note of the number of voters turned away because of an invalid or allegedly forged voters' ID card. For the most part, this number was very small. There were some cases where the president's ruling on a false card was appealed to municipal electoral officials and overturned. Observers also noted the process whereby voters who had lost their cards were able to vote, using special sealed ballots and the white ballot box. This procedure was used in a very small number of cases, but was carefully carried out when necessary.

The part of the process that might have been most prone to abuse was the assisting of illiterate, blind, and other handicapped voters. In fact, observers witnessed few problems in this area. Whether assistance was given by the station president or by one of the party agents, all interested parties watched closely and there were very few complaints.

Excerpts from Regional Team Reports

**Bengo**

Some voting stations utilized the ticket system, passing out the numbered tickets to waiting voters and granting them access in numeric order. Where the ticket system was not successfully implemented, voters were taken on a first-come, first-served basis. At the Kitangolo polling site, 1000 tickets were distributed in the morning of the first day of voting. At 19:00, 816 voters had been processed. Rather than leave the station open and allow all of the voters to vote that evening in accordance with the electoral law, the station was closed for the night. Voters initially complained, but agreed to return to the station the next day. It appeared that many of these individuals did return the next morning. However, there could well have been cases of frustrated voters not returning to stand in line a second time.

At least a dozen cases were observed of the polling station president ruling that a voter's registration card was false. In some cases this ruling was due to the fact that the "X" watermarked in the lower left-hand corner of the card was obscured by the voter's fingerprint. In two cases where the observers inquired, the voters possessing these cards were outsiders, from Zaire province in one case and from another northern province in the other. In several cases, upon returning to the polling stations on the second day of voting, the team found that the cards had been ruled valid by the PEC.

**Kwanza Norte**

There was some variation in the initiation of the actual voting exercise. For example, some polling stations handed out queuing numbers at once and others in lots of 100. Some stations prominently displayed official citizen education materials and others did not, resorting rather to ad-hoc explanations.

Commonly, the president of the station gave instructions to the polling station police to send in a couple of new voters. The situation inside the polling station was, in this respect, generally quite orderly. In several cases the mesas already distributed 1000 numbers to people waiting to vote, shortly after opening the station on the first election day. Despite the large number of people waiting, it was common practice to give priority to pregnant women, women with babies, handicapped and elderly. This might be a reason for the slow start that many stations made.

Several stations had improvised a third voting screen, so they could speed up the voting process. In one case, for example, a screen was constructed with beer bottles.

Two instances of defective or fraudulent cards were reported upon questioning mesa presidents, and to our knowledge this phenomenon was not widespread. The number of voters having lost their
registration card were rare. All those cases were processed according to the rules.

Beside the blind and handicapped voters, who are allowed to be accompanied during the act of filling in the ballot, we observed many cases in which illiterate or old people were allowed to be accompanied, often by a family member. According to our observations, this was just to help these people to fill in their ballots, and there was no coercion or intimidation. All actors cooperated without any visible partiality.

Kwanza Sul

On the second day of voting, we traveled forty kilometers south (seventeen of which was very rough terrain) to visit four voting sites in a UNITA/FALA assembly area at Kassuso. MPLA and UNITA representatives were present at all four stations. At the first site, 599 people had voted and they were preparing to begin counting. The president of the station said that anyone who arrived before 7 p.m. would still be able to vote.

While driving to the next site, the FALA General in charge of Kassuo stopped our vehicle and asked to join us. We obliged and he visited the three remaining stations with us. At the second site, we were told that according to the other members of the CNE staff, the president of the voting site had walked away at 5 p.m. the previous day. Nevertheless, the site closed as scheduled, recording 937 votes for day one.

Although the president returned for the second day, the four remaining members of the CNE staff voted to replace him with the secretary for the remainder of the voting. The new president said that most people voted on the first day and that any voters who arrived late on the second day could vote at the first voting site that we visited in Kassuso. (According to the official polling station records-- Acta das Eleições Presidentiais and Acta das Eleições Legislativos-- Savimbi had received 906 votes to Dos Santos’ 14 and in the legislative contest, UNITA received 884 votes to the MPLA’s 15.)

The two remaining sites had also stopped accepting votes and were in the process of counting. The president of the assembly also said that any remaining voters could cast their ballots at the first site as well. All four sites were within one kilometer of each other.

Bengo

A man at the Kitangolo polling station complained that the polling station president had not allowed him to accompany a blind woman into the voting booth. The woman was not able to vote. Stories were related to the team members of some sick or elderly voters who were not mobile and who had no access to transport. These voters were unable to cast their ballots.

Huila

Assistance to nervous or crippled voters was scarce, almost absent. Our team felt that the confused and the crippled should be offered more assistance in the polling station. Other observation groups reported that the polls in their areas were more forthcoming with assistance to these special populations. Clear guidance from the CNE on this issue was insufficient.

Bié

Some stations processed voters more rapidly than others. Speed of voter processing depended primarily on the use of the voting booths. Variations ranged from the limiting of one voter at a time per pair of booths to help assure privacy; to the creation of up to five makeshift supplementary booths. Ad hoc judgement calls by the station president seemed to be influenced by a concern for privacy and the need to respond to the pressure of long lines of voters.

Some rural voting stations were cramped for space and lacked tables, so that voting screens were placed on the floor. Under hostile or contentious circumstances, these arrangements would have threatened the secrecy of the vote.
Luanda

A number of sites in the residential neighborhoods of Luanda, especially those with multiple tables, had thousands of voters waiting in line on the morning of September 29. In several sites, the electoral police and the security forces lost control of the crowds. In some cases, crowds surged forward breaking down gates, fences and windows. In all cases where observers witnessed or heard reports of such disorder at polling places, order had been restored by afternoon of the 29th.

On September 30, Luanda provincial election officials tried to relieve overcrowding at polling sites in the densely populated neighborhoods of the city by providing buses to transport voters to polling sites in the center of town, where very few people were voting on the second day of the elections. In general, lines were shorter and more orderly on the second day, and the processing of voters proceeded more quickly.

Voter Awareness and Civic Education

There was a wide variation observed in the level of voter awareness regarding political parties and candidates. Many voters were able to interpret the ballot and indicate their choices with little apparent difficulty; however, a large number of voters were obviously confused about who to choose and how to indicate their choice. Beyond problems in the design of the ballots (discussed in the following section), there was obviously a lack of effective voter education to make voters, especially rural and illiterate voters, aware of and comfortable with the steps for casting their ballot. The CNE stipulated that the "How to Vote" poster, designed and printed by IFES, was to be distributed to every polling site and prominently displayed where voters waiting in line could review it. In many sites, the poster was not displayed, or was placed in a location where it was not easily seen.

Excerpts from Regional Team Reports

Benguela

The behavior of the electorate pointed to the lack of an adequate civic education campaign by the CNE and the political parties. Three voters requested assistance in voting for Angola's first president, the late Agostinho Neto.

In approximately 20% of the polling stations visited, the observers noted instances where a voter was at a total loss as to how to vote. In such cases, one representative from each party approached the voter and asked for his or her choice. The party representatives then assisted the voter in marking the ballot with the other delegates in attendance.

Approximately two-thirds of the polling stations displayed the IFES "How to Vote" poster. In most of the cases the poster was not positioned for easy reference by waiting voters.

Bengo

The Ikolo e Bengo team saw very few civic education posters, while these were wide-spread in Dande municipality and Ambriz.

Elderly voters and women seemed particularly confused by the voting procedure. In timing the voters, the team found that the average voter spent between 15 and 90 seconds in the voting booth. At one
polling station, the observers were told that some voters required as many as 15 minutes in the booth. Observers did view some voters taking several minutes to vote. The high rate of blank and spoiled ballots attested to the voters' confusion.

*Kwanza Norte*

The number of confused people, or those not aware of how the voting actually had to be carried out, was relatively high. It was common for the staff members (mainly the president) to give quite extensive explanations on the spot. One of the first people we actually saw voting was a visibly confused old woman. She was so confused that the president gave her the (IFES) voter instruction poster, and asked her to call her son in to help her. This case is typical. Another problem that was mentioned to us was the fact that especially older people were not able to distinguish between the photographs of the presidential candidates.

*Bié*

Many voters seemed reasonably well-informed. General confusion, however, about what to do in the voting booth. (Do I have to use a pen? How to fold? What to do next with the ballot?) Color coordination of ballots and boxes was a limited aid due to the pale colors of the ballots. The IFES poster on election procedures was up at only 20-25% of the sites, possibly because of a lack of tacks or tape and limited distribution.

*Huambo*

The team noted the difficulty that many (10-20%) of the voters had with understanding how to vote. This was more of a problem in rural areas. Null and blank votes were more frequent in rural areas, reflecting a higher percentage of illiterate voters.

**Ballot Design**

Ballots were designed and printed by the De La Rue Company in London. The ballots for the legislative and presidential races, were color-coded to match the appropriate ballot boxes. The legislative ballot was printed on a pale blue background and the presidential ballot on a pale pink background. When folded, only the plain white reverse side of the ballots were visible. It was easy for the elector to introduce the ballots into the wrong box and difficult for the pollworkers and party delegates to verify from a distance that the proper ballot went into the proper box, without approaching the ballot box and physically touching the elector's ballot.

The blue ballot for the legislative elections contained 18 horizontally-arranged rectangles, one for each eligible party. In each rectangle, four identifications were arranged from left to right:

- The name of the party
- The party acronym
- The party symbol/seal (in color)
- The party flag (in color)
Along the right-hand side of the ballot, there was an empty square adjacent to each party identification in which the voter marked his/her choice with an X or a fingerprint. The result was an colorful and extremely condensed ballot with lines and squares that left many voters perplexed and even paralyzed at the booth. The legislative ballot was judged by most observers to be too complicated and condensed. Inexperienced voters, and particularly voters with poor eyesight, might have fared better with this ballot if it had been printed on larger paper, so that it would be less condensed.

More problematic was the presidential ballot. In addition to the problem of identifying candidates using only a name and photograph, the ballot was arranged so that many voters were confused as to where to mark their choice. The presidential ballot showed, on a pink background, twelve names, each next to a small color “passport” photograph of the respective candidate. Illiterate voters, who could not read the candidates names, were totally dependent on the small photographs to identify the candidate of their choice. A black line connected each photograph to an empty square to the right of the photograph, where the voter was to mark the ballot. The connecting lines formed three-sided boxes between two candidates, of the same dimension as the black outline of the box destined for the voter’s mark. Many voters, searching for the “empty space next to the candidate of their choice” mistook the unintentional box for the real thing, carefully placing an “X” or a fingerprint between two candidates. Thus their ballot was voided during the counting process.

An additional design flaw resulted from the fact that the ballots were pre-printed, minus candidate names and photographs, with space for the thirteen registered presidential candidates. Andre Milton Kilandamoko of the PSDA withdrew before the names and the photos of the candidates were added to the ballots in the second printing by De La Rue. Therefore, an empty space appeared one quarter of the way down the ballot. The problem resulted from the blank square originally destined for Mr. Kilandamoko’s photograph. Information disseminated to the Angolan electorate advised them to mark the “blank” space on the ballot. The boxes on the right of the ballot for the elector’s mark were printed on the pink background. The candidates photographs were printed in blank squares minus the pink safety paper background for reasons of contrast and visibility. Due to the missing photo, there was a white square in the middle of the ballot. Angolans affiliated with the IFES project pointed out that the literal translation of “blank” as it was used during various civic education presentations was “white”. Many electors marked their ballots in the space left blank by Mr. Kilandamoko’s withdrawal. Mfulupinga N’Landu Victor of the PDP-ANA withdrew after the final ballot printing. The presence of his photo and name on the ballot created minor confusion, particularly among his supporters.

Official results issued at irregular intervals following the close of polling indicated a disproportionate percentage of null and blank ballots. It became evident to the CNE and to the observers that confusion existed not only among the voters but also among the vote counters responsible for interpreting questionable ballots. Null and blank ballots underwent time-consuming but necessary re-review at the CNE headquarters in Luanda before the release of the final election results. The official "rule of
thumb,” established in recognition of the ballot’s incompatibility with the Angolan electorate, was that the mark on the ballot had to reflect the “elector’s intent.”

A design for both ballots that better took into account Angola’s high illiteracy rate, low number of television sets, and limited access to and/or understanding of available newspapers would have significantly diminished the number of null and blank ballots. Political parties and presidential candidates would have aided the voters by employing one symbol, one party color, and one photograph throughout the political campaign that corresponded to the information printed on the ballots.

Ballot Security

The crucial time period for ballot security was the night of September 29, and, if counting was not completed at the end of the second day of voting, the night of September 30. According to the electoral law, ballot boxes and materials were to be left at the polling site on the night of September 29, guarded by the polling station staff, the party agents and the electoral police. More often than not, this procedure was followed, even if it meant that staff, agents and police slept on cement floors, or didn’t sleep at all. In some cases, security was supplemented by member(s) of the municipal police.

IFES observers witnessed or heard reports of several cases in which ballot boxes and all polling station materials were moved from the polling site to another location on the night of September 29. This was always done with the objective of finding a secure, well-illuminated place to store the ballot boxes overnight. Often this was done with the cooperation of the municipal election officials. In all cases that IFES observers witnessed, party agents accompanied the boxes and there were no complaints voiced the following day.

Ballot boxes were also sometimes moved to another location for counting on the night of September 30, usually to a place where there were electric lights. Here again, the crucial element to ballot security was the presence of party agents. IFES observers were made aware of no occasions where agents from at least two parties did not always accompany the ballot boxes.

In the weeks following the election, there were unsubstantiated reports of mobile polling stations being established without the knowledge of some political party representatives. There were also reports of stolen ballot boxes, stuffed boxes replacing real boxes, and massive numbers of forged ballots. IFES delegation members observed none of these alleged infractions of the electoral law.
Excerpts from Regional Team Reports

Kwanza Sul

At the end of the first day we visited the closing of a polling station. They closed the station and sealed the ballot boxes. Within an hour, a CNE truck carrying ballot boxes and voting materials from several other stations arrived and collected their materials. Party representatives from MPLA and UNITA accompanied the truck. The procedure was very orderly.

Outside one voting station in the evening of September 30, we were approached by the UNITA First Secretary of Kwanza Sul who complained that the previous night local CNE officials did not directly inform him that the ballot boxes were going to be taken to a central location. He confirmed that UNITA representatives accompanied the ballot boxes at all times.

Kwanza Norte

The Kwanza Norte teams observed a consistent effort by most polling stations to secure all materials and ballots according to the election rules. Each president made an effort to seal the ballot boxes in the presence of the poll workers, observers, and party delegates, and ensure that the seal numbers were properly recorded by all interested parties.

Most polling officers and party representatives spent the nights at the polling station. Each officer rotated watch during the night. To our knowledge the integrity of the process was maintained. At those stations deficient of electric light, a procedure was developed to consolidate all polling tables within that site at one secure location. As many officials and representatives as necessary spent the night with the materials.

Despite a few isolated incidents, the Kuanza Norte team found most polling stations maintaining the highest level of security possible under the limited conditions within which they functioned.

Bengo

The numbers on the ballot box seals were recorded and checked daily by the party representatives and the pollworkers. In general, security at the polling stations appeared to be adequate. Pollworkers spent the night of the 29th, and in some cases the night of the 30th, with the ballot boxes and supplies.

Several polling station presidents complained that they had not been assigned policemen to guard the polling site on the night of the 29th. The presidents said that if a policeman did not show up, they would take the ballot boxes and other materials to their individual homes over night, even though they knew that this was against the electoral law.

Huambo

Ballot security in Londuimbali Station #16 was broken. Ballot boxes were too full to continue voting so ballots were removed from the boxes and put into sealed bag in view of all station personnel. The party agents did not object to this procedure.

Bié

The municipal police providing security at polling sites at the end of the first day of voting served to facilitate calm. With this added security, no reports of vote tampering or scuffles on the night of the 29th were heard by the observers. The night of September 30 seemed similarly free of problems, but was characterized by fatigue and related procedural delays.

The night of the 30th, given interrupted proceedings (on account of darkness), posed security difficulties which seemed to have been overcome by the collaboration among electoral officials, party delegates and police. Many voting officials spent an unanticipated second night sleeping on the site. The circumstances were remarkably free of conflict or misunderstandings.
Presence of Armed and Unarmed Police, Military, and Civilians

Armed police and military personnel, and armed civilians, were forbidden by the electoral law from being within 500 meters of a polling station. The police were to enter a polling station with weapons only if called upon by the polling station president to help maintain or restore order. Military and police could vote while in uniform, but not with their weapons.

IFES observers witnessed many violations of the letter of this law, but rarely violations of its spirit. Nearly every observation team reported observing armed police or soldiers within the 500 meter perimeter of a polling station, but in most cases this was inadvertent. In some instances, the police were called in by the presidents to restore order, or were stationed close to a polling station by their superiors. On no occasion were observers made aware that violations of this part of the electoral law actually resulted in intimidation or any other disturbance to the voting process.

Excerpts from Regional Team Reports

Kwanza Sul

At Cassonga we saw a uniformed policeman armed with an automatic rifle directly outside the polling station. When we asked the president of that polling station about him, he seemed surprised and said he was not supposed to be there. The policeman was sent back to the perimeter. Our impression was that the young policeman had come close because he was bored and that his presence did not create an atmosphere intimidating to the voters.

In Condé, we were stopped at a UNITA road block. It was manned by a young FALA soldier with a gun who said he had orders to stop all cars. He offered to call for his commanding officer to answer any questions. We declined and moved on. Later that day, group two of our team passed this same point but encountered no road block.

Kwanza Norte

Despite official provincial assurances that no military or police would be allowed within the 500-meter radius of the polling sites, the Kuanza Norte group observed a consistent pattern of unarmed National Police officers posted within 100 or less yards of each polling site by mid-day of the first day of voting. In some cases unarmed police had to be called into the polling station to restore order in the crowd, but in those instances the officers retreated immediately to their former positions near the polling sites. At times and especially in the areas known for intense party conflict, however, the police were observed to routinely take walks through sections of the polling area. However, at no time did the group witness any unarmed personnel stationed in the polling sites or influencing voters from within the security area surrounding each polling place.

The group witnessed one incident and was informed of two others where armed personnel had entered the 500-meter zones. It should be emphasized that neither of these incidents involved direct intimidation of voters or polling officials. It was impossible, however, to assess whether these incidents had any indirect effect on the process or the persons involved in the process.

On the first day of voting, we were informed that two armed UNITA personnel entered a polling station in Bairro Azul seeking information from polling officials. As expected their arrival was unwelcome even though they told the polling officials that they had received permission from provincial officials to
visit the station in order to complete their task. In the end, they received no information and were promptly asked to leave by the UNITA representative at the polling station.

The next morning we were informed that respective units of armed UNITA and MPLA personnel had spent the night at the Kipata polling site as an assurance that the integrity of the ballots was maintained. They were removed by UN security and senior UNITA and MPLA officers the following morning. It was never made clear how the armed individuals came to be there. The incident did not appear to have a negative effect on ballot security.

The final incident involved the UNITA representative to the Provincial Counsel who was attempting to visit the Escola II e III polling site after the counting process had begun on the night of September 30. The UNITA representative was angered by the mixed messages sent from the CNE in Luanda about when the ballot counting would begin. He felt it important to consult with all his representatives about the process and to inform them about the latest developments. The group witnessed the representative and an armed cadre successfully persuaded not to enter the building by a UN representative and the incident ended at that point.

Bengo

Irregularities were viewed in several areas. Two armed policemen strolled by a polling place in Caxito (Delegação Provincial da Habitação), violating the 500-meter zone. No tension was observed, and intimidation did not appear to take place.

Acting on complaints from the PEC of the mobilization of armed UNITA members, the team planned extra visits in the Dembos municipality. Quibaxi, a town in Dembos, was a reputed UNITA stronghold. However, no reports of armed movements during the election days were heard and no movements were observed. Voting seemed to have taken place as peacefully as it had in Caxito.

Bié

The team noted three cases of inappropriate proximity by armed personnel. At Catabula, an armed man, presumably UNITA, stood at the entrance of the polling station. At a second site nearby, there was another armed UNITA presence, with an armed "blue" (National Police) policeman standing close by. In a Cuito school, armed national police were less than 500 meters from the polling sites, but were not menacing or apparently noticed by voters.

Huambo

We observed a total of three violations of armed forces and police staying at least 500 meters from polling sites, but in each case there was no apparent intimidation—the men were simply passing by.

Luanda

The Luanda teams observed numerous instances of armed police personnel passing by or being posted within the 500-meter perimeter of a polling site. In several locations, national police had been called in to assist electoral police in controlling large and unruly crowds, particularly on the morning of September 29. There was no apparent attempt to intimidate voters in these instances.

One team observed, at Sambizanga School 421 in the morning of September 30, three armed national police stationed outside of the school gate, through which all voters had to pass to enter the schoolyard. When questioned, the policemen said that they had been instructed to stand guard over the ballot boxes by their municipal commander. Provincial electoral officials had visited the voting site at the same time as the observers and apparently made no objection to the presence of the armed police.

Police were similarly seen stationed at the gates of the Kazenga plastics factory, a voting site with five tables, where there had been problems controlling the crowd of voters on the morning of September 29.
Vote Counting

Vote counting was to begin immediately following the close of the polls at 19:00 on September 30. The majority of polling stations observed followed this standard procedure. However, in some stations, ballot counting began earlier in the afternoon or was postponed until the morning of October 1. In most cases, these variances from the electoral law were an appropriate response to the lack of electric lighting and of any adequate alternative illumination such as kerosene lanterns. In the few cases of early or delayed counting witnessed by IFES observers, the irregularity resulted in neither the disenfranchisement of eligible voters nor a loss of ballot security.

Generally, the counting of ballots was marked by looseness and improvisation regarding procedures. This is the part of the process that the polling station presidents seemed least comfortable with. Many relied heavily on the booklet of guidelines which they had all been issued. In some cases, concern for the regulations resulted in a painfully slow counting process. In other cases, the looseness with the procedures and the haste to finish the task did provide potential opportunities for malfeasance and small-scale fraud. IFES observers believed, however, that those opportunities were diminished to almost zero by the constant monitoring of the party agents present in the polling place through the count. None of the team members reported evidence of fraudulent tabulation of the election results.

The most controversial aspect of the counting process was the judging of null or voided votes. The CNE had issued guidance only days before the elections saying that the polling station staff should count a ballot as valid as long as the intent of the voter was clear. This message did not seem to have reached many of the polling place presidents, and some were very strict in their evaluation of valid and invalid ballots. As observed by the IFES delegation, decisions on the nullification of ballots were often made by consensus of polling station staff and party agents, or at least involved everyone's passive consent to the rulings of the station president.

Observers commented on the tedious procedures employed to count and recount the ballots. It should be noted that polling station staff, party agents, and electoral police were all exhausted by this point in the process. This reduced the efficiency of the counting process.

Excerpts from Regional Team Reports

*Kwanza Norte*

The group found that the tallying process maintained a high degree of integrity and thoroughness. At times efforts to maintain integrity caused a high degree of inefficiency, but in general we found that inefficiency was more attributable to the guidelines set out for the process than to the personnel involved in the process.

We found only two stations following correct procedures as defined in the election law. One of these stations actually had to walk through the process with a UN observer. The other station took almost ten
hours to complete the count and submit the results to the provincial counting center. Several different adaptations of the rules were used by the remaining stations in order to expedite counting the ballots. Well over half the stations started with the presidential count and none that we visited implemented a numerical comparison of the number of ballots with the number of voters on the rolls before moving on to counting the actual votes.

We also found little consistency in the manner by which individual votes were judged to be valid. Some stations approved every ballot by consensus, while others allowed the presiding officer broad discretion which was then approved by the body of party representatives. In approximately 30% of the stations visited, we observed that the officials only approved ballots that were clearly marked in respective boxes. If any divergence was noticed then that ballot was automatically considered null. On the whole, we found that consensus opinion was undoubtedly the best security for the counting process.

*Kwanzu Sul*

The electricity at Waku Kungo went out at 6:35 p.m. We quickly located the Commissar for the city who told us that this was a regular occurrence and that the power would return soon. By 7 p.m., the electricity was restored and the process of counting votes began. There was some initial confusion regarding when to begin counting. One polling station said that they were awaiting orders from the municipal electoral office chairman.

At most of these locations, the president of the assembly nullified votes that did not strictly conform to voting regulations. For example, any ink vote that had a small portion outside the box designated by the voter was determined null. Other votes were nullified when a person used ink or pen to mark the flag or face of a candidate or party. In most cases, the intent of the voter was clear. However, there was no apparent attempt to nullify the vote for any particular party or candidate.

At the count another team witnessed at Porto Ambiom Escola Nivel I and II, 1,001 ballots were cast. In the first round of counting, 70 ballots were "borderline" in that the voter had marked the photograph or elsewhere on the same line as the candidate of choice. After the first round, a provincial electoral official visited the site and explained that "as long as the voter's intention was clear," i.e., on the same line, the vote should be valid. Party delegates did not contest any of the ballots among these 70.

*Benguela*

The Benguela group noted that the municipal electoral council presidents did not respect the decision-making capabilities of the polling station presidents. The relationship between the two groups was overly hierarchical. In one case, an over-zealous MEC president unilaterally decided where and when the ballots were to be counted for the polling stations in his jurisdiction.

*Bengo*

The counting of the votes was carried out in accordance with the electoral law. Few of the ballots were marked with a pen. Most of the voters indicated their choice with a fingerprint. The count was facilitated very slowly and continued in some stations through the night, ending just after 06:00 on October 1.

*Huila*

Due to the lack of lamps or electricity, counting began at 07:00 on October 1. The counting procedure was slow and laborious. However the procedure went smoothly, especially in light of 7% null ballots and 8% blank ballots. Null and blank ballots were exacerbated by the confusion surrounding the design of both the legislative and presidential ballots. Vote totals for the province began to be sent to Luanda after noon on October 1.
Huambo

Some polling stations did not follow the proper order of counting, i.e., they tabulated the presidential results before the legislative. There was also an observed variation in standards of nullification among the polling stations.

Bíé

Some voting sites began counting in the mid-afternoon on September 30 because of the lack of electricity. Some decided to move to the local municipal electoral council (MEC) office to count by electric light. Others held off counting until the morning of October 1, or simply interrupted the process for sleep.

Tabulating and Reporting of Results

Some IFES observers continued to follow the counting and tabulating process through October 1, mainly in the eight provincial capitals where they had been deployed. Throughout October 1 (and for the next several days), ballots were brought into the provincial capital by the polling station staff, accompanied by party agents. The polling station presidents also delivered a single-page summary sheet of the presidential and legislative vote totals for each candidate and party. These summary actas were created after the polling station presidents and staffs had been trained.

The summary actas were designed for immediate transmission by fax from the provincial capital to the CNE tabulation center in Luanda. In that way, provincial results were tabulated simultaneously in two places: in the provincial capital and in Luanda. In the days before the elections, the CNE publicly expressed the belief that this method of tabulating and reporting the votes would result in preliminary nationwide vote totals being announced by the afternoon of October 1.

Vote counting at the polling station level, and vote tabulation and reporting at the provincial and national levels, all went much more slowly than anticipated. In most cases observed by the IFES delegation, this was not the result in a breakdown in the transportation or communication systems, but rather a much less efficient system at the human level than had been anticipated. When ballots and actas were received at the provincial (PEC) offices, the actas often had to be revised before faxing the summary acta to Luanda. The design of the acta form itself was not conducive to clear and accurate completion by the station presidents. More importantly, the large number of null ballots were usually reviewed by provincial authorities, and the decisions of the polling station staffs were often overruled. This resulted in new vote totals and revised actas.

The confusion that existed at this step in the process, and the unexpected slowness at which it proceeded, resulted in opportunities for manipulation, or perception and allegations of manipulation. Most IFES observers departed from their provincial capitals for Luanda on the morning of October 2 when the provincial counting process was still in progress, and therefore parts of this crucial final step in the elections were not directly observed by the entire IFES delegation.
Excerpts from Regional Team Reports

**Hulla**

The formula for the official summary tally that corresponds to Article 129 of the electoral law is a sheet with 15 consecutively numbered boxes, for filling numbers for valid votes, blank ballots, non-used ballots, number of claims, etc. This formula does not imply any logical sequence, nor does it indicate a proper summation order to immediately reflect any irregularity.

**Benguela**

The single page summary sheets for the polling station results distributed by the CNE created confusion. The polling station presidents were not clear on how to utilize the forms. Sample forms were not provided to the party poll watchers for their information and use.

**Bengo**

Observing the delivery of local results to the PEC in Caxito on October 1, the team noted that many of the polling station presidents were exhausted. The absence of calculators in the polling stations made the process of checking and rechecking the vote totals difficult. The mathematical skills of many of the poll workers appeared limited.

Confusion existed among many presidents as to the treatment of blank ballots, null ballots, and ballots deposited in the third ballot box. When one polling station president was questioned as to why the vote totals for the presidential and legislative elections did not match, he explained that he had discarded some spoiled ballots and had not included them in the total.

In many cases the Provincial Electoral Council (PEC) changed the vote totals after reviewing the ballots declared null at the polling station level. Two computers and one fax machine were in place for the transmission of results and information to Luanda.

At 18:00 on October 3, team members visited the CNE in Luanda to check the status of the Bengo results. With José Gualberto de Matos, director of communications at the CNE, they looked at the faxes received from Bengo. The results of 79 of 100 assemblies had been received by the CNE. The Kitangolo results were compared with the results noted by the team during their observation of the counting process in Kitangolo. The vote totals were essentially the same as those recorded the morning of the actual count. Thirty-two spoiled votes had been added to the parliamentary count by the PEC. The presidential tally showed that 26 spoiled ballots had been added to the total, one extra vote had been attributed to President dos Santos, and the overall vote total was changed accordingly.

The reports from the two polling stations where UNITA was victorious were checked as well. The CNE's copy of the results was the same as that which had been seen in Caxito. This limited but random check convinced observers that the transmission of results was progressing according to established procedures.

The CNE personnel were willing to let the observers check the results. Mr. de Matos explained that the CNE possessed the capacity to receive all of the result in one day--the hold-up in the process was the sending of the faxes from the provincial capitals.

**Bié**

On October 1, helicopters sent to bring in the vote found rural sites still counting. There was confusion at the Provincial Electoral Council office in Cuito as ballot boxes were brought back with actas often stuffed inside. Fatigue and confusion were rampant, but so was goodwill. The situation suggested vulnerability to malfeasance, yet the team observed no apparent manipulation of the system.
Huambo

There were delays in the processing of *actas* at the PEC counting center in Huambo. A rate of 20 in three hours was improved to 10 per hour by the PEC after splitting into 2-person bipartisan or neutral teams. Fatigue, chaotic materials retrieval at the counting center, and inexperience were compounded by a failure on the part of Huambo Provincial Electoral Council to distribute summary forms with the voting kits, thereby doubling the processing time for each *acta*. The PEC felt that it was following instructions by not distributing the forms.

Luanda

The CNE second floor conference room was crowded with international and Angolan press, representatives of observer delegations, CNE workers, and members of the diplomatic corps. On the balcony of the hall sat mobile satellite dishes from the international networks. A jumble of cables ran off the balcony and down to the mobile transmission unit for the Angolan television station. Anticipation of the first results was high, bolstered by the CNE's promise of the first results by midnight of September 30. However, the process proved to take longer than anticipated at all levels, from the polling places on up.
PREPARATION AND RELEASE OF STATEMENT

The C-130 and the vehicles returned to Luanda with all team members on October 2, 1992. Before deployment, IFES staff had requested that the provincial coordinators return to Luanda with a rough draft of their teams observation report that met with the approval of all team members.

The statement drafting committee, composed of the provincial coordinators, the delegation leader, and IFES staff, met on the evening of October 2 to compare provincial findings and to develop the mission statement. Following the meeting, the delegation leader, Dr. Whitaker, returned to his hotel room with the task of completing a draft statement for presentation to the entire delegation on the morning of October 3.

The full delegation met to review the draft statement in the morning of October 3. Comments and criticism of the delegates were noted and the drafting committee met again to finalize the mission statement. Reviewing this revised statement, the delegation members agreed that it reflected their individual observations. A press conference was scheduled at the Angolan Press Center for 3:00 p.m. on October 3.

The pressure of revising and refining the statement and preparing the Portuguese translation to meet the 3:00 p.m. deadline was great. That morning, UNITA's president, Jonas Savimbi, made a threatening radio speech as the first provisional results were made public by the CNE. In that speech he announced that contrary to the CNE reports, UNITA was leading in all provinces in both the legislative and the presidential elections. He admonished the Angolan population to pay no heed to the figures being released by the CNE, accusing the MPLA and the CNE of stealing ballot boxes, rigging the computers, and tampering with the tabulation of the final election results. Mr. Savimbi promised to provide the hard data proving the "violation and theft of votes" by the MPLA. The role of the international observation effort was discounted: "As far as we [UNITA] are concerned, it will not depend on any international organization to say that the elections were free and fair." Following the speech, rumors of military unrest, approaching war, and massive electoral fraud developed and travelled at rapid speed through the streets of Luanda. Tension in the capital's domestic and international communities increased exponentially.

The press conference was postponed until 4:00 PM to allow time for the mission delegates to discuss the implications of Mr. Savimbi's speech and to complete and reproduce the mission statement. Discussion centered on the delegation's best judgement as to whether or not the timing of the previously scheduled press conference and/or the scheduled release of the delegation's statement might be susceptible to the perception or allegation of interference in the affairs of the Angolan people. The
sense of the delegation was to proceed both with the press conference and the press release, but to insert into the statement a sentence of disclaimer to the effect that the delegation’s statement did not presume to speak for the Angolan people.

The first copies in both English and Portuguese were delivered to the President and to the Director General of the CNE as mandated by the observation law. Additional copies were delivered to the U.S. Liaison Office for their information.

The delegation members were on hand for Dr. Whitaker’s presentation of the mission statement on the Angolan elections at the Angolan Press Center. Questions from the press were entertained after the reading of the statement.
POST-ELECTION EVENTS

Following the release of the statement, delegation members continued to observe the tabulation of the election results in Luanda, visiting the offices of the CNE and of the Luanda PEC. The vote tabulation process was slow. Immediately before the elections, CNE Director General dos Santos stated in a television interview that the final election results would be known within 48 hours of the closing of the polls. He was confident in the computers and the fax machines installed in Luanda and around the country, but overlooked the labor-intensive counting process at each polling place and the verification process at the municipal and provincial levels.

The high number of null and blank ballots served to complicate the process every step of the way. The observers were concerned with these ballots, which were not always mismarked. During the observers' briefings, Mr. dos Santos explained how a last minute directive had been issued by the CNE to allow for greater latitude in determining how a ballot was marked. The new interpretation permitted the elector to mark in the square provided on the ballot, or on the party symbol, party or candidate name, and/or the candidate's photograph. Whatever the mark on the ballot, that mark, to be counted, had to display the "intent" of the voter. Unfortunately, this directive was released too late to be included in the training of the polling center administrators and the dissemination of the information was far from adequate.

The last of the observers departed Angola on October 8, 1992, nine days before the official release of the final election results by the CNE. The IFES project office in Luanda remained open through the end of October. Mr. Zenos and Mr. Bayer continued to visit the CNE headquarters and the Luanda PEC, watching the reverification of the null and blank ballots. The week of October 11 was a series of busy days and tense nights. Following the explosion of a car bomb in front of the Hotel Turismo and subsequent firefight between UNITA guards and the Angolan police, tensions spiraled higher. Rumors of impending violence led shopkeepers to close their stores at dusk and encouraged employers to allow their employees to depart early in order to take public transportation to their homes. After dusk, the streets of downtown Luanda were deserted.

Employees at the CNE continued their methodical checking and rechecking of the election results. Reports began to come in from the investigative commissions formed to research allegations of fraud, and from the eighteen provincial assessment teams. They reported no evidence of systematic wrongdoing. The IFES Angolan and international staffs took turns checking in at the CNE and packing up equipment to be returned to the United States.
During the final week of October, Mr. Zenos was able to meet with officials in the CNE, the UNDP, and UNAVEM to discuss operating procedures for the second round of presidential elections. The CNE has formally requested IFES’ involvement in the second round in both the areas of civic education and international observation organization and administration.

Following their departure from Luanda on October 5, Dr. Whitaker and Keith Klein, IFES Director of Africa Programs, met with State Department and A.I.D. officials in Washington on October 7 to brief them on the activities and findings of the IFES Angola observer delegation. Later that morning, Dr. Whitaker and Mr. Klein chaired a briefing at the National Press Club in Washington for the media and others interested in the Angolan elections. Dr. Whitaker read the delegation’s statement prepared in Luanda on October 3. Dr. Whitaker also responded to questions from the audience, along with six other members of the observer delegation who shared the podium with him and Mr. Klein.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The success of the electoral process in Angola depended on one fundamental prerequisite: the full implementation of the peacekeeping sections of the Bicesse Accords. Many Angola watchers, while outwardly optimistic, were reluctant to place odds on the successful outcome of the electoral process. Many of the issues that served to feed this reluctance before the elections were proven to be more than "gamblers' hunches" following the release of the official results on October 17.

Looking back at the events of the past year in Angola, it is evident that elections are not an exercise to be taken lightly, nor are they a quick-fix for a protracted military conflict. The demobilization, disarmament, and resettlement of military forces is necessary. A massive, nationwide initiative is required to explain to the civilian and the military populations, who have known nothing but war in their lifetimes, how needs of the population are fulfilled in a multiparty democracy.

The mechanism of pursuing a political, versus a military, agenda needs to be explained. Achieving this objective calls for participatory training, not only civic education, but skills training as well. A key issue of concern to civilian and military populations in a state of transition is, "What's in it for me?" In Angola, income generation with an AK-47 provides an exponentially greater rate of return, for a small investment of time, than does shining shoes on a Luanda street corner. Risk is not a factor in the equation in the Angolan context. This applies to many other African nations: Liberia, Moçambique, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, and Zaire, to name a few.

As is indicated in the timeline that follows, much has transpired since the IFES observers departed following the elections. Through the recommendations below, IFES draws its analysis from the observations of the delegation members and the experiences of the IFES technical assistance mission staff. In the interest of making this document as pertinent to the present as is possible while remaining in the domain of the observation mission, additional issues are discussed, primarily the necessary conditions for a second round of elections—or a new series of elections. IFES does not deny that with each passing day without a cease-fire, the probability of a second round of elections diminishes. These recommendations for future elections are applicable only when conditions are fulfilled that do not exist in Angola at present, including:

1) That a solution has been found for the Angolan conflict, resulting in the establishment of a cease-fire;
2) That the cease-fire is holding;
3) That the infrastructure for the demobilization of the armed forces has been established and the demobilization is underway; and
4) That there is agreement between political parties on an administrative body responsible for organizing and facilitating the elections.
Recommendations for the Angolan National Electoral Council

Assessment and Programming of Assistance Effort

Before the donors and the technical assistance organizations return to Angola, it is critical that they develop an understanding of their mission in country. Three prerequisites must be clearly understood by all international parties involved with future elections in Angola:

1) The needs of the Angolan people;
2) The coordination of the technical assistance effort; and
3) The Angolan and the international decision-making hierarchies for the electoral process.

A series of meetings should be scheduled between representatives of the Angolan political parties, the government, the CNE, the churches, civic groups, the diplomatic community, the United Nations, and technical assistance NGOs to discuss what activities are the best suited to restore the confidence of the Angolan electorate in the electoral process. Topics for discussion might include, but are not limited to, the timing of the elections, the need for a new registration, the format for civic education programs in rural areas, the training of pollworkers, the training of party pollwatchers, and elections commodities issues.

Participants in these meetings must be individuals with the authority to elaborate on their respective needs and/or capabilities and who have a voice in their respective groups. The initial meeting(s) could be convened inside or outside of Angola. The objective of these sessions would be the production of guidelines for technical assistance, a critical action path for the elections, and a proposed budget and division of labor between donors.

Civic Education and Voters Information

- A distribution mechanism must be created for civic and voter’s education materials, programs, and facilitators. IFES was able to send teams of young Angolans into each of the eighteen provinces to discuss the upcoming elections with the population. Once it had been implemented, the program was singled out as one of the most effective information dissemination efforts of the entire technical assistance program. Unfortunately, it was too little too late. These types of campaigns must commence as soon as it is safe to travel the countryside.

- Civic education and voters’ information campaigns must be organized to educate the population as to the particulars of the multiparty system and the elections process.

9Regardless of whether the CNE remains in place for future election, the experience of its members during the first round is valuable. Director General Dos Santos’ future participation in Angolan elections would be very useful given his involvement in all aspects of the process.
These programs must be designed to reach the rural populations as well as the urban populations. Unlike for the September elections, all resources must not concentrate on electronic media--radio and television. A major effort is required to develop alternative media approaches for the dissemination of information to Angolans. Mobile video, radio-cassettes, posters, flyers, traditional theater, music, and widely distributed printed materials all possible tools to be employed in rural Angola.

A similar program should be implemented in the demobilization camps, focusing on the role of the former members of the armed forces, and of the role of the new national army, in Angola's multi-party democracy.

All groups and organizations involved in information dissemination should be certain that they are transmitting similar messages in order to avoid creating confusion on the part of the electorate.

**Election Preparation**

- Given the movements of the Angolan population due to the civil war and the drought conditions, plus the numerous casualties of the past months, a new registration must be undertaken. This serves several purposes: First, it allows the government, the CNE, and the donors to know "who is where" to more effectively facilitate food distribution, development assistance, and elections planning. Second, a new process serves to instill confidence in the electorate that measures are being taken to avoid an outcome similar to that of the September elections.

- Training of polling place presidents and pollworkers must begin early and contain a follow-up component to insure that pollworkers are clear on election procedures. The follow-up provides a mechanism for the transmission of last-minute changes in polling procedures made by the CNE.

- The body organizing and administering the elections should determine the mapping coordinates of the polling stations. Polling stations must be categorized in relation to their accessibility. Airlifts would be organized to deliver personnel and materials to the sites inaccessible via land or water transport.

- The distribution of polling station kits should be coordinated with the distribution of civic education and voter's information materials: posters, fliers, etc. This coordination requires the cooperation of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, the CNE, the UN, and the donor organization responsible for the mode of transportation.

**Election Materials**

- Those who are responsible for ballot design should incorporate input from the CNE and the political parties in order to design a ballot that responds to Angolan's needs. Samples of the ballot(s) should be available for distribution nationwide before election day. A good format for this is a "poster-size" ballot for posting in market areas, in public meeting areas, and outside of polling stations on election day. The ballot reproduction should be marked "Specimen" or be presented minus the "safety-paper" watermark(s). These measures will prevent the printing of fraudulent ballots. Familiarizing the voters with the ballot before the election will make for a smoother process on election day. The ballot reproduction should feature the same colors as will be used for the actual ballot.

The photos of the candidates on the presidential ballots need to be enlarged. The observers noted a potential confusion between the photos of Alberto Neto and Jonas Savimbi. Mr. Neto's...
photo was above Mr. Savimbi’s and there was a feeling that voters scanning the ballot from the top to the bottom might have placed their mark in the first space that featured a vaguely familiar photo.

Colors and symbols employed by the parties and the candidates should be agreed upon early and used throughout the political campaign as a means for each candidate to educate his or her supporters.

- Each polling station, regardless of location, must receive pressure lamps to be employed before the opening of the polls, at the closing of the polls, and during the counting of votes. Counting centers at the municipal, provincial, and national level must have access to a generator set or an adequate number of lamps and fuel.

- Using registration figures, polling station materials should be distributed based on population density. Additional voting booths could be set-up in heavily trafficked areas. The side-by-side booths provided in the De la Rue polling station kits did not encourage secrecy. Free-standing single booths or voting screens are necessary. Given the investment made in the dual booths, it is worth investigating if it is possible to adapt the booths to prevent communication between voters.

- Two types of polling station kits would reduce waste and the potential for fraud. In the September elections, polling stations that required additional materials were given an entire new polling station kit, even if the sole need was 200 additional ballots. A secondary kit should be prepared containing additional ballots, staining ink, forms, pens, and small materials. Absent from the secondary kit would be ballot boxes, voting booths, and ballot box seals. The primary kit would be the same (or similar) to that distributed for the September elections. Secondary, as well as primary, kits must be catalogued for distribution control.

**Election Procedures**

- The polls should open at sunrise--05:30--versus waiting until 07:00. A run-off election requires that the voter vote only one time and choose between two candidates. Therefore, voter processing will be accelerated. With adequate preparation of the population and the political parties through education and information initiatives and with solid logistical preparation of election-day logistics by the body responsible for running the election, there is no need for a two-day process. Instead, the voting hours should be lengthened to take advantage of available daylight.

- Increase the number of electoral policemen to organize voters into lines on election day.

- Arrange for civic education workers (or electoral policemen) to not only provide crowd control outside of the polling stations, but to also present voters' information, explaining to people how to vote.

- Especially in urban areas, polling place presidents must be prepared for crowds. Situations where several polling places are located off of a common courtyard or in school classrooms require that the polling place presidents and the electoral police plan ahead where the lines of waiting electors will be formed. These same individuals must communicate clearly with the voters about how and when people will be admitted to vote.

- Staining ink should not be applied before a voter has deposited his or her ballot in the ballot box. In the event that the polling station experiences crowd control problems, confusion can result regarding who in the polling station has, and has not, voted. More importantly, when initially picking up their ballot, the voter can inadvertently mark the ballot with the damp ink on his or her finger. This results in a ballot featuring two marks, the actual vote and the finger
smear. Ballots that have been marked more than once are categorized as spoiled. Only after the voter introduces the ballot into the ballot box, should the ink be applied.

- Vote counting and tabulation procedures, result transmission procedures, and ballot accounting procedures require simplification and clarification. Pollworkers, party poll watchers, and observers need to be familiar with these procedures and the forms involved.

- The CNE or the organization responsible for managing the elections, should make no public promises regarding the release of the final election results. There is no need to build up false hopes that can turn to disappointment and then to suspicion.

- Election results should be released only by the CNE. If results are released publicly from another source, i.e. party poll watcher tabulations, the source must be indicated on the air or in print.

- Final election results released to the public should be broken down by municipality. Ideally, results should be available to the public by polling station. However, the events of late October 1992 and the resulting distrust and fear make the release of results polling station by polling station a security issue.

Recommendations for the United Nations and International Observers

Additional recommendations for the international observers would no doubt emerge as a result of the assessment meetings discussed above. In its dealings with other international delegations before, during, and after the elections, IFES noted that a major topic of conversation was coordination. How, with the wide range of groups coming into the process at different points in time, could the efforts of all of the international observers be maximized? This remains a concern, and in fact becomes more important given the current situation in Angola.

In discussions and in the press, the observation effort for the September 1992 elections is frequently compared to the past effort in Namibia and the ongoing initiative in Cambodia. The numbers of personnel involved in these efforts far exceed the 800 international observers who were deployed around Angola in 1992. For the second round (or the next elections) in Angola, some political parties and international organizations have demanded that approximately 6000 observers be deployed. The need, according to these groups, is for one international observer for each polling place. In studying these various demands, there seems to be a common belief that the mere presence of the international observers will guarantee that the election will be transparent, and more importantly, that the result will be accepted by all sides. As was seen in 1992, there are many issues above and beyond the presence of observers. Elections that are held in Angola without meeting the preconditions enumerated earlier will not succeed, regardless of the number of elections observers.

Logistically and financially, the facilitation of a successful observation mission of this magnitude is nearly impossible. Transportation, lodging, briefing, communications, and field support, for 6000 observers, all require resources beyond Angola's capabilities. IFES agrees that the number of international observers can well be increased, but sheer numbers will not increase the quality of the
observation. The quality of an observation effort hinges on the make-up of the observation team and the extent of their briefing.

Some coordination of the international observers is necessary. In September 1992, the United Nations' desire for the autonomy of their 400 observers diminished the effectiveness of the entire observation effort. An office of observation "consultation" should be established, modeled on the office opened by the UN in Nairobi for the December 1992 Kenyan elections. Through this office, groups could access briefing materials, sign-up for briefing sessions, and compare deployment schedules with other groups.

The objectives of this consultative effort are to:

1. Facilitate sharing of communications, transportation, and office resources between observation teams;
2. Attempt to insure that all of the observation groups are working from a similar knowledge base;
3. Reduce deployment overlap, scheduling deployments to achieve nation-wide coverage;
4. Standardize a portion of the information to be gathered by all observation groups. A short observation checklist to be filled in by all observers in addition to their respective checklists should be designed and distributed; and
5. Establish a gatekeeper for the collection of observation checklists, reports, statements, and for the transmission of this information to the UN observation team coordination for incorporation into their assessment.

If observation teams are operating in an entirely autonomous fashion, they increase time demands on individuals involved in the electoral process and initiate a run on lodging and transportation resources. The participation of leading elections administrators, host government and political party officials, and members of the diplomatic corps in pre-mission briefings is helpful, if not necessary. Group coordination allows all interested parties to meet with various officials while minimizing the demands on their valuable time in the final days preceding an election.

This suggested coordination of the observation groups does not necessarily imply that only one global statement will be issued regarding the conduct of the elections. Each organization will be free to issue its own statements and reports and to deal with the press as it wishes.

- Observers should be prepared to have a contingent remain in significant-sized municipal tabulation centers, provincial tabulation centers, and the CNE headquarters during the voting and counting periods.
- Observers assigned to areas near Luanda should plan to remain on site overnight versus planning for a day trip to allow tracking of poll closing and ballot counting.
Groups brought in to observe the elections under the auspices of a political party should not receive official accreditation as international elections observers, but as international party poll watchers. Their credentials should be visibly different from those of the observers. According observer status to these politically-allied groups compromised the entire international observation effort in Angola. International observers are sent into a situation to ensure that an independent, impartial, and objective evaluation of the electoral process is undertaken. Groups sponsored by political parties do not observe from an impartial standpoint.

Political Parties

Training programs must be facilitated for the political party poll watchers concentrating on their role in the electoral process. Party poll watchers are often unaware of their rights as laid out in the electoral law. Improving the parties' poll watching capacity will increase their confidence in the results and/or inform them of how to respond to election activities perceived to be fraudulent.

The education of the population in the workings of a multi-party democracy and the steps in a multi-party election does not rest solely with the state or with the international community. Political parties have the responsibility to insure that their supporters are aware of some of the fundamentals of the activities taking place. It is interesting to note that the percentages of spoiled ballots were relatively low in the provinces of Benguela, Cabinda, Kwando Kubango, Luanda, and Huambo. These provinces were hotly contested in the elections or were obvious areas of strength for one of the two major parties. It is likely that the majority of the electorate in these areas was exposed to a variety of political propaganda and education from the parties.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY TIMELINE

A Brief Synopsis of Some Post-Election Events

1992

9/29-30
Presidential and Legislative elections.

10/3
Initial protests by UNITA and six other parties of widespread, massive, and systematic fraud. UNITA’s position is made public in a morning radio speech by Mr. Savimbi. IFES observer delegation’s preliminary statement is released at a press conference in Luanda in the afternoon.

10/5
Eleven former UNITA generals withdraw from the new, unified Angolan Armed Forces (FAA).

10/9
Margaret Joan Anstee, the U.S. Secretary General’s Special Representative, meets separately with President Dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. Government agrees to delay the release of the election results pending investigation of allegations of fraud. Four investigative commissions plus eighteen provincial teams formed by the CNE depart for the field. The four commissions focused on: consistency of polling records; security of ballot boxes; control of surplus electoral kits; and control of supplementary polling stations.

10/11-14
Visit of the UN Security Council ad hoc Commission to Angola. Commission composed of representatives of Cape Verde, Morocco, the Russian Federation, and the United States. The Commission’s mandate was to meet with key political, military, and diplomatic figures to generate support for the full implementation of the Bicesse Accords.

10/11
Bomb explosion and subsequent exchange of gunfire between UNITA and the Angolan police ninjas outside of the Hotel Turismo, UNITA’s de facto headquarters in Luanda.

10/14
UNITA soldiers occupy Andulo in northern Bié province.

10/15
Explosion of large FAA ammunition dump located in Luanda between the airport and UNAVEM headquarters.

10/16
Meeting of all legalized political parties in Luanda at the CNE headquarters. Results of investigation presented, no conclusive evidence of fraud is found.

10/17
Election results announced by CNE. Need for a second round of presidential elections is noted. That afternoon, Margaret Anstee releases United Nations statement on the Angolan elections, calling them “generally free and fair.” Organization for African Unity, the European Community, international organizations, and a number of the Member States register their support.

10/17-18
Serious fighting in Huambo ending in a UNAVEM-negotiated cease-fire.

10/19
UNITA and the MPLA agree to form joint political and military commissions to prepare for a meeting between President Dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi.

10/30
United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 785, extending the mandate of UNAVEM II until November 30, 1992 and supporting the Special Representative’s statement that the elections were “generally free and fair.”
10/30 Government alleges UNITA attempt to seize the airport in Luanda. Casualties result from fighting between anti-riot police and UNITA. Twelve civilians are killed in the Luanda suburb of Cassenga. UNITA is alleged to be responsible and the Government responds by deploying police throughout the city and establishing roadblocks.

10/31 Heavy fighting breaks out between Government and UNITA forces in many areas around the country. The most ferocious battle takes place in Luanda. Anti-riot police, armed civilians, and regular police combat UNITA in Luanda and in outlying areas. UNITA's Vice-President, Jeremiah Chitunda and the leader of their JPMC delegation, Salupeta Pena are killed. Several other UNITA leaders are wounded, reported as missing, or are placed (with UNITA political and military officials and civilian supporters) "under protection of the Government."

11/1 Fighting continues. Reports of thousands of casualties, primarily UNITA supporters in Luanda, Benguela, Malange, and other cities.

11/2 UN-brokered cease-fire comes into effect at 0001 hours.

11/3 Fighting continues in Malange, Benguela, Lobito, and Cafunfo. Joint UNITA/Government cease-fire commissions are set up in all provinces except Luanda. UNITA seizes Capanda dam project in Kwanza Norte province.

Immediately following cease-fire the Government enumerates four conditions for the resumption of a political dialogue between President Dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi:

1. Commitment to uphold the cease-fire, pursue dialogue and renounce violence;
2. Commitment to the principles of the Peace Accords.
3. Acceptance of the results of the September elections.

11/6-12 Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Marrack Goulding, undertakes a mission to Angola to assist Ms. Anstee in assessing the role of UNAVEM and investigate how to resume the forward momentum of the peace process. Mr. Goulding meets with top Government and UNITA officials.

11/11-15 Jornal de Angola publishes extracts from what is alleged to be Salupeta Pena's diary, found on his body when he was killed in Luanda and from other documents found in UNITA buildings in Luanda. The documents imply that UNITA's actions before and following the elections were premeditated.

11/15-16 UNITA's Political Commission Permanent Committee meets in Huambo. They agree to accept the results of the "recognizedly fraudulent and irregular" legislative elections.

11/19 MPLA Secretary-General, Lopo do Nascimento meets with a variety of officials in the U.S. government and on the Clinton transition team to encourage the U.S. to take an active stance in the Angola crisis.
11/21 Multi-party conference held in Luanda. President Dos Santos indicates his desire to form a government of national unity. UNITA does not attend.

11/23 UNITA forces surround the city of Luanda. UNAVEM confirms that 57 of Angola's 164 municipalities are under UNITA control. Reports indicate that UNITA maintains an advantage in 40 additional municipalities.

11/24 Ms. Anstee meets with Mr. Savimbi in Huambo.

11/26 President Dos Santos convenes the new parliament. The UNITA deputies are absent. França van Dunem elected parliamentary president.

MPLA and UNITA officials meet for UN-sponsored talks in Namibe province. Both sides agree on full implementation of Bicesse, a nationwide cease-fire, termination of offensive troop movements, and the expansion of UN involvement in the process.


11/30 UNITA gains control of Uíge and the airport in neighboring Negage in violation of the Namibe agreement. UNITA forces move on Soyo. Brazilian UN peace monitor is killed in Uíge. Mr. Savimbi transmits his regrets to Ms. Anstee and maintains that the military action against Uíge and Negage was conducted without his approval.

12/1 Fighting spreads into northern Angola. UNITA attacks on Soyo intensify.

12/2 New government is installed by President Dos Santos. MPLA Vice-President, Marcelino Moco, is appointed as Prime Minister. Of the 53 members, eleven are affiliated with other parties that have gained parliamentary representation. UNITA is offered five posts: the Ministry of Culture and Sport and four vice-ministries.

Western military intelligence officials say that South Africa gave UNITA a January 20 deadline to seize power in Angola.

12/6 Mrs. Anstee reports that "apparently UNITA troops had left Uíge and Negage."

12/9 The permanent committee of UNITA's political commission issues a statement saying it would join a government of national unity and return its forces to a new unified army.

12/11 At a summit meeting in Harare of the secretary general of the OAU and the heads of state of Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, the meeting condemns the violation of the air space of Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia by South Africa aircraft flying into southern Angola, and expresses concern about what appears to be continued South African support for UNITA.

12/17 The Capanda dams (still under construction) in the province of Malanje are reported to be severely damaged. UNITA troops are held responsible.

12/18 The Angolan government rejects an American proposal that it resume talks with UNITA before UNITA withdraws its troops from towns it has occupied.

12/27 An OAU delegation composed of the presidents of Zimbabwe and Cape Verde, Robert Mugabe and António Mascarenhas Monteiro, and the OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmad Salim, visits Angola hoping to encourage mediation. Mr. Savimbi refused to come to Luanda to meet the delegation.

12/30 UNITA accuses government forces of attacking Caxito and Ndalatando with planes and heavy artillery.
UNITA launches new round of attacks in Huambo, Bengo province, and elsewhere. About 200 people reported killed as government forces and anti-riot police push UNITA forces out of Lubango, the capital of Huila province.

Fighting spreads to Benguela, Caxito, Huambo, Lobito, Namibe and other cities in central and southern Angola. Prime Minister Moco says that it is clear UNITA wants to take over the government by force.

Other pitched battles take place in Luena, Menongue, and Kuito. In Kuito, FAA is said to have entered the conflict.

The government claims that it captured Savimbi’s headquarters in Huambo.

UNITA attacks Soyo, taking several dozen foreign hostages and threatening to destroy oil installations that are key to the survival of the Angolan government.

UN cease-fire teams abandon embattled towns after three monitors were injured in heavy crossfire and attacks by armed mobs.

UNITA captures the town of Soyo.

Crowds of people in Luanda, angered at reports that Zairian troops helped UNITA, go on an rampage of rape, arson, and lynching. The Zairian Embassy estimates that at least 62 people are killed.

The Angolan government claims to have shot down a South African cargo plane transporting supplies for UNITA. The South African government refutes the charge.

UNITA cuts off the water supply to Luanda by attacking the city’s main water treatment plant (15 miles north of the capital) with heavy artillery, mortars, and missiles.

UNITA-MPLA talks in Addis Ababa. The UN says 1.5 million Angolans face the prospect of starvation and that tens of thousands have been killed since the resumption of the war. The UN estimates that UNITA controls 105 of Angola’s 164 municipalities. It also reports that $7 million dollars worth of United Nations equipment, including more than 80 vehicles and thousands of tons of food and medicines has been confiscated in fighting, mostly by UNITA. Some Western observers say UNITA is capable of outright military victory.


UNITA cancels second round of negotiations with MPLA scheduled for February 10 in Addis Ababa, saying that its delegation was unable to reach Mr. Savimbi in Huambo due to the fighting in that area. Ms. Anstee is unable to contact Mr. Savimbi.

The Angolan government sends reinforcements to Huambo, reporting that it is regaining ground from UNITA. Ms. Anstee proposes a truce so that relief organizations can bring food and medicine to thousands of wounded and besieged civilians in Huambo.

UNITA is reported to reject this proposal, arguing that the Government would use the truce to bolster its military position. UNITA radio announces "This time the enemy forces will not escape our siege of annihilation." Some senior UNITA military and
political figures reject Savimbi's bellicose stance, and say they will take their seats in
the National Assembly when it meets the week of 2/15-19.

2/17

Media reports estimate that 10,000 people have been killed and another 15,000 wounded
over the last month in the battle for Huambo.

2/21

Four columns of Angolan government troop reinforcements are sent to the destroyed city
of Huambo where "the most symbolic battle of the Angolan war is under way." The
government army has apparently been newly organized. The family of Prime Minister
Moco, an Ovimbundu, are murdered in Huambo.

2/25

UNITA and MPLA agree to resume talks in Addis Ababa. UNITA says it wants to
discuss the underlying causes of the resumption of the fighting.

2/26

Addis Ababa talks are unable to commence. The UNITA delegation is unable to depart
Huambo due to heavy fighting. Estimates of the death toll reach 13,000.

2/27

Addis Ababa talks remain stalled. UNITA maintains that its representatives remain
unable to get out of the besieged city of Huambo.

2/28

"Angola is on the verge of a total breakdown with more than three million people
threatened with hunger and disease," according to the World Food Programme, now the
only relief agency fully operational in the country. Phillipe Borel, the WFP's director
in Angola says, "It is a combination of the worst that can happen to a country in terms
of factional warfare, the number of displaced people, and provincial capitals cut off by
fighting and only reachable by airlift." He says that one million people could face
starvation in Angola beginning in March if relief efforts are further hampered. One-
sixth of WFP supplies are getting through to their targets, feeding an estimated 100,000
people.

2/28

Ms. Anstee proposes a cease-fire so that UNITA representatives can leave Huambo and
attend peace talks in Addis Ababa.

3/1

UN officials call off the Addis talks after UNITA does not meet a 6:00 GMT deadline
on their participation. Of the failed meeting, Ms. Anstee says, "Its cancellation
represents a grievous setback to prospects for peace in the near future." UNITA's
representative in New York, Marco Samondo, explains that UNITA feared that the
Angolan government would attack planes offered by the UN to take the UNITA
delegation from Huambo to Addis Ababa. Fighting continues in Huambo.

3/3

South Africa's 32nd Battalion condemns alleged recruitment of its members by the
Angolan government, stating that, "Clearly this is a heavy-handed last-ditch attempt by
a faltering communist regime to bolster its inept fighting ability."

UNITA radio claims that the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave - Armed
Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) is responsible for capturing a UNAVEM II officer in
Cabinda province.

3/5

Nigerian General Chris Abutu Garuba is appointed as new UNAVEM II commander and
military observer.

3/8

Angolan government's army high command announces from Luanda the withdrawal of
its forces from Huambo after 56 days of fighting. There are reports that as many as
13,000 people have been killed in Huambo in the last seven weeks, with no prisoners
taken on either side. UNITA captured Huambo on Saturday, March 6th. Its flag is said
to be flying over the governor's palace.
No cease-fire has been established and two large columns of government reinforcements (of about 10,000 men) continue to advance on the town from the west. Their advance has been stalled by blown bridges and attacks by UNITA.

A Western diplomat says that the battle for Huambo is "the bloodiest conflict currently taking place on the face of the earth." Helicopter pilots report that the stench of rotting corpses permeates to an altitude of 1500 meters.

3/9

Angolan army Chief of Staff, General Joao de Matos says Angola is at risk of a protracted civil war. UNITA radio reports threats issued by the UNITA leaders of an imminent attack on American oil installations in the Soyo area if UNITA forces are engaged by government troops.

3/10

President Dos Santos gives a speech in which he urges the international community to abandon its "ambiguous position" on Angola and firmly support his government. The Angolan government is looking for arms and financing abroad to continue its war with UNITA. National conscription is re-instituted. MPLA hardliners want to re-launch an attack on Huambo. Thousands in Huambo cannot be reached by relief agencies. It is "still a battlefield."

Mr. Savimbi calls for UN Special Representative Margaret Anstee's removal.

3/11

A spokesman for President Dos Santos says that there is no possibility of a revision of the Bicesse Accords. He says that UNITA has proved itself to be untrustworthy. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expresses support for Ms. Anstee.

3/12

Ms. Margaret Anstee submits a report to the UN describing the current round of fighting as the heaviest ever in 17 years of civil war. The report states that UNITA troops control 3/4 of Angola's municipalities, and that the UN's current role in Angola is unsatisfactory. It sets out five alternatives for a continued UN role in Angola, ranging from a greatly expanded peacekeeping force to a purely mediating role. The Security Council prepares to endorse a proposal by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to resume peace talks on Angola.

3/13

The Security Council condemns UNITA and threatens unspecified sanctions should it refuse to cooperate in future peace talks. The Secretary-General requests a meeting at the highest level between the MPLA and UNITA to be scheduled for the end of April.

3/15

Angolan army Chief of Staff General Joao de Matos reports the recapture of the northern oil town of Soyo from UNITA. UNITA reports the capture of Cubal, 150 kilometers southeast of Huambo.

Arrangements for another summit are stalled. UNITA asks that it take place in Geneva, whereas the MPLA insists that it be convened in Africa.

3/23

The Angolan government reports the recapture of Caxito, the capital of Bengo province, claiming to have inflicted heavy losses on the UNITA forces while capturing prisoners and equipment. In the last two months thousands have fled Caxito, which is described as a "ghost town". 30,000 refugees from Bengo Province are now in Luanda, most of them in a 300-tent camp in the city.

In the south, thousands of refugees are fleeing from Huambo while the column of about 10,000 government troops continue to advance towards the city. United Nations officials estimate as many as 15,000 casualties resulted from the battle for Huambo.

3/25

U.S. envoy, Geoffrey Davidow, meets with UNITA delegation leader Jorge Valentim in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. Both sides seem convinced that talks between UNITA and the Angolan government will resume.
UNITA forces withdraw from Ndala tando, the capital of Kwanza Norte province.

Representative Harry Johnston, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa introduces a House Concurrent Resolution calling for the recognition of the government of Angola. The resolution also calls for the U.S. Congress to urge the international community to help expedite a cease-fire and negotiate a settlement in line with the Bicesse Accords. A similar resolution is introduced in the Senate by Senator Paul Simon and others the following day.

The Final Communique of the Summit Meeting of Frontline States, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, calls on the U.S. Government to extend formal recognition to the Government of Angola and appealed for a greater UN role in Angola to ensure effective peacekeeping and disarmament.
APPENDIX A.
INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION TO ANGOLAN ELECTIONS
INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
September 23 - October 5, 1992

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APPENDIX B.
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION

(Adopted by the People's Assembly and Published in the Diario da Republica, 16 April 1992)

(Official Translation by the UNAVEM II Interpretation and Translation Office, May 1992)
Law No. 6/92
dated 16 April

THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

Having agreed to regulate the process of international observation of the first multiparty elections in the People's Republic of Angola, in conformity with the provisions of the Peace Accords for Angola;

In these terms, under the provisions of article 51, par. b) of the Constitutional Law and by virtue of the power granted to me in article 47, par. g) of the same Law, the People's Assembly adopts and I sign and promulgate the following:

LAW ON INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1
(Object)

The object of the present Law is to regulate the various matters relating to international observation of the electoral process.

Article 2
(International Observation)

For the purposes of the present Law, international observation means the verification of the various stages of the electoral process, including the registration of electors, carried out by international organisations, non governmental organisations, foreign governments or personalities of recognised international experience and prestige, provided they are duly recognised as such by the National Electoral Council under the terms of the present Law.

Article 3
(Scope of the Observation)

1. The international observation of the electoral process consists essentially of the following activities:

   a) to verify and monitor the impartiality of the National Electoral Council;

   b) to verify and monitor the presence and functionality of the National Electoral Council and its organs throughout the national territory, in conformity with the provisions
of the Electoral Law;

c) to follow and assess the activity of the National Electoral Council and its organs, in conformity with the legislation in force;

d) to verify and monitor the impartiality and legality of the decisions taken by the organs competent for the settlement of electoral disputes;

e) to verify and monitor the electoral registration operations;

f) to observe the process of presentation and acceptance of candidatures for the elections;

g) to observe the course of the electoral campaign;

h) to verify and monitor the voting process, including the observation of the procedures stipulated in the Law;

i) to verify and monitor the operations of the determination of results;

j) to observe the access to and the use of the media.

2. The irregularities noted during the electoral process by international observers must be notified to the competent organs of the National Electoral Council, which shall confirm them and adopt the necessary measures for the readjustments which are indispensable to the normal course of the electoral process.

Article 4
(Beginning and End of the International Observation)

1. The international observation of the electoral process begins with the constitution of the National Electoral Council.

2. The international observation ends with the investiture of the deputies to the Parliament and the inauguration of the elected President of the Republic.

Article 5
(Angolan Citizens)

Angolan citizens, who are considered as such under the terms of the legislation in force, are not accepted as international observers even if, by the time of the electoral process, they are holding another nationality.
Article 6
(Duty to Collaborate)

1. The National Electoral Council and its organs, as well as the central and local organs of the State, must collaborate with and offer to the international observers the guarantees and other facilities allowing them to completely fulfil their mission.

2. It is incumbent on the competent organs of the State to guarantee and ensure the security and personal safety of the international observers.

CHAPTER II
INVITATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS

Article 7
(Competent Entities for the Invitations)

1. The President of the Republic and the National Electoral Council may, on their own initiative or following a request made by organs of the State, political parties, coalitions of parties or candidates to the office of President of the Republic, send invitations for the international observation of the electoral process.

2. The invitations of the National Electoral Council shall always be approved by this organ and transmitted by its Chairman.

Article 8
(Way in which the Organs of the State, Political Parties, Coalitions of Parties and Candidates to the Office of President of the Republic make Invitations)

1. The People’s Assembly, the Government and the Supreme People’s Court, if they wish to invite an observer, must notify the Chairman of the National Electoral Council who shall formalise the invitation.

2. The political parties, coalitions of political parties or candidates to the office of President of the Republic, if they wish to invite an observer, must send a written request to the Chairman of the National Electoral Council who, under the terms of the Law, shall formalise the invitation.

3. The formalisation of invitations sent to international observers under the provisions of the preceding paragraph is without prejudice to the requirement of recognition, according to the rules defined in the present Law.
Article 9
(Request to Observe the Electoral Process)

1. If any uninvited international organisation, non-governmental organisation or foreign government intends to observe the electoral process, it must send a written request to the Chairman of the National Electoral Council specifying the reasons on which the request is founded and the type of observation it intends to carry out, as well as the names of its representatives.

2. The Chairman of the National Electoral Council takes a decision within fifteen days on the request referred to in the preceding paragraph.

Article 10
(Number of Observers Invited by each Party, Coalition of Parties or Candidate to the Office of President of the Republic)

The National Electoral Council shall define the maximum number of official observers which the Government, the People’s Assembly, the Supreme People’s Court and each political party, coalition of parties or candidate to the office of President of the Republic may propose under the terms of article 8, par. 2.

CHAPTER III
CATEGORIES OF OBSERVERS

Article 11
(Categories)

For the purposes of the present Law, the following categories of international observers are established:

a) observers from the UN, the OAU and international organisations;
b) observers from non-governmental organisations constituted under the national law of a foreign country;
c) observers from foreign governments;
d) individual observers.

Article 12
(Observers from the UN, the OAU and International Organisations)

Are considered official observers from the UN, the OAU and international organisations the representatives of the said organisations who have been specially designated by them to observe the Angolan electoral process, under the terms of the present Law.
and of the Peace Accords for Angola.

Article 13
(Observers from Non Governmental Organisations)
Are considered official observers from non governmental organisations all the persons who have been specially designated by non governmental organisations constituted under the national law of a foreign country to observe the Angolan electoral process, under the terms of the present Law.

Article 14
(Observers from Foreign Governments)
Are considered observers from foreign governments all the persons who have been specially designated by the said governments to observe the Angolan electoral process, under the terms of the present Law.

Article 15
(Individual Observers)
Are considered individual observers all the personalities of recognised international experience and prestige, in their individual capacity, have been invited and recognised to observe the Angolan electoral process, under the terms of the present Law.

CHAPTER IV
RECOGNITION

Article 16
(Requirements for International Observers)
The requirements for the recognition of the status of International Observer are the following:

a) to be a foreign national of internationally confirmed experience and integrity;

b) to have been invited under the provisions of articles 7 to 9 of the present Law;

c) to be included in the maximum number of observers to be determined by the National Electoral Council, under the provisions of article 10 of the present Law.

Article 17
(Compulsoriness of Recognition)
In order to acquire the status of international observer, the representatives of the UN, of the OAU and of international
organisations, of non-governmental organisations and of foreign
governments, as well as the invited individual personalities, must be expressly recognised in that capacity.

Article 18
(Competent Organ for Recognition)

1. It is incumbent on the National Electoral Council to recognise the international observers invited to verify and monitor the electoral process.

2. For the purpose of the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the National Electoral Council shall establish an adequate structure to guarantee the proper and timely recognition of the observers.

Article 19
(Identification and Accreditation of International Observers)

1. The recognition of international observers is immediately followed by their identification and accreditation.

2. The National Electoral Council shall create an identity and accreditation card for each category of observers listed in article 11.

3. In addition to the card referred to in the preceding paragraph, the National Electoral Council shall supply the observers with a common and easily identifiable badge.

Article 20
(Compulsory Use of the Card and Badge)

It is compulsory for international observers to use the identity card and common badge while they are exercising their functions.

CHAPTER V

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS

Article 21
(Rights)

The international observers enjoy in the national territory the following rights:

a) to obtain a multiple entry visa to enter the country;

b) to enjoy freedom of circulation throughout the national territory;
c) to ask clarifications to all the structures involved in the electoral process about matters connected with the activities of international observation of the elections, and to obtain from such structures the corresponding explanations in a useful and timely manner;

d) to communicate freely with all the political parties, coalitions of parties and other social and political forces of the country;

e) to observe the electoral registration, the activities of the electoral campaign, the vote, and the operations of determination of the electoral results;

f) to examine the documentation relating to the electoral registration, whether computerized or not;

g) to have access to the information transmitted by the National Electoral Council to its organs and vice versa;

h) to have access to the denunciations and complaints submitted about any occurrence relating to the electoral process;

i) to verify the participation, as authorised by the Law, of the political parties or coalitions of parties in the organs or structures connected with the electoral process;

j) to open up offices within the country, in the case of international organisations or non governmental organisations, in order to guarantee the successful accomplishment of their missions;

k) to communicate any specific concerns they may have to the members of the various structures of the electoral process.

Article 22
(Obligations)

1. In addition to the obligations of impartiality, independence and objectivity, the international observers have the following obligations:

a) to respect the Constitutional Law of the People’s Republic of Angola, the present Law and other laws in force in the People’s Republic of Angola;

b) to supply to the National Electoral Council all data necessary for their identification:
c) to notify the National Electoral Council in writing of any irregularity, protest or complaint which they detect or receive;

d) not to interfere in nor impede the normal course of the electoral process;

e) to refrain from issuing public statements which involve the structures of the electoral process or could jeopardise the normal evolution of the various activities inherent in the said process;

f) to provide the National Electoral Council with a copy of the written information and statements which they produce;

g) to return all identification materials supplied by the National Electoral Council immediately after the end of their mission as observers.

2. The National Electoral Council may revoke the accreditation and put an end to the activity of the international observers who systematically and repeatedly violate the obligations stipulated in the present article.

CHAPTER VI

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 23
(Status of Diplomats)

The diplomats who are accredited to the country and are appointed as international observers exercise such functions without prejudice to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Article 24
(Organisation of the International Observers)

1. The structure to be adopted in order to organise and direct the internal activities of the international observers depends on the decision taken by each invited organisation, institution or government.

2. The individual international observers may agree among themselves on the adoption of a structure for the purposes referred to in paragraph 1 above.

3. The structures adopted under the terms of the preceding paragraphs must be officially notified to the National Electoral Council and the President of the Republic, who shall
define the modalities for their support.

Article 25
(Regulations)

The present Law shall be the object of regulations to be adopted by the National Electoral Council under the terms of Article 12, sub-par. h) of the Electoral Law.

Article 26
(Relations with the Government and the National Electoral Council)

1. The structures referred to in Article 24 must designate an entity, at the central level, in order to establish contact with the permanent representatives of the Government and the National Electoral Council appointed for this purpose by the Head of Government and by the Chairman of the National Electoral Council.

2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not apply to the independent observers who can establish contact personally.

Article 27
(Validity)

The present Law shall be in force only for the first general multiparty elections of 1992.

Article 28
(Doubts and Omissions)

Any doubts and omissions arising from the interpretation and application of the present Law shall be settled by the National Electoral Council.

Verified and approved by the People's Assembly.

For publication.


Jose Eduardo dos Santos
President of the Republic.
APPENDIX C.
INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
ELECTIONS OBSERVATION MISSION
Luanda, Angola
September 23-October 5, 1992

OBSERVERS' TERMS OF REFERENCE

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) has organized an international observer delegation for the September 29-30, 1992 legislative and presidential elections in Angola. An invitation has been issued to the delegation by the Angolan National Electoral Council (NEC). Delegation members range from specialists in Portuguese-speaking Africa to electoral systems experts. Several of the international participants are members of the electoral councils of their respective nations. Others on the mission include academics, employees of governmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions, and private citizens. The mission is designed to be multi-partisan in its make-up and non-partisan in its orientation. The observers, while coming from a wide variety of fields and institutions, will consider themselves as members of the IFES delegation, not as representatives of their respective organizations.

The delegation will focus on the events immediately before, during, and immediately following the two days of elections. Its objective is to monitor the degree to which activities taking place during this period correspond with the Angolan electoral code.

The election of a national legislature and a president represents a crucial moment in the history of Angola. For the first time, Angolans are competing for leadership positions by presenting themselves to the vote of the people. For the first time, Angola intends to install a government chosen by Angolans through a secret and universal ballot. The members of the IFES observation delegation will be witnessing an historic event, an event in which they will, in a small but significant way, participate. As informed, concerned, and objective witnesses, they will act as the eyes of the democratic nations of the world.

The IFES delegation will be one of several international delegations, totalling approximately 800 individuals, present in Luanda over this period. The United Nations is responsible for 400 of these observers to be deployed throughout the country. Several individual countries will be sending delegations. Some of the Angolan political parties may be sponsoring teams of international observers. The objectives of these groups will vary to some degree. The specific objectives and scope of the IFES delegation are outlined in more detail below.

This delegation is financed with funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development, but it is not to be considered an official U.S. Government mission. The selection of its members, the organization of its deployment in Angola, and the statement and report issued by the delegation are solely the responsibility of IFES.

IFES established an elections assistance project in Angola in late May 1992, under the in-country direction of Project Manager Tony Zenos. This project was designed to provide
assistance to the UNDP Advisory Team and to the NEC in preparing for these elections. The focus of the IFES project has been in the area of civic education. A "how to vote" guide has been published by IFES in cooperation with the National Electoral Council, with over 350,000 copies distributed throughout Angola. IFES also facilitated the production of a pictorial voter education poster which will be found in each of the polling stations. At the time of the delegation's arrival, nine teams of civic education trainers recruited and deployed by IFES throughout the country will have returned to Luanda. The group will share their experiences with the delegation during the scheduled observation mission briefings.

The fielding of this independent observation group represents a new phase of IFES' role in the Angolan elections. IFES/Angola staff has been busy making the transition from civic education and technical elections assistance to international elections observation organization and support.

THE ROLE OF THE OBSERVER

In observing the September 29-30 elections, the IFES delegation does not presume to supervise the elections or to interfere in Angolan affairs. The delegation will observe the elections in accordance with internationally recognized standards for the monitoring of electoral processes. Ultimately, it is the Angolan people who must make the final judgement about the significance of these elections.

The presence of the IFES delegation will add to the international community's objective assessment of Angola's electoral processes. The elections observation task represents the culmination of the commitment that the UN and other international groups have made to support Angola's considerable democratic forces through security advisors, logistical support, and technical assistance. This strong international presence throughout the elections process should encourage greater confidence on the part of Angolan citizens that they will be able to vote freely and secretly, that their votes will be accurately tabulated and reported, and that the results will be respected by all--both inside and outside of Angola.

The delegation must therefore document its observations, in all instances distinguishing verifiable fact from hearsay, and objective from subjective judgements.

In order to retain their objectivity and appearance of objectivity, individuals on the IFES observer delegation should not form relationships with political parties or groups while in Angola. Delegation members will abide by all laws of the Angolan government regarding the behavior and conduct of international elections observers.

OBSERVERS' BRIEFING AND DEPLOYMENT

The IFES observer delegation will arrive in Luanda in time for scheduled briefings from September 24 through 26. Upon arrival, observers will receive a welcome kit containing a detailed agenda, a list of participants, deployment information, and official credentials. The briefings will include a review of the campaign process in Angola and an overview of the Electoral Law. The observers will attend a series of briefings with members of the National Electoral Commission, officials from the Ministry of Territorial Administration, and representatives of the UNAVEM II mission and the UNDP Technical Advisory Team. They will also meet with representatives of the National Democratic Institute/International Republican Institute's Civic Education and Party Building Project, and of the providers of the registration cards and polling station equipment.
Representatives of the different churches will meet with the delegation, and of the major and minor political parties. It is expected that the Director of the U.S. Liaison Office in Luanda, Jeffrey Millington, will also brief the IFES observers as well as USLO security and health officials.

Following the briefings, the delegation will divide into teams that will deploy throughout the country. The first stop will be provincial capitals, reached either by road or by air travel. Upon arrival in the regions, the teams will meet with elections officials, community leaders, and political party representatives to obtain background information on local political conditions.

On the election days, the two-person teams will visit polling places and counting centers, and observe the general conduct of the elections.

**THE OBSERVERS' TASKS**

The observer's task will focus on the administration of elections on September 29-30, and on the days immediately surrounding those dates, at the location to which the observer has been deployed. Specifically, the observers will concentrate on:

1) Preparation and set-up at the polling sites
2) Voting day process
3) Ballot security (before Day 1, between Days 1 and 2, after Day 2)
4) Counting of ballots
5) Reporting the results

IFES delegation team members will receive a detailed checklist on which to record their observations in each of the above five areas. Observers will be attentive for signs of fraud or manipulation of the process to the benefit of one party or another. They will also watch for administrative inefficiencies which, even if not fraudulent in character, might result in the disenfranchisement of legitimate voters.

Some questions to be kept in mind during the days of voting and counting are:

1) Did the local elections officials conduct the elections in a politically neutral manner? Were poll officials independent of political direction? Did they act, and were they perceived to act, in a non-partisan manner?
2) Were some voters disenfranchised because of the inability to acquire a voter's registration card?
3) Were voters identified in accordance with the procedures established by the Electoral Law?
4) Were some voters prevented from voting because of errors with their registration credentials?
5) Were there adequate safeguards to prevent widespread fraud in the balloting process?
6) Were the voters able to cast a secret ballot?

7) Were the measures to prevent multiple voting effective?

8) Were people registered who were not eligible to vote, such as under-age Angolans and foreigners?

9) Were pollwatchers designated by the political parties permitted access to polling sites and counting centers?

10) Were there any challenges to the balloting or counting process?

11) Were ballots counted in the manner established by the electoral law? Were there suspicious delays in the preparation or release of elections returns?

As stated above, the focus of the delegation's observation task is on that which can be directly witnessed during the time that the observers are deployed in the field. Thus, the IFES delegation will be primarily observing and evaluating the voting and counting process as opposed to the entire elections process. The elections process began months before, and directly observed evidence of fraud or manipulation during the bulk of the electoral period is not accessible to an observer who is in Angola for less than ten days.

It is important to keep in mind the distinction between that which has been directly observed and that which is only heard about. While the emphasis for the observers must be on the former, it is appropriate to gather information on important aspects of the electoral process that the observer cannot observe directly, particularly the political campaign and the role of the media. To gain a more complete picture of the elections process, it is suggested that observers explore the following issues at the regional and local levels:

1) Were there any restrictions, de facto or de jure, that prevented the political parties from conducting their respective campaigns?

2) Were there arrests, detention or killings of party leaders or other individuals during the campaign that appear politically motivated?

3) Were citizens free to organize and become politically involved, whatever their political views?

4) Were voters intimidated into voting for (or not voting for) a particular party or candidate by the armed forces, political parties or government officials?

5) Did the candidates feel free to advocate any position?

6) Were government resources used to give an advantage to any party or candidate? What effect did this have on the campaign?

7) Did the government-controlled media provide adequate and balanced coverage of the political campaign?

8) Did journalists feel free to cover controversial topics? Were certain subjects considered taboo?

9) Did citizens view the elections as a useful mechanism to express their political views?
10) Did citizens appear informed regarding the choices being presented in these elections? Did the civic education programs provide adequate information regarding the mechanics of voting?

**IFES OBSERVER DELEGATION STATEMENT**

The IFES observer mission will report its findings in two forms. While in Luanda in the days following the elections, the delegation will release a statement based on the reports of the various observer teams. In the weeks following the election, IFES will issue from Washington a more comprehensive report on the Angolan elections.

The statement written and released in Luanda will be presented by the delegation leader(s) in a press conference or other forum, and will be released to the Government of Angola. The statement and any oral debriefings will focus on the five areas of elections administration listed above and on the events actually observed by the delegation members.

A drafting committee will be responsible for the writing of this statement. The provincial and town leaders are responsible for collecting the observations of mission members deployed in their areas and transmitting those to the drafting committee. In the event that communications and transportation difficulties prevent all of the teams from reporting in to Luanda in a reasonable length of time, and a majority of the teams' reports have been received, a release will be issued covering the reports transmitted at that time. In the release, it will be made clear that certain provinces have yet to check in with the mission headquarters.

This statement will speak for the entire delegation. All delegations members are requested to avoid discussing their observations with members of the press or other media until the statement's release. After the release of the IFES delegation statement, individual members will be free to discuss their experience and their assessment as they set fit, both in Luanda and after their return home.

The Department of State has requested that a copy of the release be provided to the USLO Director before it is made public. USLO will exercise no editorial authority over the statement. IFES will comply with this request.

In the event that the IFES delegation is deployed in conjunction with other independent delegations, a joint statement may be issued by all parties involved. This joint statement will be separate from and subsequent to the IFES delegation statement. The delegation will be informed in more detail before their deployment if such a joint statement appears likely.

**IFES REPORT ON THE ANGOLAN ELECTIONS**

IFES will prepare and distribute a written report on the Angolan elections in the weeks following the September vote. This report will incorporate the written observations of the IFES delegation team members, as well as their oral debriefings. The report will focus on the five areas of elections administration listed above. The report, however, will have a wider scope than the statement released in Luanda, as it will draw on the experience and observations of IFES staff and consultants who have been involved in the electoral process in Angola since early 1992. Despite this larger scope, the report will be largely technical in nature, and will include an enumeration of lessons learned regarding elections administration, elections assistance, and elections observation in Angola.
INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION - ANGOLA

Checklist

This checklist is intended for use by election observers as a reference and a means to obtain standard information about polling places visited. These are not the only questions that may be asked; please make other comments and as appropriate.

Observer Name

Province

Polling Station Number

Date: _______ Time: _______ President: _______

Preparation Status and Questions to Ask Polling Station Presidents:

1. Polling Station Administrators: All Present _____ Some Absent _____
   
   Who is absent? ___________ Why? ___________

   President ______

   Secretary ______

   Scrutineers ______

2. Polling station supplies--(ballots, ballot boxes, seals, envelopes, indelible ink, posters, etc.)
   
   Complete at opening _____ Incomplete at opening _____

3. What time did this station open? ________ If after 07:00, why?
4. Did the delegates and the polling station personnel witness the sealing of the empty ballot box?
   
   Yes    No

5. How many political parties are represented by delegates?

6. How many presidential candidates are represented by delegates?

7. Have you had to turn away voters at the door? On what grounds?

8. How many voters have been through the poll at this hour?

**Voter Processing**

1. How many electors in the station are in the process of casting their votes?

2. How many voters are waiting in line?

3. Is each voter processed according to Article 119? In the same sequence? If there are deviations, why?

4. Are "special case" voters processed according to articles 120, 121, 122?

5. Is each voter able to exercise the access to a secret ballot?

6. Who made complaints about procedures or decisions of the polling station president - voters, party representatives, electoral police? What complaints were made?

7. Were the complaints addressed and resolved immediately? Yes    No
**Security Issues**

1. Were there any armed persons inside or within a radius of 500 meters of the polling station?

2. Are there any overt or subtle partisan displays within 500 meters of the polling station?

3. What issues, if any, were the electoral police called upon to resolve? Were they resolved?

4. Were regular police or armed forces called upon by the polling station president to resolve problems?

5. What comments can you make regarding overnight security of box and polling station materials?

**Poll Closing/Ballot Counting**

1. At what hour does the poll close? Are people still in line allowed to vote? (Day 1 and/versus Day 2)

2. Who is present for the closing and counting procedure? Were these people present at the opening of the poll? (Day 1 and/versus Day 2)

3. To what extent is standard procedure (Art. 127) observed?

**Communications**

1. How does this polling station communicate with others in the area? With the provincial leader? What recourse does it have in case of emergency?

2. Are documented procedures for reporting, posting results followed?
3. Is there any delay in the reporting process? What is the observed reason for delay? What is the public explanation?

4. Is there any observed interference with preparation or release of the results?

Conclusions

1. According to your observations, were polling administrators sufficiently trained to adequately administer the vote and resolve questions?
APPENDIX E.
SAMPLE OBSERVERS' SCHEDULE

POLLCING STATIONS VISITED DURING VOTING IN KUANZA NORTE

TEAM A: Roger Erwin, Bill Minter
TEAM B: Tony Carroll, Job Runhaar

Assemb. Popular #41 Cazengo Team A 09/29/92
07:40AM
Assemb. Popular #41 Cazengo Team B 09/30/92
06:55AM
Bairro Azul #16 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92
09:00AM
Bairro Azul #17 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92
10:00AM
Bairro Azul #18 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92
09:40AM
Escola I Nivel #1 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92
12:45PM
Escola I Nivel #3 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92
12:30PM
Escola I Nivel #3 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92
12:40PM
Escola I Nivel #5 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92
12:20PM
Escola I Nivel #5 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92
12:30PM
Escola I Nivel #7 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92
12:50PM
Escola II/III #10 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92
10:50AM
Escola II/III #11 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92
06:50AM
Escola II/III #12 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92
09:10AM
Escola II/III #13 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92
07:50AM
Escola II/III #13 Cazengo Team A 09/29/92
08:00PM
Escola II/III #13 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92
07:00AM
Escola II/III #14 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92
10:00AM
Escola II/III #14 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92
07:00AM
Escola II/III #8 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92
10:20AM
Escola II/III #8 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92
07:00AM
Escola II/III #9 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92
10:30AM
Imbondeiro #23 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92
10:30AM
Imbondeiro #24 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92

01:15PM
Imbondeiro #24 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92

10:45AM
Kipata #26 Cazengo Team A 09/29/92

07:00AM
Kipata #27 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92

05:45PM
Kipata #28 Cazengo Team A 09/29/92

06:45AM
Tira aos Pratos #39 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92

04:35PM
Tira aos Pratos #39 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92

11:30AM
Tira aos Pratos #40 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92

04:15PM
Tira aos Pratos #40 Cazengo Team A 09/30/92

11:45AM
Zanga #37 Cazengo Team A 09/29/92

03:15PM
Zanga #37 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92

05:10PM
Zavula #42 Cazengo Team B 09/29/92

03:30PM
Kiangombe Lucala Team A 09/29/92

11:30AM
Lucala #2 Lucala Team B 09/30/92

11:30AM
Lucala #4 Lucala Team B 09/30/92

10:20AM
Lucala #5 Lucala Team A 09/29/92

10:05AM
Lucala #6 Lucala Team B 09/30/92

09:45AM
Lucala #7 Lucala Team B 09/30/92

10:40AM
Lucala #8 Lucala Team B 09/30/92

10:50AM
Lucala #9 Lucala Team B 09/30/92

11:10AM
Lucala-E.P. #4 Lucala Team A 09/29/92

01:00PM
Lucala-E.P. #5 Lucala Team A 09/29/92

01:30PM
Lucala-II-#3 Lucala Team A 09/29/92

02:40PM
Lucala-Ngola Nhinh #7 Lucala Team A 09/29/92

02:10PM
Lucala-Ngola Nhinh #8 Lucala Team A 09/29/92

02:00PM
Quileemba-Cuso-#110 Samba Caju Team A 09/29/92

10:40AM
Luanda, October 3, 1992

STATEMENT

OF THE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (IFES)

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION

ON THE ELECTIONS IN ANGOLA

SEPTEMBER 29 -30, 1992

This statement conveys the summary conclusions of the 39 member international delegation sponsored by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to observe the first ever national legislative and presidential elections in Angola held September 29 and 30, 1992. This delegation was formed in response to an invitation of the Angolan National Electoral Council. Individual IFES delegates are nationals of Brazil, Costa Rica, The Netherlands, Nigeria, Suriname, and the United States. The United States International Agency for International Development provided funding for this delegation to IFES, an independent non-partisan non-profit organization based in the United States.

DELEGATION ACTIVITIES

Most members of the delegation arrived in Angola between September 23 and 25 for several days of intense briefing. Immediately before the elections the IFES delegation focused on plans for the administration of the voting, conformity to electoral rules and procedures, norms of administrative propriety and efficiency, expectations of political party and citizen participation, and public awareness.

To maximize coverage during the elections, the IFES delegates formed eight teams of four or five persons and were dispersed to the eight most populous and accessible of Angola's eighteen provinces: Bengo, Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, Kuanza Norte, Kuanza Sul, and Luanda.
IFES delegates looked closely at issues of voting place organization, competence of electoral officials, processing of complaints, the conduct of the military and police at voting sites, the role of authorized party observers, ballot security, and vote tabulation procedures. It is estimated that in total IFES delegates closely observed over four hundred voting places, and watched thousands of voters cast their ballots. IFES observers also talked informally to a wide array of persons, official and otherwise. The delegation then gathered in Luanda on October 2 to discuss findings and to consult in the preparation of this statement.

SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS

The delegation is impressed that over ninety percent of the estimated eligible electorate of Angola registered to vote, and that a very large percent of these registrants apparently voted. Although different members of the delegation observed a range of problematic conditions and recurrent difficulties, along with isolated lapses of adherence to regulations, the delegates agree that with respect to the primary concerns of the IFES mission the Angolan elections of September 29-30 were admirably conducted. Furthermore, delegation members were struck by the enthusiasm, resolve, and persistence of the Angolan voters, who often had to stand in very long lines for up to twelve hours or more in order to vote.

Among the more serious difficulties encountered were many instances of late opening of polling places, and related occurrences of unruliness at the entrance to voting sites. While perhaps the largest segment of voters used without difficulty the complicated balloting materials that were officially mandated, a substantial number of voters observed seemed confused by them. The relatively large number of null and blank ballot papers recorded appear to be indicative of this situation.

Usually, on-site improvisations on the part of electoral officials to assist voters were in keeping with the spirit of the law. In terms of transparency, these improvisations were almost invariably executed with the consensus of all the party representatives present. IFES delegates reported occasional isolated breaches of regulations; some of these involved political party monitors. Significantly, however, politically-inspired confrontations among party observers, or between them and the voters, or with officials, or even with onlookers, were infrequent. The delegation observed scattered instances of armed military and police personnel having intruded within five hundred meters of voting places, but these do not appear to have been widespread.
BALLOT COUNTING

Ballot counting at voting sites and provincial tabulating centers were observed to have proceeded as stipulated by the electoral code. Unanticipated delay and complications sometimes arose in connection with the collection and transport of results to provincial capitals. Transmission of vote totals and tally of results at the national tabulating site in Luanda took place slowly, and this gave rise to widespread public concern and anxiety. The delegations statement, however, cannot fully take into account this last phase of the process.

CONCLUSION

The IFES delegation believes that the achievements of these elections are remarkable in light of the relatively short period of time that passed between the commencement of official election preparations and the actual event. The delegation is also conscious that this success was achieved in the extremely tense circumstances arising from the recent Angolan civil war, notably the fierce competitive relationship between the two major Angolan political parties, many of whose more active adherents have been armed and organized combatants. In these settings particularly, the generally peaceful and effective administration of the Angolan elections represents a milestone in the history of Angola.

In conclusion, the IFES delegation wishes to stress the strict limitations of our statement, which does not bear upon the conduct of the electoral campaign preceding the election, nor on the reception by various segments of the Angolan people of the outcome. The delegation has also not considered issues underlying the entire electoral process such as the possible impact of the uncompleted military demobilization on the emergent parties or, more importantly, on the general attitude of the Angolan people and the degree of their willingness to participate. Nor does this statement address other factors such as access to the media in Angola, external assistance, and related controversies.

Bearing in mind the limits of our terms of reference, and also the limits of our opportunities to observe, from what the delegation observed the consensus of the IFES international delegation of election observers was that the Angolan elections of September 29-30, 1992 constituted a proper and effective application of the mechanism of elective choice of political representatives, and the delegation congratulates the entire country. This statement does not presume to speak for the Angolan people.
APPENDIX G.
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<td>Local:</td>
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<td>Município:</td>
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**PARLAMENTO**

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| 70 | BRANCOS |

| 71 | TOTAL |

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CONSELHO NACIONAL ELEITORAL

SUA EXCELENCIA
SR. ANTHONY ZENOS
REPRESENTANTE DA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

LUANDA

Em nome do Conselho Nacional Eleitoral tenho o prazer de convidar uma Delegação do Organismo que Vossa Excelência superiormente dirige, a participar, como Observador às primeiras eleições Presidenciais e Legislativas que terão lugar a 29 e 30 de Setembro de 1992 na República Popular de Angola.

Para efeito convidamos a Delegação a chegar à Luanda uma semana antes das Eleições, pelo que agradecemos que nos seja atempadamente indicado os nomes dos vossos representantes, bem como data do chegada ao nosso País.

Mais informamos que todas as despesas referentes à acomodações, alimentação, transportes, e comunicações durante a sua permanência em Angola serão suportadas por Vossa Excelência.

Prestaremos contudo todo apoio que nos for atempadamente solicitado referente à obtenção de reservas nos Hoteis e transporte.

Aproveitamos a oportunidade para reiterar a Vossa Excelência os protestos de nossa mais elevada consideração.

GABINETE DO PRESIDENTE DO CONSELHO NACIONAL ELEITORAL, Em Luanda, aos 24 de Agosto de 1992.-

O PRESIDENTE

ANTONIO C.P. CAETANO DE SOUSA
APPENDIX J.
SOURCE MATERIAL

Background information consulted for assistance in the development of the IFES observation mission and in the drafting of this report

Bender, Gerald J., and Jose S. Goncalves, "Angola" (Preliminary draft prepared in June 1986 for publication by Colliers Encyclopedia).


The Washington Post (US)
The New York Times (US)
The Wall Street Journal (US)
The Christian Science Monitor (US)
Africa News (US)
The Associated Press (US)
National Public Radio (US)

Jornal de Angola (Angola)
Terra Angolana (Angola)
Radio Nacional de Angola (Angola)
Vorgan (Angola)

The Financial Times (UK)
The Guardian (UK)
The Independent (UK)
Reuter (UK)
BBC World Service (UK)

NRC Handelsblad (Netherlands)
De Volkskrant (Netherlands)
ANP (Netherlands)
NOS (Netherlands)

The Citizen (South Africa)
The Weekly Mail (South Africa)

The Namibian (Namibia)
APPENDIX K.
FISE confirma imparcialidade

A Fundação Internacional de Sistemas Eleitorais (FISE) tornou pública, uma declaração na qual expressa que “a contagem de votos nas assembleias de voto e nos Conselhos provinciais eleitorais está a ser feita de acordo com as orientações”.

“É consenso da delegação internacional de observadores (...) na base das suas observações efectuadas que as eleições angolanas de 29 e 30 de Setembro de 1992 constituíram uma aplicação efectiva e coerente do princípio de escolha eleitoral de representantes políticos”, salienta ainda a declaração daquela Organização independente e não-partidária, convidada pelo CNE para assistir às realizações do pleito eleitoral de Angola.

A FISE enaltece “a determinação e persistência” do povo angolano que respondeu afirmativamente às solicitações do CNE para o registo eleitoral e para a votação; Contudo, considera que o alto índice de votos nulos e brancos que se têm visto podiam ser devidos aos “complicados boletins de voto” o que originou que “um número substancial (do eleitorado) parecesse desorientado”.

5 de Outubro de 1992 — Pág. 7
Delegados da FISE reafirmam transparência na contagem

Os observadores internacionais continuam a exprimir os seus pontos de vista relativos à forma como decorreu o processo de votação em Angola. Ontem de manhã, estiveram na nossa redacção, Thomas Bayer e Anthony Pereira, ambos representantes da Fundação Internacional de Sistemas Eleitorais (FISE) para reafirmar a posição da delegação de 39 observadores provenientes do Brasil, Costa Rica, Países Baixos, Nigéria, Suriname e Estados Unidos, respectivamente.

Para Thomas Bayer, que é o responsável para África da referida organização, “os observadores (da FISE) foram ao CNE para confrontar as acções de contagem do voto nos vários pontos de votação, registrando-se ofícios de listas, assegurando a sua disponibilidade”. 

Para ele, “as dificuldades havidas durante o processo de votação não afetarão o resultado final”. Thomas Bayer não escondeu a sua surpresa pela maneira como cada mesa respondia a estes problemas, “com flexibilidade, espontaneidade, criatividade e respeito ao seu decidir”. Como maior problema, Thomas Bayer ressalta que os desenhos dos boletins nulos e brancos foram apontados como concorrentes ao preenchimento das actas, usado de forma indelevável e de outros materiais utilizados durante o processo.

Dissertando sobre as actividades desenvolvidas pelos observadores da FISE, durante o processo de permanência em Angola, os membros da delegação observaram sobredito a organização das assembleias de votação, a competência dos membros das mesas e da polícia eleitoral”.

RIGOR

O processamento das reclamações, o comportamento dos militares e da polícia nos pontos de votação, o papel dos delegados de listas, a segurança das urnas e o processo de escrutínio e contagem de voto”, foram igualmente objecto de verificação.

Os delegados da FISE deslocaram-se às províncias do Bengo, Benguela e Bié, Kuanza-Norte, Kuanza-Sul, Huambo, Huila e Luanda, subdivididos em oito grupos de 5 pessoas cada.

Na opinião de Thomas Bayer, com a realização destas primeiras eleições será possível que o CNE elabore “uma Lei Eleitoral mais ajustada às condições específicas de Angola” e que haja mais participação mais consciente da população que, segundo ainda aquela entidade “não teve tempo suficiente para aprender todos os materiais de educação cívica”. 

“Gostaria que a educação cívica demorasse mais tempo e atingisse todos os pontos do país, sobretudo lá onde não chega a televisão, os jornais, onde não há rádio, onde não há informação adequada”, reitou Thomas Bayer.

COMPROMISSO

Por fim, pedimos ao nosso convidado que nos dissesse o que mais lhe impressionou, ao longo do tempo que entre nós assiste à transição para a segunda República, ao que Thomas Bayer respondeu que foi o facto de “os dois maiores partidos, o MPLA e a UNITA respeitarem o Acordo de paz, estarem a trabalhar conjuntamente e esquecerem, de alguma maneira, as diferenças ideológicas entre si”. Apontou também “a forma como os membros das mesas davam solução às dificuldades”, diante da exigência de “cumprir todos os trabalhos nestes dois dias”.

José Cortez
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| % Valid Votes/Province | 79.68% | 29.41% | 43.51% | 70.85% | 81.50% | 63.64% | 69.46% | 73.55% | 32.06% | 14.30% |

| Valid Votes/Province | 9603 | 65488 | 267169 | 751632 | 113709 | 295538 | 235094 | 117207 | 493362 | 401119 |

| Null Ballots* | 171 | 3914 | 6233 | 19015 | 4975 | 6958 | 9489 | 100 | 8000 | 10179 |
| Blank Ballots* | 145 | 3235 | 43137 | 23746 | 6436 | 43712 | 28094 | 16842 | 27410 | 22682 |

| Total Ballots Cast | 9919 | 72637 | 316539 | 794393 | 125120 | 346208 | 272677 | 134149 | 528772 | 433980 |

| Total Registered | 16079 | 80166 | 318131 | 856981 | 137962 | 369150 | 327337 | 141545 | 567825 | 467811 |

| Total Abstentions | 6160 | 7529 | 1592 | 60588 | 12842 | 22942 | 54660 | 7396 | 39053 | 33831 |

| % Abstentions | 38.31% | 9.39% | 0.50% | 7.09% | 9.31% | 6.21% | 16.70% | 5.23% | 6.68% | 7.23% |

| % Participation | 61.69% | 90.61% | 99.50% | 92.91% | 90.69% | 93.79% | 83.30% | 94.77% | 93.12% | 92.77% |

* Percentages calculated based on TOTAL BALLOTS CAST
### Table 1: Results of Presidential Elections—October 14, 1992

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#### % Abstentions

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<th>22.35%</th>
<th>9.14%</th>
<th>5.73%</th>
<th>8.85%</th>
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#### % Participation

| Province     | 86.17% | 90.55% | 97.41% | 85.42%| 88.97% | 77.65% | 90.86%| 94.27%| 91.15%  |

* Percentages calculated based on TOTAL BALLOTS CAST.
### Table 2.
**Results of Legislative Elections — 18:30, October 14, 1992**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Polling Stations</th>
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<th>LUANDA</th>
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<td>51.88%</td>
<td>70.66%</td>
<td>71.90%</td>
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<td>65.52%</td>
<td>37.36%</td>
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<td>19.96%</td>
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<td>486651</td>
<td>394107</td>
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| Null Ballots*    | 63      | 748   | 2816 | 7996   | 1690    | 3345  | 6387    | 1135     | 8671     | 13000  |
| Blank Ballots*   | 290     | 8040  | 46363| 37652  | 8416    | 38257 | 28509   | 16278    | 35471    | 28673  |
| Total Ballots Cast | 9948   | 72710 | 311653| 797513 | 128599  | 347700| 273143  | 135991   | 530593   | 435780 |
| Total Registered | 16079   | 80166 | 318131| 854081 | 137962  | 369150| 327337  | 141545   | 567825   | 467811 |
| Total Abstentions| 6131    | 7456  | 6478 | 57448  | 9363    | 21450 | 54194   | 5554     | 37232    | 32031  |
| % Abstentions    | 38.13%  | 9.30% | 2.04%| 6.72%  | 6.79%   | 5.81% | 16.56%  | 3.92%    | 6.56%    | 6.85%  |
| % Participation  | 61.87%  | 90.70%| 97.96%| 93.28% | 93.21%  | 94.19%| 83.44%  | 96.08%   | 93.44%   | 93.15% |
TABLE 2. RESULTS OF LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS - 18:30, October 14, 1992

* Valid votes calculated based on TOTAL BALLOTS CAST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polling Stations</th>
<th>BIE</th>
<th>MOICO</th>
<th>K. KUBANGO</th>
<th>NAMIBE</th>
<th>KUILA</th>
<th>CUNENE</th>
<th>LUNDA S.</th>
<th>BENGIO</th>
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<th>%</th>
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</table>
| % of Valid Votes in Province | 13.75% | 58.49% | 21.75% | 66.65% | 63.73% | 87.64% | 53.81% | 69.91%
| PRS              | 2572| 6264  | 1214       | 656    | 5437  | 1473   | 22811   | 526    | 89875          | 2.27%|
| UNITA            | 204930| 27290 | 87008      | 15374  | 100219 | 4714   | 2681    | 13747  | 1347636        | 34.10%|
| % of Valid Votes in Province | 76.97% | 24.06% | 71.54% | 26.14% | 25.97% | 4.58% | 3.87% | 17.61%
| PSD              | 3052| 1125  | 968        | 375    | 3281  | 280    | 279     | 363    | 33088          | 0.84%|
| FLD              | 12790| 3264  | 2616       | 1314   | 8987  | 712    | 541     | 895    | 94269          | 2.39%|

Valid Votes: 266260  113437  122735  63700  385925  102958  69335  78085  3952265  100.00%

| Null Ballots* | 14403| 2063  | 2420       | 1590   | 8311  | 1800   | 2188    | 1394   | 8020           | 1.81%|
| Blank Ballots*| 24824| 5143  | 4875       | 8520   | 58750 | 10575  | 10477   | 7177   | 378290         | 8.58%|

Total Ballots Cast: 305487  120643  130030  73810  452986  115333  82000  86656  4410575

Total Registered: 354537  137798  1333161  84918  509167  148528  87451  91921  4828668

Total Abstentions: 49050  17155  33131  11108  56181  33195  5451  5265  417893
% Abstentions: 13.83% 12.45% 2.35% 13.08% 11.03% 22.35% 6.23% 5.73% 8.65%
% Participation: 86.17% 87.55% 97.65% 86.92% 88.97% 77.65% 94.77% 94.27% 91.35%
### Table 3. Null and Blank Comparison Chart—Partial Results of October 6, 1992 versus Final Results of October 14, 1992

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<th>UIGE</th>
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#### October 6, 1992

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TABLE 3.  NULL AND BLANK COMPARISON CHART--Partial Results of October 6, 1992 versus Final Results of October 14, 1992

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<th>NAMIBE</th>
<th>HUILA</th>
<th>CUNENE</th>
<th>LUNDA S.</th>
<th>BENGO</th>
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<th>%</th>
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<td>8.58%</td>
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<td>5.41%</td>
<td>5.05%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

October 14, 1992

|                  | 429 | 151    | 179       | 110    | 550   | 201    | 98       | 100   | 5579           | 100.00% |
| **Total Ballots Cast** | 305488 | 124779 | 129707    | 72541  | 452986 | 115333 | 79454    | 86657 | 4401339        | 100.00% |
| **Null Ballots** | 12544 | 7350   | 3791      | 3385   | 15907 | 4430   | 3050     | 3420  | 122911         | 2.79%  |
|                  | 4.11% | 5.89%  | 2.92%     | 4.67%  | 3.51% | 3.84%  | 3.84%    | 3.95% |                |      |
| **Blank Ballots** | 18367 | 3834   | 3891      | 7467   | 62423 | 12607  | 7735     | 5781  | 337544         | 7.67%  |
|                  | 6.01% | 3.07%  | 3.00%     | 10.29% | 13.78%| 10.93% | 9.74%    | 6.67% |                |      |
### TABLE 4
**NULL AND BLANK COMPARISON CHART—Partial Results of October 6, 1992 versus Final Results of October 14, 1992**

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<th>UIGE</th>
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<th>LUNDA N.</th>
<th>BENGUELA</th>
<th>MUAMBO</th>
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<td>255831</td>
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<td>9.34%</td>
<td>2.74%</td>
<td>5.38%</td>
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<td>10.68%</td>
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### TABLE 4.
 NULL AND BLANK COMPARISON CHART--Partial Results of October 6, 1992 versus Final Results of October 14, 1992

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<th>Huila</th>
<th>Cunene</th>
<th>Lunda S.</th>
<th>Bengo</th>
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<td>4.40%</td>
<td>7.27%</td>
<td>6.66%</td>
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#### Legislativo Elections

<p>|                  | 429    | 151    | 179        | 110    | 550    | 201    | 98       | 100    | 5579          |
| <strong>Total Ballots Cast</strong> | 305487 | 120643 | 130030     | 73810  | 452986 | 115333 | 82000    | 86656  | 4410575       |
| <strong>Null Ballots</strong> | 14403  | 2063   | 2420       | 1590   | 8311   | 1800   | 2188     | 1394   | 80020         |
|                  | 4.71%  | 1.71%  | 1.86%      | 2.15%  | 1.83%  | 1.56%  | 2.67%    | 1.61%  | 1.81%         |
| <strong>Blank Ballots</strong> | 24024  | 5143   | 4875       | 8520   | 58750  | 10575  | 10477    | 7177   | 378290        |
|                  | 8.13%  | 4.26%  | 3.75%      | 11.54% | 12.97% | 9.17%  | 12.78%   | 8.28%  | 8.58%         |</p>
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@ Estimated population figures from UN, "World Population Prospects", 1988.