The Romanian 2024 Election Annulment: Addressing Emerging Threats to Electoral Integrity

On 6 December Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled the outcome of the country’s presidential first round elections. The historic cancellation of the second round highlights the growing difficulties that information integrity, hybrid warfare, illicit political finance, and digital technologies pose to elections. In its 2018 comparative report on election annulments, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) presaged the immense challenges that these threats would pose to electoral integrity. Historically, annulments have typically been associated with clear procedural errors or fraud, but the Romanian ruling signifies an important shift; the court’s decision highlighted the impact of the extensive deployment of artificial intelligence (AI), automated systems, and coordinated information integrity campaigns on electoral integrity, among other findings of interference. The Court determined that these actions skewed voter perceptions, deprived candidates of equitable opportunities, and violated voters’ rights to make informed choices. 

This piece examines the two main elements of this shift as illustrated by Decision No. 32 of the Constitutional Court: (i) the court’s determination of its competency under the Romanian Constitution to review the case ex officio and (ii) the nature of the evidence the court relied upon to annul the elections.

I. Background: Petitions for Annulment and Validation of the First Round 

On 2 December, following a court-ordered recount of nearly nine million ballots, the Court validated the results of the first round of elections, certifying Călin Georgescu and Elena-Valerica Lasconi as the candidates for the second round. The validation signified the Court's confidence in the administrative and procedural soundness of the election, despite allegations of irregularities made by candidate Cristian-Vasile Terheș. Terheș had alleged illegal online campaigning during voting days, the use of automated bots in campaigns, and many invalid votes. He argued that these issues compromised the integrity of the election and altered the rankings of candidates for the second round. In its decision, the Court concluded that the inconsistencies identified were minor administrative errors and did not affect the overall outcome.

The Court emphasized that annulment under Article 52(1) of Law No. 370/2004 requires clear evidence of fraud or irregularities capable of altering the assignment of mandates or candidate rankings, a threshold not met in this case. However, the lack of clear rules guiding the recount, in particular for out-of-country ballots, and restricted access for observer groups, raised concerns about transparency and the adequacy of recount as a remedy. As noted previously by IFES in a white paper on election audits, “If all parties involved – including voters – do not perceive the audit process to be transparent and well organized, the audit can further erode confidence in the election, the electoral process, and the institutions that manage it.”  

II. National Security, Information Integrity, Political Finance Transparency and Strategic Corruption

On 4 December, Romanian intelligence services declassified documents outlining concerns about cyber activities by state and non-state actors, the use of digital technologies, and information campaigns that may have undermined the election's integrity. These documents underscored the dual nature of new technologies in elections and their manipulation by malign actors: while they facilitate broader access to information, they can also magnify false or misleading narratives. Contemporary information integrity strategies, such as AI-generated content and algorithm-driven visibility, create new vulnerabilities, especially in highly polarized political contexts. The Romanian election vividly illustrates how these tools can influence election litigation and proceedings, a concern that is increasingly recognized on a global scale.

III. Re-Opening the Case: Court Findings 

The declassification of intelligence reports two days later prompted the Court to revisit the matter and in its Decision No. 32, the Court acknowledged the declassified evidence of interference. The Court further highlighted serious irregularities in electoral campaign financing. Official campaign declarations submitted to the Permanent Electoral Authority reported no spending by one candidate, a figure starkly contradicted by the scale of the candidate’s online presence and findings in intelligence reports.

This discrepancy points to undeclared sources of funding, potentially linked to external entities or third-party actors operating in violation of national laws. Such practices reflect a broader trend of strategic corruption. Key issues raised include: third-party financing, in which undisclosed and unregulated funding flows through proxies to finance digital campaigns, obscuring its origins and bypassing legal limits; hybrid political finance warfare, in which external actors finance information campaigns or boost online exposure, exerting undue influence while remaining hidden from public scrutiny; and weak oversight by election management bodies (EMBs) that are insufficiently equipped to oversee online advertising expenditures carried out through intricate digital networks and platforms.

IV. Constitutional and EU Legal Justification

In re-opening the case, the Court acted ex officio, initiating an independent assessment of the election’s validity based on the newly available intelligence. Use of this power raised concerns about judicial overreach and the timing of the decision, which fell outside legal deadlines. In its ruling, the Court emphasized its constitutional authority under Article 146(f) to ensure compliance with electoral procedures, highlighting as justification its duty to safeguard democratic values, such as free elections, equal opportunities for candidates, and voters' rights to accurate information. 

The Court further reinforced its legal rationale by aligning its decision with established EU norms on electoral integrity, particularly principles outlined in the Venice Commission Code of Good Conduct in Electoral Matters and the EU Regulation on Transparency in Political Advertising. By referencing these instruments, the Court sought to demonstrate that its decision not only adhered to national constitutional standards but also upheld Romania's obligations as a member of the European Union. Notably, the Court did not justify its reasoning for taking this decision outside of the prescribed legal deadlines.

While acting ex officio carries inherent risks of overstepping judicial mandates, the Court emphasized that such an intervention was warranted due to the scale and systemic nature of the irregularities observed, including organized information integrity campaigns, hybrid interference, and opaque political financing. By carefully framing its decision within constitutional and EU legal frameworks, the Court aimed to strike a balance between addressing systemic electoral failures and maintaining judicial neutrality. The case highlights the need for clear procedural safeguards to guide future instances of ex officio judicial intervention, ensuring that such powers are exercised transparently and proportionately, and within the legal deadlines set by the laws.

V. Challenges with Intelligence-Based Evidence in the Romanian Case

The gathering and validation of evidence is fundamental to any adjudication process that could result in the annulment of an election. As IFES has noted, three primary standards are commonly utilized in evidence of election disputes. Preponderance of the evidence, the prevalent standard in civil cases, requires that a claim be more likely true than not—essentially a probability greater than 50%. While it is suitable for ordinary civil disputes, its use in election annulment cases has been questioned due to the extremely high stakes involved. The clear and convincing evidence standard demands that evidence demonstrates a claim is significantly more likely than not (often characterized as requiring 75% certainty). It is often employed in cases involving accusations of fraud, quasi-criminal activities, or serious infringements of fundamental rights. Finally, the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt standard is the most stringent, requiring evidence so persuasive that one can trust it without reservation. While seldom applied in election disputes, it may be warranted when allegations pertain to criminal acts such as voter fraud. In the majority of electoral disputes, courts adopt a more rigorous standard than the preponderance of evidence due to the public interest in maintaining electoral stability and the profound consequences of annulment.

The 2024 Romanian Constitutional Court’s reliance on intelligence-based evidence introduces significant complications for traditional evidentiary standards. These complications include admissibility, transparency and contestability, weight and verifiability, the potential for political weaponization, and links to strategic corruption. 

Admissibility: Intelligence-derived evidence is often classified, anonymized, or redacted to protect sources and methods. This creates tension with the requirement that evidence must meet clear evidentiary thresholds—particularly in cases where the standard of evidence is rigorous. The Romanian case relied heavily on intelligence reports revealing external interference, yet the lack of detail raises doubts about whether the findings could be scrutinized or contested. Courts must now grapple with the question: Can evidence that is only partially disclosed meet the rigorous standards required for annulment?

Transparency and Contestability: Electoral disputes require public confidence in both the process and the outcome. The use of intelligence findings—particularly where they cannot be fully disclosed—creates a transparency deficit, undermining trust in judicial decisions. In the Romanian case, the Court’s annulment was partially justified by intelligence reports that voters were misled through coordinated information integrity and digital manipulation. However, the inability of litigants and the public to verify or contest these claims raises concerns about procedural fairness and the legitimacy of the decision.

Weight and Verifiability of Evidence: Unlike traditional evidence, intelligence findings are often circumstantial or probabilistic, based on patterns, attribution analyses, or assessments of intent. Proving that external interference directly altered the election outcome—a key requirement in annulment cases—requires evidence of both causality (how the interference swayed voter behavior) and scale (whether the impact was widespread enough to affect the results). In the absence of definitive proof, reliance on intelligence findings risks falling short of the clear and convincing standard.

Potential for Political Weaponization: Courts must also consider the risk of selective or biased intelligence being weaponized for political ends. Intelligence agencies, while tasked with safeguarding national security, are not immune to political pressures. If their findings are perceived as serving partisan interests, this can further erode trust in both the judiciary and the electoral process.

Link to Political Finance and Strategic Corruption: The Romanian case reveals a troubling connection between opaque political finance and hybrid warfare tactics, including strategic corruption. Intelligence reports detailed undeclared campaign financing, particularly for online activities, raising suspicions of third-party funding and external influence. The use of hidden financial networks to fund information integrity campaigns and exploit social media algorithms demonstrates how strategic corruption can distort electoral outcomes. These irregularities complicate the evidentiary landscape, as the flow of funds through intermediaries is often difficult to trace and prove to a clear and convincing standard.

VI. The State’s Obligations and the Limits of Annulment: A Call for Prevention

The Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 32 highlights the state’s dual responsibilities in safeguarding electoral integrity: a positive obligation to prevent unjustified interference and protect the will of the voters and a duty of neutrality to ensure a level playing field for electoral competitors. The state must actively confront risks posed by information integrity campaigns and digital technologies, while simultaneously strengthening voter resilience. This includes raising awareness about the role of digital tools in elections, providing voters with accurate information, combating illicit political finance, and mitigating the risks of manipulation. However, the case also exposes the broader limitations of annulment as an effective remedy. While nullifying an election addresses immediate procedural violations that affected the outcome of the election, it cannot fully repair the harm. Misleading narratives and non-transparent campaigns can leave a lasting imprint on voter trust in democratic processes.

Given these challenges, the focus must shift toward prevention and resilience-building to ensure the integrity of electoral systems. Key measures must include reviewing traditional evidentiary standards as to ensure they are fit for purpose in the current context for elections; establishing robust regulatory safeguards to govern the use of digital technologies, artificial intelligence, and political advertising; proactive efforts by electoral authorities to identify and address vulnerabilities in digital infrastructure, strengthen cybersecurity measures, develop mechanisms to counter information integrity, and prevent and detect illicit financing of election campaigns; state-led efforts to build critical media literacy and educate voters to identify credible information and resist manipulation; and

VII. Implications for Electoral Integrity 

The annulment of Romania’s 2024 election marks a turning point in recognizing the transformative impact of digital threats on elections. It reflects the growing challenge electoral authorities and courts face in addressing irregularities that stem from technological and foreign interference and hybrid warfare. Traditional enforcement and sanction approaches may struggle to address modern electoral challenges effectively. Whether additional remedies like warning, fines or disqualifications could have been used given the particular facts of the case is somewhat moot in Romania but are important questions for other countries that may be facing similar threats. 

This case sets an important precedent for future electoral disputes, as courts worldwide will increasingly be called upon to evaluate claims of external manipulation, information integrity, and digital interference. Courts that choose not to engage, relying on a strict interpretation of electoral law, may provide a tailwind to bad actors as these trends gain momentum around the world. Addressing these threats requires a proactive, multi-faceted approach that combines robust legal frameworks, technological safeguards, and informed oversight to protect the integrity of elections in an AI-driven, hyperconnected world.