Chapter 4: Potential Tensions

4.1. Overview

This section discusses the phenomena, policies, and characteristics that are (or could be in the future) sources of tensions between Ukrainian refugees and host communities. It is important to stress that, at the time of writing, these had not necessarily harmed community cohesion. However, they could do so in the medium term— for example, should contextual factors change or should disinformation actors take intentional actions be taken to magnify the tensions. This chapter notes the specific types of risks related to each aspect of the refugee journey, how they have manifested to date, and signs pointing to the likelihood of the tensions becoming more significant.

While the overall risks are generally low, the risk ratings below are in relation to the risks to community cohesion in each country. This means that a tension noted as ‘relatively high risk’ might still be unlikely to materialise, but it is likely to be a higher risk than other tensions in that country. For example, tensions around the generally lower benefits received by TCNs not eligible for TP are unlikely to significantly threaten community cohesion given the very small number of such TCNs in the region; on the other hand, economic concerns are widely felt by the host and refugee populations.

4.2. Legal status, welfare, and benefits

Perceptions that Ukrainian refugees abuse the benefits system (e.g., cross the border just to get money): In the research workshops in Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia, there were discussions about Ukrainian refugees potentially abusing the benefits system by living in Ukraine and claiming support in other countries. There have been border crossings between Ukraine and its neighbours in both directions. For example, by November 2022, 370,918 Ukrainian refugees and TCNs who had entered Moldova had crossed back into Ukraine.⁴³⁴ Many of the Ukrainians (46 percent) intended to return home for a short visit and then either return to Moldova or migrate onward.⁴³⁵ Ukrainians expressed that they made these trips to reunite with family members (60 percent) or collect their belongings (46 percent),⁴³⁶ but some Moldovans perceived them as efforts to claim benefits in Moldova while living in Ukraine. Under the changes introduced by the TP directive, remaining outside Moldova for more than 45 cumulative days between 1 March 2023 and 1 March 2024 would invalidate TP status, and the individual would lose the right to work and access key public services in Moldova.⁴³⁷ In several countries, including both Slovakia and the Czech Republic, claims of abuse of the benefit system related in part to Ukrainians not generally fitting conventional narratives or stereotypical images of destitute refugees. The perception that Ukrainians abused benefits also aligned with the narrative that the war is not active across all of Ukraine and that Ukrainians should either stay in those regions or fight for their country from Ukraine.⁴³⁸

Unknown, unclear, or bureaucratic procedures to register for TP and services; (perceived) lack of information on the rights and obligations of people with TP status: In each of the five countries, a TP directive was initiated to ensure Ukrainians are appropriately registered. However, Ukrainian refugees noted a lack of clarity around TP and the service registration processes. Lack of clarity about the procedures is likely to be compounded as TP frameworks—which were generally intended to cover a period of one year—were extended and reregistration is required.⁴³⁹ In the case of Moldova, the TP process was introduced in March 2023, whereas previously refugees’ stays were extended every three months and came under the country’s state of emergency legislation. Workshop participants indicated that a lack of clarity around the procedures had raised concerns among Ukrainian communities.⁴⁴⁰ Specifically, this related to which documentation would be required to obtain TP status, the availability of in-person appointments at the General Inspectorate of Migration, and the ability to access legal assistance.

One workshop participant shared her account of visiting the information office to ask where she could access some required documentation to register for TP (specifically, an attestation of place of residence) that was not required previously. An employee didn’t know and treated her dismissively, saying she needed to figure it out herself.⁴⁴¹

Given language barriers and other factors such as location and access to technology, it is possible for Ukrainians to slip through the cracks and lose their legal residence status. In the Czech Republic, workshop participants mentioned that this could be a particular risk for youth ages 16 to 17 years who do not have legal guardians and might therefore not re-register process, thus becoming more vulnerable and more easily exploited.⁴⁴² Ukrainians who do not understand the bureaucratic processes may feel unwelcome, and host communities may perceive refugees as not conforming with required procedures.

Parallel infrastructure created to state institutions: The creation of parallel support systems for Moldovans and Ukrainians was discussed throughout the Moldova workshops, often inflected with the assumption that NGO- and multilateral-supported services for Ukrainians were superior⁴⁴³ (often with significant or even greater funding than some pre-existing government structures). For example, in 2022, over $200 million USD was dedicated to support for Ukrainian refugees in Moldova.⁴⁴⁴ This equates to approximately $1,868 USD for each refugee in Moldova in the medium to long term. This spending takes place in a country with limited financial resources; as an illustration, per capita expenditure on health for Moldovan citizens is only $284 USD per year.⁴⁴⁵ Some humanitarian actors aim to work through the government system; for example, the World Food Programme aims to use Moldovan social protection systems to provide support.⁴⁴⁶ Working through national systems is important both to avoid creating parallel infrastructure and the potential perception that refugees are receiving more or better services and support. Although the concern was mentioned only in Moldova, efforts to streamline provision of aid and ensure that state structures are strengthened through the refugee response may also help to address underlying equity issues.

Differences in provision of welcome and support to refugee or migrant groups not from Ukraine: Ukrainian refugees benefit from a regime that differs from those faced by other groups. Specific protections were set up for Ukrainian refugees, and the process to access these protections was easier than those available to other groups. This was the case across all five Central and East European countries.⁴⁴⁷ For instance, in Poland and Slovakia, non-Ukrainian asylum seekers are restricted from the labour market for the first six months while the decisions on their applications are pending.⁴⁴⁸ Though this would concern a small group of people, workshop participants noted that it could create resentment among other refugee groups that did not receive such treatment (and experience associated tensions), as it can be perceived as unfair to them.⁴⁴⁹

Government or NGO funding that is allocated specifically, and for a long period, to support Ukrainians can be a source of tension: Participants in the Slovakia research workshop commented on a sudden—and visible—availability of funding to support Ukrainian refugees.⁴⁵⁰ Such support, while valuable, can create tensions, particularly if it is perceived as exclusively for the assistance of Ukrainians, without providing benefits or additional funding for Slovak citizens in need (such as single mothers, people facing homelessness, or people in poverty).⁴⁵¹ This tension was linked to the discourse that ‘refugees are better supported than the host population, and that such support comes at the expense of funding for the host population.’⁴⁵² Workshop participants added that, for Slovak citizens, achieving a good quality of life on benefits was challenging and that, should the economic situation in Slovakia continue to worsen, this narrative might gain more traction.⁴⁵³ This tension may be linked to the length of time government-funded support is offered. Opinion polling by the Institute for Sociology and the Institute for Research in Social Communication in March and December 2022 found that a growing number of people polled approved of only short-term support to Ukrainians, and that overall public support for people displaced from Ukraine to Slovakia had decreased slightly.⁴⁵⁴

Ukrainian men being smuggled across borders, taking low-paid positions, and working illegally: Under Ukraine’s martial law, men of fighting age were prevented from leaving, with some exceptions, such as on the basis of their dependents.⁴⁵⁵ In workshops in Chisinau, concern was raised that men may enter Moldova illegally to take low-paying positions. It is unclear whether this is the case, although the international media has reported on men being smuggled into Moldova to escape involvement in fighting.⁴⁵⁶ In light of Moldova’s rising unemployment and economic inequality, singular cases that seem to validate this discourse have the potential to stoke tensions.

4.3.  Healthcare

Pressures on health systems that were already experiencing challenges, including long waits: Before the arrival of refugees from Ukraine, the healthcare systems in all five countries were experiencing challenges such as staff shortages⁴⁵⁷ and long waiting times.⁴⁵⁸ In many of the research countries, spending on healthcare is also below the OECD average, as illustrated by the table below.

TABLE 5. Healthcare statistics in the region

 Workshop participants said that the arrival of Ukrainian refugees in Slovakia exacerbates these pre-existing issues and could be perceived as an additional burden on an already over-burdened system.⁴⁶⁵ The arrival of Ukrainians increased the number of people seeking healthcare and demand for specific issues (e.g., war-related injuries and psychosocial issues) that require scarce specialist support that is already stretched in many countries.⁴⁶⁶ The additional complexities of registering and treating Ukrainian patients (such as translation, verifying foreign documentation, and explaining a new healthcare system) were mentioned as increasing pressure in Romania.⁴⁶⁷ In the early stages of the war, Moldova’s health minister stated that the refugee crisis had placed the country’s health system under ‘very big pressure’,⁴⁶⁸ and Moldova’s healthcare system has been supported by international donors and multilateral organisations throughout 2022. Host communities also feel the pressure: a study conducted by the Union of Polish Metropolises in April and May 2022 found that 68 percent of respondents were concerned about the negative impact that Ukrainian refugees might have on the healthcare system in Poland.⁴⁶⁹ Ukrainian communities may become scapegoats for systemic issues, and the pressure placed on the healthcare system has the potential to contribute to tensions. Ukrainians can also be perceived as receiving more support than local populations:

A participant in the Chisinau workshop raised concerns that, whilst systemic issues in healthcare impact Ukrainian refugees, they also receive additional support from international organisations whereas Moldovans are perceived as ineligible for such additional support.⁴⁷⁰

Differences in how services are used, resulting in perceived abuse: Workshop participants in all countries discussed norms around the health-seeking behaviours of Ukrainians compared to host country populations. Participants believed that Ukrainians call doctors more frequently, ask for ambulance services more readily, and request more support from specialists.⁴⁷¹ This could be due in part to differences in how the system works in Ukraine and host countries, as well as challenges in accessing healthcare through usual means (e.g., due to restrictions on the type of care that refugees’ insurance might cover in Slovakia). However, local populations may also visit an emergency room when other services are difficult to obtain. For example, according to the OECD, in 2017, the Slovak Republic had the highest proportion of patients in Europe (74 percent) reporting that they had visited an emergency department because no appropriate primary healthcare was available to them.⁴⁷² Some experts also point out that Ukrainian refugees use health systems differently in part because of their profile—the majority of Ukrainian refugees are female and/or children and so are likely to seek different health care services (for example, maternal and child health services, vaccinations, and/or reproductive health services) compared to the host country population. Furthermore, a population that has fled war will require more mental health support services.⁴⁷³

Workshop participants mentioned that the complexity of the Romanian healthcare system and lack of understanding among Ukrainian refugees meant that Ukrainians were more likely to use or be directed to the wrong referral process.⁴⁷⁴ One participant cited examples of Ukrainian refugees who did not need to go through the same referral steps as Romanians—in effect, skipping a step and accessing specialist treatment more quickly. In the context of long waiting lines for healthcare in Romania, the participant noted that some people viewed this as unfair treatment for Romanians who ‘paid into the system, so why are they waiting?’.⁴⁷⁵

In Romania and Poland, workshop participants noted that the lack of interpretation services increases the possibility of misinterpretation⁴⁷⁶ and widens differences in health seeking behaviour.⁴⁷⁷ Participants in Romania noted the lack of incentives for Romanian doctors to register Ukrainian patients, because a doctor receives a set fee per consultation regardless of the length of appointment (and a bilingual or translated consultation with a Ukrainian may take up to twice as long as a consultation with a Romanian).^478,479 Friction can arise between host community doctors due to the additional work of communicating with patients who do not speak the local language, particularly as they are already very stretched.

Ukrainians face additional challenges and bureaucratic hurdles in receiving healthcare: Participants in Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia reported that registration requirements contributed to bureaucratic barriers for Ukrainians seeking healthcare.⁴⁸⁰ In Moldova, Ukrainians reported being unable to make appointments using the online system, not understanding the mechanisms of a new healthcare system, and not finding information on which services require additional insurance and which are covered.⁴⁸¹ In Romania, participants commented on the complexity of the healthcare system and shared examples of small, bureaucratic obstacles to equitable healthcare delivery.⁴⁸² Several participants discussed specific challenges around registering with a doctor, reporting that Ukrainian identification numbers differed from Romanian ones in format and therefore could not be entered into the public healthcare information technology (IT) systems for doctors to receive payment. This in turn could cause some doctors to refuse to treat Ukrainian patients. In Slovakia, one of the primary challenges experienced by Ukrainians was lack of information about where to go and what services were available.⁴⁸³ Workshop participants agreed that Ukrainians can have limited knowledge of the system.⁴⁸⁴ A UNHCR/REACH assessment’s sample polling found that 23 percent of Ukrainians residents in collective centres and 19 percent of Ukrainian residents in other accommodation reported refusal by service providers as a reason for failing to access healthcare.⁴⁸⁵ Other potential barriers to accessing healthcare could include having the incorrect insurance provision or evidence, or using the incorrect referral route.⁴⁸⁶ Challenges to accessing healthcare can lead to discontent on the part of Ukrainians, which can be perceived as ingratitude by the host population and contribute to tensions. 

4.4. Housing

Pressures on housing and the rising cost of housing; pressures on social housing: This study found that housing prices have increased in all five countries in the recent past, and the stock of social and affordable housing is systemically low. A 2022 report from Investigate Europe found that housing prices in all European Union countries (except Cyprus, Italy, and Spain) had risen since 2010 at rates higher than the average rate of growth or inflation.⁴⁸⁷ In Moldova, rent prices climbed in 2022 by as much as 40 percent.⁴⁸⁸ The arrival of Ukrainian refugees poses two challenges in this context: first, Ukrainian refugees place additional demand on tight markets; second, social and affordable housing is sometimes allocated to refugees, at times despite a lack of sufficient housing for the host populations. Perceptions that the most vulnerable in Moldova do not receive adequate housing support from the government could catalyse increased tensions if out-of-context representations of working-age Ukrainians receiving housing support are pitted against the plight of elderly, poor Moldovans.⁴⁸⁹ In addition, the arrival of refugees has exacerbated regional differences in some contexts, such as the Czech Republic, where refugees have been more likely to settle in cities than in rural areas where housing challenges were already more acute.⁴⁹⁰ In these challenging circumstances, it is easy for tensions to arise, as increasing costs can threaten the stability of lower income locals’ living situation and way of life, particularly in countries such as Moldova where rent increases and inflation have been especially high.

Overcrowding of refugees in apartments and state-run dormitories, creating pressures on surrounding communities: Issues associated with overcrowding generally affect both host communities and refugee populations, particularly in Poland and Romania;⁴⁹¹ and the stock of social housing in central and eastern European countries is low. For refugees in particular, overcrowding has been recorded in collective centres. Workshop participants commented that, if the refugees’ economic situation worsens, this could lead to more significant overcrowding of collective centres. The humanitarian centre in Gabčíkovo,⁴⁹² Slovakia, was cited as an example of where the number of refugees (reportedly 900)⁴⁹³ is very high in comparison to the local population⁴⁹⁴ of approximately 5,250⁴⁹⁵ to 5,550.⁴⁹⁶ Overcrowding can affect specific marginalised groups. For example, in Moldova, concerns around overcrowding have been raised about the RACs used to house Roma refugees; Oxfam’s October 2022 report highlighted crowding and lack of privacy as humanitarian priorities, giving the case of one RAC where 10 to 16 people were staying in one dormitory-sized room.⁴⁹⁷ Such crowded collective sites can contribute to the emergence of localised tensions, including concerns about burdening local services and the impact of concentrated groups of refugees seeking support in a single area.⁴⁹⁸ In addition, workshop 

participants expressed concerns about the impact of long-term overcrowding on both refugees and host communities, citing fatigue with the situation and lack of long-term solutions.

‘We’ve been talking about this for one year, but nothing changes. We still have dormitories with three families living in one room.’499

– Workshop participant discussing refugee accommodation

Ukrainian refugees, and Roma in particular, are seen as undesirable tenants: Likely in part due to the tightness of the housing market, landlords may be selective regarding the tenants they accept. Ukrainian refugees can be considered undesirable tenants, with one participant in the Poland workshop quoting from an advertisement for accommodation for ‘Poles only’.⁵⁰⁰

Workshop participants reported instances of advertisements that explicitly excluded Ukrainians, or being told they could not view properties because they were Ukrainian.⁵⁰¹

Specific groups within the refugee community—notably Roma—experience particular discrimination in the housing market⁵⁰² (and have since before February 2022).⁵⁰³ Mothers with children are especially at risk: according to workshop participants, landlords are likely to discriminate against them due in part to tighter restrictions around eviction of tenants that include mothers and children. Landlords also were noted to have the perception that children will damage the property.⁵⁰⁴ Workshop participants noted that high demand for housing causes some landlords to engage in exploitative practices, such as insisting on informal rent agreements, and significantly increasing rents and even evictions (particularly when no official contract is signed).⁵⁰⁵ Poor housing conditions not only affect refugees’ quality of life, but they could also reinforce negative stereotypes about refugees.

Uncertainty regarding Ukrainian refugees’ length of stay in the host country, leading to lack of commitment to contracts: Ukrainians may be at a structural disadvantage in the housing market. Their return intentions are complex; regional surveys indicate that the majority of refugees say they plan to return to Ukraine once the war ends.⁵⁰⁶ This uncertainty translates to unwillingness to sign long-term rental contracts with landlords. In a tight housing market, unwillingness to commit to longer periods can disadvantage Ukrainian tenants and could breed resentment similar to that discussed above in relation to discrimination in the housing market. Participants in the Moldova workshops reported a perception that landlords did not want to rent to Ukrainians, regarding refugees as a risky investment, since it is unclear how long they will stay in the country.⁵⁰⁷ This has also been noted in the press; for example, Euronews quoted Warsaw estate agent Michał Możarowski as saying ‘Landlords prefer a year-long lease, and no one knows how long the war will continue. This means Ukrainians are not the preferred tenants’.⁵⁰⁸

‘No one thought the war would last this long’, was a repeated phrase during the workshops in Chisinau.⁵⁰⁹ This was reflected in Ukrainians’ accounts of interactions with landlords who were unwilling to sign short-term contracts or asked for prohibitively high deposits (equivalent to three months’ rent—or more) before entering into an agreement.⁵¹⁰

This could lead to increased housing vulnerability and a potential need to live in overcrowded conditions that could contribute to tensions between Ukrainians and those living in the vicinity.

4.5. Education

Pressure on schools: This is generally a medium risk in countries where larger numbers of Ukrainian children attend local schools, such as the Czech Republic and Poland. The risk is low where fewer Ukrainian children attend local schools, such as Slovakia, where about 9,000 children were enrolled in preschool and primary and secondary schools;⁵¹¹ Romania, where fewer than 1,000 Ukrainian children were fully enrolled;⁵¹² and Moldova, where 1,665 were enrolled.⁵¹³ However, as time goes on, these numbers are likely to rise—and have the potential to disproportionately affect areas where refugee populations are higher.⁵¹⁴ Ukrainian students can increase overall class sizes and pose challenges associated with lack of knowledge of the language. This might be particularly felt in countries where per-pupil spending is relatively low, as demonstrated in the table below.

TABLE 6. Education investment in the region

Ukrainians in smaller towns and rural areas also might encounter challenges due to lack of experience amongst teachers and schools in integrating foreign pupils.⁵²¹ Ukrainian children also face mental and psychological trauma due to their recent experiences; for teachers who are already poorly paid and face practical challenges,⁵²² it can be difficult to cope with this additional burden.⁵²³ Specific pressures exist with regard to transitioning older students into the education system in some countries, such as the Czech Republic, where high school students need to pass exams to register for secondary school. In part due to these issues, a significant proportion of Ukrainian youth enrol in online education rather than host countries’ national school systems. Workshop participants also raised the challenges associated with language barriers and the risk that teachers spending additional time working with students who do not speak the local language well could be perceived as a decline in the quality of education provided to the class.⁵²⁴

Pressure on kindergartens: The inclusion of refugee children in the primary school system was raised as a challenge for both host populations⁵²⁵ and Ukrainian refugees. The arrival of Ukrainians places additional demand on a system that is already stretched in many areas; it can affect both children’s development⁵²⁶ and parents’ engagement in the labour market.⁵²⁷ One EU research piece quoted a participant: ‘It is impossible to find a place in a kindergarten (it is a vicious circle, if a mother arrived alone with a child, she cannot go to work but must stay at home with the child), it is difficult with free places in schools’.528 Workshop participants suggested that problems are more acute in rural areas.⁵²⁹ However, participants across all countries mentioned a shortage of kindergarten spaces; this could lead to the perception that Ukrainian refugees are taking the places of citizens.⁵³⁰ One key informant in Poland also shared that local authority representatives attribute Ukrainian children’s low attendance in nurseries and kindergartens to distrust of state childcare facilities and a custom of sending children to school at a later age.

Integration issues in schools: Ukrainians entering national school systems face a number of challenges to integration. The first concerns their own experiences of trauma; the UNHCR reported that many Ukrainian children arriving in host countries are in need of mental health and psychosocial support.⁵³¹ Participants in the research workshop talked about the psychological burden on children entering new schools or studying full-time online while dealing with the trauma of displacement, and how this limits opportunities for integration and relationship building. One participant said that teenagers are particularly overburdened between pursuing education, trying to support parents and families emotionally, and seeking friendships and social bonds in a new environment.⁵³² Schools across the region are often unable to provide specialised programmes and specific mental health and psychosocial support. If Ukrainian children’s mental health concerns are not supported, this could lead to the perception that they are disruptive in class.⁵³³ The second challenge concerns bullying.⁵³⁴ In workshops in Chisinau, participants raised concerns that Ukrainian children integrated into the Russian language stream of Moldovan education were subject to bullying and intimidation from classmates.⁵³⁵

In Moldova, Ukrainians shared concerns that their children felt that they could not express pride in where they were from and were concerned that the content taught also emphasised Russia’s culture and history and, in some cases, pro-Russian political views.⁵³⁶

Workshop participants suggested that teachers and school administrations do not sufficiently address bullying.⁵³⁷ UNHCR have reported similar concerns and have urged Moldova’s government to support the sensitisation of teachers to bullying concerns arising from refugees’ experiences.⁵³⁸ In sum, bullying could drive young people to absenteeism or drive parents to withdraw their children from schools. The existence of Ukrainian online schools somewhat mitigates this risk, although it does present other risks such as potential loneliness and social isolation.⁵³⁹ Third, a significant proportion of Ukrainian students study online due to differences between the Ukrainian and local education systems.⁵⁴⁰ This can cause integration issues when Ukrainian and host country students do not meet and Ukrainians do not learn about the host country language and culture or build friendships with local children. In the Czech Republic, workshop participants also noted that Ukrainian children who follow the Ukrainian online curriculum in addition to host country curriculum might become exhausted and struggle to make time for new friendships where there is a language barrier.⁵⁴¹

Uncertainty regarding the length of stay for Ukrainian refugees in the host country, leading to poor school attendance and high drop-out rates: Return intentions among Ukrainians living in host countries are uncertain, and this has consequences for decisions regarding school attendance. Workshop participants said the comparatively low numbers of students enrolled in host country public schools, compared to online Ukrainian schools, was in part a reflection of this uncertainty and refugees’ hopes to return to Ukraine in the short or medium term.⁵⁴² In Poland, uncertainty around length of stay was a reason for 25 percent of respondents to the UNHCR/REACH survey not to enrol children in local schools.⁵⁴³ In Moldova, prior to the TP directive, there was little clarity about the security of refugees’ status. Other reasons for not registering Ukrainian children in local educational systems include language barriers, challenging bureaucratic processes, differences in curricula,⁵⁴⁴ and concerns about the recognition of Romanian or Moldovan education qualifications in Ukraine.⁵⁴⁵ Lack of attendance at in-person schools with host country children could lead to the perception that Ukrainian refugees do not want to integrate, and also presents a missed opportunity for social interaction and building friendships and trust between communities.

Workshop participants pointed to the expectation that refugees are in Poland only temporarily as a reason for lack of enrolment at Polish schools. Enrolment would require a significant investment on the part of the children—learning Polish, adapting to a new curriculum, and, in the meantime, potentially falling behind in subject matter knowledge.⁵⁴⁶

4.6. Employment and income

High inflation pressures on host and refugee communities: 2022 saw not only an inflow of Ukrainian refugees but also a significant increase in inflation rates in all the countries included in this study, as noted in the table below.

TABLE 7. Inflation statistics in the region

Moldova was particularly affected, with year-on-year inflation reaching 30.24 percent in December 2022 and remaining high into 2023 at 27.31 percent in January.⁵⁴⁹ Concurrently, reduced Russian gas exports catalysed a spike in energy prices, and consumers faced energy price increases of up to 200 percent in 2022.⁵⁵⁰ An October 2022 EU poll showed that an average of 93 percent of respondents across the EU, and 95 percent of Slovak respondents, were worried about rising costs of living, including increasing food and energy prices.⁵⁵¹ In another study, over 70 percent of Polish citizens in major cities thought hosting Ukrainians would have a negative impact on state finances.⁵⁵²

Ukrainian refugees have the potential to improve the economic situation in host countries,⁵⁵³ but the economic benefits that Ukrainians could bring might: (1) be longer-term; (2) not be very visible to the population as a whole at this stage, particularly in the context of rapid and noticeable price increases in basic goods; and (3) be concentrated among the more affluent, such as business owners. This in turn might lead to tensions between Ukrainian refugees and those who stand to lose out from the evolving economic situation.

The impact of Russia’s invasion on European energy prices is also widely reported in the Slovak media, linking the energy crisis to ongoing inflation and economic pressures in Slovakia.⁵⁵⁴ As inflation rises, there is a risk that frustrations about the economy will be directed at Ukrainian refugees; this can be exacerbated by perceptions that Ukrainian refugees appear well-off (through material items such as expensive cars, jewellery, and clothes).⁵⁵⁵ This perception of affluence can attract resentment, especially when inflation and the cost of living crisis worsens; Ukrainians are at risk of becoming scapegoated for the situation.⁵⁵⁶ Workshop participants also noted that the upcoming 2023 elections in Slovakia could be a trigger point for some of these tensions, particularly because early elections were called following criticism of the government’s handling of inflation and rising energy costs.⁵⁵⁷ This is an important tension to monitor.

Rising inequalities: Inequality is strong in some host countries that accept Ukrainian refugees; for instance, In 2015, the European Parliament reported that Romania had the worst income inequality within the EU.⁵⁵⁸ In Slovakia, the October 2022 EU poll showed that 84 percent of Slovak respondents worried about poverty and social exclusion.⁵⁵⁹ Price increases generally have a disproportionate effect on the poorest populations; as a result, some pockets of resentment have been noted over the distribution of government support amongst refugees and worse-off segments of local populations.⁵⁶⁰ In Romania, research workshop participants disputed how much the narrative that ‘poor Romanians should be helped before Ukrainians’ resonated. However, they noted that poverty levels, income inequality, and a difficult macroeconomic climate⁵⁶¹ meant that rising inequality remained a tension that risked undermining community cohesion efforts.⁵⁶² Some support to Ukrainians also has the potential to increase inequalities among local populations. For example, the Slovak government’s allowance to individual citizens who host Ukrainian refugees or offer accommodation free of charge⁵⁶³ was raised in September 2022 to a maximum of 710 EUR to 1,790 EUR per month for properties with one to four rooms.⁵⁶⁴ Such generous support to landlords has the potential to further increase inequalities in a context where lower- income Slovaks have to absorb rent rises. Workshop participants in Romania raised that the 50/20 scheme was profitable for wealthy Romanian landlords (particularly those with multiple properties) who were incentivised to house Ukrainian families on a short-term basis instead of those seeking to rent longer-term, particularly on lower incomes.⁵⁶⁵

‘While (relatively) wealthy Romanians benefited from 50/20 by receiving government subsidies and Ukrainians benefited from 50/20 by receiving free accommodation, the average low-middle income Romanian did not benefit and may in fact have been worse off due to rising rental market costs’.

– A research workshop participant 566 

Low Ukrainian engagement in the labour market and entrepreneurial activities: Broadly speaking, workshop participants in the country workshops, apart from Poland, stated that that host communities perceived Ukrainian refugees as not wanting to work or engage in the labour market. This perception was most pronounced in Romania. Across countries, access to employment has been challenging for Ukrainians due to a lack of understanding of where to access information and opportunities, childcare issues,⁵⁶⁷ language barriers,⁵⁶⁸ and psychological barriers such as dealing with the impacts of trauma and displacement.⁵⁶⁹

Whether Ukrainians wanted to work generated heated discussions among workshop participants, with some stressing the difference between refugees wanting to and being able to work, particularly for mothers of multiple children accessing childcare and those who had been out of work for multiple years.⁵⁷⁰ The perception of low levels of refugee employment can lead to discourses about ‘freeloading’ and has strong potential to develop into a notable tension, especially in tandem with discourses that Ukrainians receive state support that is greater than that available to host community citizens or of which they are not entirely deserving.

Tensions over the distribution of scarce resources between disadvantaged local populations and Ukrainians, including poverty among the local population: While poverty rates in all countries included in this research are at medium or low levels, distribution of wealth is often critically uneven. In both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there is a strong rural and urban divide;⁵⁷¹ in Romania, high levels of income inequality and housing inequality affect rural areas and the Roma community.⁵⁷² Many Moldovans face challenging financial circumstances, and support extended to Ukrainian refugees, such as cash assistance and job matching services, can be perceived as overlooking the needs of Moldovans. In this context, it is likely that tensions will develop around distribution of scarce resources in the form of benefits and services.

This potential tension is linked to the discourse that ‘Ukrainians have nice things and don’t need support.’ In the research workshops in Romania, one participant shared a story of a Ukrainian arriving in a BMW to collect donated goods, triggering the Romanian volunteer to charge for the goods instead of donating.⁵⁷³ Participants in all country workshops conducted under this project noted the risks of discourses around ‘we should support our poor, not the Ukrainians’ gaining traction if the economic situation worsens, although these remain fringe narratives.⁵⁷⁴

Reductions in financial assistance to refugees could lead to more refugees experiencing poverty, and the state (or other organisations) might need to step in to support the vulnerable: Poverty among Ukrainian refugees in most host countries in Europe is high compared to the poverty rates of citizens. In the Czech Republic, for instance, poverty among Ukrainians, taking account of humanitarian aid, is at 35 percent—more than three times the poverty rate of the Czech population.⁵⁷⁵ Reductions in financial assistance are being planned as the war continues. For example, in March 2023 the Polish government indicated that some types of assistance to refugees would be reduced.⁵⁷⁶ Workshop participants feared that the international community would stop funding refugees; this would put more pressure on the social services system, the government, or local NGOs.⁵⁷⁷ This in turn could exacerbate the perception that Ukrainians receive more support via local finances than local populations. As these changes take place, it becomes more critical to monitor the ways in which refugees are affected, the degree to which parallel systems are being established, and any incendiary or misleading narratives and tensions that might emerge around refugee support systems. In countries where poverty levels are higher— namely, Moldova and Romania, where poverty rates were around 30 percent⁵⁷⁸—there might be particular challenges in relation to the perception that refugees are receiving more support than host communities, as described below.

Rising unemployment: The potential for tensions to arise around Ukrainians taking the jobs of locals was mentioned in all research countries but Romania.⁵⁷⁹ This was regardless of whether unemployment rates were low (e.g., in the Czech Republic, at 2.5 percent, but with regional differences)⁵⁸⁰ at the time of research, rising sharply (e.g., in Moldova, where the unemployment rate rose sharply in early 2023 to 4.6 percent, particularly in rural and agricultural regions, after a year of stability between 2.5 and 3 percent).⁵⁸¹ Narratives have already been noted to circulate around Ukrainians taking locals’ jobs.⁵⁸²

In the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia, workshop participants noted that, as the economic situation becomes more strained, Ukrainian refugees might be scapegoated for locals’ unemployment, as they might be perceived as willing to work for less money and longer hours.⁵⁸³ Participants in Poland noted that certain jobs can be seen as exclusively filled by Ukrainians and that Poles can no longer obtain them (e.g., care workers).⁵⁸⁴

In Slovakia, sensitivity around jobs is likely to be high. Recent polling suggests that the general economic outlook among the Slovak population is pessimistic, with 56 percent of people polled by Eurobarometer stating that Ukrainians were weakening the Slovak economy.⁵⁸⁵ Segments of the Slovak population are experiencing long- term unemployment.⁵⁸⁶ This could lead to localised tensions, felt more strongly in regions with high unemployment, around perceived competition for jobs.⁵⁸⁷ The addition of significant numbers of long-term residents to host countries can place pressure on the labour market and provide an easy target for frustration about economic challenges, including unemployment. Participants in the Chisinau workshops highlighted fears that political parties would leverage economic troubles to scapegoat refugees.⁵⁸⁸ 

Underemployment of refugees, including difficulties with recognition of certifications: Across the five research countries, refugees were often employed below their qualifications and experience. In the Czech Republic, PAQ research found that 44 percent of Ukrainians who worked for Czech employers were in ‘significantly less qualified jobs’ than they held in Ukraine.⁵⁸⁹ As such, respondents to one survey in Slovakia noted that many jobs taken by refugees are those ‘in which the local population is not interested,’ categorised as ‘unqualified work’ (33.1 percent), machinery operation (26.3 percent), or related to trade and services (12.8 percent).⁵⁹⁰ OECD’s Europe-wide assessment found that Ukrainians’ current employment patterns reflect networks available to them rather than their skill levels and that, with improved recognition of qualifications and facilitation of job matching, Ukrainians have the potential to play important roles in the labour market.⁵⁹¹ Underemployment is driven by a range of factors. Those raised in the five countries included lack of certainty about length of stay, which can lead Ukrainians to seek more temporary jobs and employers to discriminate against Ukrainians; difficulties recognising higher-level skills and qualifications among the refugee population; language barriers; and experience of trauma. In Romania, research workshop participants commented that jobs taken by Ukrainians below their qualifications were often seen as temporary, while they looked for other opportunities. This in turn fuelled narratives around Ukrainian employees being unreliable.⁵⁹²

Workshop participants noted that traumatised refugees may not be in the right state of mind to undertake complex work that might require long hours away from their children, who are also suffering, and that they may prioritise lower-paid manual work with more predictable hours (especially if they are sole guardians).⁵⁹³

Stereotypes of the Ukrainian diaspora, as in some countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic, where relatively large numbers of Ukrainians work in low-skilled positions, can also contribute to underemployment. In Poland, lack of housing opportunities close to urban centres was identified as a reason for unemployment or underemployment. Underemployment of Ukrainian refugees could lead to missed opportunities for them to realise their potential and showcase their broad skills and experience; this could mitigate potential tensions due to Slovaks’ frustrations with Ukrainians not making significant contributions to Slovak society.

Money received by NGOs is earmarked for Ukrainians, but cannot be used for local populations: In some countries, such as Slovakia, Poland, and Moldova, workshop participants shared that some organisations received funding for Ukrainian populations that could not be used for other potentially vulnerable local populations.⁵⁹⁴ Workshop participants in Moldova raised concerns that money from NGOs was used to establish public service support structures that should have existed before but were prioritised only once refugees arrived. They noted that this contributed to a perception that Moldovans were treated as second-class citizens in their own country.⁵⁹⁵

One NGO representative in the workshops noted that tensions can arise because of perceptions that ‘there are finances for integration for refugees only, not much for single mothers, families, or the homeless. Money is here to sustain the Ukrainian community’.⁵⁹⁶ This has the potential to cause discontent among the local populations. Such narratives can be amplified if the source of funding for Ukrainian refugees is misunderstood, as discussed below.

Ukrainians are perceived to receive higher benefits than host communities, and communication about the amount and sources of support is poor: The perception that Ukrainians receive higher benefits than host communities can cause tension in the Czech Republic, Romania, Moldova, and Slovakia. It is somewhat grounded in reality as systems for refugees were set up quickly and provided status-based rather than means- tested benefits. In Slovakia, the tension is heightened due to the public perception that a large proportion of the government budget is spent on Ukrainian refugees.⁵⁹⁷ In Romania, resentment could arise around the lack of means testing for the 50/20 housing scheme. In all countries, workshop participants noted misconceptions about the sources of the funding, such as assuming that EU or voluntary NGO donations came from local taxpayers, which could lead to frustrations.⁵⁹⁸ In the context of rising unemployment and cost of living, such claims might stoke rhetoric about support that is given to Ukrainians and supposedly withheld from local populations.

Levels of support for Ukrainian refugees differ from support for other refugee groups: Ukrainians have received unprecedented levels of support from governments and communities in CEE—benefits that have not necessarily been enjoyed by other groups of refugees and asylum seekers. In Romania, they are eligible for the 50/20 housing scheme, whereas other refugees are not.⁵⁹⁹ In Poland, Ukrainians are immediately eligible to participate in the labour market, whereas asylum seekers who do not fall under the TP directive need to wait for six months.⁶⁰⁰ The Polish Economic Institute estimated that, in the first three months of the war, the Polish government and private citizens spent 5.45 billion EUR, or close to 1 percent of Poland’s GDP, on support for Ukrainian refugees.⁶⁰¹ Procedures are also quicker for Ukrainians, with one workshop participant in Romania suggesting, ‘Documentation for Ukrainians can take a few hours, for the rest of the refugees it’s two years’.⁶⁰² Differential treatment has the potential to foster discontent among groups of refugees; however, the numbers of refugees that are not eligible for TP in the research countries are low.

Uncertainty regarding the length of stay of Ukrainian refugees in host countries, leading to low retention of jobs among refugees: In all five countries, workshop participants stated that uncertainty around the length of stays for Ukrainians affects not only refugees’ intentions to look for and retain jobs, but also employers’ perceptions of the suitability of Ukrainian refugees for different jobs. In the Czech Republic, participants noted a perception by employers that refugees will not stay in employment long, so they prioritise others if they have a choice.⁶⁰³ In Moldova, workshop participants shared that employers might prefer to employ refugees on service agreements for discrete tasks rather than agreeing to long-term investment in opportunities.⁶⁰⁴ This limits Ukrainian earning potential and contributes to financial insecurity. Conversely, Moldovan participants suggested that since the battlegrounds in Ukraine have pushed east, western Ukrainians are returning home in larger numbers and do not offer employers the security that they expect of staff.⁶⁰⁵ These factors can impact refugees’ financial stability and contribute to further unwillingness to support Ukrainians from the private sector, especially micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, which may be more impacted by staffing changes. Uncertainty around the length of stay in host countries could contribute to lower levels of refugee employment as well as underemployment—and, in turn, tensions about the perceptions of refugees taking advantage of benefits and support provided, alongside a perceived lack of contribution to the host society.

Brain drain to multilaterals and INGOs from the public sector: In Moldova, a workshop participant raised concerns that public sector staff have also sought better-paying jobs with INGOs and multilaterals since the beginning of the crisis.⁶⁰⁶ International organisations were perceived to offer better career prospects, and this could result in a brain drain from Moldovan public services at exactly the time when they are under the most pressure.⁶⁰⁷ If the phenomenon increases in scale, this may reduce the capacity of Moldova’s public sector.

4.7. Community, social, and political life

Negative views of Ukrainians provoked by political discourses and parties: To date, most mainstream parties in the research countries have not openly endorsed misleading or incendiary discourses about Ukrainian refugees. However, nationalist right wing political parties present a risk in relation to the rhetoric about Ukrainian refugees. Risks arise particularly around election times, as the fatigue of supporting Ukrainian refugees sets in, and from more fringe political activists or Russia-aligned stakeholders. During the 2022 presidential election period in the Czech Republic, the primary opposition candidate adopted a steadily more anti-refugee platform and was seen as taking the viewpoint that Czech Republic was providing too much support to Ukrainian refugees.⁶⁰⁸ Other parties adopted positions of ‘Czech citizens come first,’ including advocating to halt temporary protections to Ukrainians.⁶⁰⁹ In Moldova, workshop participants linked pro-Russian mobilisations to an opposition party and suggested that politicians have manipulated economic issues to build opposition to the war in Ukraine and to scapegoat Ukrainian refugees by extension.⁶¹⁰ The public visibility of protests and some politicians’ pro- Russian rhetoric can be inflammatory and leave Ukrainians feeling unwelcome. Sizeable portions of the Slovak population harbour pro-Russian sentiments.⁶¹¹ In March 2023, anti-NATO rallies were held in Slovakia, with attendees calling for Slovak military neutrality.⁶¹² In Poland, such discourses remain on the fringes, with some ultranationalist and right-wing parties promoting various negative stereotypes and misinformation about refugees, including from Ukraine.⁶¹³ Given the polarising nature of such discourses, this tension risks affecting community cohesion within host societies as well as potentially between host societies and Ukrainian refugees. 

Lack of integration into host societies: Integration can generally be considered to refer to the degree to which Ukrainian refugees engage with their host communities as colleagues, neighbours, and friends. The countries included in this study varied in their theoretical openness to Ukrainian refugees; the majority of respondents to one survey in Slovakia expressed negative perceptions of refugees. However, on a personal level, respondents from all countries, including Slovakia, expressed willingness to engage with Ukrainians as friends and colleagues.⁶¹⁴ However, participants in all research workshops agreed that the two communities remain poorly connected, with limited occasions to build relationships. Lack of integration is driven partially by return intentions in some contexts. A February 2023 survey by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights found that 49 percent of Ukrainians surveyed in Romania wanted to return to Ukraine despite overall favourable responses on their experiences in Romania.⁶¹⁵ One workshop participant commented that she had not thought initially about integration because her hope had been to return to Ukraine quickly, although this appeared increasingly unlikely.⁶¹⁶ Workshop participants also shared that, as Ukrainian refugees have been in Romania for more than a year now, they will now be very much expected to integrate or migrate further.⁶¹⁷ Contrasted with Ukrainians’ uncertainty of length of stay and the difficulty learning Romanian, possibilities for tensions arise.

Other challenges to integration include linguistic barriers, ongoing effects of trauma, and lack of opportunities or time to participate in broader community life, particularly for single parents. This can be a missed opportunity to build trust and connections among the communities.

Language barriers: Language barriers were identified as a potential source of tension across all countries. Particular challenges exist in Romania, as the Ukrainian and Romanian languages are very different. Fewest challenges were identified in Moldova, though some remained—particularly in the context of administrative requirements and higher-skilled jobs that require Romanian language skills, as well as in the context of integration. The lack of a common language has two consequences. First, it impacts refugees’ ability to carry out day-to-day tasks and access services. One study found that 20 percent of Ukrainian refugees in the Czech Republic could not visit a doctor due to the language barrier.⁶¹⁸ Language was also cited as a key barrier to many areas of life and service access for Ukrainians in Romania.⁶¹⁹ Such barriers can exacerbate tensions in contexts where the health and education systems are already stretched and not equipped to manage an inflow of people who do not speak the local language. The second major consequence of the language barrier is on integration. In Slovakia, in February 2023, 48 percent of people surveyed by UNHCR (including Ukrainian refugees and the Slovak host community) reported that communication difficulties contributed to existing tensions in community life, making this the primary barrier found in this survey preventing further integration.⁶²⁰ Reasons for lower engagement in language courses include lack of childcare, as well as the cost, lack of awareness and lack of availability of language courses.⁶²¹ Research workshop participants also noted that it is difficult for working parents to juggle work, childcare, and mental stress or trauma, and to make time for regular language classes.⁶²² 

Language barriers can reduce the opportunity to build friendships and community cohesion and can increase the risks of misunderstanding, frustration, and potential resentment between groups.

Cultural differences and lack of understanding: Cultural differences were mostly mentioned in Romania. Despite being neighbouring countries, the culture, history, and language of Romania and Ukraine are very distinct. Before the arrival of Ukrainian refugees in Romania, there was little knowledge of each other’s culture or language. One Romanian citizen who rushed to the Romania-Ukraine border to help refugees as soon as he heard about the war said: ‘I never even thought of crossing the border to Ukraine or Moldova before, because in my head these places are Russian (…) But now I see these people arriving: this is not Russia’. Lack of cultural understanding could lead to prejudice and tensions, and indeed one of the potentially most impactful misleading discourses about refugees in Romania is that ‘Russians and Ukrainians are the same’.

Lack of understanding of Ukrainian trauma and its consequences: The WHO estimates that one in five people fleeing war will have a mental health condition within 10 years, with one in 10 developing a severe condition such as PTSD or psychosis.⁶²³ The effects of trauma can be debilitating and last for years,⁶²⁴ and people deal with trauma very differently. According to the UNHCR, 14 percent of Ukrainian refugees surveyed in Poland had mental health issues, reporting feeling so upset, anxious, or worried that their functioning was affected.⁶²⁵ In the Czech Republic, one study found that 45 percent of Ukrainian refugee respondents had at least moderate depression or anxiety—four times more than the average Czech population. A workshop participant in the Czech Republic explained that she started working to support Ukrainian refugees in the country to manage trauma, but her work exacerbated her own trauma and caused additional stress.⁶²⁶ A workshop participant in Poland noted that their trauma was so crippling when they arrived in Poland that they could not function normally and did not want to think about participating in various activities.⁶²⁷ The participant noted that it took six months of therapy to overcome the crippling trauma. Another workshop participant In Romania commented that they knew Ukrainian refugees who struggled to complete normal daily tasks and were unable to engage positively in Romanian society, as they were acutely aware of the suffering back in Ukraine.⁶²⁸

Lack of understanding of trauma can lead to friction between local populations, which might perceive some refugees’ behaviour as ‘lazy’ or ‘ungrateful’, while in reality, the behaviour might be due to strong trauma. The traumatised individuals might also perceive insistence on finding work immediately as very challenging and participating in ‘fun’ community activities as irritating and diminishing their experience.

Differences between Ukrainians’ experiences: Two characteristics could give rise to tensions between different Ukrainian groups: (1) time of arrival to the host country (concerning those who were in the country before February 2022, such as members of the Ukrainian diaspora and migrants) and (2) refugees’ place of residence within Ukraine before February 2022. For example, in Poland and the Czech Republic, Ukrainian migrants had held low-skilled jobs for years. This was perceived as contributing to tensions due to the potential stereotyping of Ukrainians as low-skilled labourers.⁶²⁹ In Moldova, tensions could arise between Ukrainians, with a Ukrainian ethnic minority that consumes news produced in Russian, as the majority of Moldova’s Russian-speaking population, often from within the Russian Federation; many of these individuals have adopted more pro-Russian perspectives as a result. ⁶³⁰ Second, in all countries, the possibility of tensions relating to the specific origin of Ukrainians was mentioned. Workshop participants noted discourses about Ukrainians who came from the Western regions of Ukraine but were not seen as genuine refugees—they rented their flats in Western Ukraine to internally displaced people from the eastern part of the country and came to the Czech Republic or Romania to claim financial support, or were economic migrants and not refugees.⁶³¹ Similarly, workshop participants in Slovakia shared a narrative that the war did not affect all parts of the country; therefore, Ukrainians could stay in the safe areas and fight for their country; and that their presence in Slovakia is more akin to being economic migrants than refugees.⁶³² Such narratives have the potential to generate tensions between different communities and make refugees from Western Ukraine feel less welcome.