Paths to Democratic Resilience in an Era of Backsliding: A Roadmap for the Democracy Support Community

Governance is an intricate, multifaceted system with integral (and sometimes mutually reinforcing) components. Drawing insights from the study of other complex systems, such as environmental ecosystems and information technology infrastructure, a system is considered resilient “if it continues to carry out its mission in the face of adversity.”³²  Taking this definition as our starting point, we define “democratic resilience” as the ability to maintain democratic governance functions and principles, despite attempts by illiberal actors to damage or diminish vertical, horizontal, or diagonal accountability mechanisms that are core to democracy. Democracy’s stress tests can include those listed in Table 1, but they are not limited to those examples.

Democracy itself is a system that requires continuous care and maintenance; it is not an endpoint. Fostering democratic resilience is, thus, an ongoing process. It requires democratic systems and actors to build and sustain capacities to respond to and recover from crises, possibly by transforming themselves or innovating in permanent ways. Appropriate preparation, combined with learning, reduces the need for ad hoc interventions by democracy actors. Similar resilience cycles are used in other sectors but have been underutilized for the democracy and governance space. IFES applies these three parts of the resilience cycle depicted in Figure 1 to democracy support as follows:

Preparation. A resilient system is equipped to lessen the impact of a democratic backsliding episode by anticipating that such threats will inevitably materialize, and defenses will be tested. With appropriate long-term thinking, a democratic system can be designed to weather such shocks and enable resilience among the individuals who work within it. For instance, many democracies have built checks and balances across branches of government or chains of command into their constitutions to prevent system weaknesses. In other contexts, this is akin to avoiding single points of failure; if one defensive mechanism fails, another safety net is in place. An important element of preparation is identifying new and emerging threats. Even in non-crisis times, democratic actors should stay vigilant to detect attacks against accountability mechanisms, such as the proposal of anti-democratic laws, significant cuts in the budgets of independent agencies, changes in nomination procedures that might undermine the autonomy of independent institutions, or government deployment of surveillance against opposition actors without judicial review.

Response. When built-in checkpoints fail, it is imperative to respond to present threats. Resilient responses can take several forms: armoring against or withstanding the shock; absorbing fallout by activating relevant procedures; or adapting flexibly to the situation. To withstand attacks on an independent institution, for example, trusted democratic champions can sensitize their communities to the threat with information campaigns, rallying collective pushback against anti-democratic efforts to capture or control those bodies. Democratic systems can also absorb shocks such as corruption by applying a range of available sanctions — whether disciplinary, administrative, civil, or criminal. Where those options are unavailable or unsuccessful, democratic actors can find innovative ways to respond by adapting protocols, such as by establishing new information-sharing mechanisms to understand, monitor, uncover, and expose evolving cybersecurity threats. 

Recovery and transformation. Sometimes, crises have clear endpoints; in other cases, democratic backsliding is prolonged, but there are opportunities to win back some of the democratic ground that has been lost. During this phase, democratic systems should reflect on weaknesses exposed by the backslide to recover and, where necessary, innovate to transform points of failure for future resilience. Weaknesses in autonomy and accountability structures exploited during the backslide need to be addressed — even when they might also advantage the governing position of ascendant pro-democracy actors. Even mechanisms that functioned as envisioned may need adjustment considering recent experience. Legal and procedural reforms should include new rules, norms, or practices that reflect the lessons learned from the response phase. These newly transformed institutions become the intentional design in preparation for future shocks.
 

Building and maintaining democratic resilience is an ongoing process, but there are specific interventions that can be more influential before, during, and after moments of adversity.

Because the preparation phase, by definition, does not involve an active threat, resilience efforts during this phase should identify and address vulnerabilities in the accountability architecture, prioritizing weaknesses that are more likely to be exploited. Continuous investments in building strong demand for democracy among the public and supporting the resilience of independent government agencies, CSOs, and the media can prepare countries and their citizens to avert serious threats to their democratic government. Table 2 lists examples of activities in the preparation phase.

Once a threat against specific accountability mechanisms is recognized as signaling democratic erosion, democratic breakdown, or autocratic deepening, appropriate responses can be chosen (see Table 3). That is, by identifying the context of a democratic backslide, the democracy, rights, and governance community can determine the types of resilience that are lacking and better target their interventions to support democratic champions. In so doing, we move away from the question of “what works generally?” in favor of asking “what works under these real-world conditions?”³³ The most appropriate responses should be chosen and designed in collaboration with local actors, as they are best situated to understand the threats and articulate their specific priorities. 

When there is a window of opportunity for democratic renewal or building back better — whether in autocratic countries or in democracies experiencing erosion or breakdown — the democracy, rights, and governance community should also be prepared to support and capitalize on those opportunities. Recovery need not mean a full return to the status quo; it can require standing up new or transformed resilience measures in addition to restoring elements that have been lost. This phase relies on innovation as well as reflection. Table 4 provides examples. 

This paper set out to refocus the international democracy support community’s efforts in the present era of backsliding. It articulates the ways that illiberal actors work cooperatively and creatively to dismantle the accountability architecture that is core to democracy systems. The paper offers a practical definition of democratic resilience and a straightforward framework that distinguishes among democratic erosion, democratic breakdown, and autocratic deepening and the specific threats posed to accountability structures in each of these contexts. This nuanced look at backsliding lends itself to matching appropriate resilience-enhancing interventions to the threats at hand. 

This framework offers a starting point for choosing interventions that are most likely to succeed based on the backsliding context and the impending or ongoing threat to accountability mechanisms. With this framework, we seek to shift the question from whether support is feasible or desirable in a backsliding context to how the international community can best support a democracy that is encountering any form of backsliding. For example, how can we more effectively enhance the resilience of a democracy’s horizontal accountability structures — its inter-institutional checks and balances — when there are signs that judicial independence is eroding? How can we build the resilience of vertical accountability structures, such as by (re)establishing a viable, competent opposition, in the face of autocratic deepening? 

Our key takeaway is that an effective approach to supporting local democracy champions should employ resilient design principles appropriate to the relevant stage of the resilience cycle: preparing the democratic system for shocks and stresses; responding to crises while maintaining government’s core functions; and — when opportunities arise — recovering and transforming to be more resistant to similar incidents in the future. 

Despite some bright spots, the anti-democratic challenges of the day are not fading. Defenders of democracy stand the greatest chance of success if we work simultaneously to bolster the democratic accountability architecture that is targeted by autocrats and to disrupt and diminish the impact of autocratic agendas. This paper suggests more than any one actor in the international democracy community can implement. Successful democratic resilience building will require the international donor and diplomatic community, intergovernmental institutions, and technical assistance providers to coordinate interventions to best support local democracy champions.