Securing the Vote Beyond Borders

Modern democracies increasingly use out-of-country voting (OCV) to enable citizens residing abroad to exercise their electoral rights and maintain political ties with their home countries. As of a 2025 IFES review, 119 out of 182 countries and territories currently provide for some form of OCV. In recent years, several countries have introduced reforms to improve the accessibility of voting services for citizens abroad, such as enabling online voter registration or additional voting methods. Moreover, many other countries have expressed their intention to adopt OCV in future elections.

Although offering OCV is widely regarded as a practice that strengthens democratic outcomes, no international instruments, except for the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, bind countries to implement it. Moreover, some countries have reversed or intentionally politicized OCV provisions, underscoring the fact that changes to OCV systems can also be pursued as a political tool to entrench partisan advantages and undermine the electoral competitiveness of political opponents. Importantly, politicization is not the only challenge OCV faces – nor, in some cases, the most significant one. 

By definition, OCV occurs outside of the country administering the election, and thus it presents uniquely challenging logistical and administrative hurdles for election management bodies (EMBs). These challenges can be compounded by the chosen voting method, whether it is embassy voting, in-person voting outside diplomatic missions, postal voting, online voting, or proxy voting. Additionally, prior to Election Day, the chosen method of registration can introduce added complexities, as can the scale of operations, security infrastructure, and the level of coordination with other relevant state agencies and authorities in foreign countries. For example, when a country employs postal voting modalities, ballot delivery and return processes may be vulnerable to mail delays and losses. In addition, voting outside controlled polling stations, where the privacy of the vote cannot be guaranteed, may make voters more vulnerable to coercion or other intimidation. 

EMBs, law enforcement, and prosecutorial authorities may face both legal and practical limitations to address election-related complaints as dispute resolution mechanisms often lack clarity on jurisdiction, timelines, and evidence collection across borders. In addition, as with in-country voting, OCV is vulnerable to cybersecurity threats, as well as misinformation and disinformation-related issues. Oversight, including external oversight via meaningful election observation, is logistically complex and therefore frequently limited. Political finance compliance and incidents involving the abuse of state resources are more difficult to monitor abroad, especially with the rise of online campaigning.

Considering these attendant challenges, the success of OCV depends on a holistic operational plan that covers the entire electoral cycle and addresses not only malpractice and fraud risks at home but also across the countries where OCV is taking place. EMBs that establish coordination mechanisms with relevant domestic and foreign state agencies, such as ministries of foreign affairs, migration authorities, security, and postal services, as well as diaspora organizations and media, are in a significantly stronger position to successfully execute both their OCV and domestic voting services. Hence, countries wishing to implement OCV or maximize the franchise abroad should carefully consider their capacity to do so without putting at risk the in-country voting operation.

In 2012, IFES published Out-of-Country Voting: A Brief Overview, aiming to provide decision makers and election authorities worldwide with critical insights on practical challenges related to OCV and how to mitigate them. This paper revises and expands on that work, considering the latest developments in electoral processes, including the introduction of new technologies, the spread of artificial intelligence (AI), and emerging challenges to information integrity. It also offers an updated analysis of the operational aspects of various voting methods abroad and practical recommendations for EMBs.

The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), which made this paper possible. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of Sida. 

The authors wish to express their sincere appreciation to the National Electoral Institute (INE) of Mexico, the Central Election Commission of Albania and the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania for their collaboration and for providing data and documentation that informed this study. Their openness and technical insight were instrumental in enriching the comparative analysis presented in this paper. IFES would also like to acknowledge Peter Erben, Ben Goldsmith and Aysha Shujaat, the authors of the first edition of the white paper, whose valuable study of OCV provided important context and methodological guidance for this paper.

LEAD AUTHORS 

Dr. Staffan Darnolf

Anna Denis

CONTRIBUTORS 

Dr. Tarun Chaudhary

Chelsea Dreher

Dr. Cassandra Emmons

Nicole Leaver

Vasu Mohan

Rushdi Nackerdien

Dr. Lisa Poggiali

Manuel Wally

REVIEWERS 

Dr. Fernanda Buril

Catherine Murphy

Peter Erben 

Erica Shein